Excerpts from previous updates, by subject:

Removed on July 23, 2004

The intelligence debate

The failure to find weapons in Iraq has coincided with growing doubts about the quality of prewar U.S. intelligence concerning Iraq's weapon programs. On March 5, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence agents never interviewed an Iraqi chemical engineer who provided information about mobile laboratories that were interpreted as being for biological weapon use. The Iraqi informer communicated with U.S. officials through a foreign intelligence agency, which vouched for his credibility but did not reveal his name before the war. According to the Los Angeles Times, the chemical engineer, code-named "Curveball," said he was hired out of Baghdad University to design and build the mobile labs. Last summer, U.S. inspectors discovered he was last in his class at Baghdad University, not first as he had claimed. Inspectors also learned that he had been fired from his job in Iraq and jailed for embezzlement before fleeing the country. Many of his descriptions of Iraqi buildings and sites turned out to be wrong.

The Washington Post also reported that an Iraqi major who defected had supported the information supplied by the engineer, but the major had been "red-flagged " as unreliable by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The notice of his status, however, was never passed along to other intelligence agencies. The Iraqi major was subsequently cited in U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's February 2003 presentation to the U.N. Security Council and reportedly by the CIA's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Then in February 2004, apparently in reference to the Iraqi major, CIA Director George J. Tenet admitted that U.S. intelligence used a source whose information was "unreliable" and "fabricated."

Both of these Iraqi sources were reportedly connected to the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a group of Iraqi exiles who were strong supporters of Saddam Hussein's ouster. Under a classified program run by the DIA since the summer of 2002, the INC had been receiving approximately $340,000 per month from the Pentagon in exchange for intelligence. These payments were halted in late May.

U.S. intelligence officials reportedly found that much of the information generated by the INC before the war was useless, and that some of the informants brought forth by the Iraqi group may have been coached. INC leader Ahmad Chalabi defended his organization on the CBS television program 60 Minutes, saying that the INC did not deliberately mislead the United States. Chalabi said, "We never coached any defector to say anything." Chalabi also offered the opinion that the United States should have done a better job of using the intelligence provided by the INC. On May 20, Iraqi policemen and U.S. soldiers raided INC headquarters and Chalabi’s home. The precise focus of the raid was unclear, but Chalabi is currently under FBI investigation for leaking secret U.S. intelligence information to Iran.

On the other hand, there is new evidence concerning one allegation about Iraq's nuclear ambitions thought to have been a sham. The Financial Times reported in June 2004 that three European intelligence services were aware of possible illicit uranium trade between 1999 and 2001 from Niger to several countries, including Iraq. Human and electronic intelligence sources intercepted communications regarding the potential trade. Until recently, the only evidence of Iraq's alleged attempt to purchase uranium from Niger turned out to be a forgery.

The weapon search

After stepping down in January 2004 as the head of U.S. weapon inspectors in Iraq, Duelfer's predecessor, David Kay, made the surprising announcement that he believed no stockpiles of forbidden weapons will be found there. He said "...we were almost all wrong" about whether Iraq possessed mass destruction weapons.

In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in January, Kay said that although Iraq violated U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 by failing to report all of its weapon activities, it is "...highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed militarized chemical and biological weapons" in Iraq before the March 2003 invasion. He estimated that U.S. inspectors had already found "...85 percent of the major elements of the Iraqi program." Still, Kay said there would always be "an unresolvable ambiguity" about Iraq's weapons, largely because of the failure to secure the country after the U.S. occupation. He also maintained that Iraq hid an active ballistic missile program and tried to restart its nuclear weapon program in 2000 and 2001.

Apprehended weapon experts

Though the search for banned weapons has so far turned up little, a number of top Iraqi scientists and political officials have either been captured or turned themselves in to U.S. forces. In a victory for the U.S.-led mission in Iraq, Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003, in a raid dubbed Operation Red Dawn. Legal custody of Hussein and 11 of his top aides was transferred to the Iraqi interim government on June 30, and preliminary charges were filed on July 1. The preliminary charges against Hussein include invading Kuwait in 1991, crushing the uprisings of Shiite Muslims and Kurds, killing religious figures in 1974, gassing the Kurds in the 1980s, and killing members of political parties. The 12 will remain in U.S.-run detention facilities, as Iraq does not yet operate any high-security jails. Questioning of Hussein by the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation did not yield extensive information.

U.S. troops had scored another victory earlier, when they raided a private residence in Mosul and killed Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay, on July 22. The following Iraqi scientists and officials have been accounted for so far:

• Gen. Amer al-Saadi: A top science adviser to Saddam Hussein and an expert in chemical and biological weapons, al-Saadi served as a liaison between UNMOVIC inspectors and the Iraqi regime. Al-Saadi played a key role in the development of Iraq's weapons programs in the 1980s and, according to the Associated Press, could have detailed knowledge of its missile and nuclear programs.
• Emad Husayn Abdullah Ani: An Iraqi scientist, reported to be the "father" of a program to make the nerve agent VX, Ani worked at two key Iraqi chemical weapons plants: he led the research and development program at the Muthanna State Establishment, and later ran the Fallujah 2 chemical weapons plant. Ani is also reported to have ties to the Shifa pharmaceuticals plant in Khartoum, Sudan, against which President Clinton ordered a cruise missile strike in 1998 because of alleged chemical weapons precursor production and connections to al Qaeda.
• Jaffar Dhia Jaffar: Iraq's top nuclear scientist, who pioneered and led Iraq's nuclear weapons program until 1991, and even beyond, when many believe the program went underground.
• Amir Rashid Muhammad: A former Iraqi general who headed research at the Defense Ministry in the 1980s, then led the Military Industrialization Commission before his appointment as oil minister. Rashid also headed Iraq's secret missile programs, which earned him the nickname "missile man."
• Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash: Though officially Iraq's Youth and Trade Bureau Chairman, Ammash was known as "Mrs. Anthrax" and is suspected of overseeing the country's clandestine biological warfare program. Ammash also held a prominent position in the Ba'ath Party hierarchy.
• Rihab Rashid Taha: A British-trained microbiologist known as "Dr. Germ" for her role in running Iraq's secret biological weapons facility that worked with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.
• Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti: Former personal secretary and security adviser to Saddam Hussein.
• Gen. Ali Hasan al-Majid: Saddam Hussein's cousin and adviser, better known as "Chemical Ali." Majid was also a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and a regional Ba'ath Party commander. He played a key role in the use of poison gas against the Kurds of northern Iraq in 1988.
• Gen. Abdel Tawab Mullah Huweish: Former director of the Military Industrialization Organization, which oversaw most of Iraq's lethal weapon programs.
• Lt. Gen. Husam Muhammad Amin al-Yasin: Formerly, Iraq's chief liaison to U.N. weapons inspectors.
• Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti: One of Saddam Hussein's three half brothers, a former head of Iraqi intelligence, and Iraq's U.N. representative in Geneva in the 1980s and much of the 1990s, during which time he is reported to have been involved in setting up and running front companies that Iraq used to procure weapons materials.
• Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafar: Iraq's former higher education and scientific research minister. According to Haider Ahmed, spokesman for the Iraqi National Congress, Abd al-Ghafar could have information on Iraq's clandestine weapons programs.
• Gen. Husayn al-Awadi: Formerly, a top official in the Iraqi military's chemical weapons corps and a Ba'ath Party regional command chairman for the Ninawa governorate.
  

Procurement

In the years before the most recent invasion, Iraq consistently sought to evade the U.N. arms embargo on importing military equipment. In December 2003, the Los Angeles Times published a series of articles citing multiple illicit weapon deals between Iraq and various entities during the months before the war, resulting in the procurement of 380 surface-to-air Volga/SA-2 missile engines, four laser scanners that could be adapted for missile-guidance, 1,000 heavy machine guns and up to 20 million bullets for assault rifles.

In March 2003, the Bush administration revealed alleged Russian sales of military equipment to Iraq, some of it within the previous two months. Named were Aviaconversiya, accused of selling and helping to deploy GPS jamming devices, KBP Tula, accused of selling Kornet antitank missiles, and an unidentified company accused of selling night vision goggles. According to the Washington Post, the Russian government had been given detailed information, such as names, addresses, ports and shipping dates, but failed to stop the sales. The Russian government denied the allegations. Also, U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was quoted as saying that Syria had shipped night vision equipment to Iraq, although it was unclear if the equipment was Russian or Syrian in origin. Finally, two German businessmen were convicted on January 31, 2003 of breaking German arms export laws and violating the U.N. embargo by helping to buy cannon-boring equipment that wound up in Iraq.

Political Environment

In a surprise ceremony, the United States transferred political power to the interim Iraqi government. The Coalition Provisional Authority was immediately dissolved, to be replaced by a U.S. embassy. The new government was first appointed by U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi on June 1, at which point the U.S.-appointed Governing Council promptly disbanded.

On June 8, the United Nations Security Council had unanimously endorsed the transfer of “full sovereignty” to a new Iraqi interim government and charged it with making political decisions and controlling the economy - including oil-industry revenue. At that time, the United Nations also authorized a multinational force to maintain security in Iraq. The U.S.-led force will serve at the invitation of, and in partnership with, the new government. The mandate for the multinational force will be reviewed at the request of the new government, or after 12 months.

The new government will remain in power until direct elections are held, no later than January 2005. Ghazi Ajil Yawer assumed the largely-ceremonial post of president, and Ayad Allawi the post of prime minister, which controls day-to-day governmental operations. Yawer is a 45-year-old Sunni Muslim with no government experience beyond his tenure on the U.S.-appointed Governing Council. Allawi is a Shiite politician who worked in exile for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Assuming the posts of vice presidents were Ibrahim Jafari, a Shiite member of the Governing Council and Rosh Shawais, president of the Kurdistan parliament.

On March 8, the Transitional Administrative Law was signed. It contains a bill of rights, guarantees for women and a framework for democratic self-rule. The document also makes Islam the official religion of Iraq.