THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN IRAQ
(Senate - February 25, 1998)

HON. THOMAS DASCHLE

in the Senate

February 25, 1998

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I want to address the evolving situation relating to Iraq and talk briefly about the circumstances surrounding the agreement reached between Secretary General Annan and Iraq as we know them now. I am concerned about some of the comments made in the media and on the floor about the situation in Iraq . I think it is important to review the situation as the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have laid out in the last 24 hours.

First, with respect to what we are seeking, from the outset of this crisis the fundamental goal of the United States has been very simple. The goal has simply been to assure that UNSCOM has unconditional and unfettered access to all suspect sites as called for in the U.N. Security Council resolutions. Period; that's it. All we needed was simply an opportunity to visit sites that we think are suspect.

We were denied that, which triggered this whole affair, beginning, as everyone now knows, several months ago. Diplomacy, backed by the threat to use overwhelming force if required, has moved us forward and closer to achieving that goal. There can be no doubt that the presence of a military force of the magnitude that is currently in the gulf had everything to do with the fact that we now have an agreement. General Secretary Annan has said that. Others have noted it. There is no question that the combination of diplomacy and military force gave us the opportunity to bring about this agreement over the last 72 hours.

Iraq precipitated this crisis, as we all know, by trying to avoid its obligations under the Security Council resolutions. It attempted to dictate to the international community where UNSCOM could hold inspections, the manner in which they could be conducted, and the length of time that they would continue. Iraq's effort has failed. We were clear about what we were seeking: Unfettered access. Iraq objected. Iraq obfuscated. Iraq clearly was at fault in not allowing access to the sites in question. Diplomacy was used, force backed up that diplomacy, and the results are now in hand.

Let's look at what we have achieved with this agreement. The government of Iraq has made a written commitment to provide immediate, unrestricted, unconditional access for the UNSCOM inspectors to all suspected sites. So, regardless of the rhetoric, regardless of whether it was framed in exactly the way we might have it framed, what matters is the bottom line. What matters is what is now to be the order. And the order is very clear. The order is to provide immediate, unrestricted, unconditional access for inspectors to all suspected sites. If fully implemented, this commitment will allow UNSCOM to fulfill its mission: First, to find and destroy all of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; second, to find and destroy the missiles that could deliver these weapons; and, third, to institute a system for long-term monitoring to make sure Iraq doesn't do it again.

This commitment applies to all sites anywhere in the country, including eight so-called `Presidential Sites' that have now been precisely delineated, as well as the so-called sensitive sites that until now Iraq has tried to claim were off limits to UNSCOM. Any and all of these sites are subject to repeat visits. There are no deadlines to complete the work. In short, for the first time Iraq has committed explicitly to open every site throughout the country to weapons inspectors. Again, that has been our bottom line. That will continue to be our bottom line. And we now have it in writing that Iraq will agree.

For the eight `Presidential Sites', the agreement allows diplomats to accompany the UNSCOM inspectors, and that is acceptable if the inspectors are free to conduct rigorous and professional inspections. All other sites will be open to inspection under the existing UNSCOM procedures. The Secretary General has assured us that UNSCOM Chairman Butler remains in

charge of UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. He has also made that abundantly clear to the Iraqis themselves.

Questions have been raised about the Memorandum Of Understanding between Annan and Iraq . There are issues that still need clarification and we want to clarify them, notably with respect to the inspection procedures for the eight `Presidential Sites'. The United States has made clear that we expect all aspects of this agreement to reinforce the fundamental requirement that the investigators be permitted to carry out their inspections in a rigorous and professional manner.

We have received important assurances from the Secretary General that clarify aspects of the MOU, notably with regard to the eight `Presidential Sites'. UNSCOM and Chairman Butler will preserve their independence. The special team for the `Presidential Sites' will be part of UNSCOM. The team leader will be an UNSCOM Commissioner who is an expert in Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, chosen by the Secretary General and UNSCOM Chairman Butler. The special team leader will report to Chairman Butler. The diplomats will be observers only, with UNSCOM retaining operational control. Procedures for these inspections will be developed by UNSCOM and the Secretary General, not by Iraq . And, as has been the case since 1991, Chairman Butler will continue to report to the Security Council through the Secretary General.

So, the more clarification we get, the better the agreement looks, the clearer the understanding we have about the success of this effort. The bottom line is that we have access in Iraq that we didn't have last week at this time.

So what is next? We support a U.N. Security Council resolution that will make it clear to Iraq that any violation of its commitments would have the most serious consequences. That would be a useful but not necessary signal from the international community. We also need to test and verify Saddam's intent. In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must robustly test and verify this commitment. It is one thing to have it in language. It is one thing rhetorically to agree. It's another thing to allow it to occur. Failure to allow UNSCOM to get on with its job would have serious consequences. The United States will keep its military forces in the gulf at a high state of preparedness while we see if Iraq lives up to its commitment that it has signed.

The United States remains resolved to secure, by whatever means necessary, Iraq's full compliance with its commitment to destroy its weapons of mass destruction. So again, it will be diplomacy backed up by force. So long as diplomacy works, force will not be necessary. At the very moment diplomacy appears not to be working, force will be employed. So, let there be no mistake. This is not a question of breathing room. This is not a question of simply delaying and somehow, then, obviating the need for the use of force should it be required. It will be there.

Iraq's commitments are an important step forward, but only if matched by its compliance. They have made an important step forward in word. Now they must step forward in deed. As the President has said, `the proof is in the testing.'

This agreement can be a win-win. Either Iraq implements the agreement or it does not. If it does, the weapons inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites in Iraq with no limits on the numbers of visits or deadlines to complete their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we are in a stronger position internationally than ever. After two crises provoked by Iraq in 4 months, the international community has certainly lost its patience and will not stomach another bout of Iraqi defiance. And there will be no doubt in anyone's mind about who will be responsible for those consequences.

This agreement is backed up by an immediate test that Saddam Hussein will either clearly pass or clearly fail. Our response will be swift. It will be strong. It will be certain.

So, Mr. President, we have made great progress on paper over the last 72 hours. Again, I give credit to the United Nations

Secretary General Annan, to the administration, to all of those responsible for bringing us to this point. I respect the President's decision and believe it was the correct one, to keep our forces there, because, as we say, there is only one option for Saddam Hussein: Comply with his agreement. Allow access. Allow us the opportunity to complete our work.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.