As of August 2006, Iraq Watch is no longer being updated.
Click here for more information.
   



Information Paper
Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles

Released July 25, 2000

Information Papers are reports of what we know today about military equipment and/or procedures used in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. This particular information paper on Iraq's Scud ballistic missiles is not an investigative report, but is meant to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the characteristics, capabilities, and employment of Iraq's Scuds. This is an interim, not a final paper. We hope that you will read this and contact us with any information that would help us better understand Iraq's Scud ballistic missiles and more accurately report their use during the Gulf War. Please contact my office to report any new information by calling:

1-800-497-6261

Bernard Rostker
Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Department of Defense

Many veterans of the Gulf War have expressed concern that their unexplained illnesses may result from their experiences in that war. In response to veterans' concerns, the Department of Defense established a task force in June 1995 to investigate incidents and circumstances relating to possible causes. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses assumed responsibility for these investigations on November 12, 1996, and has continued to investigate topics related to reports of chemical warfare agent incidents.

To inform the public about the progress of these efforts, the Department of Defense is publishing on the Internet and elsewhere accounts that may contribute to the discussion of possible causes of illnesses of Gulf War veterans, along with documentary evidence or personal testimony used in compiling the accounts. This information paper will aid in understanding incidents involving Iraq's use of Scud missiles.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  SUMMARY

II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

III.  IRAQ'S SCUD CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES

IV.  SCUDS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A.  Threat Estimates Before Operation Desert Storm
B.  Information During the War
C.  Post-War Findings

V.  IRAQ'S USE OF SCUDS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

A.  Introduction
B.  Total Scud Firing Incidents
C.  Scud Incidents in the Eastern KTO

1.  Summary
2.  Details on Selected Incidents

D. Scud Incidents in the Riyadh Area

1.  Summary
2.  Details on Selected Incidents

E.  Scud Incidents in the KKMC and Hafir Al Batin Areas

1.  Summary
2.  Details on Selected Incidents

F.  Scud Incidents in Israel

VI.  FALSE ALARMS AND FALSE TARGETS

A.  False Alarms
B.  Patriot False Target Detections

VII.  SCUD OXIDIZER INCIDENTS

VIII.  COALITION RESPONSE TO SCUD THREAT


IX.  THE RESIDUAL THREAT

X.  SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

TAB A ' Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary

TAB B ' Bibliography

TAB C ' Chemical Evidence ' Scud Incidents In KTO

TAB D ' Analysis of CURR Scud Incident List

END NOTES

 

I.  SUMMARY

Iraq began launching short-range ballistic missiles (known as Scuds) at Israel and Coalition forces soon after the Coalition's Gulf War air campaign began on January 17, 1991. Many Gulf War veterans observed or became aware of incoming or overflying Scud missiles, Patriot missiles fired in defense, and Scud missile or debris impacts. American and other Coalition forces in the Kuwait theater of operations knew that Iraq had the capability to use chemical and biological weapons, and Scud missile attacks represented a significant cause for concern for anyone within their range.

This Information Paper offers a primer on Scud missiles and describes Iraq's use of Scuds during the Gulf War. The paper also briefly reviews topics related to counter-Scud operations, including Patriot missile defenses.

Iraq filled both chemical and biological warheads for their Scud missiles before the Gulf War. However, Iraq probably feared retaliation if they used them. In-depth research for this paper uncovered no hard evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological warheads during the Gulf War. All Scud debris analyzed indicated use of conventional warheads.

Iraq's Scud attacks involved 88 missiles, of which 46 reached Coalition countries in the Kuwait theater of operations and 42 reached or closely approached Israel. A few more probably failed early in flight and struck within Iraq's borders. Iraq told United Nations inspectors after the war that they launched 93 ballistic missiles, 50 against the Coalition in the Kuwait theater of operations and 43 against Israel. Scuds, while inaccurate, nonetheless damaged area targets and caused 28 of the 148 United States battle deaths during the Gulf War. Scuds often broke up on reentry, dispersing propellant that sometimes caused burning sensations of the skin and throat, nausea, headaches, breathing difficulties and other symptoms in some United States servicemembers. Also, Scud attacks and precautionary alerts disrupted lives and operations by forcing passive defense measures and generating stress.

 

II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND[1]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) used the nickname "Scud B" when referring to the Soviet-made, mobile, single-stage, single-warhead, liquid-fueled, short-range ballistic missile (originally designated by the Soviets as the R-17). Within the intelligence community, it also carried the designation SS-1c (SS for surface-to-surface). The Soviets developed this missile from an earlier version (Scud A) fielded in the 1950s, which they based in turn on the infamous German V-2 of World War II. The Scud B model first appeared with Soviet operational forces in 1962.[2]

The Soviet Union provided Iraq with Scuds mounted with conventional warheads during the 1970s and 1980s.[3] During its war with Iran, Iraq first developed modified or "stretched" Scuds, resulting in the Al Hussein model, with enough propellant and range to reach Iran's capital of Tehran. Because Baghdad is closer to the Iran-Iraq border than Tehran, Iran was able to reach Baghdad from much closer range with their own Scuds and did not need longer-range missiles. The Al Hussein closed the "missile gap." During the seven-week "war of the cities" in early 1988, Iraq's Scuds rained terror on Tehran and other Iranian cities while Iran used unmodified Scud Bs against Baghdad and other targets in Iraq. Iraq's missiles with high explosive warheads killed about 2,000 Iranians and injured 6,000. Over a quarter of the population of ten million fled Tehran. In April of 1988, Iran ended its Scud attacks on Iraq and subsequently negotiated for peace.[4] In the wake of his success with the modified Scud, Saddam Hussein sought further improvements with the Al Abbas and the Al Hijarah models.

 

III.  IRAQ'S SCUD CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES

Coalition forces knew the ballistic missiles that Iraq developed from Soviet Scud Bs as "Scuds," regardless of Iraq's Arabic names for their longer-range variants. For this reason, we have used the same shorthand in this paper. Iraq fired mainly the Al Hussein model at the Kuwait theater of operations and Israel.

fig1s.gif (4163 bytes)

Figure 1.  Scud missile components[5]

Figure 1[5] diagrams the basic components of Iraq's Scuds. Regardless of the variants, original Scud B, Al Hussein, Al Abbas, or Al Hijarah, all of Iraq's Scuds were liquid fueled, short-range ballistic missiles with a crude guidance system. Unsophisticated gyroscopes guided the missile only during powered flight, which lasted about 80 seconds for the Al Hussein variant.[6] Once the rocket motor shut down, the entire missile with the warhead attached coasted unguided to the target area.[7] Consequently, Scuds had notoriously poor accuracy, and the farther they flew, the more inaccurate they became.[8]

Table 1 reflects key data on Iraq's ballistic missiles including the Scud B acquired from the USSR and the three variants produced by Iraq by modifying the original Scud configuration.

 

Table 1. Characteristics of Iraq's selected missiles [9]

 

Scud B

Al Hussein

Al Abbas

Al Hijarah

Length (ft.)

36.8

41

47.6

Unknown

Diameter (in.)

35

35

35

Unknown

Warhead Wt (lbs.)

2,200

1,100

308-550

About 550

Max Range (mi.)

186

373+

500-560

Iraq claimed 466

Accuracy (CEP)[10] (mi.)

0.62

1-2

1.9-3.1

Unknown

Gulf War Involvement

None fired

All but 5 fired were this model

Development stopped in 1990 ' none fired

Iraq claimed 5 fired

 

All of Iraq's Scuds used kerosene as the fuel and some form of red fuming nitric acid, probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA)[11] as the oxidizer. Iraq told the United Nations Special Commission inspectors after the war that they had not experimented with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), a more powerful (and toxic) fuel than kerosene, for their Scuds, which would require engine redesign. However, inspectors subsequently uncovered evidence that Iraq did experiment with UDMH,[12] but this investigation found no evidence that Iraq switched to UDMH during the Gulf War.

To extend the Scud's range, Iraq cut Scud Bs apart and inserted airframe sections from these missiles into other Scud Bs to increase the capacities of the fuel and oxidizer tanks from about 8,700 pounds to about 11,000 pounds.[13] Iraq also reduced warhead weight from 2,200 pounds to less than 1,100 pounds. (See Table 1 above.)

In 1991, Iraq had three kinds of mobile Scud launchers for its operational Scud models.[14] Other support vehicles included cranes, separate tanker trucks for fuel and oxidizer, command and control vans, and missile resupply vehicles.[15]

Iraq's modifications to the Scud Bs created flight stability problems. Unlike more modern ballistic missile designs, the Scud's warhead does not detach from the rest of the missile after the boost phase (the period when the rocket motor fires and accelerates the missile). The missile body reenters the atmosphere still attached to the warhead. The changes in the center of gravity and weight distribution between the modified warhead and missile body, plus the added speed and subsequent increase in atmospheric heating during reentry, made the missiles unstable and often caused them to disintegrate before impact. Such break-ups degraded accuracy by changing missile trajectory. Iranian reports about Al Hussein attacks during the Iran-Iraq war noted that the missiles frequently broke into pieces. Coalition and Israeli reports about Gulf War Scud attacks contained similar observations (see Section V below).

IV.  SCUDS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The evidence clearly shows that Saddam Hussein eventually intended to field operational Scuds armed with chemical and biological warheads, and he committed substantial resources to that end.[16] However, did Iraq successfully achieve that goal by the time of Operation Desert Storm?

A.  Threat Estimates Before Operation Desert Storm

Information from before the Gulf War generated serious concern among Coalition forces about Iraq's possible use of Scuds armed with chemical or biological warheads. Pre-war intelligence judged that Iraq might have chemical warheads for Scuds.[17] One source said that despite very unstable flight characteristics, Iraq successfully completed development of a Scud with a chemical warhead in 1990, and that Iraq had stockpiled 150 Scuds with chemical warheads.[18] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) judged that these warheads would most likely contain persistent chemical warfare agents such as VX (nerve agent) or mustard (blister agent).[19] However, another report quotes an Iraqi engineer who claimed to have worked on the Al Hussein and Al Abbas missile programs. This engineer stated that Iraq still had not succeeded in manufacturing chemical warheads for its ballistic missiles and that Saddam Hussein's threat to launch Scuds with chemical warheads at Israel was "a mere poker game."[20]

According to an intelligence source, the Al Hussein missile could carry either chemical warfare (CW) or biological warfare (BW) warheads. Iraq could mount a biological agent warhead on the Al Abbas version of the Scud. This source reported Iraq planned to use cholera for biological warfare against targets in the Gulf region (but weaponization of cholera could not be verified later).[21]

Intelligence agencies may have put less emphasis on Scuds as a biological threat, but they considered that threat real. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed:

We have no information to confirm that Iraq has developed or manufactured BW warheads for its ballistic missiles. However, Iraq has the ability to weaponize its BW agents'including anthrax spores'and we believe it is well within Iraq's technical capabilities to produce BW warheads for its Scud missiles'. It probably would take only one BW warhead to neutralize any one given target. Our analysis indicates that the Al Husayn [alternate spelling], carrying about 100 kilograms (KG) of dried anthrax spores, would theoretically produce a maximum area of lethal contamination of 1,600 square kilometers [579 square miles]. That would be a dispersion area about 90 KM long and 15 KM wide at the widest point [56 by 9 miles]. Other of Iraq's BW agents would be equally potent: Botulinus toxin would produce a maximum lethal area of contamination of about 21 square kilometers [8 square miles] and anthrax spores in solution would produce an area of about 110 square kilometers [42 square miles].' Iraq only needs a few BW-tipped missiles in its stockpile to cause significant casualties.[22]

Another CIA document stated:

If Saddam concluded his personal position was becoming hopeless, this could convince him to use biological weapons to shock the Coalition into a cease-fire. In such a situation, the use of anthrax against a coalition military installation or a major Saudi oil facility might seem an attractive option.' Iraq is almost certain to use chemical weapons tactically to avoid serious battlefield defeats.[23]

B.  Information During the War

After Iraq began its Scud attacks, Coalition forces saw reports suggesting the possibility of imminent attacks by Iraq with chemically or biologically armed Scuds. The first Scud attack on Israel occurred on January 18, 1991, the day after the Coalition began offensive air operations. An 82nd Airborne Division log sheet noted at 5:32 AM on January 18th that "Israelis have informed the United States that at least some of the missiles that impacted were chemical rds [rounds]."[24] We could not determine who initiated this report, and shortly after 6:00 AM a retraction was transmitted.[25] Israeli officials confirmed to the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses that none of the Scuds that attacked Israel carried chemical or biological agent warheads.[26]

As the Coalition air campaign proceeded, a VII Corps log included an entry at 8:00 PM on January 20th noting that "a source of unknown reliability" stated that Saddam had ordered a chemical/biological attack for the following day.[27] The XVIII Airborne Corps advised the 82nd Airborne Division intelligence staff several hours later that a chemical (or biological) attack would most likely come by surface-to-surface missiles and estimated the likelihood of such an attack at 50 percent.[28]

On January 27, 1991, another report stated that Saddam Hussein had ordered the beginning of chemical attacks.[29] The CIA noted that Iraq's forces "would be 'virtually certain' to use chemical weapons if they were pushed back by an Allied offensive."[30] As the Coalition ground campaign began, the DIA assessed that "Baghdad may be tempted to launch non-conventional [i.e., chemical or biological warfare agent] attacks with whatever warheads are available."[31]

However, the expected chemical or biological attacks did not materialize. Even before the Gulf War ended, media reporting indicated Iraq had used no such weapons aboard Scuds. As one newspaper article noted, "Speculation that Iraq also would fit chemical warheads atop longer-range Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas missiles have [sic] not been borne out by the 67 firings so far of these missiles on civilian and military targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. This fact has caused some officials to conclude that Iraq still lacks the capability of placing chemical warheads on the longer-range Scuds."[32]

Intelligence suggested one possible reason no chemical or biological warfare attacks had occurred. The CIA reported in January 1991 that, while Iraq had chemical warheads for Scud missiles, it had not yet mastered the fuse technology and trigger mechanism to detonate the warhead. The same report stated that Iraq's missile officials were considering having Scud missiles deliver chemical or biological weapons, counting on Patriot missiles to intercept the Scuds, thus dispersing the agent and contaminating an estimated 60 square kilometers (23 square miles).[33] Such a concept suggested that Iraq knew that their own Scud contact fusing could not do a good job, although an area would still be contaminated. As a United States government assessment indicated at the time, analysts did not expect a Patriot intercept to increase dissemination of agent, and it might greatly reduce such dissemination.[34]

The Armed Forces Journal International magazine also reflected upon the technical challenges involved in arming Scuds with chemical warfare payloads:

Why have not Iraqi Scud chemical warheads appeared? Though there are reliable reports that the Iraqis have tested such warheads, technological challenges in the design of such warheads are more formidable than most reports have suggested'. The main hurdle in chemical warhead design is the missile's high terminal speed, nearly one mile per second. For a chemical warhead to function properly, it must dispense the liquid agent into an aerosol cloud a fraction of a second before impact. This is accomplished using a proximity fuse in the nose of the warhead detonating a burster charge in its base. The fuse must withstand the substantial heat build-up, shock, and vibration of descent. The burster charge must be sufficient to breach the warhead casing without destroying the small load of toxic liquid. If either device fails, the warhead plunges into the ground and the chemical agent is largely destroyed or absorbed.[35]

The United States Air Force's Tactical Air Command speculated in early March 1991 that

Iraq well may have refrained from employing chemical agents for political and tactical reasons including inadequate targeting and intelligence and adverse weather. In addition, the tempo and magnitude of the coalition campaign kept Baghdad off balance, and Saddam and his generals may not have wanted to risk the expected massive retaliation for a minimal tactical advantage.[36]

C.  Post-War Findings

A declassified DIA document reported that a thorough analysis of each Scud impact point in at least the King Khalid Military City (KKMC) area uncovered no evidence of chemical warfare agents or their decomposition products.[37] We did not find any indication of verified detection of chemical warfare agents in any other Scud impact areas, including Israel where officials confirmed all Scud warheads recovered were conventional.[38]

In accepting United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, Iraq agreed to a cease-fire, intrusive inspections, and elimination of their weapons of mass destruction and related materiel including Scuds. To perform the inspections and monitor Iraq's compliance with the agreement, the United Nations created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).[39]

After the Gulf War, publicly-released UNSCOM information, as well as the United States intelligence community's independent information collection and analysis, provided insight regarding Iraq's ability to field Scuds fitted with chemical and biological warfare agent warheads. From such sources, we gained perspective on what the Coalition might have faced had Iraq possessed and used workable Scuds with such warheads. UNSCOM verified that Iraq produced 50 chemical and 25 biological Scud warheads that could have been filled for field-operations. Iraq also produced five warheads specifically designed for trials of chemical warfare agents. Of the 50 chemical warfare agent warheads, 16 were filled with the nerve agent sarin and 34 were filled with binary components (chemicals that mix and produce sarin nerve agent) or the persistent nerve agent VX.  UNSCOM did not identify the biological agents.[40]

In 1995, Iraq admitted to UNSCOM inspectors that it had produced the biological warfare agents anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.[41] Inspectors found that Iraq had launched a crash program in December 1990 to field weapons with BW agents to include artillery shells and some Al Hussein Scuds. Iraq claimed they never used such weapons because the United States sent them a message implying that if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons, the United States would counterattack with nuclear weapons. According to Iraq, Israeli officials sent a similar message.[42]

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed that Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons against Coalition forces in the Gulf War.[43] For example, Near East South Asia (NESA), a CIA office focused on the Middle East and other areas, thoroughly searched their files regarding potential use of chemical warfare (CW) of biological warfare (BW) agents by Iraq during the Gulf War. They summarized the results as follows: 1) They found no evidence that Iraq's leaders ordered chemical or biological warfare agent use during the Gulf War and no conclusive evidence that Iraq's forces employed those weapons; 2) Iraq had some Scud missile warheads loaded with CW and BW agents, and that Iraq planned to retaliate with CW and BW weapons for a nuclear attack on Baghdad; and 3) Husayn Kamil (Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law and former chief of Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical weapons development who defected to the west) stated in August 1995 that Iraq's officials believed that the United States would respond with tactical nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the Coalition.[44] This summary suggests that Iraq did not employ CW or BW weapons against Coalition forces.

We have assembled in Tab C excerpts from operational reports regarding chemical agent testing and any symptoms (or lack thereof) for the Scud incidents in the Kuwait theater of operations discussed in Section V below. Reporting on this issue demonstrates that Iraq did not arm Scuds launched against Coalition forces with chemical warheads.

 

V. IRAQ'S USE OF SCUDS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

A. Introduction

Support for this Information Paper came from hundreds of pages of operational and open source evidence, allowing investigators to piece together lists of Iraq's Scud firings (presented below by general target area). Source documents sometimes contained inconsistent information. Even official logs and chronologies frequently recorded disparate detail and third-hand accounts. While a large volume of contemporary 1991 operational reporting has been declassified or released, some of the most reliable sources of information on Scud firings contain sensitive details and remain classified. Investigators considered all available information in constructing summaries for each attack. For completeness, however, our summaries below cite reports with alternative information on numbers of Scuds in an attack, Patriot defensive reactions, ground damage, and other details. For some operational logs and chronologies we uncovered only individual pages detached at some point and set aside because they touched on Scuds. In some cases, we could not identify the originating military organization, but all such evidence came from archives of official documents that the services reviewed for use in this paper.

The brief summaries that follow integrate what we know regarding Scuds fired at targets in the KTO and against Israel. The map in Figure 2 plots generalized launch locations in Iraq, impact areas in the KTO and Israel, and approximate maximum range of Scuds from the launch areas.[45]

fig2s.gif (10738 bytes)

Figure 2.  Scud launch areas, target regions, and Al Hussein range

We have converted all times to local date and time in the KTO.[46]

In the rest of this section we first discuss the total number of Scud missiles fired at Coalition forces and Israel during the Gulf War. Available counts vary. We follow this with separate coverage of the Scud attacks in four geographic regions: the eastern KTO, the Riyadh area, the region of KKMC and Hafir Al Batin, and finally Israel. We summarize in tables the Scud strikes against each KTO region and follow the tables with a few more detailed accounts of the most significant incidents.

B. Total Scud Firing Incidents

At one of our veterans' outreach programs in 1998, a veteran questioned the number of Scud missiles fired against Coalition forces during the Gulf War. He based his opinions on an internal working document produced by the Armed Forces Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) and provided by that Department of Defense organization to some veterans. The listing had 179 incident entries totaling 344 missiles. A junior officer of the Center had compiled a list of Scud launch information from hundreds of operational reports, many with inconsistent data. Not knowing which accounts were correct, this officer included all versions of what happened. CURR designed the list to serve as a reference for responding to veterans' communications regarding Scud incidents at particular times. Our research and analysis confirmed that Iraq fired 46 Scuds into the KTO. The rest of the entries in the CURR list involve duplicate reporting or other incorrect information. We have included the CURR compilation and our analysis of it in Tab D. The operational documents that CURR used as sources for their summary we used in preparing this information paper. Many of these documents were not previously available.

After the Gulf War, various authors and government agencies published assessments of Iraq's Scud attacks including the numbers of missiles fired at Coalition forces and Israel. Pieced together from differing data sets, the totals varied generally within a narrow range. Table 2 summarizes the data from selected authors and organizations. The United States Space Command's count of 97 launches includes nine more than the 88 missiles our investigation determined struck Coalition countries and in or near Israel. Some of the sources cited in Table 2 noted several early in-flight failures that could explain this difference. In reassessing unclassified or declassified material on individual attacks, we can now account for the 46 Scuds that attacked the KTO but only 41 of the 42 Scuds that struck in or near Israel (for a total of 87). However, based on all available information, including classified documents, we are confident that a total of 88 missiles struck in or near the KTO and Israel.  In the summaries that follow we break out the 87 firing incidents covered in unclassified or declassified documents by general area attacked (the eastern KTO, Riyadh, KKMC/Hafir Al Batin, and Israel). These incidents are summarized in Figure 3.[47] After an initial period of intense daily attacks, the number of missiles launched against the Coalition and Israel per day fell off substantially.

Table 2. Number of missiles fired by source

Source

Atk'd KTO

Atk'd Israel

Total Attacks

Remarks

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses[48]

46

42

88

Case Narrative ' "Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia"
Department of Defense Report to Congress[49]

N/A

N/A

88

Published in April 1992.
Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center[50]

45

40

85

Disseminated on February 27, 1991, just before the ceasefire.
Iraq, as reported to United Nations Special Commission[51]

51

43

93

Further details are not in the public domain, but Iraq's launch information agreed well with other sources (with a few exceptions).
United States Space Command[52]

N/A

N/A

97

Based on Defense Support Program infrared satellite data on launches (rather than impacts in target areas).
Center for International Studies[53]

42

39

81

Plus 5-8 that failed shortly after launch.
Military Lessons of the Gulf War[54]

46

40

86

A book published after the war in 1991.
Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review [55]

46

40

86

Plus "five missiles believed to have broken up immediately after launch and did not reach Saudi Arabia or Israel."

 

fig3s.gif (6358 bytes)

Figure 3.  Scud attacks by target area

During the war, some intelligence estimates concluded that Iraq fired Al Abbas missiles with an even greater estimated range than the Al Hussein. Authorities later determined that Iraq fired only the Al Hussein extended range missile except for five attacks with the Al Hijarah variant.[56]

The KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area did not get targeted until the later stages of the Scud attacks. At the end of the war, Iraq fired several Scuds toward Bahrain and Qatar in the eastern KTO (See the regional summaries in Sections C and E below.)

Because many Scuds broke up as they reentered the denser atmosphere, and Patriots intercepted others, some observers might believe a single missile attack included more missiles than was the case. Also, the kinetic energy of heavy debris striking the ground at about 3,600 miles per hour (one mile per second) could cause a significant crater.[57] Both the heavy warhead and engine sections sometimes separated from either end of the missile body on reentry. In these instances, the large but now significantly lighter missile body could decelerate enough from air resistance to survive impact almost intact, as several did.[58]

C. Scud Incidents in the Eastern KTO

Below we address Scud attacks in the Eastern KTO. In this section and those that follow, we summarize the nature of attacks in table entries, including the best available information on the number of attacking missiles. We also note alternative missile numbers we determined were inaccurate but that appeared somewhere in operational reporting (alternative reporting or "alt rpts" numbers in the fourth column). We follow the tables with more detailed accounts of a few incidents chosen because of potential veteran interest or operational significance. Often, many unit logs, chronologies, and summaries recorded the same Scud attack. In such cases we cite only representative and substantive samples for practical reasons. However, we reviewed all cited references as different documents often contained additional data that could provide a more complete picture of the incidents.

1.  Summary

Evidence indicates that Iraq fired 19 Scuds against the areas of Dhahran, Al Jubayl, Bahrain, and Qatar. Table 3 summarizes the details and describes each event.

Table 3. Scud attacks against Eastern KTO

Event #

Date (1991)

Time (Local)

# Scuds (Best est.)

Impact Area

Remarks (MULTIPLE PAGE TABLE)

1

Jan 20

9:43 PM

2 (alt rpts 3)

Dhahran

Some sources reported three Scuds. Chemical alarms went off, tests were negative. Patriots claimed 2 kills. MOPP Level 4 (see Tab A) was in effect for six to seven hours. Debris and two impacts found. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

2

Jan 21

12:29 AM

2 (alt rpts 3)

Dhahran

Patriots claimed one kill, let other hit water. Debris hit runway at Dhahran International Airport, outside an aircraft bunker, and other areas.[59]

3

Jan 21

10:18 PM

1 (alt rpts 2)

Al Jubayl

No Patriot engagement.[60] Target may have been Dhahran.

4

Jan 22

7:10 AM

3 (alt rpts 4)

Dhahran

Scuds one and two were not engaged and hit outside of town. Scud three was intercepted by Patriots and landed off Qatar. Debris hit Dhahran area. Most chemical warfare agent tests were negative. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

5

Jan 23

10:54 PM

2 (alt rpts 3-5)

Dhahran

Iraq rapidly fired five Scuds ' one at Israel and two each at Dhahran and Riyadh. Of the two Scuds fired at Dhahran, Patriots intercepted at least one. Debris fell within and just outside United States occupied base.[61]

6

Jan 26

3:28 AM

1 (alt rpts 2)

Dhahran

Successful Patriot engagement reported. Debris hit Dhahran International Airport.[62]

7

Feb 16

2:01 AM

1

Al Jubayl

Patriot down for maintenance ' no engagement. Scud broke up over harbor and hit the water near ammunition pier. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

8

Feb 22

2:31 AM

3 (alt rpts 1-2)

Bahrain

First time targeted. Patriot battery on Bahrain engaged one Scud and debris was found. Other two Scuds were out of defended area.[63]

9

Feb 23

4:59 AM

2 (alt rpts 1, 4)

Dhahran

Scud one had non-threatening trajectory, and Patriots did not engage it. It landed 12 miles north of King Fahd International Airport. Scud two broke up in flight.[64]

10

Feb 25

8:32 PM

1 (alt rpts 3)

Dhahran

Of two Patriot batteries in range, one was non-operational and other did not detect Scud because of software problem. Warhead hit United States barracks killing 28 and injuring over 100. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

11

Feb 26

1:26 AM

1 (alt rpts 3)

Qatar

Scud overflew Dhahran headed for Qatar. No Patriot engaged because it was out of defense zone. Scud fell into Gulf 40 miles off Doha, Qatar.[65]

 

2.  Details on Selected Incidents

a.  January 20th Attack on Dhahran (Event 1 in Table 3)

Shortly before 10 PM on January 20th, Iraq fired the first two Scuds at the Dhahran area.[66] One report noted that Patriot units fired five missiles at three (rather than the actual two) Scuds and that M8 chemical agent alarms went off, but subsequent tests proved negative.[67] A separate United States Air Force unit at Dhahran logged an entry at 9:50 PM noting multiple explosions. Checks revealed that none of that unit's chemical agent detectors had alarmed. A later entry reported a possible impact near a barracks and the United States Army Component United States Central Command headquarters as well as near a Saudi police camp and the port area. Subsequent investigation turned up no building damage, casualties, or unexploded ordnance.[68] A witness to the January 20th attack remembered that a Patriot battery took out the Scuds near a pier in Dhahran and that everybody went to MOPP Level 4 (full chemical protection ' see glossary at Tab A) for about six or seven hours while tests and assessments were made. He did not know the test results, but an "all clear" was sounded permitting a termination of the chemical alert.[69] A chemical company soldier remembered witnessing repeated M8A1 chemical agent alarms and positive M256 chemical detection kit tests the first night of Scud attacks in the Dhahran area and recalls remaining in MOPP Level 4 for seven hours. He believed no one had chemical agent symptoms.[70]

b.  January 22nd Attack on Dhahran (Event 4 in Table 3)

Shortly after 7:00 AM on January 22nd, Iraq fired three Scuds toward Dhahran. The first two flew outside of the Patriots' defended area with at least one landing in the desert about 50 miles west of town. The other reportedly went down in Gulf waters north of Qatar. Most unclassified sources credit Patriots with intercepting the third Scud.[71] Debris reportedly struck on a Dhahran Air Base runway just as an aircraft took off to the south, but the aircraft apparently escaped damage.[72] Most pieces of debris were described as small (less than 3 inches), but something falling out of the sky caused a crater 23 feet in diameter and 4 feet deep on the air base. All but one field test indicated no presence of chemical warfare agent. In that one positive chemical warfare agent test, a chemical agent monitor registered a very low concentration on the nerve agent scale. Subsequent testing at that location proved negative.[73] A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle (see glossary at Tab A) took samples from the crater area for additional testing, but we found no specific results of any Fox tests.

Alternative reporting included a fourth Scud that appeared in some chronologies at this time as a target for two Patriot launches. However, this track represented a false target (radar interference ' see Section VI.B). One summary suggested that Patriot units fired two missiles at each of three Scuds.[74]

c.  February 16th Attack on Al Jubayl (Event 7 in Table 3)

Iraq fired a single Scud at the port city of Al Jubayl early on February 16th.[75] The Patriot battery positioned to defend Al Jubayl was undergoing maintenance at the time and could not engage the Scud.[76] The incoming missile broke up in flight over the harbor and hit in the water just off a large pier where six ships and two smaller craft were tied up. The missile's impact also was about 500 feet from ammunition storage on the pier.[77] Figure 4 displays a map of the harbor showing the impact location.

fig4s.gif (21716 bytes)

Figure 4.  Map of Jubayl harbor Scud impact

One witness recalls hearing a loud explosion and seeing white-hot objects falling.[78] The Scud caused no casualties or damage, but it exuded a blue, green, and yellow substance and bubbled a strong-smelling gas for some time (probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid ' see Section VII). United States Navy explosive ordnance disposal specialists eventually recovered the missile in parts using divers, flotation bags, and a crane. Test results performed on this Scud determined that it did not have a chemical or biological warhead.[79] Figure 5 shows the recovered high explosive warhead.[80]

fig5s.gif (10077 bytes)

Figure 5.   Recovered Scud warhead

d.  February 25th Attack on Dhahran (Event 10 in Table 3)

Iraq launched one Scud toward Dhahran early in the evening of February 25th. One Patriot battery on Dhahran airfield was not operational and another nearby did not track the Scud, apparently because of a software problem.[81] The Scud broke up on reentry showering a United States housing compound with debris, and the warhead hit a warehouse serving as a United States barracks in Aujan compound in the Dhahran suburb of Al Khobar. The strong explosion and resulting fire killed 28 United States soldiers from the 475th Quartermaster Group (a United States Army Reserve unit) and injured 100, about half of them seriously. According to one source, most of the injured suffered burns. Initially, some 40 soldiers were believed missing.[82] Most of the soldiers in the warehouse had just arrived and had not completely processed into their units. This, plus the presence of their personnel files and computer records in the same devastated warehouse, played havoc with the ability to account for people.[83] Helicopters eventually evacuated 70 to 100 soldiers to six hospitals including five Saudi facilities.[84] This single incident caused more combat casualties than any other in Operation Desert Storm.[85]

Some documentation includes alternative details to this horrific event. One message stated that this incident involved three confirmed launches (one against Dhahran, one against nearby King Fahd Airport and one against Qatar).[86] A press briefing attributed the lack of Patriot engagement to a combination of the warehouse location (housing) and debris trajectory from a disintegrating Scud.[87] The media quoted another senior officer as explaining that "because it [the Scud] had gone into a tumble ' it wasn't within the parameters of where it would be attacked by our missile defense system."[88]

D. Scud Incidents in the Riyadh Area

1. Summary

Investigators counted 18 Scuds fired against the area of Riyadh during Iraq's missile attacks. Table 4 and the details on selected incidents that follow address these attacks.

Table 4. Scud attacks against Riyadh area

Event #

Date

(1991)

Time (Local)

# Scuds (Best est.)

Impact Area

Remarks

(MULTIPLE PAGE TABLE)

12

Jan 21

12:42 AM

4

(alt rpts 6-17)

Riyadh

Scud attack on Riyadh coordinated with one against Dhahran (see Event 2 in Table 3). Patriot units in area fired 26 missiles and claimed all Scuds killed. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

13

Jan 22

3:41 AM

3

(alt rpts 2-9)

Riyadh

Patriots engaged and possibly intercepted all three (30 Patriots fired). Debris noted south of town. TV coverage showed three ground explosions in area. Nearly intact Scud body (minus warhead and tail section) landed on a street. No casualties or damage.[89]

14

Jan 23

10:54 PM

2 (alt rpts 3-5)

Riyadh

Iraq fired five Scuds in a very short time ' one at Israel and two each at Dhahran and Riyadh. In Riyadh, Patriots reportedly destroyed one or both. During this period, Patriots at KKMC fired at one false target and Patriots with VII Corps fired at two false targets.[90]

15

Jan 25

10:23 PM

2

(alt rpts 3-5)

Riyadh

Patriots intercepted with two missiles against each Scud. However, one Scud warhead demolished a six-story Saudi Department of Interior building killing one and injuring 30. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

16

Jan 26

10:46 PM

1 (alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

Patriots engaged Scud. Warhead exploded in empty field ╝ mile from United States Central Command Headquarters.[91]

17

Jan 28

8:55 PM

1

(alt rpts 3)

Riyadh

Patriots fired four missiles ' one intercepted the Scud and the others engaged debris. Debris struck farm in suburbs with no significant damage.[92]

18

Feb 3

12:41 AM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

Patriots fired two missiles, but Scud warhead detonated near apartment damaging several buildings and slightly injuring 29 people. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

19

Feb 8

1:54 AM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

One of two Patriots fired reportedly intercepted this Scud north of city. However, warhead hit parking lot and detonated. No casualties or major damage. Patriots considered this a "mission kill"[93] (see glossary in Tab A).

20

Feb 11

10:20 PM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

One of two Patriots intercepted, but warhead hit near swimming pool and building at Islamic University. It exploded causing significant damage. It broke many windows and slightly injured two people by flying glass. Considered Patriot "mission kill."[94]

21

Feb 24

4:32 AM

1

Riyadh

Two patriots fired and warhead kill claimed (it landed without exploding), but minor damage caused to Saudi school (no injuries).[95]

22

Feb 24

9:23 PM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

Patriots fired two with one malfunction and command destruct. Other Patriot engaged Scud with "mission kill" reported. Scud broke up before or as result of intercept. No explosion from debris.[96]

 

2.  Details on Selected Incidents

a.  January 21st Attack on Riyadh (Event 12 in Table 4)

Shortly after midnight and within a few minutes of an attack against Dhahran (Event 2 in Table 3), Iraq launched four Scuds in the first attack on the Saudi capital of Riyadh. Patriot batteries in the area launched 26 missiles (eight at the first Scud and six at each that followed) recording kills against all targets.[97] One report noted the Patriots claimed 14 kills at Riyadh and Dhahran combined "'because [Patriot] missiles went after [Patriot] missiles."[98] A log entry suggested that some Patriots fired on fragments from missile intercepts.[99] News media videotapes reportedly captured three ground explosions. One of the ground explosions near an office building blew out the back wall of one structure and produced a 10-foot crater. Twelve people had minor injuries.[100]

As in other Scud events, some logs reported a larger number of separate Scuds fired than we could confirm in our analysis of all available evidence.[101]

b.  January 25th Attack on Riyadh (Event 15 in Table 4)

Late in the evening of January 25th, Iraq fired two Scud missiles toward Riyadh. Patriot batteries fired four missiles, reportedly intercepting both Scuds.[102] However, one of the Scud warheads completely demolished a six-story Saudi Department of Interior building in downtown Riyadh killing one Saudi and injuring 30 (most slightly). The warhead struck only a little over a mile south of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation building housing United States Central Command Headquarters.[103] At this building, communications technicians reported hearing a "loud boom" from above. They investigated the roof and found debris from the Scud. Nuclear-biological-chemical specialists who were called to the scene to test for chemical agents did not find any contamination and gave an "all clear."[104]

Although other sources reported three or five Scuds heading toward Riyadh,[105] available evidence points to only two Scuds.

c.  February 3rd Attack on Riyadh (Event 18 in Table 4)

After almost five days of no strikes on the KTO, Iraq resumed Scud attacks with a single launch against Riyadh very early on February 3rd.[106] A Patriot battery fired two missiles[107] but apparently failed to disable the Scud warhead, which detonated damaging several buildings and slightly injuring 29 people.[108]

One report suggested Iraq launched a second Scud shortly after the first; however, the available evidence does not support this account.[109]

Two other sources recorded a successful intercept of the Scud. They stated that the engagement resulted in a mission kill (meaning a Patriot missile deflected the Scud from defended territory or the Scud warhead had significantly reduced effectiveness) and that the warhead hit in the desert east of Riyadh air base.[110] However, the damage and casualties in a populated area noted above attests that at least the warhead struck within the city. We found no evidence concerning chemical warfare agent testing for this event.

E. Scud Incidents in the KKMC and Hafir Al Batin Areas

1.  Summary

Iraq targeted King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and the area around Hafir Al Batin with an estimated nine Scuds beginning in mid-February. See Table 5.

2.  Details on Selected Incidents

a.  February 14th Attack on Hafir Al Batin (Event 23 in Table 5)

On February 14, 1991, Iraq fired a barrage of Scud missiles in what was the first attack against the general KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area as well as the first attack against a military target in the middle of the day. The attack against Hafir Al Batin involved at least two Scuds and two different launch locations.[111] Patriot radars near KKMC tracked the Scuds, but because the missiles threatened an area outside the batteries' designated defense zone and range, the crews launched no Patriot missiles against these Scuds.[112] One Scud reportedly exploded in the southeast part of Hafir Al Batin collapsing the side of one house, stripping off the fašade of another, and destroying an automobile maintenance workshop along with four or five cars.[113] Another Scud struck in a civilian district, but damage involved only broken windows. These missiles caused four minor injuries.[114]

Table 5. Scud attacks against KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area

Event #

Date (1991)

Time (Local)

# Scuds (Best est.)

Impact Area

Remarks

23

Feb 14

11:45 AM

Poss 5 (alt rpts 2, 3, 4)

Hafir Al Batin

First attack on this area and first in middle of day. Number of missiles unclear in evidence. Five impact areas reported, but most sources noted two Scuds that broke up. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

24

Feb 21

5:06 PM

2 (alt rpts 3)

KKMC

Seven Patriots fired, intercepting one or both Scuds (one Scud reportedly disintegrated on its own). No damage or casualties reported.[115]

25

Feb 21

9:00 PM

1

KKMC

Projected impact 12 miles north of city so Patriots did not engage. No casualties or damage. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

26

Feb 24

12:17 PM

1 (alt rpts 2)

KKMC

Patriot intercepted one missile. No casualties or damage reported. Second impact of debris recorded. Several sources incorrectly reported another Scud overflying.[116]

 

One log contained plots of five impacts for these attacks, but did not indicate which involved warheads (and hence separate missiles) and which might have resulted from debris. Three impacts happened close to the town and two at some distance to the south and to the east. The log suggested that the additional impacts resulted from one Scud breaking up in flight.[117] Other reports noted that local eyewitnesses claimed a Scud broke up after another Scud missile or a Patriot hit it.[118] An official United States Air Force post-war assessment noted five Scud launches on the 14th.[119] Another Scud-tracking organization listed four launches on February 14th. Scuds struck no other target area on this date.[120] A nuclear-biological-chemical operations summary stated that one Scud in this attack had an airburst suspected of involving a chemical agent warhead. Units did both ground and aerial surveys. Reports did not indicate how the air survey was conducted, but part of the ground survey included use of a Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle. The report noted that no contamination was found and that the air burst really involved the Scud breaking up in flight.[121]

Other reporting typifies the variety of accounts that surrounded Scud attacks. From reports that all of the impacts occurred in unoccupied desert areas (but there were casualties and damage in town) to accounts that witnesses saw three air bursts near the town with a warhead separating from one of the missiles (the only report noting three air bursts),[122] unclassified documentation clearly does not present a consistent picture regarding how many missiles were involved in this attack. Based on all available evidence, however, we assess that five separate Scuds struck in the area.

b.  February 21st Attack on KKMC (Event 25 in Table 5)

Iraq launched this attack from the Baghdad area toward KKMC at about 9:00 PM.[123] Missile impact was expected about 12 miles north of the city.[124] However, the missile disintegrated prior to impact, and witnesses observed an air burst. All but two reports indicated Patriots defending the KKMC area did not attempt to engage the Scud.[125] Research revealed no indications of casualties or damage, but one source reported that debris fell in Trailer City, a temporary United States housing area. A United States airman in the housing area remembered the debris falling around him but recalled no injuries.[126]

F.  Scud Incidents in Israel

Iraq fired 42 Scuds that reached Israel or nearby areas of Jordan beginning on January 18, 1991. Iraq launched these missiles from Western Iraq against three general target areas ' Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the Negev Desert in Southern Israel, specifically, Dimona where Israel had a nuclear facility.[127] Figure 6 summarizes the general impact areas for these strikes. Those hitting in the West Bank of Jordan presumably fell short of their intended targets in Israel proper.[128]

fig6s.gif (2929 bytes)

Figure 6.  Where Scuds landed in or near Israel

As noted in Section V, the director of Israel's Scud Recovery Unit indicated none of the missile warheads they recovered had chemical or biological warfare agent components. All had conventional warheads.[129]

The director of the Israeli Scud Recovery Unit also noted that when Patriots shot down a Scud, release of the residual rocket oxidizer (inhibited red fuming nitric acid) generated a cloud of yellow mist that caused burning sensations on exposed skin. Some who experienced Scud attacks incorrectly believed this yellow or orange cloud to be nerve agent.[130] See Section VII on Scud oxidizer incidents.

VI. FALSE ALARMS AND FALSE TARGETS

Coalition forces in the Kuwait theater of operations responded not only to actual Scud launches but also to many false reports of Scud attacks generated by early warning surveillance assets, intelligence reports, or because Patriots fired at false targets.

A. False Alarms

After a thorough review of ballistic missile incident accounts from Operation Desert Storm, we determined that at least 60 false alarms were logged in the KTO[131] (in addition to the Patriot false target detections addressed separately below). None of these 60 alarms documented an actual missile attack, but they may have created the impression that such attacks occurred more frequently than was the case. Even though many of these alerts were cancelled within minutes, many servicemembers and civilians took appropriate measures, donned chemical protective gear, and sought shelter. We believe (because alerts were canceled promptly) that misinterpretation of initial infrared (heat-source) detections by satellites led to most of these false alarms. At least two other false alarms came from detection of signals from a radar associated with Scud operations (it tracks weather balloons to determine winds aloft).

The United States operations, intelligence, and space communities collectively made history when they developed a system to provide warning of Iraq's ballistic missile launches to the entire KTO (and Israel) within minutes.[132] This system relied primarily on space-based infrared surveillance. However, across any combat theater, there are many non-missile infrared sources including exploding bombs, high intensity flares, demolitions of weapons storage sites, and other sudden heat-producing events capable of registering on infrared-sensitive devices. Because warning time was at a premium, some early alerts proved false, but the goal was always to notify quickly to protect lives.[133]

On January 17th, the day the air campaign began, a Scud warning shortly after 4:00 AM put many bases and units in the Dhahran area into MOPP Level 3 (full protective gear except gloves ' see glossary in Tab A).[134] Reports even noted confirmed missile impacts in the area[135] and Scud fragments collected.[136] The warning was eventually cancelled.[137]

A mobile Army surgical hospital (MASH) chronology includes the following for January 17th:

The 807th MASH has entered the war, and suddenly loudspeakers begin to blare, "SCUD alert ' MOPP level four" ' we all scurry into our MOPP gear ' The lights are out, now, and we have been previously informed that the Saudis think a SCUD can only penetrate the top two floors of our building. In total darkness, punctuated only by the red-lensed flashlight beams, all 250 members of the 807th troop down three flights of stairs. As we occupy the empty apartments, each person sits on the floor, alone inside his mask except for his or her thoughts and fears. For 2 long hours we breathe claustrophobic air in hot chemical suits, until, with dawn, we hear, "ALL CLEAR, MOPP level zero." ' We later find out that radar confused our own returning B-52's with Scuds. Fortunately, we learn that after the war has ended.[138]

Figure 7 summarizes the false alarms during Operation Desert Storm. These false alarms declined in frequency after the first eight days of the war. The decline possibly reflected refined human judgment or adjustments in procedures. In addition to the detections graphed, United States Space Command generated five false alarms from December 25-30, 1990, three the result of live ballistic missile test firings by Iraq.[139]

fig7s.gif (5224 bytes)

Figure 7.  False alarms during Operation Desert Storm

B. Patriot False Target Detections

According to information published after the Gulf War, a problem with the Patriot radar system caused Patriot missiles to fire at phantom targets. In September 1992, an Army official admitted that electronic signals, or noise, emitted by a variety of United States systems caused computer problems and accidentally launched Patriot missiles in the first week of the war. The Patriot's radar system processed these signals as the result of software flaws and a design that left the back of the radar unit open to stray signals. These signals came from the airborne warning and control system aircraft, radar jamming pods on fighters, test equipment, airport radars, and communications systems. Software changes and makeshift shrouds for the backs of Patriot radars eventually resolved the problem.[140] During the early stages of the air war that began on January 17, computers automatically directed the Patriot missile batteries' threat responses. Soldiers in Patriot units did not have a role in the fire, no-fire decisions. Patriot units later revised the procedures, and changed to a manual mode of engagement that allowed operators to decide when to fire.[141]

The first actual ballistic missile attack against the KTO occurred against the Dhahran area at 9:43 PM on January 20, 1991. However, false targets involving Patriot reactions began on January 18, 1991, without warnings from national surveillance assets. Veterans aware of these engagements believed, at least at the time, that incoming missiles threatened them. Most reports did not identify the January 18th incidents as reactions to Patriot false targets until after the war when the discrepancy became public knowledge. For example, during the war, one Army document noted for the 18th that Patriots intercepted a single Scud in the Dhahran area.[142] Alpha Battery, 2nd Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery got credit for a first successful Scud intercept. An element of the XVIII Airborne Corps reported seeing a Scud missile heading south. Three powerful explosions occurred over Dhahran Air Base. This report claimed that three missiles had been fired at Dhahran. The same document indicated that Patriots engaged one incoming missile but that another hit Khobar, an area where United States forces were billeted. The entire Dhahran area was reported at MOPP Level four with lower MOPP levels ordered further west.[143] A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle searched for evidence of chemical warfare agent but found none.[144] One chronology stated that the explosions happened when a friendly aircraft released bombs into an ordnance jettison area.[145] We found only one contemporaneous record that indicated (correctly) that the reports of ballistic missiles launched at Dhahran on the 18th were erroneous.[146]

Despite the flurry of Patriot false targets early in the war (some interspersed with real attacks), we found no evidence that Patriots engaged false targets after January 23, 1991 (presumably because of the equipment and software fixes). Figure 8 shows how the 20 false target detections break down by day based on research of unclassified and declassified operational reporting.[147] Patriots did not launch missiles at every false target, but one report indicated that Patriot batteries fired a total of 22 missiles at false targets. In another report, an official admitted that the number was 24.[148]

fig8s.gif (5500 bytes)

Figure 8.  False Patriot detections by date

 

VII. SCUD OXIDIZER INCIDENTS

As Israeli officials pointed out to us, when reentering Scuds were intercepted or broke up on their own, they sometimes released a yellow-to-reddish-to-brownish cloud of the Scud's residual propellant oxidizer. People on the ground observing these clouds voiced concerns that the airborne releases involved chemical warfare agent. Incoming Al Hussein missiles contained about 300 pounds of residual oxidizer and 100 pounds of fuel. The oxidizer and accompanying oxides of nitrogen were dangerous in their own right and caused a range of symptoms in people exposed on the ground.[149]

Iraq's Scud oxidizer, inhibited red nitric acid (IRFNA), can cause deep and painful burns on the skin or in the lungs. When inhaled, the oxidizer and its nitrogen oxide decomposition products can produce immediate or delayed symptoms including throat dryness, cough, headache, dizziness, anxiety, extreme fatigue, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, labored breathing, inflammation of the lungs, choking, fluid build-up in the lungs, and suffocation, depending on the extent of exposure.[150] In interviews with our investigators, or during testimony before government panels, Gulf War veterans reported a variety of symptoms consistent with oxidizer exposure. Extracted from their accounts, these symptoms included tearing eyes, runny noses, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, sleeplessness, headaches, and blurred vision.[151]  Kerosene, the fuel component of Scud propellants also escaped during breakups. Kerosene is not particularly toxic, even after acute exposure, and is used, for example, as barbecue lighter fluid and in jet fuels.[152]  

Readers wanting additional information on Scud oxidizer should consult our information paper on IRFNA.[153]

 

VIII. COALITION RESPONSE TO SCUD THREAT

The Coalition took strong actions to protect forces and civilians and diminish the impact of Scud attacks. The Coalition considered Scuds a military and psychological threat to their forces, populations, and interests. Scud threat reduction efforts went forward on several fronts and included expanded surveillance and warning, deploying Patriot surface-to-air missiles with some ballistic missile intercept capability, air strikes against production and storage facilities, and attempts to destroy Scud units in the field before or after they launched missiles.[154]

The key component of the Scud alert process was the Defense Support Program surveillance satellites (see Figure 9)[155] that identified launches by detecting the infrared energy from a rocket in powered flight.[156] During Operation Desert Storm, United States Space Command quickly assessed the downlinked infrared detections and rapidly passed alert data to United States Central Command and other allies.[157] According to one source, military radars in the region could track missiles and aid in the extrapolation process to identify potential target areas.[158]

fig9s.gif (12505 bytes)

Figure 9.   DSP surveillance satellite[159]

In another response to the Scud threat, the United States deployed Patriot surface-to-air missile units to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Tab A includes a Patriot system description. Figure 10 summarizes the targets at which post-war analysis determined the Patriots fired.[160]

fig10s.gif (3413 bytes)

Figure 10.  Patriots expended by target area

Part of the Coalition strategy for dealing with Scuds involved pre-planned air strikes against associated production and storage facilities.[161] These strikes were concentrated during the early part of the air campaign.[162]

Another component of United States reaction to protect Coalition forces was Scud hunting. Beginning with the initial Scud attacks against Israel on January 18, 1991, and Saudi Arabia on January 20, 1991, United States forces came under enormous pressure to do something about the immediate Scud threat. Reportedly, the United States leadership in Washington, DC, focused on the potential diplomatic and political fallout from Scuds, while most senior air commanders believed that Scuds "did not represent a particularly credible military threat" (emphasis original). As Air Force Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, commander of the United States Air Force Component United States Central Command observed, the Scud was "a lousy weapon."[163]  

Nevertheless, the Coalition diverted considerable resources to attempt to neutralize Iraq's Scuds. Figure 11 displays in parallel graphs the number of total sorties dedicated to counter-Scud operations of all kinds (right) and the number of Iraq's Scuds attacking the KTO and Israel (left). Day 1 was January 17, 1991, and Day 43 was February 28, 1991.

fig11s.gif (8333 bytes)

Figure 11.   Scuds fired and anti-Scud sorties flown by day[164]

Scud units in the field proved difficult to locate and hit. What became known as "the Great Scud Hunt" had questionable operational effectiveness. As the United States Gulf War Air Power Survey noted, most, and possibly all of the 100 mobile launchers reported struck by Coalition aircraft appeared later to have involved decoys, other vehicles, or other objects that presented Scud-like signatures.[165]

IX.  THE RESIDUAL THREAT

The United Nations Special Commission supervised destruction of 48 Scuds plus additional components and found evidence that Iraq unilaterally destroyed at least another 83 missiles unsupervised.[166] However, many estimates point to a substantial residual Scud inventory. Some data points from various sources include:

  • In 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that Iraq retained "perhaps hundreds" of missiles, and his successor estimated the residual force at 100-200 missiles.[167]

  • Israeli sources indicated Iraq may have as many as 100 Scuds of all versions.[168]

  • In 1995, Iraq eventually admitted to the United Nations Special Commission that in 1987 it had begun a full-scale program to indigenously manufacture Al Hussein Scuds largely from scratch and had established specialized factories for this purpose. Iraq planned eventually to produce 1,000 missiles, but it claimed that by January 1991 they had failed to produce a single operational missile.[169]

  • In mid-1996, a general officer defector from Iraq said that he believed Saddam Hussein had retained some 40 Scud-type missiles.[170]

  • By 1996, UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-like missiles indigenously that inspectors could not locate.[171] After UNSCOM unwillingly withdrew from Iraq in 1998, some estimated that Iraq could resume production of Al Hussein missiles within one year.[172]

  • According to a United States government white paper in 1998, Iraq maintained a small force of Scud-type missiles and may have pieced together Scuds by integrating original guidance and control systems it concealed from UNSCOM with parts produced in Iraq.[173]

 

X.  SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

The results of our Scud missile research and analysis can be summarized as follows:

  • During the Gulf War, Iraq attacked with approximately 88 Scuds, almost all of them Al Hussein models, with 46 striking in the KTO and 42 in or near Israel. Several more firings probably resulted in early in-flight failures within Iraq.

  • An internal working paper produced and released to veterans by the Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) included 179 entries appearing to involve approximately 344 missiles. In it, CURR listed each variation in attack detail, however minor, as a separate Scud attack entry. For example, if separate reports covered an attack, one using coordinated universal (Z) time and the other using local time in the KTO (C time - three hours difference) the CURR report generated two entries, one for each time, even if all the other details coincided. The officer that prepared the compilation knew the entries involved duplications, but CURR released the list before they could scrub it to consolidate different reports of the same incident. Our analysis of CURR's incident record revealed massively redundant counting based on various second-hand accounts of individual attacks and included false alarms where Iraq launched no Scuds. When we subtracted these duplications and false alarms, the total number of attacking Scuds very closely matched the counts published by other expert sources. See an accounting of the CURR list at Tab D.

  • Iraq worked to develop extended-range Scud variants capable of delivering both chemical and biological warfare agents. As of early 1991, they had produced and filled such warheads on Scuds. However, the evidence suggests that they could not carry out an effective attack with these weapons because of fusing and flight stability problems.

  • We uncovered no convincing evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological agent warheads at Coalition forces or Israel. Technical problems, threats of retaliation, and risk-benefit considerations may have affected Iraq's decision not to employ them.

  • A substantial proportion of the Al Hussein Scud models spontaneously broke up on reentry, probably due to faulty design and unstable flight characteristics.

  • During disintegration on reentry or impact, some Scuds released a yellow, red, or brown cloud containing corrosive inhibited red fuming nitric acid. Observers sometimes mistakenly believed these releases of oxidizer were releases of chemical warfare agents. While not nearly as toxic as chemical warfare agents, IRFNA and accompanying nitrogen oxide decomposition products can cause, as described previously, distressing symptoms in exposed people.

  • The extended-range Scuds fired by Iraq demonstrated even poorer accuracy than the original Soviet design but had modest success as a terror weapon against large population concentrations. As the Scud attacks progressed and it became apparent that Iraq had used no chemical or biological agent warheads, the missiles became less effective as a terror weapon.

  • Iraq probably retains some Scud-type missiles and may be able to produce more.

TAB A ' Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary

This tab provides a listing of acronyms and abbreviations found in this report. Additionally, the Glossary section provides definitions for selected technical terms that are not found in common usage.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADA air defense artillery
ARCENT United States Army Component United States Central Command
BDA battle damage assessment
Bn battalion
BW biological warfare
 
CENTAF United States Air Force Component United States Central Command
CEP circular error probable
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINC commander-in-chief
CTOC corps tactical operations center
 
CURR Center for Unit Records Research
CW chemical warfare
CWA chemical warfare agent
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DISUM defense intelligence summary
 
DoD Department of Defense
DS Desert Storm
DSP Defense Support Program
DTG date time group
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
 
Gen general
GPALS Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
HTH calcium hypochlorite
INTSUM intelligence summary
IRFNA inhibited red fuming nitric acid
 
IZ 2-letter shorthand for Iraq
JTF joint task force
KG kilogram
KKMC King Khalid Military City
KTO Kuwait theater of operations
  
MOPP mission oriented protective posture
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NESA (CIA office) Near East South Asia
NBC nuclear biological chemical
OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
 
Refs references
S2/S-2 intelligence officer or staff
SigOps significant operations
SITREP situation report
SRBM short-range ballistic missile
 
TBM tactical ballistic missile
UDMH unsymmetrical dimethylhydrozine
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission
USARCENT United States Army Component United States Central Command
USCINCCENT United States Commander-in-Chief Central Command

 

Glossary

B TIME

The time in the time zone located two time zones east of the time zone centered on the prime meridian. This time zone included Israel.

CEP

Circular error probable. An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missile's projectiles are expected to fall.[174]

C TIME

The time in the time zone located three time zones east of the time zone centered on the prime meridian. This time zone included the KTO.

DSP

Defense Support Program uses a satellite-borne system with infrared detectors to sense heat from missile plumes against the earth background. It detects and reports in real time missile launches, space launches, and nuclear detonations. During Desert Storm, DSP detected the launch of Iraq's Scud missiles and permitted timely warning to civilian populations and coalition forces in Israel and the KTO.[175]

Fox Nuclear, Biological Chemical Reconnaissance System

The Fox vehicle is a six-wheeled, light armored vehicle designed primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer (primary detection device), the M43A1 chemical agent detector (an integral component of the M8 alarm system), and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox also has two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and it allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.[176]

M256 Chemical Warfare Agent Detector Kit

In the field, the M256-series chemical warfare agent detector kit is referred to simply as the M256 kit. The portable, expendable M256 kit can detect and identify hazardous concentrations of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The M256 kit is used after a chemical warfare agent warning to test for and confirm the presence and type of chemical warfare agent, and to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. United States forces used both the M256 kit and the M256A1 kit during the Gulf War.

Some smokes, high temperatures, standard United States decontamination solution number two (DS2), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Sampling in smoke from burning debris may produce inaccurate results.[177]

M8A1 Chemical Alarm

The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the presence of the nerve agent in the air with both an audible and visual warning. The United States military fielded the M8A1 to replace the wet chemical M8 detector'which eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden, and associated costs. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or vehicle mounted configuration.[178]

Mission Kill

Patriot intercepts that do not disable the ballistic missile warhead but nevertheless minimize damage on the ground. There were two types of mission kills. One involved low yield kills in which the Patriot damaged the ballistic missile warhead to the point that either it only burned at ground impact or it exploded with greatly reduced force. The other involved diversion in which a Patriot deflects the ballistic missile from its initial path and it impacted with no significant ground damage to personnel or major structures.[179]

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask'a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides individuals protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins. At MOPP Level 0 servicemembers carry their protective mask and keep their remaining MOPP gear readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.) At MOPP Level 1, servicemembers wear their overgarment and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, servicemembers wear their overgarments and overboots while carrying the mask with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, servicemembers wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, servicemembers wear all their MOPP gear. Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.[180]

Patriot Surface-to- Air Missile System

The Patriot is a long-range, all-weather, high and low altitude system designed to defeat advanced aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. It can engage multiple, simultaneous targets. The Patriot Fire Unit consists of a radar, launchers, missiles, and battle management/command control and communications centers. The multifunction phased array radar provides surveillance, target detection and tracking, and missile guidance support. The trailer-mounted launcher holds four Patriot missiles in the configuration used most in Operation Desert Storm. The missile has a blast fragmentation warhead.[181] Each missile weighs 2,200 pounds and has a range of nearly 43 miles. When launched, the missile turns toward the target and enters the radar beam. A computer on the ground then directs the missile toward the target. In the terminal phase, the missile's internal radar receiver guides it to interception.[182]

VX

V-series nerve agent. Chemical Name: O-ethyl-S-(2-isopropylaminoethyl)methyl phosphonothiolate.[183]

Z time

Coordinated universal time (UTC), also called "zulu time," formally Greenwich Mean Time. The time in the time zone centered on the prime meridian and used by United States forces as a standard time in, for example, electronic messages because it puts global forces on the same clock.[184]

TAB B ' Bibliography

1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, "1st Brigade Chronology," Annex B, undated.

1st Calvary Division, "AAR 1st Calvary Div Command Report," April 10, 1991.

1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group, "1st EOD Group Daily Journal," January 25, 1991.

1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), "Log of Events."

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 8, 1991.

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991.

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "Operation Desert Storm AAR and Significant Events," March 6, 1991.

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "Significant Events from Daily Log," March 6, 1991.

3rd Armored Division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 14, 1991.

3rd Armored Division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," January 22, 1991.

3rd Armored Division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," January 28, 1991.

VII Corps air defense element, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991.

VII Corps, "Daily Log," September 3, 1991.

VII Corps, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 20, 1991.

VII Corps, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 22, 1991.

VII Corps, "Defense of the Wadi Al Batin."

VII Corps, "Enclosure A to Appx 2 to Tab H to VII Corps DS AAR," undated.

VII Corps, "Jayhawk Daily News," February 4, 1991.

VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA."

VII Corps, "NBC Operations Summary," Appendix 2, undated.

11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, "11th ADA Brigade S2's Chronology of Events," undated.

11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, "11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade S2's Chronology of Events," undated.

11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, after action report, "NBC Overview," undated.

XVIII Airborne Corps message form, "Confirmation on Scuds," February 14, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps personnel staff, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 21, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 21, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, "Intelligence Spot Report Format," Scud Update, February 14, 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," December, 1990.

XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," February 1991.

XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," January 1991.

20th Engineer Brigade, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 25, 1991.

74th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Explosive Ordnance Incident Report," January 23, 1991.

82 nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 18, 1991.

82 nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991.

82 nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 22, 1991.

82 nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 26, 1991.

82nd Airborne Division intelligence staff, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 21, 1991.

513th Military Intelligence Battalion, "Foreign Material Intel Bn Section III G I," undated.

807th Surgical Hospital (Mobile Army), "The 807th Surgical Hospital (Mobile Army) and its Contributions and Adventures during Operation 'Desert Shield/Storm,'" undated.

Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' ' Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991.

Boley, Ray M. "Patriot Performance Assessment in Desert Storm Roadmap (U)," CAS, Incorporated for United States Army Missile Command, July 25, 1991 (S).

Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995.

Broad, William J., "Iraqis Using Clouds to Cover Scud Firings, Meteorologists Say," New York Times, January 25, 1991.

Carus, Seth W., and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990.

Center for Naval Analysis, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," August 1996 (S).

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Iraq, on site cns.miis.edu (as of April 24, 2000).

Central Intelligence Agency memorandum, subject "Consolidated SCUD Comments," April 18, 2000.

Central Intelligence Agency message, subject "Iraq CW," undated.

Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center fact sheet, "The Russian Scud B," undated.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Chronology of Iraqi CW Development."

Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Gulf War Syndrome," July 1995.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq and the Gulf War, 1990-91," undated.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq as a Military Adversary," November 1990.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi Capabilities and Intentions to Use Chemical Weapons," undated.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi Special Weapons Capabilities," January 1991.

Central Intelligence Agency, "IZ Chemical and Biological Warhead Threat," undated.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Report on Iraqi Chemical/Nuclear Warhead Systems," 1991.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of NESA Files," February 21, 1996.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Why WMD were Withheld," March 1991.

Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "1990; The Iraqi Scud Threat," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of September 24, 1997).

Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "Devil's Brews Briefings: Iraq," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of September 9, 1997).

Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "Iraq's Ballistic Missile Capabilities," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of July 29, 1999).

Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "National Briefings: Iraq," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of July 29, 1999).

Cooper, Ambassador Henry F., "Limited Ballistic Missile Strikes. GPALS Comes Up with an Answer," NATO Review, June 1992 on NATO web site: www.nato.int (as of July 27, 1999).

Cordesman, Anthony H., "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Brassey's, London, 1991.

CURR unit location database.

Defense Intelligence Agency electronic mail, subject "Preliminary Response on Information Paper Entitled 'Iraq's SCUD Ballistic Missiles (U),'" April 17, 2000 (S).

Defense Intelligence Agency message, subject "IIR 6 284 0008 94/Detection of Chemical Agents By Czechoslovak Unit during Desert Storm, Part III," 141325 Oct 93.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations; Iraq's Capability and Posturing," undated.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "Daily Training Schedule at Mukhabarat," undated.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "Effects of Patriot Interception on SCUD Warhead," January, 23, 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "IZ Chemical and Biological Warhead Threat," undated.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "NADA INTSUM 231-91," February 22, 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "Scud Chemical Agent Coverage Patterns - Aug 90," August 1990.

Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Assessment 181A-91, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," January 27, 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Assessment 181A-91, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," February 23, 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Assessment 91A-91, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," January 27, 1991.

Defense Intelligence Agency, Report, Subject:  "Reference Task OICC 4139, Orange Cloud Assessment," redacted, February 4, 1991.

Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message, subject "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 26 February 1991," 271603Z Feb 91.

Defense Technical Information Center, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, web site: www.dtic.mil (as of September 15, 1999).

Department of Defense message, subject "IIR 2 340 2823 91/Information on Mines, Missiles and NBC Weapons," 011735Z Mar 91.

Department of Defense, "Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992.

Department of State, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," United States Government white paper, February 13, 1998.

Department of the Army, "Patriot TBM Engagement Modes," executive summary, January 24, 1991.

European Oil Company Organization for Environment, Health, and Safety, "Kerosine," web site: www.concawe.be (as of January 27, 2000).

Federation of American Scientists, "Defense Support Program," web site: www.fas.org (as of September 30, 1999).

Federation of American Scientists, "UNSCOM and Iraqi Missiles," web site: www.fas.org (as of May 13, 1999).

Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Forces Guide, "al-Abbas," web site: www.fas.org (as of May 13, 1999).

Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volumes I and II, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993.

Hoffman, Sergeant Timothy, "Space Capabilities Vastly Improved Since Gulf War," Air Force Space Command Public Affairs, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, March 1998.

Howard Hughes Medical Institute, "Laboratory Chemical Safety Summaries," Nitric Acid, web site: www.hhmi.org (as of May 8, 2000).

Isby, David C., "The Residual Iraqi 'Scud' Force," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, Nbr 3.

Jane's Information Group, "Al Hussein," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems 1995-96, September 16, 1996.

Jane's Information Group, "Strategic Delivery Systems," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1995.

Kagan, Mark H., "Iraq's Case: The International Missile Trade and Proliferation," The International Missile Bazaar; The New Suppliers' Network, William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1994.

Lead Sheet #1232, Interview of United States Navy explosive ordnance disposal specialist, January 8, 1991.

Lead Sheet #1410, Interview of United States Coast Guard watch stander, February 24, 1997.

Lead Sheet #8802, Interview of 703rd Provisional Boat Company engineer-oiler, June 25, 1997.

Lead Sheet #9462, Interview of 10th Battalion soldier, December 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet #10922, Interview of 567th Transportation Company soldier, October 8, 1997.

Lead Sheet #13099, Interview of Marine aviation technician supervisor, December 19, 1997.

Lead Sheet #15828, Interview of 3rd Armored Division soldier, April 9, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16471, Interview of Army Support Group operations, training, and procurement officer, May 15, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16642, Interview of 390th Transportation Unit soldier, May 19, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16866, Interview of 318th Chemical Company soldier, May 28, 1998.

Lead Sheet #17229, Interview of Navy master chief of motor vessel Baugh, June 10, 1998.

Lead Sheet #18912, Interview of 354th Equipment Maintenance Squadron airman, September 10, 1998.

Lead Sheet #19849, Interview of 55th Support Battalion supply soldier, October 10, 1998.

Lead Sheet #20899, Interview of 551st Transportation Company soldier, December 29, 1998.

Lead Sheet #21097, Interview of B Company, 702nd Transportation Battalion soldier, January 14, 1999.

Lenhart, Warren W. and Todd Masse, "Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Scud Ballistic Missile Systems," Congressional Research Service report to Congress, February 14, 1991.

Lennox, Ducan, "Inside the R-17 'Scud B' Missile," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1991.

Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 1993.

Lovece, Joseph, "Electronic Noise from U.S. Gear Prompted Errant Patriots," Defense Week, September 28, 1992.

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16, "Command Chronology 1-28 Feb 91," Section II, March 1, 1991.

Memorandum from Air Force Space Command vice commander to Headquarters, United States Space Command, Subject: "Declassification/Security Review Request from OSD," December 9, 1998.

"No Chem Scuds?" Armed Forces Journal International, March 1991.

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "The United States Navy in 'Desert Shield/Desert Storm,'" May 15, 1991.

Postol, Theodore A., "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," International Security, winter 1991/92.

Proctor, Nick H., et al., Chemical Hazards of the Workplace, third edition, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1991.

Public television station WGBH, "M1M-104 Patriot," web site: www2.pbs.org (as of October 1, 1997).

Raytheon Corporation, "Patriot Combat Proven Air Defense System," web site: www.geocities.com (as of October 10, 1997).

Schubert, Frank N., and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., "The Whirlwind War, the United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," Appendix A, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1995.

"Scud Data Raise Questions About Barracks Destruction," Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1991.

Simon, Alexander, "The Patriot Missile. Performance in the Gulf War Reviewed," July 15, 1996, Center for Defense Information web site: www.cdi.org (as of October 1, 1997).

Smith, R. Jeffrey, "Iraq's Chemical Weapons Still a Threat to Ground Troops, U.S. Says," The Washington Post, February 19, 1991.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia," (Case Narrative), web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/al_jubayl/, August 13, 1997.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid," (Information Paper), web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/irfna/, August 3, 1999.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/m256/, July 23, 1999.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Middle East Trip Provides Useful Information Exchange," January 27, 1998.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/mopp/, October 30, 1997.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Possible Chemical Agent on Scud Missile Sample," (Case Narrative), web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/scud/ August 19, 1997.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper) , web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/foxnbc/, July 29, 1997.

Tactical Air Command, "CENTAF-Rear DISUM 184," 062300Z Mar 91.

Testimony of Fox subject matter expert, Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of GEN H. Norman Schwartzkopf before the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, January 29, 1997 on the United States Senate web site: www.senate.gov (as of June 11, 1999).

Testimony of Ms. Harmon-Davis before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.

Unidentified United States Army air defense element message form, "Scud Launch," 252210C Feb 91.

Unidentified United States Army air defense element message form, February 25, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army air defense element message form, February 25, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army air defense element message, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 17, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army air defense element, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 21, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army air defense element, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 24, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army air defense element, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 24, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army corps daily summary for January 23, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army division air defense element "Spot Report Format," February 3, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army division air defense element, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," subject "Follow-up on SCUD Launch," February 25, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army division air defense message form, 202157Z Jan 91.

Unidentified United States Army division intelligence staff, "Journal Sheet," January 21, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 21, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 11, 1991

Unidentified United States Army intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 14, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 14, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army operations staff air defense element message, subject "Scud Launch," January 23, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army operations staff, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," 252042C Feb 91.

Unidentified United States Army operations staff, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 25, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization log, "Scud Launch Report," January 23, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Desert Shield G3-NBC Significant Events," undated.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "G-3 Spot Report," January 20, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," February 14, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Message Form," January 26, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 24, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 11, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 21-22, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," January 25, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," January 28, 1991.

Unidentified United States Army rear command post, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 23, 1991.

Unidentified United States Central Command command post "JTF J2 Message Form/Journal Log," February 8, 1991.

Unidentified United States Central Command unit, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated.

United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review," Annex A, Status of the Material Balances in the Missile Area, and cover letter, January 25, 1999, web site: www.un.org (as of March 10, 2000).

United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review," Annex C, Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, January 25, 1999, web site: www.un.org (as of March 10, 2000).

United States Army Component United States Central Command operations staff United States Marine Component United States Central Command Desk, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 7, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command operations staff, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 17, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command, ARCENT Spot Report, "CENTCOM Scud Update," January 21, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command Support Command memorandum, "Written After Action Report, Desert Shield/Desert Storm," May 30, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," February 14, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," February 25, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," January 26, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command, "Mass Casualty ' SCUD Attacks," United States Army Component United States Central Command Lessons Learned Worksheet, April 25, 1991.

United States Army Component United States Central Command, "Unconfirmed Spot Report," memorandum for command group, January 18, 1991.

United States Army Field Manual 3-4, United States Marine Corp Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," February 21, 1996.

United States Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Equipment and Organizations," August 10, 1994.

United States Army Field Manual 3-9, United States Navy Publication P-467, United States Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990.

United States Army Technical Manual 3-6665-342-10, "Operator's Manual, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) Fox XM93," Washington, DC, Change 2, April 21, 1995.

United States Central Command, "Air Defense Operations," February 24, 1991.

United States Central Command, "CINC's Press Briefing," February 27, 1991.

United States Central Command, "Daily Staff Journal Sig Ops Events," January 25, 1991.

United States Central Command, "Daily Staff Journal Sig Ops Events," February 3, 1991.

United States Central Command, "G-3 Spot Report," January 20, 1991.

United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January-February, 1991.

United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log."

United States Central Command, "Sequence of Events, 2nd Scud Launch," January 25, 1991.

United States Central Command, "Sig Ops Events," January-February, 1991.

United States Coast Guard Port Security Unit 301, "Port Security Unit-301, Al-Jubayl Saudi Arabia 1990-91," undated.

United States Commander in Chief Central Command message, subject "SITREP/USCINCCENT/168/Jan," 242115Z Jan 91.

United States Commander in Chief United States Central Command message, "Daily Staff Journal Sig Ops Events," January 23, 1991.

United States Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," February 13, 1998.

United States Space Command, "Defense Support Program," web site: www.spacecom.af.mil (as of September 30, 1999).

University of Michigan Computer Club, "Soviet Operational Missiles and Rockets," web site: www.umcc.edu (as of July 27, 1999).

Watson, Bruce W., "Iraqi Scud Launches During the Gulf War," Appendix C, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, George Watson and Cyr Tsouras, London, Greenhill Books, 1991.

Zaloga, Steven, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Defense Review, November 1988.

TAB C ' Chemical Evidence ' Scud Incidents In KTO

Table 7. Chemical Warfare Agent Evidence

Date/ Time (1991)

Area

Reports on Test Results or Indications

(MULTIPLE PAGE TABLE)

Jan 20 9:43 PM

Dhahran

  • Numerous M256 kit, M8A1 alarms, and Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) tests/checks produced negative results.[185]

  • Impact was assessed as high explosive.[186]

Jan 21 12:29 AM

Dhahran

  • Fox nuclear-biological-chemical reconnaissance vehicles detected no chemical contamination.[187]

Jan 21 12:42 AM

Riyadh

  • At least two Scuds exploded on impact. See Table 4 and Selected Incident detail.

  • No confirmation of nuclear-biological-chemical contamination. All clear reported.[188]

Jan 21 10:18 PM

Dhahran

  • Struck in water ' no damage/casualties reported.[189]

Jan 22 3:41 AM

Riyadh

  • No casualties or damage. See Table 4.

Jan 22 7:10 AM

Dhahran

  • Numerous negative CAM results. However, one CAM produced one-bar (very low concentration) for G nerve agent, but later checks with M256 kit proved negative.[190]

Jan 23 10:54 PM

Dhahran

  • An M8A1 alarm did not alert.[191]

Jan 23 10:54 PM

Riyadh

  • United States/Saudi police desk reported no nuclear-biological-chemical alarms. NBC reported all clear. Then Saudis reported mustard reading in area, but Explosive Ordnance Disposal team checked and found nothing.[192]
  • French investigated one suspected impact area but found no crater or contamination.[193]

Jan 25 10:23 PM

Riyadh

  • One warhead explosion demolished Saudi building.
  • NBC personnel sent to roof of Ministry of Defense and Aviation building (location of United States Central Command Headquarters) after impact about one mile away ' reported all clear.[194]
  • Received all clear from Explosive Ordnance Disposal at strike site.[195]

Jan 26 3:28 AM

Dhahran

  • Reporting contains no indications of chemical agent delivery or casualties. See Table 3.

Jan 26 10:46 PM

Riyadh

  • Reporting contains no indications of chemical agent delivery or casualties. See Table 4.

Jan 28 10:55 PM

Riyadh

  • Reporting contains no indications of chemical agent delivery or casualties. See Table 4.

Feb 3 12:41 AM

Riyadh

  • Warhead detonated damaging several buildings. See Table 4 and Significant Incidents.

Feb 8 1:54 AM

Riyadh

  • Warhead exploded (indicating high-explosive warhead). See Table 4.

Feb 11 10:20 PM

Riyadh

  • Warhead exploded. See table 4.
  • All clear for NBC contamination reported.[196]

Feb 14 11:45 AM

Hafir Al Batin

  • No casualties or chemical munitions use reported.[197] See also Table 5 and Significant Incidents.
  • Ground and aerial reconnaissance performed and no contamination found.[198]

Feb 16 2:01 AM

Al Jubayl

  • Warhead recovered and confirmed as high explosive. See Table 3.

Feb 21 5:06 PM

KKMC

  • No chemical agent exposure reported. See Table 5 and Significant Incidents.

Feb 22 2:31 AM

Bahrain

  • One of three Scuds hit water. No report of chemical warheads in operational reporting.

Feb 23 4:59 AM

Dhahran

  • Reporting contains no indications of chemical agent delivery or casualties. See Table 3.

Feb 24 4:32 AM

Riyadh

  • No explosion, no injuries. See Table 4.

Feb 24 12:17 PM

KKMC

  • No explosion. See Table 5.

Feb 24 9:23 PM

Riyadh

  • All clear for chemicals called. Dud warhead confirmed as high explosive by Explosive Ordnance Disposal.[199]

Feb 25 8:32 PM

Dhahran

  • High explosive warhead hit barracks with extensive damage and casualties. No chemical casualties.[200]

Feb 26 1:26 AM

Qatar

  • Impacted in water 40 miles off Qatar. See Table 3.

 

TAB D ' Analysis of CURR Scud Incident List

Release of an internal working paper to several veterans by the Armed Forces Center for Unit Records Research (CURR, formerly Center for Research of Unit Records ' CRUR) led to accusations that the Department of Defense had understated the number of Scud firings against the KTO. The working paper listed Scud attacks against Coalition forces. We present below our analysis of this list. In analyzing the list, we based our judgments on careful review of the original operational references used by a CURR officer to construct the list. This material also served as a major resource in preparing the firing incident summaries in Section V. We have provided most of this material, sometimes in redacted form, for review through hyperlinks in the on-line version of this paper on our GulfLINK web site. The sources were too numerous to conveniently cite separately in this tab. Note that this tab and the original CURR compilation address only Scud strikes against the KTO and do not include those against Israel.

Table 8 that follows includes all of the original data from the CURR Scud attack list including date and time of the incident, the number of Scuds reportedly fired, the reported target location, and the CURR analyst's remarks. To this CURR section of the table, we have added an entry number and our estimate of the time zone used in the list (coordinated universal time ' Z time ' or local time in the KTO ' C time, which is three hours later than Z time). The right side of the table adds our assessment of each CURR entry. We placed CURR's missile numbers from each entry into one or more columns based on careful analysis of whether the entry was the first in CURR's list to cover a valid Scud attack on the KTO, a duplication of a valid previous entry, or data at variance with what we believe happened. These last nine columns include:

  • "1st Ref." The first time a valid Scud attack shows up in CURR's list. While the attack was valid, the entry sometimes includes erroneous information, and we so note this in our remarks column. (46 Scuds each);

  • "Dupes." CURR Scud attack entries that we believe address valid attacks previously listed. However, these additional entries sometimes include more (or less) accurate details on the attack than the first entry, in which case we note this in our remarks. (202 reported missiles);

  • "Likely Dupes." The CURR entry appears to address a valid incident covered previously, but the CURR entry and the documents used to create it include details (other than number of Scuds fired) at variance with the bulk of the evidence. This made us somewhat less sure that it was a duplicated entry. (30 missiles);

  • "Dupe of." Where an entry appears to involve information about a Scud attack previously listed in the table, the next column notes the entry number of the duplicated CURR entry;

  • "False Target." In this column we include entries that were documented as Scuds when in reality they were only false Patriot targets resulting from radar interference (27 reported Scuds);

  • "Wrong Salvo Size." Where a CURR incident entry lists a valid attack but includes an incorrect (too large) number of Scuds for the attack, we put the overage in this column (33 reported Scuds);

  • "No Match." In a few cases, we could not match a CURR attack entry with any documented event, usually because the entry and its source material lacked key data such as date and time (6 reported Scuds).

  • "Event # in Sec V." Where any CURR entry corresponds to an attack we document in the event tables in Section V of this report, we note our serial number from Section V here.

  • "OSAGWI Remarks." This final column summarizes our analysis of each entry to help the reader understand our logic and provides other observations on the CURR entries.

Figure 12 below summarizes the numbers of CURR entries that fell in each of the above categories. The 46 valid missile attacks against the KTO correspond to our assessment noted in Section V.

fig12s.gif (3492 bytes)

Figure 12.  Assessed categories of CURR Scud attack entries

Table 8.  Analysis of CURR Scud Incident Entries

 

END NOTES

[1] Tab A provides acronyms, abbreviations, and a glossary.

[2] Lennox, Ducan, "Inside the R-17 'Scud B' Missile," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1991, p. 302; University of Michigan Computer Club, "Soviet Operational Missiles and Rockets," web site: www.umcc.edu (as of July 27, 1999).

[3] Carus, Seth W. and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's' Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, p. 204.

[4] Jane's Information Group, "Strategic Delivery Systems," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1995, p. 18; Carus, Seth W. and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, June 1990, p. 242-244.

[5] Based on Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center fact sheet, "The Russian Scud B," undated.

[6] Lennox, Ducan, "Inside the R-17 'Scud B' Missile," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1991, p. 302, 304; Central Intelligence Agency memorandum, subject "Consolidated SCUD Comments," April 18, 2000, p. 3.

[7] Jane's Information Group, "Al Hussein," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems 1995-96, September 16, 1996.

[8] Central Intelligence Agency, "IZ Chemical and Biological Warhead Threat," undated.

[9] Lenhart, Warren W. and Todd Masse, "Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Scud Ballistic Missile Systems," Congressional Research Service report to Congress, February 14, 1991, p. CRS-2, CRS-5-7; Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Forces Guide, "al-Abbas," web site: www.fas.org (as of May 13, 1999); Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "National Briefings: Iraq," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of July 29, 1999); Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "Iraq's Ballistic Missile Capabilities," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of July 29, 1999); Department of Defense message, subject "IIR 2 340 2823 91/Information on Mines, Missiles and NBC Weapons," 011735Z Mar 91; Cordesman, Anthony H., "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Brassey's, London, 1991, p. 40, 45-46; Defense Intelligence Agency, "Daily Training Schedule at Mukhabarat," undated; Carus, Seth W. and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, p. 205; Jane's Information Group, "Al Hussein," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems 1995-96, September 16, 1996; Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," web site: cns.miis.edu (as of April 24, 2000).

[10] Circular error probable. See glossary at Tab A.

[11] Defense Intelligence Agency, Report, Subject:  "Reference Task OICC 4139, Orange Cloud Assessment," redacted, February 4, 1991.

[12] Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center fact sheet, "The Russian Scud B," undated; Federation of American Scientists, "UNSCOM and Iraqi Missiles," web site: www.fas.org (as of May 13, 1999).

[13] Carus, Seth W. and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, p. 204-205.

[14] Jane's Information Group, "Al Hussein," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems 1995-96, September 16, 1996.

[15] Zaloga, Steven, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Defense Review, November 1988, p. 1427; Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "1990: The Iraqi Scud Threat," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of September 24, 1997).

[16] Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq and the Gulf War, 1990-91," undated.

[17] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations; Iraq's Capability and Posturing," undated.

[18] Central Intelligence Agency, "Report on Iraqi Chemical/Nuclear Warhead Systems," 1991.

[19] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Scud Chemical Agent Coverage Patterns - Aug 90," August 1990.

[20] Kagan, Mark H., "Iraq's Case: The International Missile Trade and Proliferation," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1994, p. 193-194.

[21] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Daily Training Schedule at Mukhabarat," undated; United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review," Annex C, Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, January 29, 1999, web site: www.un.org (as of April 25, 2000).

[22] Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq CW," undated.

[23] Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq as a Military Adversary," November 1990.

[24] 82nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 18, 1991.

[25] VII Corps, "Defense of the Wadi Al Batin," p. 91.

[26] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Middle East Trip Provides Useful Information Exchange," January 27, 1998.

[27] VII Corps, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 20, 1991.

[28] 82nd Airborne Division intelligence staff, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 21, 1991.

[29] Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Assessment 91A-91, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," January 27, 1991.

[30] Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi Capabilities and Intentions to Use Chemical Weapons," undated.

[31] Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Assessment 181A-91, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," January 27, 1991.

[32] Smith, R. Jeffrey, "Iraq's Chemical Weapons Still a Threat to Ground Troops, U.S. Says," The Washington Post, February 19, 1991, p. 7.

[33] Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi Special Weapons Capabilities," January 1991.

[34] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Effects of Patriot Interception on SCUD Warhead," January 23, 1991.

[35] "No Chem Scuds?" Armed Forces Journal International, March 1991, p. 23.

[36] Tactical Air Command, "CENTAF-Rear DISUM 184," 062300Z Mar 91.

[37] Defense Intelligence Agency message, subject "IIR 6 284 0008 94/Detection of Chemical Agents By Czechoslovak Unit during Desert Storm, Part III," 141325Z Oct 93.

[38] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Middle East Trip Provides Useful Information Exchange," January 27, 1998.

[39] United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review," Annex A, Status of the Material Balances in the Missile Area, and cover letter, January 25, 1999, web site: www.un.org (as of March 10, 2000).

[40] Federation of American Scientists, "UNSCOM and Iraqi Missiles," web site: www.fas.org (as of May 13, 1999); Defense Intelligence Agency electronic mail, subject: "Preliminary Response on Information Paper Entitled 'Iraq's SCUD Ballistic Missiles (U),'" April 17, 2000 (S).

[41] Department of State, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," United States Government white paper, February 13, 1998.

[42] Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "Devil's Brews Briefings: Iraq," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of September 9, 1997); Central Intelligence Agency, "Why WMD were Withheld," March 1991.

[43] Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996.

[44] Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of NESA Files," February 21, 1996; Central Intelligence Agency, "Why WMD were Withheld," March 1991.

[45] Scud firing areas based on Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part II, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 400.

[46] Readers are cautioned to note the difference in the time zones used in cited references, hyperlinked in the online version, and to add three hours to "Z times" to track with the convention used in this paper. Also note that such conversions in the middle of the night (when many of the Scuds flew) can change the date as well as the time. For example, 2300Z (11:00 PM in London) on February 4th equals 0200C (2:00 AM in the KTO) on February 5th.

[47] Graph based on summaries for each geographic area in section V.

[48] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia," (Case Narrative) , web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/aljubayl/, August 13, 1997, p. 2.

[49] Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 165.

[50] Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message, subject "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 26 February 1991," 271603Z Feb 91.

[51] United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review," Annex A, Status of the Material Balances in the Missile area, and cover letter, January 25, 1999, web site: www.un.org (as of March 10, 2000).

[52] Memorandum from Air Force Space Command vice commander to Headquarters, United States Space Command, Subject: "Declassification/Security Review Request from OSD," December 9, 1998.

[53] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 42.

[54] Watson, Bruce W., "Iraqi Scud Launches During the Gulf War," Appendix C, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, George Watson and Cyr Tsouras, London, Greenhill Books, 1991, p. 225-226.

[55] Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225.

[56] Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Assessment 181A-91, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," February 23, 1991; Central Intelligence Agency, "Chronology of Iraqi CW Development;" Jane's Information Group, "Al Hussein," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems 1995-96, September 16, 1996.

[57] Postol, Theodore A., "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," International Security, winter 1991/92, p. 133.

[58] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48.

[59] Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; 82nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991; unidentified United States Army division air defense message form, 202157Z Jan 91; XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," January 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 47; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225; Lead Sheet #13099, Interview of Marine aviation technician supervisor, December 19, 1997.

[60] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 47; 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, "11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade S2's Chronology of Events," p. 10; 82nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991.

[61] Unidentified United States Army corps daily summary for January 23, 1991; 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), "Log of Events;" unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; VII Corps, "Daily Log," January 22, 1991; Lead Sheet #21097, Interview of B Company, 702nd Transportation Battalion soldier, January 14, 1999; United States commander in chief Central Command message, subject: "SITREP/USCINCCENT/168/Jan," 242115Z Jan 91; unidentified United States Army operations staff air defense element message, subject "Scud Launch," January 23, 1991.

[62] XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," January 1991; United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," January 26, 1991; unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225; United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January 26, 1991; 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group, "1st EOD Group Daily Journal," January 25, 1991.

[63] XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," February, 1991; VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA."

[64] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 50; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "The United States Navy in 'Desert Shield'/'Desert Storm," May 15, 1991; VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA;" VII Corps, "Daily Log, September 3, 1991.

[65] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 50; XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," February 1991; unidentified United States Army air defense element message form, February 25, 1991.

[66] Watson, Bruce W., "Iraqi Scud Launches During the Gulf War," Appendix C, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, George Watson and Cyr Tsouras, London, Greenhill Books, 1991, p. 224 225; unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 47.

[67] United States Central Command, "G-3 Spot Report," January 20, 1991.

[68] The Air Force element did not have a M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm go off and checked using Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) and M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit. 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), "Log of Events."

[69] Lead Sheet #15828, Interview of 3rd Armored Division soldier, April 9, 1998, p. 1.

[70] Lead Sheet #16866, Interview of 318th Chemical Company soldier, May 28, 1998, p. 2.

[71] Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225; United States Central Command, "SigOps Events," January 22, 1991.

[72] As documented by 3rd Armored Division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," January 22, 1991.

[73] 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), "Log of Events."

[74] Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message, subject: "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 26 February 1991," 271603Z Feb 91.

[75] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225.

[76] Center for Naval Analysis, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," August 1996 (S).

[77] Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16, "Command Chronology 1-28 Feb 91," Section II, March 1, 1991; Center for Naval Analysis, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," August 1996 (S); and Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia" (Case Narrative), August 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/aljubayl/.

[78] Lead Sheet #1410, Interview of United States Coast Guard watch stander, February 24, 1997, p. 2.

[79] Lead Sheet #1232, Interview of United States Navy explosive ordnance disposal specialist, January 8, 1991, p. 2; Lead Sheet #16642, Interview of 390th Transportation Unit soldier, May 19, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #10922, Interview of 567th Transportation Company soldier, October 8, 1997, p.2, 3.

[80] United States Coast Guard Port Security Unit 301, "Port Security Unit-301, Al-Jubayl Saudi Arabia 1990-91," undated.

[81] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 50; unidentified United States Army air defense element message form, "Scud Launch," 252210C Feb 91.

[82] Watson, Bruce W., "Iraqi Scud Launches During the Gulf War," Appendix C, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, George Watson and Cyr Tsouras, London, Greenhill Books, 1991, p. 225; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "The United States Navy in 'Desert Shield/Desert Storm,'" May 15, 1991; unidentified United States Army operations staff, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 25, 1991; United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," February 25, 1991.

[83] United States Army Component United States Central Command, "Mass Casualty - SCUD Attacks," United States Army Component United States Central Command Lessons Learned Worksheet, April 25, 1991.

[84] Unidentified United States Army organization, "Message Form," January 26, 1991.

[85] United States Army Component United States Central Command Support Command memorandum, "Written After Action Report, Desert Shield/Desert Storm," May 30, 1991.

[86] Unidentified United States Army operations staff, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," 252042C Feb 91.

[87] United States Central Command, "CINC's Press Briefing," February 27, 1991.

[88] "Scud Data Raise Questions About Barracks Destruction," Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1991, p. 16.

[89] Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; 82nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 22, 1991; VII Corps, "Daily Log," January 22, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; VII Corps, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 22, 1991; VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA."

[90] United States Commander in Chief Central Command message, subject: "SITREP/USCINCCENT/168/Jan," 242115Z Jan 91, Section 5; unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; unidentified United States Army organization log, "Scud Launch Report," January 23, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January 23, 1991; unidentified United States Army air defense element, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 24, 1991.

[91] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," January 26, 1991; 82nd Airborne Division, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 26, 1991.

[92] Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," January 28, 1991; 3rd Armored Division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," January 28, 1991.

[93] United States Army Component United States Central Command operations staff United States Marine Component United States Central Command desk, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 7, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225; unidentified United States Central Command command post "JTF J2 Message Form/Journal Log," February 8, 1991; 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 8, 1991.

[94] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49; unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 11, 1991; United States Central Command, "SigOps Events," January 25, 1991; unidentified United States Army intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 11, 1991.

[95] Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 24, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 50; United States Central Command, "Air Defense Operations," February 24, 1991.

[96] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 50; unidentified United States Army division air defense element, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," subject "Follow-up on SCUD Launch," February 25, 1991; VII Corps, "Daily Log," February 24, 1991; XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," February 1991.

[97] Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated.

[98] United States Army Component United States Central Command, ARCENT Spot Report, "CENTCOM Scud Update," January 21, 1991.

[99] VII Corps air defense element, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991.

[100] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 47.

[101] VII Corps, "Daily Log," September 3, 1991; unidentified United States Army division intelligence staff, "Journal Sheet," January 21, 1991; 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, "11th ADA Brigade S2's Chronology of Events," undated, p. 10.

[102] Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," January 25, 1991.

[103] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message, subject: "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 26 February 1991," 271603Z Feb 91; unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated; unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," January 25, 1991.

[104] United States Central Command, "Daily Staff Journal Sig Ops Events," January 25, 1991.

[105] VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA;" VII Corps, "Daily Log;" January 25, 1991; 20th Engineer Brigade, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 25, 1991.

[106] 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, "11th ADA Brigade S2's Chronology of Events," undated, p. 11; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225.

[107] Unidentified United States Central Command organization, "Scud Launch/Kill Summary," undated.

[108] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 48; VII Corps, "Jayhawk Daily News," February 4, 1991.

[109] Unidentified United States Army division air defense element "Spot Report Format," February 3, 1991.

[110] Watson, Bruce W., "Iraqi Scud Launches During the Gulf War," Appendix C, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, George Watson and Cyr Tsouras, London, Greenhill Books, 1991, p. 224; United States Central Command, "Daily Staff Journal Sig Ops Events," February 3, 1991.

[111] 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, "11th ADA Brigade S2's Chronology of Events," undated, p. 12; unidentified United States Army organization, "Iraq-Kuwait: Situation Update," February 14, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49.

[112] Unidentified United States Army intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 14, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49.

[113] United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," February 14, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49.

[114] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49.

[115] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49; unidentified United States Army air defense element, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 21, 1991; Defense Intelligence Agency, "NADA INTSUM 231-91," February 22, 1991; XVIII Airborne Corps personnel staff, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 21, 1991; VII Corps, "Daily Log," February 21, 1991.

[116] Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 24, 1991; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 50; unidentified United States Army air defense element, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 24, 1991; XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," February 1991.

[117] 3rd Armored Division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 14, 1991; XVIII Airborne Corps, Intelligence Spot Report Format, "Scud Update," February 14, 1991.

[118] XVIII Airborne Corps message Form, "Confirmation on Scuds," February 14, 1991; United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," February 14, 1991.

[119] Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume I, Part I, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 245.

[120] Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message, subject "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 26 February 1991," 271603Z Feb 91.

[121] VII Corps, "Enclosure A to Appx 2 to Tab H to VII Corps DS AAR," undated; VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA;" 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "Operation Desert Storm AAR and Significant Events," March 6, 1991.

[122] VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA."

[123] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49; 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, "11th ADA Brigade S2's Chronology of Events," undated, p. 12.

[124] VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA."

[125] United States Central Command, "SigOps Events," February 22, 1991; VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 ADA;" XVIII Airborne Corps, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," February 21, 1991; unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 21-22, 1991; unidentified United States Army division intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 21, 1991.

[126] Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 49; unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 21-22, 1991; Lead Sheet #18912, Interview of 354th Equipment Maintenance Squadron airman, September 10, 1998, p. 1.

[127] United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," February 25, 1991.

[128] Basic sources consulted in building this graph included the following cited extensively elsewhere is this paper: Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, p. 42-50; Watson, Bruce W., "Iraqi Scud Launches During the Gulf War," Appendix C, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, George Watson and Cyr Tsouras, London, Greenhill Books, 1991, p. 224-225; Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message, subject "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 26 February 1991," 271603Z Feb 91; Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225; "11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Chronology of Events," undated; United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," February 25, 1991.

[129] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Middle East Trip Provides Useful Information Exchange," January 27, 1998.

[130] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Middle East Trip Provides Useful Information Exchange," January 27, 1998.

[131] There were too many source documents to conveniently cite here. We cited most of them elsewhere in this paper, such as United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log;" VII Corps, "Major Subordinate Command Historical Reports -- Task Force 8-43 AD;" VII Corps, "Daily Log," January-February 1991; and other command post logs and journals.

[132] Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 177.

[133] Schubert, Frank N. and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., "The Whirlwind War, the United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," Appendix A, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 245-246; Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 176-177.

[134] Unidentified United States Army air defense element message, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 17, 1991; XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," January 1991.

[135] United States Army Component United States Central Command operations staff, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 17, 1991.

[136] 513th Military Intelligence Battalion, "Foreign Material Intel Bn Section III G I," undated.

[137] United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January 17, 1991.

[138] 807th Surgical Hospital (Mobile Army), "The 807th Surgical Hospital (Mobile Army) and its Contributions and Adventures during Operation 'Desert Shield/Storm,'" undated.

[139] The December 25, 26, 27, 29 and 30, 1990, false alarms were based on XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," December, 1990.

[140] Lovece, Joseph, "Electronic Noise from U.S. Gear Prompted Errant Patriots," Defense Week, September 28, 1992, p. 1, 13.

[141] Simon, Alexander, "The Patriot Missile. Performance in the Gulf War Reviewed," July 15, 1996, Center for Defense Information, web site: www.cdi.org (as of October 1, 1997); Department of the Army, "Patriot TBM Engagement Modes," executive summary, January 24, 1991.

[142] VII Corps, "Defense of the Wadi Al Batin," p. 91; Lewis, George N., Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, "Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War," Appendix, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 1993, p. 47.

[143] XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps Operation Desert Storm Chronology," January 1991; 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, "1st Brigade Chronology," Annex B, undated.

[144] United States Army Component United States Central Command, "Unconfirmed Spot Report," memorandum for command group, January 18, 1991.

[145] 1st Calvary Division, "AAR 1st Calvary Div Command Report," April 10, 1991.

[146] United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January 18, 1991.

[147] Based on messages and logs referenced in Section V and too numerous to repeat here.

[148] Boley, Ray M. "Patriot Performance Assessment in Desert Storm Roadmap (U)," CAS, Incorporated for United States Army Missile Command, July 25, 1991 (S), p. D-2; Lovece, Joseph, "Electronic Noise from U.S. Gear Prompted Errant Patriots," Defense Week, September 28, 1992, p. 1.

[149] Central Intelligence Agency, "Gulf War Syndrome," July 1995; Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996. See also bullets in this section.

[150] Central Intelligence Agency, "Gulf War Syndrome," July 1995; Howard Hughes Medical Institute, "Laboratory Chemical Safety Summaries," Nitric Acid, web site: www.hhmi.org (as of May 8, 2000); Proctor, Nick H., et al., Chemical Hazards of the Workplace, third edition, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1991, p. 425-426.

[151] Testimony of Ms. Harmon-Davis before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Washington, DC, May 1, 1996; Lead Sheet #19849, Interview of 55th Support Battalion supply soldier, October 10, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #9462, Interview of 10th Battalion soldier, December 18, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #16471, Interview of Army Support Group operations, training, and procurement officer, May 15, 1998, p. 2, 5; Lead Sheet #20899, Interview of 551st Transportation Company soldier, December 29, 1998, p. 1,2; Lead Sheet #17229, Interview of Navy master chief of motor vessel Baugh, June 10, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #8802, Interview of 703rd Provisional Boat Company engineer-oiler, June 25, 1997, p. 2.

[152] European Oil Company Organization for Environment, Health, and Safety, "Kerosine," web site: www.concawe.be (as of January 27, 2000).

[153] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid," (Information Paper), web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/irfna/, August 3, 1999.

[154] Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 73, 97, 166, 168, 169.

[155] Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 177.

[156] United States Space Command, "Defense Support Program," web site: www.spacecom.af.mil (as of September 30, 1999).

[157] Hoffman, Timothy, "Space Capabilities Vastly Improved Since Gulf War," Air Force Space Command Public Affairs, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, March 1998; Cooper, Henry F., "Limited Ballistic Missile Strikes. GPALS Comes Up with an Answer," NATO Review, June 1992, web site: www.nato.int (as of July 27, 1999).

[158] Broad, William J., "Iraqis Using Clouds to Cover Scud Firings, Meteorologists Say," New York Times, January 25, 1991, p. 10.

[159] Federation of American Scientists, "Defense Support Program," web site: www.fas.org (as of September 30, 1999).

[160] Boley, Ray M. "Patriot Performance Assessment in Desert Storm Roadmap (U)," CAS, Incorporated for United States Army Missile Command, July 25, 1991 (S), p. D-2.

[161] Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part I, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 124, 149, 151.

[162] Testimony of General H. Norman Schwartzkopf before the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, January 29, 1997, the United States Senate web site: www.senate.gov (as of June 11, 1999).

[163] Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part I, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 178, 182, 184.

[164] For Scuds fired, see section V. Anti-Scud sorties based on Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 165.

[165] Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part I, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 189.

[166] United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review," Annex A, Status of the Material Balances in the Missile Area, and cover letter, January 25, 1999, web site: www.un.org (as of March 10, 2000).

[167] Isby, David C., "The Residual Iraqi 'Scud' Force," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, Nbr 3, p. 115.

[168] Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "National Briefings: Iraq," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of July 29, 1999).

[169] United Nations Special Commission, "UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review," Appendix 1, Status of the Material Balances in the Missile Area, and cover letter, January 25, 1999, web site: www.un.org (as of March 10, 2000).

[170] Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, "National Briefings: Iraq," web site: www.cdiss.org (as of July 29, 1999).

[171] Federation of American Scientists, "UNSCOM and Iraqi Missiles," web site: www.fas.org (as of May 13, 1999).

[172] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Iraq, on site cns.miis.edu (as of April 24, 2000).

[173] United States Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," February 13, 1998.

[174] Defense Technical Information Center, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, "Circular Error Probable," web site: www.dtic.mil (as of September 15, 1999).

[175] Federation of American Scientists, "Defense Support Program," web site: www.fas.org (as of September 30, 1999).

[176] United States Army Technical Manual 3-6665-342-10, "Operator's Manual, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) Fox XM93," Washington, DC, Change 2, April 21, 1995, p. 1-2, 1-6; Testimony of Fox subject matter expert, Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997; United States Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Equipment and Organizations," August 10, 1994, p. 2-1.

[177] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site: www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), web site www.gulflink.osd.mil/m256/, July 23, 1999.

[178] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 412.

[179] Boley, Ray M. "Patriot Performance Assessment in Desert Storm Roadmap (U)," CAS, Incorporated for United States Army Missile Command, July 25, 1991, (S) p. 3.

[180] United States Army Field Manual 3-4, United States Marine Corp Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," February 21, 1996, p. 2-2 to 2-4.

[181] Raytheon Corporation, "Patriot Combat Proven Air Defense System," web site: www.geocities.com (as of October 10, 1997).

[182] Public Broadcasting System, "M1M-104 Patriot," web site: www2.pbs.org (as of October 1, 1997).

[183] United States Army Field Manual 3-9, United States Navy Publication P-467, United States Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.

[184] Defense Technical Information Center, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, "Universal Time," web site: www.dtic.mil (as of September 15, 1999).

[185] Unidentified United States Army organization, "G-3 Spot Report," January 20, 1991; 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), "Log of Events," January 20, 1991.

[186] United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January 20, 1991.

[187] Unidentified United States Army organization, "Desert Shield G3-NBC Significant Events," undated.

[188] 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991; United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January 21, 1991; unidentified United States Army organization, "Desert Shield G3-NBC Significant Events," undated.

[189] VII Corps air defense element, "Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log," January 21, 1991.

[190] 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), "Log of Events," January 22, 1991.

[191] 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), "Log of Events," January 23, 1991.

[192] United States Commander-in-Chief United States Central Command, "Daily Staff Journal Sig Ops Events," January 23, 1991; 74th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Explosive Ordnance Incident Report," January 23, 1991.

[193] Unidentified United States Army rear command post, "Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet," January 23, 1991.

[194] United States Central Command, "Sequence of Events, 2nd Scud Launch," January 25, 1991.

[195] United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," January 26, 1991.

[196] United States Central Command, "SigOps Events," February 11, 1991.

[197] XVIII Airborne Corps, "Intelligence Spot Report Format," Scud Update, February 14, 1991; unidentified United States Army intelligence staff, "Spot Report," February 14, 1991; United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," February 14, 1991.

[198] 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "Significant Events from Daily Log," March 6, 1991; VII Corps, "NBC Operations Summary," Appendix 2, undated.

[199] Unidentified United States Army organization, "Scud Alert," February 24, 1991; United States Central Command, "NBC Desk Log," February 25, 1991.

[200] United States Army Component United States Central Command, "ARCENT Spot Report," February 25, 1991.

 

 


 

Home - Search - WMD Profiles - Entities of Concern - Iraq's Suppliers - UN Documents
Government Documents - Controlled Items - Perspectives - Subscribe

About Iraq Watch - Wisconsin Project - Contact Us

As of August 2006, Iraq Watch is no longer being updated. Click here for more information.

Copyright © 2000-2007
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control