IRAQ TRANSITION (PART III)

HEARING BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

April 22, 2004

OPENING STATEMENT OF

RICHARD G. LUGAR
A Senator from Indiana
and
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

LUGAR: This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today the committee will hold its third in our series of three hearings this week on Iraq. This hearing is the most important of the three because we will have an opportunity to learn from representatives of the administration about their plans for the transition to Iraqi sovereignty.

American credibility in the world, progress in the war on terrorism, our relationship with our allies, the future of the Middle East and the fate of Iraqis themselves depend on the resolve and the wisdom of the United States government and the American people in achieving a positive outcome in Iraq. What happens in Iraq during the next 18 months almost certainly will determine whether we can begin to redirect the Middle East toward a more productive and peaceful future beyond the grip of terrorist influences.

Consequently, moving the Iraqi people toward a secure, independent state is a vital United States security problem that requires the highest level of national commitment. The president and other leaders, including members of Congress, must continue to communicate with the American people on this point because the work that must be done in Iraq will test our national fortitude.

LUGAR: American lives will continue to be at risk in Iraq and substantial American resources will continue to be spent there for the foreseeable future.

During the last two days we have heard testimony from 10 expert witnesses representing many perspectives, and we have asked them whether American and Iraqi authorities are ready for the transition to Iraqi sovereignty on June 30 and what steps are required to fill out a comprehensive transition plan. Their contributions greatly advanced our understanding of the situation in Iraq and helped this committee to answer many questions.

However, expert witnesses cannot speak for the United States government. That is the duty that falls to our witnesses today. Our experiences with adequate planning and communication related to Iraq contribute to the determination of this committee to impose a very high standard on the information provided about Iraq.

Yesterday I noted the lack of information about the transition plan in Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's testimony on Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee. We're clearly hoping for more details today.

I would stress that what we are attempting to do here is not an academic exercise. Within the substantial bounds of Congress' oversight capacity, we're attempting to illuminate the United States' plans, actions and options with respect to Iraq, both for the benefit of the American people and to inform our own policy-making role.

I'm convinced that the confidence and commitment demonstrated by the pronouncement of a flexible but detailed plan for Iraq is necessary for our success in Iraq. With lives being lost and billions of dollars being spent in Iraq, the American people must be assured that we have carefully thought through an Iraq policy that will optimize our prospects for success. Moreover, a detailed plan is necessary to prove to our allies and to Iraqis that we have a strategy and that we are committed to making it work.

LUGAR: If we cannot provide this clarity, we risk the loss of support of the American people, the loss of potential contributions from our allies, and the disillusionment of Iraqis.

We may determine after this hearing that more hearings on Iraq are required to generate answers and to provide the confidence that we seek.

At yesterday's hearing, I urged the administration to prepare quickly for a hearing on the nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be our ambassador to Iraq. We would like to hold that hearing next Tuesday. It is critical that Ambassador Negroponte and his team be put in place at the earliest possible moment.

During the first two days of hearings I posed a set of six questions as a way of fleshing out a plan for Iraq. I believe that clear answers to all of these questions would constitute a coherent transition strategy for Iraq.

First, what are details of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi's plan for an interim Iraqi government to which a transfer of sovereignty is planned on June 30, 2004? Specifically, what executive and legislative positions will be established in the interim government and how would these positions be filled? Are we confident that Iraqis will support the United Nations formula for a new government? And what would the United States do if the Iraqis reject the Brahimi plan? What is our fallback strategy at that point?

Our expert witnesses expressed confidence in Ambassador Brahimi and his ability to find credible Iraqis to serve in the interim government.

But some concern was voiced that the United States must better synchronize the military and diplomatic actions of Ambassador Brahimi's efforts to build an interim government. We must think creatively about how the coalition and the international community can facilitate the emergence of national leaders in Iraq who are viewed as legitimate and prepared to govern.

Second, what should be contained in a status of forces agreement so that the United States and coalition armed forces will have clear and effective roles in providing internal and external security for the new Iraqi government?

And will that agreement make clear the chain of command or chains of command -- because we heard yesterday from a witness that as many as three chains of command might be required -- and the relationship of Iraqi police, reserves and army personnel with United States and coalition forces?

LUGAR: All of our expert witnesses agreed that achieving security was the key to success in Iraq. They underscored that we have to determine who our partner is in the status of forces agreement. They also generally believe that the current level of U.S. forces could not achieve the degree of security that is necessary for a successful political outcome.

In the short run, this may require more U.S. forces and more patrols that secure streets and neighborhoods. It will also require us to find other sources of competent troops from willing nations.

Our ability to find these troops will depend on our flexibility in including the United Nations in decision-making on the ability of our own troops to diminish violence in the short turn.

We heard many views on how to establish improved Iraqi security forces, but generally our experts believe that an effective Iraqi army and police force would require much more time, equipment and resources than we have thus far dedicated to bringing these units to fruition.

Third, will United Nations Security Council resolutions undergird the international legitimacy of the new Iraqi government and all of the security arrangements that it will require? How will the United States pursue such resolutions and what will they contain?

Our experts stressed that United Nations involvement is necessary if we are to generate greater international participation, improve the political legitimacy of the interim Iraqi government and take the American face off the occupation of Iraq.

They also underscored that we know how to operate under the auspices of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and we can do so without sacrificing command of our troops or the intent of our mission.

Fourth, will elections for the transitional and permanent Iraqi government, scheduled for tentatively January 2005 and December 2005 respectively, be held under the auspices of the United Nations or under some other authority? How will that authority provide security for the elections and assemble a registration list or otherwise determine who is eligible to vote?

LUGAR: How would we deal with elections that are postponed or deemed to be fraudulent? Will the national assembly that is to be elected in January 2005 have full authority to write a constitution and construct the framework of a permanent government?

Our experts spoke to the importance of going forward with elections in Iraq even if security and registration procedures are imperfect. They noted that elections would force Iraqi factions to enunciate policy choices and would stimulate dialogue between political leaders and the Iraqi populous. In the absence of elections, factions will continue to bid for influence through violence, croneyism or anti-American demonstrations.

Fifth, beyond Ambassador Negroponte what will be the composition of the United States embassy in Baghdad? And what is the schedule for the arrival of embassy personnel?

Given security concerns, our witnesses noted that some system must be worked out to allow embassy personnel to travel throughout Iraq. They emphasize that we should attempt to get as many personnel as possible in place before June 30.

Sixth, will the costs associated with the new diplomatic presence be covered by a transfer of funds under the umbrella of the $87 billion appropriation enacted by Congress last year? But if not, what is the plan for providing necessary funding?

There was general consensus that some transfer of sovereignty will occur on June 30, but U.S. forces will be required to provide security in Iraq for at least several more years. We should develop cost estimates that assume an extensive United States involvement.

Another important point generated by yesterday's hearing was that the interim Iraqi government will require funding as well. What parts of oil reserves or the $18 billion of reconstruction money will be controlled by the interim government? Or what other sources of revenue will be available to them?

The Foreign Relations Committee will be persistent in asking these questions and many others because Americans should have the opportunity to understand the administration's plan and to carefully monitor its progress.

We welcome today Mr. Marc Grossman, undersecretary of state for political affairs; Mr. Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; Mr. Andrew Natsios, administrator of the United States Agency for International Development; and supporting them, Mr. Frank Ricciardone, our ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines and State Department coordinator for the Iraq transition; and Lieutenant General Claude Kicklighter, the transition chief for the Coalition Provisional Authority.

We welcome these witnesses. We thank you for coming to the hearing this morning.

Before I recognize you, I want to recognize first of all my colleague and this committee's ranking member, Senator Biden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOSEPH BIDEN
A Senator from Delaware
and
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

BIDEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I thank our witnesses for being here today.

We have serious and prominent witnesses. And I hope before the hearing process ends we will have their bosses before us as well, the secretary of defense and the secretary of state.

Let me begin by explaining to everyone that I notice a number of people looked when I walked in with my new staff person as I sat back here.

BIDEN: My new foreign policy adviser is my granddaughter. For some of you who may not know, today is Bring Your Daughter To Work Day. And I brought my granddaughter in the hope that someone may mistake her for my daughter.

(LAUGHTER)

And so I just want to explain that. I realize it's a bit unusual. But I can see the looks on some of your faces: "It's a serious hearing and what's he bringing a 4th grader in for?" It's Bring Your Daughter To Work Day.

Rather than do my whole statement, Mr. Chairman, because I'm anxious to hear the witnesses and because you have laid out such a thorough road map here, I, as we say in our business, associate myself with your remarks. I think the questions you asked are the ones that have to be answered.

I would just like to say that it seems to be we really have no option but to invest in the success of this undertaking in Iraq.

But the thing that I hope we keep on our eye on is to oversimplify it in one sense and understate it in another. We cannot want a representative government for the Iraqis more than they want it. We cannot want a representative government for the Iraqis more than the Iraqis want it.

And the premise upon which I continue to support this what hopefully history will judge is a noble undertaking is because I believe that the vast majority of the Iraqi people want a representative government.

I might note for the record -- and from the beginning I think my friend from Nebraska shared this view as well, and possibly my chairman and my friend from Rhode Island; I'm not certain. I don't want to associate them with me if I am mistaken -- but I have never believed from the outset, do not believe now, we are going to have a liberal democracy established in Iraq in the near term; a liberal democracy in the sense that we mean it.

But I do think it's fully in our capacity to have a representative government that's within the existing border that the vast majority of the people of Iraq feel they have a voice in.

BIDEN: Now, whatever form that takes, I'm not certain. But if we think we're going to have a replication of what we have here in the United States or European capitals, I think that is somewhat naive.

And so I want to make it clear again that -- because we're going to be -- come back and be judged based upon whether or not we succeeded or failed in this undertaking based on what we state our objective is.

Mine personally is a representative government that is probably a loosely federated republic of some nature, that has the ability to grow over generations into what we call a living democracy.

But again, we can't want that government more than they want it.

I know all the witnesses well, respect them all. I think I probably know Marc better than most, him having to deal with me for so long.

And I'd say to Secretary Grossman that one of the reasons why we continue to focus so much on the security piece of this is we -- or I have come to the conclusion that there is no reasonable prospect that that -- what we would say in U.S. political terms 25 years ago, that silent majority of Iraqis who want a representative government, there's no way after 30 years, three decades of being battered and beaten by a dictator, that they're going to raise their heads in any environment other than a secure environment.

And I say to Secretary Rodman, we have an inordinately high regard for the bravery, the decency and the idealism -- and I say idealism -- of our troops who are fighting over there. But the primary focus -- and it should be first and foremost -- is providing security for our troops, not security for the Iraqi people in the way in which we would think about it here.

We have over 100 missions that go through the neighborhoods every day, but they usually go through in a Humvee about 30 to 40 miles an hour, and I don't blame them.

BIDEN: I've thought from the beginning we have too few forces on the ground, whether they be American or others -- total number of forces -- to be able to do something more than force protection.

And the irony is I think we've created resentment. We've created resentment as the neighbor's daughter is raped or kidnapped or the house is looted or they are robbed, and there's a Humvee going by and no one's seen it.

In a sense, we have suffered from expectations that were not particularly reasonable but understandable. After 30 years of thinking Saddam was not only a dictator and a brutal thug, they also thought he was somewhat omnipotent and incapable of being taken down. And along comes the United States and in very short order, in an awesome display of power, takes him down. I think it raised expectations that we are suffering from, as well. But somehow we got to deal with it.

And so my generic point is this: I think that we went with too little power and too little legitimacy, and I think the only way to rectify this is to figure how to generate more power and more legitimacy. And I think they go hand in hand, which leads me -- and I'll ask unanimous consent that this all be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman.

LUGAR: It will be placed in the record in full.

BIDEN: But to summarize, I think it leads me to the conclusion that -- and please, guys, I love ya'll, but don't tell me how you all agree, OK? None of us will believe it if you tell us that State and Defense are in agreement on this. Please don't ruin your credibility. We love you. Make your statements, but don't try to convince us what we know -- I know for a fact is not true, OK?

So please don't do that because I came through the door here today and I turned to Tony Blinken. I said, "Tony, I'm going to try to be really, really polite today."

(LAUGHTER)

"I'm going to try to be really calm and cool and collected today." So please don't do that.

But one alternative -- one alternative is that we end up with some international group involving major powers, not necessarily the United Nations, not necessarily the Security Council, but major powers that is not unlike the contact group. I call it an international board of directors. Call it whatever you want. But it seems to me we need to get the major powers -- PERM 5, even some of the neighbors of Iraq, maybe even, as heretical as it sounds, Iran, Syria -- to basically be put in place by some umbrella sanctioning of an international organization, like the U.N., who will come along and bless what the president says he's about to bless, Brahimi's proposal, whatever that turns out to be exactly.

BIDEN: And we think we know.

And then maybe go back and get some legitimacy for that through the U.N. with no U.N. control. As George Will said, paraphrasing, you know, "The U.N. maybe should come in as a convenient way to mask the fact that we are still in power."

But everybody -- even the George Wills of the world acknowledge, we, kind of, need some umbrella of legitimacy here to get a number of nations to do what I think they still are willing to do, although time is running out, which is to provide some more legitimacy and power -- the combination of the two.

And I think that's the only way to base the testimony we heard yesterday and from a lot of people we individually interview is that we get NATO into the deal. And by the way, Marc, I have no illusions, or, Mr. Secretary Rodman, I have no illusions that NATO can send 50,000 troops in. I don't suggest that at all. But they can send 3,000, 5,000, 7,000 now. They can take over border patrol now. They can do significant things now. They can free up 15,000 to 20,000 American forces now. They can do a lot.

But most of all what they can do is convince the American people we're not in this alone. Because for NATO to be involved means major powers said their prestige is at risk as well in the success or failure of Iraq.

So let me conclude by saying the questions that I want, and some of them overlap, who's going to decide in the future, when we set up this embassy, how to handle the Fallujahs and the al-Sadrs? Is it going to be an Iraqi caretaker government? Is it going to be the American military? Is it going to be some senior national figure?

When we claim that our commanders on the ground say that they have enough forces to carry out their mission, what's their mission? What's their mission? Does that include more than force protection? Does it include civil protection? Does it include policing? Does it include reconstruction? What's the mission?

And one of the private security contractors, the second largest armed group in Iraq after American armed forces -- estimated 20,000 -- what is our policy toward them? How are they handling the morale problems there likely to create for our regular soldiers who were paid considerably less -- in some cases, 10, 12, 15 times less? Are they under an effective command and control? Are they coordinating with our uniformed military? How do they plan to reestablish the security?

What's the plan for training the Iraqi police? I know, Secretary Grossman, you know -- you're going to tell me you don't but I know you know -- that no one you've worked with in the last 10 years thought we could train up an Iraqi police force in less than three to five years, and no one thought we could train up an Iraqi military of more than 40,000 forces in less than about three years. And yet we put 200,000 people, quote, "in uniform."

BIDEN: Why has only $3 billion of the $18.6 billion that Congress appropriated last year been spent on the urgent request that the president made? Is it something you need help from us in breaking through bureaucratic Gordian knots here? Because we want to help. I can't speak for anybody else, but if there's a rational way to do this, we want to do it. Or what's the explanation?

And after June 30, who's going to be in charge in deciding how the money is spent? And when the Pentagon decides or the State Department decides they're going to put a road here or there or a project here or take care of this electrical grid, does this Iraqi sovereign government have a right to say, "Hey, no, no, no. We don't want the money spent there. We want you to go over here and build X, Y or Z"? Who makes those decisions?

And what's the current burn rate? I think we were told -- I think that came out yesterday -- about $4.6 billion per month for our military. And what are the range of the estimates of cost for Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction for next year? How are we going to pay for it?

Now, I'll conclude by saying I know that some of these figures are not precisely -- to use the secretary of defense's favorite word last year -- "unknowable." I know some things are unknowable.

One thing we know: If we're going to have more than 100,000 troops there, it's going to cost more than $4 billion a month, if they're just hanging around. So don't we know that it's going to cost for fiscal year 2005 somewhere -- somewhere in the neighborhood of $50 billion, at a minimum? Don't we know that? And if we know that, why don't you tell us now, and then come back for a supplemental beyond that if you need it?

So those are the questions I have along with others, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that the appendix to this statement, which lays out more clearly some of the points I made, be made part of the record at this point.

LUGAR: It will be made a part of the record in full.

BIDEN: I thank you for your indulgence.

I thank you gentlemen for being here.

LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.

I'm going to ask Secretary Grossman to testify first. Mr. Natsios will be in support of him; I understand will not have an opening statement.

Is that true or do you have one, sir?

NATSIOS: I actually had a short one.

LUGAR: Very well. Then we will ask you to testify, and then Secretary Rodman.

Let me just indicate in advance I know that Secretary Grossman, because he has already filed a very important statement, has considerable detail, and I would simply invite him to embellish that further.

This is not a hearing in which the bell is going to ring after five minutes or 10 minutes or what have you. It is a hearing to explore as fully as possible the plans of our administration.

I know from previous conversation with Secretary Rodman that he has a much briefer comment, and has, in fact, indicated to me, so that we'll not have anybody in the dark about this, that many of the decisions on security are, in fact, the subject of administration talks and visits even as we speak, or today or the days ahead, so that much of that, perhaps, he is not available to give to us today.

LUGAR: But we invite you, Mr. Secretary, as you hear Secretary Grossman and you've heard the questions, at least, of Senator Biden, myself, to give us as much detail as you can and to be responsive to our questions.

I would like now to call upon Secretary Grossman for his testimony.

STATEMENT OF

MARC GROSSMAN,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

GROSSMAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Senator Biden, thank you very much.

And I appreciate the opportunity to be here to report to you on progress we are making regarding the 30th June transition in Iraq.

Senator Biden, I also wanted to just welcome your granddaughter. It's a good thing, bring your daughter to work. My daughter was going to come with me, but she kept hearing I was such a low-ranking State Department official, she said, "The hell with it. I'm not coming."

(LAUGHTER)

BIDEN: With your daughter here, we would have elevated...

(LAUGHTER)

It may have been the one way you could have got more respect.

GROSSMAN: Perhaps. Perhaps. I'll certainly take your invitation to the secretary back, but just for the record, I mean, the letter of invitation was to me, and I am very glad to be here. I'm very glad to be here.

Like you, and I think all of us here on this side and in the committee, let me also start by paying tribute to the men and women who are serving the United States of America today, military and civilian, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, around the world. They demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination and courage as they try to bring security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq.

And I also think it's worthwhile to thank our coalition partners, who have also sacrificed, both military and civilian.

And if I could, as I have done on many times before this committee, thank you for your support of the State Department, and particular today, as I go through some of the details of a new embassy, for your support of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, so we have the people and the wherewithal we need to carry out this country's diplomacy.

And I also appreciate the statements that you have made in support of John Negroponte's nomination by the president to be our ambassador to Iraq. And we appreciate the rapidity that you want to go ahead and get this confirmation hearing done. And we will work with you to get this done as quickly as possible, because I agree with you completely, we need that finished so that he also can join us and make sure we are going forward as quickly as we possibly can.

As I said, I read the letter of invitation that you sent to me very carefully. I've listened to the questions that you and Senator Biden have posed, not just today, but I looked at the ones for the past couple of days. And it seems to me that your focus on the preparations that we're doing to get ready for 30 June/1st of July are the right ones, and that you ought to keep asking us these questions, we ought to keep doing these hearings, because, as you both said, they're absolutely crucial to the success of the United States.

I report to you today on what I consider to be a tremendous amount of work that has been done. As you say, we don't have all of the issues settled, but we look forward to close consultations and further hearings or any other way that this committee would like to have interaction on these issues.

We have, I believe, the guidance that we need, the direction that we need, and also I hope to convince you that we have a plan for going forward between now and the 30th of June.

Our guidance comes from President Bush, and he repeated it last week. He said the central commitment is to transfer sovereignty back to the Iraqi people on a deadline of June the 30th. And he went on to describe that day, and I think it's important to put it out, which is to say, on June the 30th, when the flag of a free Iraq is raised, Iraqi officials will assume full responsibility for the ministries of government.

On that day, the Transitional Administrative Law, including a bill of rights that is unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect. The United States and all nations of the coalition will establish normal diplomatic relations with an Iraqi government. An American embassy will open. An American ambassador, obviously subject to the confirmation of the committee and the Senate, will be posted.

The specific direction that we take with this guidance comes from Secretary Powell, who says that it is our -- he has put the State Department in motion to support the president's direction.

As I reported to you one other time, Senator, after CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council signed the November 15th agreement and established the June 30 transition date, Secretary Powell asked Ambassador Frank Ricciardone to come back from Manila to head our transition team. And in his first day on the job he went to the Pentagon to meet his counterpart, Lieutenant General Mick Kicklighter, and they are today one interagency team. And I just would ask them both to stand up so that the committee knows who they are...

LUGAR: Thank you.

GROSSMAN: ... and what they are accomplishing. And I think they've done a tremendous amount in the weeks that they have worked together.

GROSSMAN: We thank them.

We have also established an interagency team in Baghdad under the leadership of Ambassador John Holtzman (ph). He works on transition planning and implementation in immediate consultation with Ambassador Bremer and General Sanchez.

I can tell you that the secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues daily. We send to the secretary each night a table of what got accomplished today and what needs to be done in the next day, and these notes I think demonstrate the broad range of interagency, bilateral and multilateral things that we have to get done.

We're also following the president's guidance and the secretary's direction. We have developed a plan which I have put there -- and I know it's far away from people, but we will leave one for everybody -- about how to get to and through the 30th of June. And we've set ourselves some broad deadlines and some specific ones as well. And to execute that plan we have, and continue to work closely with our interagency colleagues and consult regularly with Congress, coalition partners, Baghdad and Washington.

Mr. Chairman, among the questions that you asked and one I'd like to deal with first with your permission is how to transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to an embassy of the United States of America.

The first job that we undertook here -- a very good idea of General Kicklighter's -- was to send teams to Iraq, assessment teams, to consider what the basic requirements were to make this transition successful. And we identified 15 key sectors that we thought were crucial to success.

We've identified those 15 broad areas, and we're working now to make sure that each of them -- that the requirements there are accomplished.

Each of these sectors is broken down into individual tasks and milestones. And again, I'll just show you what we've got which is about 500 or 550 of these tasks broken down. Somebody is responsible, there is a date for each one of them. And as you can see, some are green, some are red, some are yellow. Object obviously is to turn them all to green.

And I would invite the committee and the committee staff to come to the State Department at any time where we have this on the Web and it's a living document, and all of you are certainly welcome to take a look at it at any time so that you can get updated as you wish.

LUGAR: Is the document classified?

GROSSMAN: It is not, sir. But it's on our intranet and we want to keep it that way. But you're welcome to come to the department, and your staff, and look at it at any time, because it changes all the time.

LUGAR: I thank you for that invitation.

GROSSMAN: And I think it'd be useful as we go forward.

As I say, each of these are broken down into milestones, individual tasks, and our object, obviously, is to get them all done.

As I said, there were 15 of these large tasks to accomplish. I won't -- even with your invitation to be detailed -- go into all of them.

GROSSMAN: But I'd like to talk about four today, if I could. I'd like to talk about people, security, buildings and money. And I think all of those were encompassed in questions that you asked.

The State Department, of course, as you know, and as we have talked about from time to time, has been in Iraq from the very beginning, from Jay Garner's operation, ORHA, to Jerry Bremer's operation, CPA. And we currently have a 170 people in Iraq of whom we are immensely proud. And they come from many parts of our Washington operation and around the world: senior officers, junior officers. And I say we're proud of them and of their service.

How big will this embassy be? It's not going to be a 3,000- American person embassy as I have seen places in the press. Our planning is for about 1,000 Americans and about 700 Iraqi employees.

So exactly how do I get to that figure? I get to that figure in this way. First, the State Department has announced positions of 142 American employees and 155 locally engaged staff: Iraqis.

In addition, in January of this year, Secretary Powell asked his Cabinet colleagues to identify contributions that other agencies might make to the mission in Iraq as we have contributions in missions all around the world from other agencies.

To date, 10 Cabinet agencies have come back to us and requested a presence in Embassy Baghdad for a total of 254 Americans and about 300 locally hired personnel.

Long term, because we haven't heard back from everybody, we estimate that there will be about 350 to 400 Americans, other than the State Department, from some 12 to 15 agencies and then a reasonable number also of foreign service national staff.

A number of CPA staff who have specific and very important skills to bring will also continue, we believe, to work after July the 1st under the chief of mission. And we have put in a reasonable number for them as well.

And so that's how I come to a number of approximately 1,000 Americans and about 700 Iraqi employees.

I will say -- and I hope that you will be proud of this as well -- we have had so many State Department people volunteer for these jobs that we have no trouble assigning them to the 142 positions that we have currently announced. In fact about 200 people have requested to be assigned to the new embassy.

And of those 142 positions that we have announced, we have formally assigned 97 people. Thirty-two more assignments are pending. And we do believe, Mr. Chairman, as you asked, that they will be in Iraq well before the 1st of July.

GROSSMAN: In fact, I guess using a retail term, our object is to have a soft opening of our embassy some three weeks in advance so that people can get used to what they're doing and then on the day, there will really be an American embassy there.

I should also say that we've already begun hiring for local staff, and the first people that we have hired are currently in Washington undergoing training. And their job is to then go back to Iraq and get more locally hired staff.

So for those who just joined us, it's about 1,000 Americans, about 700 Iraqi employees.

The American ambassador, as we discussed the last time I was with the committee, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him a letter from the president, as all of our ambassadors to, that spells out clearly his authority in Iraq.

It will say that he, as the chief of mission and personal representative of the president reporting to the secretary of state, will have responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States government executive branch employees in Iraq except for those under the command of the U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.

And that is exactly how we do it everywhere in the world, and we believe that this will work successfully in Iraq.

Of course, the American military commander and the ambassador are going to have to have the closest possible relationship and, of course, we do this other places in the world, like in Afghanistan, to ensure that they their respective operations are fully coordinated and best serve the interests of the United States.

There have also been questions about the command and control of U.S. forces in Iraq after June 30, and I can tell you that U.S. forces in Iraq will report to the U.S. commander of the Multinational Force I -- Multinational Force Iraq -- will report to the president through the military chain of command.

We'll obviously consult closely with the Iraqi interim government. As General Myers said earlier this week, we'll be looking for a partnership with this Iraqi government.

And I don't know, Senator, where the three chains of command come from. As I see it, those are the chains of command that we look forward to in Iraq.

The president has said we will turn sovereignty over to Iraqis on June 30/July 1.

GROSSMAN: In the security area, obviously there's going to have to be an arrangement with that Iraqi government that is based on the Transitional Administrative Law, that's based on U.N. Security Council 1511, that's based on CPA order 17.

But I believe that Iraqis who have this vision for their own society recognize that they can't meet that vision without security. And they can't create that security without the support of the United States of America.

And so with General Myers' vision of a partnership with the Iraqi forces and with Ambassador Negroponte on the ground, I'm confident that turning sovereignty over to Iraqis with this security arrangement will be successful for us.

Second area, and that is security. Our top priority, obviously, is to keep people safe. Everybody here should understand that this is not just a dangerous mission for our military forces and coalition military forces that are out in Iraq. This is a dangerous mission for our people as well.

We've already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim embassy buildings and we've selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on its security features.

We have 51 armored vehicles already in Iraq. Another 98 are on order, and I can tell you that these vehicles have already saved Iraqi and American lives.

You ask whether we had security agents already on the ground. The answer to that question is yes. We have 32 diplomatic security staff who are already in Iraq to define the mission's security requirements and begin to meet them.

Difficult questions in the security area are left to be answered but, as you know, Deputy Secretary Armitage and our assistant secretary for diplomatic security, Frank Taylor, were in Iraq earlier this week and now will come back and I think help us define further questions in the security area.

But I repeat that this is going to be for us, as well as for our military colleagues, a dangerous place to live and work for some time.

Facilities: Our director of overseas building operations, Ambassador Chuck Williams, traveled to Baghdad in February. We've identified a building to serve as the embassy from the 1st of July until a more permanent facility can be established. We're referring to that as the temporary chancery. It's already under renovation and, Senator, you asked, we believe we'll be absolutely ready to go on the 1st of July.

GROSSMAN: In that temporary chancery will be the ambassador and a limited number of staff. In addition, until we build a new embassy compound, we'll continue to use some of the buildings that the CPA is currently using, mostly for non-public operations, and we'll continue to use the residence that is currently used by Ambassador Bremer.

We've got some housing issues. CPA people are currently housed in trailers. That's where our people will be temporarily. We've got some more trailers on order. But in the facilities area as well, I think we've got a plan in process.

And again, Rich Armitage, who was in Baghdad on Tuesday, walked all of the sites of the temporary facility, walked the site of a new -- possible new embassy compound, and reported to me by phone yesterday that he was confident that in this area we can get this job done.

Finally, you asked about money. And here, Senator Nelson, when I was before the committee the next time, asked me about the money. And I have been trying to get him an answer ever since, and I am finally able to give you, I hope, Senator, a complete answer about where the finances go.

And here's how this works, as far as we're concerned. Our current estimate for the resource requirements for the mission for the rest of FY '04 and all of '05 are between $1.1 billion and $1.5 billion, excluding -- excluding the cost of a new embassy building.

Obviously these cost estimates are subject to change. I'm giving you a snapshot as they are today. The $1.1 billion to $1.5 billion.

We have so far identified $535 million to pay these bills through the end of this calendar year, broken down as follows.

First, we have $97.3 million from the FY '03 and FY '04 Iraq supplementals, which will help provide for some ongoing renovation and security costs, and interim facility requirements.

Second, based on current OMB apportionments, $195.8 million will be available in the fourth quarter from CPA operating expenses, since they will transfer to this embassy. And so that will help as well.

And third, as a successor to CPA, up to 1 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and that's about $184 million, can be transferred for operating expenses.

And our FY '05 did include $46 million for some State Department operating costs, support costs, and $29 million for staffing.

GROSSMAN: So that's $523 million that we have identified.

We're also exploring a number of other funding strategies, nonreimbursed support from other agencies that will participate in this embassy. It's possible also -- and the lawyers are looking at this -- to use a larger percentage of the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund for administrative expenses. And so there are ways that we are looking to fill that gap.

But both Senator Biden and Senator Lugar asked about a supplemental. And if you ask me, in terms of our requirements, we believe a supplemental will be required. Obviously the size and timing ought to be set by the president.

So that is where we stand on the finances at the moment. We'll continue to refine those numbers. But we've got a job in front of us, we've identified some money, and we're going to continue to work on this as we go forward.

My report to you (inaudible) and I say I was very encouraged by hearing from Rich Armitage on the phone the other day is that he believes that the work that has been done by General Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone, and the work that is being done on the ground means that we will be ready to stand up an embassy of the United States of America on the 1st of July.

The second major question that you have both posed is what about the transition on the political side? What happens in Iraq 30 June/1st of July? And let me take a moment to talk about those issues as well.

The restoration of Iraqi self-government on June 30, we have here, again, clear guidance and clear direction. The president has said on a number of occasions that we will return sovereignty to Iraqis on the 1st of July. The plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty is essentially laid out in the November 15th agreement -- and I just have a chart; and again, I would be glad to have some left with you so this is not an eye examination -- is the way forward from the November 15th agreement.

You'll remember that agreement.

GROSSMAN: It was signed by CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council. It calls for a Transitional Administrative Law encompassing a basic bill of rights. And that agreement, as it goes along there by dates, calls for the selection of an interim Iraqi government to oversee the preparation of national elections and the transfer of governing authority to an interim government by June 30, 2004.

The agreement also established a timeline for national elections and the drafting and ratification of a new constitution and the election of a government under that constitution by December 31, 2005.

Mr. Chairman, I might suggest, if it would be all right with you, is I'd like to ask the TAL in its entirety be submitted for the record. I think it's a very important document and one that does lay out the plan as we go forward. I think it would be very worthwhile.

LUGAR: It will be included in the record in full.

GROSSMAN: Thank you, sir.

Now, there have been some changes in the November 15th agreement since that time. But I think the basic framework and the timeline still holds.

The first step was obviously the governing council's agreement on the Transitional Administrative Law now almost three months ago. It marked an important achievement: equal rights for all Iraqis without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin. It confirms Iraq as a single state with federal structures. It confirms civilian control of Iraqi security services and the independence of the judiciary.

And finally, the TAL establishes the general framework for national elections by January 31, 2005, and the drafting of a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, and then the transition to a constitutionally based post-transition government by December 31, 2005.

Let me talk specifically about the Iraqi interim government. As you all know, and we've talked about before, following the U.N. secretary general's February 23 report and the signing of the Transitional Administrative Law, the governing council on March the 17th asked the United Nations to come to Iraq to help it with two jobs: first, to advise it on how to get to this interim government and, secondly, to advise it about how most popularly to do elections.

GROSSMAN: And so, on April the 5th, Ambassador Brahimi returned to Iraq to resume intensive consultations with Iraqis for this purpose.

And you all have seen, I know, the statement that President Bush made last week that we welcome the proposals that Ambassador Brahimi presented. He's identified a way forward to establishing an interim government that is broadly acceptable to the Iraqi people. The president thanked the United Nations and the secretary general for making Ambassador Brahimi ready for this work. And we look forward to working with him more closely.

In our consultations with the United Nations and in our talks with Ambassador Brahimi we have tried to lay out what we think this Iraqi governing council ought to be about. Let me just give you some criteria that I consider to be important.

First, that this interim government should represent the diversity of Iraq.

Second, that it should not have a law-making body. We don't believe that the period between the 1st of July and the end of December should be a time for making new laws. The structure of the government should be effective, simple, and in order to avoid deadlock should not be overly large.

Third, the process of selecting the government should be as simple as possible.

And fourth, the interim government should have all the necessary authorities it needs to lead Iraq into the community of nations, and especially to undertake agreements with economic reconstruction and to prepare the country for elections.

And as I say, given that criteria, we are pleased with the sketch that Ambassador Brahimi provided of his proposed way forward, and believe his idea fits in our vision.

Mr. Chairman, you have talked a little bit about that vision of Ambassador Brahimi. He believes he can establish by mid-May an interim government led by a prime minister, that also includes a president, two deputy presidents, a council of ministers which would report to the prime minister, and then an advisory body which would be selected by a national conference to be held -- as Ambassador Brahimi foresees it -- sometimes in July which would serve alongside of the executive, but not have legislative authority.

We look forward, obviously, to discussing this further, and I know that Ambassador Brahimi will be reporting to the Security Council on Tuesday in more detail, but we look forward to that.

GROSSMAN: I also want to highlight Ambassador Brahimi's statement regarding the central importance of elections, and that is something with which we absolutely agree.

And in fact for us, the call for national elections in early 2005 was a key part of the November 15 agreement.

In this regard -- and I just really have to say how much we admire the work that the U.N. election team, headed by Ms. Pirelli, did while they were in Baghdad.

They got to Baghdad in late March. They were there for quite a number of weeks. They worked very hard with the Iraqi Governing Council and other Iraqis to establish an election system. And I just want to highlight something that Ms. Pirelli said in her press conference on the way out, which is that the timeline for getting these elections going is very tight. And so we need to pay close attention to getting the election system in Iraq right.

Finally, on the United Nations Security Council resolution, you asked about that, Senator, and both President Bush, Secretary Powell and others have talked about the need for a new U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq.

Now, I can tell you today that we've not decided in terms of its exact text or when would be the best time to get it: either just before the 30th of June, after the 30th of June; that is something that we are still considering.

But what we have done is lay out -- and I will lay out for you today -- some of the basic components of that resolution when it comes.

The new resolution should, obviously, extend a hand to the new Iraqi government and support it, as you've said, Senator Lugar. It could deal with reconstruction activities including the future of the Development Fund for Iraq, and with the continuing need, obviously, for security for the Iraqi people. It would help the Iraqi people complete the political process for themselves. It would, as Senator Biden said, encourage other nations to get involved in security and reconstruction efforts.

And the resolution could also structure a role for the United Nations in this new political framework, particularly in supporting the process toward elections, which was another of your questions: Who runs these elections?

So, Senators, I sit before you here on the 22nd of April. I have a vision of Iraq on the 1st of July where there will be, subject to Senate confirmation, an American ambassador.

GROSSMAN: There'll be a large but recognizable American embassy.

The ambassador's team, including a highly experienced deputy chief of mission, will include representatives from a broad range of United States government agencies.

There will still be a very large number of American troops on the ground helping to provide security and train Iraqi army and police forces.

And when the ambassador goes to call on Iraqis in government, he will be calling on the president and prime minister of a sovereign Iraq.

But clearly the work we have to do will not be complete. Iraq will still be in transition.

I think it's important to recognize, as the chart does and as we will do I'm sure during the question-and-answer period, that this is an interim government that lasts from the 1st of July until December, and its job is to get elections going, help us and participate as a partner in security.

Security will still be an issue. Elections will need to be held. A permanent constitution will need to be drafted. Economic reconstruction will remain unfinished.

The United States is committed until we reach our objective: a democratic prosperous Iraq governed by a duly elected representative government at peace with itself and its neighbors.

And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we moved this conversation along from the last time I was here and we have a lot more detail on both ends of this plan. I recognize that we don't have every answer, but I believe we have a plan and we are well on our way to carrying it out.

And I thank you for offering me the chance to give the statement in detail and I hope it has been of some use to you.

LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Secretary Grossman, for a very comprehensive and extraordinary statement. Each one of us will want to digest carefully as we respond with questions back and forth.

Ambassador Natsios?

STATEMENT OF

ANDREW NATSIOS,
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

NATSIOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

USAID has played a major role in the reconstruction of Iraq. Over the past 12 months, it has been hard at work doing this reconstruction. I expect that it will continue to be hard work for quite some time.

But it has been very rewarding, and I would say the thing that surprised us the most in the reconstruction process is the high technical competence of the Iraqis in the ministries and in local government that we've met and in the other public institutions. That has made our work much easier when you have competent local partners who can manage things and get things done.

We have programs in every province of the country and we intend to keep them going. We have built a solid presence in many places. Obviously our headquarters is in Baghdad, but we have large offices in Irbil, in Al Hillah and in Basra, and we continue those offices beyond the 30th of June.

We have worked very closely with the CPA. We report to Ambassador Bremer, and on the 30th of June, or the 1st of July, we will report to the U.S. ambassador, my good friend John Negroponte, who, by the way, was an ambassador in three countries where there were AID missions. So he knows what AID missions do. He works well with them. Our officers actually were quite pleased with the choice of John Negroponte for this position.

We work in the following areas: in health care, humanitarian assistance for people affected by the war, in local governance and economic growth, in education, in infrastructure, electricity, agriculture, civil society and civic education, and water and sewage treatment systems.

NATSIOS: We work through 32 partner organizations, 11 contractors, 11 NGOs, five universities -- and, by the way, our university partnerships are quite innovative. They're American universities which have partnerships with five European universities and five Iraqi universities. And what we're doing is now having our professors go there to teach and then some of the Iraqis come back to the United States because many of them have never been allowed out of the country and they want to see what the West if like. They keep asking us that.

We also worked with five U.N. agencies, some of them to an enormous degree. They've been extraordinary partners for us under difficult circumstances.

To date, we've been allocated $3.8 billion from the first and second supplementals, and we've obligated of that $3.3 billion.

Let me explain what obligation means. It means there is a signed, written contract, grant or cooperative agreement with a partner organization, that organization has money transferred to its account, and that they begin work on the ground.

Because most of what we're doing we started a long time ago, our partner organizations have a well-established presences on the ground. There are about between 70 to 80 AID officers in Baghdad and these other regional offices. And there are 100 Iraqis who have been working with us for the last eight months. There are about 755 to 800, depending on the time of year and the projects, expatriate contractors who work for our partner organizations.

And then there are thousands and thousands of Iraqis -- depends on -- last summer, we were up to 35,000 Iraqis who were working for AID partner organizations, exclusively funded by the U.S. government. It's down less now because we were using a lot of contractors to do the reconstruction of schools, but it's still on the order of 5,000 or 6,000 as of last week.

I could go through all of the accomplishments of last year. I don't think you want to here that. That is in the record of the larger statement. But I just wanted to give you a sense now.

From our perspective, unless Ambassador Negroponte tells us to change course, we will continue to implement our contracts that are in place and our programs and projects in the areas that I just mentioned on July 1st. The difference will be, we will revert to a traditional AID template in terms of how we actually do our operation.

This is not a normal operation, obviously, in Iraq. It's a massive operation, the most massive AID has been involved in since the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, where we actually got our start in reconstruction.

But we don't use strategic objectives now because there's one strategic plan for reconstruction the CPA has. We're part of that.

On June 30th, we will revert to the traditional system. We will have our own strategic plan, which is being written now, and we will function under what are called strategic objectives. Strategic objectives are implemented through contracts, grants, cooperative agreements and our staff using the budget that's given to us by OMB and the embassy. And that's what will happen July 1st.

NATSIOS: But we rebid all the contracts: 10 of the 11 contracts we started with before the war. We rebid them recently and they're three-year contracts. So in terms of our time horizon, our planning horizon now is three years.

We do have -- the NGO contracts or grants are about two years, but they can be annually renewed without any difficulty. They don't have to be rebid because of the nature of the contracts.

We will simply continue these projects.

If Ambassador Negroponte decides he wants us to undertake other activities, we will do that. There are four new activities we were given in the last few weeks by Ambassador Bremer. We're out to bid now on these projects. One of them is a very innovative thing in civic education to prepare the country for a democratic transition at the national level.

In any case, we will do as we're asked to do, and we will revert to our traditional mission structure in reporting relationships to the ambassador.

Thank you.

LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Natsios.

The extent of that work really does need to be illuminated. You have done a good job, at least in outlining that today. And all of your testimony will be a part of the record for each of one us to study and to understand how much is already proceeding, but likewise the relationship with the new government.

Secretary Rodman?

STATEMENT OF

PETER RODMAN,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

RODMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend the chairman and the ranking member of the committee on the timeliness of this hearing and on the importance of the subject matter.

I also should take the opportunity to commend my colleagues at the State Department, my Defense Department colleagues for what I do believe is a very smooth transition. We're working together. There are always bureaucratic issues to resolve, but I think this is an unusually successful example of cooperation.

Senator Biden was hoping to stimulate some fireworks between State and Defense. I guess I should try to accommodate him, but on this I have to say it won't be as easy to do as he may believe.

The point I did want to stress, if I may, Mr. Chairman, is just to say why the June 30th transfer of sovereign authority is so important.

Of course, first of all, it shows that we're keeping our promise. It symbolizes that we came there as liberators not as occupiers. It is important, as I think everyone recognizes, to end the occupation as such as soon as possible.

In addition, it adds to the incentive for the Iraqis to step up to their responsibilities. As long as CPA is in charge of everything, we see the Iraqis, you know, hanging back a little bit. But we see the value of this deadline because it has brought Iraqis forward. It has given us, I think -- increased our ability to find good people and give them the responsibility when the day comes.

But more than that, it's really at the heart of our strategy. Our strategy is not just a military strategy, it's a political strategy. The collapse of the old regime left a vacuum, and the essence of our strategy is to fill that vacuum with Iraqi institutions -- to help the Iraqis build their own new institutions: political, economic, security institutions.

RODMAN: First of all, it empowers the moderates in getting the Iraqi moderates in charge to the maximum degree is precisely -- it's the way you marginalize the extremists politically while the coalition is out there trying to hunt down the extremists militarily. So it really is at the heart of what we're doing.

And the validity of it I would say is confirmed by the famous Zarqawi letter that you're familiar with. This is the message sent by Mr. Zarqawi that we intercepted a number of weeks ago -- a message he was sending to his Al Qaida colleagues.

And one of the things he dwelt on in that message was how big a problem June 30th was for him. He said, "Once democracy is there, we have no pretext. How do we get Iraqis to attack their own brothers and cousins once the Americans have stepped back?"

So he seems to think this strategy of ours is an effective one. He and his colleagues are doing everything they can to derail it. And I dare say that so far they have not succeeded in derailing it.

So this political process is crucial to our overall strategy. That's why I believe we have to pursue it, which is why we have to make that transfer of authority a success. That's the one point I wanted to make. Thank you.

LUGAR: Thank you very much, Secretary Rodman.

The committee will go into questions and answers now and we'll limit our first round to 10 minutes each.

I'll commence the questioning by raising three questions to you, Secretary Grossman, to amplify your testimony in these ways. And I'll ask all three questions so that you can comprehensively fill in the interrelationships.

First of all, will the Iraqi government -- the officials that are to be named by Ambassador Brahimi after consultation, are we confident that they will accept the transition law that you have pointed out and the timetables?

LUGAR: In other words, you've suggested that not much legislation really is contemplated. The group of consultative persons will be just that to the president and the prime minister and the two vice presidents, and they will have ministries and administrative authority.

But nevertheless, as you are pointing out, we are transferring sovereignty. It is, after all, their government at that point and they did not adopt -- the governing council before them has adopted this transition plan including the bill of rights and various other aspects of this that we found very commendable.

So my first question is the degree of certainty about the timetable the transition law: Can we count upon that being the rules of the game and the framework during this period as you prepare for the elections?

And secondly, to what extent is a status of forces agreement required?

You've pointed out General Myers' testimony about the importance of a partnership between the new Iraqi government and the armed forces of the United States and the coalition. And that surely common sense would dictate that security has to be provided for some time by the United States and coalition forces, even as Iraqis are trained for the police and civil guard and their army.

But, once again, sovereignty comes July 1. It's a new government. They have a president of Iraq, a prime minister, two vice presidents. And it's conceivable that from time to time they might have different ideas as to how security should be obtained or who ought to do what.

And furthermore, if there's not a status of forces agreement that -- which we've tried to think this through beforehand -- there could be divisions that become extremely injurious and hazardous to all the people who are involved in Iraq as well as our armed forces and diplomatic forces.

LUGAR: So I'm curious, once again, about how we pin down the status of forces situation.

And thirdly, you mentioned that our government is now thinking through, by ourselves and with others, the value of a United Nations Security Council resolution that brings recognition, legitimacy, some undergirding to these new arrangements -- that would include the security arrangements and the sovereign government arrangements that Ambassador Brahimi and others have come before -- and likewise offers grounds for other nations, who have either been reticent to participate, or some who want the resolution in order to continue participating, and suggested that might come just before or just after.

But would you fill in why the timing at that point, at the point that the resolution has to come after sovereignty occurs? Why might not that occur likewise in prudent preparation during the month of June, say?

I was heartened by your testimony -- I think it's a very important fact -- you mentioned that by mid-May a lot of the groundwork is going to be there. A lot of Americans, a lot of Iraqis, are to be a part of the diplomatic presence. And certainly, you've suggested that Ambassador Brahimi's plan, the naming of these four important officials, would occur by then.

So these are not unknown factors. So that's the basis of my first question: how do we know and when do we know?

So you're saying by mid-May. However, at that point, unless Ambassador Brahimi has been extraordinarily successful at touching all bases, there may be objections by some Iraqis to the people that are suggested. Or may be objections by the United States or by Great Britain or whoever. Now, how is all of that resolved?

One would say, "Well, after all, you have some time. If the nominations have come in May, and for some reason there's some extraordinary need to reconsult, why, you still have a few days to do that." That's far better than springing it all on July 1.

So you (inaudible) recognize that, and that has been the point of some of my tedious questioning: the need, really, for much of this to occur in May and June, for this massaging of all the players in the new drama. So that when the curtain opens on July 1, the participants are not only familiar with each other and their plans, but we've undergirded it with, if possible, a U.N. resolution, the status of forces, acceptance of the government, this timeline that would have legitimacy adopted, the bill of rights; all of this.

LUGAR: That would be very reassuring to Iraqis, to Americans, to the U.N., to anybody else looking in on this.

And it appears to me that, obviously, you've thought of all of these subjects and have illuminated really the plans, as you suggested today, plus very detailed planning on 500 positions, as you pointed out, that's available for the committee to examine, and that's important likewise, and some much more precise figure on how many Americans will be involved, how many Iraqis in the diplomatic side.

So let me ask for you to comment at least on these three questions: the timeline, the U.N. Security Council, the status of forces.

GROSSMAN: Yes, sir. Let me try to do all of those things.

We certainly agree with you that as much of this as can be accomplished, as early as possible, is obviously a good thing, for exactly the reason that you say, Mr. Chairman, which is that we should not be in a position, we don't want to be in a position on the 30th of June of turning on a light switch and having all of these things appear.

We would much rather be in a position, in terms of our embassy, in terms of our representation, and in terms of what the Iraqis are going to move forward with in an interim government to have, as you say, have practiced this a little bit.

And that's why I said to you, we are trying to have -- we will try to have what we might call a soft opening of our embassy a few weeks in advance so people have a chance to learn their roles and do what they're supposed to do.

And, you know, Mr. Brahimi in his press conference said as clearly as could that he was confident that it will be possible to form such a government in a timely manner during the month of May 2004.

And so I have seen nothing since he gave this press conference on the 14th of April to lead me to believe that that isn't true. And so we ought to be able, Mr. Chairman, to bring some of these lines together in the way that you wish.

Let me try to answer each of the questions as specifically as I can.

First, what happens, what about this interim government in relationship to the Transitional Administrative Law?

When Brahimi gave his press conference, he said that he had been in Iraq a few weeks, he had consulted widely, and he'd come to certain conclusions. And among the conclusions that he had come to was that it was possible under the Transitional Administrative Law, as it calls for, was to create an interim government.

And so I believe that the answer to your questions is, yes, is that this interim government, which will serve from the 1st of July to the end of December of this year -- I think there's a high degree of confidence that they will accept the Transitional Administrative Law.

And why do I say that? Because I would bet you -- and he'll have to speak for himself -- that as Mr. Brahimi went around to his consultations and starts to make his list of people who are going to be on this government and that he would recommend be on this government, I would imagine among the questions he would ask them would be, "Do you believe in the Transitional Administrative Law?

GROSSMAN: "Do you believe in the bill of rights? Do you believe in this timeline?" And I think that would be a prudent thing for him to do. And we'll see when he reports to the Security Council on Tuesday.

LUGAR: And hopefully listen to your testimony right now.

GROSSMAN: I hope so.

But I think of the things that you have asked me, I think there's a high degree of confidence that that answer is yes.

Second, when Ambassador Brahimi left Iraq on the 13th of April, he left behind some homework. And that homework was to Iraqis and to the CPA and to others, which was to start generating more lists of people; start talking to people: jurists, for example, people in the NGOs, people who are working with Andrew's people, others, the Iraqi Governing Council. So that when he arrives back in Iraq in the first week of May, there will have been generated a big conversation about who these Iraqis are that will fill these jobs.

And again, I think it's very interesting to read in his press conference that he believes -- he's optimistic about getting this job done in May for all the reasons that you say.

Second, in terms of the SOFA, here's what we have come to on the SOFA. We believe that for now, and certainly for the period until there is a transitional government, three documents really serve as a status of forces agreement.

First is the Transitional Administrative Law, and you've already been good enough to put that in the record that Article 59 of the transitional law talks about the relationship of the Iraqi armed forces to our armed forces and says specifically, in subparagraph C, that, "The elected transitional government shall have the authority to conclude a binding international agreement regarding the activities of the multinational force." And so part of this SOFA question is dealt with in the TAL.

The second part of the issues that are around the SOFA are from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 and, we believe, any subsequent U.N. Security Council resolution. I won't quote you from there but there's a paragraph, number 13, out of 1511, which we believe helps us in terms of status of forces.

And then finally, is what's called CPA Order 17, which lays out how our forces are operating in Iraq; whether -- their privileges and their immunities and their jobs. And we believe that the Transitional Administrative Law, Resolution 1511 and any subsequent resolutions, and CPA 17 will take us through the period until the end of this year.

You asked me, "What happens? You know, how do you work with this new government?"

GROSSMAN: And these are, obviously, questions that we are considering as well.

I think I'd go back to, kind of, a couple of basic points, which is that we are going to turn sovereignty over to Iraqis on the 1st of July.

In the security area, there's obviously going to be an arrangement that has to be made so that we are able to continue to provide security for Iraq.

And the reason I say that is that Iraqis want to have a certain kind of society and they can't get there without security. And they can't get there -- they can't create that security on their own. And so all through the Transitional Administrative Law and all through the other things that we're doing is this recognition that we are going to have to provide for security in Iraq for some time to come for Iraqi success.

And I believe that with General Myers' view of partnership, with Ambassador Negroponte on the ground, with the work that we are doing with the new Iraqi army, the security forces, the police, the civil defense corps and the border security patrol that -- the border security forces that this, that we are very confident that this can work out.

Now, is it perfect every time? Absolutely not. But we've done this before. We did this in Afghanistan. We did it in Bosnia. We do it around the world where we're dealing with places where there's an arrangement, armed security.

And in a sense it comes after the 1st of July to a question of diplomacy. Indeed, which is the ambassador of the United States of America, the commander of U.S. military forces and the people who are in charge of the sovereign government of Iraq.

Finally, to the question of the Security Council resolution, I appreciate what you say about the testimony. I've tried to lay out some of the elements in there. The reason we haven't made a decision about timing, Mr. Chairman, part -- I guess part of the reason is -- goes back to your first question, which is, it seems to me anyway, it makes more sense for a Security Council resolution to come after Ambassador Brahimi has finished his consultations and made some kind of decision or announcement.

And since I don't know what day that is, I can't give you a date for the Security Council resolution. But I think you can see, given the kind of elements that I've said would be in there, where it most like -- where it might most logically fall.

GROSSMAN: Because again, none of us -- and certainly I don't -- we don't want to be running around at midnight in New York on the 30th of June trying to get a Security Council resolution. That's something that ought to have been done to support this effort well before.

So we're working on these things, but we've got to -- I think Brahimi's effort has to be complete before there can be a Security Council resolution.

LUGAR: Well, I thank you very much for those responses.

Let me just say that when Ambassador Negroponte was nominated by the president, Secretary Powell was asked by our committee for help in doing our job. And I want to just acknowledge appreciation to Senator Biden, staff on both sides of the aisle and our committee for their work in preparation for a hearing next Tuesday. Likewise, the State Department for moving ahead through the paperwork that is required.

This is clearly an abnormal situation, and I think we all recognize that. And therefore, sometimes routines and things that we always take for granted are accelerated.

But it seems to most of us to be warranted and my prayer is that with the help of my distinguished friend from Delaware, we'll have a quorum next Thursday for a business meeting. It may be held somewhere in the Capitol, wherever we can find a quorum so that we can, in fact, by the 1st of May, and prayerfully the 29th of April, at least confirm on the part of our committee our work. Then we will move to the floor of the Senate and we will appeal to our colleagues, at least in this special instance, to confirm this ambassador.

And so this is the reasons -- and I spell all of this out because we have some obligations too. We've been calling upon you for timetables and so forth. It's reciprocal, and we are in this together. And I appreciate your cooperation and that of the secretary.

GROSSMAN: I appreciate that.

We certainly are doing everything we can to meet your timetable on Ambassador Negroponte's confirmation hearing. Secretary Powell told the senior staff today to get this done as quickly as possible. And so, we want to do our part.

LUGAR: Thank you.

Senator Biden?

BIDEN: Thank you very much.

Let me pick up where you left off with the status of forces agreement. And, Secretary Grossman, I understand the three documents you referred to as the basis for this agreement, and you made an analogy to Afghanistan and Bosnia with loose ends.

There's a big difference: In Afghanistan and Bosnia we had international involvement in a big way. We had U.N. resolutions. We had an international legitimacy that hung over. We had an interim government there that we, you, helped put together in Germany, but it had the major powers all buying into it. There is an international security force and NATO is in Afghanistan and in Bosnia. It's not even comparable in my humble opinion for the following reason.

What happens on September 7th when the prime minister and the two -- or what? -- one president and two vice presidents, et cetera -- what happens when there's another Najaf and/or in Karbala there is another major, major undertaking, one of the militia goes off the wall and our U.S. commander says, "We're going to take out Sadr. We're going to go in and take out whomever"?

And I predict to you what will happen with this government if it has any legitimacy, they'll say, "Do not go in there." Just like Sistani has said, "Don't -- don't go in and take out Sadr," because he can't afford to be seen as siding with an American force.

Does the government have the authority to say under this new agreement, "The United States of America, we do not authorize you to use forces inside the city of, bang"? What's the answer to that question?

GROSSMAN: Let me try to answer both questions.

In terms of Bosnia and Afghanistan, the reason I raised those, Senator, is that to say that we know how to deal with or have some experience in dealing with governments that have sovereignty but in which we have an arrangement on security. And I don't dispute any of the points that you've made, but my example was, sort of, a more specific one.

BIDEN: Well, no, here, let me just make sure because I have great respect for you. Let's make sure we don't just gloss over this.

The reason why you were able to have those arrangements is because there's an international blessing, international responsibility. The governments with which we are dealing were about to, with their people, look to, as they negotiated with us as to how to proceed diplomatically, the imprimatur of the United Nations as well as NATO forces and the European power. So therefore they weren't left hanging out there.

This time around, as a president of this transition government is going to be nakedly dealing with one person, again the United States of America, with no international imprimatur on this, at least as of now; maybe you're going to have a resolution asking for that.

And, look, it seems to me, Marc, the dilemma is this: Iraq is going to need a significant force in place for years to come to help them work through democratization and this transition. And as the president so eloquently said, he understands why they will chafe under occupation. There is no reasonable prospect -- and I will bet my career on it -- of us being able to stand up an Iraqi army and police force in the next six months, eight months or a year that will do anything other than be able to augment and work with oversight by a major international force doing the bulk of the work.

So what's going to happen is that on -- for this to work on June 30th, it seems to me, in a general sense, there has to be two things: one, that there has to be a maintenance of this massive force in Iraq, and, two, there has to be a meaningful change in the circumstance that the Iraqi people think they find themselves in.

But what they going to find? On July the 1st, they're going to wake up and there's going to be 160,000 American troops and an American ambassador pulling the strings.

I love your phraseology. You said, "When the American ambassador," -- where was that phrase about getting in the car? -- "When the American ambassador" -- this is an important. Excuse me for the digression here.

GROSSMAN: That's right at the end.

BIDEN: At the end.

GROSSMAN: I said he would, "get in his car and go call on...

BIDEN: Yes...

GROSSMAN: ... call on the president of the sovereign Iraq."

BIDEN: ... and that's exactly what's going to happen. The whole world's going to see it. The American ambassador's going to get in the car, and going to go call on the new president.

BIDEN: There's going to be 160,000 American forces out there, 140,000, whatever the number's going to be, and the American ambassador, when there's a problem, is going to get in his car and he's going to go speak to -- get in the car and go talk to the new transition government, whatever that form's going to take.

Now, how does that translate to the Iraqi people as they wake up in the morning thinking there's any transition? I mean, how is that reflect this notion that there is going to be some meaningful change in their circumstance, the average Iraqi? I mean, how does that take the American face off of this?

You know, it reminds me, at least with the CPA we had Bremer and we had Greenstock and we had other international diplomats in a room, and they all played some part. This is kind of like going from Clark Kent to Superman, you know? Clark Kent at least was dressed in his suit when he was in the CPA, everybody knew Bremer called the shots, but there was Greenstock and there are others. Now it's like Clark Kent taking off the suit and saying, "Now I'm the new super ambassador, I'm the proconsul."

I'm not being facetious.

GROSSMAN: I understand.

BIDEN: I mean, I'm very, very concerned about how this changes what the president acknowledges is the Iraqi chafing under occupation. What has changed in this June 30 arrangement?

GROSSMAN: I believe that a lot will change under the June 30 arrangement. And maybe we make a mistake, Senator, and maybe I make a mistake in focusing solely -- although very important -- but let's just stop focusing for just a moment on the security question.

BIDEN: Yes.

GROSSMAN: I'm not trying to put it aside.

BIDEN: No, I agree.

GROSSMAN: What will Iraqis see on the 1st of July that's different from today? They will see a minister of health. They will see a minister of transportation. They will see a minister of reconstruction. They will see all of those ministries.

BIDEN: All of whom will get in the car and drive to the ambassador and ask, "What can I do?"

GROSSMAN: Well, no, sir. Well, I don't think -- look...

BIDEN: Tell me how that's not going to happen.

GROSSMAN: I'll give you a good example. We've already transferred, the CPA has already transferred the ministry of health over to Iraqis, a couple of weeks ago. One of those things, you know, it doesn't get reported anywhere in the news.

BIDEN: Yes.

GROSSMAN: Saddam Hussein in his last year spent $16 million or $17 million on health, and they're now spending about $1 billion on health. The Iraqi ministry of health is now run by Iraqis, period, that's all. Jerry Bremer doesn't go there and tell them what to do. And on the 1st of July, all of those ministries will be run by Iraqis.

GROSSMAN: Iraqis will take control of the Development Fund for Iraq. It'll be their money. Iraqis will take control of the oil revenues. It'll be their money.

I don't debate you in the security area. But what I say to you is, is that in many, many, many other parts of Iraqi life there will be a very important Iraqi face on an Iraqi government.

And I'd say one more thing...

BIDEN: Sure.

GROSSMAN: ... and that is, is that there will also be an Iraqi/U.N. face on elections.

One of your questions was, Who runs the elections? I mean, the TAL says that this transitional authority will run the elections. They're going to need a lot of help from the United Nations. But that's another place where I think the Iraqis and the international community will do a lot.

And finally, you know, I know that people say, oh, they're only little numbers and they're from, you know, odd countries. But I don't think we ought to denigrate the contribution that the coalition makes here.

BIDEN: I wish you guys would stop this. No one's denigrating. This always happens. We talk about, you know when we say there's no real coalition. You guys always say, "Well, you're denigrating the Hondurans or you're denigrating..." I'm not denigrating. They're wonderful, brave soldiers.

But let's get something straight. They are hardly a blip on the screen of security. We have no major powers there. We have Great Britain there with what, 6,500 troops? The people in my state think Great Britain has 20,000, 30,000, 40,000, 50,000, 60,000 people. They got 6,500 troops there.

We got 140,000 Americans, 6,500 Brits, no Spaniards, the Polish minister on the way out says, whether it happens or not, we have to consider whether we pull out the Polish division. Hopefully, that will not happen. We have a minor little hemorrhage going on right now.

So come on. I mean a coalition is a coalition is a coalition. That's like me saying I'm going to have a baseball team where I'm going to play center field and I got eight other little leaguers on the team with me. Their average age is 8 years old. They're wonderful, brave kids. They'll turn out to be brave athletes.

But my goodness, I'm not denigrating any of these other nations. But I am putting in perspective the physical contribution they provide -- and it is de minimus. It is brave, honorable and noble where it's provided, but it is de minimus.

BIDEN: I mean, it's like this little game we play here. It's like when we had the hearings before we were going into Iraq. And Secretary Wolfowitz said to me, when I said there's going to be no Iraqi civil service to stand up -- remember that? We were going to stand up -- this Iraqi civil service was going to be stood up, remember that? And I was presumptuous enough to say there was no possibility of that.

And, "Oh, no. Are you suggesting, Senator, the Iraqi people aren't bright and competent and capable?" Give me a break.

All I'm trying to figure out is how do we get, in a circumstance where the Iraqi people look out there on a day-to-day basis and see, you know, something happened on June 30th here and this is no longer a U.S. occupation. That's all I'm trying to get at...

GROSSMAN: And I appreciate that. And all I can say is that I believe that in ministry after ministry, and relationship after relationship, with this interim government Iraqis will see an Iraqi face.

And further, I do hope, as I've testified, that there will be a new U.N. Security Council resolution. And as I've said in my testimony, that that Security Council resolution will invite other countries to participate.

BIDEN: Who's going to be the referee? Who's going to be the referee when there is a significant internal dispute? Right now in Afghanistan when that happened, what'd we do? You, under your leadership, State Department, got everybody together and said, "Boys, go back to the tent. This ain't going to work."

Who's going to send them back to the tent? Us? It wasn't us in Afghanistan. It was the international community. Who's going to say, "No, no, no, no, no," when Chalabi, if he's still around, cuts a deal with Sistani, which he will -- he's going to eat you guys alive, by the way -- cuts a deal that women no longer have the rights we thought they should have under the transitional agreement? Who's going to say, "Hey guys. Now wait a minute. You've got to go back in the tent and work this one out or go back to the meeting house or go back to" -- I wasn't being derogatory saying tent, literally that's what happened, you know. Who's going to say that, the American ambassador?

GROSSMAN: I think it'd be some combination of the American ambassador, and, as I say, once we have a new U.N. Security Council resolution which talks about an increasing role for the United Nations -- I don't mean to stick a name on it, because I don't know if it'll be Ambassador Brahimi, you know, but we hope...

BIDEN: So you envision there will be a U.N. figure, a prominent U.N. figure, not Brahimi, whoever, a prominent U.N. figure that's going to have a prominent, visible role in Iraq? Is that what you're thinking?

GROSSMAN: I don't know the answer to that question yet because the Iraqis haven't asked for it and Kofi Annan hasn't asked for it, as Secretary Powell has said on a couple of occasions. I know that in your speech...

BIDEN: Kofi Annan didn't ask for anything in Bosnia. He didn't ask for anything in Afghanistan. Let's get off this, OK? They're not going to ask for anything. We're the ones who have suggested it when we sit down with the other major powers and say, "How do we work this out?"

And, you know -- I will end, Mr. Chairman.

BIDEN: But the idea we're going to invite -- I assume Mr. Rodman is going to tell me we're going to invite NATO to participate. Right? That's what we're going to do? We're going to invite them.

RODMAN: We've already been talking to our allies about the future, about the next phase, the multinational force, after sovereignty, after the U.N. comes back in.

BIDEN: Have we sat down with them and said, "Look, NATO, we need your help, and this is what we would propose" -- which we did in Bosnia, we did in Kosovo, we did ultimately in Afghanistan. We said, "This is what we need, and this is what we propose, because we've been doing this for 50 years with you guys, and this is how it works."

Because you all know, but the public doesn't know in this little Kabuki dance we're having here, that's how it gets done. The way it gets done is the president of the United States authorizes the secretary of defense to pick up the phone and call General Jones and say, "General, as supreme allied commander, we'd like to see if you can put together a NATO force."

The general sitting behind you knows exactly how this works.

"We'd like you to put together a NATO force, and we'd like you -- and it should be along the following lines. Over here at DOD, we figured out this is the best way to do this. And it would be best if we had the following number of -- boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. We can only provide the following nine helicopters, because we had a fight over Afghanistan in providing four other helicopters, and we're going to do this..." And it's an American that does that. And we then go in and we have a plan.

Do we have a plan like that, or we going to sit down like President Carter -- like Secretary Vance did, when I was a part of a group convincing the president of the United States that we should lift the arms embargo in Bosnia. And what did Secretary Vance do? He want over to Europe and said, "You know, I think we should lift the arms embargo, what do you guys think?" Which was signal, "Don't worry, don't have to lift the arms embargo."

It matters how we do this. And I guess my time's long up. I just hope that somebody sitting there has made a firm decision: "We're going to get NATO involved, we have a specific game plan that we're going to try to sell NATO and work it hard to get it done." And if that's happening, I'd be overjoyed. It may be happening and you all aren't telling us.

But the idea, if we're going to wait for Kofi to ask us -- I spoke to Kofi yesterday for 10 minutes. He's not going to ask you. What he's going to do is find out what you want, what you're willing to give, what your plan is, and then'll find out whether he's willing to sign on. But he's not going to ask you, Marc.

LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Biden.

LUGAR: Senator Hagel?

HAGEL: Gentlemen, thank you for coming before the committee this morning and express our thanks to your colleagues for their service.

Secretary Grossman, could you explain what we are doing to enlist the support, involvement of Iraq's neighbors, our Arab allies, what roles are we asking them to play as we work toward a transition and beyond?

GROSSMAN: Yes, sir, Senator Hagel.

One of the reasons that the president sent Rich Armitage to the region last week was to do precisely that. He visited a number of Iraq's neighbors, and his messages were really three.

First, it's very important that they support this transition and the date of the June 30th and give all the support that they possibly can.

Second message was that they, as best they could, with the communities that are important to them, either Sunni or Shia -- that they also send messages to those communities that they needed to support the governing council now, the transitional government -- the interim government -- when it comes on the first of July. And those were obviously to those that are our allies.

We've also, as you know, Secretary Powell has sent a letter to the Syrian government saying it's very important that they pay attention to their border and to do all they can. And with the Iranians we have communicated as well that they have a responsibility, just like we do, to try to make sure that Iraq comes out right.

And so we've tried to be in contact with everybody in the neighborhood.

HAGEL: What additional roles do we foresee these Arab allies, Iraqi neighbors playing?

I understand what you've just said, what Rich Armitage is doing. It's important diplomatic outreach. But give us an example, if you can, where you could see more active involvement in Iraq from our Arab allies and Iraq's neighbors.

I'll come to you in just a minute, Mr. Secretary.

I suspect Secretary Rodman wants to talk about the security part of this, in which I'll welcome that.

But give me some tangible explanation, beyond what Rich Armitage is doing visiting the capitals, and that's important.

GROSSMAN: Right.

HAGEL: But what could we expect will be a follow-on -- a tangible follow-on from that?

GROSSMAN: Well, first, of course, is to make sure that countries in the region, especially the near neighbors, meet the obligations that they gave at the Madrid conference to contribute money.

Second would be to speak out, because I think it's very important that these countries speak out in favor of the Iraqi interim authority once it's established.

We would also look, as I say, I think quite important, and I don't want to put it aside, for them to speak to the various communities.

GROSSMAN: For example, if the countries in the region who had impact on the Sunni community inside of Iraq were to reach out to them and say, "You have a future here and you ought to get yourself organized politically, and you have to leave aside, you know, the people who are leading you to violence," all of those things would be extremely important.

So it's, sort of, physical resources, it's political resources and then, you know, I'd looked to Peter to see whether there were any military things that could be done.

HAGEL: Do you expect that, in fact, our Arab allies, Iraq's neighbors, will, in fact, do that