Excerpts from previous updates, by subject:

Removed on Janury 27, 2005

The intelligence debate

In July, condemnations poured forth from official bodies on both sides of the Atlantic charged with looking into British and American spy agencies, and with figuring out how they could have overstated the weapon threat from Iraq. In the United Kingdom, a special committee chaired by Lord Butler, and in the United States, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, found that poor communication, weak sources, and, in the case of the United States, insufficient analysis were to blame. But neither committee was able to conclude what a considerable portion of the public in both countries suspected: that their governments had deliberately exaggerated the threat in order to justify going to war.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued its report on prewar intelligence assessments on July 9. Its key findings included the following:

Nuclear Weapons
• There was no indication that the dual-use equipment that Iraq procured (including magnets, high-speed balancing machines and machine tools) was intended for suspect nuclear facilities;
• While Iraqi scientists continued to work at pre-Gulf War nuclear facilities, no reports suggested the work they engaged in related to a nuclear weapon program;
• Statements indicating Iraq may have tried to purchase uranium from Niger overstated what was known, and were based in part on poor analysis;
• Not only were judgments about the intended use of aluminum tubes that Iraq wanted to purchase erroneous, but CIA analysis regarding the dimensions and material composition of the tubes was incorrect; and
• Intelligence information did not support the conclusion that nuclear infrastructure was being expanded in order to produce nuclear weapons.

Chemical and Biological Weapons
• Iraq may have retained some of its pre-Gulf War stocks of weapons, and was unable or unwilling to fully account for these items;
• Iraq was attempting to procure dual-use materials that could have been used to produce chemical or biological weapons;
• Iraq was renovating or expanding facilities that had been associated with its past biological weapon program, and was engaged in research that had biological weapon applications;
• Intelligence suggested that Iraq may have had a mobile biological weapons program;
• Information concerning the reliability of an Iraqi informer code-named Curveball was withheld from many analysts, and dealings with Curveball were seriously mishandled; and,
• Human intelligence indicated Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons.

Delivery Systems
• It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq was in the final stages of development of the al Samoud missile and might be ready to deploy the al Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range ballistic missiles;
• It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq was developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities; and,
• Numerous reports indicated that Iraq was developing a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, though there was no indication that Iraq intended to use these UAVs to deliver chemical or biological weapons.

The British inquiry, led by Lord Butler, concluded that pre-war intelligence reports stretched information available to the "outer limits." Pre-war intelligence was flawed, and major documents were misleading. The Butler Report did not offer as many details as the Senate report, and largely echoed the Senate report’s findings. In addition, the Butler Report found that:
• Assessments by Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of Iraq's nuclear capabilities were balanced and measured;
• The claim that Iraq had sought uranium in Africa was reasonable; and,
• The claim by the UK's JIC that Saddam Hussein could use chemical and biological weapons on 45 minutes' notice was misleading in that it did not clarify that the claim referred to battlefield weapons.

Responding to pressure, President Bush on February 6 named an independent, bipartisan commission to examine shortcomings in prewar intelligence. The commission will also analyze possible intelligence misjudgments about weapon programs in Iran, Libya and North Korea. The panel has a deadline of March 2005. The commission's meetings are held behind closed doors.

Iraqi scientists

On the issue of scientists, the United States has established three separate programs to employ former Iraqi weapon experts. The State Department has launched the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry, whose goal is to retrain and re-employ Iraqi scientists. The center aims to host a series of workshops to establish scientific, technological and engineering priorities for Iraq. The project was funded with $2 million, and the State Department is investigating sources for additional funding of up to $30 million. In another program, the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation will bring six former Iraqi weapon scientists to the United States to meet with U.S. scientists and begin forging ties. Finally, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration is funding a program to engage Iraqi scientists in reconstruction efforts. The initial phase requires an assessment of the equipment and facilities needed by Iraq for scientific purposes.

At least four, and as many as nine former Iraqi scientists reportedly talking to the Iraq Survey Group have been killed by hostile fire. It is unclear whether these killings were intentional or occurred by chance. For a complete list of the “most wanted” scientists and officials accounted for so far, see the count of Iraq's leaders.