Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, just a short time ago, the Senate was prepared to consider, and likely to adopt, a resolution granting the President largely unlimited authority `to take all necessary and appropriate actions' to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs. After some of us raised concerns about the echoes of Tonkin Gulf in that original wording, we were then prepared to endorse a measure which constrained that authority by requiring that it be `in consultation with Congress and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws.'

Some of us were prepared to stand behind this language, and its endorsement of the President's policy determinations which we generally believed would culminate in air strikes by American forces against Iraq , though no one, including the President, believed that such strikes would necessarily accomplish our principle objective of removing Saddam Hussein's arsenal of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

We then were presented with a diplomatic solution of the crisis negotiated by U.N. Secretary-General Annan that offered the prospect of achieving our principle goal in a way which strikes from the air could not possibly have done. It empowered UN inspectors on the ground in Iraq to more fully investigate and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The President has, in my view, taken the correct approach. He welcomes the agreement as representing a solution to the current problem, while immediately seeking to test and verify Iraqi compliance. He reserves our ability to take such other action as may be necessary if the agreement proves inadequate. Let me say clearly that this outcome is a good deal for the United States, the people of Iraq , the entire region and for international security. It is especially a good deal for the thousands of American families who have loved ones on guard right now for us in the Persian Gulf.

There is no more awesome responsibility facing us as members of the United States Senate than the decision to authorize the use of American military power. Such action puts America's finest, its servicemen and women, in harm's way. This basic fact was driven home to me as I reviewed the following press reports from my home state of Georgia over the past few weeks:

From the February 12 Valdosta Daily Times:

Troops from south Georgia's Moody Air Force Base departed for the Persian Gulf today. Up to 3,000 soldiers from Ft. Stewart are expected to follow soon. About 80 Air Force rescue personnel from the base near Valdosta departed just after 7 AM along with two HC-130s, which refuel rescue helicopters, drop para-rescue jumpers to assist in operations and deploy equipment for rescue operations. . .

From the February 12 Augusta Chronicle:

As tensions mount in Iraq , some Fort Gordon troops are preparing for possible deployment in the Middle East, and the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade is poised to provide intelligence support for military operations there. . .

From the February 13 Macon Telegraph:

Base workers loaded a C-5 cargo plane with communications equipment Thursday afternoon as 30 members of the 5th Combat Communications Group prepared to fly to the Persian Gulf area about 6 a.m. today. The communications group, commonly known as the 5th MOB, primarily is responsible for establishing communications and air-traffic-control systems for military operations. . .

From the February 18 Savannah Morning News:

3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) soldiers like Spc. Shane Rollins of the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, had little time to relax as they prepared for a deployment to the Middle East. In less than a week, Rollins and nearly 3,000 other Fort Stewart soldiers will be in Kuwait.

And from the February 22 Columbus Ledger-Enquirer:

As about 200 Fort Benning troops left Saturday for a possible confrontation with Iraq , Acting Army Secretary Robert Walker said the decision to send more troops from the post hinges on what Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein does next.

Such scenes have been repeated all over America in recent weeks, and underscore the human consequences of our policy deliberations in this chamber. Before discussing those important questions with which this body must grapple in fulfilling its Constitutional role, we must always be mindful of the young men and women who will risk more than their reputations in carrying out the policies we approve.

A LITTLE HISTORY

Karl Von Clausewitz, the great German theoretician on war, once wrote,

War is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carrying out of the same by other means.

In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein tried to accomplish by war what he could not achieve by other means. Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. This came just two years after the conclusion of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, a terrible conflict in which Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons. The war left 600,000 Iranians and 400,000 Iraqis dead.

After months of fruitless negotiations and after a huge U.S. and allied military build-up in the region, in January of 1991 President Bush was granted authority by Congress to use force to compel Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The resulting Persian Gulf War lasted 44 days, and the U.S.-lead forces achieved the primary mission of evicting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In the process, the United States crippled Iraqi defense forces, and in the words of Lt. General Tom Kelly, `Iraq went from the fourth-largest army in the world to the second-largest army in Iraq .'

All along, the U.S. goal was to compel Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and in particular its nuclear weapons program, was only a secondary goal. It was only discoveries made during and after the Gulf War of greater than anticipated Iraqi capability for deploying chemical and biological weapons, in addition to nuclear weapons, which elevated the destruction of these capabilities to a key aim of American policy.

After the cease fire which ended the 1991 war, the U.N. Security Council established the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, to investigate, monitor and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability, including its delivery systems.

Over the past 6 years, UNSCOM has been doing yeoman's work in fulfilling this task by destroying more Iraqi chemical weaponry than was accomplished in the Gulf War itself. Late last year, Saddam Hussein began denying UNSCOM the ability to inspect key Iraqi facilities where production and processing of weapons of mass destruction materials was suspected to be taking place.

Since then, the United States, our allies and the U.N., have been working around the clock to win access to Iraqi sites in compliance with U.N. Resolution 687, which calls for the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability.

PERMISSION CREEP

A few weeks ago, I raised concerns regarding the original version of the Senate resolution which, though not sought by President Clinton, would have given the President largely unlimited authority to use whatever force he deemed necessary to accomplish this objective. I was concerned that the original resolution was overly broad. I did not think it was appropriate to grant such authority on the monumental issue of war and peace without the Congress being thoroughly consulted about the President's plans and justifications.

I was concerned about `Permission Creep.' Permission Creep is when Congress grants the President broad powers in the glow of victory without thinking about the long term consequences of granting such authority. Of course, the reverse is also true. Whenever the United States suffers a defeat, the Congress is swift to limit presidential authority.

Prior to the Vietnam War, President Johnson reported that as a result of military tensions in the Gulf of Tonkin he had ordered a strike against certain North Vietnamese naval targets and oil reserves. In the glow of the victory of this air strike, the Congress passed the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that approved the President's taking `all necessary measures' to repulse an armed attack against U.S. forces and to assist South Vietnam in the defense of its freedom. It is reported that President Johnson compared the resolution to `grandma's nightshirt--it covered everything.'

Of course, we all know the history of Vietnam--a history we are so carefully trying to avoid repeating. We gave the U.S. military extremely difficult and complex missions. We asked it to prosecute a war against a seasoned and highly motivated opponent while simultaneously engaging in `nation building' in South Vietnam. At the same time, we did not give the military the latitude to win. Political leaders micro-managed the Vietnam War, and we did not use decisive force. Of course, in the aftermath, the Congress saw fit to reign in the President's authority to commit U.S. troops in harms way when it passed the War Powers Resolution in the early 1970s.

A more immediate example of `Permission Creep' is the 1991 Defense Authorization Act. Again, in the glow of victory in the Gulf War, the Congress expressed its approval for the `use of all necessary means' to achieve the goals of U.N. Resolution 687. That is where we stand today. This authority exists as a result of the initial joint resolution passed by Congress in January 1991 authorizing the use of force to compel Iraqi compliance with the relevant U.N. resolutions of the time, particularly with respect to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This authority was later extended to cover U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 which established the U.N. Special Commission whose function is to uncover and dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 states specifically that it was the sense of Congress that:

`The Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1).'

I appreciate the fact that some interpret this as being non-binding, even though it was passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President as part of the Defense Authorization Act. And, though some contend that these expressions of Congressional will are no longer in effect, in the absence of formal action to rescind or terminate these non-time limited authorizations, I am led to the conclusion that the President continues to have all the authority he needs to use military force against Iraq pursuant to our laws and relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. The real question is whether or not he should! I for one am glad that President Clinton showed restraint in the most recent confrontation with Iraq .

I see signs that some are already viewing the President's acceptance of the diplomatic agreement as somehow a defeat. I do not share that view! In the words of UN Secretary-General Annan, I think America showed, `resolve on substance and flexibility on form.' To paraphrase President Teddy Roosevelt, in the recent Iraq crisis this nation, `walked softly and carried a big stick.'

THE SENATE DEBATE

Whatever happens from this point, I am pleased that our deliberations on the details of the Senate resolution led to closer consultation between the Administration and the Congress, and to a more informed and thoughtful consideration of the policy choices before us. The current diplomatic solution offers us a great opportunity to debate our policy in the Persian Gulf. I welcome that opportunity.

I know some are concerned about whether this debate sends the wrong message to the world about American resolve. If I were able to address Saddam Hussein today, I would say the following words:

`The future is up to you. If there is to be light at the end of the tunnel for you and the Iraqi people, it is your decision. Because America walked softly during this crisis, consulted with our allies, and chose a diplomatic solution does not mean the willingness of the President and the Congress to use the big stick has gone away.'

As for the U.S. troops stationed abroad listening to this debate, as I listened thirty years ago when the U.S. Senate debated the Tet Offensive, the Siege of Khe Sahn, and the future of the Viet Nam War, I say this:

`Your country is the oldest constitutional democracy in the world. As such, we all have a right to express our views openly and honestly about the most important act of that democracy--sending you into harm's way. You are America's finest. We are all proud of your service. If called upon to conduct military action, I know you will do your duty. We are with you all the way. You will be in our thoughts and prayers until you return safely home.'

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

My first question in the debate on Persian Gulf policy is: `What vital national interests do we have at stake?' In answering this question, the President and the Congress together must determine what responsibilities should be shared by other nations which also have vital interests involved. In some cases those interests are more vital than our own!

I believe that we do have a number of vital national interests in the Persian Gulf region, including:

Fighting the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons around the world;

Promoting stability in an area where Iraq shares borders with: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Syria, all potential flashpoints on the world scene; Turkey, an important U.S. ally; and Jordan, historically a key moderating force in the region;

Securing access to the region's oil supplies, which account for 26 percent of world oil stocks, and 65 percent of global oil reserves; and

Building regional support for the Middle East peace process between Israel and its neighbors.

I would stress that these interests will remain regardless of whether or not Saddam Hussein is still in power. For example, Saddam is not the only problem with respect to weapons of mass destruction even in the Persian Gulf region itself. With respect to stability, it is very possible that if Saddam suddenly vanishes from the scene, the situation, at least in the short run, will worsen, with particular instability along the Turkey-Iraq and Iran-Iraq borders.

Along these same lines, I believe we must take a hard look at how containment of Iraq is related to the achievement of our vital national interests, which, as just noted, are basically regional in nature. On weapons of mass destruction, for example, the nation of Iran poses a similar challenge. In terms of access to oil supplies, while Saudi Arabia supplies over half of all Persian Gulf oil exports (and 85 percent of U.S. oil imports from the region), even before the Gulf War Iraq accounted for a much smaller portion of Persian Gulf oil production. With sanctions now in place, Iraq's contribution to global oil supplies is minimal. The point is, while we must not underestimate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and especially by his willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, we must be careful to not overestimate the role of Iraq and thereby get preoccupied with that nation to the detriment of focusing on our vital regional and global interests.

Another matter which begs an answer is the question of sustainability, of our capacity to maintain our policies, not only now but also well into the future. For example, on the military front, are we going to require deployments for months and years rather than just days and weeks?

There is also the question of consistency--the extent to which our policy choices in pursuit of one national interest objective do not hamper the achievement of other vital objectives. For example, we need to take into account what impact each of the diplomatic and military options designed to contain Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons programs are likely to have on other vital American interests such as our encouragement of Russia to continue forward with ratification and implementation of START II, and other arms control agreements.

On a more specific matter of military policy, I feel we need to take a long, hard look at our current force deployment strategy. Before we get to the point of committing our servicemen and women, we must certainly determine if we have an appropriate military mission which can only be accomplished by military means. Once such a determination is made, we must provide our forces with sufficient resources, and clear and concise rules of engagement to get the job done.

The distinguished Senator from Kansas, Senator Roberts, made a very fine and thoughtful address to the Senate the other day. He cited the following quotation from one of my personal heroes, Senator Richard B. Russell, from thirty years ago during the War in Viet Nam. At that time I was serving in that war. Senator Russell said:

While it is a sound policy to have limited objectives, we should not expose our men to unnecessary hazards to life and limb in pursuing them. As for me, my fellow Americans, I shall never knowingly support a policy of sending even a single American boy overseas to risk his life in combat unless the entire civilian population and wealth of our country--all that we have and all that we are--is to bear a commensurate responsibility in giving him the fullest support and protection of which we are capable.

As part of our effort to produce an effective long-term policy for dealing with Iraq and Saddam Hussein we must also ask the question about appropriate burden-sharing among all of the nations, including the United States, which have vital interests in the area. It should be the long-term aim of our policies that the American people should not be asked to alone shoulder the costs, whether in terms of financial expenses, potential military casualties or diplomatic fallout, of pursuing objectives whose benefits will not be realized exclusively, or in some cases, even primarily, by the United States. To cite but one example of the kind of calculations I have in mind here, while the Persian Gulf accounts for 19% of U.S. oil imports, that region provides 44% of Western Europe's oil imports and fully 70% of Japan's.

In posing these questions regarding our long-term policy toward Iraq , and arriving at my own answers to them, I am led to make the following conclusions.

First, the best, and perhaps the only, way to secure our vital interests of curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and preventing Saddam Hussein from developing the capacity to threaten neighboring countries is through a continuation of people on the ground. In this case right now, the people on the ground are the UNSCOM inspections. It is these inspections, and not any conceivable military option, short of an all out invasion and occupation of Iraq , which can locate, identify, and destroy, or at least impede Iraq's development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Second, in order to secure our national interests, we should place a priority on international coalition building for peace and security in the Persian Gulf. Not only is such an exercise called for in order to insure that American soldiers and American taxpayers are not asked to bear a disproportionate share of the burden in confronting the mainly regional threat posed by Saddam Hussein, but also it is essential to achieving our policy goals--anti-proliferation and regional stability.

Third, in order to aid both weapons inspection and coalition-building, we should be prepared to re-examine our approach to sanctions policy. We should not follow an approach which isolates us from our allies in the region or elsewhere, nor which makes us the villain in the minds of the Iraqi people and its future leaders. In other words, just as I don't want us to pay a disproportionate economic cost, neither should we have to alone bear the diplomatic costs of containing Saddam Hussein. While I certainly do not call for an end to economic sanctions against Iraq , and indeed I believe the international community will need to find a mechanism to secure long-term leverage to maintain adequate surveillance of Iraq's weapons-building programs, I believe that we should work with our allies to develop a comprehensive, long-term approach with respect to sanctions, with graduated modifications geared to concrete Iraqi actions.