REMARKS BY DONALD H. RUMSFELD
DEFENSE SECRETARY

U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

August 20, 2002

Excerpts

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Q: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that U.S. intelligence and the U.S. military recently identified a group of non-Afghans in Northern Iraq who were possibly producing chemical weapons and that the site -- the group, whatever -- was targeted by the U.S. military but that the strike was called off apparently because they dispersed or something. Could you fill us in on that or give us any details at all about that?

Rumsfeld: I have said for some time that there are al Qaeda in Iraq, and there are. I have no comment that I care to make on the subject that you raise, however.

Q: So you'd -- I mean, was there any -- you have no information on any --

Rumsfeld: I didn't say I had no information. I said I had no comment that I cared to make. And I don't.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said there are al Qaeda in Iraq. These people are --

Rumsfeld: Repeatedly. I wasn't saying these people -- I was -- I have said repeatedly that there are al Qaeda in Iraq. There are. They have left Afghanistan, they have left other locations, and they've landed in a variety of countries, one of which is Iraq.

Q: When you say that in response to a question about this other group, it leaves the impression that these people are affiliated with al Qaeda or are operating with al Qaeda. Is that the impression you want to leave?

Rumsfeld: I -- the impression I want to leave is that I have no comment to make on the specific question that was raised by Charlie.

Q: Of the al Qaeda who are in Iraq, are they there under the auspices of the current regime? Are they simply using it as a hiding place? Are they being protected by Saddam Hussein?

Rumsfeld: Well, in a vicious, repressive dictatorship that has -- exercises near-total control over its population, it's very hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what's taking place in the country.

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Q: Mr. Secretary, it seems with each passing week, more allies are expressing concern about the apparent direction the United States is headed with regard to Iraq. Do you feel, as you ponder your options on Iraq and other countries that may be threatening to the United States, that this growing list of friends of the United States that are expressing concern -- does that alter, affect your thinking? Or is it the threat that you focus on that drives you down that path to, I gather from what other people in the administration say -- that that is what you have to focus on, not voices of dissent that are being raised by traditional American friends? Help us understand your thinking.

Rumsfeld: Well, of course, I think the first thing to say is, my thinking is probably not particularly relevant, or certainly not determinative. The president and the society and the Congress and other countries have to wrestle with these issues and come to grips with how they want to deal with them.

I, as a student of history -- we all know that in a number of periods of history, there have been -- there's been almost unanimity in a certain position and it's proved to be wrong. So the fact that voices can cluster in a certain way does not mean that that is necessarily the wise course or the prudent course.

Second, I think you'll find if you look below the surface, that an awful lot of the voices one hears get somewhat louder during election periods and then seem to be less noticeable after elections are over. And there are always elections taking place around the world.

Third, I don't know that I would agree with you, necessarily, that there is a notable accumulation of opposition. I think that there are properly people in our country and people in the world looking at the circumstance that our world is in and expressing their concerns about it, and people fall on one side of the spectrum or another side of the spectrum or all across the range of the spectrum. And I think that's understandable because if these things were easy, there would be no debate. People would be out doing what people do in August when they're not sitting in the Pentagon press room. But because they are important issues, it's not surprising that they're discussing them and thinking about them.

Q: Do you feel as your --

Rumsfeld: And I respect that.

Q: Do you feel as your case, the president's case, is laid out on these issues, that -- certainly you hope, but do you believe that there will be a swing more in the direction of the United States than there currently is now on this issue?

Rumsfeld: I have no idea what the president will ultimately decide, or when, or if. Clearly, in any endeavor, one would prefer to have near acclamation and support. Life is not like that, generally. We find that leaders have to make decisions that may be close calls. And that's what they do. And sometimes they -- they find that when the decision's ultimately made -- that the tone and the tempo changes dramatically. And --

Q: In terms of support.

Rumsfeld: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in regard to Iraq and al Qaeda: You said --

Rumsfeld: I was trying to talk about Afghanistan.

Q: I know. You said you --

Rumsfeld: It seems like anything that -- I really do think that it's a mistake for the press and the media to focus excessively on this one subject and particularize everything to it. I find that the debate and the discussion, the national dialogue, the international dialogue is a little out of balance. I don't know what one can do about that, except that I've found that from time to time, I'll give an interview and never mention the word Iraq, and I find that the whole interview is cast around Iraq. And --

Q: But sir, the administration, itself, put Iraq on a front burner and turned up the heat. And now you're asking --

Q: The president talks about it every day.

Rumsfeld: That's fine. He did give a speech on the "axis of evil." I think it was a good speech. I think it'll prove to have had a beneficial effect for the people in all three of those countries when we look back a decade from now.

Q: Actually --

Rumsfeld: Excuse me. You have a question. I apologize.

Q: Actually, I was going to follow up on something you said earlier -- that --

Rumsfeld: On Afghanistan -- oh -- (laughter).

Q -- al Qaeda is in Iraq and that you find it hard to imagine that the government of Iraq wouldn't know what's going on inside its own country. But is there evidence -- what kind of evidence is there that the government of Iraq is any way hosting, supporting, sponsoring al Qaeda or any other terrorists inside Iraq?

Rumsfeld: Well, I suppose that at some moment, it may make sense to discuss that publicly. It doesn't today. But what I have said is a fact -- that there are al Qaeda in a number of locations in Iraq. And the suggestion that those people who are so attentive in denying human rights to their population aren't aware of where these folks are or what they're doing is ludicrous.

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Q: You've talked on a couple of occasions on philosophically perhaps the need to preemptively strike a nation -- not necessarily Iraq, just somewhere. And I'm wondering if you have a litmus test or a set of conditions that you would need to see in order to make the call for a preemptive strike? What has to be in place? Is it a nuke? Is it complicity with al Qaeda? Have you considered any of those things?

Rumsfeld: I have considered a lot of those things. And the problem is, if I answer your question, someone's going to think I'm talking about Iraq.

Q: Let's say you're definitely not talking about Iraq. (Laughter.)

Rumsfeld: We'll go to Dick Myers' "the moon." (Laughter.) Remember? Were you here for that when he -- theoretically, the --

Q: What makes a preemptive strike legal under international law, in your eyes?

Rumsfeld: Well, I'm not a lawyer, Pam. You know that. Don't give me that --

Q: Okay, skip the international law part. What makes a preemptive strike okay, acceptable?

Rumsfeld: Well, I would make the case that there are a whole series of things that ought to be looked at, and that there isn't a single one that's determinative, and that what one would have to do is to evaluate those and weigh them.

And the construct I would suggest would be what are the benefits -- what are the advantages and disadvantages of not acting? And of course, the advantage of not acting against the moon would be that no one could say that you acted; they would say, "Isn't that good, you didn't do anything against the moon." The other side of the coin, of not acting against the moon in the event that the moon posed a serious threat, would be that you'd then suffered a serious loss and you're sorry after that's over. And in weighing the things, you have to make a judgment; net, do you think that you're acting most responsibly by avoiding the threat that could be characterized -- X numbers of people dying, innocent people -- and it's that kind of an evaluation one would have to make.

Q: Is there some way of judging what the likelihood of a tragic event happening if you didn't take a preemptive strike? I mean, does it have to be 50 percent possibility or 25 percent possibility? What's that algebra?

Rumsfeld: Well, if you think about it, think of the people today who are still writing books about Pearl Harbor, and what did you know and when did you know it, and what might have been done to not have that happen, and so forth. There would be a lot more people writing books and analyzing that question if the attack on Pearl Harbor had been with a weapon of mass destruction as opposed to conventional weapons, which killed several thousand people.

People are still trying to connect the dots and say what did people know and what might have been done with respect to September 11th. There are committees up on the Hill looking into that and asking those questions. The problem is that if you think back to the beginnings of World War II, where millions and millions, tens of millions of people were killed, historians go back and look at that and ask themselves the question: Isn't it possible that if countries had behaved marginally differently during that period, notwithstanding the fact that the chorus of peace in our time and "don't do anything that would be unseemly" was very strong, and it was near unanimous. There were only a few lone voices suggesting that Hitler might ought to have been stopped earlier.

Q: Do you see parallels?

Rumsfeld: No. I'm taking Pearl Harbor, World War II in Europe -- what's another example? Well, I mentioned September 11th.

Q: How about Iraq? (Laughter.)

Q: How about the start of World War I, where actions were taken that set events in train and somebody reacted and we wound up with what I think a lot of historians think may have been an avoidable catastrophe.

Rumsfeld: Mm-hm. The problem is, after a catastrophe, almost -- there is always going to be a great deal of history written about how it might have been avoided. And that's just the nature of human beings. We do do that; we do go back and look. And of course, it's an awful lot easier to go back and look at the past and analyze it than it is to analyze the future and what might take place. And you're asking questions that are difficult, and they're important, and they merit the thought and the attention and the discussion of the American people and the people in the world.

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