OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ

Hearing Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee

September 25, 2003

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOHN WARNER
A Senator from Virginia, and
Chairman, Armed Services Committee

WARNER: Good morning. The committee meets this morning to receive the testimony of Ambassador Paul Bremer, the presidential envoy to Iraq, and General John P. Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command.

And we extend to you a very warm welcome, Mr. Ambassador. While we may have differences among us with regard to policy issues, I think you're setting somewhat of a record in the United States Senate for the number of hearings and the appearances -- perhaps I should say the United States Congress. Monday, you appeared before a committee, three committees yesterday, three today, that's seven, plus I think three other briefings. But not only is it a reflection on the depth of knowledge that you have which you're sharing with the Congress, it's a reflection on the leadership -- I think leadership on both sides of the aisle of both houses that are trying to labor for the respective bodies and the Congress as a whole -- a body of fact on which we can hopefully proceed early next week to have a full and thorough debate and passage of this matter.

And General Abizaid, you've taken leave of your forces in Central Command, but the urgency of your appearance justifies that. And we commend you and those under you and your command.

ABIZAID: Thank you.

WARNER: Particularly their families here at home for the extraordinary courage and staying power that they've manifested throughout this.

So we're pleased to have both of you here today, together with Mr. Corlogis (ph). Mr. Corlogis (ph) has been ambassador plenipotentiary throughout this whole matter, and we welcome him.

The timeliness and importance of this hearing in the wake of President Bush's forceful speech to the United Nations on Tuesday cannot be overstated. The stakes, not only in Iraq but indeed Afghanistan, are enormous. The military victories -- and indeed they were military victories -- achieved by our armed forces they're not complete as yet. Certainly initial goals were achieved on the military side and we did that with coalition partners. We must now secure the advancements that have been made.

While America is watching this hearing and the other hearings, indeed the whole world is focused upon it. They're watching to see if America has the staying power to complete its mission. I feel we do. I know you, Ambassador, and I know you, General, likewise feel we do.

We've achieve these successes in a relatively short period. Saddam Hussein has been deposed, his ruthless regime deposed. And I have not heard anyone raise their voice to say we would be better off had we not done that.

We must, though, through deliberations and actions in the days ahead on President Bush's emergency supplemental request send another strong message of bipartisan resolve to our fellow countrymen here in America, to our troops, to our coalition partners, to the rest of the world.

WARNER: We'll stay the course and we'll get the job done.

It is part of the oversight responsibility of this committee to review ongoing military operations and other significant activities undertaken by the Department of Defense. This is the fifth hearing in a series of hearings this committee will conduct, along with countless briefings and updates we receive, to review the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom and to understand the challenge that lay ahead of us in the future operations.

The hearing is also part of a unique process. This week alone three Senate committees and a like number of House will conduct hearings on this subject and provide a body of fact for the Congress. This is, I think, unprecedented.

Twenty-four months ago, terrorists turned New York City and the Pentagon and a lonely field in Pennsylvania into battlefields, terrorizing all the world and forever changing our sense of security. War against terrorists and those who support them became essential. This nation, under the leadership of our president, responded, as did our coalition partners.

America didn't ask for this war, but we have acted appropriately to defend our nation and to prevent future terrorists from reaching our shores or from attacking our interests and friends abroad.

As the president stated so eloquently on September 14th, and I quote it, "And for America, there'll be no going back to the era before September 11th, to false comfort in a dangerous world. We are fighting the enemy in Iraq, in Afghanistan, so that we do not meet him again on our own streets here in USA."

The choices involved in prosecuting this global war have been difficult, and not all nations have agreed. But I applaud our president for reaching out as he has done this week and continues to do, not only in the United Nations but elsewhere. We invite their participation. If we, together with those who join us, succeed, we will have done this region of the world a whole change of direction toward freedom and some measure of democracy for the peoples.

The decision to confront Saddam Hussein was made not without careful deliberation, extensive diplomacy and substantial efforts to find a peaceful solution. By the time U.S. troops crossed into Iraq on March 19th, it had been the conclusion of three consecutive administration of our government, countless other nations and the United Nations, that Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime had used weapons of mass destruction, had threatened them against others in neighboring countries, and represented a clear and present danger to regional and world peace. It had been the conclusion of the Clinton administration that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, was actively seeking more and would ultimately use them.

WARNER: The United Nations Security Council passed 17 resolutions dating back to 1991, 12 years, which required full Iraqi cooperation in the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein's response was defiance, deception.

October 2002, after an unprecedented amount of debate, the Senate voted 77 to 23 to authorize the president to utilize force in Iraq. The House of Representatives also voted overwhelmingly in favor of authorizing the use of force. By that act, it became our war and the American people's war, not the president's war.

At this critical junction, it is our responsibility to continue to support the president in this operation which we overwhelmingly supported, and to provide the resources necessary for him to finish the job together with our coalition partners.

American armed forces, together with coalition partners, achieved extraordinary, rapid military success in Iraq with minimum casualties and damage. This is a clear tribute to the professionalism and the dedication of our young men and women in uniform and those who support them.

We have succeeded in ridding the world of a brutal tyrant and have revealed the extent of his barbarism. We should be congratulating our president and our armed forces on a job well done. And I so do this morning.

Despite the pockets of resistance in Iraq, that feeling of gratitude and good will toward the United States seems to grow. A Gallup poll conducted earlier this week found that 62 percent of Iraqis believe that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they have endured since the invasion, and two-thirds think Iraq will be better in condition five years from now before that invasion. And that will be a direct result of your efforts, Mr. Ambassador, and those of the armed forces of the United States under our military commanders and the coalition partners. We must build on this good will and seize this historic opportunity to help build a thriving democracy and ally against terror in Iraq.

American forces and coalition partners have already done a remarkable job restoring basic services. And I think if there's anything that's been understated, Mr. Ambassador, and you have that opportunity this morning, you had a plan. Do not be reserved in telling us, in your judgment, how closely you've achieved the goals of that plan.

You've ended ethnic violence, creating an environment where reconstruction can succeed. Most members of this committee have seen this with their own eyes, and the response of most members who have been to Iraq is concern for the good things that are taking place in Iraq and are not somehow getting that message out, not only to our people but to the Iraqi people.

This reconstruction work is being done in a difficult environment of harsh conditions and significant risks. Those who've been removed from power seek to delay their inevitable defeat and, as terrorists, lash out.

We're ever-mindful of the risk of our forces, General Abizaid, every day and the sacrifices made by their families and communities that support them. What is the best way to reduce U.S. casualties and create better conditions for eventually withdrawing our forces? That's the question before this committee.

WARNER: In my judgment, the key is to improve the security situation in Iraq by restoring essential services, recruiting and training dependable Iraqi security forces, and repairing the infrastructure so that real economic growth opportunity can once again grow.

The emergency supplemental request before this body of $87 billion submitted by President Bush specifically addresses that goal. That is why it merits our support.

It is imperative that we give our president and our troops the resources they need to complete their missions both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The faster money gets to these sources, the faster conditions will improve and the faster our troops will have the opportunity to come home.

And I hope you, with specificity, address as best as you can the schedules that you contemplate as it regards this particular bill and the monies in it.

Lasting peace and security will be achieved when we establish the environment for a democratic, economically viable Iraq. The first steps to democracy have been taken, and a fledgling government is preparing itself to assume the responsibilities of sovereignty.

Senator Levin and I and other senators had the opportunity earlier this week to meet with two ministers: one in charge of electricity, the other water; both vital to this infrastructure. I, myself, say I was greatly impressed with the credentials of their background and professional training. One had left his family, as so many -- you, yourself, and other members of your team have left your families and literally volunteer to let this nation once again take its rightful place in the world community.

So I commend them, and I commend you.

You will talk today about the Marshall Plan, which brought peace and prosperity to a war-ravaged continent. I think that's an important historical precedent. The modest investment has been repaid hundred times more. The funding we are now being asked to provide is an equally important investment that will likewise be repaid many times over in the decades to come.

You have my support. I wish you well.

Senator Levin?

OPENING STATEMENT OF

CARL LEVIN
A Senator from Michigan, and
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me join you in welcoming Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid, to our committee this morning. We appreciate what you and those who work with you, particularly those on the ground in Iraq, are attempting to do at great personal risk and under very different and difficult circumstances.

It's clearly in our national interest for democracy and stability to be successful in Iraq. For this to happen, the stabilization and reconstruction effort needs to become much more of an international effort. Achieving this will lower the risk to our military personnel both by sharing that risk and by changing the nature of the effort from a U.S.-dominated occupation, where the United States is identified and visible as the target, to an internationally-supported transition to a new Iraqi government.

Internationalizing the effort is also the only way that the cost of reconstruction can be shared with other countries so that the burden is not carried so exclusively by U.S. taxpayers.

LEVIN: And we will be able to leave Iraq sooner, rather than later, the sooner that we internationalize the effort.

Recent experiences in other settings illustrate that point. In Bosnia, for example, the 1,800 U.S. troops constitute approximately 15 percent of the 12,000 total NATO stabilization force and the police task force, to which we contributed financial and with manpower, has now been replaced by a European Union police mission.

In Kosovo, the roughly 3,000 U.S. troops make up about 11 percent of the 27,000 total NATO-led Kosovo force and the U.N. mission in Kosovo runs the civilian side of the effort there. The United States pays only 25 percent of the costs for the U.N. mission and the European Union carries most of the burden of reconstruction.

While I was pleased that President Bush went to the United Nations this week, I was disappointed that the president seemed to so severely limit the possible role of the U.N. in Iraq to assisting, quote, "in developing a constitution and training civil servants and conducting free and fair elections," close quote.

In the aftermath of other conflicts, and even at times when as in Iraq the conflict was continuing, the United Nations has been responsible for post-conflict reconstruction, for the conduct of civil administration, for the supervision of civil administration and for executive responsibility for police and the judiciary.

A number of nations have made it clear to us for months that their willingness to provide troops for Iraq or to contribute financially to Iraq's reconstruction depends on the United Nations being given a key role in Iraq.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan told me earlier this month when I met with him in New York, that the United Nations will need to have broad functions in the reconstruction in political development effort, if we are going to have a realistic hope of persuading other key countries to join in the effort.

The president's apparent reluctance to grant a meaningful decision-making role for the U.N. in Iraq's reconstruction means, I fear, that we will not succeed in acquiring the troops and financial resources from other countries that we seek.

LEVIN: What is necessary is not just a vague U.N. resolution of support, but a resolution assuring real power-sharing with the international community over the civil administration and reconstruction effort that results in additional nations, including Muslim nations, joining this effort.

There are a great many other very serious issues that Congress must address concerning the administration's $87 billion supplemental request. Some are life-and-death issues affecting how long our troops will be in Iraq and at what risk. Some will have a long-term impact on our taxpayers and on our deficit. Others are transcendent issues, relative to how a democratic nation can be built and sustained in Iraq in the current circumstances.

There is no reasonable way that these issues can be adequately thought through, much less properly worked through, by next week, as the majority leader currently plans, despite urgent and repeated requests by the Democratic leadership and Democratic members for additional hearings. We take months to consider far less significant matters. The massive and unprecedented $87 billion request has been before us for just two weeks.

Some have compared the Iraq reconstruction effort to the Marshall Plan that led to the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In fact, the differences between the current proposal and the Marshall Plan are dramatic. For instance, the Marshall Plan required countries receiving assistance to contribute a matching amount to their own reconstruction and also included loans that were eventually paid back. Neither of these important requirements are present in the Iraqi reconstruction request of the administration.

There is one aspect in which the Marshall Plan analogy can be helpful. When the legislation went to the floor of the Congress, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of the architects of our bipartisan World War II foreign policy, called the Marshall Plan, quote, "The final product of eight months of more intensive study by more devoted minds than I have ever known to concentrate on any one objective in all my 20 years in Congress," close quote.

Well, we don't need to study the request before us for eight months, but we certainly owe it to the people that we represent, to our military members serving overseas in harm's way and to the institution in which we serve to give the $87 billion request more than a two-week, slap-dash, lick-and-a-promise review.

LEVIN: When it comes to the portion of the supplemental request which supports our troops there should be no issue: Our troops must be and they will be supported.

But when it comes to the request for tens of billions of dollars for the building of an Iraqi nation the answers, and indeed the questions, are far more complex.

Should a time line be established for Iraqis to assume responsibilities for their own safety and security? What are the administration's goals for Iraq's economic reconstruction? What are the time line and costs to meet those goals, including a detailed plan for the restoration of basic services, an estimate of the cost and percentage to be born by the United States and the percentage to be born by other countries?

What is the time line to meet the administration's goals for Iraq's political reconstruction, including the adoption of a constitution, the holding of elections and the establishment of an elected government with broad public support?

What is the likelihood that the administration will be able to assemble a broad international coalition to address the military, economic and political needs of Iraq and how does that affect the need for the $87 billion request before us?

And why shouldn't Iraq invest more in its own future by pledging some of its future oil revenues to the building of its nation? Put more bluntly, isn't it essential that the people of Iraq want to become a unified and secure nation badly enough that they are willing to make that pledge and that financial commitment now, to help raise funds now for reconstruction costs and not simply be the recipient of financial assistance? Would it not be an important step toward independence and self-reliance for the Iraqis to make the same pledge of their fortunes that the founders of our nation made in 1776?

And how do we ensure competition in awarding contracts for reconstruction projects and transparency in budgeting and expenditure of U.S. taxpayers funds?

These and many other questions need careful and thoughtful consideration by the Congress. Getting answers to probing questions on the reconstruction funds is not aimed at shirking our responsibility, but at fulfilling our responsibility.

LEVIN: That is what our constituents send us here to do. That is the job that they expect us to do. And there is no way we can do that job properly in two weeks.

The issue is not whether we are willing to spend enough to defend America; of course, we all are. The issue is whether the huge amount requested for an American reconstruction effort, doled out by an American administrator, an effort that will be seen in some parts of the world as perpetuating an American occupation of Iraq, will make our troops more or less secure and make their job of stabilizing Iraq more or less difficult.

We have expended huge amounts of blood and treasure already. Will the additional $87 billion requested by the administration, effectively reduce our future sacrifice or will it be lost in a deepening and downward spiral of civil disorder and chaos?

I hope that thoughtful congressional consideration of this reconstruction request can lead to sharing the burden with other countries who will benefit from a secure and democratic Iraq and to reducing the risk of American troops being drawn more and more deeply into a jihad-type guerrilla war against Western occupiers. We should take the time to do this right and to do it on a bipartisan basis. These times and the threats surely call for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Senator Levin, thank you. I'd like to ask the committee if we could digress for a moment, that we have a quorum, because we have a number of promotions relating to the armed forces of the United States.

I observe a quorum now present. I ask the committee, first, to consider the nomination of Gordon R. England to be secretary of the Navy. His nomination has been before the committee the required length of time and no objection has been raised regarding it. We had a thorough hearing on Tuesday. Is there a motion? So moved.

(UNKNOWN): Second.

WARNER: All in favor, say aye.

Opposed?

Next, I ask the committee to consider a list of 5,552 military nominations. Again, no objection has been raised among the committee members regarding these noms.

However, I must inform the committee that 705 of these appointments, all for officers below the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral lower half, were not received by the committee until September 22nd, due to the federal government being closed last week. Under the committee's seven-day rule, these 705 officers would not be eligible for consideration unless the committee provided the waiver.

Monday, in my view, would be not fair for the promotion of any of these officers to be delayed, when they would have been eligible had we not had the storm conditions. Therefore, I ask that we now waive the seven-day rule with regard to those nominations.

LEVIN: So moved.

(UNKNOWN): Seconded.

WARNER: All in favor, say aye.

Opposed?

The full slate of nominations have now been acted upon favorably by the committee.

WARNER: I thank my colleagues very much.

Listening to not only the comments this morning by us, but there's a chapter in history that always interests me about the Marshall Plan. Truman is reputed to have said that he was concerned that Congress would not pass this plan and he turned to George Marshall and he said, "Let's name it the Marshall Plan; it'll go through." Perhaps we should refer to this as the Abizaid plan.

Here we go. Mr. Ambassador, would you lead off?

STATEMENT OF

AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER III,
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority

BREMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear on behalf of the president's supplemental.

Before I begin, I, like you, Mr. Chairman, want to pay tribute to the fine young men and women in our armed forces who led a coalition to a military victory without precedent. In roughly three weeks, they defeated an enemy larger than -- defeated a country larger than Germany and Italy combined, and they did so with forces smaller than the Army of the Potomac, a point I make with all respect to the chairman for bringing up memories.

(LAUGHTER)

WARNER: I hear you.

BREMER: Mr. Chairman, I know that you, like all members of Congress, hate to wake up to the news that another American service man has been killed in Iraq. These deaths are painful. I hear about them often before you do, because I'm eight time zones ahead of you.

The deaths, although they're painful, are not senseless. They are part of the price we pay for fighting for civilization, for being part of a world that refuses to tolerate terrorism and genocide and weapons of mass destruction.

Those who ambush coalition forces, who set truck bombs and who assassinate people like the deceased member of the governing council are trying to thwart constitutional and democratic government in Iraq. They will win some battles, Mr. Chairman, but they're going to lose their war with history.

President Bush's vision for Iraq envisages an Iraq that is secure through the efforts of the Iraqis. It provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles and bolstered by a reliable infrastructure. And finally, the president's plan provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date.

The stakes couldn't be higher. If we fail to recreate Iraq as a sovereign democracy sustained by a solid economy, we will have handed the terrorists a gift. We must deny terrorists that gift of state sponsorship, which they enjoyed under Saddam, and we must deny them the chaos, such as they thrived on in the 1980s in Lebanon.

Creating a sovereign, democratic, constitutional and prosperous Iraq deals a blow to terrorists. It gives the lie to those who describe us as the enemies of Islam, the enemies of Arabs or the enemies of the poor. That's why the president's request has to be seen as an important part of the global war on terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, many of you have pointed out our national experiences teaches us how to consolidate military victory. This is a lesson we did not learn at the end of the First World War. Many here opposed that war and wanted to solve problems at home. We won the war, but we did not consolidate the peace. And we know what price we paid: Extremism bred in a swamp of despair, bankruptcy and unpayable debts gave birth to a world of fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany and another world war.

After that conflict, America showed that we had learned that military victory must be followed by a program to secure the peace. In 1948, America's greatest generation responded with the boldest, most generous and most productive act of statesmanship in the last century: the Marshall Plan.

BREMER: When George Marshall first described the Marshall Plan at Harvard, he laid out some truths that resonate anyway to me today. He said, and I quote, "Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy, so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist -- the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

The Marshall Plan, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support by this Congress, set war-torn Europe on the path to the freedom and prosperity which Europeans enjoy today. After a thousand years as the cockpit of war, Europe became the cradle of peace in two short generations. A similar opportunity for transforming the region lies before us in Iraq.

The grants to Iraq the president seeks bespeaks a grandeur of vision equal to the one that created the free world at the end of the Second World War. Iraqis living in freedom with dignity will set an example in this troubled region which so often spawns terrorists. A stable, peaceful, economic, reproductive Iraq will serve American interests by making Americans safer.

I'd like to make just a few points about the supplemental request. We do have -- in response to several comments, we do have a definite plan with milestones and dates.

Second, no one part of this supplemental is more important than any other part. It is an integrated request.

Thirdly, this request is urgent. The urgency concerning military operations is self-evident, but the funds for nonmilitary action in Iraq are equally urgent.

Most Iraqis welcomed us as liberators. And as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, a just-released Gallup poll shows that almost two-thirds of the Iraqis continue to say that getting rid of Saddam makes the sacrifices of the war and the aftermath worthwhile.

Even so, the reality of foreign troops on the street is understandably chafing. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but faster progress on reconstruction can help stem the tide.

The link to the safety of our troops is indirect but real. It is true that the people who ambush our coalitions are small in number, and they're not ambushing us because they don't have adequate electrical power. But the population's view of the United States and the coalition is directly linked to their cooperation in hunting down those who attack us and giving us, in a word, good intelligence. Early progress on restoring basic infrastructure gives us an edge against the terrorists.

This money will be spent with prudent transparency. In answer to the question that Senator Levin raised, every contract of the $20 billion requested for Iraq will be competitively bid.

Mr. Chairman, I know there's been some talk of granting some parts of this as a loan. Initially, this may appear attractive, but once again I'm afraid the facts and historic experience intrude.

The facts are that the Iraqi people have a debt of more than $200 billion hanging over them, a debt incurred by Saddam's economic incompetence and by his wars of aggression against his neighbors. $200 billion. They cannot pay that debt. They can't even service it. And it makes no sense to lay more debt on top of them. Again, a lesson we should have learned from the aftermath of the First World War.

The president's first priority in this supplemental request is security and it has three elements, most of which you and the other members heard about when you came to visit in July.

First, public safety: money for the police to get a professional, well-trained police respectful of human rights on board; funds for border police and border enforcement.

Secondly, a national defense element, which involves standing up a new Iraqi army as quickly as we can, and a civil defense system.

And thirdly, a justice system, so that when criminals are caught there are courts and prisons to look after them.

BREMER: This security assistance benefits the United States in four concrete ways.

First, the Iraqis will be more effective collecting the important intelligence than we can be. As talented and courageous as coalition forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, who knows his people, their customs, their language and their rhythms. Iraqis have asked repeatedly to play a greater role in providing their security and we agree; they should.

Secondly, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace coalition forces in some of the roles that generate frustration, friction and resentment: things like conducting searches, manning check points and guarding installations.

Thirdly, this freezes up coalition forces for the mobile, sophisticated, offensive operations against former regime loyalists and terrorists for which they are best suited.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, building up these new Iraqi forces reduces the overall security demands on coalition forces and can speed up the day when we can bring our troops home.

Security, of course, is indispensable, but it's not enough. A good security system cannot persist on the knife edge of economic collapse.

Saddam left behind an economy ruined, not by our attacks, but by decades of neglect, theft and mismanagement. In 35 years, he never once prepared a national budget. The Iraqis must fashion their economy from the Soviet-style command economy Saddam left behind. That poor model was further hobbled by cronyism, theft and pharaonic self-indulgence by Saddam and his intimates.

Members of the committee saw a number of the palaces in Baghdad. I can tell you those palaces exist in every single city in the country.

The good news is that important changes have already begun on the economic front. As many of you know, on Sunday, at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF in Dubai, the minister of finance announced a bold and sweeping set of economic reform programs: the most open program for a foreign direct investment of any country in the region; a new central bank law which establishes complete independence for the central bank; a tariff policy which is simple, it's zero, except for a temporary, two-year, 5 percent tariff, called a reconstruction tariff, to raise funds for the Iraqi government.

On October 15th, we will introduce a new currency to Iraq. For the first time in 20 years, there will be a unified currency. That currency will float against the world's currencies.

Mr. Chairman, the Iraqi government, by taking these steps, has put in place the legal infrastructure necessary to create a vibrant private sector. But those policies will come to nothing if they don't rest on a sound economic infrastructure in a reasonable security environment.

BREMER: We've made significant progress in restoring these essential services. The widely predicted humanitarian crisis did not occur. There was no major flow of refugees.

You spoke about our plan, Mr. Chairman. All 240 hospitals and 90 percent of its health clinics are open today. All of the schools finished their school year. All 22 universities in Iraq held final exams in late May and early June, despite the difficult circumstances, and they will reopen again in a few weeks.

There is an adequate food supply, and there is no evidence of epidemic. We have cleared thousands of miles of irrigation canals. Electric service will reach pre-war levels within a month.

But there are remaining demands that are vast, and that is why most of the president's non-military, non-security assistance is focused on critical infrastructure.

The third major element of our overall strategy is to move toward a democratic Iraq, and here too, Mr. Chairman, there's good news. We have laid out a seven-step process for Iraq to return to full sovereignty through elections. Three of the seven steps have already been taken.

Governing council took office on July 13.

Second step was then when they appointed a committee to make recommendations to them on how to write a constitution.

The third step was the appointment of the cabinet on September 2nd. You met, and some others met, two of the very impressive members of this cabinet when they were here earlier this week.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, that an Iraqi friend pointed out to me last week that this is the best educated, most qualified cabinet in Iraq's history. And as I probed a bit, I learned that 17 of the 25 cabinet members have Ph.D.s, which makes them probably the best educated cabinet anywhere in the world.

And these are not just Ph.D.s in subjects like I'm an expert in history, these are Ph.D.s that actually, really count. The minister of agriculture is a professional agronomist. The minister of water resources is a hydrologist. The minister of electricity, whom you met, has had almost 30 years experience running power companies. They are a very competent group of people and they have lots of responsibility.

The remaining steps on the path to Iraqi independence and sovereignty are to write a constitution -- we hope a constitutional convention will be convened shortly, in the next month or so.

That constitution will have to be ratified by the Iraqi people; the fifth step.

The penultimate step will be holding of free elections.

And finally, the seventh step is when the Coalition Provisional Authority hands sovereignty back to the Iraqi people. And no one looks forward to that day more than I do, except perhaps my wife.

Some, including a few members of the Iraqi Governing Council, suggest we should give full sovereignty to an Iraqi government immediately or anyway very soon.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that such haste would be a mistake and so do the Iraqi people. The same Gallup poll I cited earlier shows that 85 percent of the people of Baghdad believe that an immediate departure of coalition forces would lead to chaos.

And no appointed government, even one as honest and dedicated as the Iraqi Governing Council, can have the legitimacy necessary to take on the difficult issues the Iraqis face as they write their constitution, elect a government and, I might add, undertake a major economic reconstruction effort.

The only path to true Iraqi sovereignty is through a written constitution, ratified and followed by free democratic elections.

BREMER: Shortcuts are potentially dangerous.

As you examine the president's plan, as I hope you will, I am sure you'll see that every part is connected to the others. The need to protect the coalition and the Iraqi people alike against terrorists and common criminals is obvious. The United States must take the lead in restoring Iraq as a friend and democratic model.

There is, as you have mentioned, a donors' conference in Madrid in late October. And we, the United States, must set the example before then and work to show that we must avoid together the near anarchy in which terrorists will feel right at home.

Mr. Chairman, make no mistake, these requested funds represent an investment in America's national security. If, after coming this far, we turn our backs and let the Iraq lapse into factional chaos, we will have sewn the dragon's teeth which will sprout more terrorists and eventually cost more American lives in Iraq or even here at home.

You may think I exaggerate. But I ask you to look at what happened in Afghanistan, another country which, after it was debilitated by decades of war and mismanagement, became easy prey to the Taliban and Al Qaida.

The reconstruction of Iraq may seen distant from American concerns today. Eight time zones and two continents separate where we are in the East Coast from Iraq. The West Coast is effectively half a world away. But Iraq only seems far away.

Today Iraq has become a focal point in the global war on terrorism -- a point I make with some trepidation because it means we are on the front line of the global war on terrorism. But failure there would strengthen terrorists morally and materially.

And, Mr. Chairman, I think you said in your opening remarks, it is extremely important for the world to understand that we have the staying power to see this through. All of this requires the combined support of the American people and of both parties in Congress. This is a large, serious, important and urgent matter. It must be done quickly, and it must be done well.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I look forward to answering your questions in support of this request.

WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for a very thorough and strongly delivered statement, with your own personal conviction resonating every sentence.

General Abizaid?

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID,
United States Army Commander of CENTCOM

ABIZAID: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. It's an honor to be here. It's an important opportunity to testify before you.

As you know, CENTCOM stands at the center of the global war on terrorism. We're at the heart of it. We've got over 200,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that are out there serving in the east, all the way from Kyrgyzstan, to the west in the horn of Africa.

They've had important tactical success in the past two years on the broader global war on terror. And they have, in conjunction with friendly nations in the area, done much to help defeat and disrupt the terrorist threat.

But there's much work that needs to be done in that broader war. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, our troops are involved in combat operations to attain stability.

In Iraq, our focus continues to be that of increasing Iraqi security capacity, looking for opportunities to integrate international forces into the coalition, building a stronger intelligence system to enable us to get actionable intelligence against the various enemies that we face there, building the infrastructure and working an information campaign that tells the Iraqi people what we are doing, why we are doing, in order to bring them more strongly to the side of the coalition.

ABIZAID: I've said on numerous occasions, and I know all of you know it, there is no strictly military solution to the problems in Iraq. We must move together, hand in hand with the Coalition Provisional Authority and Ambassador Bremer. We must synchronize the power of the United States government in diplomatic, economic and political measures, along with the military, in order to achieve success.

Our young people are capable and they're confident. Much is made of my father's generation being the greatest generation, but I will tell you the next-greatest generation is out there serving in the Central Command area and fighting and winning, and representing the American people in an absolutely outstanding manner. Their work will continue to be difficult, and it will continue to be dangerous. We will need both patience and courage to see the mission through.

Likewise, the Iraqi people have shown great courage. Many of them serve with us day after day to make their country a better place. They have put their lives on the line in the battlefield, and they continue to show optimism about the future.

This battle for Iraq is a battle of moderation versus extremism. We've got to give Iraqis a chance to succeed. This supplemental is about giving our troops, the great people that work in the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqis the tools necessary to succeed.

Mr. Chairman, it's an honor to be here. I look forward to your questions.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

Colleagues, it would be the desire of the chair to try and achieve two rounds of questioning. We'll start with five minutes each on the...

PROTESTER: (OFF-MIKE)

WARNER: Would the uniformed officers secure the room, please?

PROTESTER: (OFF-MIKE)

WARNER: For those who may be interested, a similar incident occurred with this individual yesterday, so we were prepared for this.

I'd like to do five minutes a round in the fervent hope that we can achieve two rounds for all of our members. And I urge the clerk to talk to the chair and make sure I stay within the five minutes. But I'd like not to be charged for that outburst.

(LAUGHTER)

ABIZAID: Actually, it makes the ambassador and I feel right at home.

(LAUGHTER)

WARNER: First, Ambassador Bremer, each time I listen to you I develop a greater respect for your professionalism and the team that you're with, recognizing so many of them have been uprooted very quickly. And like the men and women of the armed forces, you're all volunteers. And well done to you and indeed those of the coalition with whom you work.

WARNER: And on that point, I'd like to start off. The perception is given that this money will be under the control, adopted by the Congress, of yourself. But my understanding is that, each day, other departments and agencies of our government, and indeed the coalition partners, have a very strong voice in how these funds are utilized.

Would you address that point?

BREMER: Yes, that's correct. Mr. Chairman, I have on my coalition staff now representatives of 17 other countries. I have representatives from 15 executive branches here from Washington. And there are more coming. It is very much an integrated effort by not only the United States government but also coalition governments.

WARNER: Good.

On the question of the discussion by many and, I must say, well- intentioned members of Congress, with regard to structuring some type of security for the $21.3 billion part of this budget request, I personally think -- I don't know that there's a real precedent in history. I would hope that we could do further research on the comments made by my distinguished colleague about the Marshall Plan and whether portions of that had some security interest.

But what concerns me is, number one, you pointed out the first part, the debt now owed Iraq, their total inability for the foreseeable future to do anything about that. There is no legal structure in Iraq by which it could be a borrowing authority, in my understanding, until the constitution is adopted, the election is held.

But perhaps the most disturbing potential problem is that we would play into the hands of those who have repeatedly, since day one, said the coalition forces are not there for peace, it is not there to allow democracy to begin, they are there to seize the oil.

Do you share that view?

BREMER: Yes, I do. And the oil revenues are a sensitive subject in Iraq, quite understandably. It is the major source of government revenues.

And in the new foreign direct investment law, which the Governing Council asked me to sign a week ago today, they have explicitly excluded foreign investment in the oil sector for now, until they have an elected government which can decide how they want to proceed with oil.

BREMER: And I think we have to be respectful of that political sensitivity.

WARNER: But there's been a unique partnership between your organization and that of the coalition military headed up by General Abizaid. Let's just have a frank assessment: Is that working?

BREMER: Yes, sir, it is unique, because the challenge of stabilizing Iraq after the war is a challenge of bringing together the civilian capabilities and the ongoing military capabilities in a way that is really require challenging.

The commander of the joint task force in Iraq, General Sanchez, has colocated his headquarters with mine. Each of us have as our first meeting of the day meeting together to discuss the plans for what happened overnight, what the plans for the day are.

It is a totally integrated operation. All of the public affairs people who work for the military, for example, work under my direction.

WARNER: Do you share those views, General Abizaid?

ABIZAID: Sir, I was the person that said to General Sanchez, "Move your headquarters and colocate with Ambassador Bremer."

WARNER: Let me throw out an idea that indeed I read a good deal about and done some of my own study. I see the presence of Dr. Walter Slocombe here, who has been before this committee many times, and I commend him and his team for what they're doing to try and construct a security arrangement, drawing up on former Iraqi military and the likewise.

Are you giving consideration to perhaps utilizing this force earlier than anticipated as a part of the integrated security to augment the police?

The problems that I see and others are that our soldiers do not have the language capabilities; maybe some have fragments. There's always the presence of a U.S. uniform facing the disparate elements that threaten them.

Would it not be better if quickly you could put together from the remnants of their former military -- and perhaps other sources -- an Iraqi force to go out and we change roles; rather than the occasional Iraqi being an adjunct person to our military forces that we are more or less the advisers to an Iraqi force? Is that achievable?

BREMER: Yes, it is. And if you look at the president's request, $5.1 billion of it is directed at security, and as part of that, we intend to raise four separate Iraqi forces. The new Iraqi army is one which you mentioned. If this supplemental is approved, we'll be able to produce an Iraqi army of 27 battalions by a year from now...

WARNER: The point is, can it be now used to confront the threats?

BREMER: That's right.

WARNER: So this is a new concept in this plan.

BREMER: That's right.

WARNER: We want to bring that to the attention of all.

BREMER: That's right.

WARNER: A new initiative.

BREMER: That's right. And there's an Iraqi civil defense corps which is also in this supplemental; also puts Iraqis in place of Americans.

WARNER: My time is up.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you.

General Abizaid, in your opening statement, on page three, you point to a more dangerous threat from radical Islamist extremism than before.

Just to quickly read this, because you did not in your oral presentation, "The enemy's ideological base, financial networks and information networks remain strong. Indeed, the demographic and economic conditions that breed terrorists may be worsening, and those conditions are heightening the ideological fervor associated with radical Islamist extremism."

In view of that assessment, what's the strategy for dealing with this threat -- this worsening threat, apparently?

ABIZAID: Of course, Senator, what I was referring to there is not specifically Iraq, but the broader Middle East. And I think, actually, if you look across the Muslim world, all the way from Morocco to Indonesia, you see that there are ideological movements that are very anti-Western, that are very anti-American, in particular. And while we are having good tactical success against this phenomenon, we are continuing to see growing strength in it.

ABIZAID: Now, having said that, I do believe that we have to continue to re-evaluate the way that we will approach this internationally -- not only internationally, but also interagency.

LEVIN: Would it help if the governing council requested or endorsed foreign troop participation in addition to what's already there, particularly from Muslim countries, in terms of getting Muslim countries' troops there? Would it help if the governing council went on record as endorsing it?

ABIZAID: As far as my point is concerned, yes, it would.

LEVIN: Have we asked the governing council, Ambassador, to do that?

BREMER: We've had some discussions with them, Senator.

LEVIN: Have we asked them to do that?

BREMER: Yes...

LEVIN: Are they willing to do that?

BREMER: We have -- let me try to be more precise. Some of the countries that have been talked about have expressed an interest in either having the U.N. resolution pass or in having a governing council invitation. We've discussed those two in combination with the governing council.

LEVIN: And what has been their response to requesting other countries to send foreign troops, including Muslim countries?

BREMER: Their response has been varied. Some of them are in favor of doing that; some of them are more reluctant. I would say at the moment...

LEVIN: Will they be taking a vote on this issue?

BREMER: I'm sorry?

LEVIN: Will they be taking a vote?

BREMER: They might.

LEVIN: Would you encourage that?

BREMER: Yes, but I don't run it. Senator, I just saw...

(CROSSTALK)

LEVIN: You would encourage it, though?

BREMER: Of course. Absolutely.

LEVIN: You will ask them then...

BREMER: I have encouraged it.

LEVIN: And one other question about the council, and that has to do with the seven steps which you've outlined. Have they formally endorsed those seven steps?

BREMER: The majority of the governing council endorses those steps.

LEVIN: Have they taken a formal action to endorse them?

BREMER: No, but they've acted in conjunction with it, because they're following it.

LEVIN: I think it would be very helpful if you ask the governing council, since you've appointed it -- it's supposed to represent the people of Iraq -- if they formally endorsed the seven steps which you have laid out as what you believe to be the correct path. Makes sense to me, but I don't live there, and it would be very helpful, it seems to me, to avoid this impression that somehow or other we are laying down the law and we are laying down the path, and we are doing this and we are doing that, if you ask the governing council to formally endorse those seven steps. I'm just asking you simply would you do that.

BREMER: Yes.

LEVIN: Now, on the question of Iraqi oil, we were told by Secretary Wolfowitz a number of months ago that Iraqi oil would be used in the reconstruction, I believe he said in a matter of months. Why should not we ask the governing council to pledge some of their future surplus now to collateralize it?

LEVIN: We want them to control their oil, right? We don't want to control their oil. They control it.

Now the only answer that I've heard to that is, "Well, there's no government there that can technically make that pledge to collateralize that oil."

BREMER: Right. Correct.

LEVIN: But there is a government that is being asked to put up $20 billion that could guarantee that pledge. That's us.

And if the governing council were asked to pledge a portion of its future oil surplus -- it would be up to them, but if they were asked to make that commitment, to show just how badly they want to contribute financially to their reconstruction, which would help, it seems to me, us here in terms of persuading the American people, "Hey, we're not alone in this, the Iraqi are pledging their own oil surplus," we could then, if we simply guaranteed that pledge, help to collateralize that and produce current funds for reconstruction.

Will you at least consider that possibility?

BREMER: Thank you, Senator.

Yes, I will consider it.

Let me just clarify one point. Effectively, oil revenues will be used for reconstruction next year because oil revenues are funding the 2004 Iraqi budget. We may have a couple of hundred million dollars in revenues from taxes, but effectively oil revenue's what we've got.

In the Iraqi budget for next year, approved by the Iraqi ministers and the governing council, there are some reconstruction projects. If I remember correctly, it's on the order of $1.5 billion; it's not a lot of money.

So the question of what you called excess revenues really doesn't arise...

LEVIN: I said future...

BREMER: No, I know. I just wanted to, sort of, put some numbers around it.

It doesn't really arise until 2005, by which time we hope that the revenues will generate about $5 billion a year more than are needed for expenses. So the question arises in a couple of years.

LEVIN: I think you missed my point. But my time is up.

Thank you.

WARNER: Senator McCain?

MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid for the outstanding work they are doing. And I know that they share our sorrow and regret over the murder of Akila Hashimi, who served her nation and the cause of freedom with valor and distinction. And her name will go down, I think, as an Iraqi hero. We regret her loss.

With only five minutes, I'd like to try to get in two questions real quick.

One is that we had an interesting poll this morning. Seven out of 10 Iraqis say they expect their country and their personal lives to be better five years from now; 66 percent versus 27 percent do not want an Islamic government; 74 to 18 percent Saddam's henchmen should be punished; and two-thirds of the Iraqis say that the coalition troops should stick around for at least another year.

I think that helps us put into perspective -- that's the first significant poll I've seen the Iraqi -- I think that's an indicator of great success and a testimony to the magnificent job that is being accomplished.

But my first question, Ambassador Bremer, suppose that in the very unlikely situation we decided not to extend this reconstruction aid -- my distinct view is that the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people are still up for grabs -- what would be the implications, as briefly as possible, of our failure to approve not just the military aid but most important the reconstruction aid, which most impacts the Iraqi people most significantly?

BREMER: Well, it would be directly contrary to America's interest -- obviously, it would be contrary to the Iraqi people's interest, but it would be contrary to our interest, because it would create a situation of much greater insecurity. I think we would find more of the population turning against us. I think we would find more attacks on coalition forces.

Eventually, Iraq would, as I suggested in my opening statement, recede into a situation of chaos, not dissimilar from what was experienced in Lebanon in the 1970s and '80s, and we would find another breeding ground for terrorists. So I think it's a rather grim outlook.

MCCAIN: You share that view, General Abizaid?

ABIZAID: Sir, I do. I think it's very important that we move together on all fronts...

MCCAIN: And quickly.

ABIZAID: ... simultaneously.

MCCAIN: And quickly. Time is not on our side, is that correct?

ABIZAID: I agree.

MCCAIN: Thank you. I'm a little concerned to see the article today: "Pentagon May Call up Additional Reservists." Quote, "'We've had one piece of bad news after another to share with families this year, and at some point, it's got to take a toll,' said one senior Army National Guard official, who spoke on the condition that his name not be used. 'Our people don't sign up to be full-time soldiers. If they did, they would join the regular army.'"

General Abizaid, in Sunday's New York Times, Tom Friedman wrote, "The resistance from the Saddamists in Iraq is getting stronger, not weaker. It's becoming so strong that a new war needs to be mounted against the Saddamist forces in the Sunni Triangle near Baghdad."

Friedman also wrote that an Iraqi internal security force is the only way to fully rout out the Baathist threat. And I think we both agree on that.

When do you expect to deploy such an Iraqi force in sufficient numbers to go on the offensive against the Baathists? Until that time, don't you think we need more American forces, in addition to better intelligence from Iraqis and aggressive training of an Iraqi security force?

ABIZAID: Well, thank you, Senator.

Actually, we are on the offensive in the Ar Ramadi-Fallujah area, and we just moved in the 82nd Airborne Division into that area. We moved them in there, along with one brigade from the 82nd, plus a brigade from the 1st Infantry Division.

ABIZAID: You will see an upturn in combat in the Ar Ramadi- Fallujah area, no doubt about it, and you probably already have.

There are many Iraqis in what we call the Iraqi civil defense corps that are with them. They are not fully capable yet. In about four months, we'll have about 20 battalions that are fairly capable, serving alongside our forces.

I believe that the offensive action that we are undertaking, the increase that we've had over time with Iraqi forces of both police forces, the Iraqi civil defense forces and others, gives us the opportunity to maintain a stable environment to the best of our ability and also conduct combat operations.

I am confident that we've got enough troops at the right time, right now. I talk to my commanders in the field about this all the time. And I think we're OK, Senator.

MCCAIN: My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Senator Kennedy.

KENNEDY: Thank you very much.

And to Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid, we all want to congratulate you and are very aware that your lives are at risk, as well as those you represent, and we have enormous admiration and respect for those individuals. That's why we believe it's so important to get it right.

Part of the trouble, I think, for many of us, not only as members but also our constituents, is to hear sort of the rosy picture that you're describing, Ambassador Bremer, which is very similar to what the secretary of defense has described, and also read about what is happening on the ground and try to understand the difference.

We read in the New York Times, September 17th, "New intelligence assessments are warning us the United States' most formidable foe in Iraq in months ahead may be the resentment of ordinary Iraqis, increasingly hostile to American military occupation. Good will is wearing thin. Indications are that hostility is going well beyond the Sunni heartland of Iraq, which has been the main settlement" (ph).

Just two days ago, the New York Times said, "Ambassador Bremer came to tell the president, among others, that the situation was bleak in Baghdad."

We hear one rosy story from you; we read something else.

We look at the newspapers this morning. And this is, I think, the indictment of the administration's current policy. First of all, in The Washington Post: "Bush fails to gain pledges of troops or funds in Iraq." We look at the front page of the New York Times, here: "The American leading the hunt for banned weapons in Iraq says his team has not found any of the unconventional weapons cited by the Bush administration as the principal reason for going to war."

KENNEDY: Notice on the -- look on the front page, again, of The Washington Post: "Crossed Wires Deprive Iraqis Of Electric System. War plans Ignored Worn Infrastructure."

Many of us who were concerned about the rush to war by this administration anticipated this various product that you are going to find out, the worn-out infrastructure. Now you're saying to us, "Unless we do this, it's going to be more and more of a breeding ground for terrorists." Well, welcome to the fact that we're finding that out now, because many of us believed that that was going to be the case previously.

And then if you read in the New York Times, as has been mentioned, "Stretched Pentagon says it may need to call up thousands more reservists to serve in Iraq." And you wonder why there is concern that we don't have a plan.

This is what we have as the plan from the administration that was provided to us. It's 28 pages. It's a draft form, "working document, July 23rd." This is an insult to the troops and an insult to the Congress. We want to know where the policy is -- where the policy is.

You could just review some of these items -- in security: "August 1st to October 3rd, locate and secure and eliminate WMDs. November 3rd to January 1st, continue to locate and secure weapons of mass destruction. February 4th onward, continue to locate and secure, eliminate weapons of mass destruction."

Is this the best that this administration could do in terms of developing a plan that is going to have not only the support of the American people, but the international community, and that offers us the best hope to provide some relief to our troops and to bring democracy to Iraq and hopefully bring our troops home with honor?

Mr. Ambassador?

BREMER: Thank you, Senator.

First, just let me react to one of those citations, which I somewhere missed about I was coming back to say there was -- the situation was bleak. I don't know where that came from. It certainly was not...

KENNEDY: That was in the New York Times.

BREMER: Well...

KENNEDY: Elizabeth U. Miller (ph), New York Times. I believe it's 8/14.

BREMER: OK.

(CROSSTALK)

BREMER: All I'm saying is that's not my message. Anybody who quotes me as saying the situation is bleak is inaccurate.

(CROSSTALK)

KENNEDY: ... in fairness to you, just indicate, and I'll ask that the record be in, "Iraq (inaudible) Bush aides on edge."

KENNEDY: And then it says: "The new concern began this summer, one official said, with Bremer, the American, traveled to Washington to tell Mr. Bush, among others, the situation was bleak in Baghdad. He needed billions of additional dollars for the kind of security and reconstruction.

"Led the administration to begin a troop withdrawal within a year. Although no administration official says so explicitly, the White House goal is to show substantial improvement in Iraq before next fall's elections."

Next fall's elections, that bothers a lot of us.

That's completely -- that's inaccurate?

BREMER: Yes, sir. That bothers me as much as it bothers you.

KENNEDY: OK. You're saying that you...

BREMER: It's not part of my considerations.

KENNEDY: ... didn't talk -- that you didn't have the conversation with the president?

BREMER: I never said the situation in Baghdad was bleak. I've had many conversations with the president. I'm just objecting to somebody else characterizing how I report to the president.

We have difficulties in Iraq. If we didn't have difficulties, I wouldn't be here before you asking the American taxpayer to put another $20 billion up.

And we've heard some citations from some polls. I do not believe it is accurate to say that resentment is growing. I think it is correct to say that we need to move urgently now to head off a problem of not being able to have essential services and security for Iraq.

The main thrust of this request, Senator, as you have pointed out, is for security to get the Iraqis to take more of the security on board and to restore essential services. That's the main thrust. And I believe it's urgent. I believe we must do it. In answer to the previous question from Senator McCain, I said I think if we don't do it, the consequences for American troops and American interests will be severe.

KENNEDY: Thank you.

WARNER: Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McCain talked about the poll that was out yesterday. And I wasn't at all surprised when I read that this morning that 74 percent of the people believe that they should be punished, they appreciate our presence there and getting them out from under tyranny. And this is consistent with informal polls that we heard about when you and I were together -- all of us were together over in Baghdad.

And I suspect that the majority of the members sitting before you in the United States Senate here at this table have been to Iraq. And I would suggest that the senior senator from Massachusetts pay Iraq a visit, talk to the troops, talk to the people, talk to the citizens who come up to us in the street thanking us for what we've done in this liberation.

I -- it disturbs me a little bit when we have a hearing like this -- and we've had many. And I agree with the chairman: I appreciate so much your making yourselves available, both of you.

INHOFE: But people are watching. And when you hear the term, which has been mentioned three times so far since we started this hearing, "cut and run," I just hope that the American people know that probably I would suspect the majority of us up here would say that if there is one thing that should be taken off the table, it would be cut and run.

Senator Akaka and I started the Army caucus a couple of years ago that yesterday morning we had General Schoomaker, the new chief of staff. He made a statement. He said, "This war is about the will of the American people." He said that, "Those attacking our troops are attacking our will, and we cannot afford to cut and run."

And I strongly suspect that now the American people, after having seen the results of cutting and running, which is essentially what happened in 1991, realize, after looking at the mass graves, after knowing about the 328 kids under 12 years old lined up and executed summarily, about the school buses where the kids were buried alive -- I can recall that first freedom flight in 1991 after the war was over, several of us -- about five of us went over there. In fact, they didn't even know the war was over. But seeing the torture chambers, seeing a little boy with his ear cut off for carrying around an American flag, I don't think any American should ever think about cutting and running.

Ambassador Bremer, when we met, you provided us with a rough time line. And it happened coincidentally that while we were there, they had the bombing of the U.N. facility. And, of course, obviously that changes time lines. And I applaud you for your event-driven time line and would encourage you not to come up and be forced into any kind of a time-driven time line because that's not the way it works over there. This has to happen, and it has to happen right.

General Abizaid, I've read some things in some of the newspapers about the 101st Airborne in the north and the 1st Marine Division in the south and perhaps some kind of a lack of coordination with the Coalition Provisional Authority. Do you have any comments to make about that?

ABIZAID: Sir, I think that the 1st Marine Division, of course, just recently left. And the 101st has been up in the north in Mosul for a long time.

In the early days, it was clear that we had the capacity to do a lot of work. And so, I wouldn't call it lack of coordination. I would say before Ambassador Bremer got there, that they were essentially moving out on their own azimuth to achieve what they thought was the right thing to do.

ABIZAID: And over time, Ambassador Bremer has set the policies and we've had to bring the policies in line. Sometimes that necessarily hasn't been in the interest of what some of the commanders up there wanted to do, but they know who they -- whose policy line they follow.

So I think today coordination is good. Ambassador Bremer visits up there are the time with all the commanders, as do I. What the commanders want more than anything else is Ambassador Bremer's money.

INHOFE: Thank you, General.

Ambassador Bremer, there was some discussion over there when we were there about whether or not the Coalition Provisional Authority has the adequate organizational infrastructure to accomplish your goals and missions. Do you have any comments to make about that?

BREMER: I think it is the case that the buildup of the civilian part of the coalition authority was somewhat slow in the May-June time frame.

But since the visit of, for example, John Hamre, who was over doing a study on behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld -- he was there in late June, and noted that we didn't have enough people in the Coalition Provisional Authority -- I have now got six times as many people working for me as I did on July 1st.

INHOFE: Thank you very much.

And then lastly -- my time has expired, but, General Abizaid, Senator McCain talked about the force structure there in your area. I would like to have you, for the record, since there isn't time in my time here, to respond to my concern and the concern of many people at this table that the overall end strength and the overall force structure, in terms of all the way around the world and other potential problems we might have, and with specific emphasis on the Guard and Reserves -- so if you could give me your analysis of that for the record I'd appreciate it very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, very much for asking that question be put into the record.

Senator Akaka?

And I appreciate the cooperation of all members. We will be able to get to a second round.

AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my thanks to Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid for your great service to our country. And I want to tell you that we owe both of you a debt of gratitude for your efforts under very, very difficult circumstances.

And I want to ask that my statement be included in the record, Mr. Chairman.

General Abizaid, I understand that the supplemental request assumes that there will be a continued presence of -- already committed, two multinational divisions and possible contributions of up to two additional divisions from other nations.

What are your expectations about the rotation base for the international forces? And are the coalition members expected to continue their source future rotations at the same level, and if so how realistic are the expectations to be?

ABIZAID: Well, thank you, Senator.

The two multinational divisions that are currently serving, the British multinational division in the south and the Polish multinational division in the central south, are both expected to continue to source forces over time. Certainly, the British will continue as long as the mission continues; so I've been assured by British military leaders at the highest level. And they also assured me that the members of their coalition will continue to bring troops in as a part of the British force.

Now, the Polish forces are a little bit harder to say, although it's clear that the Poles are committed. I talked to the Polish commander a couple of days ago down in Agila (ph). He told me that his nation is committed for the long run. You know, it's hard for me to say exactly what that means, but I believe certainly the Polish part of that contingent.

But as you know, that is a very large mixed contingent. There's a brigade of Spanish troops, a brigade of Ukrainian troops that form the core of the division. I could not say for sure that they are here beyond a year, but I believe that most of the nations that are part of the Polish division are committed.

As far as a third division is concerned, I have been hopeful that we can get a third division -- and as I have said to the committee before, I have been hopeful that we can get a third Muslim division, led by either Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans or another major Islamic country that has a large degree of military capacity. We could certainly use them in a lot of different places and we're hopeful that over time they will be able to include a third multinational division on the force.

As of now, we don't have that commitment, which is one of the reasons you see CENTCOM saying to the joint staff that we need to maintain our commitment of forces of total brigades, which has then caused them to go to the National Guard and reserve component to look for how they're going to source.

AKAKA: Mr. Chairman, I also want to indicate that I will certainly support additional funding for troops in Iraq and wherever it's necessary.

General Abizaid, we have not received very many details about the level of effort -- and I'm shifting a little bit -- the level of effort involved in Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. Can you provide a brief description of the mission there, its relationship to operations elsewhere in the theater and how many people are involved?

Acknowledging that, of course, you cannot predict the future, but do you expect this mission will remain at about the same level of effort during fiscal year 2004 or will it be growing?

ABIZAID: Senator, it will be my recommendation to the department that Joint Task Force Horn of Africa continues its mission. There's about 1,400 people on that task force. They're based in Djibouti. They primarily work with the local nations in the Horn of Africa to increase their capacity against terrorism.

For example, the other day I was in Yemen visiting with our special forces trainers that are working with the Yemeni army to increase their special forces capacity. I've also seen them do civil military projects and training projects with the Ethiopians and the Kenyans.

ABIZAID: It is a small task force that doesn't have a direct combat role as yet. They do have the capacity to execute a combat mission should a terrorist target appear in their region, but for the most part they are designed to increase the confidence and capacity of those nations in the Horn of Africa that are beginning to see the influx of some foreign fighters.

AKAKA: Mr. Chairman, my time...

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.

AKAKA: ... has expired, but I want to clarify, Mr. Chairman, that I have the utmost respect for my colleague, Senator Inhofe, who is co-chair with me of the Senate Army Caucus.

In response to his comment about members suggesting that, quote, "cut and run" -- we cut and run, I've not heard that sentiment on this side. I believe we have been very thoughtful on how best to support our troops.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Roberts?

ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a former newspaper publisher and editor, and as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I would make the observation that, while the New York Times and the Washington Post are very respected newspapers and fountains of self-asserted knowledge in this city, they are not 100 percent accurate in terms of actionable intelligence. We don't rely on the Times and the Post exclusively for intelligence, in terms of the decisions that are being made.

Let me say that I think the key to this hearing is something called staying power and resolve. And I'm going to quote Winston Churchill, who said something after Pearl Harbor -- we call 9/11 the Pearl Harbor on the global war on terrorism; I think that's accurate.

He said, "Silly people, that was the description many gave in discounting the force of the United States. Some said they were soft; others that they would never be united, that they would never come to grips, they would never stand bloodletting, that their system of government and democracy would paralyze their war effort.

"Now we will see the weakness of this numerous but remote, wealthy and very talkative people. But I have studied American Civil War fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark made to me years before: 'The United States is like a gigantic boiler; once the fire of freedom is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate.' It is a matter of resolve."

I am just wondering, in terms of the criticism -- not wondering, I'm very concerned that if the criticism is so harsh as to create the impression of lack of resolve, I wonder what goes through the minds of President Karzai, President Musharraf, Prince Saud, King Abdullah, President Mubarak, not only our men and women serving in uniform, but the very terrorists who are killing our troops and their fellow Iraqis. And it concerns me a great deal in that I think we have a leaky boiler, and I think we better fix that leaky boiler real quick, and, as Senator Akaka has pointed out, make doggone sure what we're saying is interpreted in the right way in regards to the global war on terrorism.

So, General Abizaid, I think you put the Iraqi challenge into perspective when you said, and I quote, "If we can't be successful here, we won't be successful in the global war on terrorism."

ROBERTS: So based on your expertise and experience, can you give us a sense of how the Baathists, and the foreign fighter terrorists in particular, would benefit from the adoption of a mere timetable? We've heard a lot about a timetable here for the coalition departure, as opposed to a set of milestones such as outlined in the much- criticized Ambassador Bremer's CPA strategy that did come to members over two months ago. What would be the effect on the global war on terrorism?

ABIZAID: Senator, I believe that you always run the risk when you set a timetable to send the wrong signals. We need to have a conditions-based strategy that allows us to get at our objectives in a coherent and a synchronized fashion. And I believe with regard to Iraq, that militarily and politically we are probably lashed up better there than any place I've been before.

With regard to the broader war on terrorism, I think we have to continue to look at the various movements throughout the theater that show the danger continues to grow and we need to develop a more unified international and interagency strategy to deal with the broader problem.

BREMER: Senator, may I pick up on something you just said?

ROBERTS: Certainly.

BREMER: The fire of freedoms are lighted in Iraq and I've got -- we have newspapers here today. There are 186 new newspapers since liberation. These are two of them. This particular one happens to be very critical of me and the CPA -- that's freedom of the press. This particular one happens to support us. But there are 184 other newspapers being produced in Iraq today. There are 85 new radio stations. There are more than 20 television stations.

The fire of freedom, that Churchill talked about, has been lighted in Iraq and we need to nurture it forward to democracy.

ABIZAID: Senator, if I just might add one thing, this notion of will and how we're seen in the theater -- I talked to President Karzai and President Musharraf and others -- that the best manifestation of our will in the theater is the work that our young soldiers do out there. And when you see that work that a young captain does on the Afghan-Pakistani border and you see the confidence in his eyes, you know there is no problem with understanding our will to get the job done. And I believe those leaders see that.

ROBERTS: My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Pryor?

PRYOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Bremer, I'd like to follow up on a couple of statements that you made in your opening comments, if I may. One was you said something to the effect that Iraq is the focal point of the global war on terrorism. I can't remember the exact words that you used, but that was the gist of it. Tell the committee what you mean by that.

BREMER: What I mean by that -- and I think the term I used, or anyway meant to use, was it's really become the front -- the main front in the war on terrorism.

What has happened, Senator, is that Saddam Hussein supported terrorism. He was identified as a state sponsor of terrorism for almost 20 years.

BREMER: He played host to terrorists to Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas. There were connections with Al Qaida over the last decade.

There was particularly a strong connection with an Al Qaida- related group called Ansar al-Islam. You may recall, in the early days of the war, we attacked a camp in the northeast of Iraq. We killed quite a few of the terrorists, unfortunately not enough of them. Several hundred of them escaped into Iran and what we found was they reconstituted themselves and started to reintegrate back into Iraq in roughly early July.

We now estimate that there are several hundred of these trained, professional Al Qaida-type terrorists in Ansar al-Islam back in Iraq. We have captured several dozen Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaida terrorists in our military operations. So we have a serious terrorist threat in Iraq.

PRYOR: Now has that terrorist activity increased since U.S. troops have been present there?

BREMER: I would say it has increased, as I suggested, since they reconstituted and came back in. And the reconstitution seems to have taken them a couple of months. And they started coming back in July.

PRYOR: What were the terrorists doing before we came into Iraq because, apparently, they were not attacking the Saddam Hussein regime? What were they doing there?

BREMER: Well, they were supported by the Saddam Hussein regime. What they were doing was killing Kurds.

PRYOR: OK. So it's terrorism mostly against the Kurds.

BREMER: It was. It is now a very serious threat to not only us but we've seen attacks against the U.N. We've seen attacks against religious leaders. We don't know at this time who conducted those attacks, but we certainly have seen an increase in terrorism.

PRYOR: And have you seen an influx of new individual terrorists and new terrorist organizations in Iraq since we've been there?

BREMER: It's a bit hard to parse it.

We know that during the war a number of countries sent what they said were volunteers to fight along side Saddam, foreign fighters. We have captured 278 of these people since the war. Most of them are Syrians. We have seen rat lines established across the Syrian border where we have more of these people coming in, foreign terrorists and foreign fig