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OPENING STATEMENT OF JOSEPH
R. BIDEN, JR. REPERCUSSIONS
OF IRAQ STABILIZATION Hearing
Before the June 12, 2003
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses today. Last July and August, you and I held a comprehensive set of hearings on Iraq. One of the panels we convened was devoted to the subject of the regional context. In fact, Dr. Kemp testified on that panel. Clearly, the aftermath of hostilities in Iraq cannot be viewed in a vacuum. The ultimate success of our efforts to create a stable, representative government at peace with its neighbors will both influence and be influenced by the regional environment. A number of important American interests intersect in the Middle East – including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, the decades long goal of achieving Arab-Israeli peace, our nation’s dependence on energy supplies, and the glaring absence of democracy in the Arab world. For better or worse, the United States is now a Middle Eastern power. In fact, we are the pre-eminent power. With 150,000 troops in Iraq and alliances stretching across the region, we have deeply vested interest in seeing the Middle East evolve in a positive direction. We look to our witnesses today to help us identify the choices we face and to offer guidance on the larger strategic focus of American policy in the region. Are Iraq’s neighbors playing a constructive or destructive role? What objectives do the Syrians, Iranians, and Turks have? Could a different U.S. policy toward Iran have an impact on Iranian actions in Iraq? How would Iran react to an aggressive regime change policy? How would it respond to a policy of engagement? How will the composition of the next Iraqi government affect Iranian perceptions and behavior? More broadly, what should our policy be toward Iran? How should we conceive of security in the Persian Gulf? Should we expect to see the military competition between Iraq and Iran continue? How will the smaller states of the Gulf react to the new reality? Is it time to think of a new security architecture for the Gulf – if so, what would be its main elements? What is the best way to deal with Syria and get it out of the terrorism business and get it out of Lebanon? Can coercion alone work? Is there a credible alternative to the present regime in Damascus and how would that impact our interests? What is the best approach to take with respect to Saudi Arabia? What reforms can we realistically expect the Royal Family to take? What should our long-term posture be with respect to the Kingdom? Before the war we heard a great deal of discussion of the so-called “democracy domino theory.” I’d like to hear what impact our witnesses think the war has had on regional attitudes toward democracy. What is the best way to advance democracy throughout the region? I’d also like to hear the assessment of our witnesses regarding the reconstruction effort in Iraq. Ambassador Wisner chaired a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force that produced a first-rate planning document for post-Saddam Iraq. Ambassador Galbraith, who served on the Committee staff for several years, was recently on the ground in Iraq for three weeks. And Dr. Kemp has consulted closely with Europeans and Arabs on the Iraq issue. Where in your judgment could we be doing better? Have we done enough to involve our friends and allies in the reconstruction and peacekeeping effort? What sort of political process would you design for the post-conflict transition? There is a lot of ground to cover and I look forward to your testimony.
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