U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF
(Extension of Remarks - February 03, 1998)

• Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to my colleagues' attention my monthly newsletter on foreign affairs from November 1997 entitled U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf.

• I ask that this newsletter be printed in the Congressional Record.

• The newsletter follows:

The United States has vital national interests in the Persian Gulf: to maintain unrestricted access to Gulf energy resources at tolerable prices, to prevent any power from gaining control over them, and to ensure the security of regional friends and allies.

The crisis over UN weapons inspectors in Iraq highlights the strain in U.S. policy. The policy of `dual containment' of Iraq and Iran has not changed these defiant regimes, and it is not sustainable. Seven years after the Gulf War, friends and allies have little enthusiasm for open-ended UN sanctions against Iraq . The U.S. threat to sanction firms that invest in Iran's energy sector has caused rifts with Europe. Key Arab states boycotted the U.S.-supported summit in Qatar, but all Arab states will attend a December Islamic summit in Iran. U.S. policy needs review.

Iraq , a police state led by an unpredictable tyrant, still threatens regional stability. Iraq is weaker than it was six years ago, yet Saddam's grip is tighter. He is unchallenged at home. The Arab-Israeli impasse, and the suffering of Iraqis due to sanctions, enable Saddam to win Arab support. Many of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been destroyed; but many have not, especially chemical and biological weapons. Thus, the work of UN inspectors is far from over. We will need highly intrusive inspections in Iraq for years to come.

Iran, with over 60 million people, confronts the U.S. and the region with a challenge of great difficulty. The 18-year break in U.S.-Iran ties means that mutual understanding is poor. U.S. policy is to contain Iran because of its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, its WMD programs, and its support for terrorism. The present U.S. policy of unilateral sanctions against Iran is not backed by our European allies and is not working. Those sanctions have been counterproductive in achieving U.S. goals.

The Arab Gulf states host a large U.S. military presence, rely on us for security, and are doing little for collective self-defense. They are reluctant to support confrontation with Iraq and Iran. With the exception of Kuwait, they resent what they see as U.S. partiality toward Israel and hostility toward Arabs and Muslims--in the West Bank and Gaza, Libya, Sudan, Iraq , and Iran.

Within the United States, there is strong support for military deployments in the Gulf, which are seen as vital to defending U.S. interests. Iran, and especially Iraq , remain deeply unpopular, but there is little desire for war.

How should U.S. policy change? First, the willingness of Gulf states to stand with the U.S. will improve if we get the Arab-Israeli peace process back on track. The greater the momentum in the peace process, the stronger the support in the Gulf for overall U.S. objectives.

Second, we should state precisely U.S. objectives toward Iraq , which have always lacked specificity. U.S. policy has not been clear about whether Saddam should be removed and at what point sanctions should be lifted. Our prime objective should be to contain Iraq , because its weapons programs are a threat to peace. If Saddam threatens his neighbors, or openly pursues WMD, the U.S. should severely punish Iraq . To maintain support for UN sanctions against Iraq and to eliminate Iraq's WMD successfully, U.S. policy needs some adjustment.

We must make clear that our problem is not with Iraq's people, but with the policies of its government. To lessen the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, we should allow them to get much more food and medicine, so long as the UN can monitor end-use. We should support Iraq's territorial integrity, and maintain sanctions until Iraq complies with all UN resolutions. The U.S. should indicate its willingness to help a new government in Iraq that abides by UN resolutions. An Iraq that accepts international norms of behavior should be allowed to return to the family of nations.

Third, the U.S. opposes many of Iran's policies, but does not seek to oust its government. U.S. criticisms should focus on the conduct of Iran's leadership, not on Iran's people and certainly not on Islam. Our goal should be to change Iran's unacceptable policies on terrorism, the people process, and especially its quest for WMD.

The U.S. and Iran need to cool the rhetoric, end mutual demonization, explore better ties, and gradually establish a reliable and authoritative dialogue. As Iran's policies change, the U.S. should respond step-by-step--reducing sanctions, permitting non-military trade, and allowing U.S. firms into Iran.

We should support the military containment of Iran. We should push for full international inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities and multilateral restrictions focused on, and limited to, WMD and related technology.

The U.S. should work to reduce differences with its allies and develop new avenues for cooperation against Iran's unacceptable behavior. Because Central Asia's energy resources are becoming increasingly important, we should work with our allies to secure access to them. In this process, we should not automatically exclude commercial relations with Iran. The U.S. needs more carrots in its policy toward Iran, and Europe needs more sticks. We cannot guarantee success if we work together, but we will surely fail if we do not.

Finally, there must be no doubt that the U.S. plans to remain in the Gulf. U.S. forces continue to be necessary, yet we need balance between the military and civilian aspects of our presence. The profile of the U.S. military in the region has been reduced appropriately since the Khobar Towers bombing last year, but we also need to strengthen political and economic ties. More attention from senior U.S. officials will help preserve the Gulf coalition and strengthen the U.S. message about reform, accountability and openness in Gulf societies.

Conclusion. Peace and security in the Gulf are vitally important to the U.S. national interest. For the immediate future, Iraq and Iran will require constant, consistent and balanced attention from U.S. policymakers. The task is enormously difficult. Success will require close and effective cooperation with friends and allies, and strong American leadership.