IRAQ LIBERATION ACT IMPLEMENTATION

Hearing of the
Near Eastern and South Asian Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

June 28, 2000

OPENING STATEMENT OF

SEN. SAM BROWNBACK,
A Representative from Kansas,
and
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

SEN. BROWNBACK: The hearing will come to order. Mr. Perle, Dr. Chalabi, delighted to have you here. Welcome again to both of you. I am very pleased to see you both here today to review U.S. policy towards Iraq and in particular to review the Clinton-Gore administration's progress in implementing the Iraq Liberation Act.

As we have done this drill several times before, I think you will have some idea just how I feel about the administration's commitment to liberating Iraq. To put it as straightforwardly as possible, I cannot understand why President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act when he had absolutely no intent of implementing the provisions of the law. It is hard for me to figure out why administration officials, from President Clinton and Vice President Gore on down, keep insisting that they are interested in ousting Saddam and yet not one official of this administration has been willing to take even the most minimal steps towards that end.

Let me just review what the Congress, with complete bipartisanship -- and I emphasize that -- complete bipartisanship -- has done in trying to press forward on Iraq policy. Since 1998, I count nine House or Senate resolutions calling for democracy in Iraq nine: promoting a War Crimes Tribunal for Iraq; demanding compliance with U.S. resolutions. We have authorized tens of millions of dollars to support war-crimes research and for the opposition. The only arguments we have had are over how more can be done to promote the overthrow of Saddam and bring him and his cronies to justice. That's the only debate or argument we have done or had here is how more or what else we could do.

As far as the administration is concerned, in the last two years alone, the Clinton-Gore team has presided over the abolition of UNSCOM, the end of the sanctions review for a significant number of products imported into Iraq; and a staggering -- a staggering erosion of international support for isolating the Saddam Hussein regime. This is not a complex matter, but the Clinton administration has failed to explain why it is imperative that sanctions remain on Iraq. They ought to explain that.

They have failed to remind the world at large that Saddam Hussein has killed tens of thousands of his own people and that it is his choice, and his choice alone, whether sanctions are lifted. That's up to Saddam Hussein. They seem to forget that Saddam's devotion to amassing weapons of mass destruction is the only remaining obstacle to Iraq's rehabilitation. That's it.

As far as the opposition is concerned, the administration has disbursed approximately $20,000 -- I want to emphasize that -- the administration has disbursed approximately $20,000 of the $97 million in available funds under the Iraq Liberation Act. I guess that's for a few fax machines; I am not sure.

Of $10 million appropriated for the opposition and for the prosecution of war crimes in FY 2000, nothing -- nothing has been spent. On Monday, representatives from the Iraq National Congress, of which we'll hear from today, met with Vice President Gore. Miraculously, on Tuesday, the administration announced that 140 INC men would be trained under the ILA. Now, I am not sure trained for what. I hope we can hear a little bit about that today, exactly what's going to be trained on how to use those fax machines or if it's going to be on other things.

They also announced they would support an amendment we have in this year's Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, giving $15 million to the INC for humanitarian deliveries into Iraq. This is the first time since the signature of the Iraq Liberation Act that we have seen someone in the administration galvanized to do something for the opposition. The usual routine we hear in Congress is: "Can't do it"; "Won't do it"; "Don't want to do it"; "Don't like them anyway." Most memorably, General Zinni, the soon-to-be-former commander of CENTCOM announced that the Congress was, quote in his words, "stupid" to support the opposition.

Either Saddam is a long-term threat, or he is not. If he is, then we must do something short of invading Iraq. Once again, we must support the opposition. The opposition is not a group of Girl Scouts, nor is it a group of Jeffersonian democrats. It is an agglomeration of very different people in different groups, who have been crushed under Saddam Hussein's rule for decades. They are the people willing to work with the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein. They are the people with the courage to come to us.

They have been treated with complete contempt by this administration. To date, the vice president has done nothing for this group. Maybe this week's meeting will mark a turning point; I hope so. Maybe it's just politics as usual. We'll find out soon.

I am pleased again to have both of you here. I hope we can get some further illumination from the meeting with the vice president, and some of your thoughts on this, Mr. Perle, as to what has taken place in the administration, what needs to take place, and what possibly might occur under future administrations. And with that, Mr. Perle, let me turn the floor over to you, and I appreciate again your attendance and presentation here at this meeting.

STATEMENT OF

RICHARD PERLE,
Former Assitant Secretary for International Security,
U.S. Department of Defense

MR. PERLE: And thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for including me in these hearings and, perhaps more important, thank you for holding these hearings.

It sometimes takes longer than we would wish to see policies adopted. And even when they are adopted and become the law of the land, it sometimes takes much longer than we wish to see them implemented. And that clearly is the situation we are now in with respect to the Iraq Liberation Act and the repeated expression by the Congress in both houses, in support of the strategy for the liberation of Iraq very different from the strategy that now constitutes administration policy.

The word "policy" is probably an overstatement in describing the administration attitude toward Iraq; "paralysis" is probably more appropriate. The administration describes its policy as one of "containment." And on any number of occasions, administration spokesmen have expressed their satisfaction at a "policy that has kept Saddam" -- as they sometimes put it -- "in a box"; powerless, ineffective, unable to act.

Now the evidence, however, is overwhelming that during the lifetime of this administration, Saddam's regime has become stronger and not weaker. It has exercised more independence of action than before. And while the administration is happy to describe the policy as "containment," it's fair to observe that what was once a regime inspected by international inspectors is a regime no longer so inspected.

The inspections that provided the principal means by which we could judge Saddam's effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction has come to an end, despite the fact that the administration's own announced goal preceding a bombing campaign against Iraq was the restoration of inspections that were terminated unilaterally by Saddam Hussein in violation of U.N. resolutions. Saddam posed a clear and unambiguous challenge; we failed to meet that challenge.

If we are able to resume inspections in Iraq, it will be the product of a negotiation with Saddam himself. And I can't help but observe that any inspection regime that is agreed by Saddam, in which he exercises a virtual veto over who is to do the inspecting and under what circumstances, cannot be effective. Saddam will not agree to an inspection regime that has any reasonable prospect of uncovering his covert program to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And the fact that he feels free to choose between this inspector and that, giving the approval to one who he believes will be pliable, and denying approval to one who he believes will not, is an indication of how weak and ineffective we have become. If anyone is in a box, it is not Saddam Hussein; it is the American administration.

Not only has the inspection regime, which is vital to our comprehensive understanding of what programs Saddam has under way, been shattered -- and by the way, even if a reasonable inspection regime could be put in place, we have now -- owing to the long period in which no inspections have taken place -- we have lost much of the database upon which any reasonable intelligence operation must be based. Everything that could be moved has been moved; whatever knowledge we once possessed about where to look has now been taken from us. And we are now back, if we were able to return, looking for a very small object in a very large territory, and the prospects of success are very limited.

But not only has the inspection regime been shattered, the political support that has sustained the one constant element of administration policy, which is the sanctions now in place, has been declining rapidly. The coalition that was once arrayed against Saddam is in a shambles. Among the former coalition partners, even some of our close allies now take the other side and are eager to see the sanctions lifted. And increasingly, the world has come to believe that the victim of the sanctions is not Saddam Hussein, but innocent civilians -- men, women and children -- in Iraq.

I think it's very important to be clear on this point: Saddam has manipulated the perception of the impact of the sanctions. And he has it entirely within his power to bring significant relief to the civilian population of Iraq. And much of the money that has been made available for humanitarian purposes, has not been spent and will not be spent as long as Saddam can prevent it, in order to build pressure against the continuation of the sanctions by creating the impression that only the elimination of the sanctions can restore health to Iraqi women and children and deal with the humanitarian catastrophe that we're now seeing. So I would in no way relieve Saddam Hussein of responsibility for that humanitarian tragedy.

But at the same time, I think it's important to observe that the sanctions themselves are of declining effectiveness. They are increasingly circumvented. Saddam has found ways around the sanctions in collaboration with others, including some of his former enemies. There is a steady flow of resources into Iraq that are at Saddam's disposal. And sanctions, among other things, have actually solidified his total control over the Iraqi economy. And so no one can argue that the sanctions are of such force and weight and effectiveness that we can count on them to bring down Saddam's regime. They simply won't, and any belief to the contrary is sadly mistaken.

But in any case, the sanctions won't last forever because support for them is eroding. And when they are finally lifted, as they almost surely will be, Saddam will expect, and with good reason, a political victory of enormous proportions. He will emerge in the Gulf as the leader who stood up to the United States and the Western world and prevailed. And at that point, I believe the region will be a much more dangerous place and the manifest failure of American and allied policy -- and here it's largely a failure of American leadership -- will be evident to everyone.

But by then it will be too late. And I fear that the administration calculates that "too late" will come after the next presidential election. And the evidence is overwhelming that their short-term objective is to get past the election without a more visible catastrophe. And that's probably their long-term perspective, as well.

Mr. Chairman, in contrast to this policy of drift, deterioration and ineffectiveness, the Congress has, in a series of actions that I believe are without precedent, empowered the administration to organize and assist the internal opposition to Saddam Hussein.

As one would expect, a ruler like Saddam Hussein, who rules by terror, who rules by murder and assassination, has accumulated over the years a great many enemies. In fact, the number of victims are so large that they alone would constitute an inchoate revolutionary force. So the issue for the West, in my view, is how best to organize that opposition, to assist it, to forge it into an instrument by which Saddam's murderous regime might be brought down.

The term "freedom fighters" is an entirely appropriate term. And the Iraqi National Congress has for many years been organized along lines expressing support for democratic principles. It has been comprehensively organized, reflecting all elements of Iraqi society. It deserves and has indeed received, the support of the Congress of the United States. And as you well know, as a leader in this effort, the Congress has appropriated money and other resources to assist the INC.

We should be very clear about the administration's attitude toward this approach. It is one of opposition, flat-out unmitigated opposition. And at every turn, the administration has sought to frustrate the Congress -- the congressional intent by withholding the resources that you have offered to them to assist the Iraqi National Congress; and even, I am sorry to say, by acting in a manner calculated, not to unite the opposition, but even to divide it. And there is very substantial evidence that the administration and various elements of the executive branch, have actually worked to exploit those differences that one would expect to find in any coalition group, differences that make it more, and not less, difficult to achieve the goals of the Iraq Liberation Act, which is the formation of a coherent opposition.

I know this because, like others in this small town, I frequently discuss this matter with officials from the administration, sometimes in rather formal debate and other times in casual conversation. And I think I can say to you that I have never had a conversation with any official of the administration, on this matter, in which those officials did not state that they thought the policy reflected in the Iraq Liberation Act was a mistake and should not be implemented. And they have given expression to that conviction by dragging their feet endlessly, by failing actually to do what the Iraq Liberation Act calls upon them to do.

As you rightly observe, within the last 24 hours the vice president, a candidate for the presidency, has met with the Iraqi National Congress and once again, made pledges of support to the Iraqi National Congress. I don't know whether he took his earlier pledges of support off the word processor and changed the date or whether he drafted a new set of talking points.

But I do know that in August of 1993, the same vice president, who was not then a presidential candidate, gave a very full expression of support to the Iraqi National Congress; and that preceded, by almost three years, a military operation by Saddam against the Iraqi National Congress in which a great many people working with the United States, who had placed trust and confidence in the United States, were executed by Saddam Hussein. And I don't recall the vice president on that occasion taking any action whatsoever to keep the commitment that was made then. And hope springs eternal, and maybe this time he means it. But it is still, it seems to me, a commitment that falls far short of the kind of vigorous program that would give the policy behind the Iraq Liberation Act a decent chance for success.

Let me conclude by saying what I think is required in this case. It is the administration's conviction that attempting to assist the INC is unwise because the INC is incapable of taking on Saddam Hussein.

They are weak and disorganized, according to officials in the administration, including officials who report directly to the vice president and others, always in private in the latter case.

Let me say that all oppositions that lack external support, that lack a strategy with resources behind it, that give it a reasonable prospect of success, are by definition weak. So it means nothing to say that an organization lacking the fundamental support it needs is going to be weak. It's inevitable.

As to the disorganization, I think the INC has come a very long way in organizing itself. And you see in this room a number of representatives of the INC from all elements of Iraqi society who have come together in what is a very impressive display of unity.

Now, there are differences, to be sure, and the differences will always be larger when the prospects of success are smaller. The point is that it is well within the power of the United States, as a world leader and as the source of the resources necessary to mount an effective campaign against Saddam Hussein, it is within the power of the United States to assist this opposition in a way that will assist its achieving cohesion and effectiveness. And it is within our power to help them design the plans by which they can effectively challenge Saddam's regime.

So the pessimism of the administration, the defeatism of the administration, the paralysis of the administration is, in fact, a self-fulfilling prophecy. If they say long enough and often enough that the opposition is weak and divided, if they withhold the support that the Congress has urged them to extend, then they can, of course, weaken the opposition and prevent it from achieving reasonable and attainable objectives.

So I hope very much that we will see a change in administration policy. It will probably take a new administration to accomplish that. I'd be quite happy to see a new administration in any case, but one of the reasons for preferring a new administration is that we may look forward to one that implements the law now on the books that requires support for the liberation of Iraq by those people who have been willing to run the risks and organize themselves to bring that about.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you, Mr. Perle, for those thoughtful comments, and I look forward to some question and answer between the two of us.

Dr. Chalabi, I am pleased to see you again, although I am sorry it's here. I had -- we had hoped at this point in time that you would be in Iraq organizing, pushing and prodding for the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. It's been some years ago that you first met with members of Congress and we first expressed our support for your efforts, put forward resources to do that. And we certainly all thought by this point in time we wouldn't still be meeting in hearings in Washington, D.C., but that we would be pressing forward in your homeland and with the coalition that you put together. Yet we are here, and I want to hear what you have to say about the progress on implementing the Iraq Liberation Act.

You might also take a moment, if you would, to introduce the other people of the INC that are here and what groups that they represent so that we could have that for the record as well.

Dr. Chalabi.

STATEMENT OF

AHMAD CHALABI,
Presidency Council Memeber,
Iraqi National Congress

MR. CHALABI: Thank you, Senator Brownback.

Let me first introduce my distinguished friends and colleagues, the leaders of the Iraqi National Congress. First I would start with Mr. Jalal Talabani.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Please stand, if you would, General.

MR. CHALABI: Mr. Talabani is a leader -- the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, who has worked long and hard for the cause of democracy and human rights in Iraq and the rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq. He is a well-known leader internationally, and he has been of great support for the Iraqi National Congress, a tireless fighter.

Mr. Riyad Al-Yawar is a man who has been an Iraqi diplomat and he is a man who has been working against tyranny and dictatorship in Iraq for over four years now, and he has worked tireless to help unite the INC.

Saif Khalor al-Bapart (ph), who came yesterday from Iraq, is from the South, he is a leader of opposition, armed opposition to Saddam Hussein in the South, and he came here to put his case and the need for assistance before the American people.

On my left, my very good friend and colleague in fighting Saddam Hussein -- in March '95 we were together in the battlefield -- Mr. Kossra Rassul (ph), who has been prime minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, and he has been fighting Saddam. He has personally suffered losses.

His two children were killed by Saddam's bombs, and he, himself, suffers from wounds inflicted on him by Saddam. He has demonstrated a remarkable tenacity in continuing to fight Saddam, and his ability to do so is unchallenged.

Dr. Latif Rashid. He is a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and he has been working with the INC for a long, long time. He was a founding member and he has been of immense -- he has made immense contributions to our fight against Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Hoshyar Zibari a member of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. He is a founding member of the Iraqi National Congress. He has fought Saddam in battles for many decades now, and he has personally suffered family losses due to Saddam's activities, and he has been a person who has worked to help us unite the INC and restore its current united status.

I am sorry to say that Sharif Ali Hussein (ph) and Sheikh Albuhyder (ph), Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammed Ali (ph), had to go for a TV interview with the Voice of America, but they, both of them, Sharif Ali is from the former royal family of Iraq, the Hashemite family, and his presence with us gives a sense for the people of Iraq that they look back with nostalgia to the days of the (monarchy ?), when there was much more freedom, much more democracy than now. And he has been working very hard with us as a colleague to restore democracy in Iraq. Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammed Ali, is a leader of the Islamic movement in Iraq, and he has been a victim of Saddam and he has worked -- he is a founding member of the INC, and he has worked very hard with us all those years.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Very good. Welcome, all of you, and thank you for coming here.

MR. CHALABI: Thank you, Senator Brownback.

This is the third time that I have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a representative of the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi people. Each time, it is a great, greater honor. I am joined here today by the entire leadership of the Iraqi National Congress, and I am proud to bring you our united message to the United States government.

Unfortunately, on this occasion I am the bearer of bad news. Since my last testimony a year ago, Saddam Hussein has become a greater threat to the Iraqi people, to the Middle East region and to the interests of the United States. Saddam's dictatorship is based on three pillars: money, foreign support and terror. On all three fronts, he is resurgent. Manipulation of the oil-for-food program, illegal smuggling of oil and extortion of the Iraqi people are now providing Saddam with billions in cash for internal repression and external aggression.

His intelligence service is resurgent. In the past two weeks, General Najib Al-Saydahi (ph), a member of the Iraqi National Congress Central Council and a leading commander in the Iraqi army, has received a videotape of a rape of one of his relatives in Baghdad by the intelligence service, in an attempt to intimidate him. Many others have received that recently, but they have not chosen to speak out. He had the courage to do so, and I will bring -- I want to bring this to your attention now.

There are now massive investments in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs unrestricted by United Nations inspections. Saddam succeeded in throwing out UNSCOM. Foreign governments, including those of United States allies, such as Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE, have all restored full diplomatic relations with the Iraqi dictatorship in the past few weeks, providing Saddam's weapons acquisition and terror networks with unfettered access to the outside world.

He has large-scale intelligence operations going on right now in the UAE, including procurement of prohibited materials and smuggling them into Iraq. Russia, France and other significant countries, such as Italy, are working for Saddam's interests on the international stage.

Saddam's internal terror continues to destroy our people, and his abilities for external aggression are increased as a result of his increased funds and his increased foreign diplomatic access. Even so, however, Saddam remains vulnerable. Inside Iraq, he is continuously challenged by the Iraqi people, united in their hatred of his tyranny. In the North, in Iraqi Kurdistan, Saddam's authority is almost non- existent, extending only to intelligence operatives and paid agents. In the North, Iraqi National Congress member parties administer over 50,000 square kilometers of Iraqi territory independently and in opposition to Saddam. This was our base until Saddam attacked our base in August 1996 and killed our people.

Southern Iraq is in a state of latent revolution, punctuated by increased armed rebellion against the regime. In the audience today is Saif Khalor Bapart (ph) a leader of the Iraqi National Congress southern resistance to Saddam's regime. He left Iraq this weekend to bring us news of the fighting and a plea for U.S. protection of support.

In Baghdad, Saddam is continuously challenged, his security forces only able to suppress, not preempt, frequent and large-scale uprisings against his authority. It is this universal opposition to Saddam Hussein which the Iraqi National Congress embodies and which is the only avenue towards peace in Iraq, a peace which can only be secured by Saddam's overthrow and establishment of a new popular and democratic federal Iraqi government.

The benefits from Saddam's overthrow are clear. The Iraqi people will be free, free to govern themselves, free to cherish their children, free to employ their talents for good. The region will be free, free from the fear of Saddam's warmaking, free from Saddam's terrorism, and free from the threat of Saddam's inhuman weapons of mass destruction. And the United States, as the sole superpower, will be free from its excessive military commitments arrayed against a megalomaniac dictator who survives only on the indecision and the contradictions of United States and international policies.

Which leads me to my central point: Saddam's future, the future of the Iraqi people and the future of the Middle East are dependent on the actions of the United States. It is an indisputable fact, if the United States is committed to Saddam's overthrow and the establishment of an Iraqi democratic government, it can happen, and happen quickly. If the United States is not committed, our struggle for freedom will be long, painful and bloody, both for the Iraqi people and the world.

The Congress of the United States has recognized this fact and moved decisively against Saddam. By overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate, duly signed by the president, Congress has appropriated funds, provided constitutional authority and ordered military support to the Iraqi National Congress. The Iraq Liberation Act, the centerpiece of these congressional efforts, is historic legislation.

In the ILA, for the first time the United States has overtly committed itself to the overthrow of an illegal dictatorship and to support for the establishment of a democratic government in its place. The Iraqi people are forever grateful. The Iraq Liberation Act is United States law. President Clinton signed the ILA on December -- on October 31, 1998. On November 15, 1998, he made the ILA the centerpiece of his Iraq policy.

Yet, despite bold words and professed commitments, almost nothing has been done. There has been virtually no military drawdown, less than $20,000 from the ($7 million ?) authority. There has been virtually no financial support, less than $100,000 actually given to the INC.

This inaction is, unfortunately, part of a bitter history for the Iraqi National Congress relations with the United States. In 1996, the Iraqi National Congress was abandoned to Saddam's invasion of Northern Iraqi despite U.S. guarantees of protection, not only to the INC but to the 3-1/2 million Iraqis living in the area. Since that time, the INC has been routinely disparaged by administration officials from the NSC, the CIA, the State Department and the Department of Defense. And, while blaming the victim may provide temporary political cover for betrayal of U.S. interests, ideals and commitments, it has done little for the confidence of the Iraqi people or Iraq's neighbors.

Despite this record, the INC still looks to the United States for leadership, confident that the American people are with us against Saddam. And we are encouraged by the progress we have made in the last few days. Monday's meeting with Vice President Al Gore was very successful, continuing a long record of his support for the Iraqi people's interests. Senator Gore was one of the first U.S. officials to condemn Saddam's genocide against the Iraqi Kurds in 1988. I first met him in 1991, and he was instrumental in the development of U.S. support for the INC at that time. In 1993, he received the INC in Washington and again advanced our struggle against Saddam. Since that time, he has been one of the strongest voices for the interests of the Iraqi people in the United States and internationally.

As he begins his presidential campaign, we welcome his clear calls for Saddam's overthrow and his forthright assertion that peace in the Middle East is impossible while Saddam remains in power. Similarly, we welcomed his actions this week as vice president. U.S. commitment to military training for the INC under the ILA authority is a promising step in the right direction, as is yesterday's announcements of U.S. support for the INC's humanitarian relief projects in Iraq. With Vice President Gore's sponsorship, we expect speedy progress and tangible results. Nonetheless, we cannot rely on rhetoric. Our task is too urgent, and the needs of the Iraqi people are too great.

Our proposal for $8 million in FY 2000 State Department economic support funds appropriated to the INC is on the administration's desk, and has been since November. If it is approved before the end of this month, we can begin humanitarian relief projects within 45 days and begin broadcasting operations in less than 30 days.

Our preliminary requests for material and training under the ILA have been submitted since February. If accepted by the end of this month, effective INC military units, intelligence teams and humanitarian aid workers can be operating in coordination with United States support by the end of August. We need these U.S. actions immediately, and we are counting on the word of the vice president to deliver them.

The United States faces a clear choice. Sanctions, bombing and containment are not a sustainable policy. Either Saddam must go, and go quickly, or he must be accommodated. If he is accommodated, he will quickly develop nuclear weapons and become the dominant military power in the Gulf. If she's overthrown, Iraq can become the peaceful and prosperous country which is in the interest of its people, the region and the world.

Thank you.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you, Dr. Chalabi, for that strong statement. I have a vote that is on on the floor. I thought what we could do is have a couple of questions and exchange and take a short break and come back.

I'm curious. You said that opposition actions in the south continue on a regular basis and are growing and that you had news directly from the south. Could the individual that's here from the south inform us of what's taking place there? Would it be possible for --

MR. CHALABI: Yes. Yes. (Inaudible) -- he can easily speak, senator, as you wish.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Could he for a couple of minutes here before I go to vote, and then we'll take a short break. I would be very interested to hear of what's taking place in the south now. We get regular information out from the north of what's occurring, but not so much from the south. If you would identify yourself and state what's taking place in the south for as far as opposition to Saddam.

MR. CHALABI: He says he comes from el Bathar (ph) from the southern marshes. He identifies himself as a fighter amongst other fighters from the south.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you.

MR. CHALABI: Dr. Bussam (ph) will translate.

IRAQI OPPOSITION MEMBER: (Through interpreter.) There is no secret in what Saddam is doing inside Iraq as far as crimes against humanity and against the Iraqi people. There has been no outrage in history that has not been committed by Saddam. It's Saddam's crimes against humanity and ecology and everything that's been created in this world. He has committed crimes against his neighbors as well as against his people and against humanity and against the world. The draining of the marshes in Iraq caused destruction both to the ecology, to the animal and feed stock as well as the fish, and the humans who are living there.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Could I ask what is going on in opposition to Saddam in the south?

IRAQI OPPOSITION MEMBER: All Iraqi peoples suffer from Saddam's actions and they are in opposition. We fight Saddam in the marshes of Iraq that have been drained but have been liberated. And the last battle was on the fifteenth of May, this year in the northern Rumayla (ph) area, near Basra. However, we fought alone and we did not get any aid to help us fight to destroy Saddam and his forces.

I'm sorry to say that the United States government that has claimed support for human rights and humanity in the world, and has taken upon itself the responsibilities nobody forced it to, to protect the Iraqi people and even the Iraq Liberation Act. Unfortunately American aircraft fly over us as we are being continuously being bombarded by Saddam's forces. And that to us implies what is happening is not reality. We are in an uprising in Iraq and the whole Iraqi people are in opposition to Saddam, but we need weapons and other support, such as radio stations and food support.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you very much for the updated information of what's taking place. I appreciate that greatly.

We have a vote on the floor and I'm going to have to go over to vote. I'll be back in ten minutes. I'll be able to walk over and back in that period of time. If you could stay with us for a few minutes, Mr. Perle, Dr. Chalabi, I have a number of questions, particularly Dr. Chalabi, for how your meeting with the Vice President went and whether he pledged any new assistance, direct U.S. assistance, whether he made any specific offers of assistance and any timetable in which those offers of assistance would be forthcoming. I would like to know if there are any specifics that were promised at that meeting with the Vice President on Monday. So I will be back within ten minutes. So, we will stand in recess for ten minutes until ten after ten. (Bangs gavel.)

(Recess.)

SEN. BROWNBACK: We do have another vote scheduled shortly, and so what I want to do is try to get through a couple of key questions with Dr. Chalabi about the meeting with vice president, and Mr. Perle with any thoughts he might have on a future administration, if it's a Republican administration, if it's a Bush administration, how might they deal with Iraq and the INC and the Iraq Liberation Act. Dr. Chalabi, will you please illuminate us on the specifics from the meeting with the vice president and any particular pledges of assistance and timetables of that assistance to the INC?

DR. CHALABI: The vice president -- we wrote him a letter. We wrote all the candidates a letter on January 21st requesting meetings. The vice president answered on February 8th, and we had the meeting on Monday, on the 26th of June.

In that meeting the vice president made a very strong statement that he does not believe that there can be peace in Iraq or the Middle East while Saddam remains in power. He said that he is committed to the Iraq Liberation Act and it is the cornerstone of U.S. policy towards Iraq. He said that he will help us remove -- get rid of Saddam, and that is the United States position.

We made some specific requests. We asked first that the United States would change the rules of engagement of American aircraft so that Saddam's forces poised to attack Iraqi civilians in the south and the north and the liberated areas of the north would become legitimate targets. This is especially poignant in light of the statement of Saif Khalor al-Bapart (ph) just before you now about the American aircraft flying without -- while Saddam is oppressing the people.

We also requested that the United States would reverse their ecological disaster from the dying of the marshes. This can be done. We requested that the United States would help us to establish an international commission which would have access to the oil-for-food funds so that they can be spent for the benefit of the Iraqi people rather than sit in the bank as they are now. There are balances in the excess of $8 billion now. Saddam refuses to spend it. We want to take the idea of relief for the Iraqi people away from either -- give Saddam more resources or lift the sanctions. That is not the way to do it. Giving Saddam more resources is tantamount to more oppression and deprivation now.

We also ask that the United States affirm what is in the Iraq Liberation Act that they would help the Iraqi people integrate into the international community and help lift the sanctions as soon as Saddam is removed and there is a democratic government. We asked for all those. The vice president -- and we asked of course for full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act.

The vice president said they will help us with training. We have submitted names, and they said they will help us with training speedily -- he said by the fall they would train all those people. Then --

SEN. BROWNBACK: Let me ask you about that -- train all those people -- there was mention about 115 --

DR. CHALABI: A hundred -- we have submitted two lists, one 21 and the other 120.

SEN. BROWNBACK: And trained to do what?

DR. CHALABI: The training is restricted to seven areas, all of them to non-lethal.

SEN. BROWNBACK: So it's all to non-lethal training that these people would be submitted to.

DR. CHALABI: Yes. But there -- some of the training is useful, such as logistics, communications and communications security and field medicine and for military operations subsequently. But there is no lethal training.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Why was he resistant to the lethal training?

DR. CHALABI: We don't really understand, senator, there is resistance in the administration to provide lethal training. We have some theories, but we don't really know why.

SEN. BROWNBACK: But he pledged to you then by this fall that there would be some 140 INC people trained in non-lethal areas. Some of these areas you would find useful; others you don't particularly understand. And you don't understand the reason for the resistance to lethal training?

DR. CHALABI: We don't, because the Iraq Liberation Act is meant to liberate Iraq. You cannot liberate Iraq by treating wounded people. We need to liberate Iraq by fighting Saddam, and that's what we need. I mean, we need all the assistance we can get in terms of weapons, because there are tens of thousands of fighters fighting Saddam or confronting Saddam now. In the north Saddam was about to attack the area in late May this year, and he amassed troops. The Kurdish forces, if they were given some anti-tank weapons they can resist that. In the south Saddam bombards them with artillery and he attacks them with tanks. If they have some anti-tank weapons, if they have any kind of communications equipment, anti-tank weapons -- some kind of weaponry that can confront the superior armor and artillery of Saddam, he will lose control of the area. The Iraqi army is not fighting really in the south. They are forced and coerced into making these movements, but there are many generals that are -- there are many, many generals and many officers who left Saddam's army and are now sitting in the liberated areas in northern Iraq ready to join training for the Iraq Liberation Act now. But they are sitting there with no assistance and no prospect of going anywhere, and they are wondering why.

SEN. BROWNBACK: What's the administration's resistance to providing any sort of anti-tank weaponry to the Iraqi National Congress or to the people that are fighting against Saddam.

Why will they not provide that equipment?

DR. CHALABI: Well, it is lethal, and they say they are not giving lethal equipment. Senator, it seems to me --

SEN. BROWNBACK: Did they give you a specific reason as to why they would not provide lethal assistance?

DR. CHALABI: Yes. They say that we do not want you -- you are not ready, and we don't want you to jump into confronting Saddam and get killed in the process.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Yet in the period that we have had the Iraq Liberation Act, a period of two years, that they have said you are not ready, they will not provide any assistance or training in lethal weaponry or any assistance or training at all yet.

DR. CHALABI: Senator, the idea of the Iraq Liberation Act is to enable us to make us ready to fight Saddam. That is the whole purpose of the Iraq Liberation Act, and to enable us to train us and to equip us for this purpose. We really don't understand what is the thing.

Now, there is another excuse saying that the regional countries object to this, that they don't want us trained. But our experience with the regional countries is they ask, Why isn't the United States serious? Why are they not implementing the law?

SEN. BROWNBACK: I ask the same question. How long have we had this available to you to be trained, to provide this equipment to you, and it has not occurred?

DR. CHALABI: Indeed I think we have now close to 18 months since the Iraq Liberation Act has been passed. We work very hard. We establish -- we demonstrated time and time again the unity of the Iraqi National Congress, and