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IRAQ WHAT NEXT? CONTAINING SADDAM IS THE MOST LIKELY U.S. POLICY
Richard N. Haass,
The San Diego Union-Tribune
1 March 1998
Once again, it appears that an armed confrontation between Iraq and the international community has been averted. This outcome should not be confused with a resolution, however, for in fact little is resolved. The United States and the world community will continue to face an Iraq headed by Saddam Hussein who possesses some weapons of mass destruction.
What should be done?
For the immediate future, we should take advantage of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf region being at a post-Desert Storm high. The United States should test Saddam's willingness to live up to his latest agreement. This requires that the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency undertake an aggressive series of inspections. Any frustration of international inspectors should be met with a robust military response. No more warnings are required or warranted.
Any materials associated with weapons of mass destruction that are uncovered by UNSCOM, the IAEA, or the newly configured "Special Group" should be destroyed or rendered harmless. This said, it is quite possible that inspectors will find nothing given that Saddam Hussein has now had an additional four months to conceal production capabilities, weapons, or both. Thus, even a clean bill of health from the United Nations would not constitute a guarantee that Saddam possessed no weapons of mass destruction. Nor would it preclude his threatening his neighbors with conventional military attack or terrorism or violating any of his many other commitments.
As a result, the question arises: What should constitute the long-term policy of the United States toward Saddam Hussein and Iraq?
There are two very different paths to choose from, keeping in mind that there are variations of each. One approach -- rollback -- would seek to bring about Saddam Hussein's removal from power, be it by assassination, providing support to Iraqi opposition elements, or by taking control of the country. The second approach available to the United States can best be described as containment.
The case for rollback is straightforward; namely, that containing Saddam is likely to prove difficult, eliminating his weapons of mass destruction virtually impossible. In principle, rollback solves the problem of contemporary Iraq by getting rid of the person who is at its core.
Is assassination, as some have suggested, an option?
The short answer is "no." As Fidel Castro's continued rule suggests, it tends to be difficult to carry out. Moreover, assassination raises a host of legal, moral and political problems. An Executive Order continues in force that precludes assassination. Any change in this order would set off a major domestic and international debate that would damage the reputation of the United States. In addition, we need to think twice before weakening this norm for more practical reasons. The United States is the most open society in the world. We are as a result highly vulnerable to assassination and retaliation ourselves.
A second version of rollback would borrow from the experience in Afghanistan. Thus, some individuals are advocating that the United States promote Saddam's ouster by supporting the Iraqi opposition with money, radio broadcasts, arms, and air power.
But this proposal overlooks the reality that the Iraqi opposition is weak and divided. "Oppositions" would be more accurate. Building a strong, united opposition is an uncertain proposition that at a minimum would take years. A better parallel than Afghanistan might be to Hungary in 1956 or the Bay of Pigs, where U.S. support for local opponents of regimes was enough to get them in trouble but not enough to put them over the top. Providing direct military help for the Iraqi opposition would prove even more dangerous. We would be investing U.S. prestige and risking U.S. lives in situations in which it could be impossible to distinguish between friend and foe.
The parallel to Afghanistan breaks down in other ways as well. Where is our "Pakistan" here? What local country is likely to step forward to be our partner? Neighboring countries, including our ally Turkey, are likely to oppose some of the goals of various Iraqi factions, while U.S. support for Iraqi factions that are in any way defined by geography or ethnicity could easily increase Iraqi military (and Sunni Muslim) support for the central government.
And Afghanistan is a caution in one additional way, showing as it does that ousting regimes is one thing, restoring order and installing a better system something else again. A policy that resulted in an Iraq that was the site not only of prolonged civil war but also regional conflict involving Syria, Iran, Turkey and possibly others would hardly qualify as a success.
More realistic than this indirect or light form of rollback would be occupying Iraq with ground forces, akin to what we did in Germany and Japan after World War II and on a far more modest scale in Panama and Haiti. But such "nation building" in Iraq could well take years, place U.S. forces in non-battlefield situations where they could not exploit their stand-off and precision-guided munitions, and generate intense resistance and casualties. There would be little appetite here at home for a course of action that would almost certainly prove expensive in both financial and human terms. Nor would there be any more support in the region for such a policy, one that would seem to many to constitute an unacceptable form of "neo-colonialism."
The alternative to rollback in any of its various forms is containment. Under a containment strategy, the principal goal of U.S. policy would be to limit Iraq's ability to threaten the region and to encourage its compliance with the many resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
Making containment work would be far from easy. It is beyond our capacity to do alone. As a result, and more than anything else, we would need to shore up the international coalition that has helped keep Saddam in a box for some seven years now.
Regenerating Arab support -- essential if we are to mount any significant military operation -- requires that we support additional Iraqi exports of oil if it needs revenue to pay for needed food and medicine. More important, the United States should declare that it is prepared to allow Iraq to resume unlimited oil exports if it complies fully with the U.N. requirement that it not possess nor produce chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or long-range missiles and if it accepts that any money earned from exports be funneled into a mechanism controlled by the United Nations. This would ensure that no funds could be use to purchase arms (which would remain forbidden) and would pay for ongoing work of the weapons inspectors (to continue in perpetuity).
Proceeds also would be used to purchase food, medicine and consumer goods for the Iraqi people, to compensate Kuwaitis and others for war losses, and to pay Iraq's debts. This latter provision should encourage France and Russia to support the introduction of such a provision. Moreover, issuing such a declaration now would not change anything regarding the status of sanctions unless and until Saddam is certified by UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors. But even a change in declaratory policy would have the immediate benefit of strengthening our position in the Arab world where current U.S. policy, that Saddam comply with every aspect of every resolution before he receives any sanctions relief, is seen as unreasonable and unfair.
We also need a more energetic policy toward an Arab-Israeli Middle East peace. Linkage here is a fact of life. One need not and should not equate Israel and Iraq (or ignore Palestinian and Syrian shortcomings) to recognize that U.S. determination to press Saddam contrasts markedly with American passivity when confronted with Israeli reluctance to implement the Oslo accords or cease unilateral actions that complicate the search for peace. The willingness and ability of Arab governments to work with us against Saddam requires that we do something to reduce this perceived double standard.
Rebuilding the coalition more broadly will require, too, that we make Iraq a diplomatic priority. This may mean going slow on subsequent phases of NATO enlargement -- in particular, possible Baltic entry -- so as not to further alienate Russia. (That moving slowly may also be good for NATO lest it dilute its capacity to act is an added benefit.) Shoring up the anti-Iraq coalition may also mean eschewing secondary sanctions that penalize France and others in Europe when they do not join U.S. boycotts of Cuba or Iran.
A more nuanced U.S. approach toward Iran, one that embraced a reciprocal road map for improving relations, would help in other ways, as it would threaten Saddam with further isolation or even encirclement. The good news is that all these policy adjustments make sense on their merits. No American interest would be sacrificed or compromised to make our Iraq policy more effective.
Any use of military force should be large and sustained if Iraq again seeks to block U.N. weapons inspectors or if it masses forces against or attacks one of its neighbors. The target should be the Republican Guards, a critical part of Saddam's power base and one that he will be loathe to alienate. To make this possible, the United States should maintain an augmented military capacity in the region on an open-ended basis.
An element of deterrence should also be introduced into U.S. policy. Specifically, Saddam Hussein should be informed that if there is any use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq, or if there is any use of such unconventional weapons by others that can be traced back to Iraq, the United States will do whatever is necessary to remove the regime and bring all those responsible to justice.
A containment policy along the lines outlined here promises to be better than explicit rollback options. It may not offer the promise of a near-term solution that Americans tend to favor, but it will limit the problem. Moreover, it is both doable and affordable, something that cannot be said of more ambitious proposals.
To make containment effective, though, will require that it become a priority of American foreign policy. It is not enough for the president and his chief lieutenants to turn their attention to Iraq after Saddam creates a crisis. As was demonstrated in our struggle with the Soviet Union, containment -- "long-term, patient but vigilant" in George Kennan's original formulation -- can work if we are prepared to commit to it.
Moreover, Kennan's original formulation teaches us something else. A successful containment policy can set in motion forces that can actually lead to the demise of the regime in question. Change, if and when it comes to Iraq, is most likely to come from actions taken by those in or near the center of power who have access to Saddam and who would not be opposed by the majority of those in or near power. This is what took place in the Soviet Union and much of the formerly communist world.
In the case of Iraq, this argues for a policy that would relax export restrictions on Iraq only in the event of its full compliance with its obligations related to weapons of mass destruction, maintain critical import sanctions for the foreseeable future, and regularly remind the Iraqi people of improvements they can expect when they are led by a different leadership that meets its international obligations. It also would require a readiness to attack directly and with great intensity Saddam's domestic sources of support on those occasions when military force is justified.
If all this leads to a change in Iraq's leadership, so much the better. But the advantage of containment over the alternatives is that it protects our core interests even if Saddam manages to hang on.
Richard N. Haass is director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book is "The Reluctant Sheriff: The U.S. After the Cold War." Haass served on the staff of the National Security Council during the Bush administration. This commentary is adapted from his testimony Wednesday before the House Committee on International Relations.
Copyright: The San Diego Union-Tribune
Reprinted by permission of the Brookings Institution.
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