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Excerpts
from previous political updates, by subject:
8-2-02
Prelude to war?
Meanwhile, Saddam
was trying to do what he could to prepare for the onslaught. In mid-July,
he got the Iraqi parliament to approve military preparations and promised
to repel any invasion. At the end of July, he threatened to punish economically
any country that supported U.S. military action. At virtually the same
time, however, he was reported by the Post to be courting Oman
and Qatar (possible launch pads for U.S. military strikes), to be making
friendly overtures to Kuwait, and increasing his public declarations of
support for the Palestinians. In addition, he continued his effort to
get U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to negotiate terms for renewed U.N.
inspections. In July, after three fruitless meetings with Saddam's representative,
Annan declared that there was nothing more to talk about unless Iraq changed
its position. On August 1, Iraq suddenly invited the inspectors back to
Baghdad for talks, hinting that some movement might be in the works.
These efforts followed
a successful foray at the meeting of the Arab League in March. Iraq persuaded
the league to condemn "the threat of an aggression on some Arab countries,
particularly Iraq," and declared that such aggression would be considered
"a threat to the national security of all the Arab states." At the meeting,
Iraq smoothed the way by promising not to re- invade Kuwait, to recognize
Kuwait's sovereignty, and to work with the United Nations, although Iraq
claimed that it had already fulfilled its U.N. obligations. Iraq also
scored a second diplomatic victory at the meeting by concluding a non-aggression
agreement with Kuwait that called for the lifting of U.N. sanctions.
Despite Saddam's
efforts, the momentum for war continues to build. On July 17 the Financial
Times reported that large numbers of U.S. soldiers had already been
sent to the Gulf region, and that Britain had begun recalling troops from
the Balkans and Afghanistan to train as part of the invasion force.
Before any shooting
starts, however, more of a case will have to be made to the American public
and nervous allies that Saddam is an acute threat. That is a point upon
which all the talking heads – and the Bush administration – agree. At
the end of July, French and German leaders warned that any military offensive
would require explicit U.N. approval. Russia said that Iraq's fate should
be decided peacefully, and Jordan reiterated its opposition to war. Turkey
continued to try to dissuade Washington from launching an offensive in
which it would be involved.
Back in March, it
appeared that British Prime Minister Tony Blair's government was ready
to make a public case for action. Blair's government had built a dossier
on Iraq that Blair planned to present to President Bush when they met
in April. The dossier was said to prove that Iraq had developed nuclear
armaments beyond the blueprint stage, that it already possessed other
unconventional weapons, and was actively supporting terrorism –– possibly
including Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network. In light of the perilous
situation in Palestine, however, Blair scrapped the plan to release it.
Inspections
By August 2000, Mr.
Blix was poised to report that 44 of his inspectors had completed training
and were "in a position to start activities in Iraq" including "baseline"
inspections of facilities that might be involved in building prohibited
weapons. To avoid a confrontation with Baghdad, however, the Security
Council persuaded Blix to report only that UNMOVIC "could plan and commence
a number of activities in Iraq which would be necessary to prepare" for
monitoring and inspection.
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