U.S. Policy Towards Iraq

Hearing of the House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

October 4, 2001

OPENING STATEMENT OF

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
A Representative from New York,
and
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

REP. GILMAN: (Sounds gavel.) The committee will come to order. During the prior administration, Congress was told that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was in a, quote, "strategic box." We were told that U.S. patrols over northern and southern Iraq were preventing Saddam from threatening his neighbors with conventional forces.

We were also told that the international sanctions were denying Saddam the revenues with which to rebuild large weapons of mass destruction. And were also told that Saddam Hussein was isolated in the international community.

The purpose of today's hearing is to question those assumptions and to discuss what Saddam Hussein has been up to nearly three years following the last U.N. weapons inspectors having left Iraq.

Iraq has adamantly refused to allow any new inspections, even while making the absurd claim that Iraq is no longer developing any mass destruction weapons. With Americans justifiably concerned about further terrorist attacks since September 11th, we want to know the extent to which Saddam has rebuilt his biological, his chemical and his nuclear weapon capabilities. September 11th has taught us how costly it is to be complacent. It has also taught us to pointedly challenge those who assert that aggressive terrorists or dictators are contained in boxes.

In point of fact, we can never be certain that dictators or terrorists are in any strategic box, as long as they are in power or at large.

Secretary of State Powell's targeted sanctions is intended to concentrate the efforts of the world community on denying Saddam technology and illicit revenue. Regrettably, however, it seems likely that it will allow Saddam to pick the lock of his cage and break down its door altogether. Accordingly, I very much doubt that the proposed approach will yield the hoped-for plugging up of leaks in the sanctions regime, leads for example that permitted a Chinese company to install new fiberoptic capable to link Iraq's air defense network and make it more effective against U.S. aircraft patrolling the skies over Iraq; leaks that allowed Iraq six years ago to import through Jordan Scud missile guidance systems from a Russian middle man. There is no reason to believe that Saddam should shrink from providing his weapons of mass destruction technology to terrorists, although there is not reason to believe that he has done so as of yet. We cannot rule out the possibility that a man who would kill 5,000 Iraqi Kurds in a poison gas attack in Halabja would contemplate the use of such weapons against American targets.

I am on record along with the chairman of the committee and many of the members of our committee as advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, it is officially declared U.S. policy to change Iraq's regime. There is no other way to fully and finally end the threat Iraq poses to our national security.

This is an important goal, whether or not Saddam has demonstrated to play a role in the September 11th attacks on our nation. We do not of course want to unnecessarily complicate the struggle we are currently undertaking against Osama bin Laden and terrorists of his ilk, but our nation should be able to chew gum and walk at the same time. At the earliest possible moment, which might be very soon, and certainly will have to come before we can declare total victory over terrorism, we must turn our attention toward ending a regime which we should have dismantled years ago. Saddam's regime continues to defy the will of the international community -- defies all norms of acceptable international behavior, as well as human rights norms. And while we are striking at other terrorists, we should end the regime of a master terrorist like Saddam.

Today we will hear from distinguished experts on Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programs, Geoffrey Kemp, Charles Duelfer, and Gary Milhollin. We'll introduce them in more detail after Mr. Ackerman has an opportunity to make an opening statement if he so desires. Mr. Ackerman?

OPENING STATEMENT OF

GARY ACKERMAN
A Representative from New York,
and
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

REP. GARY ACKERMAN (D-NY): Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today's hearing. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, I think it's important that we as a nation not lose sight of those states that in the past have wanted to do us harm. Indeed, in the case of Iraq, we have a state that clearly intends to do us harm in the future as well.

It is also appropriate for the subcommittee to take up this subject because at the end of November the United States will again have to make the case in the United Nations Security Council for continuation of sanctions on Iraq.

In past discussions of the sanctions issue we have heard a chorus of calls for the relaxation of sanctions from Russia, China, France and the Arab world, ostensibly because the sanctions hurt the Iraqi people. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we must be clear and emphatic that only Saddam Hussein hurts the Iraqi people. If he were to abide by the conditions laid out in the U.N. Security Council resolutions, conditions which he accepted and which the international community demanded, the sanctions would be lifted. But over the last decade, what we have seen is the continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq, in direct contravention of those resolutions.

But even if the sanctions remain, it is still Saddam Hussein who chooses not to use the money from the oil-for-food program to provide for the Iraqi people. Billions of dollars flow annually through that program, and yet somehow Iraqis continued to suffer, and Saddam built dozens of palaces, none of which appear to be edible. It is time for those outside of Iraq who lament the suffering of the people to acknowledge its true source.

Mr. Chairman, we must take back the public debate about sanctions, because for too long Saddam Hussein has portrayed himself and his people as the great victims of U.S. aggression. He has identified himself with the Palestinians and suggested that it is U.S. policy to repress both. It is time for this nonsense to stop. The United States government should be making an aggressive public case for our policy, and we should be making that case around the world.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 give us a new context in which to pursue our Iraq policy. The heinous acts of that day should serve as a reminder to our friends on the Security Council that Iraq is still a state sponsor of terrorism, and in this new global coalition to fight terror Iraq should remain on the terrorist target list rather than their targeted customer list.

The evidence that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attack is circumstantial. But if the United States does not continue with an aggressive policy towards Iraq, those nations which have been opposing sanctions will conclude, if they haven't already, that the status quo in Iraq is acceptable. This is an outcome that we must reject. Instead, we must seize upon this opportunity to press vigorously for continued sanctions. The evidence in support of this policy continues to be clear, as I believe we will hear this afternoon. Saddam Hussein continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction technologies and the means to deliver them. He therefore remains a threat to the region and to U.S. interests.

All of the reasons that the international community went to war in 1991 remain ten years later. A strong effective sanctions regime must remain an integral part of U.S. opportunity. The real question in Iraq no longer revolves around whether Saddam Hussein can be contained. The real question is whether the international community, and in particular his immediate neighbors, will recognize that as long as he remains the region and the world continue to be at significant risk.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from today's distinguished witnesses.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. I call on Mr. Chabot, our ranking minority member.

REP. STEVE CHABOT (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'll keep my remarks very brief so that we can --

REP. ACKERMAN: (?) He still is in the majority, Mr. Chairman. (Laughter.)

REP. GILMAN: Correct the record -- ranking majority member. (Laughter.)

OPENING STATEMENT OF

STEVE CHABOT
A Representative from Ohio

REP. CHABOT: Thank you. I'll keep my remarks brief so that we can get to the panel. I would just like to thank the chairman for holding this important hearing. And just from this member's point of view, I personally believe that Iraq, and Saddam Hussein in particular, ought to be -- I think he has given us more than enough reason to put him right up there with Osama bin Laden in this war against terrorism. And if we are serious about ending, destroying, stopping international terrorism, we absolutely have to target Saddam Hussein. And, you know, my principal concern, and I said this to a lot of -- I've spoken at a lot of schools back in my district, and they're -- some of the kids are a bit concerned about war and the possibility of a draft and that sort of thing. And what I said, and what I firmly believe is that the loss of life that this nation suffered just a few weeks ago in New York, and here in Washington, D.C. and in Pennsylvania, as terrible as it was pales in comparison to the potential loss of life next time if chemical or biological or, God forbid, nuclear weapons are used some time in the not-too-distant future in this country. And that's why it's absolutely critical that we prevail in this war against terrorism. And I believe Saddam Hussein has to be a principal target of that war. And I would urge the administration to include him in those people that we absolutely have to get rid of.

I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Mr. Hoeffel? Thank you. Mr. Lantos?

OPENING STATEMENT OF

TOM LANTOS
A Representative from California
and
Ranking Member, Committee on International Relations

REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I will just take a few moments to put my views on the record.

I was one of the handful of Democrats who supported George Bush a decade ago on the Persian Gulf war. It was not a particularly proud moment for my political party, because the majority of my colleagues were on the other side. But the president was correct, and the results as far as they went were satisfactory.

They obviously didn't go far enough. And the history books will be written from the vantage point of 100 years from now, the failure of the first Bush administration to get rid of Saddam Hussein once and for all will stand as one of the great policy mistakes of the end of the 20th century.

Now, our three distinguished witnesses have submitted superb testimony. I read every line of it, and I find it very convincing. Professor Kemp I think in his statement basically summarizes their conclusions: Saddam and his regime pose a growing danger to the Middle East and the United States. The regime cannot be rehabilitated. Therefore the goal of regime replacement should remain a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy options. I could not agree more.

I believe that the current war on global terrorism, so eloquently expressed by our president at the joint session a couple of weeks ago, lays out the formula. And it also lays out the sequencing. The number one task will be to get rid of bin Laden and his complex organization present in many countries. But as soon as that task is finished, this nation and our willing allies will have to move on to get rid of Saddam Hussein and other similar regimes. This regime, as Professor Kemp says, cannot be rehabilitated. It has to be destroyed, and it has to be displaced. And the American people will find the willpower to do so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Issa.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

DARRELL ISSA
A Representative from California

REP. DARRELL ISSA (R-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate greatly the opportunity to hear the knowledgeable -- and although I haven't read it all yet, I will read the package -- well written and insightful historic accounting. I am particularly looking forward to this committee, and hopefully the public, moving back toward where we were prior to September 11th and focusing on our obligation to isolate Iraq, and particularly in our programs that seem to have been long abandoned to reduce -- eliminate his ability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Like many people around the world, I am concerned with the consistent and continued problem of hunger and absence of good medical supplies for the Iraqi people. And I hope that all of us on this committee can work together, and I hope you can give us some insight on how we might do it, to find a way to provide humanitarian relief that actually gets to the people of Iraq, while continuing and improving the containment of Saddam Hussein. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will put the balance in the record.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Issa.

And Mr. Sherman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

BRAD SHERMAN
A Representative from California

REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have gotten some phenomenally bad public relations as to the effect of our sanctions. There are hungry children and an inadequate amount of medicine in Iraq. But we have saved millions of lives by insisting that these sanctions be there. If they were not, then every penny of Iraqi oil revenue would go directly to Saddam Hussein. He would have so many more palaces. He would have nuclear weapons. He would have tanks by the thousands, and the deaths would be in the millions from starvation.

I don't know whether we need humanitarian aid for Iraq, because frankly that is a country capable of producing oil revenue, enough to make it a relatively well-off country. But we have somehow got to explain to the world that these are not sanctions against Iraq but rather they are a control system to make sure that Iraq's oil revenue is used to buy food, medicine and the trucks to transport them. And in the absence of that, we would be looking at millions of Iraqi deaths. Never has a country saved so many civilians and gotten not only so little credit for it but actually been blamed for those who are dying.

As to clearing out Saddam Hussein's regime, I think our policy should be first bin Laden then the Taliban. And I think we would have substantial allies to do that. And then we would be in a position to make demands of the Iraqi regime, particularly as to U.N. inspectors. If they reject those demands, as I expect they would, then perhaps with fewer allies we could proceed down the road that the ranking member of this committee laid out for us. I yield back.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Cantor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

ERIC CANTOR
A Representative from Virginia

REP. ERIC CANTOR (R-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I too just want to thank the three distinguished panelists for being here today and sharing with us some of your outlook on the situation that we have with Iraq, and if I could just ask you in your remarks or at some point in your presentation to focus on the issue of Iraq's state sponsorship of terrorism. And, as you know, in the State Department's terrorism report, Iraq continues to provide safe haven and support to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups as well as bases, weapons and protection to an Iranian terrorist groups. Dozens of terrorist groups are supported by Saddam Hussein, and several maintain offices in Baghdad, including the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Front, and Abu Nidal. The PLF leader has appeared on state-controlled television to praise Iraq's leadership in rallying Arab opposition to Israel. And, furthermore, Saddam Hussein has offered $10,000 rewards to the families of the Palestinian suicide bombers.

So in your remarks, if you could, just share with us some of your knowledge as to the state sponsorship that Saddam Hussein is undertaking towards the terrorist movement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Kantor. Today's first witness is Geoffrey Kemp, a well-known expert on the region who served in the first Reagan administration as senior director for the Near Eastern affairs at the National Security Council. Earlier this year, Mr. Kemp co-chaired a prestigious working group on Iraq under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Kemp, your statement will be entered in full in the record, and you may summarize it if you prefer. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF

GEOFFREY KEMP
Director of Regional Strategic Programs
The Nixon Center

MR. KEMP: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to summarize for five minutes.

REP. GILMAN: Without objection, your full statement will be made part of the record. Would you press the button by your mike?

MR. KEMP: Is that --

REP. GILMAN: That's better. Thank you.

MR. KEMP: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm very honored to testify this afternoon on this very, very important subject.

Let me get straight to the point. If there is substantial and persuasive evidence that Iraq was directly involved in the attacks on September the 11th, the president has no option but to prepare for a major offensive against Iraq, including the use of military force. Its purpose would be the removal of the regime in Baghdad.

With compelling evidence, one would hope such action would have the direct support of NATO, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. However, if the evidence of an Iraqi connection is indirect, circumstantial and not credible to our key allies, the United States must pursue a longer- term strategy to undermine the regime.

Whatever the evidence, if we mount an operation to change the regime in Baghdad, we will have few regional allies. Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is intense and pervasive. Its causes are complex and are to be found in many more issues than the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In event of clear, substantive and persuasive evidence connecting Saddam to September 11th, the objective, as I said, must be the removal of the regime, as well as a coherent policy for a post-Saddam Iraq. There is no guarantee that any of Saddam's successors that come from within the regime will be any less anti-American than Saddam or that they will disband their WMD programs or abandon their wish to rebuild Iraq's military conventional forces.

Under the circumstances of Iraq being responsible in part for September 11th, the military choices the United States faces are formidable. While air power and missiles can wreak a great deal of damage on Iraqi facilities and demoralize Iraqi security forces, most notably the Republican Guards, there is no assurance such an operation would lead to the end of the regime.

In the process, we could anticipate a severe backlash throughout the Muslim world since a sustained bombing campaign would need to be more intense than anything witnessed during the Clinton administration. This would undoubtedly lead to civilian casualties, probably deliberately orchestrated by Saddam. While Iraqi forces are much weaker than in 1991, they may still have access to WMD and certainly they possess short-range surface-to-surface missiles. And my colleagues will talk in more detail about this, I believe.

The occupation of an Arab country by American forces would reinforce Muslim radical basic tenets that we are intent on waging a war against Islam. Nevertheless, we may have no option to take -- (inaudible). Kuwait would likely make facilities available, but this provides a very narrow base from which to launch an invasion. If Saudi Arabia decided to support such an action, the operation becomes much more favorable for the United States.

As for coordinating a guerrilla war using Iraqi opposition forces against Saddam, this too requires bases in regional countries. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria are unlikely to support such operations from their territory. Kuwait might agree, but the terrain in southern Iraq is not well-suited to guerrilla operations. Turkey and Iran are much better-suited, but Iran will clearly not participate. Turkey might, but will continue to be extremely concerned about the role of the Kurds, given its fear of instability on the border and its own Kurdish problem.

Now, what should we do if the evidence linking Saddam to September the 11th is flimsy and inconclusive? First, we should not abandon the efforts to strengthen the sanctions regime. The present regime against Iraq is unraveling. And up until September the 11th, regional support for Saddam Hussein was growing. The revived sanctions policy proposed by the administration deserves support.

Today President Putin may be prepared to go along with the U.S. proposal to tighten the sanctions regime. China and France have already agreed to. But for this to work, we will have to provide more aid to Jordan and to convince Turkey and Iran that their interests are served by working with a new U.N. Security Council resolution on sanctions.

The question of support for Iraqi opposition forces outside Iraq arouses controversy, both within the United States government and among our allies. Iraqi opposition groups could and should be encouraged to remain active in the political arena and the propaganda war against the regime. Provision of lethal assistance could be considered, based on future political progress. A parallel effort must be made in the intelligence arena to seek ways to infiltrate and undermine the Saddam Hussein regime from without and from within. Given the intensity of his security, this is a long shot but one we should pursue.

Irrespective of September the 11th, the U.S. needs to make sure that regional allies understand American red lines and that we understand the limits of their support for future U.S. military action. Three red lines are most likely to continue to receive active Arab and Turkish support, as direct from acquiescence: First, Iraqi military threats or attacks on allied forces; second, Iraqi threats or attacks on neighboring states; third, Iraqi acquisition and deployment of weapons of mass destruction or their use, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Red lines less likely to solicit active support include Iraqi aggression against the northern Kurdish enclave, which could be a real problem, and Iraq's military support for Palestinians against Israel. And here, to emphasize what several of you said on the panel, the United States must be more assertive and aggressive in its public diplomacy. It should outline its hopes for Iraq and its people once the Saddam Hussein regime has gone.

Our most effective short-run strategy towards Iraq should be to keep Baghdad guessing as to what we are going to do. There is circumstantial evidence that since September the 11th, governments cozying up to Saddam and the dozens of companies seeking lucrative business deals have had second thoughts, not wanting to be seen acting against American interests or caught in the crossfire of military confrontation. If countries such as Turkey reassess their present favorable relations with Iraq, others might follow.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. will have to walk a fine line between developing a more robust diplomacy while seeking regional support in preparing for a military response at some time in the future. Thank you.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Kemp. Next we'll hear from Charles Duelfer, who is one of the few experts who can attest from personal experience just how difficult it is to obtain information from Iraq on its weapons programs. He visited Iraq many times during his tenure as deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM, the special U.N. commission charged with dismantling Iraq's weapons programs. He's now a visiting scholar in the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Mr. Duelfer, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF

CHARLES DUELFER
Visiting Scholar, Middle East Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

MR. DUELFER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to have my written testimony submitted for the record.

REP. GILMAN: Without objection, we'll be pleased to make it part of the record. You may summarize.

MR. DUELFER: I'll summarize briefly and informally, and hoping in questions we can get to some of these points in more detail. Much of what I have to say would underline, I think, the comments made by members of your committee.

My comments, as you mention, draw upon my experience of having spent a lot of time in Iraq with all sorts of Iraqis, both very senior officials, Saddam's highest officials in charge of his weapons-of- mass-destruction program, his experts, and average Iraqis in the street.

Let me make first some comments on the weapons-of-mass- destruction threat, and then secondly I'll talk about some of the specific problems with the Iraqi regime. UNSCOM, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, and the IAEA accomplished a lot during the many years we spent chasing down these programs in Iraq. We accomplished a lot over the obstructions put in our way of the regime. We accounted for a lot of weapons of mass destruction, but there were some key remaining issues and some key uncertainties which were left.

Ultimately, Iraq successfully divided the Security Council and we found that the Security Council, all of its members, would not agree to pursue sufficient force to cause Iraq to fully comply.

But anyway, in this process we learned a few key things. One is the enormous value that Iraq attaches to weapons of mass destruction. I remember spending many long nights with top commanders trying to get them to explain how they planned on using them, why they were designing them, why they kept them. And it really boiled down to two points which they made.

One, in the war that they conducted with Iran, they believe that the use of chemical weapons saved them. Iran was using these human wave attacks, you may recall, and Iraq responded by using 101,000 chemical munitions. And they believe that they survived and prevailed in that war because of their possession of weapons of mass destruction.

Secondly, in the second Gulf war, they argue that the possession of weapons of mass destruction deterred the coalition and the United States from going to Baghdad. From their perspective, that's how they see it. It raises a question of who's deterring who in the region these days. But in any case, that's the view. They attach high importance to these weapons. It explains why they devoted so many resources, billions and billions of dollars, buildings, people, throughout decades.

Some of these weapons had military rationale. This is what we tried to explore from them. Some of them did not. Iraq would never explain what the rationale was for some of their biological weapons. UNSCOM was never able to get a full and concrete description of the purposes for some of these.

We all have our opinions, but it's not a pretty picture. It is for population modification. Killing their own population was one of the logical explanations. Iraq never said that. UNSCOM never stated that as a fact. But it's one of the logical reasons why they would have made some of these agents.

Remaining in Iraq is the intellectual capital to produce all of these. Remaining in Iraq is production equipment. Remaining in Iraq is at least a strategic reserve of these forces. And from what we are able to gather from many Iraqis who have left Iraq, these programs are still underway. Their full extent, their full capacity, can only be surmised. But no serious analyst believes that Iraq is not pursuing these programs and does not retain some capability. One can only assume that they continue to harbor ambitions of having a full array of these weapons, including nuclear.

A couple of comments about the regime and its behavior. America seems to think that the Gulf war ended in 1991. Baghdad doesn't. They are still at war. And, in fact, they make an argument that they have been successful and are probably winning the war. They believe that there's been an economic as well as a hot military war going on throughout the period. So there's definitely a difference in view between Washington and Baghdad on what's going on.

Their fight to erode sanctions has been largely successful. Even if new sanctions are put in place, Baghdad will see that as a success, because the type of sanctions and the type of enforcement are certainly less stringent than had existed originally.

Curiously, in a lot of my experience with senior officials and professionals in Iraq, it was astonishing that, in fact, they would like nothing better than to be reconnected with the West, with the rest of the world, and, curiously, the United States. The average Iraqi -- the professionals, the technocrats, the bureaucrats -- are all under the thumb of an onerous government.

But the people are the ones who are suffering, and that's where the real tragedy of this whole circumstance is, because if you look at what Iraq could be in the region, the potential for economic growth, for a growing society, for the proper utilization of oil revenues, with a different regime, with one that would behave by international norms, one that Washington could have relations with, it could change everything in the Middle East. Palestinians could be going to Iraq for schooling and for jobs.

This, to me, if you compare what Iraq could be with what Iraq is and what it is growing as a threat, there's a big difference. And the potential gain to me is worth some risk, because it really could change everything in the Middle East.

A couple of other brief comments. One good thing about Saddam Hussein is that he doesn't appear to be suicidal. And therefore, deterrence seems to work. This has been the one success, I suppose, of the last decade, and that is that we've been able to deter Iraq from invading again its neighbors, from using overtly some of the weapons which we know it possesses.

However, the question is if Baghdad were able to conduct an attack that we would not be able to link specifically to Baghdad, and the potential that we saw in his biological weapons program and some of the research activities which we saw them conducting seemed to indicate that they were looking at ways where they could conduct an activity or a strike that would not be able to be connected with Iraq.

I'll just ask you to envision. If you went up to Saddam Hussein and said, "Hey, boss, I've got a way of responding to the economic hardships that have been imposed on us by the United States; we can cause them some damage, and they will never be able to connect that to you," what would he do?

So we've got a problem if all we do is rely on deterrence. And I say this simply to say that treating this problem incrementally, continuing to kick the problem down the road, may be a recipe for a long-term disaster. I subscribe to those of you who said this is a problem that's got to be dealt with. Managing it and deferring it is not going to work. So far the regime has not done us the favor of collapsing on its own. I think it's going to need some help.

Thank you very much.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Duelfer. We'll next hear from Gary Milhollin, who's the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, perhaps the most authoritative center for the study of proliferation issues in our nation. Mr. Milhollin has produced volumes of work on Iraq's efforts to obtain weapons-related technology.

Mr. Milhollin, you may put your full statement in the record and summarize however you may desire.

STATEMENT OF

GARY MILHOLLIN
Director
The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

MR. MILHOLLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have three items that I would like to add to the record.

REP. GILMAN: Without objection.

MR. MILHOLLIN: They are findings from a roundtable that we conducted recently, an article from Commentary Magazine, and a table in the New York Times.

REP. GILMAN: Would you identify the conference and the article dates? Could you identify those dates?

MR. MILHOLLIN: Just a moment. The roundtable has just been put on our website in the last few days.

REP. GILMAN: And where was that conducted, and the date of the roundtable?

MR. MILHOLLIN: The date of the roundtable was May 24th, 2001. It was -- it was conducted here in Washington.

REP. GILMAN: All right.

MR. MILHOLLIN: And the article in Commentary Magazine was published in the July/August edition, 2001. And the table in the New York Times dates from 1998. We -- we prepared the table just after the inspectors left.

REP. GILMAN: Without objection, they'll be received in the record. Did you wish to summarize your statement.

MR. MILHOLLIN: Yes.

REP. GILMAN: And your full statement will be made part of the record.

MR. MILHOLLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will just make a few comments about the threat that I see from Iraq that is still retained after inspections ended, and then I'll make some comments about the administration's sanctions proposals.

First of all, I think we -- it's very important to remember what Saddam Hussein appears to have left. And I'll just go down the programs one at a time.

In biological weaponry, the experts that I have spoken to, who seem to be the foremost ones, believes that Saddam Hussein is now essentially self-sufficient -- that Iraq has the strains, the equipment, and the know-how necessary to make biological weapons -- that it is pretty much independent now of imports. We know that Iraq did not account for all the biological agent that it made before the Gulf War, and we know that it produced anthrax. I think a reasonable assumption is that that capability still exists and is an active threat.

With respect to nuclear weapons, Iraq, we discovered during inspections, has a workable nuclear weapon design. The inspectors look at it carefully and judged that it will work. We know that Saddam Hussein made most if not all of the components of the nuclear weapon, and that the only thing lacking to have a successful bomb is the fissile material needed to fuel it, which in the case of Iraq's design, the latest design I know of, is about 15 to 16 kilograms of high-enriched uranium. If Iraq could acquire that somehow on the international black market, I think we'd have to assume that Iraq could make a bomb within in weeks, months at the most.

Chemical weapons. Iraq retains, in the judgment of the inspectors at least, stocks of chemical agent. The quantity is unknown. We do know that Iraq knows how to make VX, which is the most lethal nerve agent, and we know that Iraq is capable now of producing more VX. We don't know what Iraq might be doing with respect to VX because we don't have any inspectors in the country.

Missiles. Iraq, under U.N. resolutions, is allowed to develop missiles that fly up to 150 kilometers. Unfortunately, the technologies necessary to master a missile that flies up to 150 kilometers is transferable. That same technology can be used to make missiles that fly much farther than that. We know that Iraq appears to be hiding some of the SCUD-type missiles it had during the Gulf War, and also appears to be hiding a substantial number of components for those missiles.

All of this capability, and it's a massive capability, has been built up through imports. Iraq has bought from abroad just about everything it needed for its programs. And the important thing I think to point out here is that the procurement activity did not stop with the beginning of sanctions. It has continued through the 1990s. I'll just give you some examples of things that I have -- my organization has discovered.

In 1998, Iraq ordered some machines from Siemens in Germany to pulverize kidney stones inside the body. These are known as lithotripter (sp) machines. Unfortunately, in each machine is a high- precision electronic switch that is also used to detonate nuclear weapons. Iraq ordered 120 switches as spare parts. Siemens says they supplied eight -- one for each machine and two spares. The State Department seems to think that Iraq got even more than that, and the last time I talked to the U.N., they seemed to think that there was a risk that the number was even higher. This is an -- the reason, I should say, that this export happened was because medical equipment is an exception -- or was at that time -- to the embargo.

So, one of the risks we're facing in Iraq is that Iraq will procure things under the guise of civilian equipment, humanitarian equipment, medical equipment, oil equipment, that will in fact have other -- have other purposes -- arms, or weapons of mass destruction.

In the Commentary Magazine article that I submitted, my colleague, Kelly Motts (sp) and I managed to track Saddam's efforts to buy forbidden missile parts from Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The Iraqis sent delegations to the Ukraine, to Belarus, Romania, and Russia. In each country -- this is during the embargo -- they made contracts which were -- would be illegal to perform in each of those countries, and the inspectors know that some things were delivered. The problem is that the inspectors found documents but they didn't find -- they didn't find much of the equipment that was described in the contracts. So, we're faced with the problem that we know Iraq contracted for lots of missile components. We don't know how -- how many components were actually -- actually delivered.

The inspectors reported that the shopping list included, quote, "turnkey facilities, know-how, and raw materials." The Iraqis had a very aggressive shopping list. The -- already today we've mentioned the episode with technologies, the Chinese company that's helping Iraq improve its air defenses with fiber optic technology. It's important to know that that company was built up with U.S. help. It imported a great amount of sensitive U.S. equipment with license -- under licenses from the Commerce Department. And when I read about this company, it had an import license pending for Motorola. It's not true that the United States is totally innocent in this -- in these affairs. What we're seeing is that exports from the United States, for example, to China, wind up biting us in Iraq.

I'd like to make a few comments about smart sanctions -- the administration's proposal. I think -- from my -- from what I can gather from this proposal, and from the situation in Iraq, it seems to me unlikely that it's going to make the situation better. Saddam Hussein is using the suffering of the Iraqi people as a lever against the world. The objection is -- his objective is to use the suffering to create momentum sufficient to give him control over his own bank accounts. So, just because we're allowing Iraq to buy more civilian equipment, doesn't mean that the Iraqi people will be -- will be -- will be helped.

This proposal, the smart sanctions proposal, does make it easier for Saddam Hussein to import sensitive technology. Under the smart sanctions approach, the U.N. will only be reviewing a small fraction of the contracts that it's now reviewing. That means that there's a significant risk that dual-use equipment or arms are going to go into Iraq under the guise of civilian equipment. And it's important to notice that we're not getting anything in exchange for the relaxation in import controls on Iraq. That is, there is no quid pro quo coming from the Iraqi direction. Iraq has not agreed to disarm, to permit inspectors to come in, or to take any other steps.

There is also the problem of oil smuggling. It's getting worse. The amount of oil now being smuggled out without U.N. control is growing, and it looks like it's going to grow more in the future. We estimate that it's above $2 billion now, probably closer to four. And we have to assume that all of that money can be looked at as sort of an arms index. Iraq gets more for its oil by shipping it legitimately through the oil for food program. To smuggle it out, Iraq has to sell it for less. So, why should Iraq do that? Why does it want to get less money for its exports in order to launder the money, to get it free of U.N. control? Answer: either to prop up the regime, or buy arms. So, we can tell how much -- well, we can tell how fast the risk is growing by looking at the amount of oil that's being smuggled out.

I don't know of any links directly between Iraq and the events of September 11th. There have been some meetings reported in the press, but there's no evidence that I'm aware of that links Saddam Hussein to the attacks.

I think overall we have pretty much lost the public relations battle on sanctions, so I recommend that our government make a -- a better effort to take our case to the public and the world. We have a good case, we're just not making it very well. So, I think that's the first recommendation I would make, is we have to take our case to the world.

Second, I think we should -- we have to do something to bring Russia back into the fold. Russia is asking as Saddam Hussein's lawyer in the United Nations. If Russia wants to be part of the solution to the terrorism threat, then Russia can start by helping us on Iraq, which it is not doing at the present time.

And then finally, there has to be some kind of a solution for the front line states. They are now cooperating in oil smuggling. If we want to keep Saddam's bank accounts under international control, that has to be stopped. We have to find a formula for bringing the front line states into line. And I -- I'm afraid that so far I don't see one.

Thank you very much.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Milhollin. And I want to thank our panelists for their excellent testimony. We'll now call on Mr. Ackerman for questioning.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do I understand that the three of you would answer yes to the question, should we take out Saddam Hussein? Mr. Kemp?

MR. KEMP: I think we -- I mean, certainly my view is the regime has to be changed. The question is how do we do it, when do we do it, and who do we do it with? Those are the operational questions that I think we're -- I don't think there's any doubt that this regime, the longer it stays, the more dangers we're going to have because all the --

REP. ACKERMAN: Are you suggesting there's other than a military option to take out the regime? A public relations effort or --

MR. KEMP: I think -- I think you need a multifaceted strategy, and that dependent upon what the linkage is between Saddam Hussein and what happened on September the 11th, clearly if it were a direct link we would have no option but to consider a military force. But, in the absence of that, the most important thing we have to do is to pull together an alliance that will take seriously the long-term threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

REP. ACKERMAN: Let me -- let me -- let me zip to the -- to the end game of this. It would seem to me you're indicating putting together a strategy, not to get a Democratic or Republican convention that screams, "it's time for him to go" or something and puts up a different candidate, but you want an international coalition built on whatever kind of evidence, so that people understand and know that he's a bad guy, and then when they do that, we've won the public relations battle, and then lead a military effort to take him out? Or is there some other way to take him out? In the end, no matter -- let's say -- let's say 99 percent of the world agrees with us, it's time for him to go -- what -- how do you do this? Does it have to be military, or is there some other notion that anybody has?

REP. KEMP: I'm certain there are intelligence options that have not worked in the past, but then, I don't think we've taken this as seriously as we should in the past, and therefore I would not say military options are the only ones.

REP. ACKERMAN: I am hard pressed to think of another. If anyone could suggest one in your answer. Mr. Duelfer?

MR. DUELFER: Well, I think what Mr. Kemp is suggesting is you can conduct cover activities, but who knows how successful they will be?

REP. ACKERMAN: What do the covert activities do?

MR. DUELFER: Well, presumably you attempt to build an opposition within Iraq. But, you know, as we have seen in the past, that is a highly suspect endeavor. If you --

REP. ACKERMAN: Does anybody -- part of the same question -- does anybody seriously think that you are going to go back to the original premise that you are going to get the people of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein in his lifetime? Or in the end is it a military option? When you say intelligence, when you say covert, when you say all these things, somebody is going to hit the guy -- is that what we're saying? Or are we going to -- are we thinking -- is anybody seriously thinking we are going to bring enough democracy while Saddam Hussein is there to get them to -- when is the election, by the way? I didn't notice -- (laughter) --

MR. DUELFER: He won the last election with 99 percent of the vote.

REP. ACKERMAN: Yeah, okay, fine. So we only have to convince, you know, another how many percent, 49? Another 50 percent, and we've got him.

MR. DUELFER: Ninety-nine.

REP. ACKERMAN: Is there a way other than a military option in the end? And when I mean military, it could be some kind of covert -- you know, it could be a military one.

MR. KEMP: I would argue yes, if you take it seriously and do not expect instant results. In other words, it is going to take a whole new culture of creating sort of covert operations once more, and it's going to take a long time, and it's probably going to take a lot of money.

REP. ACKERMAN: Mr. Milhollin?

MR. MILHOLLIN: Mr. Ackerman, I would say there may be a lesson to be learned from what we are doing now with respect to Osama bin Laden. I think we can all see in order even to conduct a military operation against Osama bin Laden, a lot of diplomatic preparation is necessary. And so I would think that if you are going to conduct such an operation against Saddam Hussein that you are going to have to go through a similar process of preparations. I am not sure that we can do both at once. But that doesn't -- I don't mean to say that I would be opposed to doing that in Iraq, it's just that -- I think that's how you would have to do it. You'd have to do the kind of steps that we are doing now with respect to Osama bin Laden.

REP. ACKERMAN: Yes, so what you are saying then, Mr. Milhollin is that if we build an international coalition of some sort, engage and win over public opinion internationally to a large extent, then use the military option once the world is on our side?

MR. MILHOLLIN: I think that's how you would have to do it. Otherwise it would be -- the cost would be very great in just going in and doing it unilaterally.

REP. ACKERMAN: Do you see us in any way during the lifetime of Saddam's regime being able to convince the Iraqi people to rise up and overthrow him?

MR. MILHOLLIN: I am not an expert on domestic Iraqi politics, but I think any observer can see that he has a regime of terror, and it's very effective, and we know that other regimes of terror in the world have lasted a long time. So I am quite pessimistic that we are going to get some kind of internal revolt that would be successful.

REP. ACKERMAN: I'll yield back my time for another round.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. Cantor.

REP. CANTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And if I could just pose the question about this reign of terror and how Saddam has sort of sustained himself in power all these years given the trends in the other countries in the region and their, if you will, their fragility. How is it he has been able to sustain himself so well, if you will? And what is the state of any opposition within Iraq? And, again, if you could comment towards the terrorist side and the sponsorship of any groups that are conducting themselves in the Middle East?

MR. KEMP: Well, I would argue, Mr. Cantor, that his first, second and third priority is to stay in power, and therefore everything derives from that. The way he does it is quite simple: he has enough hard currency from the illegal sales of oil to pay off all the security details he needs, and he is utterly, utterly ruthless about his own protection. And it's virtually impossible, it seems to me, to break into that security system, unless there is some collapse from within.

Now, with regard for his support for terrorist groups, undoubtedly Saddam has extremely close ties with many of the terrorist groups throughout the Middle East. But my sense is that he's fairly cautious about having his fingerprints identified with their actions, and that's why I am dubious that we will ever find any direct compelling link between Saddam and Osama bin Laden and September 11th. But I would stand corrected if that evidence comes forward, but it hasn't done so far.

This is a man who knows how to survive. And what we have to do is to understand that as long as he has access to hard currency, his ability to purchase all the wherewithal to, A, remain in power, and B, expand his weapons inventory, is going to grow. Therefore the problem is going to get worse, not better. And I think the dilemma that we are all struggling with is: How do you end this, absent the sort of coalition we had in 1990 and 1991? Could you replicate the coalition that we have put together now for Afghanistan? I have grave doubts about this at this point in time. But there is an argument that goes as follows: If we succeed in getting rid of bin Laden and the Taliban regime, we will have put the world on notice that we are dead serious. We may be able to hold together some key members of this new alliance that we have put together, including the Russians, to then focus on other serious problems in the Middle East. But we should have no illusions that these other alliance partners are going to go along completely with our agenda, because they have all got their own agendas -- the Russians have Chechnya, the Chinese have other problems, the Europeans have other problems. So it's going to be a long, difficult operation. But I don't think it's impossible.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Cantor.

Mr. Berman.

REP. BERMAN: There are a lot of issues to explore, but maybe I'll go from the narrow to the broader. I am fascinated by this notion that in this period of sanctions post 1991, the kind of technologies that have hemorrhaged to Iraq at a time when Russia and all the other countries for which we have major differences, for instance on export strategies in the context of Iran, are committed to at least a certain level of controls.

Let me just take two examples to understand this. Mr. Chairman, do I have 30 seconds before it went to --

REP. GILMAN: No, we are resetting the time. Please proceed.

REP. BERMAN: First let's take this Siemens export. First, what are the electronic switches for in the context of WMD programs, the electronic switches you talked about, what are they for?

MR. MILHOLLIN: They provide a very strong, accurate pulse of electricity that is necessary to detonate the high explosives that causes implosion.

REP. BERMAN: So this is for the nuclear program?

MR. MILHOLLIN: This is for a nuclear weapons.

REP. BERMAN: Okay, I've got it.

MR. MILHOLLIN: It's hard to do a nuclear weapons without one of these.

REP. BERMAN: All right.

MR. MILHOLLIN: And the ones in the machine are particular good for nuclear weapons.

REP. BERMAN: Now, when a company like Siemens -- this isn't your fly-by-night little importer/exporter -- gets a request from an Iraqi end user, not for eight kidney stone smashers, but for eight electronic switches supposedly to replace switches in a kidney stone smasher, in a country where the medical conditions are such that my guess is that kidney-stone smashing is not the major priority of the Iraqi government or the Iraqi people at this particular moment. They've got enough pain beyond the kidney stones. What happens in the corporate mentality of Siemens, or in the export control regime of Germany, if this was exported from Germany, that says we are going to let this go? And that's one issue I'd guess I'd like an answer.

The second one is on the fiberoptics. I remember the Iraqi air defense system, I remember the French helping the Iraqis build it. I remember the Desert Storm coalition knocking it out. You're telling me they are now replacing their air defense system using fiberoptics? Explain a little more clearly what you meant, what came from China, what was China able to develop that they got from the United States? So if you could just address both of those issues.

MR. MILHOLLIN: I'll take the first one first. In the case of Siemens, there is an exception in the U.N. resolution for medical equipment --

REP. BERMAN: I understand that.

MR. DUELFER: For Siemens to sell a machine, a lithotripter, with a switch in it that would be highly useful to detonate a nuclear weapon, Siemens would have to make a corporate judgment that the risk is worth taking. I don't think that's a good judgment. Then Siemens would have to get an export license from the German government, which then it would have to make the decision that that's a risk worth taking.

REP. BERMAN: But you're telling me Siemens didn't even sell the machine with the electronic switch. They sold --

MR. MILHOLLIN: No, they sold the machine with the switches. They sold six machines with switches, plus two spares.

REP. BERMAN: Oh, I'm sorry, okay, okay.

MR. MILHOLLIN: So they sold eight switches -- according to Siemens -- that's what Siemens told me. Whether the additional switches were sold is another question, and frankly --

REP. BERMAN: No, just --

MR. MILHOLLIN: I think it's a little unclear how many they actually got, but I think it's pretty clear that Siemens was ready to sell however many the export control people in the German government would approve.

REP. BERMAN: Is this a case where Siemens is putting its head in the sand knowing there is no practical way in the world, given the priorities of Iraq these days, they would want six of these kidney- stone smashing machines, knows -- has every reason to believe it's the highly valued electronic switches that they want, and saying, Ah, but a deal is a deal, and we can make some money, and we are going to do it?

MR. MILHOLLIN: It's hard for me to put myself in the position of Siemens, but I can say that I have been tracking exports and imports as you know for a long time. And Siemens is a company that keeps coming up. For example, Libya has two poison gas plants. In those poison gas plants there is a process control computer. In both plants the process control computer was made by Siemens. I don't have my Siemens book with me today, but Siemens is a name that is quite familiar with me. So I think it's just -- Siemens has to stand before the tribunal of world opinion and decide what to say. I am not going to make Siemens' argument. I think it's -- I don't think it was as good sale, let's put it that way.

REP. BERMAN: It's easier to bash them than to bash us. Go to the fiberoptic transfer in the time we have.

MR. MILHOLLIN: Well, in the case of the fiberoptics, the company that provided it, Allway Technologies, was a very small company until U.S. companies started doing joint ventures with it, and started exporting it sensitive U.S. equipment. And since then it's become a giant.

REP. BERMAN: And is this sensitive U.S. equipment on the commodity control list?

MR. MILHOLLIN: Yeah, licensed by the Commerce Department.

REP. BERMAN: So this was approved, licensed --

MR. MILHOLLIN: Approved, licensed by the Commerce Department to Allway. And then Allway did --

REP. BERMAN: And is there any effort in that to control end use and prohibit retransfers of items manufactured, or in the area of fiberoptics do we not care what the company --

MR. MILHOLLIN: Well, some of the exports were of instruments and computers, not just fiberoptics. And I -- you know, the Chinese have not been very cooperative in allowing us to verify what they do with things we sell them. So my guess is there is little or no control on what Allway does with what we sell Allway.

REP. BERMAN: All right, this is interesting, and my time is up. So --

REP. GILMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Berman.

I have just a few questions that I'd like to address to the panel. First of all, can you panelists tell me what is the state of economy today in Iraq -- good, bad, growing, declining? I'd ask that to all of the panelists. Mr. Duelfer?

MR. DUELFER: Perhaps I can address that just from personal observation. When I was last there was 1998. It was bad of course. The average Iraqi was selling his possessions on the street. You would go to take a cab, and you'd find a university professor driving it. Perhaps the best measure is that before the Gulf War an Iraqi dinar was worth three and a half dollars. These days an Iraqi dinar -- or, excuse me, a dollar will get you 2,000 Iraqi dinars. So you know we would spend -- we used wads of dinars -- you know, you get a wad about an inch thick, and that was the unit you measured. So if you had your personal savings in Iraq, as most of the citizens do, it went effectively to zero.

Now, in the last couple of years, under the oil-for-food program and with the illegal oil sales supplementing the incomes of the elite, from visitors who have been there I understand there I understand there's a lot more new cars around. But, again, you have to be connected to the regime. You can buy anything you want in Baghdad for a price. You can buy these jet skis to go run up and down the Tigris River, if you have the cash. But if you -- you have got to be a loyal member of the regime to get the cash.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Kemp?

MR. KEMP: Well, I'd answer you this way, Mr. Chairman, that Iraq is clearly better off than it was several years ago because oil prices have gone up and Iraq has been exporting more oil. But its potential for being a strong player economically is enormous. Iraq's oil reserves are second only to Saudi Arabia, and that over time if Iraq were to get out from under sanctions, were to start importing all the necessary equipment to refurbish its oil production capability, Iraq could be up to three or four million barrels a day, and get back to the sort of growth levels that it had before Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. At that point Iraq was on the verge of an economic takeoff. This is a country that in those days had a strong middle class, and that could all come back. So we are dealing here with a country that has huge potential, and that's why that potential in the hands of Saddam Hussein is so potentially dangerous.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you. Mr. Milhollin, do you wish to comment?

MR. MILHOLLIN: No, I have no comment on that.

REP. GILMAN: Gentlemen, what's the relationship now between Iran and Iraq? Any comments? Mr. Kemp?

MR. KEMP: They still have not resolved a lot of the issues after the war ended in '88. There's still a big POW problem. The Iraqis permit this organization, the mujaheddin-e-khalq to operate out of Iraq against Iran. Iran regards these as terrorists. Iran in turn has taken several military forays into Iraq to follow these mujaheddin. So relations are not good, but they have been getting better.

I think the most serious problem we face, and the long-term problem, is that the Iranians themselves are clearly thinking, talking and acting in the sense of going nuclear at some point in the future. And the issue that is most important for them is Iraq. So if we do not resolve the issues of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, we can be guaranteed that Iran will either follow suit, or is already following suit. And that puts us in a whole new ballgame.

REP. GILMAN: Any other panelists wish to comment?

MR. DUELFER: Just briefly. The relations are bad. When something would blow up in Baghdad, and it wasn't the United States, it was probably Iran, that was in back of that. So --

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Milhollin?

MR. MILHOLLIN: I'd like to just add to what Mr. Kemp has said. Right now I think we have to consider that Iran and Iraq are in an undeclared nuclear arms race. If you look at Iran, it has Pakistan on one side, which is nuclear-armed; Iraq on the other, which is trying to get nuclear arms. And so the Iranians are under a lot of pressure to develop nuclear arms. And if they do, then I think if Iran and Iraq manage to develop nuclear weapons, then you are going to have to start worrying about Egypt and Turkey and Saudi Arabia. So it's -- nothing is more important than keeping those two countries from getting the bomb.

REP. GILMAN: Are either one -- well, let's concentrate on Iraq. Is Iraq training and exporting terrorism? Any comment by any of our panelists? Do you have any knowledge of that? Mr. Kemp?

MR. KEMP: Oh, undoubtedly, they're up to no good. I mean, I cannot give you the nuts and bolts, but Iraq clearly has a very sophisticated intelligence service, and clearly they talk to other groups around the world who hate the United States. Exactly how involved they have been in various terrorist incidents is a matter of great debate amongst analysts in this town.

I don't have any conclusive evidence of their involvement in terrorist attacks recently against the United States, but I certainly wouldn't put it past them. I think it's an issue that you should explore with the intelligence services, because clearly if there is that link, then we have to take the issue even more seriously than we have done so far.

REP. GILMAN: Any of the other panelists? Mr. Milhollin?

MR. MILHOLLIN: No comment on that.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Duelfer?

MR. DUELFER: Well, I have to limit a bit what I say, because a lot of what I learned was under U.N. auspices, and we had one function and that was weapons of mass destruction. So when we would stumble across a lot of the other activities of the Iraqi government, no matter what they were, I mean, that was not part of our mandate.

Having said that, we stumbled across a lot in our wandering about Iraq. And my view is that there's certainly a lot of support to terrorist groups, and I would believe a lot of what I have seen about the types of groups based there and the types of training that has been going on. But I think I would have to second what Geoff Kemp has said about the relationship with this particular act of September 11th.

I frankly would be somewhat surprised if there was a command relationship between Baghdad and that event. Equally, though, I would be surprised, very surprised, if there were not a relationship between the Iraqi intelligence services and the al Qaeda networks in some fashion, either from financial perhaps expertise and trading information.

REP. GILMAN: My time has run. Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you very much. I think all three of you have said, in one way or another, what Mr. Kemp said directly, and that's we've lost the sanctions case and that we have to take our case to the world.

Moving on from that, trying to figure out how you do that and if you can do that, the issue of the nuclear arms race that Mr. Duelfer, you just referred to in your former capacity as the deputy executive chairman of the U.N. Special Commission, UNSCOM -- and then I guess it's acting director until its abolition -- some of our friends in the international community, presumably those to whom we would take our case, being an important part of the world, are our friends on the Security Council.

They have called you and your associates all kinds of names -- I guess being a spy was among the most kind -- for your determined insistence to be able to inspect, according to the international mandate, the places at which they were either storing or producing materiel or indeed weapons of mass destruction. They've taken some pretty heavy hits at you, and I just want to give you your shot. (Laughter.)

But having made that available here, I also want you and the others to address how in the world do we take our case when we have China and France and Russia -- you know, permanent members of the Security Council, at least in one certainly a leading democracy, certainly in all three cases countries willing to sell their soul for a prospective market to be able to do business with Iraq -- how do we even think we're going to be able to take our case to the World Court if we need to build this coalition going back to what we have to do before we change the regime, which everybody says we have to do one way or another? That's a long, run-on-sentence question, so take the rein and run with it.

MR. DUELFER: Let me see if I can sound an optimistic note in recent events. I think that, you know, September 11th we focused the attention in a lot of capitals, because I think they quickly realized that the threat was not just to the United States but it was to the world economy. It was to the world system, which they had all enormous stakes.

With respect to the U.N. Security Council in the particular case of Iraq, I mean, I'm with you. A lot of these so-called friends and allies, they were getting a free ride with Iraq. You know, they could make deals. They could criticize the United States. They could criticize UNSCOM. They could behave irresponsibility, because they knew if, at the end of the day, Iraq did something nutty again, the United States would save the day, that the United States forces were there, that they would contain Saddam and his regime. And so they could have a free rein.

I think the United States should have gone much further in terms of holding their feet to the fire. These countries, which are happily making oil contracts with the same people who happily used gas against their own population, as some of you have pointed to, they should not be allowed to forget that. They should not be allowed to effectively convey legitimacy on this regime through their dealings with it.

It was much easier, it turned out, for the Security Council to modify UNSCOM than it was to modify Iraq. And let me just interject a thought here. A lot of people are talking about "Let's get Iraq to accept weapons inspectors again." Well, I dare say, be careful about what type of weapons inspectors might be accepted into Iraq, because they may not be serious under the conditions that Iraq might potentially accept them.

But I agree with the thrust of your question. The Council, I think, was behaving irresponsibly. They were taking a very short-term view. But I think, under current circumstances, with leadership, the international community can perhaps refocus it, but if not, we've got to be able to go on our own. We can't be allowed, you know, to have to visit Lilliput and be tied up by some of these people if they're not going to agree.

REP. ACKERMAN: Mr. Milhollin.

MR. MILHOLLIN: I think it's true that both the French and the Russians are motivated primarily by money. That is, the rhetoric they put out is that they're concerned for the Iraqi population. I don't think that's true. It's just a matter of money.

In my experience, the way to counteract people who are motivated by money is to shame them out of their position. And we haven't been successful in that. I would say that if we want to succeed, we're going to have to put leading officials, meaning the secretary of State, the president, the vice president, out in public. And they're going to have to lay out the case against Iraq. They're going to have to shame countries like Russia and France from the positions they're taking. And I haven't seen it happen. And I guess I'm an optimist. I think you can do it. It's just that we haven't really -- we haven't made it a high priority. And I think we could.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GILMAN: The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Berman.

MR. MILHOLLIN: Could we just have Mr. Kemp respond to that?

REP. GILMAN: Sorry. Mr. Kemp, go ahead.

MR. KEMP: Well, I think the two points I'd make here is I think the previous administration made a deliberate calculation that they put a priority on the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, which I think was a reasonable thing to do, but they did not want to stir up this hornet's nest of Iraq at the same time, because it would have meant treading on a lot of toes at a very delicate time.

Now, I think I agree with my colleagues where it's a whole new ball game now. I mean, and September the 11th has changed everything. But we should not, I think, underestimate the resistance we're going to get to a more proactive Iraq policy in the region. I think it will be frankly easier to get the Russians and Chinese on board now, because they have different agendas and they ultimately see this as an opportunity to work with us.

But I think for our Arab friends in the region, Iraq is still a huge dilemma, because there is enormous support on the street for the plight of the Iraqi people, which they wrongly blame us for, but as we've all agreed, we have yet to reverse that image. And therefore, perhaps the first thing we have to do is, while we're corralling Russia and China in New York, we also have to take the case to the region to make it clear that we are very, very concerned about the plight of the ordinary Iraqi people and that it would be the American policy, following the demise of Saddam Hussein and his regime, to work as diligently as we could to help rebuild the country and to bring back some semblance of hope for these people.

REP. GILMAN: The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Berman.

REP. BERMAN: Mr. Kemp, you think some part of Iran's motivation for their nuclear program is the Iraqi nuclear program?

MR. KEMP: Absolutely, and their chemical program and their biological program and their missile program. After all, Iran suffered from major chemical attacks from Iran.

REP. BERMAN: Yes. Do you think that, knowing that that -- with the absence of that program or the knowledge that that program had been discontinued or that intervening events have taken care of that problem, change, would that affect Iran's decision to pursue those systems?

MR. KEMP: Well, if you'd asked me that a year ago, I'd have probably said it would slow it down. But I think what we have to accept as happened in the last three weeks is that by essentially ending our sanctions on Pakistan, by ending sanctions on India, after years and years of making proliferation on the subcontinent a priority of American policy, we are essentially grandfathering India and Pakistan into the nuclear club.

And the Iranians are preoccupied with -- they're preoccupied with Iraq, but they're also preoccupied with Pakistan. And therefore, I think that certainly Iraq is a big factor in their calculations, but now Pakistan is going to be up there, too. Of course, they worry about Israel as well, but fundamentally it would slow them down. And if we had better relations with them, it would give us an opportunity to help discuss alternatives with them. But I'm very skeptical that you're going to change their mindset at this point in time.

REP. BERMAN: How would you characterize -- I guess, at least prior to September 11th, how would you characterize this administration's policy towards Iraq on --

MR. KEMP: They didn't have one. It was under review, as I understand it. I think what's interesting about this administration's actions before September 11th is that they had not made any major comprehensive statement about the Middle East, covering the peace process, Iran, Iraq, energy. There was no major speech. Now, I understand that they were preparing to do this, if the New York Times is to be believed, irrespective of September 11th. But I do think now it'll be incumbent upon them to put this all into the perspective of a new policy.

REP. BERMAN: I think that's a great way to build a coalition now is you -- "Here's what we were going to say before September 11th," and you can really build your base. So the debate; I mean, for anybody around Washington, it's quite clear that a lot of people who now have important positions in the Bush administration had very definitive views on a much more assertive policy vis-a-vis Iraq before they came into this administration. But that assertiveness had not yet developed into an administration policy. Is that fair to say?

MR. KEMP: As I understand it, that's correct.

REP. BERMAN: What is -- Gary Milhollin mentioned one way to get people to stop doing things for money is to shame them. The other one is to pay them more to do the opposite. Of course, that has the effect of being a rental, not a good purchase. But Russia, in terms of this, how do you think we should approach Russia in the context of sanctions in Iraq at this particular point? And given Osama bin Laden, the September 11th priority, accepting your premise that first things first, how do we envelop Russia both as to Iraq and perhaps as to Iran, particularly as to Iraq?

MR. KEMP: Well, I think this is an opportunity to get them to support the smart-sanctions proposal, which I think, against a lot of expectations, the administration had been successful in getting France and China to agree to. Now, if you get Russia on board as well, you know, we can argue the utility of smart sanctions, but one thing I don't think we can dispute is that this would put the onus once more on Saddam Hussein to make the case that sanctions are hurting the Iraqi people rather than him.

We've had this terrible problem of being blamed for the misery, and I think the smart sanctions give you a way out of that. So I would think that's a much more useful avenue to approach with the Russians than, for instance, trying to get them to stop their nuclear cooperation with Iran or their arms sales with Iran, which I think involves a lot more money and much more basic strategic partnership.

REP. BERMAN: So in a way, Iraq, just to finish up, if we're going to focus with Russia on something, focus on their positions vis- a-vis Iraq, not Iran.

MR. KEMP: That would be my priority. Others might disagree. But that's what I would say, yes.

REP. BERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Berman. Mr. Kemp, why do you feel that the targeted-sanctions approach advanced by Secretary Powell, along with other measures you recommend, would have any measurable impact on the Iraqi regime and on the economy of Iraq?

MR. KEMP: Well, I'm not sure it would. I mean, I think a lot will depend upon how successfully it is implemented. You not only need to get the Russians on board in New York. You have to have cooperation in the region, because the leakage right now, the black marketeering that goes on across the Turkish border through Jordan, through Iran's waterways, is legion. My colleagues have both discussed this.

So you've got to, at the same time, convince the regional players that it's in their interest to cooperate with more border controls. Whether that is possible or not, I don't know. I would have said before September the 11th it was going to be difficult to get the Russians and it would be difficult to get regional support. I would say, after September the 11th, we have a fighting chance. But it's not going to be easy.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Kemp, do you agree with Mr. Duelfer that Saddam cannot be deterred through classical deterrence methods?

MR. KEMP: Well, it depends what you mean. Deterred from doing what? I think he is deterred from using military force against his neighbors. I think he is deterred from using overt military force against Israel, absent some regional conflagration. I do not think he's deterred from using force against his people and conducting sort of covert operations that we may know nothing about. I don't think he's deterred from that.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Duelfer, given that there's been no inspections for nearly three years now, is there any evidence that Iraq is rebuilding its WMD programs?

MR. DUELFER: There was continuing evidence even when we were inspecting in Iraq. It was not stuff that we could take to the Security Council and say, "This is proof." But there was certainly evidence. And that has not abated. There are Iraqis who leave Iraq regularly. And, curiously enough, some of them were involved in the weapons programs, and they will relate what they were involved in. And their activities continue to this present time.

REP. GILMAN: Is there any evidence that during the Gulf War that Iraq used some chemical weapons against our forces?

MR. DUELFER: We looked at that pretty closely, and we saw no definitive evidence that they used chemical weapons. There were some chemical weapons plants in storage bunkers which were blown up. But our understanding and certainly the Iraqis' claim was that they did not use them. And, of course, we pressed them on that. And fundamentally the reason that they said they didn't was because Saddam thought he'd be toast if he did.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Milhollin, your testimony seems to stop short of saying that Iraq is actually rebuilding its WMD program and is referring instead to the rebuilding of facilities and a potential for reconstituting those program. Is there any reason why you drew those distinctions?

MR. MILHOLLIN: Well, we have evidence that certain facilities are being rebuilt, and we know those facilities were used in previous -- in prior days to -- for illicit purposes, for making weapons of mass destruction. But so far as I know, and I haven't -- I haven't been privy to any information that proves that the sites they're rebuilding are actually being used to make chemical or biological weapons, for example. Saddam has learned a lot about our intelligence capabilities over the years, and so getting accurate information from on-high is harder than it was before. So, the reason I stopped short is just because I don't want to make a statement I can't support. But, I guess I would make one point, though, that -- that the fact that Iraq has forgone scores of billions of dollars in oil income rather than disarm, I think shows you the extent of the commitment to weapons of mass destruction. So, it's safe to assume that what we can't see is what we should be worried about.

REP. GILMAN: I have one last question to all of our panelists. There have been some reports suggesting Iraq may have been aware or involved in the September 11th plot. There was some report that they met with an Iraqi intelligence person before they undertook their attack. What's your assessment of those reports? And what has been the relationship, if any, between Iraq and Al Qaeda?

MR. DUELFER: Well --

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Duelfer.

MR. DUELFER: Let me take the -- I would be surprised, again, if there were not a relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraqi intelligence and Iraqi expertise. Iraq has certainly maintained contact with all kinds of nefarious actors and organizations, but I'm not sure I would be -- I would say that because an Iraqi intelligence officer, you know, in Prague met with a guy who turned out to be conducting one of these activities, I don't think that would be necessarily evidence that they were connected to the September 11th. Iraqi intelligence officers are all over the place. They're in New York. They're -- you know, they're everywhere. So, there's a lot of people who meet with Iraqi intelligence officers whether they know it or not.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Kemp.

MR. KEMP: Yes, I think we have to -- I would keep an open mind on this, Mr. Chairman. I mean, we're in the process of conducting the most intensive intelligence investigation in history, and sooner or later, if there is a connection, we'll find it. So far, I have not seen any evidence that that exists, but I wouldn't rule it out.

REP. GILMAN: And Mr. Milhollin.

MR. MILHOLLIN: I don't see any evidence of the contents of any of these meetings, so, without that, I don't think it's possible to know whether the Iraqis knew about the event before it happened, or whether they had any role in it. I think, though, that we have to assume -- well, on an optimistic note, I guess I can say that Saddam right now seems to be doing pretty well. That is, he's escaping the embargo. If we want to make assumptions, we could assume that it would not be prudent at this time for him to be connected to an attack on the United States. But, like all assumptions, that could turn out to be wrong.

REP. GILMAN: And one last question. Some who do not want to pursue or oppose the overthrow strategy try to disparage the opposition's unity and fighting capability. What's your assessment of the capability of the opposition to overthrow the regime of Saddam? All -- to all the panelists. Mr. Duelfer.

MR. DUELFER: I think they -- they should be incrementally given the opportunity to prove themselves. I think the INC and others, you know, they were in Iraq when it was not pleasant to be in Iraq. And I think that, you know, a lot of people criticized them. Incrementally, they can be given the chance to prove themselves, and if they demonstrate progress, give them some more support.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Kemp.

MR. KEMP: That's -- that's my view. That's what I said in my formal testimony. And I think you need to have some military personnel testify on this because I -- there's simply not any way -- I can't judge how good they would be militarily, but I agree it has to be incremental. They have to prove themselves first.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you. Mr. Milhollin.

MR. MILHOLLIN: I agree with Mr. Duelfer.

REP. GILMAN: Well, gentlemen, we want to thank you for your testimony, your time to appear before our committee. The committee stands adjourned.