BRIEFING BY RICHARD BOUCHER
SPOKESPERSON

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

March 3, 2003

Excerpts

QUESTION: Would you bring us up to date on Turkey and what you're hearing about the possibility of a second parliamentary vote, what the U.S. is doing with respect to that?

QUESTION: Well, they asked the same question.

MR. BOUCHER: We're keeping in close touch with the Turkish Government as they decide how they wish to proceed, how they will proceed.

In terms of the parliamentary vote over the weekend, obviously we're a bit disappointed that parliament didn't approve it over the weekend.

But we'll continue to discuss this with the Turkish Government in the spirit of strong friendship and the strategic partnership between our two countries. We appreciate the efforts that the Turkish Government has made in this regard. We appreciate the cooperation and always remember that Turkey remains a very important NATO ally and we have all kinds of cooperation with them in a variety of fields.

We also note in particular the statements that Prime Minister Gul made today about his government's intention to implement strong economic policies, and that's always been an important aspect of our relationship. We applaud him for that.

QUESTION: Does that mean that you don't have any assurance from the Turkish Government that they will put it to a second vote?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we have always said in our work with the Turkish Government, in our work with the Turkish Prime Minister, for example, when the Secretary met him in Davos about a month ago, or when the Secretary talked with Prime Minister Gul on the phone over the weekend, we've always made clear that the parliamentary handling of this, the internal politics of Turkey, is a matter for the Turkish Government to decide, what they could do and how they would seek the appropriate approval in their system.

So we've stayed in touch with them. Obviously, we're interested in how they can proceed and intend to proceed. But at this point, we'll see what they decide.

QUESTION: And does this, assuming that there is no change in the position, does this have any long-term effect on relations between the United States and Turkey? Will you, for example, continue to press European countries to take Turkey into the European Union and so on?

MR. BOUCHER: Our fundamental view of Turkey as an ally, as an important nation, as an important part of Europe, is unchanged and we'll continue to work with Turkey in a variety of ways -- economic, military, political -- as befits our cooperation with an important ally.

QUESTION: On that point, so what is the status of the aid, the assistance program that you guys had been considering? Is that tied at all to their -- to a parliamentary vote the other way?

MR. BOUCHER: We'll continue to work with Turkey on economic matters, as we have in the past. We do have a strong interest in Turkey's economic stability. We'll continue to support the Turkish economic program and Turkey's cooperation with international financial institutions.

As far as this particular package, most of it was predicated on helping Turkey meet the costs of involvement, the direct costs or the consequences, and therefore I guess I'd have to say much of that would not occur if there's not direct involvement by Turkey.

QUESTION: You said earlier that time is of the essence with this situation. How -- can you comment on that with the latest development? How has it hurt the United States situation and what sort of time frame, will the aid package still be viable?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I can give you a precise time frame. As I said, it's -- the aid package was predicated on the costs of involvement, the economic consequences, the direct costs of deployments and support. If that involvement, if that kind of effort, doesn't occur, then the costs don't -- won't be incurred.

I think as the Turks consider what their alternatives are in terms of the handling of the situation, the cooperation and the political situation, we, including our military, will have to consider our alternatives as well. And I'm sure people -- well, people are looking at those things now.

Whatever happens, I think we have full confidence in the American military's ability to prosecute a successful military operation if that's what the President decides needs to be done.

QUESTION: Are the negotiations over this particular package finished, done with, or is there a possibility that the pot could be further sweetened?

MR. BOUCHER: I wouldn't speculate at this point. The negotiations over this package were concluded. As I said, they were predicated on a certain kind of involvement, certain costs that would be incurred for involvement, and the package was done.

Teri.

QUESTION: A follow-up, if I could. What is the American policy now in light of the Turkish parliament's vote on allowing Turkish troops into Northern Iraq in the event of a war?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything new on that.

Teri.

QUESTION: Well, that's my question. I hope that's not my answer, though.

(Laughter.)

Prime Minister Gul of Turkey has said that it was important for the United States to tell the Iraqi opposition leaders that they -- that it would not be advisable to view incoming Turkish troops as enemies and that they were asking the U.S. to reinforce that with the Iraqi opposition.

Are there talks like that going on?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. I'd have to check and see.

QUESTION: But it's important -- that was part of the deal with Turkey was that Turkish troops would enter Northern Iraq and --

MR. BOUCHER: There was an economic portion of it; there was a political portion of it that talked about how our countries both wanted to see the situation in Iraq should it come to military conflict, and third, there was a military cooperation package. But as I said, as they consider their alternatives, we have to consider ours as well. How some of that stuff may end up in the end, I don't know.

Elise.

QUESTION: There was a report today out of Turkey that suggested that it wasn't necessarily that the Turks didn't want to support the U.S. request, that it was the style and manner and timing in which the administration went about asking Turkey for its request, that they felt that it was a little bit insensitive, the timing. And there have been similar reports about -- from other Security Council countries, out of their capitals, that suggest that they just don't want to be bullied by the U.S., that they don't like the style in which the United States has gone about asking for support.

Can you talk to that, and do you think that perhaps using a little bit more humility, as President Bush promised to in his campaign, might have worked a little bit better?

MR. BOUCHER: I'd have to say let's look at the facts, look at the facts of how long it's been since Iraq was first given a 45-day deadline to comply with the UN Security Council demands for disarmament. That was back in 1991, 4,200 days ago.

People thought somehow last summer that we were rushing off to war. Instead, the President laid it before the Security Council on September 12th.

People thought we were going to give up on the Security Council after a couple weeks of negotiation. Instead, we pursued seven and a half weeks of negotiation to arrive at a resolution that the Council could agree upon, as 15.

People thought we were going to rush off to war when the Iraqis presented a bad declaration, which everybody agreed and still agrees was an awful product and no attempt to clarify. But that didn't happen, either.

And then some networks were even running little things on the bottom of their screens in January as we approached January 27th, with "Countdown to War" and such things.

And yet, in the end, here we are, four to six weeks later, which is what many people were asking for at the time.

We have heard from the inspectors not once, not twice, but half a dozen times, including the latest report by Dr. Blix that came over the weekend. And he asked the question: Has Iraq made the fundamental choices of cooperation? And his answer was, cooperation has been very, very limited.

And so I think the United States has worked with other governments. We have worked this patiently. It's the facts of the matter. It's the facts that are becoming clearer and clearer every day, that Iraq's cooperation has been token at best, that when faced with the prospect of military conflict they dribble out small pieces of cooperation, but that there are thousands of munitions, thousands of liters of biological and chemical weapons, hundreds of munitions filled with biological and chemical weapons that remain in Iraq's arsenal that have never been properly accounted for. And that's a danger that we need to face up to.

So I think we've been led to where we are by the facts. We've been led to where we are by the repeated reports of the inspectors, by the repeated observations that we and others have made of Iraq's actual behavior, by the facts that the Secretary laid out February 5th, a month ago now, to the Security Council. And that's why we're here where we are today, and we've called on others, invited others and talked to others about facing those facts and being willing to make the tough decisions that ensue.

QUESTION: Richard, but it looks like the cynical dribs and drabs policy is working quite well, from Iraq's point of view. What is your strategy for winning over the people in the middle ground?

And what's your current feeling about the second resolution? I think it was meant to be, what, within a week or ten days or so that you originally scheduled this vote on this. Is that still your timetable for this?

MR. BOUCHER: It's still the basic framework that we're operating in. We look forward to hearing from Dr. Blix one more time on Friday about Iraq's cooperation or more likely lack thereof, given the facts as we know them. We'll be in touch with other members of the Council and we'll consider ourselves in the period after that how to proceed in the Council, whether to proceed with a vote at that point, but that's the moment at which I would expect us to decide.

The strategy as I said is for people to be engaged with countries around the world, particularly Security Council members. We've had travelers out last week, I think you know. Over the weekend or late last week, Assistant Secretary Rocco was in Pakistan as well as Bangladesh. Special Envoy Otto Reich was down in Chile. We've kept in touch with all the members of the Security Council. John Negroponte, our ambassador in New York, has been very active in consulting with other representatives up there. The Secretary's, at his level, been on the phone over the weekend. He's talked to Jack Straw, he's talked to President Musharraf, and when President Musharraf obviously, his main purpose was to congratulate President Musharraf on the tremendous success of getting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed into custody. The Secretary also talked to Foreign Minister Ivanov, Foreign Minister Palacio of Spain, Prime Minister Gul of Turkey, and Secretary General Kofi Annan.

So we continue at all these levels to work on the diplomacy, to work towards a second resolution. I mean, let's face it, the second resolution that we presented has one new sentence. And that new sentence is an obvious fact: that Iraq has failed to cooperate in the full, immediate, and active manner that was required. That's what we're focusing people's minds on, the facts of the matter and the need for a resolution that says so.

QUESTION: Richard, you said you look forward to hearing from Blix one more time. Do you mean again, or do you mean one more final time and this is the last time you expect the inspectors to give these kind of monthly reports? And have you decided that inspections should end?

MR. BOUCHER: The question of inspections will obviously be related to the question of what the Council decides to do and what Council members decide to do, and so until those decisions are made, I don't think I would say anything particular about inspections.

George.

QUESTION: Well, in that same connection, you said, I believe this is a quote, "that's the moment at which I expect we'll decide." Decide what?

MR. BOUCHER: We'll decide how we wish to proceed based on our consultations and our own considerations.

Teri.

QUESTION: On Turkey, I don't know if you were asked this completely directly. Since Secretary Powell spoke with Prime Minister Gul, was it his understanding after that phone call that there will certainly be a new resolution in Turkey, and whether that will be dependent on whether the UN passes one in the near future?

MR. BOUCHER: As -- the timing of this -- when the Secretary talked to Prime Minister Gul it was while the Turkish party, I think, was still meeting, and was still discussing.

QUESTION: It was not after the decision was announced and revoked?

MR. BOUCHER: It was after the parliament was announced and revoked --

QUESTION: Right.

MR. BOUCHER: -- but then the party leaders themselves were meeting and having discussions, as I suppose they still are, in terms of how they want to proceed. So it wasn't a moment for any final news.

QUESTION: Was that the message he was giving then, by --

MR. BOUCHER: He was just comparing notes at that point.

QUESTION: He wasn't, was he pressing then that this --

MR. BOUCHER: No, as I said, we've always left the politics of this in the hands of the Turkish Government from the very -- from the moment the Secretary met with Prime Minister Gul and Party Leader Erdogan in Davos, a month or so ago, through our discussions and including the discussion yesterday, we've always said to the Turkish Government, you have to decide on the cooperation you can provide, and you have to decide on the politics of that.

QUESTION: Two things on that. One, did Prime Minister Gul give the Secretary any indication that there was some nervousness about the election this coming Sunday, (inaudible) election in which the party leader is running and may get into parliament, may become prime minister. Is that --

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to put myself in the position of reporting on what a foreign leader said in a conversation about his own political attitudes, so --

QUESTION: Is that something that you guys would --

MR. BOUCHER: We're aware of that coming up, but I'm not going to offer any political commentary.

QUESTION: And the initial, I think the initial reaction from the embassy in Ankara to the rejection was that this is a democratic vote, we respect it. Does the United States consider closed parliamentary votes to be, you know, ones that are not taken in public, to be democratic, part of the democratic process?

MR. BOUCHER: Each country has a different sort of democratic process. I don't think we are in the position of quibbling with Turkish democracy at this point.

QUESTION: Let me go back to that (inaudible). You said it was widely known that there was a plan for Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq. You said nothing has -- we have nothing new on that. Does that mean that such a plan still exists and could go ahead?

MR. BOUCHER: Are you asking about Turkish military matters? One, I don't talk about military matters, and two, I don't talk about foreign governments' military matters.

QUESTION: No, you said that your understanding was the Turkish Government on --

MR. BOUCHER: It amounts to the same thing.

QUESTION: Well, no.

MR. BOUCHER: Elise.

QUESTION: There was, or do you want to finish Jonathan?

QUESTION: Well, yeah, you know --

MR. BOUCHER: This is another one of what-have-they-told-you questions, isn't it?

QUESTION: No, because you'll be running Iraq as far as we understand it, so it's up to you to decide whether Turkish troops go into northern Iraq. Are you now in favor of Turkish troops, are you still in favor of Turkish troops going into northern Iraq or not?

MR. BOUCHER: I will check and see if we have any views on the prospects.

QUESTION: Zalami Khalil Zad said today, he was quoted saying, that if any troops, any Turkish troops will enter northern Iraq, it will be part of the American forces. That's, can you confirm that?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry, who said that?

QUESTION: Zalami Khalil Zad.

MR. BOUCHER: Oh, Zal. I'll check and see.

Elise.

QUESTION: Back to the Security Council, there's a report from the New York Observer that the United States is in the process of an aggressive surveillance operation of Security Council member countries involving the interception of home and office telephones and emails of the UN by the National Security Agency.

MR. BOUCHER: I think it was the London Observer, but --

QUESTION: Oh, sorry.

MR. BOUCHER: It doesn't matter what the paper is or whether it's true or not. I wouldn't have any sort of comment on that kind of allegation.

QUESTION: Can you say whether or not you've had complaints from foreign governments?

MR. BOUCHER: I wouldn't have any comment whatsoever on that kind of allegation.

QUESTION: So you can't deny that you're spying on Security Council member countries?

MR. BOUCHER: I would not have any comment whatsoever on that kind of question or allegation.

QUESTION: Why not?

MR. BOUCHER: Because we never comment on intelligence matters and I'm not going to do it now.

QUESTION: You don't want to say never, do you?

MR. BOUCHER: We don't comment on sources and methods.

Mark.

QUESTION: Richard, setting aside the chances that this might happen, if Iraq were to disarm, would the United States not launch military action?

MR. BOUCHER: We have made clear all along that the goal was disarmament. The goal of the United States, the goal of United States forces, if necessary, and the goal of the UN Security Council resolution is to achieve disarmament by Iraq. That's been what we've been pushing for.

We all recognize that the only reason there has been any modicum of cooperation by Iraq in the last six months is because the United States and others have been willing to mobilize a credible threat of force. That remains the case today, until the President should decide otherwise.

But the goal is to get Iraq to disarm so that Iraq no longer has weapons of mass destruction that it can use again against its people, that it can use again against its neighbors, and that it might eventually fall into the hands of terrorists or others who would use them against any and all of us. That remains the goal. That has been the goal.

QUESTION: Excuse me, Richard. You came close, but not quite there. If Iraq were to disarm --

MR. BOUCHER: I thought I answered it fully and completely -- and accurately.

QUESTION: If Iraq were to disarm, would there be no U.S. military action?

MR. BOUCHER: We have said before, the goal is disarmament by whatever means it needs to be achieved. If it's achieved peacefully, then that would be that.

Elise.

QUESTION: Can you speak to this UAE initiative that Saddam Hussein and his top leaders should leave within the next two weeks, leaving the country over to the United Nations and Arab League and be afforded amnesty?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know what more I can say about it than we've already said before. I think I've seen a couple others -- Kuwait and Bahrain -- speak out in support of the idea. Certainly, we've always made clear that we felt that it was an option that Saddam Hussein would be wise to take and it certainly would be a peaceful solution to the problem.

QUESTION: Would you afford him and his top lieutenants amnesty? And also, did the UAE talk to you about this proposal before floating it to some of these other countries?

MR. BOUCHER: These ideas have been floating around that part of the world for a number of months now. I don't know if they -- if we, during the course of those months, had some conversation with the UAE or not. But they, as you note, were the ones who decided to put forth such a proposal to the others in the Arab League, and I note that a few others did speak out in support of it.

As I said before, it's something that we would have to -- the basic idea is one we would support. The issue of, you know, war crimes or other things for Saddam Hussein and his top leadership is a pretty complicated one that involves not only us but international law and Iraqis themselves, and so that is something that would have to be sorted out.

QUESTION: One of the hopes is that by a leader of an Arab state making this proposal formally, it will encourage other Arab and Muslim states to kind of -- you know, this bandwagon effect and, in effect, really bully Saddam Hussein to step down.

Are you encouraging other Arab states to endorse the proposal?

MR. BOUCHER: They decide themselves what they want to do. I think we've made clear all along this is something that was a good idea. The Secretary, on his recent trip at one point, said it's time for Saddam Hussein to disarm or depart. Those are, I think, the two basic scenarios for how this can be resolved without military conflict.

Since he does not appear to do the first in any sincere and complete manner, then the second has to be an option as well, and we support any solution that produced that, that would produce an Iraq where the Iraqi Government was one that wanted to live in peace with its neighbors, wanted to destroy its chemical weapons, would live in peace with its people as well.

Jonathan.

QUESTION: Richard, the Secretary and the President have both said that the UN Security Council runs the risk of being irrelevant if it doesn't enforce resolutions against Iraq. I just wondered what exactly you're thinking of if it does, in fact, prove itself irrelevant. How would the United States treat the United Nations if this came about? Would you withdraw? Would you ignore it? Would you pay your dues? What would happen?

MR. BOUCHER: I think you're speculating about 20 miles down the road. Let's get through the upcoming period and see what the United Nations does, what United Nations members do, and what relevancy the United Nations can show in the upcoming period.

QUESTION: Back on the UAE exile plan, you said the basic idea is one we would support. Does that support extend to the second part of the proposal, which is the UN and Arab League administration of Iraq in a post -- you know, like temporarily after Saddam goes?

MR. BOUCHER: I think that's their proposal. I'm not endorsing particular aspects of it, but the basic approach is one that we've always said we would welcome and we'd consider any particular aspects if it was a serious effort in that direction.

QUESTION: Well, yeah, but, I mean, this is -- this goes a bit -- their proposal, you know, takes it down the line one step after Saddam leaves, if he does leave, to that. Do you have any ideas for a non-conflict scenario that would -- for ruling, for how Iraq should be run if Saddam were to leave?

MR. BOUCHER: I am sure there are a variety of ways of handling that situation, but this is one of -- excuse me. I mean, this is one of a number of ideas that are out there, and if there were active efforts underway in one direction or the other, I think we'd be happy to discuss those things with people.

QUESTION: Well, there are active efforts underway, apparently. You know, you just talked about three countries coming out publicly and saying this.

So as you guys go ahead with your planning --

MR. BOUCHER: As you so often point out to me when I'm up here saying things, that saying things and actually making them happen is -- becomes different things.

QUESTION: Oh, right, I understand. But are you --

MR. BOUCHER: So we're at the stage of saying things now, and that's about all we have to say.

QUESTION: But you're not aware, then, of any planning that might be going on in this government for such a scenario with a non-war?

MR. BOUCHER: Oh, I don't know that I could rule it out. I'm sure these possibilities have been considered, but which might be the most likely or how it might be organized and administered is really very hypothetical at this point since we're still dealing, let's face it, we're still dealing with a dictator in Iraq who has shown no inclination to do what's good for the people of Iraq or the people of the region.

QUESTION: Richard, you said the goal is disarmament. So if getting Saddam Hussein to step away and being able to disarm the country, even if it meant giving him a pass on war crimes, if your goal is disarmament, why isn't it a no-brainer?

MR. BOUCHER: Didn't I just say ten minutes ago that the Secretary himself had said it's time for Saddam Hussein to disarm or depart? How exactly that might be organized is something one would consider as one saw what might happen. But the basic premise, as I've said for now the last ten minutes, is one that we would support.

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