STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOSEPH HOAR

Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

Hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Committee

September 23, 2002

GEN. HOAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, distinguished members, for this opportunity to address the committee.

First, I should say that I am in favor of regime change in Iraq. What is at issue is the means and the timing. My view is that we should slow down and be cautious and be sure we get it right. This is not a time for hyperbole or time to attack people who have honest disagreements with the manner in which we're going forward.

When I was a young officer, our government attempted to define the nature of the upheaval that was going on in Southeast Asia. Our government failed to define correctly the nature of the Vietnam War, and we all know the result.

Today we are faced with a new war. It has been described as a war on terrorism. Unfortunately, the use of that term obscures the underlying problems that we face going forward. "War on terrorism" is perhaps a useful slogan, but terrorism is not an ideology or a political movement or a sovereign country; it is a technique used to achieve either a political or a military result, not unlike strategic bombing. While I am in no way condoning the activities of al Qaeda and the terrorist attacks perpetrated against Americans over the last five years by this group, it is still important to look beyond this activity to find what are the causative factors, because the term "terrorism," as a means of achieving political and military ends, is merely a tactic. Fighting terrorism is in fact our number-one priority, but it is only a portion of what needs to be done if we are to emerge from this experience successfully.

The reality is that there are perhaps only 5,000 al Qaeda members worldwide. I've just read recently that only about 200 are in the inner circle. Beyond that, there are perhaps 10,000 to 20,000 supporters that materially, financially or in some way could be described as a support group for al Qaeda terrorists.

What is really at stake is the minds and hearts of the 1 billion Muslims throughout the world. We know from attitudinal surveys that they like Americans, like American society and American culture. In fact, many of them would prefer to emigrate to the United States.

Their quarrel with the United States is that they do not trust our government. The reason for this is a pattern of behavior perpetrated by the U.S. government in South Asia and the Middle East over the last 20 years. They believe the U.S. government has acted unilaterally, sometimes as a bully, sometimes has used other nations for its own interests and abandoned them when the objective has been achieved. And most important, they believe the U.S. has unjustly supported Israel over the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

At the end of the day, the war on terrorism will be won only when we convince 1 billion Muslims that we are, in fact, a just society; that we do support peace, justice, equality for all people; that in fact we really are the city on the hill. We will in due course defeat al Qaeda. We will do it through a coordinated effort of military action supported by integrated intelligence from our friends, international law enforcement operations, worldwide coordination to shut down financial support that flows to the terrorists. But at the end of the day, it will be members of the worldwide Muslim community that drive a stake in the heart of al Qaeda so that it does not rise again.

There are three interrelated crises that need to be addressed as we look to the future. The first is the operation against al Qaeda. It seems as we came up on the 11th of September 2002, with ground-to- air missiles ringing the capital and uncertain about where and when we might be attacked again by terrorists, that we need to continue as our primary effort to defeat al Qaeda. This will require broad support from our European allies and from our friends in the Arab world. This is not the time to risk the loss of support from so many countries shocked by the attacks of 11 September last year, who have offered to help us and indeed provide it on a daily basis. We have seen recently the results of that support in success against al Qaeda in Morocco, in Yemen, Pakistan, as well as in Europe.

Secondly, as a matter of justice but also as a means of public diplomacy to ease the concerns in the Muslim world, we must step up to the Israeli-Palestinian problem and put pressure on both sides to move to a peaceful solution.

Finally, there is the campaign against Iraq. To my knowledge, and from the quotations attributed to people in and out of government who I greatly respect, there has not been a case made to connect Iraq and al Qaeda. While we have known for many years about the capabilities of the Iraqi government with respect to chemical and biological weapons, there is still no proof that a weaponized nuclear device has been produced, and there is certainly no information, to my knowledge, that one has been tested.

Last week the president at the United Nations took a step forward in speaking about the need for a new United States -- United Nations Security Council resolution. This had an immediate positive effect around the world, notably with the French government and the government of Saudi Arabia. I believe that we must move, with the approval of the United Nations, to take the time to do the tough diplomatic work to gain support in the Security Council or disarmament; and failing disarmament, then military action.

Allow me to speak briefly about my concerns regarding the conduct of a military campaign against Iraq.

There are people in this city that believe that the military campaign against Iraq will not be difficult, especially because of the enormous advances in technology and the willingness of some groups in Iraq to revolt once the campaign has begun. I am not as certain that a campaign of this nature will take this course. I certainly hope so.

One thing I am certain of is that there is a nightmare scenario, which I will share with you, that needs to be planned for, and it's basically this: The absolute lesson to be learned from the 1990-'91 Gulf War, that was you do not take on the United States armed forces in the open desert and expect to win. A joint force of Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force and Special Operation force is unstoppable in an environment because of our technological advantages and our inherent mobility. The nightmare scenario is that six Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions and six heavy divisions, reinforced with several thousand anti-aircraft artillery pieces, defends the city of Baghdad. The result would be high casualties on both sides, as well as in the civilian community. U.S. forces would certainly prevail, but at what cost, and at what cost as the rest of the world watches while we bomb and have artillery rounds exploded in densely populated Iraqi neighborhoods.

The risk of a military campaign against Iraq can be measured in the lives of American men and women serving in uniform. It is imperative that adequate preparations are made so that regardless of what action the Iraqi government takes, we can amass the appropriate forces to win decisively, regardless of the circumstances, with minimum loss of American lives and to the civilian population of Iraq.

Eleven years ago, the U.S. government clearly defined the military mission against Iraq. It was to liberate the state of Kuwait from the occupation by Iraqi forces. What was overlooked was the necessity for a companion political and economic plan, generally described as "war termination," that would have allowed us to move forward and create a situation where the Ba'athist regime in Iraq would be overthrown. Failure to complete the political and economic portion of the coalition strategy has resulted in our requirement to revisit this issue today. I am reminded of the statement of Sharon Peres, made to me several years ago. He said, "Military victories do not bring peace. You have to work twice as hard to achieve a peaceful settlement."

There has been scant discussion about what will take place after a successful military campaign against Iraq. The term "regime change" does not adequately describe the concept of what we expect to achieve as a result of military campaign in Iraq. One would ask the question: Are we willing to spend the time and treasure to rebuild Iraq and its institution after fighting, if we go it alone during a military campaign? Who will provide the troops, the policemen, the economists, the politician, the judicial advisers to start Iraq on the road to democracy? Or are we going to turn the country over to another thug who swears fealty to the United States?

We have heard the financial figures that a war against Iraq will cost 100 to $200 billion and that oil will rise to something above $30 a barrel for some unknown period of time. These figures seem to me to have an almost certain downward spiraling effect on our economy. The Gulf War cost $60 billion in 1991 dollars. The cost of that war was paid for the most part by our friends -- notably, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Japan. Who will help us defray the cost of a military action and the nation-building in Iraq?

In summary, I urge you to continue the dialogue to encourage the administration to do the hard diplomatic work to gain broad support for a just solution to the Iraqi problem. I urge you to examine in open and closed session the consequences of this contemplated action to be sure that the cost in blood and treasure is consistent with the expected outcomes and those unintended consequences that inevitably flow from an undertaking of this magnitude.

I thank you, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, General Hoar.