Excerpts from previous political updates, by subject

April 11, 2003

The Fall of Baghdad

With a suddenness that stunned the world, the Ba'ath regime of Saddam Hussein collapsed on April 9, 2003, a date sure to be remembered by Iraq's population. As crowds toppled statues of Saddam and kissed U.S. marines, special teams of allied weapon experts pressed their search for evidence of Iraq's mass destruction weapons. Though scattered resistance in Baghdad remained, the bloody last stand that many predicted would take place for control of the capital never materialized. Instead, most Iraqi soldiers abandoned their positions and uniforms, either fleeing or joining in joyful demonstrations. In addition to Baghdad, Basra and the northern towns of Kirkuk and Mosul also fell within the control of coalition forces. The Bush administration was careful to warn against precipitous cries of victory, cautioning that the war "most assuredly is not over." Nevertheless, attention was shifting to restoring order and organizing and managing a post-Saddam Iraq.

Throughout the conflict, Iraqi forces showed no signs of using mass destruction weapons. However, there are rumors that chemical-filled artillery shells were deployed. According to the New York Times, U.S. Army officials have intelligence from Iraqi POWs and intercepted Iraqi government communications indicating that 155-mm shells filled with mustard gas and sarin, or other nerve agents, were dispersed to Iraqi troops.

Costing the war

In early March, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that merely moving U.S. troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf and back would cost nearly $25 billion, with an initial deployment cost of some $14 billion, and that monthly combat costs would be $10 billion in the first month and $8 billion in subsequent months. The CBO said that to bring troops home after a war would cost $9 billion, and that a U.S. occupation of Iraq would cost $1 to $4 billion per month.

U.N. Resolution 1441

The Renewed U.N. inspections that started began in November 2002, were taking place under U.N. Resolution 1441, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on November 8, 2002 under U.S. pressure. The vote was unanimous; even Syria joined at the last moment. Resolution 1441 gave inspectors the right to interview Iraqi scientists inside or outside Iraq, the right to freeze movement around suspicious sites so that Iraq could not remove evidence, and the right to inspect all sites in Iraq - including "presidential" and "sensitive" sites. The resolution also required Iraq to file an "accurate, full and complete declaration" of its mass destruction weapon efforts by December 8.

In addition to these requirements, the resolution declared Iraq in "material breach" of past U.N. resolutions and defined what might constitute further material breaches. They would include any false statement or omission in Iraq's declarations, as well as any failure to comply or cooperate fully. The resolution contained no explicit mention of force, but warned that Iraq would face "serious consequences" for noncompliance. Nor did the resolution require member states to seek U.N. approval before causing such consequences to ensue.

Background on UNMOVIC

The recent U.N. inspectors are members of a new body created in December 1999 called the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The new body replaced the former U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and was tasked to complete the disarming of Iraq and to monitor Iraqi behavior to prevent the restarting of its weapons programs. In January 2000, the Security Council chose Hans Blix, former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to be the executive chairman of UNMOVIC.

Mr. Blix soon suggested that he would favor a softer approach to U.N. inspections. In February 2000, he announced that his inspection teams would not force their way into suspected weapons sites, but would defer to U.N. headquarters to resolve confrontations. And the following March he affirmed that while he would demand "unrestricted access" to Iraqi sites, he would not "humiliate" Iraqi leaders with surprise inspections.

The U.N. approved his organizational plan for UNMOVIC in April 2000. The plan reaffirmed Mr. Blix's intention to make virtually all of the inspectors permanent U.N. employees, rather than using experts on loan from national governments. Although former UNSCOM officials were eligible to be hired, most departed. The plan also made special arrangements for receiving intelligence information from national governments. The official in charge of the "Office for Outside Information" is the "sole entrance point" for national intelligence other than Mr. Blix himself. The flow of intelligence is declared to be "one-way" into UNMOVIC but not out. And in what was seen as a move to reduce American influence over the inspections, Mr. Blix eliminated the post of deputy chairman, which had been staffed by a U.S. official.