IRAQ
(Senate - March 02, 2000)

HON. ROBERT KERREY

in the Senate

March 2, 2000

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I want to call to the attention of my colleagues an issue that is not being raised in the otherwise informative presidential primary campaigns. It is not a theoretical issue, nor is it an issue concerning budgetary decisions.

Rather, it is an issue which sends American pilots on combat missions almost daily. It is an issue which throughout the last decade has cost the lives of hundreds of American and thousands of soldiers and civilians of other nationalities. It is an issue which threatens the peace and security of some of our closest allies, and which, if not solved, could threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction. It is an issue which starves and hold captive twenty-two million people in conditions of unparalleled terror of their government. It is an issue which we have failed to deal with decisively, and that failure calls into question our dedication to the freedom we prize so highly for ourselves.

The issue is the continuing rule of Saddam Hussein. Nine years after the United States led a coalition to eject Iraqi forces and liberate Kuwait, Saddam continues to brutalize his people, threaten his neighbors, and develop weapons of mass destruction--earlier versions of which he used on neighboring states, on Israel, and on his own people. The good news is that sanctions have weakened his military, and his political support base has shrunk to his immediate family. All of mountainous northern Iraq and large swathes of southern Iraq are free of his control. Nonetheless, he continues to rule the central part of the country and, as Jim Hoagland pointed out in today's Washington Post, Saddam is likely to outlast yet another American President.

The Administration will no doubt point to the restraining effect UN sanctions have had on Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors. In truth, his regime would have been far more aggressive if sanctions and the no-fly zones guaranteed by U.S. and British airpower had not been in effect. But in choosing policy options against an outlaw like Saddam, restraint is a minimal objective.

For example, we and our allies in the former Yugoslavia are not seeking to restrain those accused of war crimes during the ethnic war there; we seek to catch them, lock them up, and get them to The Hague for trial. Saddam has killed far more than any of the wanted Yugoslavs, and he keeps on killing today. Our rhetoric, including mine today, calls for the same response to Saddam.

But our real policy is merely to restrain him. The fact that the restraint has endured nine years is what the Administration shows as evidence of its success. But adhering to the policy of restraint is actually taking us farther from our stated goals. Support for the sanctions policy is eroding at the UN. This, along with rising oil prices and Iraq's rising oil production, have made Saddam a key global energy player once again. In addition, Saddam has had thirteen months to develop weapons of mass destruction without the inhibition imposed by outside inspections. Now, a new inspection regime has been voted by the Security Council. If Iraq eventually accepts it, I presume Dr. Blix and his new inspectors will do their best. Yet, they will never be as intrusive, and therefore as effective, as UNSCOM. In sum, the restraints which we have kept on Saddam for nine years are loosening. He is very close to being free of the handcuffs in which both we and his people have invested so much.

Restraining Saddam was always a minimal objective. It was a way to avoid the strategic risk many see in the bolder objective of acting in support of the Iraqi opposition to remove Saddam from power and achieve democracy. It is ironic that the minimal objective requires the continual application of U.S. military force, not just for a decade, but presumably forever. The bolder objective, once achieved, would bring U.S. military operations and basing in the Gulf countries to an end. I believe Congress has recognized the need for bold action. In passing the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998, Congress expressed its frustration with the status quo and provided resources with which the Administration could support the Iraqi opposition in their efforts to remove Saddam from power.

In signing the Iraq Liberation Act, President Clinton affirmed that U.S. policy was not merely to restrain Saddam but to see him replaced. Unfortunately, the President's policy pronouncement has not been followed by action. The President and Vice President have encouraging words for Iraqis seeking to free their country, but their words are belied by the inaction of their Administration. Despite unprecedented unity, the Administration has provided only a small proportion of available resources to the Iraqi opposition, and this only on superficialities which will have no effect on opinion inside Iraq . The countries in the region all agree the U.S. is not serious about supporting Saddam's removal. If you don't believe me, call the ambassador of any Middle Eastern country and ask him or her if our actions and rhetoric match.

If the Administration actively sought Saddam's replacement, our allies in the region would know it and they would cooperate with us. But the Administration has not asked because the truth is, beneath the rhetoric, we are clinging to the old policy of restraining Saddam. There are now signs that the consensus for even that is fraying. I would hate to think that the boldest hope of our national security establishment is that our policy will hold until noon on January 20 of 2001.

I admit to coming late to an understanding of the evil of the Iraqi regime and the imperative of fighting it. After Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, I voted against the Gulf War resolution. My distrust of the Bush Administration's statements regarding the need for the use of force in Iraq were colored by my own experiences in Vietnam. But Iraq is not Vietnam. And I have come to understand the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime and the overwhelming requirement to support the efforts of Iraqis to replace it. I understand the threat the regime poses to his people, to his neighbors, and to the rest of the world. Most of all, this is about our commitment to freedom.

The long night of the Iraqi people will not be ended through a policy of merely retraining the Iraqi regime. Instead, we must work to match our words and our deeds to actively support the Iraqi opposition in their effort to remove Saddam Hussein and establish a democratic Iraq . When the people of Iraq obtain their freedom, it will transform the Middle East. It will create a new region in which brutality, poverty, and unnecessary armaments will be supplanted by security, prosperity, and creative diversity.

Mr. President, this goal is within our reach. But the difference between success and failure in this endeavor will be measured by our willingness to act in support of the people of Iraq .

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.