S/1995/287
11 April 1995

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-general has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication, dated 5 April 1995, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex
Letter dated 5 April 1995 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-general

Paragraph 8 of resolution 715 (1991), adopted by the Security Council on 11 October 1991, requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). These reports are to be submitted when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715 (1991).

Accordingly, I am requesting you kindly to transmit to the President of the Security Council the enclosed seventh six-month report on the implementation of the Plan. I remain available for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Appendix
Seventh report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of Resolution 687 (1991)

I. Introduction

1. On 11 October 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 715 (1991) approving, inter alia, the plan submitted in document S/22872/Rev.l and S/22872/Rev.l/Corr.l by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and with the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 707 (1991). In paragraph 8 of resolution 715, the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit to it reports on the implementation of the plan when requested by the Security Council and, in and any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715.

2. The Director General submits herewith the seventh six-month report *l on implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification related to Iraq's nuclear capabilities (hereinafter referred to as the Plan).

3. It will be recalled that in the previous six-month report a detailed account was given of the IAEA's inspection activities which led to the identification and neutralization of the past covert Iraqi nuclear programme. In that report it was concluded that, with the establishment at the end of August 1994 of the IAEA's continuous presence in Iraq — the Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) — all elements of the Plan were in place, thus indicating that the Plan was operational. It was also concluded that (i) monitoring and verification measures would evolve as technical needs arose and as advanced technologies became available, and that (ii) the implementation of the Plan did not foreclose the exercise by the IAEA of its right to investigate any aspect of Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme through the follow-up of any new result or new information which in the IAEA's judgement warranted further investigation.

4. With the NMG in place at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC), most of the future activities of the IAEA in Iraq, be they monitoring and verification of existing data or follow-up of new results or new information, will be carried out by that group in cooperation, where necessary, with the other resident teams of the Special Commission. This will not preclude the possibility of sending specialized inspection teams to Iraq, as has been done in the past.

5. Information has recently appeared in the media suggesting the existence in Iraq of a secret project which could be related to a nuclear weapons programme. The details are discussed further below.

II. Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme

6. As indicated in the previous six-month report, the IAEA is confident that the essential components of Iraq's past clandestine nuclear programme have been identified and have been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless, as appropriate. The IAEA is also confident that the scope of the past programme is well understood. Areas of residual uncertainty have been progressively reduced to a level of detail, the full knowledge of which is not likely to affect the overall picture.

7. This assessment is based not only on the verification of Iraqi statements, which may be presumed to be biased and incomplete, but also on information gathered during inspections and information provided by suppliers and Member States and, to a great extent, on analyses of the large quantity of original Iraqi documentation relevant to the covert programme which was seized in Iraq in September — October 1991 by the teams of the sixth and seventh IAEA inspection missions.

8. The cache of original Iraqi documentation consists of a total of 54,9222 pages, comprising 2,348 individual documents, 1,138 of which had been stamped by the Iraqi authorities as secret or top secret. All of the documents have been abstracted and 325 have been fully translated. Of the 2,348 documents, 564 (about one quarter of the total) have no date; the remaining 1,784 cover a period of thirteen years,from 1979 through 1991. The distribution of documents by year of issue is shown as a bar-chart in the Attachment. As can be seen from this chart, 41% of the seized documents relate to the period 1988-1991. Documents stamped "Petrochemical Project 3" or "PC3", which was the code name of the covert Iraqi nuclear programme, tend to occur more frequently in the later years.

9. These seized documents contain a wealth of detailed information regarding the following areas of activity of the covert nuclear programme:

- electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) for the production of enriched uranium;

- chemical enrichment of uranium by liquid-liquid extraction and solid-liquid ion exchange;

-gaseous diffusion enrichment of uranium, abandoned in 1987;

- research aimed at lithium-6 production;

- design of facilities to handle large amounts of tritium; and

- weaponization *2.

10. The documents also provide detailed information regarding matters such as:

- the organizational structure of PC3 and the staff assigned to the various project operations;

- the code numbers and description of the technical tasks assigned to each PC3 unit;

- achievement and failures in the execution of the various technical tasks;

- the identification and coding of eight dedicated sites directly associated with PC3 activities (Tuwaitha, Al Atheer, Tarmiya, Al Sharqat, Al Qaim, Al Jezira, Al Rabiya and Dijia); and

- procurement and foreign suppliers.

11. The IAEA believes that some of the documents seized by its inspectors in the course of the sixth inspection mission at the premises of the Engineering Design Centre and then forcibly taken from them were not returned. To the IAEA's repeated requests for their return Iraq has consistently responded that no documents were withheld and that, in any event, no programme documents were any longer available as all of them had been destroyed. This response is not credible, but the IAEA has neither information on the location of such documents, nor any means to retrieve them.

12. Detailed analyses of the seized Iraqi documents have led to the following general conclusions:

- These documents provide a detailed account of the achievements and failures of PC3 from its inception until mid-1990 (i.e. shortly before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait). The most recent technical report among them is dated 11 November 1990 *3 and describes the progress in weaponization during the period 1 January 1990 - 31 May 1990. The absence of more recent documentation gives rise to uncertainties regarding PC3 activities in the several months which preceded the Gulf war, i.e. between June 1990 and January 1991.

- None of the seized documents contains information on gas centrifuge research and development, but there are indications that it was started in mid-1987, when the gaseous diffusion project was abandoned. There is evidence in at least two documents that in mid-1987 a complement of 150 staff who were working on gaseous diffusion were transferred to gas centrifuge enrichment, responsibility for which was transferred from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to another organisation. The documents do not mention which organisation assumed responsibility, but other sources indicate that it was the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialisation (MIMI).

Attachment

13. This leaves two questions open: the first concerns the progress made by PC3 from June 1990 to January 1991; the second concerns the completeness of the IAEA's knowledge regarding gas centrifuge enrichment — nothing concerning this project was found in the seized documentation.

14. As to the first question, the Iraqi authorities assert that the invasion of Kuwait brought all Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) activities to a virtual halt; the sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution 661 of 6 August 1990 interrupted the flow of equipment and material needed for completing the industrial installations associated with the project and efforts had concentrated on measures to protect existing facilities from the threat posed by air raids — for instance the moving of foreign nationals who had been taken hostage to potential targets (this certainly happened in the case of Tuwaitha). The IAEA has no evidence to contradict these assertions. In fact, the absence of technical reports documenting progress after May 1990 could be an indication that the situation had become chaotic.

15. As to the second question, the Iraqi authorities maintain that, before the commencement of IAEA inspections in Iraq under resolution 687 (1991), orders were received from a senior government level requiring them to collect all sensitive documents and to surrender them to the Iraqi army for destruction. They also maintain that the IAEA's ability to get hold of documents in the course of the sixth inspection mission was due to negligence for which those responsible were punished. One of the seized documents records the fact that a considerable amount of documentation had been brought to the "previously agreed place" on 6 June 1991 — in the interval between the first and second inspection missions. There is, however, no corroboration that this documentation was subsequently destroyed, nor is it considered credible that a complete master set of such documentation has not been retained.

16. The absence of original Iraqi documentation describing the progress of Iraq's gas centrifuge programme has compelled the IAEA to concentrate considerable effort on the independent verification of the correctness and completeness of the declarations concerning this programme contained in Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Report" and in other statements. *4 This independent verification has included investigations through suppliers (from whom the IAEA has obtained copies of original drawings of the Iraqi gas centrifuge components) and the assistance of a group of centrifuge technology experts. The consensus of these experts is that the picture of the centrifuge design and manufacturing activities carried out in Iraq is coherent, with no obvious gaps, and essentially complete.

17. The importance of verifying what materials and equipment subject to control and monitoring under the Plan has actually been imported by Iraq, is not limited to the centrifuge area. As discussed in the previous six-month report, the verification process is a lengthy one, calling for cooperation from concerned Member States and various suppliers. To date this investigation has entailed enquiries involving 186 companies in 28 countries.

III. Media reports on possible non-compliance

18. A recently published article in the British press reports that an Iraqi scientist formerly employed by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission informed a British Journalist that Iraq had resumed its nuclear weapons programme and was attempting to conceal it. According to this article, before his disappearance, the Iraqi scientist provided to the journalist copies of documents to support his contentions.

19. The IAEA has received and reviewed the documents in question.*5 If genuine, they could suggest that theoretical computer-based studies related to nuclear weapons design are being conducted in Iraq. Initial analysis could not establish the documents' authenticity. Iraqi authorities deny the existence of such a programme, and challenge the authenticity of the documents pointing to many inconsistencies in content and in form. The IAEA is pursuing this matter with a view to determining the authenticity and clarifying the substance of these documents.

20. The IAEA will keep the Security Council informed on the outcome of its investigation.

IV. Implementation of the plan

A. Inspection activities

21. Since the issuance of the previous six-month report on 10 October 1994, the IAEA has carried out one inspection mission in Iraq, the twenty-seventh. The detailed report on this inspection is contained in document S/1994/1443, dated 22 December 1994. As indicated in that document, the report was the last of the series of mission-specific reports. With the establishment of the continuous presence in Iraq of the NMG, the IAEA's activities in Iraq will henceforth be described in semi-annual reports to the Security Council on the implementation of the Plan. The main focus of the twenty-seventh inspection mission was the implementation of activities associated with the Plan.

B. Ongoing monitoring and verification activities

22. The activities involved in ongoing monitoring and verification include: inspections at facilities, installations and sites; environmental monitoring; verification of the use of items described in Annex 3 of the Plan; verification of information provided by Iraq in accordance with paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the Plan; verification of information acquired from Member States, from aerial surveillance and from open sources and assessed to warrant further investigation; and interviews with Iraqi personnel who were connected with Iraq's former nuclear programme.

23. When the NMG was established in August 1994, the conversion of the section of the Canal Hotel which was to accommodate the BMVC was in its early stages. The conversion is now practically complete and the internal structure has been modified to provide office, laboratory and storage space for each of the monitoring groups and centralised facilities for the communications, medical and administrative units. The normal complement of the NMG is three to four persons; they are accompanied on inspections by personnel from the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD). In most instances the NMD escorts are not given prior notice of the location to be visited.

24. When the need arises, additional persons with particular expertise are assigned to the NMG to carry out specific tasks — e.g. the twice-yearly hydrological survey of the watersheds of the Tigris and Euphrates. The fifth such survey, carried out during the twenty-seventh inspection mission, involved the collection of samples of water, sediment and biota at 16 locations selected from the 52 locations for which baseline date had been established in the original survey, completed in November 1992. This part of the IAEA's environmental monitoring programme is a powerful and proven technique for the detection of activities such as the operation of nuclear reactors or of facilities for the extraction of plutonium from irradiated nuclear material.

25. This environmental monitoring programme also includes aerial and ground-based gamma radiation surveys, the collection of airborne particulate matter and the sampling — by the well-established "smear" technique — of materials deposited on surfaces.

26. Seals with unique verifiable signatures are attached by the IAEA to critical items of equipment in order to provide confirmation that such items are still at their respective declared locations. Seals are also used to prevent the undetected use of controlled equipment. A few cases of unauthorised removals of seals have occurred in the past two years, but in each case it was possible to verify that the identity and integrity of the equipment from which the seal had been removed had not been compromised.

27. IAEA video surveillance and recording equipment installed in two major engineering establishments has, with the assistance of the Special Commission, been modified in order to enable television signals to be transmitted from monitored locations to the BMVC. This capability provided the NMG with the opportunity to observe, at any time, activities in the areas under video surveillance. As the activities in some Iraqi engineering establishments are of interest both to the NMG and to the Ballistic Missile Group, the relevant video signals are routed to both groups regardless of which group had installed the video surveillance system.

28. Since the establishment of the IAEA's continuous presence in Iraq 23 facilities have been inspected for the first time: three facilities identified by Iraq as the recipients of monitored items for which it had requested release or change of use; two facilities where previously undeclared items of dual-use equipment (coordinate measuring machines) were located; 16 facilities declared as having a means of power supply greater than l0 MWe; one facility at which radioisotopes are used or stored; and one facility which was inspected on the basis of information obtained from Member States. The inspections at facilities in the Basrah area having a means of power supply greater than l0 MWe revealed shortcomings in the inventory of such facilities declared by Iraq; information was obtained through the inspection process on an additional sixteen such facilities. The Iraqi NMD has been requested to prepare a correct declaration of the inventory of such facilities.

29. An inspection carried out on the basis of information received from Member States was conducted at a facility directly across the Tigris River from Tarmiya, the primary production-scale EMIS uranium enrichment plant. The inspection, which was unannounced, showed the facility to be a water purification plant which had been Iraq's largest producer of bottled drinking water. The facility was closed down in 1994 owing to a lack of process chemicals and of materials for making plastic bottles.

30. The level of practical cooperation by Iraqi counterparts in facilitating the carrying out of IAEA field activities continues to be high. The Iraqi personnel accompanying IAEA inspectors are usually punctual and helpful, and have been effective in locating the appropriate con tact persons at facilities being inspected. Similarly, the facility personnel have proved willing and effective in providing materials and services required for the installation of video surveillance systems.

C. Provision of in formation by Iraq

31. Since the acceptance by Iraq, on 26 November 1993, of its obligations under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), Iraq has made three semiannual declarations of, inter alia, the inventories of all facilities, installations and sites where nuclear activities of any kind have been or are carried out, or which are suitable for carrying out such activities, and of all material, equipment and items in Iraq identified in Annex 3 of the Plan.

32. To facilitate the preparation of these declarations, the IAEA prepared a series of forms (with detailed guidance for their completion) setting out the information requirements (detailed in paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the Plan) with respect to: facilities, installations and sites; nuclear and non-nuclear material; equipment, isotopes, and existing and proposed programmes of nuclear activities. These forms have since been revised and reproduced in computer database format, which has led to significantly improved efficiency both in Iraq's production of the required declarations and in their evaluation by the IAEA.

33. In ongoing discussions the IAEA is seeking Iraq's cooperation in improving the quality and completeness of this information and particularly in producing a consolidated declaration which will bring together all of the information provided in the three semiannual declarations. Iraq has given an assurance that the necessary work is in progress and has also agreed to provide computer-generated site and building plans to improve the quality of the drawings so far provided.

D. Release, relocation and change of use of equipment,
materials and facilities

34. Requests for the release of — or for permission to relocate — equipment and material are processed in consultation with the Special Commission, as are requests for permission to change the use of monitored buildings. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

E. Nuclear material accountancy

35. As previously reported, all weapons-usable nuclear material has been removed from Iraq — the final shipment, to the Russian Federation, having taken place in February 1994. This material, which comprises the fresh and irradiated fuel from the Tuwaitha research reactors and had been subject to routine verification under the safeguards agreement with Iraq, is fully accounted for and is under IAEA safeguards at its storage location in the Russian Federation. The irradiated fuel removed from Iraq has been reprocessed, and the recovered uranium has been mixed with natural uranium to reduce its enrichment in uranium 235 to less than 20%. The nuclear material remaining in Iraq comprises 1.8 tonnes of low-enriched uranium, 6 tonnes of depleted uranium and 540 tonnes of natural uranium, in a variety of physical and chemical forms, in sealed storage under IAEA control. The IAEA has carried out a detailed assessment of Iraq's procurement, production and usage of nuclear material and, taking into account the declared usage, considers that the inventory is correct, within the normal limits of accuracy.

F. Data analysis and processing centre

36. Over a year ago the IAEA established a Data Analysis and Processing Centre to support its ongoing activities in Iraq. This Centre maintains a computerised information system for the management, analysis and retrieval of information. The databases which make up the computerised information system contain — inter alia — textual, photographic and sensor data collected during inspections, data obtained from a variety of open sources, seized Iraqi documents, information provided by Member States, overhead imagery, Iraqi declarations, and other data on projects and sites in Iraq. The system, which currently contains the equivalent of some twenty thousand pages of text, is used in the preparation and support of field activities and provides the capability to record, process, search and retrieve data both at Headquarters and in the field. The data cover all relevant activities, facilities, materials and equipment known to exist in Iraq.

37. Information from Member States, overhead imagery, taken by U-2 and helicopter-based cameras (obtained and interpreted with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission), environmental monitoring data, and information gathered from inspections, are analyzed and correlated to identify sites which should be further investigated.

V. Mechanism for monitoring exports and imports

38. In paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991), the Security Council requested the "Committee established under resolution 661 (1990)", *6 the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA "to develop in cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder".

39. The export/import monitoring mechanism is an important element of the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's undertaking not to acquire proscribed nuclear weapons capabilities. Such monitoring is of indefinite duration and is to continue until the Security Council decides that it should be terminated.

40. To develop this mechanism, the Special Commission and the IAEA held a number of informal consultations with the Sanctions Committee and a group of international experts. On 15 February 1995, a report setting out the envisaged mechanism was formally submitted to the Sanctions Committee for its consideration and approval and for subsequent transmission to the Security Council.

VI. Revision of Annex 3 of the Plan

41. Before submitting to the Security Council the tripartite proposal referred to in Section V above, the Sanctions Committee expressed the opinion that a more detailed list of items to be reported under the export/import monitoring mechanism should be developed.

42. Accordingly, the IAEA has, in consultation with international experts in export control, revised Annex 3 of the Plan. Under cover of a letter dated 17 March 1995, the Director General transmitted the revised Annex 3 to the United Nations Secretary-general for translation and subsequent presentation to the Security Council. *7 The revised Annex 3 will also be made available to the Sanctions Committee for its information.

43. The revision of Annex 3 of the Plan had three main objectives:

(a) The identification of items prohibited to Iraq under paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991):

The Plan provides that the existence in Iraq of any items in this category must be declared by Iraq. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 687, the IAEA may dispose of such items through destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate. The transfer to Iraq of any item in this category and of technology directly associated with — or required for — the development, production or use of the item is prohibited. The prohibited items also include some of the dual-use commodities listed in the Annexes of the "Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology" *8.

(b) The identification of items which are directly relevant to research and development activities in the area of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and which are not prohibited to Iraq under paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991):

Such items — which include nuclear materials, dedicated-use nuclear equipment, research and power reactors and components thereof, nuclear-fuel-cycle-related plants, components thereof and related technology — must be declared by Iraq to the IAEA under the provisions of the Plan. While resolution 687 (1991) does not prohibit the conduct of non-weapons- related nuclear activities by Iraq, paragraph 3 (vi) of resolution 707 (1991) currently restricts nuclear activities in Iraq to the "use of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes". This restriction is to remain operative until such time as "the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with this resolution [707 (1991)] and paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), and the IAEA determines that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency".

Until the restriction is lifted, the transfer to Iraq of items in this category is prohibited — except for those items related to the non-proscribed nuclear applications in medicine, agriculture and industry. Items in this category which are located in Iraq are controlled by the IAEA under its Plan to verify Iraq's compliance with this restriction. When the restriction is lifted, such items will be released for use by Iraq, their use being monitored under the Plan.

The transfer to Iraq of items for use in non-proscribed nuclear activities (i.e. the use of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes) continues to be circumscribed by the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the Security Council in resolutions 661 (1990) and 670 (1991).

(c) The identification of dual-use material, equipment and related technology which could be of significant value in the pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme or of nuclear fuel cycle activities prohibited under resolution 687 (1991):

As indicated in sub-paragraph (a) above, some such items are prohibited to Iraq, notwithstanding their dual-use nature. Non-prohibited dual-use items present in Iraq at the end of the Gulf war are required to be declared to the IAEA under the Plan and their use is monitored by the IAEA. Until the sanctions provided for in resolutions 661 (1990) and 670 (1990) are lifted, the transfer to Iraq of dual-use items for essential civilian needs is regulated by the sanction. Subsequently, it will be covered by the export/import monitoring mechanism.

VII. Resumption of technical assistance and cooperation in areas not prohibited by Security Council resolutions

44. As indicated in the previous report on the implementation of the Plan, the IAEA has agreed to examine the extent to which technical assistance and cooperation might be accommodated within the constraints of the relevant Security Council resolutions. In so doing the IAEA took into account the practice followed by other United Nations organizations in securing the concurrence of the Sanctions Committee with the provision to Iraq of assistance which involves the transfer of funds, equipment or material.

45. The IAEA has identified five technical assistance projects approved by the Board of the Governors which, in the view of the IAEA, fall outside the proscription of the conduct of nuclear activities by Iraq imposed by resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). Of the five projects, three relate to agriculture (mutation techniques for crop protection; immunoassay techniques for rinderpest diagnosis; improvement of soil fertility) and two relate to nuclear medicine (rehabilitation of nuclear medicine services; rehabilitation of radiotherapy services for cancer).

46. As these projects involve the provision by the IAEA of experts, equipment and fellowships and — in two cases — the funding of visits by Iraqi scientists to foreign laboratories, the IAEA has requested, and recently received from, the Sanctions Committee its concurrence that the provision of the assistance in question falls within the limited exceptions to the sanctions provided for in resolution 661 (1990) and for approval of the start of project implementation.

VI. Summary and conclusions

47. As indicated in the previous six-month report, the IAEA is confident that the essential components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme have been identified and have been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless and that the scope of the past programme is well understood. This assessment is based not only on the verification of Iraqi statements, which may be presumed to be biased and incomplete, but also on information gathered during inspections, on information provided by suppliers and Member States and, to a great extent, on an analysis of the large cache of original Iraqi documentation which was seized in Iraq by the teams of the sixth and seventh IAEA inspection missions. Despite the absence in this cache of original Iraqi documentation regarding its gas centrifuge programme and the suspected withholding by Iraq of some documents from the cache, the areas of residual uncertainty, regarding Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme, have been progressively reduced to a level of detail, the full knowledge of which is not likely to affect the overall picture.

48. The IAEA's extensive knowledge of the scope of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme has facilitated the design and implementation of a credible and sustainable plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

49. The Plan has been operational since the end of August 1994, when the continuous presence of IAEA inspectors in Iraq — the Nuclear Monitoring Group — was established. The refurbishing and modification of the Canal Hotel in Baghdad to accommodate the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre is practically complete and the Centre provides adequate facilities for the implementation of the Plan.

50. During the period under review the Nuclear Monitoring Group has conducted more than 160 inspectors at some 70 facilities, including 23 facilities not previously inspected.

51. A number of requests for the release, relocation and change of use of equipment material and facilities, to be used in non-nuclear activities, have been approved, with the concurrence of the Special Commission and in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 3 (iii) of Security Council resolution 707 (1991).

52. Progress has been made in developing the export/import monitoring mechanism called for in paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) to monitor any future sale or supply to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991), to the temporary restriction on nuclear activities in Iraq pursuant to paragraph 3 (iv) of resolution 707(1991) and to the Plan approved in resolution 715 (1991).

53. At the suggestion of the Sanctions Committee and in accordance with the procedures for amending the Annexes provided for in the Plan, the IAEA has revised Annex 3 thereof with the assistance of international experts on export control. The revised version reflects the need to provide customs and export control authorities with a more detailed description of items subject to notification.

54. The Plan provided a sound basis for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions in the area of nuclear weapons and will continue to be developed as technical needs arise and as advanced technologies become available.

55. The implementation of the Plan does not foreclose the exercise by the IAEA of its right to investigate any aspect of Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme. Indeed, vigorous exercise of the right — provided in the Plan — to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation represents an important confidence-building measure.

56. Recent information made available through the media suggesting the existence of a secret project which, prima facie, could be related to a nuclear weapons programme, requires further investigation to verify its authenticity.

Endnotes:

*l - The Director General has so far submitted six reports, circulated on 15 April 1992, as S/23813; on 28 October 1992, as S/24722; on 19 April 1993, as S/25621; on November 1993, as S/26685; on 22 April 1994, as S/l 994/490; and on 10 October 1994, as S/l 994/1151.

*2 - Weaponization refers to knowledge, techniques, technologies and engineering activities required to construct a nuclear explosive device capable of being delivered to a target and of achieving a nuclear yield, assuming that fissile material is available.

*3 - As already mentioned the date-spread of seized documents included the year 1991. However, the documents dated 1991 were mostly of an administrative nature.

*4 - When the "Full, Final and Complete Report" (FFCR) was handed over by the Iraqi authorities, in July 1992, the IAEA was informed that the FFRC was not a free-standing document and that it had to be assessed together with a number of "Annexes". These "Annexes" were the written replies by Iraq to the detailed questions asked in the course of inspections, the documents supplied in the course of the "seminars" held on the different projects including the gas centrifuge project and the thousands of seized documents.

*5 - The documents consist of a single page memorandum in Arabic and a single page excerpt from a memorandum in Arabic.

*6 - Referred to as the Sanctions Committee.

*7 - The IAEA may, after informing the Security Council, revise the Annexes of the Plan in the light of information and experience gained in the implementation of resolutions 687 and 707 and of the Plan.

*8 - See IAEA documents INFCIRC/254/Rev.l/Part 1 (issued in July 1992), INFCIRC/254/Rev.l/Part 2 (issued in July 1992), and INFCIRC/254/Rev.l/Part l/Mod.2, (issued in April 1994).