REMARKS BY SENATOR RUSSELL FEINGOLD

UNITED STATES SENATE

July 25, 2002

Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I am pleased to cosponsor S.J. Res 41. As the resolution makes clear, the time is ripe for an open debate on our plans for Iraq.

Some are concerned that an open debate on our policy toward Iraq could expose sensitive intelligence information or that such a debate would tip our hand too much. Others fear that a meaningful debate could back the administration into a corner, and in so doing encourage the administration to adopt a tougher military response.

Ultimately, all of these arguments against an open and honest debate on Iraq could be made with respect to nearly any military decision, and if taken to their extreme, these arguments would challenge the balance of powers in the Constitution by excluding Congress from future war-making decisions. Moreover, to answer some of these concerns more directly, I would also note that the almost daily leaks from the administration on our Iraq policy have tipped our hand even more than responsible congressional hearings and debate would. It is hardly a secret that the United States is considering a range of policy options, including military operations, when it comes to Iraq. And the argument that an open discussion of military action could, in effect, become self-fulfilling is too circular to be credible.

I am concerned with the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein, as well as with the humanitarian situation in Iraq. But I am also very concerned about the constitutional issues at stake here. This may well be one of our last opportunities to preserve the constitutionally mandated role of Congress in making decisions about war and peace.

On April 17, 2002, I chaired a hearing before the Constitution Subcommittee on the application of the War Powers Resolution to our current antiterrorism operations. The focus of that hearing was to explore the limits of the use of force authorization that Congress passed in response to the attacks of September 11. At the hearing, leading constitutional scholars concluded that the use of force resolution for September 11 would not authorize a future military strike against Iraq, unless some additional evidence linking Saddam Hussein directly to the attacks of Sept. 11 came to light. Many of the experts also questioned the dubious assertion that congressional authorization from more than 10 years ago for Desert Storm could somehow lend ongoing authority for a new strike on Iraq.

On June 10, I delivered a speech on the floor of the Senate in which I outlined my findings from the April hearing. As I said then, I have concluded that the Constitution requires the President to seek additional authorization before he can embark on a major new military undertaking in Iraq. I am pleased that S.J. Resolution 41 makes that point in forceful legislative terms.

So this is indeed an appropriate time to consider our policy toward Iraq in more detail. I look forward to hearings that Senator Biden will chair before the Foreign Relations Committee. I also look forward to additional debate and discussion on the floor of the Senate, and, when appropriate, in secure settings, where the administration can make its case for a given policy response, and the Congress can ask questions, probe assumptions, and generally exercise the oversight that the American people expect of us.

Through these hearings and debates, it will be important to assess the level of the threat that exists, along with the relative dangers that would be posed by a massive assault on Iraq--dangers that include risks to American soldiers and to our relations with some of our strongest allies in our current anti-terror campaign. And it will be crucially important to think through the aftermath of any military strike.

We don't have to divulge secret information to begin to weigh the risks and opportunities that confront us. But the American people must understand the general nature of the threats, and they must ultimately support any risks that we decide to take to secure a more peaceful future. I don't think the American public has an adequate sense yet of the threats, dangers or options that exist in Iraq. I don't think Congress has an adequate grasp of the issues either. And that is why additional hearings and debates are so necessary.

Finally, I have always said that another military campaign against Iraq may eventually become unavoidable. As a result, I am pleased that S.J. Res 41 is neutral on the need for a military response, while recognizing the intrinsic value of open and honest debate. Following a vigorous debate, if we decide that America's interests require a direct military response to confront Iraqi aggression, such a response would be taken from a constitutionally unified, and inherently stronger, political position. We must also remember that constitutional unity on this question presents a stronger international image of the United States to our friends and foes, and, at the same time, a more comforting image of U.S. power to many of our close allies in the campaign against terrorism.

I am pleased to cosponsor S.J. Res. 41, and I look forward to a vigorous debate on this issue.