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# **The Current Military Situation in Iraq**

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## Comments from Baghdad: CPA Briefing

The briefing raised familiar points and themes. Some points on the military and security situation are of particular interest:

### Ambassador Bremer

--95% of threat consists of Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs), is highly local, and reactions to UAS successes in nation-building.

--Most foreign terrorists come across the Syrian border with some across Saudi border and a few from Iran. There seem to be a mix of Syrians, Saudis, Yemenis, Sudanese and others.

--Captured volunteer with Syrian passport turns out to be Yemeni. Felt Syria intelligence knows, but not proactive in encouraging. Have captured some 300 so far, but most entered Iraq before war.

--Still face major threats from criminal elements released at the end of the war. It complicates the problem. It is clear that some of the attacks for hire come from this element as well as target theft and sabotage in response to guidance or payment from Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs)

--Most critical problem is intelligence. Still weak on both FRLs and foreigners. Did set up fusion center in August. Are getting better but still major problems in HUMINT collection and analysis.

Technical means are of minimal help. Lack area and language skills in US forces. Key is getting Iraqis on the street and taking over part of mission. HUMINT improvements will come from Iraqis.

--Do not have a reliable picture of who is organizing attacks, or the size and structure of various elements. Feel there is loose local coordination, possibly some regional coordination. No national coordination. Cannot assess nature of links between FRLs and Jihadis with intelligence now available.

No evidence to support reports Saddam, Ibrahim, and al Douri in charge or of direct role of Al Qaida versus Al Ansar. Saddam felt to be isolated and constantly on run. Al Douri felt to be dying. Do not know where so-called senior officials ever got the idea that Saddam's deputy was in charge, but then do not know where the media is getting all of these senior officials.

Feels that Sadr is declining as a potential threat. Losing popular turn out at rallies. Mostly voice of unemployed young Shi'ite men. Pushed idea Shi'ites not a potential threat.

Feels UN deadline of 15 December for plans for transition to new government and

constitution will undercut much of terrorist support as show serious in transferring power. Feel useful because forces Iraqis in governing council to act.

--FRLs still have lots of money to buy attacks. At least \$1 billion still unaccounted for. Some \$3 billion more of Iraqi money in Syria by Syrian admission.

--Do feel that suicide bombing was done largely by foreigners. Raised argument that suicide attacks go against the Iraqi character, and fact that bomb unusually sophisticated, but made clear had no hard intelligence to confirm were foreigners.

No way to seal borders with Syria, Saudi and Iran. Too manpower intensive. Anyone can enter as a civilian and then suddenly turn terrorist. Try to limit major vehicle movement but this is a limit of what can do.

--Continuing to try to make forces lighter and more mobile, phase out heavy armored forces.

--Placed heavy stress on Iraqis taking over mission, rather than seeking more troops, although made it clear that did not expect Iraqis to substitute for US forces and combat action.

One key is police. Have cut training time to 8 weeks versus international minimum of 12 weeks. Many are old police, but all military and low ranks in security services. Some 24,000 more to be trained,

--Repeated past comments on accomplishments in aid program and creating new government. Made it clear sought to get a new constitution in six months using locally elected members to convention, and election and new government by later 2004 -- faster than previous dates of 2005.

### **Walt Slocombe**

US will do more than create infantry forces. Will leave having created an armored regiment, some form of air force, and navy.

--Again said no way to ever use old army, Described Garner as never trying to retain it while active and as "bitter." Said not only deserted but looted facilities not bombed down to building materials. Nothing left to use.

-- 60% of new army has manpower from old army and nearly 100% of officers and NCO (includes both military and personnel from 5 security services.)

--Old army personnel can join police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) as well as army.

--Bremer said trying to stabilize rapid turnover in civilians in CPA. Now insist on 6 months and want a year.

### **CJTF Military Brief**

--115,000 US troops now in country out of total of 139,000. Now have troops from 37 different countries.

--All MEK forces -- some 3,800 -- detained in May at detention camp near Baqubah. 4th ID detained and seized equipment as well. Now screening for return to home country, transfer to other countries, stay in Iraq. Camp is at Ashraf.

--Hope to have some 150,000 Iraqis in ICDC, police, and military in 3-4 months, 12 of 36 ICDC battalions already stood up. Have 6,000 border police, rising to 12,000 to cover 40 key roads.

--62,000 police stood up and bring to 72,000 soon, but training problems. Trying to solve by training in Jordan, Now have 6,000 training. Hope to process 18,000. Two week training course, largely in human rights, proper treatment of suspects, investigative procedures.

--Governing Council pushing for harder line. Feels the US is too soft in attacking hostile targets, arrests, and use of force. The US feels restraint is the key to winning hearts and minds.

--Training US force better. Two weeks training in police action and patrols before arrive. Cites fact ca not use dogs because Islamic, don't use sticks because used against animals, train for Ramadan. Admit unprepared when entered Iraq. Troops simply not prepared for mission.

--Pattern analysis shows that threat is largely confined to limited area between Ar Ramadi, Baquba, and Baghdad

--Says Saddam is cut off, isolated, moving constantly, no real role in control. (One officer said expected to capture him soon...)

--Al Douri dying, not in control of anything. Problem is ex-generals and colonels with no other future -- not former top officials.

--Need to understand that will be some attacks until day US leaves. Some Sunnis and others will always treat US as "antibody" and cannot ever getting intelligence up to point where will stop all attacks.

--Saddam made officers read "Black Hawk Down" to try to convince them US would have to leave if major casualties.

**David Kay**

-- Iraq was actively violating accords during later 1999-2003.

--Cites Tariq Aziz as unreliable but as saying that Saddam became convinced could renew missile programs without provoking attack as long as did not matter to WMD warheads.

Were serious Iraqi missile efforts:

--Two liquid fuel efforts with 1,000 KM range.

--Two solid fuel efforts with 1,000 KM range.

--Converting SAM with 250 KM range even while UNMOVIC in action.

--Converting Silkworm anti-ship missiles to land attack missiles in two forms. Converted 11 to land attack missile and fired one at Kuwait; Worked on another version using a new Soviet engine to push range to 1,000 KM.

**Chemical:**

No evidence of weapons production. Could do Sarin in two years and Mustard in two months. Were trying to synthesize key chemical to stabilize VX for further production. Ironically, troop interviews indicate most Iraqi commanders thought other units did have chemical weapons. Still looking for chemical weapons in areas like Special Republican Guard areas.

--Found some strange things. For example, a 10,000 pound Soviet bunker buster that no Iraqi aircraft could lift and deliver.

--More detail on North Korean relations with Iraq. Paid for 1,300 KM No Dong type technology, with \$10 million down. Refused to refund when could not deliver because of US pressure, but have recently found later negotiations to buy whole missiles.

**Biological Weapons:**

--Still search for data on biological warhead design. Situation is complicated by shift of bio program from Al Hakim to Tuwaitha in 96, which fooled the UN because Tuwaitha was seen as a nuclear site at looked at by IAEA and not UNSCOM.

Located under cover of new agricultural facility. Made two generations of advances in developing dry storable power forms of Botulinum Toxin and could have applied to Anthrax. Major progress in weapons design.

**Nuclear Weapons:**

--Kay said people still misunderstand the aluminum tube issue. Never able to track overall progress in centrifuge design after 1991. Knew Iraq used aluminum tubes for rockets, but Iraq steadily upgraded specifications after 1999 for tubes that were never delivered but could be used for centrifuges. Said government that opposed war (Germany or France) blocked the shipment and warned US could be used for centrifuges.

--Did order nuclear equipment from 1999 on, but no evidence of new major facility to use it. Some real problems because one key research facility was found with all servers burned out. Only now beginning to read.

--Are getting better cooperation from Iraqi scientists, particularly in biological area. Many talking are not in detention. Some in detention are. Have names of 12 biological weapons scientists working under Taha.

--No evidence of any Iraqi effort to transfer weapons of mass destruction technology or weapons to terrorists. Only possibility was Saddam's Fedayeen, and talk only.

--Feel did seek to use Aflatoxin as a genocide weapon against Iranians and Kurds. Slow, untraceable killer. Feels tried to weaponize Ricin as more than assassination weapon because did not realize US and Russia have tried and failed.

--Kay denied reports of major transfer of his team to other missions. Said they simply did not have the expertise to take over in counterterrorism effort. Have 50 WMD case officers not useful for CT. Same true of 100 experts. 300 translators now trained to work WMD documents, not CT.

--Noted that efforts to use keywords for WMD analysis failed. Experts and translators must work together on entire document. Must rethink this aspect of intelligence analysis. Keywords are not adequate to deal with complex technical issues.

## **Notes on a Visit to the International Division and the South East Sector: November 6, 2003**

The Polish-led International Division, which covers the sector immediately south of Baghdad down to the British sector and east to the Iranian border, tends to be seen as a political symbol. A visit to the unit, however, tells a different story. It has so far been subject to only limited attacks, but it is playing a significant security role and a major role in civic action.

Its area of operations (AOR) covers an area of 400 X 220 kilometers or some 80,000 square kilometers. This includes five provinces that include such key areas as: Al Kut, Karbala, Babil, and Najf.

It is not a token unit, although it is smaller than a US division. It has some 8,234 men from 17 countries with assistance from five more. All elements use the English language, however, and communicate according to NATO rules. This gives the force considerable interoperability.

The main contingents also all come from three countries, which make up its combat elements. There are 2,378 Poles, 1,633 Ukrainians, and 1108 Spaniards, plus 459 Bulgarians. This allows each of the brigade sized combat teams to be manned by personnel from one country, which also cover different geographic areas.

Rotation times are short, however, with 3,4 or 6 month tours.

The unit is also linked to the NATO CIS, and has support from an additional 2,200 US soldiers in the sector. The US provides logistic support and transportation.

Like other combat formations, the unit sees local intelligence as critical to both its security and civil action missions. It is also dealing with a largely Shi'ite area (80 percent) versus 15% mixed, 3% Sunni and 2% other.

Unlike most regions, its intelligence branch feels the main threat comes from the outside and estimate some 500 Al Ansar and other foreign fighters mixed with FRLs.

(The unit intelligence officer is Spanish and estimated a total of 2,000 foreign volunteers in all of Iraq. This is a notably more precise and higher figure than US intelligence provided.)

The FRLs include Baath loyalists, criminal elements and some religious groups. These are called Wahhabi, largely as local slang. They actually have Salafi beliefs.

There may be some Iranians but there is no evidence. The main border problem is weapons smuggling and criminal activity.

The unit had suffered 34 attacks before a Pole was killed on November 6th. The main centers were 11 attacks in Karbala and 13 in Babil.

The unit, somewhat optimistically, described the holy cities as "stable," but it had reinforced Karbala after the violence. One problem is that key Shi'ite leaders, like Sistani, protect themselves with their own militias with CPA approval. This has its advantages, but it means they cannot be given effective coalition protection.

Sadr is seen as a problem but a declining and erratic one with more direct impact on young Shi'ites in Baghdad than the division's AOR. He has moved from Al Hillah to Al Najaf and the "Kupa" Mosque.

The key focus of the unit is civic action and the key has been the use of SERP funds, although coordination with the CPA and US civil aid has been better than in the 4th ID and 1st Armored areas. The division can provide \$100,000 for approved projects and for brigades \$50,000. Money can only go to Iraqis, although the division can provide physical help.

One key focus is to support the national CPA effort to create 300,000 jobs, with a goal of 67,000 in this AOR.

Key aid activities include restoring Iraqi self-sufficiency, power, fuel, paying conscripts and ex-Army, electricity, dinar exchanges, and removing toxic chemicals.

It is seeking to support CPA in national goal of reaching 4400 MW pre-war level and then raising 30%. The fuel situation is improving for diesel, benzene, and kerosene, but LPG is still a serious problem along with the lack of gas for power generation plants.

As is the case with the US units, the military grant of SERP funds directly to the Iraqis is far faster, more focused, and efficient than the CPA civil aid and contracting effort.

Other tasks include:

- Convoy protection
- Demining in military areas
- Storing Iraqi ammunition and destroying it.
- Armed searches, sweeps and raids. (Some very tough special forces from each country have been deployed.)
- Holding security and blocking positions.
- Unlike the US units, it has a weapons buy back program. It has recovered 58 Manpads, 1757 small arms, RPGs and mortars, and 158,094 rounds of munitions.

The unit -- like the other US and allied combat units -- benefits from the ICDC (1,500 men) and police (14,000?), plus border guards. These have been a key source of HUMINT, translation, and security assistance.

Working with local, tribal, and Shi'ite leaders and other confessions is also critical. Feel need constant contact at the local and province level. Like US units, building personal relations has taken time, but it is critical to both aid and HUMINT.

Several of the senior officers have previous experience in Iraq before the war, and a senior Polish officer held the US interests section in Iraq during 94-98.

They make an interesting point. They have found the whole structure of power is changing at the local level and in the Shi'ite community. An Iraq expert from the prewar period is no longer an Iraq expert, and now leaders continue to replace the old.

They have also found some Shi'ites that want the US to stay longer and take more time. They are deeply concerned that the schedule may be so fast that no stable government emerges and there is either confessional fighting or the Sunnis come back. They also feel that those Shi'ites who support the coalition do so in large part because they realize they will get power in elections, get massive aid, and we will then leave.

Discussions with local Shi'ites following a visit to the International Division supported this theme, although the leaders were chosen by the CPA and were clearly friendly to the US.

As is often the case, the Shi'ite clerics were very well educated, realistic, and showed considerable tolerance. This does not seem to be for political reasons. One key leader is a university head, and clearly someone who sees Iraq's future, and that of Iraqi Shi'ites, as having to be part of a much broader Arab world and global economy.

## **Notes on a Visit to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division: November 6, 2003**

The 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division covers Baghdad and the Green Zone, with over 5 million people. Along with the 4 ID, which covers the Sunni triangle. It is dealing with virtually all of the major hostile groups in Iraq and bears the brunt of most attacks. It has to defend the CPA and other key targets. The division has 88 neighborhoods, 94 military zones, and 9 city districts in its area of operations.

Explosives in the form of IEDs and vehicle bombs are a major problem, although many were very crude in design and fuzing. The UN, Jordanian Embassy, and Turkish Embassy bombs were all big, but crude, and many of the munitions did not explode.

It has dealt with 40 RPG and grenade attacks since June, as well as the rocket attacks on the Rashid, which marked the first use of an improved rocket launcher. The first attack was on 26 September, and the second on 26 November. The first attack involved a homemade multiple launch rail in the open on a stand. The second was launched from within a van. The rockets have a maximum range of about 6-7 kilometers. This makes clearing the area impossible. Some 850,000 Iraqis live in this radius.

Similar problems exist with mortars, although radar tracking radars and UAVs can be used to find the source of the firing and they are not remotely detonated. There are new improvised launchers, which consist of little more than an aluminum tray aimed in the general vicinity of the target and triggered by a gunpowder fuse.

The effect of such attacks, however, is steadily more limited as range increases because of accuracy and attacks which are not line of sight attacks are not accurate enough to matter. "Anything at over 1,000 meters is a bottle rocket and they can hit a specific target." The attackers do, however, have truck mounted 60 mm mortars, although these as yet lack the skill to properly register them and use them accurately. As a result, it is using UAVs, photo images, and computer models to track line of sight lines against key targets and either watch them or block access.

The unit estimates some small elements of Al Ansar and Al Qaida may be present but that virtually all of the active threat consists of FRLs.

--No estimate of numbers. "A bit tired of visitors pressing us for guesses, getting numbers, and then being surprised when they are not accurate." (Unit officers seemed equally tired of "senior officials" in US making statements with no real intelligence justification.)

--Divided up in to trigger pullers, financiers, and command. Only the trigger pullers and intermediates ever expose selves. Command level stays at distance.

--Best estimate of total is few percent of population even in worst areas like Fallujah. Many Iraqis stand aside, dislike or distrust us, but percentage of active hostiles is very small.

--FRLs have mixed motives, pro-Saddam, pro-Ba'ath, nationalist, Sunnis fearing loss of previous status to Shi'ites, tribal motives, FRL-Islamist views combined. No real profile as yet. Captured FRLs real mix of motives and attitudes.

--FRLs do have likely at least 8 cells in the city of Baghdad, with strength of about 25 each for a total of well over 2000. Find cells actively recruiting and paying youth. Hope is closing in.

The division did not find an FRL complex between Al Fallujah and Baghdad as originally thought existed.

It feels that foreigners were responsible for the 5 car/vehicle bomb suicide attacks, but the data are uncertain. It bases its conclusion that all of the teams in the suicide attackers were foreign on the capture of one foreigner – whose attack may have been designed to be a delayed detonation – and the assumption that suicide attacks go against the Iraqi character. All of the four successful vehicle bombs also used PE-4 and more sophisticated triggers, although intelligence knows that FRLs have extensive stocks of such equipment as well as the cruder mix of blast triggers and regular ordnance they have generally used.

The size of the foreign forces are thought to be less than 50, plus the 20 already arrested. Have found two safehouses tied to Al Ansar, although there is no evidence of any links between Al Ansar and Al Qaida. Very few foreigners seem to be operating in the Baghdad area, and those that do often entered before the war. They are a mix of Egyptians, Yemenis, and Syrians, plus other countries. “There is no evidence of any Iranian activity to support terrorism or hostility to the US.”

It feels the momentum is in its favor in spite of the recent increase in attacks. The HUMINT situation greatly improved once Uday and Qusay were killed. It has also had success in changing its patrol tactics. These now mix dismounted patrols, US only movement, and joint patrols with the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which has proved to be a major help in dealing with the threat.

Crime and looting is down by 40% since the Iraqi police deployed, which is also important because many criminals seem to have been hired out to FRLs in conducting attacks, along with poor and unemployed Iraqi youths.

If one compares the trend for July, August, September, and October, one gets the following patterns per type of crime:

--Total: 1763, 1094, 1235, 909

--Murder: 92, 75, 54, 24

--Assault: 135, 118, 90, 40

--Kidnapping: 29, 28, 27, 11

--Burglary: 202, 128, 126, 60

--Carjacking: 196, 189, 187, 61.

--Estimates of the payment for attacks have risen from \$25-100 to \$100-\$500. (US experts disagree sharply on how much). Intelligence cannot confirm bonus payments for successful attacks. The money seems to come exclusively from FRL sources.

The unit feels, however, that there is no chance of ever stopping all attacks. The sheer area and fact the city has 5.6 million people mean that even if the hearts and minds can largely be won, it will always be possible for small cadres to fire a mortar or rocket or set off a bomb.

Similar to all of the officers and commanders interviewed, the unit also made it clear that they can never secure the borders. Turkey is not a problem, but much of the Iranian border is wide open. The Saudi and Kuwaiti borders have many crossing areas, as does Syria. Can find vehicles or major movements much of time, but some infiltration will always occur and can never tell a Jihadist from any other Arab moving in and out of the country. Deploying troops for perfect border security is as pointless as trying to block immigration from Mexico to US.

The unit also recognizes that the threat could grow:

--Some 300 arms caches were known to be in the AOR as of 1 May. The number has risen to 2100. At least 3 are known to still be concealed.

--Light artillery and many multiple rocket launchers with calibration for accurate long distance fire have never been accounted for. One 1007 mm rocket has been found versus the 81`mm rockets used to date, and many 12mm rockets are scattered throughout the country.

--Bombs can get larger and larger and the hostiles are learning better fusing techniques.

--One 120mm mortar attack has taken place and long-range heavier mortars would be far more accurate if the attackers learned how to survey and register them to hit specific buildings.

--There are many surface to air missiles unaccounted for, including 5 models of light manportable and vehicle mounted systems in addition to the basic SA-7.

--Hostile forces are improving their own intelligence networks and penetration of US and allied facilities using Iraqi nationals. Vetting will always leave gaps, and many service personnel cannot be vetted.

--The city has to move and live and Americans have to be able to work in constant with Iraqis.

The unit has taken 32 KIAs and 400 WIAs since June. It has killed 16 civilians, including a mistaken attack on 5 Iraqi police.

Morale is mixed. The division commander notes the Stars and Stripes survey occurred in mid August with temperatures of 130 degrees and many elements without proper or air conditioned quarters and no rotation date. Soldiers and officers all still see the lack of any clear or convincing departure date as a major problem and reason for not reupping. At the same time, combat forces have high mission morale. Casualties seem to create mission dedication, not fear, isolation from the population, or a lack of aggressiveness.

The unit was not trained or equipped for the mission when it arrived. It did not have vests or uparmored HUMVESS, and other special mission equipment. It is still short 52 vests and 2,000 plates for the vests, but got 200 uparmored HUMVEEs in the last 60 days. It would like to have Strykers because the Bradleys and M-1s are too heavy and vision limited for some missions.

The division has had to change its whole operating style after 20 years of focusing on fighting conventional heavy forces. It has had to develop HUMINT procedures and turn away from reliance on technical intelligence sources. Even now it needs twice as many HUMINT teams as it has.

The problem is the Army as a whole does not have the MPs, civil action, intelligence, and trained counterinsurgency assets it needs. The commander feels this illustrates the fact that the Army may need more men to reduce the burden of overdeployment and get rotations back in line but more troops on the ground are not needed. Quality, not quantity is the problem and the shortages are in skilled assault teams, MPs, intelligence analysts and translators – already have manpower can not use because of their lack of skills and training. They do not need more people to sit and complain.

Glad Turks not coming. Feel would have been nothing but problem anywhere in Iraq, not just north. Feel no other Muslim country is going to make life easier. Troops would be seen are worse than US, second-raters with their own agenda whose use would be an

affront to Iraqi dignity. Already have Iraqi ex-soldiers they can trust going into police, ICDC, and new Army. Nothing was organized after the war to build upon.

Tactics have also changed since it deployed. The unit has gone from protection and defense to an emphasis on offense. It was covering 24 bases or defensive points in June, with 56% of the force in guard roles. These bases have been cut to 6 to concentrate on offensive sweeps and patrols.

The coming of the Iraqi police has been invaluable. There are 7,000 now in Baghdad and the greater city area needs 19,200. Hope there will be 17,000 when the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division replaces the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division.

The unit feels that intelligence is the key to success. It was slow to fully organize and create suitable data bases, learn how to run sources, find out what sources were reliable and what sources work. A lack of translators and trained intelligence personnel was and is a problem. Took 6 months to organize, but now feel are making major progress and can often confirm targets for focused attacks with multiple reliable sources. "Improved HUMINT is a function of trust and proven relationships, not more troops."

There is a flood of intelligence coming in from the Iraqi people and it is now able to sort it out and use it much more quickly. Can now get complete input from local government, religious figures, and tribal leaders, and now know who really has influence and who is reliable. The intelligence relied on for sweeps, searches and attacks now is about 80% reliable, although multiple visits and attacks are sometimes necessary to act upon it. The number of attacks in Baghdad is not going up. This is happening only in Fallujah in the division's AOR.

The division commander stressed, however, that the reaction of Iraqis is already one of "descending consent." Even when they win the hearts and minds—it is not open ended. It is clear that the US must make it clear it will leave and then do it. The US cannot stay. The more time elapses, the more Iraqis will turn against the US. Feel the US has a year maximum in Baghdad to accomplish its mission and leave.

One of the key initial problems was a lack of any clear information operations strategy to reach out to the Iraqi people. It has since brought in Iraqis to create improvised PAO units, and made an active effort to reach out to the Iraqi press.

In contrast, the directly military grant aid program to the Iraqis – SERP funds can only be paid directly to Iraqis – it has been invaluable. The ability to work together to do immediate aid programs and use money in targeted way to influence key groups and problem areas has been critical – "Dollars are better than bullets." One key problem is that they have run out of money for new projects and will not get more until money arrives with supplements in January. Like other commanders, the division commander felt providing such funds ASAP was far more important than more troops.

Here the civil aid program has not been anywhere near as effective as it has shown to be. Coordination between the civil and military aid program is not effective, and the civil program is slow, relies on US contractors, takes time, and is fielded far too slowly. Do not see sufficient civilian aid personnel in the field in hostile areas.

A separate visit to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade raised similar themes. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade of the 1st Division alone covers central Baghdad, including Sunni blue collar and Shi'ite slum areas, and the university are in the center, and Tuwaitha, with well over 750,000 Iraqis in its area, which it must cover with around 5,000 people. It has a tank battalion and two infantry battalions: the equivalent of 8 combat teams. It currently conducts some 5-8 combat raids a week.

It finds that most of the Iraqis in its area do not split along Sunni and Shi'ite lines and are highly nationalistic. It finds the main point of interface with the Iraqis to be tribal leaders, which often cut across religious lines. These leaders have change significantly since the early 1990s, and even since the war, and one lesson is that area expertise based on the past turns out to have limited operational value in an unstable present.

The nationalism in the area makes it very difficult for foreigners to operate, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade has not found foreign volunteers to be a major problem but they do seem to have been responsible for the attacks on the Al Rashid. There are, significant numbers of Former Regime Loyalists and criminals freed during the fall of the regime, and the unit faces a variety of attacks. The Aub Ghareeb area in the west is particularly dangerous because many young Sunnis work on weapons plants in the area and they are now out of work.

## **A Visit to the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division/Taskforce Ironhorse—November 6, 2003**

### **Part One: General Observations**

As a preface to this report, I should note that flying into Tikrit on a Blackhawk is an experience in itself. The flight profile is a low altitude, high-speed dash, avoiding roads and populated areas, until the outskirts of Tikrit, when the helicopter must slow down and fly a more predictable path.

The helipad is near the 4th ID HQ, located near one of Saddam's grandiose places – reportedly one where he stayed all of one night, with its own compound and large enough so a bridge is needed between the various sections.

The end result is both an insight to the scale of Saddam's tyranny and ambitions – like most palaces it was built after 1991 – and a feeling on entering a combat zone. Unlike Mosul and Babil, or even the airport at Baghdad, the helicopter flight gives a real impression of the risks being run by the troops and real war fighters – a risk illustrated by the fact a similar helicopter was forced down the next day.

The visit to the 4th ID command post also came after visiting three other military headquarters, plus the CPA, and reinforced several impression that I should probably summarize at the outset:

1. The impression sometimes comes out of media reporting that the US and its allies are static in tactics, isolated from the Iraqis, and being limited to their compounds. Nothing is further from the truth. The 4th ID provided more unclassified statistics than other units, but it is clear that major outreach efforts go on in all units, that the Iraqi police and ICDC do provide useful new sources of HUMINT, that aggressive local contacts and civil action programs are underway in all of the areas visited, and that new tactics and equipment are the rule and not the exception. They also vary by AOR and threat mix. This is an adaptive war where unit commanders have considerable flexibility and make use of it.

2. Everyone agrees that intelligence is a critical problem. Steadily better organization is underway. A major shift from technical intelligence to working HUMINT has largely been accomplished, although supported by UAVs, SIGINT, helis, and fixed wing aircraft.

In each area, local networks have been established, sources are now computerized on history and reliability, there is a large and continuing amount of input, and most raids and actions are based on multiple sources and payoff – although often after multiple attempts. The strikes are focused, rather than general, and tailored to limit provocation with well-defined ROEs. No one is perfect, and there are always mistakes. Claims of 90% success rates in using validated multiple source HUMINT are too high, but 70-80% with really good data may be fair.

Yet, everyone agrees that there is a serious shortage of analysts and translators, and that the entire intelligence team has had to retrain, reorganize, and reequip in place to focus

on HUMINT and low intensity combat, and not on technical intelligence and heavy weapons. As a rough rule of thumb, the US has only about half the translators and intelligence specialists it needs, but has no reserves of qualified personnel. They are being created in combat.

Everyone hopes that deploying Iraqis will help fix this situation. There may be too much optimism about the ICDC, police, and Iraqi Army in terms of loyalty, reliability, and capability, but it is clear that the US can't turn to foreign countries for what it needs most: local area experts who can reinforce the intelligence and operational effort.

At the same time, there is no world of illusions here. One only has to look closely at the faces of the intelligence experts when one asks the usual questions about exactly who the FRL, Iraqi Islamist, and foreign opposition are, how many there are, who is directing what, sources of money, and the hunt for Saddam.

The truth is that a lot of information is flowing but there are no certain answers – except that every officer we talked to felt that any direction of the FRLs came from loose coordination of regional cadres, that Saddam and the ex-senior leadership were hiding and not in charge, and that the “foreign” and Islamist threat was so far minor compared to the FRLs, Iraqi volunteers, paid attackers, and criminals working for and with them.

I also have to say that working intelligence officers seem sick and tired of the facile generalizations being attributed to senior officials, and efforts to tie the threat to outside political agendas for dealing with Al Qaida, Iran, Syria, etc. They feel they are working on an evolving local threat with some outside presence, and one whose leadership and direction can survive because it is dispersed, in many cells, diverse, and now uses others to take risks and carry out the attacks.

3. No one feels there can be any early end to attacks, casualties, and sabotage. They see the present LIC as likely to continue in some form until the US departs. They fully realize that as the US and its allies improve, so will the threat, and it can turn to larger car bombs, more use of SAMs, longer range mortars, better rockets, and use improvements in their intelligence to improve sabotage.

The effort is to contain and reduce the threat, not eliminate it, and the focus is as much on hearts and minds as fighting and HUMINT. The civic action program, local liaison, Iraqification of security, and above all the SERP aid program are also seen as absolutely critical.

There may be a problem with the CPA civilian aid effort. It is far from clear that it is as yet focus ed on what Iraqis want, what impacts most on Iraqi perceptions, and the needs in high threat areas or that the civilian aid program is seen in time urgent terms and that measuring its effectiveness day-to-day in terms of local Iraqi perceptions has a suitable priority. The US military tend to be over polite, wince, or laugh when asked about this aspect of the struggle. Admittedly they have their own biases, but it is clear that they see the SERP funds as a tool as good as any weapon, and working with local tribal, urban,

and sectarian leaders as critical.

4. There is a general feeling that things are getting better, and that the US will “win” to the extent of containing and localizing the threat – although never in eliminating attacks and casualties. There is no false optimism here, however, and all of those interviewed see risks and uncertainties. No one talks about early victory, or rotating out and leaving a peaceful area to their successor.

Victory is seen in relative terms: allowing the aid program and nation building to catch hold, allowing Iraqi ICDC and police to take over in most areas, allowing the CPA to work out a new government. There is a good understanding that hearts and minds means tolerance and not love, and is dependent on departure in 2004 and 2005. No officer felt the US could or should stay unless in a very limited form and at the invitation of a new government. Victory is also seen as something that will always have some new attacks hitting the press. This tracks well, incidentally, with the goals set by CPA. There is now civil-military split on goals and timing in the theater, although some may be much more ambitious in the US.

5. Only one officer interviewed privately called for more troops in Iraq. Every other officer either privately or during briefings talked about quality and the need for better training, better intelligence, more MPs, more translators, more rapid delivery of key equipment, and immediate available of SERP aid money.

Behind all of this, however, is the broader problem of morale. No one I talked to, officer or enlisted, objected to the risk or the mission, although the US could do a much better job of explaining its goals to the troops, and why their mission is needed. The problem is not fear, risk, or casualties. There are soldiers, not unformed bureaucrats, and the risk is accepted.

The key problem is rather overdeployment and a total inability to plan a life. Officers and soldiers alike feel they are overstretched, deployed too long and too often, and have no way to explain to their families when they are coming back or why so many delays occur. This may ease with time under current deployment schedules, but the general impression one gets is that reenlistments are going to be a massive problem simply because US forces as a whole are too small to limit the strain on deployments.

The National Guard and reserves are particularly stressed on these lines, and there is a separate problem. Rightly or wrongly, they feel they don't get the same quarters, protection, and equipment.

The key point I would make, however, is that this is not a disheartened or unmotivated force for this mission, or a casualty or risk adverse one. It is a force that feels it is being overstretched, and treated badly in terms of rotations and career conditions.

6. Finally a point about winning or losing. On paper we are winning in spite of the successful attacks. The frequency and impact of attacks may be up but so are the US and allied raids, seizures, and impact on local areas. At present, serious combat remains limited to the Sunni triangle and Baghdad, although attacks do take place in other areas.

If the war remains limited largely to FRLs, we will probably win to the extent we can accomplish much of the aid and rebuilding effort, secure most areas most of the time, and allow a new Iraqi government to takeover.

The US and allied military, however, cannot control the other risks that could lead to defeat:

--A Shi'ite leader emerging that turned the Shi'ites largely hostile. This would be like losing the Buddhists in Vietnam. It would mean losing the war (Here far too much now rests on the support and survival of older clerics like Sistani and the US may be counting Sadr out too soon).

--The failure of the Governing Council and Iraqis to take effective control over their own destiny.

--Serious ethnic divisions and beneath the surface, there are rural problems with Kurdish expulsion of Arabs and serious Sunni and Shi'ite tensions over the shift of power and wealth to the Shi'ites.

--A major religious crisis in which the US made a major mistake in a Shrine area or somehow gave the Islamists ammunition in charging it was anti-Islamic.

Here one point is clear. US information operations remain crude and inadequate. Radio and TV coverage are better, but it is unclear who in Iraq really cares. The US backed paper gets read from intelligence on the CPA and contracts, but its credibility is uncertain. So far, most information comes from hostile Arab sources.

Moreover, the problem no one really seems to want to address is the Iraqi perception that the US uncritically backs Israel and has strong anti-Islamic elements, and that Iraqis see constant images of Israelis attacking Palestinians on Arab satellite TV.

These images are compounded by the CPA, which has no observable charisma, and is divided and slow to react in pushing forward with the constitutional effort, elections, and a clear picture of Iraq's future. Like the problems in the way the CPA seems to focus aid and communicate locally, the information battle is a weak link.

## **A Visit to the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division/Taskforce Ironhorse—November 6, 2003 Part Two: Fighting and Nation Building in the Sunni Triangle**

I write this memo with some sadness, knowing other Americans died in a helicopter flight a day after my visit. At the same time, the 4th ID has a powerful story to tell, and most of it is positive.

Task Force Ironhorse, with the 4th ID at its core, bears the brunt of the present war fighting, along with the 1st Armored Division.

It covers the Sunni triangle and the area from Kirkuk to the north of Baghdad. It has to cover part of the Iranian and Syrian border, but the main threat areas are the Sunni portion of Mosul (1/3 of the population) and the Sunni towns of Huwayiat, Bayji, Tikrit, Ar Dawa, Samarra, Balad south to Baghdad, and Mansur (Not really much of a triangle on a map.)

It has been engaged in combat almost since the defeat of Saddam's conventional forces. The intensity of combat is indicated by the chronology of major operations:

- Operation Peninsula Strike - 8-15 June
- Operation Desert Scorpion - 15-29 June: 56 initial raids rising to total of 87
- Operation Sidewinder: 29 June-5 July 33 initial raids followed by attacks on 29 major targets
- Operation Ivy Serpent - 12-17 July - 89 raids.
- Operation Ivy Needle - 11 Aug- 9 Sept - 182 raids, 11,590 coalition only patrols, 2,285 joint patrols with Iraqis. 373 flash checkpoints, 905 static checkpoints. Hit 109 targets, capture 965 detainees, and find 5 IRD bomb makers and 6 financiers. Weapons seizures include 4 howitzers, 84 mortars, 199 rockets, 115 RPGs, 5 IEDs and 3 kits.
- Operation Ivy Focus - underway since 10 September - Reflects both intensive operations and a shift to tactics suited to a prolonged LIC effort:

Focused raids to eliminate mid-level organizers, financiers, and other non-compliant forces.

IPB driven counter mortar and IED ambushes.

Focused recce and counter-recce along Corps/Division/BDE<SRS.

Continuous engagement with key civic, religious, and tribal leaders.

Continue investment to improve basic infrastructure and basic life services and create jobs.

Train, employ, and equip Iraqi national police, ICVDC, and Border Guards to protect key infrastructure (oil, power) and urban areas and the Iranian border.

Identify, seize and destroy enemy munitions.

The division feels that Ivy Focus describes the way ahead. It stresses that far more is involved than military operations, and there have been 857 engagement meetings with local and tribal leaders and a constant process of contact. Civil-military action is seen as just as critical as military operations, and the division has steadily strengthened its civil military operations effort, created an operations center, a project coordination cell, a division plans cell, and an "Effects Coordination Cell." The latter is of major importance because projects are chosen to have the maximum political and military impact, and are constantly monitored to see they are carried out and determine their local political effect.

The aid efforts to date include joint work with the Iraqis, which now include 2,596 ICDC, 8,461 new police, and 1,203 border police plus new units of the Army. They include interim government activity, including some elections and multi-ethnic participation in provincial and local councils plus the selection of provincial governments. The figures for Iraqis required, recruited and hired, in training and training are:

--Border Police: 1372, 1203, --, 1,203  
--Iraqi police: 15,601, 8461, 217, 1502  
--ICDC: 8,834, 3,933, 797, 2812.

The Iraqi CDCan police now have begun to respond to threats on their own, the Border Patrol is intercepting illegal crossers, courts are trying and jailing criminals.

The first Iraqi Army battalion with 41 offices and 649 other ranks is coming on line with four rifle companies with 6/112 men each, and 17/201 headquarters and service personnel. It will begin joint field training with US forces at the platoon level in December and move to the battalion level, with scheduled completion of operational experience in early May.

Leaders and sheiks are constantly engaged as well, courts are refurbished, and the Iraqis now review provincial budgets. (It was pointed out to me that outside expertise proved useless in determining who was really a local leader or tribal leader in many cases. As a result, the 4th ID held local and provincial meetings, and saw who was respected and took charge. One key indicator was who stayed in the front row. "You can't get intelligence or area expertise at this level. You have to develop it in the field.")

New styles of government are being created. Kirkuk has an Interim Government which splits all senior jobs along ethnic lines and an interim council with a Turkoman Chairman (the governor is a Kurd) and members along such lines: 6 Kurds, 6 Turks, 6 Assyrians, 6 Arabs, and 6 independents appointed by their commander of Task Force Ironhorse (4th ID.)

The military has provided aid to 480 schools, and created a model school program with 40 schools as candidates. They are creating youth centers, sports programs and computer training centers. Delegates selected the Interim Council which chose the governor, deputy

governor, and three assistant governors so that all ethnic groups were represented.

The military is also working to create social service initiatives like Women's Rights Councils, Religious site engagement initiatives, employment centers with a goal of 30,000 jobs, and an NGO recruit and housing initiative.

Civil-military infrastructure goals and progress include major increases in radio stations and repeaters and TV, newspapers, Internet cafes, etc. There is now radio and TV coverage of virtually all of the populated AOR.

Power generation is up 300%, 25 water projects have been started, and 8 sewage projects. Medical refurbishment is complete for 96% of the hospitals and 95% of the clinics and a nation immunization day has been held. In addition, targeted initiatives have been held in a largely unscathed Kirkuk for a rail/airport initiative, business symposiums, and creation of a comprehensive local economic plan.

At the same time, the ops tempo is now way up: 361 raids, 21,877 coalition only patrols, 3504 joint patrols, 2653 static checkpoints, 1919 flash check points, 843 ambushes. There have been 231 targets and 1634 detainees, finding 46 IED bombmakers, 6 financiers, and 201 IEDs \*(91 disarmed.) Massive seizures of ammunition continue.

The 4th ID does, however, face risks anywhere in its AOR south of the "ethnic dividing line" along the first major ridge/mountain line south of Kirkuk where the population is largely Sunni and virtually every town in this area has had enough incidents to qualify as some kind of hot spot.

To put the aid effort in perspective, as of November 3, there were 2012 aid projects underway in the AOR, 1,063 completions. The aid effort, however, is just beginning to take hold. Only \$18.4 million of \$139.8 million worth of projects begun has been spent. This is a key point, since most of the hearts and minds impact of aid is only beginning to have an effect. The major projects were national aid (\$91 million). CPA had started \$5.1 million worth, OHD/CPA \$1.1 million, Bechtel \$5.2 million (3 projects with 0 completions), and NGOs \$4.2 million.

The civil military CERP programs have, however, had a major impact already and all of the money goes directly to Iraqis. A total of 70 projects have been started at the central command level, with a total value of \$8.1 million and 43 completions and \$4.9 million spent. The brigade level projects total 1740 out of 2012, with a value of \$24.8 million; 947 have been completed and \$11.2 million spent out of a total spent for all aid of \$18.4 million.

This too is a critical point and lesson for the future. The civilian aid program at best is far too slow and cumbersome for hearts and minds and unfocused in terms of security and local objectives. If the military had not have major CERP funds, and spent them quickly, it seems almost certain than Iraqi hostility would today be far greater and the civil aid program and nation building effort would never have had time to take hold. The military

may not like armed nation building, but it seems clear that it is the most vital aspect of the aid effort in asymmetric wars and it seems unlikely that civil or contractor efforts can ever be a substitute.

## **A Visit to the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division/Taskforce Ironhorse–November 6, 2003**

### **Part Three: Combat and Intelligence Details**

The previous parts of this three part memo have summarized the overall military situation in Iraq, and the formal data on the operations of Task Force Ironhorse and the 4th Infantry Division. This memo highlights the points raised by US officers during briefings and discussions to the area.

The reader should be aware that as with all trip reports, no verbatim record exists. All mistakes and politically insensitive comments are the result of the author's mistakes and inadequacies and not of what was actually said during the briefing.

#### 1. The Ethnic Politics of the Region

There is a sharp ethnic fault line between the Kurds and mixed areas in the north and the largely Sunni areas in to the south of the ridge line that slants to the southeast south of Kirkuk.

So far the Kurds have avoided overt ethnic clashes but there is severe tension over the "return" of Kurdish property. The largely Sunni areas can see the risk of a major shift in power to the Kurds and Shi'ites, but the political impact may be exaggerated. So far, they have other issues, both local and in terms of nationalist concerns over the occupation.

One example of a local issue is Tikrit. Samarra was the traditional power center. With Saddam gone, it is far from clear what role Tikrit has or how it will ever get anything like its past funding, although it might become a university town.

No problems with Assyrians and Christians. Have learned to keep low profile, avoid provocation.

#### 2. The Military Situation

There are some 10 raids a day.

Made 23 raids in the last 4 days (end 5 November) and sought 44 individuals and caught 33.

IEDs represent the greatest threat although can now find 33-50% before detonated. Random mortars are a problem but rarely hit anything. Can see, however, the same shift to standoff attacks as in other areas, and rocket/mortar threat to come.

#### 3. The 4th ID Heavy and Technology

The 4th ID would like more uparmored HUMVEEs and looks forward to deployment of the Stryker. Tanks are too heavy in many areas, and the Bradley has its limits. However, the heavy division has unique self-protection and the digital networks and displays in its

vehicles and command centers are invaluable. Can precisely map locations towns and cities, know location of every unit, and show location of hostiles and sensitive areas. The all digital force allows far more secure and focused raids and quicker response, as well as better fusion of threat and friendly data and combined arms/joint operations.

Knowing exact locations in towns like Tikrit, Baqubas, and Samarra is of great value and works well with HUMINT to allow quick and precise reactions.

The 4th ID is also the only unit with UAVs integrated at the brigade level and on call to the brigade commander in real time. This has been vital and the data can be interpreted along with the digital location data.

The real time tasking of the UAVs has “flown the wings off” and they are used very night.

The training to use heavy weapons in urban areas before the war also has proved to be vital. Tanks and APCs are not the answer to every urban problem but they can be of immense use if they have digital netting and situational awareness.

The UAVs also work well with mortar locating radars and helicopters. Fusion provided tools for day and night warfare.

The only real problem has been integrating a non-digital 173rd Airborne unit into a digital force.

“We’re a bit sick and tired of the claim you need light forces for LIC. How many of our capabilities can LIC units perform and how many casualties are you willing to accept. What you need is the right partnership and force mix. ”

Do need more UAVs, uparmored HUMVEES, assistance in intelligence training, and computer support of HUMINT records and analysis. Look forward to Stryker brigade’s arrival next month, M-1 is too big for cities. Bradley has some of similar limits. HUMVEEs too light on armor and firepower even if uparmored and gunned.

#### 4. The AOR Threat

Almost all of the threat is local FRLs. All claim, however, that the threat is foreign. Getting a lot of misinformation about foreign attackers. Al Ansar, Al Qaida, etc., trying to shift our focus. Some of the latter threat is real, but HUMINT is always a mixed bag.

Some 70-80% of those captured to date are paid attackers, many criminals freed by Saddam before the collapse. Prices vary sharply but now some \$150 to \$500. Criminal element and private gain are key motives for FRLs.

No evidence of any Al Qaida action. Cannot confirm Al Ansaar activity. No signs of problems with Iranians, but foreigners are coming in through Mosul and across Iranian

border.

Mohammad's Army is present but seems to be an FRL cover and not truly Islamists. FRLs keep using new names to make selves look different, create false flags, image of being Islamic or Arab.

Threat tactics have evolved:

--June: Were direct fire, but they found could not compete against our night and thermal sights, protection and firepower.

--July: Moved back in distance. Used RPGs. We attacked into them and rush them. They couldn't survive.

--August: Shifted to IEDs and used everything in sight. Mixes of C-4 and with good triggers and crude efforts with 6,155mm rounds badly linked together.

--Since then: Have added mortars and rockets but IEDs are key. Found 55 IEDs in the last week, but found 19 before set off, many with Iraqi help. Detonated 26.

--See 43 mortar and rocket attacks in the last week. So far crude and poorly aimed. Lost one HUMVEE but no casualties.

--ICDCs and Border Patrol of great help.

Do estimate threat will improve in tactics, skill, and intelligence over time. Feel will conduct fewer but better planned attacks, make more use of foreign fighters and experienced cadres.

See future threat will use MANPADs, artillery, heavier mortars, more sophisticated and larger IEDs and vehicle bombs, multiple and single rocket launchers can aim, possibly mines and ATGMs can all expand the range of threat attacks and will learn to make more accurate. Cannot ever stop their intelligence from improving as well, although our intelligence networks are getting steadily better.

Mortar locating radars and UAVs will get steadily more important with time.

Do not know where talk of Saddam, Ibrahim and/or Al Douri being in charge came from. Feel Saddam is moving constantly, relying on tribal contacts, and constant change of houses and cars. Are doing random checks.

##### 5. More Troops.

No. This is not the issue. Do need quality in some areas, but ICDC, Iraqi police, Army and Border Guards will give manpower strength as well as language skills and HUMINT, area expertise.

More Americans are not the answer and neither are new foreign contingents. The Iraqi police will be the key to urban security, and making good use of 1,20 Iraqi border police.

## 6. Intelligence

Technology helps but everything boils down to HUMINT. Have had to reorganize around 3-4 man Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs). These have 1-2 intelligence specialists and translator. Do have a shortage of analysts. Can only field half of the THTs would like.

Do, however, have threat analysis now on every link, and going down to battalion level. Multisource where possible and computerized down to individual. Can call up at battalion level in real time.

A-10 and AC-130 provide imagery and fire powers support. Have two battalions of AH-64s per brigade. Often pick up air support in real time. Are fighting joint operation, and LIC is scarcely ground only.

Sheer volume of HUMINT is not a problem. Get flood of data from Iraqis. Have also learned to sort out the intertribal efforts to use us to attack others, and similar problems. Have also learned to keep source through end of raid. Have been attempts to set up for false raids, provocative or ambushes, and holding on to source helps.

Need to remember here that every raid cannot be a winner. Targets move, etc. But if information is correct, coming back pays off or produces leads that help in the future. Much also is now done at night. Reduces impact on innocent, targets less prepared.

Gradually have developed solid networks of proven informers and ability to use them to get multiple sources. Now really on [proven sources, multiple data, and can judge plausibility much better. Success rate near 80%, although often have to repeat raids until target actually present.

Have set a goal of two hours from information to attack. There or close.

Police HQs very helpful. Do have US intelligence liaison at most.

Also getting far more walk-ins since May: volunteer, seek payment, or want influence. Believe would go way up if Saddam taken as well as sons.

Must note, however, translators are as important as analysts. Have never had enough high quality US translators and cannot acquire enough vetted locals or use in some roles. Still have only one Category 4 translator per battalion.

Simply cannot handle all material gathering. Tend to be slower in dealing with new or unproven sources because do not have enough of both translators and linguists to deal with full flow of information.

Rotation may be a problem but will be overlap, clear records, all computerized. Hope can avoid short tour and rotation problems of Vietnam.

#### 7. MPs

Have proven invaluable for operations and training Iraqis. Need far more. Key element of asymmetric warfare.

#### 8. Changes in US Tactics:

(See summary in part two)

Keys are more focused raids based on better HUMINT and reaction times and emphasis on local engagement: See 857 such meetings with local officials and dignitaries between September 10 and November 1.

Ramadan did lead to step up in attacks on US during first two days, but then slack off. One key tactic is educating troops in sensitivity to Ramadan, local customs, altering profile of action to suit local customs and concerns.

#### 9. Aid: Dollars are Bullets

The CERP program is absolutely critical, as is civil military action. Cannot fight in asymmetric wars without aid and money as tools.

Another key is the Effects Coordination Cell. Aid must be targeted to local military and political efforts, given in ways that really help with hearts and minds and influence, and effects must be validated to make sure are lasting and meet local needs.

Seriously doubt, however, can really rebuild country before leave. Dealing with 15-20 years of cannibalization, lack of maintenance, and lack of training. Can make a start but should not assume can fix a nation. See far too many Iraqis passive or not communicate. Find regional power distribution company not talk to local. Caused serious power problems while one waited for equipment other already had. Ultimately up to Iraqis.

Lack of CERP funds is an issue. Local CPA rep good, but in general civilian aid is poorly coordinated with local security needs, lacks analysis of effectiveness.

#### 10. Role of Iraqi Force

Very careful to recruit and use intertribal council as key source. If a local leader vets a volunteer then some chain of history as well as responsibility.

All eight tribes in AOR involved and represented in proportion to size. Serves a number

of other purposes and clear understanding that if create a problem, other tribe gets the money and influence. Have found knowledge of tribes and clans to be critical to HUMINT and focus of aid efforts.

--Worked well in Afghanistan and are transferring techniques. Have special forces experts from Afghanistan helping. Using local Sheiks to help guard pipelines. Hiring their poorer young men gives them influence and helps make support us.

--Tikrit tribal leaders do, however, remain hostile as do young men. No way to convince them and other towns/men that got maximum benefit from Saddam that new regime will ever offer same privileges.

Have found very valuable and that working jointly with US forces in field makes up for lack of formal training time. ICDC, for example, training 10-14 days but then works with US in field before put on own.

Police problem is cultural. Lack of patrols, investigative skills, concern for civil rights. Shortened training is a problem, but again see working with US counterparts is key. Here really do need more MPs.

New Army will help overtime, and trying to field 27 BNs by September 2004, with first coming on line. On holiday for Ramadan but first unit will start field deployments and working with US units once over. Hope first BN operational on by June 2004.

Do have outreach to former generals and colonels. Try to bring into local government, consult. No old Iraqi Army to use or rebuild but not want to isolate part leaders and have them feel no option but opposition.

#### 11. Outreach Efforts

Major problem but physical radio, TV, and press facilities much better, and beginning to have clear themes, concerted effort to explain aid and plans for new government.