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BRIEFING BY PHILIP T. REEKER U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT August 19, 2002 Excerpts
. . . QUESTION: Can the State Department add anything to the accounts of Abu Nidal's demise? MR. REEKER: The accounts of Abu Nidal's demise -- I don't believe I can add anything. We're following the story, but I don't have anything to contribute other than what we've seen in the press. Abu Nidal is a craven and despicable terrorist and the world would certainly be a better place without people like Abu Nidal. He'd reportedly been living in Iraq since 1998, and as we've talked about for some time, Iraq's record of providing support, safe haven, training, logistical assistance and financial aid to terrorist groups like the Abu Nidal organization is why Iraq is listed as a state supporter of terrorism. And you can read about that organization in the April 2002 -- that is the most recent edition -- of Patterns of Global Terrorism. QUESTION: Did you say living in Iraq since 1998? There's a slightly different version -- MR. REEKER: That's what had reportedly been -- I know there are a number of various reports out there, but reportedly he had been living there since 1998. I think that's what we're able to put out, but you might check the Patterns of Global Terrorism because it gives you what we have on that. . . . QUESTION: Any comments to make about Russia's potential deals with Iraq announced over the weekend? MR. REEKER: I think I spoke to a number of you, or your colleagues, on Friday. We haven't seen the agreement that's been widely discussed in the press, but I believe the Russian Foreign Ministry has said that the agreement is fully consistent with UN Security Council resolutions. As you know, Iraq issues are part of our regular dialogue with Russia. Russia is a fellow Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and we do consult regularly with them. But obviously we would expect that anything would be consistent with UN Security Council resolutions. QUESTION: Are we looking into whether we believe it's consistent with UN Security Council resolutions? MR. REEKER: I am sure we'll look at that. As I said, we hadn't seen any particular deal, and we saw what the Russian Foreign Ministry had to say. Joel. . . . QUESTION: Anything you can tell us about Ambassador Coates' conversations with members of Chancellor Schroeder's staff last week? MR. REEKER: Our Ambassador to Germany, Ambassador Dan Coates, did have meetings with German officials at the Chancellery in Berlin last week. The meetings were part of the ongoing consultations with our German friends and allies. As you would expect, the United States Ambassador to Germany has fairly regular meetings with officials at the Chancellery in Berlin, and I don't think I could go into any particulars of the substance of the Ambassador's meeting with his German counterparts. It's not something that we usually try to read out. QUESTION: Well, he has today given an interview to one of the German papers in which he sort of contradicts the statement out of Schroeder's office that Schroeder's foreign policy spokesman saying in the meeting the German side presented its views on the US plans for Iraq and Coates saying, oh, no, this meeting was called because we were presenting our views. Are you -- can you not tell us what -- MR. REEKER: Maybe both sides presented all their views on issues. That's usually what diplomatic meetings are about is an opportunity to exchange views and talk about issues. Whether Iraq was part of that discussion or not, I don't know. I think we have been very clear, and the President has been very clear, that, in terms of Iraq, why we have concerns about Iraq, about their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons, about their support of terrorism -- all of that a threat not only to the Iraqi people and the neighbors of Iraq, but to security and peace around the world. And the President has said quite clearly as well that we're seeking advice, listening carefully to many people, including our allies. That would obviously include Germany. There are no plans to attack Iraq on the President's desk. He has said that. And he has said he is patient and deliberative. And that's exactly where we stand. I can't move that along any more. QUESTION: You say you don't know if Iraq was discussed, but, I mean, Coates today said it was. It was in The New York Times on Saturday, or did you not read that? MR. REEKER: That's perfectly fine. QUESTION: Okay. MR. REEKER: I wasn't in the meeting. I don't have a specific readout for you. I've seen all of the discussions about the meeting; I just can't give you anything. What I'm trying to reflect on is that in the course of normal diplomatic discourse, when our Ambassador meets with his counterparts and his officials in Germany, those are the types of discussions we have, where we share information and share views. QUESTION: This was apparently a meeting that he requested at the direction from this Department. MR. REEKER: Which also happens quite frequently. QUESTION: Okay, fine. But in order to present a point, which is US displeasure at Schroeder's recent campaign comments -- MR. REEKER: I couldn't dissect any further the discussions that our Ambassador had with German officials. I'm sorry. QUESTION: Phil, without talking about the meeting in particular, can you say whether this building has any position on recent comments made by Chancellor Schroeder that were derogatory to any US plans that might -- MR. REEKER: Again, all I can keep reiterating is, you know, that there are no specific US plans. The President has addressed this subject repeatedly and made quite clear what our concerns are vis-à-vis Iraq, and the fact that he's deliberative, that he's patient, but that he's very focused on the threats we see there. He keeps all of his options available, all of these options on the table, but no decisions have been made in that regard, and we're very much interested in listening and hearing the views of as many people as possible, particularly our allies and others. QUESTION: But anything about Chancellor Schroeder's comments in particular that you have any comment on? MR. REEKER: No. QUESTION: Phil, can you elaborate on -- this is on Iraq, too. Can you elaborate on remarks by a White House official today which brought up the possibility of limited military action against specific targets in Iraq, rather than -- falling short of -- MR. REEKER: No, I couldn't speculate on remarks: (a) I haven't seen; (b) from some apparently unnamed official. QUESTION: -- his name -- MR. REEKER: Well, I don't have anything. Why don't you talk to the White House about it? QUESTION: Some hawk -- this is on Iraq. Some hawkish pundits have suggested -- MR. REEKER: Hawkish pundits. Okay, here we go. QUESTION: Hawkish pundits have suggested this weekend that the State Department has not been fully on board in expressing the President's policy of regime change for Iraq to our foreign allies. So I was just wondering if you could just sort of maybe summarize in a general sense our message. I know you've been talking about this. Have we been telling people and making it very clear that we would seek, we would like to see the Hussein regime ended? MR. REEKER: I think anyone -- even you, Eli -- and all of the foreign leaders around the world who have read the President's remarks, the President's speeches, listened to Secretary Powell, listened to officials -- even lowly people like myself from this podium -- know what the US policy towards Iraq is; why we are concerned about Iraq and the threat that Saddam Hussein's regime poses to the people of Iraq itself, to countries in the region, including friends and allies of ours, and indeed, to all of us around the world. Weapons of mass destruction, trying to acquire the means to deliver such weapons, support for terrorism -- these are all things that we've seen from the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein. And the President has been quite clear that the US policy toward Iraq is that there should be a different regime there, that we would all be better off if there were a different regime in Baghdad. That's been echoed by foreign leaders around the world quite clearly, even more recently when the Spanish Foreign Minister, for instance, was here and spoke to you along with Secretary Powell about a week ago. So I don't think I can add any more to the discussion. I think it's fairly clear out there, and if anybody's having a problem understanding it, they should just pick up some of your dispatches and read them. QUESTION: Thanks, but I'm afraid -- but that's what makes our -- the US entreaties to allies and non-allies, Arab governments for instance, puzzling. I mean they all agree. They seem all to agree, the Arabs, with a little bit of, you know, ambiguity, that they would all be pleased to see Saddam Hussein go away. Now, if the US hasn't decided whether to attack to get rid of him and if we knowwhat their position is -- that they don't like Saddam Hussein -- what are all these discussions about? Are you trying to line foreign governments up to endorse something that hasn't happened yet, to give the United States sort of carte blanche to do the right thing? Because you know their views and they know your views, except to know what option you're going to take. MR. REEKER: We like to talk to other governments, Barry, because that's what diplomacy is about -- hearing their views, and perhaps their views that they haven't shared with you, specifically, as we all discuss Iraq and certainly many other things. QUESTION: Okay. MR. REEKER: Certainly in the war against terrorism we have a coalition. It's working very closely together on many, many fronts: financial, law enforcement, intelligence and information sharing, as well as in the military aspects of that effort in Afghanistan. So I think that will always continue, Barry. We want to hear from allies and friends. We want to have a good discussion about a broad variety of issues, including issues related to Iraq. We've heard their public comments. And as I was pointing out to your colleague, Mr. Lake, many of those public comments reflect exactly the views that we espouse publicly, as well. So that type of dialogue, that type of discussion, that type of diplomacy is going to continue. QUESTION: I understand. It's puzzling to those of us who were here last time around during the Gulf War. The US knew what it wanted to do and it went out and made a concerted effort to line up support for what the US wanted to do and managed to get some 30 countries to be part of this coalition. Now we've got discussions going on and we're supposed to believe that the US doesn't know what it wants to do, but still we're having intensive -- we haven't picked an option. I don't mean to -- MR. REEKER: I will just refer you to what the President said, Barry. QUESTION: I don't get it. MR. REEKER: I can't really add any more. Thank you for the history lesson, but I think you just need to stay tuned. QUESTION: No, no, it's not a history lesson. It's a little bit -- Phil, it's a little bit of disbelief that the United States is talking to its best friends in a very serious way without telling them or knowing even having made a choice of its own, what option to take, which are the tools, as the President puts it, to use. MR. REEKER: I think diplomatic dialogue is an important part of the way we interact in the world and that's going to continue on a broad array of issues, including on how to deal with the threat of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. QUESTION: All right, let me ask you a specific, one quick specific. MR. REEKER: Yes, Barry. QUESTION: We know the inspection problem. You know, there's been no budging on it. Will there be -- is there ongoing this, for instance, a page one story in The Financial Times over the weekend. Is the article the last ditch? Because I don't suppose we'll ever give up trying to get a look at what he's got, but is the US making another effort to somehow get Iraq to open its suspect weapons sites to international inspection? MR. REEKER: Well, Iraq knows what it has to do. There are UN, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to which Saddam Hussein's regime agreed at the end of the Gulf War. This is about disarmament under those agreements. And inspectors are a way towards verifying disarmament. They need to have access to assess this. Instead of readmitting inspectors so that the inspectors can assess key disarmament tasks, the Iraqis continue to propose further discussions and obfuscation and moving of the goal post. So the latest Iraqi letter, for instance, offers nothing new. They continue to refuse to comply with UN Security Council resolutions that mandate verified disarmament. Matt. QUESTION: Can I change the subject? QUESTION: One more on Iraq? MR. REEKER: Yes. Elise. QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to reports over the weekend that the previous Bush Administration aided Iraq in developing a chemical weapons program for use against Iran? MR. REEKER: I think as you saw the responses from this Department in that particular press story. Claims that the US was complicit or acquiesced in the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, those claims are complete nonsense and utterly without foundation. QUESTION: So, one more brief one? MR. REEKER: Okay. QUESTION: That same paper had a small item today saying that the President had called a meeting of his national security team for later this week in Crawford and listed the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and National Security Advisor as being invited, but not the Secretary of State. Is he planning to be there? MR. REEKER: More recent reports that I saw about that meeting coming from the White House were discussing a defense -- a review of a variety of defense issues. So I think it's a DOD meeting, but I would refer you to the White House for that. . . .
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