Excerpts from previous updates, by subject:

Removed on July 2, 2004

Capture of Saddam Hussein

After his capture in December 2003, Saddam Hussein was confronted by four senior Iraqi political figures. In response to their questions about chemical attacks on Kurdish villages, the invasion of Kuwait and the ruthless killing of two Shiite Muslim clerics, he was unapologetic and defiant. However, Lt. Gen. Sanchez said Hussein was "cooperative" and "talkative" and described him as "a tired man, a man resigned to his fate." Iraqi officials plan to try Hussein in a national tribunal, but U.S. officials have still not handed over the former Iraqi dictator to anyone outside U.S. control.

Request for Resources

A heightened insurgency forced the Bush administration in May 2004 to boost its estimate of the resources required to secure Iraq before the transfer of power on June 30. On May 5, the White House asked Congress for an extra $25 billion to be added to the $400 billion in military funding already being sought for the coming fiscal year. The funding request came on the heels of a decision to keep at least 138,000 troops in Iraq through 2005. Originally, troop levels were supposed to fall to about 115,000 by the end of May.

Kay's findings

In October 2003, Kay delivered a summary of what the ISG had found up to that time. Kay's assessment was that Iraq's chemical weapon program "was reduced–if not entirely destroyed" by a combination of military action, sanctions and inspections. His findings also appeared to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's conclusion that Saddam Hussein did not "build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material" after U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998. Although no "smoking gun" had been found in Iraq, Kay's report detailed a number of discoveries, notably in the missile and biological weapon fields.

Biological weapons:

• Saddam Hussein's program was compartmentalized after 1996 in order to create "smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents;"
• The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) operated a clandestine network of labs and facilities, allowing Iraq to preserve biological weapon expertise and research capability;
• Iraq used overt work with nonpathogenic organisms to hide prohibited work with pathogenic organisms such as anthrax and ricin; this work included improvements in fermentation and spray drying capabilities;
• Inspectors found a collection of reference strains of biological agent, including botulinum Okra B., in the home of a biological weapon scientist; these strains were never declared to the United Nations;
• The scientist was asked to conceal a larger cache of biological agents, which he refused to do.
  

Chemical weapons:

• The Iraqi practice of storing unmarked chemical munitions at the same location as conventional munitions is complicating the work of inspectors, who are struggling to sort through 130 known ammunition sites containing approximately 600,000 tons of ordnance;
• Iraq was prepared to use low-tech solutions in order to produce chemical weapons, such as stainless steel substitutes for more corrosion-resistant equipment;
• Iraq may have pursued proscribed chemical weapon activities after 1991, including research on a VX stabilizer, research and development for chemical weapon munitions, and procurement of dual-use materials and equipment.

Nuclear weapons:

• Iraq preserved its skills and science base by keeping intact some technical groups from its pre-1991 nuclear program;
• There is evidence that beginning in 2002 Iraq was interested in reconstituting its centrifuge enrichment program; the research initiatives of Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id, a high-level Ba'ath Party and Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission official, are particularly suspect.

Delivery systems:

• Iraq continued to develop both solid and liquid fuel missile systems that exceeded the U.N.-imposed range limit of 150 km, despite the return of U.N. inspectors in late 2002;
• According to missile designers at the Al Kindi Company, Iraq had reinitiated work on converting SA-2 surface-to-air missiles into ballistic missiles with a range of 250 km;
• Design studies for solid-fueled missiles were "initiated, or already underway," with range goals of between 400 km and 1,000 km, according to various Iraqi sources;
• Work was underway on clustered engine liquid-fueled missiles;
• Iraq may have maintained some Scud variant missiles until at least 2001; reports indicate that between 1996 and 2001, the al Tariq Factory was used to make Scud oxidizer and Iraq continued to produce liquid fuel specific to Scud missiles until 2001;
• Iraq maintained two unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs, one at Ibn Fernas aimed at developing traditional UAVs, and one at al-Rashid Air Force Base, which was never fully declared to U.N. inspectors;
• Iraq may have engaged in high-level dialogue with North Korea beginning in December 1999 on the transfer of North Korea's No Dong missiles with a range of 1,300 km and a land-to-sea missile with a range of 300 km;
• Until just before the war, Iraq used a network of foreign suppliers to procure illegal parts and assistance for its missile programs.