Excerpted from
PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE

Office of the Secretary of Defense

April 1996

[Sub-section of Section I - The Regional Proliferation Challenge]

Iraq

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Despite Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War and the severe costs to its military forces and its civilian infrastructure, Saddam Hussein's goals remain almost identical to those in effect prior to the war: to establish Iraq as the leading Arab political and military power in the Middle East and to dominate the Persian Gulf. To these ends, Saddam, or any successor with similar ambitions, will seek to rebuild Iraq's conventional military forces and reconstruct its NBC warfare and ballistic missile capability.

Historically, Iraq had developed NBC weapons and missiles programs to support Saddam's two primary goals mentioned above. Saddam has demonstrated his willingness to use chemical weapons and ballistic missiles for their tactical, strategic, and psychological value. Iraq orchestrated the development of these weapons by diverting dual-use technologies and creating extensive procurement networks with front companies. Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, the United Nations has challenged Baghdad's lack of cooperation and its noncompliance with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). Iraqi government officials have used concealment, deceit, and intimidation with the aim of eventually rebuilding their missile force and their nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.

RESOURCES

Iraq's economy remains weak because of United Nations' sanctions. These sanctions, based on a number of UNSCRs, prohibit arms imports as well as most industrial imports that support the civilian sector. Iraq also is not permitted to export oil or other goods unless the proceeds are spent on food and medicine (under UN supervision), and its assets abroad remain frozen. Although industrial production has increased since the end of the war, it is only about one-third of its pre-war level. In November 1993, Iraq accepted UNSCR 715 calling for continued UN monitoring of Iraqi weapons programs; unfortunately, all indicators suggest that this acceptance does not signal Iraqi intentions to forego eventually rebuilding its NBC weapon capabilities.

STRATEGY

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, Iraq systematically misled foreign suppliers and governments regarding the actual end-users of purchases. Further, Iraq purchased controlling interests in selected Western companies to obtain legal mechanisms for placing orders for products subject to export controls. It employed middlemen and established front companies to facilitate covert acquisition activities to funnel dual-use technologies to Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi government sent numerous students to Western universities to study nuclear technology so that these individuals could eventually support Iraq's nuclear program.

Iraq has continued its deceptive efforts to keep alive elements of its NBC weapons and missile programs, as demonstrated by the August 1995 public disclosures concerning the extent of Baghdad's biological warfare effort. Another example of Iraq's noncompliance is a December 1993 incident involving the interdiction of a shipment of ammonium perchlorate -- a dual-use chemical with solid missile fuel applications. The shipment was a violation of UNSCR 715, which Iraq had already accepted.

The return of production equipment, computers, and documentation removed from key facilities prior to and during Operation Desert Storm has expedited reconstruction of military industries. Furthermore, Iraq is preserving enough of its NBC weapons programs to provide the foundation for revitalized efforts once sanctions are lifted and inspections ease or are terminated.

Iraq's large number of scientists and technicians is one of its most valuable resources for rejuvenating its programs for NBC weapons and missiles. Iraq retains the services of several thousand scientists, engineers, and technicians who were previously employed in its nuclear weapons program. With this pool of expertise, together with significant foreign assistance and supplies, Iraq could probably rebuild its nuclear weapons program and manufacture a device in about five to seven years.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Iraq's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon production capability constitute a textbook case of the many avenues a country can pursue to reach this objective. To realize its nuclear weapon ambitions, Iraq established a broad, multifaceted program to produce fissile material and to develop the associated technology essential for nuclear weapon design.

Iraq began laying the groundwork for its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, when it attempted unsuccessfully to purchase a plutonium production reactor similar to the one France used in its nuclear weapons program. In 1976, France agreed to build the Osirak and Isis reactors, part of Iraq's large nuclear research complex at Tuwaitha in Baghdad. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, Baghdad experienced several setbacks, the most notable being the Israeli air strike on the Osirak reactor in June 1981 shortly before its first fuel was to be loaded. With the loss of this reactor, Baghdad apparently refocused its nuclear weapons effort on producing highly enriched uranium. Its interest in acquiring plutonium as fissile material for weapons continued, but at a lower priority.

Iraqi scientists concurrently investigated almost every viable uranium enrichment technique. Documents seized by IAEA inspectors in 1991 revealed a broad-based Iraqi effort to design and develop a nuclear weapon. In addition, in August 1995, the Iraqis admitted that they had established a crash program to build a nuclear weapon by April 1991.

Iraq's nuclear weapon design and development work, which was supported by at least 16 primary and supporting facilities, was severely disrupted by Operation Desert Storm. Most of the facilities were in Baghdad and the outskirts of the city, but others were in Mosul in the north and Al Qaim and Akashat in the west near the Syrian border.

The extent and sophistication of the Iraqi nuclear weapon program uncovered by UN and IAEA inspectors surprised the international community. The diversity and broad scope of the Iraqi program prompted subsequent efforts to tighten up the IAEA safeguards procedures and export controls.

Chemical Program

Since the early 1980s, Iraq has produced several thousand tons of chemical agents, primarily at its main production facility in Samarra. Other chemical warfare-related facilities were located at Al Habbaniyah. Iraq used some of its chemical weapons stockpile against the Iranians and the Kurds during the mid- to late-1980s. By the time it invaded Kuwait, Iraq probably had 1,000 metric tons of chemical agent on hand, split equally between blister agents and nerve agents. Also, it had become self-sufficient in producing many types of precursors, had produced a variety of chemical agents on its own, and had weaponized munitions with some of these agents.

Iraq built its chemical program with assistance from Western sources, both individuals and companies, that supplied Iraq with vital chemical processing equipment, chemical precursors, and technical expertise. In the absence of UN monitoring or import controls, Iraq could revive a viable chemical weapon capability in a matter of months, despite war damage to its production and storage facilities. The Iraqis still have a domestic chemical industry, and converting some of these plants from producing chemicals to producing chemical warfare precursors and even agents would be relatively straightforward. Iraq retains the capability to deliver chemical agents using a variety of munitions, including artillery shells and rockets, aerial bombs, spray tanks, mortar rounds, and SCUD-type missile warheads.

Iraq's past use of chemical weapons demonstrates its willingness to ignore international norms of conduct. Iraq first used chemical agents in 1983, when Baghdad attacked Iranian military forces with mustard gas. In 1984, Iraq employed tabun-filled aerial bombs against Iran, making Iraq the first and only nation ever to have used a nerve agent on the battlefield. Iraq's successful integration of chemical weapons into offensive operations is widely accepted as one of the reasons for its victory over Iran in 1988. Baghdad used chemical weapons for their tactical and strategic value, not to mention their overwhelming psychological effect on Iranian forces. Iraq also used lethal chemical agents against its own Kurdish civilian population in 1988.

Biological Program

Iraq revealed to UN inspectors in August 1995 that it had a far more extensive and aggressive biological warfare program prior to the Gulf War than it had previously admitted. The Iraqis claim to have produced 90,000 liters of botulinum toxin and 8,300 liters of anthrax, as well as significant quantities of an agent that causes cancer. Further, the Iraqis claim to have loaded botulinum toxin and anthrax on SCUD missiles warheads and aerial bombs. Baghdad also admitted conducting research on mycotoxins and infectious viruses. The Iraqis claimed in August 1995 that they destroyed the agents after the Gulf War (January-February 1991), but have yet to produce evidence to support their claim.

Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi declarations and UN inspections have exposed an extensive dual-use fermentation capability and additional facilities probably linked to the weapons program. Because of their dual-use nature, most equipment and procedures related to producing biological agents are rationalized as legitimate agriculture, biomedical, and biotechnical industrial activities.

Coalition air strikes destroyed or damaged many of Iraq's facilities associated with biological warfare, including those at Al Kindi and Salman Pak. However, before the Coalition operations began, the Iraqis had relocated virtually all of their agent production equipment to Al Hakam and other facilities. All known fermentation and bioproduction equipment remains intact, and key experts are still available to serve Iraq's military programs. Consequently, Iraq retains the infrastructure that previously developed and produced biological warfare agents and weapons, and could easily renew production of biological agents when intrusive UN inspections are discontinued.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Soviet SCUD missiles were the basic building block of Iraq's missile development program. During the late 1980s, Baghdad began to enlarge the propellant tanks and reduce the SCUD warhead weight to reach targets beyond the missile's 300-kilometer maximum range. Iraq also focused on a domestic manufacturing capability for these modified SCUDs, as well as the Badr 2000, a solid-propellant missile based on the Argentine Condor, with a 750-1,000-kilometer range. Baghdad also had plans for a 2,000-kilometer range missile, called the Tammouz I. As a result, by the start of Operation Desert Storm, Iraq had in place a support structure for the eventual manufacture of liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles.

The principal missile launched during Operation Desert Storm was the 600-650 kilometer SCUD variant called the Al Husayn. A variant of the Al Husayn was also produced, known as the Al Husayn Short. The Iraqis claimed to have fired another SCUD variant, the Al Hijarah, which may have had a concrete-filled warhead, at Israel during Operation Desert Storm.

Even though most of Iraq's missile production facilities received heavy damage during the Gulf War, Baghdad maintains some of the equipment needed to produce ballistic missiles, in part because of the dual-use nature of much of the equipment required for producing SCUDs. Today, Iraq's production efforts are focused on developing the Ababil-100, with an estimated maximum range of 150 kilometers, and the Ababil-50, a Yugoslav-designed 50-kilometer range battlefield artillery rocket. Many of the Ababil-100 liquid-propellant missile production technologies are compatible with SCUD production.

UNSCR 687 prohibits Iraqi possession of missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. Nevertheless, the United States believes Iraq has hidden a small number of mobile launchers and several dozen SCUD-type missiles produced before Operation Desert Storm.

CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF DELIVERY

Iraq has Chinese land-based and air-launched antiship cruise missiles. Although its stockpile is likely limited, Iraq used French air-launched and Chinese land-based and air-launched missiles during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq enhanced its anti-ship capability by forward-deploying aircraft and by using aerial refueling to strike oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq still possesses a variety of other platforms capable of delivering both chemical and biological weapons, including artillery and tactical rockets, combat aircraft and helicopters.