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PREPARED TESTIMONY OF
GEOFFREY
KEMP
Director, Regional Strategic Programs
The Nixon Center,
Washington, DC
Subcommittee
on the Middle East and South Asia
Committee on International Relations
United States House of Representatives
October 4, 2001
The immediate priority for U.S. foreign policy must be the removal of Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network from Afghanistan and the installation of a new regime in that country. To this end the Bush administration has assembled a powerful but fractious coalition. It includes Russia, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, our European allies and some of our Arab friends. This is not going to be an easy operation and it may take months to succeed. We may find ourselves drawn deeper into the quagmire of south Asian politics. The stability of Pakistan, including its nuclear facilities, must be of concern. A humanitarian crisis could be upon us. Under these circumstances any effort to widen the confrontation to take on Iraq or other Middle East countries that harbor terrorists would put in jeopardy this particular coalition. Thus the administration’s argument for a sequential approach to dealing with states that support terrorism makes strategic sense.
If we are successful in eliminating the Bin Laden network from Afghanistan and if a government comes to power in Kabul that can bring some stability and humanity to the region it would signal that we are serious about confronting those states that support terrorism. At that point our ability to muster support to end the remaining terrorist threats in the Middle East may be enhanced, though not assured.
In the meantime, Saddam and his regime pose a growing danger to the Middle East and the United States. The regime cannot be rehabilitated. Therefore, the goal of regime replacement should remain a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy options. The danger posed by Iraq increases the longer Saddam Hussein has access to ample hard currency, which enables him to continue to fund his security services and his WMD programs. The U.S. cannot negotiate with the Saddam Hussein regime. Its demise would be greeted with pleasure by the vast majority of Iraqis, most of our Arab friends, and of course, Israel.
In the aftermath of September 11th, the most pertinent questions concerning Iraq are what actions should we plan for and over what period of time? If there is substantial and persuasive evidence that Iraq was directly involved in the attacks the President has no option but to prepare for a major offensive against Iraq, including the use of military force. Its purpose would be the removal of the regime in Baghdad. With compelling evidence one would hope such action would have the direct support of NATO, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
However if the evidence of an Iraqi connection is indirect, circumstantial and not credible to our key allies, the United States must pursue a longer term strategy to undermine the Iraqi regime. This should include: more aggressive intelligence operations and assistance to opposition groups both in Iraq and outside; tightening of U.N. sanctions; continued patrols of the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq; and a coordinated international campaign to demonstrate to the world that the United States cares about the plight of the Iraqi people and that it is Saddam Hussein alone who is responsible for their misery and suffering.
Whatever the evidence of Iraq’s complicity the reality is that if we mount an operation to change the regime in Baghdad, we will have few regional allies. Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is intense and pervasive. Its causes are complex and are to be found in many more issues than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its true that the Intifada of the past year has magnified the problem, but even if there was an Israeli-Palestinian agreement hatred towards America would still be present. Much of the anti-Americanism in the Arab world reflects the anger and rage of discontented populations against their own regimes. As my colleague, Fouad Ajami has written, " It has been America’s fate to be caught in the crossfire of a war over Islam itself. A war between privilege and wrath, between the secular powers in the saddle and a nativist-pious opposition from below."
Some have argued that anti-Americanism is one thing, but that if the United States shows new resolve and is prepared to do whatever it takes to end the regime in Baghdad key Arab governments will support us, albeit reluctantly, since their interests ultimately lie with the West. However this proposition would need to be carefully tested before taking precipitous action. Certainly the hostility shown to the United States by citizens of one of our closest Arab friends, Egypt, is a very sober portend of what could lie ahead.
What options do we have in event of clear, substantive and persuasive evidence connecting Saddam Hussein to the events of September 11th? Few governments, including Arab governments, approve of the Saddam Hussein regime. However they express concern that a new American military offensive that did not guarantee the final and definitive removal of Saddam Hussein and his cohorts and the emergence of a stable, unified, Iraq would create more problems than it would solve. Thus if force is to be considered, the objective must be the removal of the regime, as well as a coherent policy for a post-Saddam Iraq. Removing Saddam alone might have some short term benefits, but there are downsides. First, if only Saddam and his immediate entourage are ousted, the Baathist regime will remain in power and Saddam’s likely successor (unless it is his sons) would likely be greeted with such relief by the international community that Iraq could soon get out from under the punitive sanctions that have limited Saddam’s strategic ambitions. There is no guarantee that any of Saddam’s successors that come from within the regime will be any less anti-American than Saddam or that they will disband their WMD programs or abandon their wish to rebuild Iraq’s military conventional forces. Iraq has suffered great humiliation in the past 10 years; the desire for redemption and revenge is not restricted to Saddam Hussein alone.
The military choices facing the U.S. in event of a decision to use major force are formidable. A strategic air offensive without the use of ground forces has well known limitations. A ground offensive analogous to Desert Storm would take months to put in place, assuming we had access rights in the region. A more indirect strategy of subversion and guerilla warfare has no guarantee of success.
While airpower and missiles can wreak a great deal of damage on Iraqi facilities and demoralize Iraqi security forces, most notably the Republican Guards, there is no assurance such an operation would lead to the end of the regime. In the process we could anticipate a severe backlash throughout the Muslim world since a sustained bombing campaign would need to be more intense than anything witnessed during the Clinton administration. This would undoubtedly lead to civilian casualties, probably deliberately orchestrated by Saddam. Images of Iraqi suffering would be duly reported by the worlds’ media, particularly CNN and the Arab station Al-Jazeera. Under these circumstances the danger of polarizing the region against the United States would grow unless we were lucky and in the early days of an air campaign Saddam was either overthrown or killed.
If the Iraqi regime survived such an attack but was severely hurt another consequence could be chaos. An imploding Iraqi state could have a destabilizing impact on the neighborhood, particularly on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Iran. Of course events might turn out for the good, but the belief that a pro-Western Iraqi regime will emerge from the ashes of a strategic bombing campaign may be wishful thinking.
The only sure way to replace the Baathist regime is to invade and occupy Iraq. This is such a daunting challenge that it would require a far greater consensus amongst regional and international partners of the United States that is present today. While Iraqi forces are much weaker than in 1991, they may still have access to WMD and certainly possess short range surface to surface missiles. The occupation of an Arab country by American forces would reinforce Muslim radicals basic tenet that we are intent on waging a war against Islam.
Nevertheless under certain circumstances we may have no option but to take such a step. The political and logistical complications are formidable. Without major bases in Saudi Arabia it is difficult to invade from the south. Kuwait would likely make facilities available but this provides a very narrow base from which to accommodate a major American ground force and launch an invasion. If Saudi Arabia decided to support such an action and accept a large American military build up on its soil, the operation becomes much more favorable for the United States. However in 1990 Saudi Arabia itself was directly threatened by Saddam’s forces; today it is not. In fact the regime might become more vulnerable from within if it accommodated a huge American military presence.
As for coordinating a guerilla war using Iraqi opposition forces against Saddam this, too, requires bases in regional countries from which to support such action. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria have repeatedly made it clear they would not support such operations from their territory. Kuwait might reluctantly agree but the terrain in southern Iraq is open and not well suited to guerilla operations. Turkey and Iran are better suited but Iran will clearly not participate. Turkey might, but will continue to be extremely concerned about the role of the Kurds, given its fear of instability on the border and its own Kurdish problem.
What should we do if the evidence linking Saddam Hussein to September 11th is flimsy and inconclusive? First, we should not abandon the efforts to strengthen the sanctions regime. The present sanctions regime against Iraq is unraveling and up until September 11th regional support for Saddam Hussein was growing. The revised sanctions policy proposed by the administration deserves support. It is focused on four key issues.
First, the preservation of the UN "escrow" account and other measures directed against the regime’ s financial assets to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining additional revenues from increased commerce between Iraq and the outside world.
Second, giving Iraqis more freedom to purchase civilian goods thereby shifting responsibility to the regime for continued civilian suffering.
Third, the continuation of an embargo on all conventional weapons transfers to Iraq.
Fourth, a refinement of the list of prescribed dual use technologies that can assist Saddam Hussein’s efforts to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction.
These are realistic goals for which there is considerable international support.
It can be argued that under the new circumstances with greater Russian cooperation on a number of issues, President Putin may be prepared to go along with the U.S. proposal to tighten the sanctions regime on Saddam Hussein. China and France have offered support for a new sanctions regime. If it were to be implemented it could set the stage for reducing Saddam’s access to foreign currency.
In parallel we will have to provide more aid to Jordan and to convince Turkey and Iran that their interests are served by working with a new UN Security council resolution.
It will be difficult to ensure that goods and services which would now be free to move to Iraq do indeed reach the Iraqi people and are not pilfered by Saddam and his cohorts. Yet under these circumstances it would be less easy to criticize the sanctions as being against the Iraqi people. Saddam would now be demonstrably accountable for the suffering, not the UN.
Concerning enhanced support for Iraqi opposition forces outside Iraq, this issue arouses great controversy, both within the United States government and among our allies. Many military analysts have little expectation that any of the Iraqi opposition forces could at anytime soon provide the basis for a military challenge to Saddam Hussein. However the Iraqi opposition groups could and should be encouraged to remain active in the political arena and the propaganda war against the regime. Incremental support for the opposition can be pursued with additional support contingent upon progress in political de-legitimization efforts and opposition successes in the field. Pressure to broaden the appeal of the opposition among the various Iraqi clans, both Sunni and Shiite, should be made though we do need to find more specific groups we can effectively work with. Provision of lethal assistance could be considered based on future political progress. Under present circumstances, it would take a major political investment by the U.S. to make support for opposition groups more credible in the region.
A parallel effort must be made in the intelligence arena to seek ways to infiltrate and undermine the Saddam Hussein regime from without and from within. Deception and dirty tricks should be refined and implemented. No one doubts the difficulties of these types of operations, but clearly the most likely danger to Saddam himself is an uprising within his own Sunni organizations. Given the intensity of his security, this is a long shot, but one that should not be pursued.
Saddam Hussein is likely to behave egregiously at some point in the future. The U.S. therefore needs to make sure that regional allies understand American red lines and that we understand the limits of their support for future U.S. military action. Red lines remain an important element of our policy. Three red lines are most likely to continue to receive active Arab and Turkish support, as distinct from acquiescence.
First, Iraqi military threats or attacks on allied forces.
Second, Iraqi threats or attacks on neighboring states.
Third, Iraqi acquisition and deployment of weapons of mass destruction or their use, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
Red lines less likely to solicit active support include Iraqi aggression against the Northern Kurdish enclave and Iraq’s military support for Palestinians against Israel. There remains considerable room for ambiguity on these issues. For instance, most regional powers accept the US and UK right to defend aircraft patrolling in the NFZ by attacking Iraq’s anti-air capability. However, they are unlikely to support major retaliatory action against other Iraqi military and civilian targets.
The United States must be more assertive and aggressive in its public diplomacy. It should outline its hopes for Iraq and its people and state that they will be well treated and respected once the Saddam Hussein regime has gone. The U.S. has been losing the propaganda war and it should be a priority to retain the high ground on the matter of who is most responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people. The U.S. should lead international efforts to indict leading regime figures, including limiting their foreign travel and freezing their external bank accounts. Those who wish to profit from supporting present regime should be placed in position of having to defend it in light of its track record.
Our most effective short run strategy towards Iraq should be to keep Baghdad guessing as to what we are going to do. There is circumstantial evidence that since September 11th governments cozying up to Saddam and the dozens of companies seeking lucrative business deals have had second thoughts, not wanting to be seen acting against American interests or caught in the crossfire of military confrontation. If countries such as Turkey reassess their present favorable relations with Iraq, others might follow if they believe the U.S. is serious about eventual regime change. This could reverse the favorable momentum Saddam has been exploiting for the past year and could make it more difficult for Baghdad to reassert its presence in the region. For this reason the U.S. will have to walk a fine line between developing a more robust diplomacy while seeking regional support in preparing for a military response at some time in the future.