S/24108
16 June 1992

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-general has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-general pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Annex
Third report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-general pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

Introduction

1. The present report is the third report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-general pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991) to cover the period 4 December 1991 to 10 June 1992. This report summarizes developments since the previous report *1 in order to provide, together with the first report of the Executive Chairman, *2 a comprehensive picture of the establishment and functioning of the Special Commission since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

2. The report itself highlights the principal developments and activities. It also gives the Executive Chairman's assessment of the results achieved, the difficulties encountered and what remains to be done to secure full implementation of the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Where necessary, separate appendices give a more detailed account of specific aspects of the Commission's work during the period under review.

I. Organizational and administrative issues

3. In the period under review, there have been two changes in the composition of the Commission. On 5 February 1992, the Deputy Executive Chairman, Mr. Robert Gallucci (United States of America), resigned to take up important new responsibilities in Washington, D.C. The Executive Chairman would like to take this opportunity to express his thanks to Mr. Gallucci for his invaluable services to the Commission and for his unfailing support and to pay a tribute to his contributions in the field, including participation in some of the most difficult inspections in Iraq, in which he amply demonstrated both his courage and his diplomatic skill. The Secretary-general appointed Mr. Michael Newlin (United States) as Deputy Executive Chairman in succession to Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Newlin, who has served as United States Ambassador to the United Nations Organizations in Vienna, has considerable experience in the nuclear field and the Office of the Special Commission has already benefited greatly from this, particularly in its collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4. In March 1992, the Executive Chairman learned with great regret of the untimely death of Mr. Ken Adachi (Japan), who had played such a valuable part in the work of the Special Commission and, in particular, the Chemical Biological Weapons Group. The Secretary-general has appointed Mr. Hideyo Kurata (Japan) to replace Mr. Adachi.

5. The organizational structure remains essentially as described in the first report of the Executive Chairman. The Office of the Executive Chairman has been supplemented by the addition of an Information Assessment Unit, which is now operational. The Field Offices in Bahrain and Baghdad continue effectively to service and support the surveillance activities.

6. Finances continue to require attention in the absence of Iraqi agreement to sell oil under the terms of Security Council resolution 706 (1991). The Commission's operations are supported by contributions in cash and in kind from a number of Member States. Further information on organizational and administrative issues is contained in appendix V.

7. The Executive Chairman wishes once again to place on record his profound appreciation to the Secretary-general, to Governments and to the agencies concerned for the assistance made available, as well as to the able staff placed at the disposal of the Commission for the dedicated service they have rendered, sometimes in very trying and dangerous circumstances, to carry out the mandate of the Security Council.

II. Status, privileges and immunities

8. The status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission, IAEA and the United Nations specialized agencies involved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the various agreements and Council resolutions and decisions mentioned in paragraph 5 of the first report. *3 By an exchange of letters between the Secretary-general and the Director-General of IAEA on the one hand, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain on the other, the agreement in respect of the Commission's field office in Manama has been extended for a further period of six months, to 29 September 1992. Issues which have arisen in Iraq in the implementation of the status, privileges and immunities of the Commission have been principally in connection with the operation and landing rights of the Commission's aircraft, where difficulties persist (see appendix I).

III. Developments

A. Political developments: the attitude of Iraq

9. In the period under review, the Special Commission and IAEA have continued to conduct vigorous inspections of sites declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission. These inspections have served as the main source for compiling a picture of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the capabilities for their production. Although cooperation has been extended, in most instances, to inspectors at the field level, Iraq's authorities have not been uniformly forthcoming in providing information on the weapons programmes as a whole. The problems which were emerging in the first five months of the operation have crystallized, and thus the emphasis of the work of the Commission has shifted in the period under review from concentration on the organization of inspections to seeking compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council. The major developments in this regard are described in detail in appendix I. Broadly speaking, the problems may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Commission's task has always been viewed as having three phases: inspection and survey; destruction; and long-term ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire proscribed weapons. Although these three phases will overlap to a large extent, the intention was that the emphasis should shift with time from the first through to the third phase. However, on 19 November 1991, the Iraqi authorities informed the President of the Security Council that Iraq considered that the Commission's and IAEA's plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, approved under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), were unlawful.

(b) Furthermore, Iraq has failed to provide the initial declarations required under the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, which are important for the identification of which facilities, materials and activities would need to be monitored under the plans. On 5 June 1992, Iraq transmitted to the Commission documents containing what it has characterized as a comprehensive and complete version of its nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missiles activities. These documents, which should correspond to the full, final and complete disclosures required under Council resolution 707 (1991), are now being analysed by the Commission and IAEA. An assessment of these documents will be transmitted to the Council as soon as possible to complement the present report.

(c) The situation is further aggravated by the continuing obstructions that the Iraqi authorities have been putting in the way of the Commission's landing rights for fixed-wing aircraft and their increasing criticism of the Commission's high-altitude surveillance flights.

Thus, the realization of the intentions to proceed with the evolution of the Commission's activities from inspection and survey through destruction to ongoing monitoring and verification have so far been in large part delayed by the actions of the Iraqi Government.

10. In response to a special report on the situation by the Executive Chairman, the Security Council declared that Iraq was in material breach of resolution 687 (1991) and dispatched a high-level mission, headed by the Executive Chairman, to Iraq, armed with a statement demanding that Iraq give the necessary assurances on compliance with the Council's resolutions or face serious consequences. That mission visited Iraq from 21 to 24 February 1992. In its report *4 it concluded that unconditional agreement by Iraq had not been provided and that, therefore, the initiation and practical implementation of resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder for ongoing monitoring and verification could not be undertaken in a credible manner. Partly coinciding with the mission, Iraq refused to permit the start of the destruction of equipment associated with its ballistic missile production programme. Upon being apprised of the situation, the Security Council condemned the failure by Iraq to comply with its obligations to destroy equipment as directed by the Council and to make the declarations required under the Council's resolutions. Furthermore, the Security Council reiterated its statement that Iraq was in material breach of resolution 687(1991).

11. The Security Council met in formal session on 11 and 12 March 1992. In an initial statement, the President of the Council, on behalf of all members, reiterated the Council's position. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, made two statements, neither of which contained the assurances sought by the Council. The Council furthermore heard statements by all its members, by the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, by the Director-General of IAEA and by the Executive Chairman of the Commission. The Chairman in his statement indicated that, although it was the aim of the Commission to report to the Council as soon as possible that Iraq was in substantial compliance with section C of resolution 687 (1991), no question of this could arise until Iraq had acknowledged and implemented its obligations under all the relevant Council resolutions and decisions. In a concluding statement on 12 March, the President of the Council, on behalf of the Council, stated that Iraq must immediately take steps to comply fully and unconditionally with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

12. Following the Council's meeting, Iraq made additional declarations concerning the numbers of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and associated items. Furthermore, it declared its readiness to go along with the required destruction of buildings and equipment. Subsequently, destruction of such items, relevant to the missile and nuclear weapons programmes, have been carried out. As referred to above, the Iraqi authorities have handed over to the Special Commission what they called "full, final and complete reports" on chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles as well as on its nuclear programme. These reports are now being studied by the Special Commission and IAEA to assess whether they meet the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. However, neither the initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification nor the acknowledgement of Iraq's obligations have been received.

B. Operational developments

13. With regard to chemical weapons, although verification and survey activities continue, there has been a progressive shift in emphasis with relatively more time and resources being devoted to issues directly related to the destruction of Iraq's identified chemical weapons (CW) assets. At Khamisiyah, the Special Commission has supervised the first destruction of filled chemical munitions, while at the Muthanna site work is progressing to construct chemical agent destruction plants. The aim is to have these plants commissioned during the summer of 1992. A new development was the Iraqi admission of 19 March 1992 that it had omitted to declare 24,470 chemical munitions and that these weapons had been unilaterally destroyed in direct contravention of resolution 687 (1991), which requires that possession of Iraq's chemical weapons should be yielded to the Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless under its supervision. An inspection team has since been able to verify, by examining the excavated remains of the munitions, that the numbers contained in the Iraqi declarations were substantially correct.

14. There have been few developments on the biological side. Inspection activities have continued through joint chemical and biological teams.

15. Regarding ballistic missiles, the emphasis has shifted to the destruction of facilities associated with Iraq's production programme. The Executive Chairman informed the Iraqi authorities that destruction should start in February 1992. Initially, as recorded in the report of the Secretary-general of 7 March 1992, *5 Iraq delayed and refused to comply. Only at the end of March 1992 did Iraq allow the destruction of these facilities to begin. This destruction programme is now advanced.

16. Meanwhile, inspection activities also continued, with Iraq maintaining that it no longer had any missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and hence that there was no further missile destruction to be done. Confronted, however, with the information that the Special Commission had incontrovertible evidence that Iraq's initial declarations of April 1991 had not included a substantial number of ballistic missiles and related equipment then in its possession, Iraq presented on 19 March 1992 a new declaration. In it Iraq admitted that it had failed to declare 92 proscribed ballistic missiles and much associated equipment and vehicles, including mobile missile launchers, and that it had destroyed these unilaterally, in contravention of resolution 687 (1991), in the summer of 1991. Inspection teams since then have been able to verify that the numbers contained in this new declaration were substantially correct.

17. However, although events have proceeded more smoothly at the field level than at the political level, there have been occasions when there has been deliberate interference with inspection activities, e.g. tampering with equipment designated for removal by inspection teams for further analysis and doctoring of documentation. Such interference, coupled with Iraq's failure to date to provide the full, final and complete disclosure required under resolution 707 (1991), can only be interpreted as evidence that Iraq is still seeking to conceal from the Special Commission information directly relevant to section C of resolution 687 (1991).

C. Health and safety

18. A matter of increasing concern as the Special Commission moves into the destruction phase is the fact that many of the activities carried out by the Commission in Iraq are potentially very hazardous. Sufficient information and experience have been gained in the first six months of operations by the Commission to provide a basis for a realistic health and safety policy document. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Working Group, during the course of its discussions of safety issues, decided in December 1991 to prepare such a document and delegated to the Destruction Advisory Panel the task of preparing a draft. The draft was prepared by the Panel during its meeting in February 1992 and was reviewed by the CBW Working Group during its meeting in April 1992.

19. Environmental aspects of the activities of the Special Commission have also been given thorough consideration by the Destruction Advisory Panel. In particular, environmental and safety issues have been at the forefront of their consideration of chemical destruction activities. The situation at many sites, particularly at the Muthanna State Establishment, is already leading to local environmental contamination which requires rapid solutions. A short paper giving details of the factors considered and the technical steps taken to minimize environmental contamination during chemical destruction operations has been prepared for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

IV. Issues and priorities for the future

20. Although much has been achieved by the Special Commission, clearly much remains to be done. In particular, the following require action before the Commission can report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations:

(a) The destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's prohibited weapons capabilities - i.e. equipment and facilities associated with its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programmes and the successful initiation of destruction of Iraq's stocks of chemical munitions, agents and precursors;

(b) Acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991);

(c) Verification by the Commission of the accuracy and adequacy of the data provided in Iraq's "full, final and complete report";

(d) Declarations by Iraq under the plans adopted through resolution 715 (1991), with regard to, inter alia, dual capable facilities used for permitted purposes but which could be used for prohibited purposes;

(e) The initiation and smooth functioning of the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire prohibited capabilities;

(f) Acceptance by Iraq of the Special Commission's aircraft landing rights.

21. The priority at the moment is to obtain from Iraq its acknowledgement of its obligations under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), and the declarations due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification of its obligations not to reacquire those proscribed items. On the operational side, immediate attention needs to be given to the continuing obstruction facing the Special Commission with regard to landing rights for the fixed-wing aircraft. The verification and assessment of Iraq's reports transmitted on 5 June on its weapons programmes is furthermore already under way.

22. Work progresses on the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, of the items covered by section C of resolution 687 (1991) and thought is being given to which facilities will have to be subject to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. As the Special Commission moves further into the verification and monitoring phases, more consideration will have to be given to funding and staffing of these more permanent activities. The issue of import monitoring will, prior to the lifting or easing of sanctions, need to be addressed in coordination with the Sanctions Committee established by the Security Council under its resolution 661 (1990),

Appendices to the report

I. Political developments
II. Chemical and biological weapons
III. Ballistic missiles
IV. Special Commission inspection schedule
V. Establishment and mandate
VI. Contributions to the Special Commission

Appendix I
Political developments

1. In the period under review it has been necessary to devote much time and effort to seeking to obtain from Iraq three of the essential elements outstanding in the implementation of the Special Commission's mandate, namely:

(a) The full, final and complete disclosure, as required by Security Council resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of Iraq's programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes;

(b) Acknowledgement of Iraq's obligations under Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and under the plans of the Special Commission and of IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligations approved by resolution 715 (1991); *6

(c) Provision of the declarations called for under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

Much time and effort have also been devoted to seeking to resolve difficulties arising in connection with the second phase of the Special Commission's activities relating to the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of weapons of mass destruction and the relevant associated facilities. Certain difficulties in connection with the Special Commission's air operations have also continued.

A. Ongoing monitoring and verification

2. An express acknowledgement by Iraq is necessary, not only of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) but also under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), to ensure Iraq's continued compliance with its obligations not to reacquire prohibited weapons. Ongoing monitoring and verification cannot be implemented without a clear picture and understanding of Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as they existed before the conflict in the Persian Gulf and without full and verified declarations, required under the plans, which cover both military and civilian sites, facilities, materials and other items or activities that could be used in contravention of Iraq's obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991).

3. The Special Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing monitoring and verification called for the submission by Iraq of its initial declarations by 10 November 1991. By letter of 19 November 1991 to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq criticized the plans as being "aimed at objectives incompatible with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, the norms of international law and international and humanitarian pacts and covenants". Under cover of the same letter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs transmitted "information required under resolution 687 (1991) that comes under the mandate of the Special Commission". This information did not correspond to the declarations required under the plans.

4. The Security Council's attention was drawn by the Executive Chairman to this situation in his second report submitted to the Security Council on 4 December 1991 *7 and it was elaborated upon in the Secretary-General's report to the Council of 25 January 1992 on the status of Iraq's compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. *8 On 31 January 1992, the Security Council met at the level of Heads of State and Government and, in the President's statement issued at the conclusion of that meeting, *9 it was, inter alia, provided, with reference to the Council's resolutions on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, that those resolutions "remain essential to the restoration of peace and stability in the region and must be fully implemented".

5. Also late in January 1992, the Executive Chairman sent a special mission, headed by two Special Commission members, to Baghdad to seek from the Iraqi authorities the undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 above. Although that mission was able to report some progress in obtaining through an interrogative procedure information on Iraq's programmes to acquire or produce weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, it was not able to obtain the undertakings required and, on resolution 715 (1991), the Government of Iraq affirmed its position as stated in the letter of 19 November 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6. Faced with such a situation, the Executive Chairman, on 18 February 1992, submitted a special report *10 to the Security Council in which he concluded that the position taken by Iraq was such that it was neither legally nor practically possible for the Special Commission to carry out effectively a programme of ongoing monitoring and verification of the nature and scope approved by the Council. On 19 February 1992, the President of the Council issued a statement, on behalf of its members, *11 expressing, inter alia, their grave concern at Iraq's position which constituted "a continuing material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991)", and supporting the decision of the Secretary-general to dispatch a high-level mission headed by the Executive Chairman of the Commission "to visit Iraq immediately to meet and discuss with the highest levels of the Iraqi Government for the purpose of securing the unconditional agreement by Iraq to implement all its relevant obligations under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)".

7. The high-level mission, headed by the Executive Chairman, visited Baghdad from 21 to 24 February 1992. In his report submitted to the Council on 26 February, *12 the Executive Chairman concluded that he was not able to secure "from the highest levels of the Government of Iraq unconditional agreement by Iraq to implement all its relevant obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)". As regards the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, the Executive Chairman reported that Iraq "accepted only the principle of ongoing monitoring and verification, and this is subject to considerations of sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security and non-infringement on Iraq's industrial capabilities". The Executive Chairman's report indicated that the Iraqi authorities had referred to their intention to dispatch a high-level delegation to New York, and that "the Iraqi delegation dispatched to talk to the Security Council will convey Iraq's position on resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)".

8. On 28 February 1992, the President of the Security Council made a statement on behalf of its members, *13 deploring and condemning Iraq's failure to provide the undertakings sought by the high-level mission, approving in full the conclusions of the mission and demanding "that Iraq immediately implement all its obligations under Council resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions on Iraq".

9. On 7 March 1992, the Secretary-general submitted to the Security Council, at its request, an update of his report of 25 January 1992 on Iraq's compliance with the obligations placed upon it by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions. *14 In annex I to that report, containing information received from the Special Commission, attention was again drawn, inter alia, to Iraq's failure to acknowledge and implement its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and under the plans approved by resolution 715(1991).

10. On 11 and 12 March 1992 an Iraqi delegation, headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, appeared before the Security Council. At the outset of that meeting, the President of the Council made a statement on behalf of its members *15 in which he recalled in some detail the Council statements of 19 and 28 February 1992, referred to above.

11. The Deputy Prime Minister addressed the Council on 11 March 1992, and on 12 March he responded to questions addressed to him by members of the Council. *16 The unconditional assurances which the Council had been seeking were not forthcoming on either occasion. In his initial statement he said that Iraq had already provided the Special Commission with all the necessary information on its proscribed weapons and production facilities. He further disclosed for the first time that Iraq had unilaterally destroyed 270,000 proscribed items after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). He also stated that Iraq was ready to reach a practical mechanism regarding the issue of equipment proscribed under paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991), with a view to rendering that equipment harmless. In regard to ongoing monitoring and verification, the Deputy Prime Minister stated that Iraq was prepared to cooperate, while underlining the need for respect for Iraqi dignity, sovereignty and national security. In his response to questions, he basically affirmed the positions he had set forth the previous day.

12. Speaking in the Council on 11 March 1992 after the Deputy Prime Minister, the Executive Chairman underlined that the fundamental aim of the Commission was to report to the Council that Iraq had met in full all its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991) as elaborated upon in resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). However, the Commission's ability to do so was conditioned by the degree of cooperation which it received from Iraq and the openness and transparency of that State. Although Iraq claimed to have provided all necessary information on its proscribed programmes and weapons, that was not the case. The information given was not complete, systematic or supported by the documentary and material evidence necessary to verify it. With regard to the items declared to have been destroyed unilaterally, the Commission had requested a list fully accounting for all those items but had not received it. Such unilateral destruction had been contrary to resolution 687(1991) and apparently on a scale which indicated that many gaps remained, which Iraq must fill, in the picture of its prohibited weapons programmes. Turning to the second phase of the Commission's operations, the Executive Chairman acknowledged that Iraq's cooperation had been good in regard to the destruction of actual weapons declared by Iraq. However, another situation prevailed in regard to the production facilities for such weapons where Iraq was, for instance, refusing to comply with the Commission's decisions in respect of the destruction of certain missile-producing facilities. Likewise, regarding the third phase of the Commission's activities, namely ongoing monitoring and verification, the existence of an impasse had now clearly been established. If the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the Council appeared intrusive, that was in large measure a result of the conduct of Iraq. If Iraq cooperated, the intrusive elements need not be invoked. The Executive Chairman concluded by saying that until Iraq undertook to comply with the Council's decisions in full, and confirmed such an undertaking in practice, the possibility of the Special Commission's certifying Iraq's compliance with its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991) did not even arise.

13. On 12 March 1992, the President of the Council made a statement, on behalf of the Council, in which, with reference to "the extent of compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions" he recorded that "the Government of Iraq has not yet complied fully and unconditionally with those obligations, must do so and must immediately take the appropriate actions in this regard". The President's statement concluded with the Council's hope that "the goodwill expressed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq will be matched by deeds".

14. On 12 and 13 March 1992, when the Iraqi delegation appeared before the Security Council, an Iraqi team met with the Executive Chairman and other officials of the Commission. The latter provided to the former detailed explanations as to the format and modalities required by the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification under its different sections and annexes. The Iraqi team promised to provide, by early April, the information required under the plan except on the sources of imported items and on operational deployment or disposition of relevant weapons. The Commission's side stressed, however, that the information should be provided in full as required by the plan.

15. On 10 April 1992, the Secretary-general, as required by paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), submitted to the Council a report on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991 ). *17 A similar report on the implementation of IAEA's plan was submitted by the Director-General of the Agency, *18 The Secretary-general's report, after recounting pertinent details on the developments outlined above, concluded that Iraq had not been in compliance with Security Council resolutions nor with the plans. The members of the Council decided that the President of the Council should convey to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations that Iraq's compliance with the plans was imperative. He did this on 22 April 1992. No formal reply to this approach has been made. However, on 26 May 1992, the Executive Chairman received a letter from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq *19 in which the latter mentioned drafts of the declarations required under the plan but made no promise of when the final declaration might be received. The letter also reiterated the position taken by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq on 11 March 1992 on the issue of Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991 ) and on how the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification should be implemented. The plan itself contains precise methods for implementation which have been approved by the Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. Destruction, removal or rendering harmless of proscribed items

16. Another issue to which much time and attention has had to be devoted in the period under review relates to the second phase of the Special Commission's operations, namely the disposal of weapons of mass destruction, facilities and other items related thereto through destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, as provided for in resolution 687 (1991). For the Special Commission the issue has arisen mainly in connection with Iraq's ballistic missile production capabilities and for IAEA in connection with the Iraqi complex at Al-Atheer, the technical core of which was intended for the special processes needed for nuclear weapons development and manufacturing. In the area of the disposal of Iraq's chemical weapons and precursors, the Iraqi authorities have continued their earlier cooperation and have been working on the construction of hydrolysis and incineration facilities at the Al-Muthanna site which should be operational and meet the Special Commission's safety and environment requirements in the near future (see appendix II). Throughout the planning, development work and execution of chemical destruction operations, relations with Iraq have generally been much more relaxed, technically detailed and businesslike compared with the inspection activities. The better atmosphere thus generated has undoubtedly contributed to the timely and satisfactory progress made in this area.

17. Under paragraph 9 (b) (ii) of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq is required to destroy, under the supervision of the Special Commission, all its proscribed missile capabilities, including launchers. On 14 February 1992, the Executive Chairman addressed a letter to the Iraqi authorities concerning the destruction of certain missile facilities and transmitting lists of items which must be destroyed and items for further consideration and decision. *20

18. A ballistic missile team sent to Iraq on 21 February met, however, with a request for delay. The Executive Chairman, who was in Baghdad at the time for the high-level mission, agreed to a brief delay in the scheduled date for commencing destruction. After he left Iraq, however, the Iraqi authorities refused to comply, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs instead sending a letter to the Executive Chairman *21 reiterating his earlier proposal to reuse equipment for the BADR-2000 ballistic missile project for a variety of what were stated to be "civilian purposes" and for the manufacture of 100-kilometre range missiles. Upon receipt of Iraq's decision not to proceed with the destruction of the items concerned, the Executive Chairman ordered the team to withdraw from Iraq.

19. On 28 February 1992, the Security Council met to consider the report by the Executive Chairman *22 on the results of the special mission sent to Iraq pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 19 February 1992. In introducing his report in Security Council consultations on 27 and 28 February 1992, the Executive Chairman informed the Council orally of Iraq's failure to comply with the Special Commission's decisions on the destruction of the missile capabilities concerned. The President of the Council, in the statement which he issued on 28 February 1992 at the conclusion of those consultations, *23 recorded, inter alia, that the members of the Council deplored and condemned Iraq's failure to commence destruction of the equipment concerned and reaffirmed that it was for the Special Commission alone to determine which items must be destroyed under paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991), its failure in this regard being a further material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687(1991).

20. An account of the foregoing developments was given in the Secretary-general's further report *24 of 7 March 1992, referred to in paragraph 9 above, and the President's statement of 28 February 1992 was repeated in paragraph 18 of the introductory statement *25 made by the President on behalf of the Council on 11 March 1992, when the Council met with the participation of the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. On 19 March 1992, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, in a letter to the Executive Chairman, confirmed that Iraq was ready to carry out the destruction as required by the Commission.

21. On 7 April 1992, the Executive Chairman sent a letter to the Iraqi authorities transmitting the updated versions of annex A, on items which must be destroyed, and annex B, on items for further consideration and decisions. This update resulted from the findings of UNSCOM inspections and the review of Iraq's suggestions and requests.

22. During the period 21 to 30 March 1992, a ballistic missile team oversaw the destruction of nine items of equipment and, during the period 13 to 21 April 1992 another team supervised the destruction of the majority of the remaining items in the extended List A. *26 Developments up April 1992 were reported to the President of the Security Council in a letter of 2 April 1992 from the Executive Chairman.

C. Inspection and survey

23. The Iraqi declarations of 19 and 28 March 1992, referred to in paragraph 12 of the present report, while evidencing some shift by Iraq towards greater openness, have at the same time proven that the Iraqi authorities have not only deliberately misled the Special Commission by omission but have also actively falsified the evidence. Thus, perhaps paradoxically, this potential shift towards more transparency, while welcomed if it heralds a real shift towards a fully cooperative attitude on the part of the Government of Iraq, has taken place under circumstances that justify the Commission's scepticism of Iraq's declarations in the past. It also indicates that, at least for the immediate future, new declarations will also have to be closely scrutinized and that the Commission will have to continue with its programme of inspection and survey missions.

24. Throughout the period, relations at the field level between inspection teams and their Iraqi counterparts have been generally satisfactory. However, there have been some instances of obstruction by Iraq and, on one occasion, actual physical harassment. By contrast, the better relations established between those involved in the preparations for chemical weapons destruction prove that a more cooperative approach by Iraq benefits both sides in terms of efficiency and timeliness.

D. The Commission's air operations

25. Generally speaking, Iraq has complied in the period under review with its obligations in respect of the status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission. However, Iraq has continued to cause difficulties in respect of the Commission's conduct of its own fixed-wing and aerial surveillance flights. Arrangements in regard to the Commission's helicopter operations have been satisfactory since they were commenced, after considerable difficulty, in October 1991.

26. Throughout the period under review, Iraq has continued to protest vigorously against the Special Commission's aerial surveillance flights, and this matter was reported 16 the Security Council on a number of occasions. *27

27. The protests from Iraq escalated to the point where, on 10 April 1992, the Executive Chairman transmitted to the President of the Council a letter of 9 April he had received from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of Iraq in New York and the response of 10 April the Executive Chairman had sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The letter from the Charge d'affaires referred to a recent incursion by Iranian aircraft into Iraq and called for a halt of all the Special Commission's aerial surveillance flights "in order to avoid any unfortunate incidents" and made reference to the possibility that the flights might "now endanger the aircraft itself and its pilot". In his letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Executive Chairman expressed the gravest concern at these remarks "which appear to constitute a threat to the security of the Commission's aerial surveillance flights which derive from Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and which are expressly authorized under Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and in the status agreement between the United Nations and Iraq of 14 May 1991". The Executive Chairman indicated that unless the Special Commission received immediate assurances that the Government of Iraq would take all "the necessary steps to ensure that the Iraqi military forces will not interfere with or threaten the security of the flights, the modalities for these unescorted flights will have to be reviewed".

28. Upon receipt of this correspondence, the Council held consultations on 10 April 1992, after which the President issued a statement on behalf of the Council members, *28 in which it was pointed out that "the surveillance flights are carried out under the authority of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)", and the right of the Commission to conduct such flights was reaffirmed. The Council called upon the Government to give the assurances on the security and safety of the flights which the Executive Chairman had sought in his letter of 10 April to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned of serious consequences if Iraq did not comply with its obligations in this regard.

29. On 12 April, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, *29 in which he said that the sole purpose of the Charge d'affaires' letter of 9 April had been to draw attention to the dangers to which surveillance flights might "be exposed by reason of the recent hostile action of the Iranian Air Force in Iraqi airspace and the Iraqi defensive counter-action". He affirmed that the Government of Iraq "did not intend and does not intend to carry out any military operation aimed at" the Commission's aerial surveillance flights.

30. The other issue which remains unresolved is that of landing rights for the Special Commission's fixed-wing aircraft in the Baghdad area. Up to the present, landing facilities have been made available by the Iraqi authorities for these aircraft at Habbaniyah airfield, 100 kilometres from Baghdad, although two airfields within Baghdad city limits have been returned to operational use (Muthanna and Rasheed).

31. At Habbaniyah, from time to time, Iraq has proposed to introduce control measures which would impinge on the rights of the Special Commission and IAEA to take into and out of Iraq all necessary equipment, materials and other items required for inspections and the analyses of their results. In the face of objections from the Commission, these measures have not been enforced. However, Iraq has required the Commission's aircraft to land at greater and greater distances from the airport ground facilities where immigration and other formalities are carried out. This has become increasingly onerous and time-consuming.

32. Reference to these difficulties were made in the Secretary-general's report to the Security Council of 25 January 1992 *30 and the matter was elaborated upon in the Executive Chairman's special report to the Council of 18 February 1992. *31 In that report, the Executive Chairman recalled that, under Council resolution 707 (1991), Iraq is required to allow the Commission "to make full use of ... such airfields in Iraq as [it] may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission". He further indicated that on 23 January 1992, an official approach on behalf of the Special Cornmission had been made to the Iraqi authorities, proposing that the Commission's incoming and outgoing flights use Muthanna or Rasheed airfield and that discussions be immediately entered into to make the necessary practical arrangements.

33. Repeated attempts to receive a response from the Iraqi authorities both in the field and at the level of the Executive Chairman, during his special mission to Baghdad in February 1992 and discussions with the Iraqi delegation to the Security Council in March 1992, have so far been unsuccessful. The Security Council has been kept informed on a number of occasions, *32 without the Executive Chairman so far requesting specific Council action. However, on 11 April 1992, the Executive Chairman addressed a letter to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq recalling the entire history of the matter. In that letter, the Executive Chairman indicated that the Special Commission will have in the near future to make a determination that Rasheed airfield is the most appropriate for the work of the Commission, unless in the interim the Iraqi authorities propose to the Commission an airport in Baghdad which meets the Commission's requirements. Rasheed would permit consolidation of all the Commission's air operations at one location convenient for its offices and accommodation in Baghdad and would obviate the long delays occasioned by the use of Habbaniyah. At Habbaniyah, the distance from Baghdad has been compounded as a source of delay by the resumption of flights by Iraqi military aircraft requiring the Commission to take long detours to reach the airport facilities.

E. Conclusions

34. The conduct of Iraq, as demonstrated above, confirms the invariable experience of the Special Commission that only a resolute and determined attitude by the Commission, backed up by the Security Council, is likely to achieve the necessary cooperation from Iraq in the many areas covered by section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and by resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) where this cooperation has yet to be forthcoming. Where the Special Commission has sought to adopt a different approach, for example in respect of landing rights for its fixed-wing aircraft, it has met only with evasion or lack of definite response. The Special Commission's repeated calls for a change in the attitude of Iraq to one of candour, transparency and cooperation at all levels remain largely unanswered. While Iraq has referred on a number of occasions to a new spirit of cooperation, words have not, for the most part, yet been translated into deeds.

Appendix II
Chemical and biological weapons

A. Inspections

1. At the time of the last report, the first joint chemical and biological inspection team (UNSCOM 21) had very recently completed its work and only a preliminary account of the results was available. The inspection concentrated on possible chemical-weapon (CW) or biological weapon (BW) storage sites, such as airfield bunkers and ammunition depots. A total of 15 sites designated by the Commission were subject to very short-notice inspections. In some cases the notification of inspection was handed to the Iraqi hosts only as the site itself was being approached either by road or by air (helicopter), resulting in virtually no-notice inspections. In addition, a visit was made by a sub-team to Al-Muthanna to witness experiments, using the simulant D4, on the destruction of nerve agents by caustic hydrolysis. At only two of the inspected sites were any items of relevance to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) found. At Karbala, a 12-frame bunker appeared to have had an unusual level of security around it; on questioning, the Iraqi hosts admitted that it had been used for the storage of bulk mustard agent in 1984-1985 but there were no indications that this or any other agents were present when this bunker was destroyed by coalition bombing. Also at Karbala three undeclared, apparently discarded, SCUD triple-frame missile carriers were discovered and reported to the ballistic missile team. Although Iraqi officials stated that four of the buildings at this site had been used for the storage of SCUD missiles during the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, there was no evidence of the recent storage of such missiles. At the Mosul Sugar Factory, almost 100 items of metal working machinery from the bomb workshop and general workshop at Muthanna were discovered. This machinery had been used for the manufacture of 250- and 500-gauge bombs. These items were marked and catalogued and the Iraqi officials were requested in writing to return all the items to Muthanna.

2. The seventh CW inspection (UNSCOM 26), which was in Iraq from 27 January to 5 February 1992, inspected 10 sites which had either been declared by Iraq or were designated for inspection by the Executive Chairman. No evidence was found of activities or items relevant to resolution 687 (1991). The team was also able to verify the return to Al-Muthanna site of the bomb-making equipment from Mosul and to observe preparations for and completion of one experimental test run of nerve agent hydrolysis at the pilot plant. Changes to the experimental conditions and procedures were required by the team, largely on safety grounds, but also including technical aspects. The team concluded after the test run that further test runs would be required to establish and prove satisfactory operating conditions and procedures.

3. The eighth chemical inspection team (UNSCOM 35) visited 14 sites over the period 15 to 29 April 1992 to verify, to the extent now practicable, Iraq's declarations, handed to the Chief Inspector of UNSCOM 31 on 28 March 1992, relating to CW items unilaterally destroyed by Iraq during July 1991. Additionally, the team carried out a no-notice inspection of a suspected documentation centre. The team also visited the previous headquarters of the Centre for Technical Research. No activity of relevance to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) was seen at either site.

B. Destruction activities

4. The destruction of Iraq's chemical agents and filled chemical munitions will certainly be a complex, difficult, time-consuming and potentially hazardous task; arguably it is the most difficult task facing the Special Commission, involving health, safety and environmental aspects in addition to varied technical problems. The planning and preparation for these activities, in New York and in Iraq, continues; destruction of some filled chemical munitions has already been carried out.

5. During the inspections carried out by UNSCOM 20 during October-November 1991, the team concluded that the 122-millimetre rockets at the Khamisiyah site were too unsafe to be moved to Al-Muthanna for destruction there. It was therefore decided that these rockets should be destroyed on site at Khamisiyah. Discussions on the optimum method of destruction involved the Destruction Advisory Panel and the CBW Working Group of the Special Commission. Taking all factors into consideration, it was decided that the rockets were best destroyed by the use of explosive charges to destroy the rocket motors and open the warheads at the same time and to thermally destroy the released agents and degradation products in a fuel fire ignited at the same time the explosive charges were detonated. A team (UNSCOM 29) over the period 21 February to 24 March 1992 directed, controlled and observed the whole operation and provided specialist technical skills and equipment (explosive ordnance destruction expertise, decontamination and medical cover, atmospheric sampling, agent monitoring equipment, etc.) as necessary. Owing to a combination of technical problems, the work experienced initial delays; in addition more rockets were present than expected and further rockets were discovered, buried on the site, some of which were recovered and destroyed during the operation. These set-backs required the team to stay at Kharmsiyah for an additional two weeks. The initial problems were overcome and the team was able to start destroying the rockets. In this way, a total of 463 rockets (389 filled, 36 partially filled and 38 unfilled) were destroyed, approximating to 2.5 tonnes of agent (a GB/GF mixture). Safety and environmental concerns were of paramount importance throughout, and the Special Commission's requirements were strictly observed. A system for atmospheric monitoring was established as two linear arrays, at 200 metres and 1,800 metres, down-wind of the destruction area. No evidence was obtained for any significant atmospheric contamination by the nerve agent.

6. Preparations for the destruction of CW agents at Muthanna have been actively continued and a team (UNSCOM 32) was in Iraq over the period 5 to 13 April 1992 to assess progress and to provide expert technical guidance.

(a) Mustard agent incinerator. Considerable progress has been made with the construction of this facility and the team estimated that the work is approximately 70 per cent complete. The major elements were in place but further work, including modifications required by the team, were required before commissioning can be considered. Given completion of this work to the standard required, the team saw no reason why the incinerator could not be made to work in a safe, effective and environmentally acceptable manner.

(b) Nerve agent hydrolysis. The experimental work on nerve agent hydrolysis carried out to date, together with the four experiments directed and observed by the team, has demonstrated the feasibility of the process. Consistent achievement of the destruction limits set by the Special Commission has yet to be convincingly demonstrated owing to the need to check the analytical procedures. Further experimental runs will be required to fully define operating parameters once the effectiveness of the analytical procedures, based on gas liquid chromatography, has been proven. The construction of the large-scale nerve agent hydrolysis plant has progressed well but further work and modifications requested by the team as a result of their inspection are required. Given completion of all outstanding work to the required standard, and satisfactory definition of the operating parameters as a result of the experimental programme at the pilot plant, the team saw no reason why the large-scale nerve agent destruction facility could not function safely, effectively and in an environmentally acceptable manner.

(c) Other tasks. Just prior to UNSCOM 32's departure for Iraq, the Special Commission decided that ballistic-missile-related chemicals (ammonium perchlorate, hexamethylene diisocyanate, tolylene diisocyanate, and aluminum powder - all used in the production of solid rocket propellant) should be transferred from their present locations to the Al-Muthanna site for controlled destruction there. Al-Muthanna is now the site in Iraq where, as far as possible, all of the Special Commission's chemical destruction operations will be carried out. UNSCOM 32 was therefore instructed to reconnoitre Al-Muthanna site to select an area or areas where the ballistic-missile chemicals could be safely stored to await destruction there. The team was also instructed to discuss with Iraq possible means of destruction of these chemicals and also safe transport of the chemicals to Muthanna. These objectives were achieved. A roller mounted cradle to which was fitted a remotely operated electric drill had been developed by Iraq for the remote drilling of potentially hazardous 155-millimetre shells. The team inspected this and agreed that it would be safe and effective but would be time- and labour-intensive. Drilling and draining of filled munitions was very likely to represent the rate-determining step in the destruction of Iraq's chemical agents. Advantage was also taken of the presence of UNSCOM 32 at Muthanna to discuss provision of facilities required by the UNSCOM team which will need to be permanently available at Muthanna during the CW destruction operation; a suitable building was identified for use as an operations room, offices, medical room and other facilities.

Appendix III
Ballistic missiles

1. During the period from December 1991 to June 1992, the United Nations Special Commission conducted a further six ballistic missile inspections in Iraq.

2. There have continued to be doubts about initial Iraqi ballistic missile declarations. In particular, there were questions about the numbers provided by Iraq concerning how many Scud and Scud-variant missiles were used in the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and for other purposes. Iraqi declarations of 19 March 1992 and subsequently confirmed that the Special Commission's suspicions were well-founded; 89 Scud-type missiles were claimed by Iraq to have been destroyed unilaterally and buried in the summer of 1991. Iraqi authorities modified earlier declarations by, inter alia, reducing by 67 the number they previously asserted had been used in the war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the light of this and of Iraq's unwillingness to provide evidence which confirms their latest declarations on the past disposition of its ballistic missiles, the Commission continues to harbour justifiable doubts. It is thus not clear that the latest declarations constitute transparency, cooperation and candour.

3. The Commission is now engaged in studying the 5 June report by Iraq and will strive to arrive early at an assessment of the comprehensiveness of the report. Additional inspections and destruction at declared and undeclared sites are required to fulfill the Commission's responsibility to ensure that all ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 150 kilometres, related major parts, and repair and production facilities have been located and destroyed.

4. UNSCOM 23 was conducted from 1 to 9 December 1991 to verify the destruction of fixed launch sites primarily in the Western Zone and the destruction of "supergun" components. A number of undeclared potential missile sites particularly in the production area were also designated for inspection. The team inspected a total of 17 different locations, of which 7 were undeclared sites. Reconstruction at some sites was fairly advanced. In addition, two sites to which production equipment had been evacuated from a production facility were also visited. At two undeclared sites, equipment assessed by the team to have been primarily intended for use in ballistic missile production and testing was found. Iraqi officials were instructed not to remove this equipment pending further instructions from UNSCOM. Four Scud-missile transporters were inspected once again; two of them had been welded and fitted with a non-prohibited short-range missile cradle. Destruction was required for all these transporters; Iraq agreed to destroy them and proposed to blow up the four similar ones remaining at Al-Taji.

5. UNSCOM 24 was conducted from 9 to 17 December 1991 to inspect a number of suspected ballistic missile sites for documentary evidence relating to missiles and equipment and for suspected missile concealment locations. The team inspected 14 different locations; 1 site was in Baghdad, the remainder were in the Western Zone. The team employed a combination of ground and air transportation to accomplish its task of inspecting 13 undeclared sites and 1 declared site. All inspections were conducted on a short-notice basis with site declaration given either upon arrival at the site, or 30 to 40 minutes before arrival at the site. The team was organized in two elements, tailored to tasks and skills. A document search group was composed for those sites designated for document search.

6. UNSCOM 28 was conducted from 21 to 28 February 1992 to supervise destruction by Iraq of missile repair and production facilities and related equipment which were identified to Iraq in a letter dated 14 February 1992. In addition, all prohibited items discovered were to be catalogued and their exact locations recorded. The team inspected a total of seven different locations. The ballistic missile production and repair facilities for the missile solid propellant project were visited and the team observed that all of them had been extensively rebuilt. A number of areas which were inaccessible to previous inspection teams owing to war damage were visited and prohibited items were catalogued. However, the Iraqi authorities refused to comply with instructions to destroy the missile production and repair equipment as required in the Executive Chairman's letter of 14 February 1992 to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. No items were destroyed but they were recatalogued for a future destruction mission. When it became apparent that the Iraqi authorities would not permit destruction to occur, the Executive Chairman ordered the team to halt its activities and withdraw from Iraq, which it did.

7. UNSCOM 31 was conducted from 21 to 30 March 1992 to verify Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed 89 ballistic missiles during the summer of 1991 along with certain associated equipment, to initiate the destruction of Iraq's ballistic missile production and repair equipment and to carry out a number of undeclared inspections. The team supervised the destruction of some of the missile production equipment that UNSCOM 28 BM8 had not been able to destroy. Among papers given to the Chief Inspector was a revised accounting of the number of missiles Iraq claims to have received from the former Soviet Union, and the uses to which they had been put; in particular, the list revises downward the number of missiles fired against the Islamic Republic of Iran between 1980 and 1988.

8. UNSCOM 34 was conducted from 13 to 21 April 1992 to resume the activities of UNSCOM 28, i.e. the supervision of the destruction by Iraq of facilities and equipment associated with Iraq's ballistic missile production programme. The team supervised the destruction of 45 such items of production equipment and 10 buildings, that is, the majority of the items on List A of the Executive Chairman's letter of 14 February 1992 as extended by his letter of 4 April 1992, both to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, and continued with the verification of the Iraqi declaration of 19 March 1992.

9. UNSCOM 36, conducted from 14 to 22 May 1992, further continued this process. The team inventoried equipment designed for the production of nozzles for the BADR-2000. All items declared were verified as destroyed, including a second mock-up of the BADR-2000 ballistic missile, miscellaneous components, and missile transport dollies. The team additionally verified the destruction of two horizontal test vehicles, two independent test vehicles, two independent training test vehicles, and one missile maintenance vehicle, the erector arm of the training launcher, nine oxidizer and four propellant vehicles, a spot welder and a rolling machine. UNSCOM 36 identified five sets of Iraqi manufactured missile guidance components which the team had been directed to remove from Iraq for technical analysis. Additional guidance component parts were found; these had been destroyed unilaterally by Iraq and the remains scattered in and around a 10-kilometre stretch of a canal. The team inspected remains of previously destroyed "TONKA" fuel starter systems. Finally, UNSCOM 36 found a number of the documents relating to the construction of facilities associated with, or suspected of being associated with, missile systems. After some discussion, the team removed for further analysis copies of 33 pages of documents concerning construction at Sa'ad 16.

Appendix IV
Special Commission inspection schedule

Appendix V
Establishment and mandate

1. Establishment and composition

1. The establishment, organization and mandate of the Special Commission remains essentially as described in the first report of the Special Commission. *33 Changes in the composition are recorded in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present report.

2. Organization

2. The Office of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission continues to discharge its responsibilities for operations support, with the assistance of the Field Offices in Bahrain and Baghdad. The number of regular United Nations staff assigned to the Special Commission or specifically recruited for service with it total 45: 14 Professionals and 31 General Service. Staff made available by Governments to serve in the three offices number 14.

3. As the amount of information available to the Special Commission has continued to increase rapidly, it became obvious during the period under review that a capability to manage it more effectively was required. An Information Assessment Unit has thus been established in the Executive Office of the Special Commission. This Unit commenced its operations in early January 1992. The principal functions of the Unit include the systematic, computer-assisted storage, retrieval and assessment of information pertaining to the Commission's mandate. Other key functions are assisting in the planning and execution of inspections in Iraq, and the direction, on behalf of the Executive Chairman, of aerial surveillance flights over Iraq. The primary sources of information for the Information Assessment Unit include: reports of Commission inspection teams, results of aerial surveillance flights, information provided by States, and information from public media. Iraqi declarations required by Security Council resolutions, when they come to constitute full, final and complete disclosure, will also be an important source of information to the Commission. It is expected that the Information Assessment Unit will play an increasingly important role in the operations of the Commission, particularly in ongoing monitoring and verification.

3. Mandate

4. The mandate of the Special Commission remains unchanged, although further progress has been made in the preparations for the introduction of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It has not proved possible to initiate such ongoing monitoring and verification in the period under review, given Iraq's failure to acknowledge its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and under the Commission's and IAEA's plans for such monitoring approved by resolution 715 (1991). *34 Furthermore, the declarations by Iraq required under the plans will be needed before ongoing monitoring and verification can commence. (See appendix I for details.)

Appendix VI
Contributions to the Special Commission

1. The following contributions in cash and in kind (i.e., in addition to materials and equipment provided by Governments to individual inspectors) have been received to date.

(a) In cash paid into United Nations accounts

The United Nations provided support out of the Working Capital Fund for the first five months of operation to a total of $8 million

(b) Outright grant

(c) Loaned for the duration of the operation

(d) Loaned and returned

Personnel

2. In addition to personnel assigned from the United Nations, IAEA and the World Health Organization, the following Governments have provided personnel for the Commission's activities: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

3. To date, New Zealand has provided full medical support consisting of a core team of five personnel, augmented as necessary by additional doctors and medical assistants for particularly hazardous inspections or special projects.

4. Several Governments have responded positively to the Commission's request for personnel to be seconded to the chemical destruction programme at Al-Muthanna. The Commission will report on these contributions once the programme is under way.

Air support

5. The Commission has been provided with high-altitude reconnaissance flights over Iraq. The flights are undertaken on a regular basis by an aircraft with crew and support personnel made available to the Commission by the United States. Flights are directed by the Special Commission and the aircraft bear United Nations insignia. They are notified to Iraq 72 hours in advance and acknowledged by Iraq within 48 hours.

6. The Government of Germany has provided full air transport and support for the Commission's ground activities. Two C-160 Transall aircraft, based in Bahrain, transport inspectors and United Nations Special Commission personnel and cargo to and from Baghdad. Thirteen crew and support personnel operate the aircraft. Three CH-53 rotary-wing aircraft, including 28 crew and support personnel, are based at the Al-Rasheed airfield in Baghdad. They ferry teams to and carry out surveillance flights in relation to inspection sites, and act as the primary means of emergency medical evacuation of United Nations Special Commission personnel. They have also provided emergency medical services, on an ad hoc basis, to other United Nations personnel in Iraq.

Facilities

7. The Government of Bahrain generously provides facilities for the Bahrain Field Office at Manama airfield. In addition, it has made available facilities which enabled personnel from the Special Commission to install and use analytical equipment specifically required by one of its chemical inspection teams.

Endnotes:

*1 - S/23268

*2 - S/23165, annex.

*3 - Ibid.

*4 - See S/23643.

*5 - S/23678

*6 - S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr. 1

*7 - S/23268, annex, para. 4

*8 - S/23514, annex, sect. B, paras. 15-26.

*9 - S/23500

*10 - S/23606, annex.

*11 - S/23609

*12 - S/23643, annex.

*13 - S/23663.

*14 - S/23687

*15 - S/23699

*16 - S/PV.3059 and S/PV.3059(Resumption 2).

*17 - S/23801

*18 - S/23813

*19 - S/24002, annex

*20 - , annex I.

*21 - S/23673, annex III

*22 - S/23643, annex

*23 - S/23663

*24 - S/23687

*25 - S/23699

*26 - List contained in S/23673, annex I, enclosure II as modified by the Executive Chairman's letter of 4 April 1992 to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

*27 - S/23514, annex, sect. B, para. 31; S/23606, para. 9; and S/23687, annex I, para. 17.

*28 - S/23803.

*29 - S/23806.

*30 - S/23514, annex, sect. B, para. 31.

*31 - S/23606, annex, paras. 7 and 8

*32 - S/23643, annex, enclosure, para. 23; and S/23687, annex I, para.17.

*33 - S/23165, annex

*34 - S/22871/Rev. 1 and S/22872/Rev. 1 and Corr. 1