OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ

Hearing Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee

September 25, 2003

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOHN WARNER
A Senator from Virginia, and
Chairman, Armed Services Committee

WARNER: Good morning. The committee meets this morning to receive the testimony of Ambassador Paul Bremer, the presidential envoy to Iraq, and General John P. Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command.

And we extend to you a very warm welcome, Mr. Ambassador. While we may have differences among us with regard to policy issues, I think you're setting somewhat of a record in the United States Senate for the number of hearings and the appearances -- perhaps I should say the United States Congress. Monday, you appeared before a committee, three committees yesterday, three today, that's seven, plus I think three other briefings. But not only is it a reflection on the depth of knowledge that you have which you're sharing with the Congress, it's a reflection on the leadership -- I think leadership on both sides of the aisle of both houses that are trying to labor for the respective bodies and the Congress as a whole -- a body of fact on which we can hopefully proceed early next week to have a full and thorough debate and passage of this matter.

And General Abizaid, you've taken leave of your forces in Central Command, but the urgency of your appearance justifies that. And we commend you and those under you and your command.

ABIZAID: Thank you.

WARNER: Particularly their families here at home for the extraordinary courage and staying power that they've manifested throughout this.

So we're pleased to have both of you here today, together with Mr. Corlogis (ph). Mr. Corlogis (ph) has been ambassador plenipotentiary throughout this whole matter, and we welcome him.

The timeliness and importance of this hearing in the wake of President Bush's forceful speech to the United Nations on Tuesday cannot be overstated. The stakes, not only in Iraq but indeed Afghanistan, are enormous. The military victories -- and indeed they were military victories -- achieved by our armed forces they're not complete as yet. Certainly initial goals were achieved on the military side and we did that with coalition partners. We must now secure the advancements that have been made.

While America is watching this hearing and the other hearings, indeed the whole world is focused upon it. They're watching to see if America has the staying power to complete its mission. I feel we do. I know you, Ambassador, and I know you, General, likewise feel we do.

We've achieve these successes in a relatively short period. Saddam Hussein has been deposed, his ruthless regime deposed. And I have not heard anyone raise their voice to say we would be better off had we not done that.

We must, though, through deliberations and actions in the days ahead on President Bush's emergency supplemental request send another strong message of bipartisan resolve to our fellow countrymen here in America, to our troops, to our coalition partners, to the rest of the world.

WARNER: We'll stay the course and we'll get the job done.

It is part of the oversight responsibility of this committee to review ongoing military operations and other significant activities undertaken by the Department of Defense. This is the fifth hearing in a series of hearings this committee will conduct, along with countless briefings and updates we receive, to review the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom and to understand the challenge that lay ahead of us in the future operations.

The hearing is also part of a unique process. This week alone three Senate committees and a like number of House will conduct hearings on this subject and provide a body of fact for the Congress. This is, I think, unprecedented.

Twenty-four months ago, terrorists turned New York City and the Pentagon and a lonely field in Pennsylvania into battlefields, terrorizing all the world and forever changing our sense of security. War against terrorists and those who support them became essential. This nation, under the leadership of our president, responded, as did our coalition partners.

America didn't ask for this war, but we have acted appropriately to defend our nation and to prevent future terrorists from reaching our shores or from attacking our interests and friends abroad.

As the president stated so eloquently on September 14th, and I quote it, "And for America, there'll be no going back to the era before September 11th, to false comfort in a dangerous world. We are fighting the enemy in Iraq, in Afghanistan, so that we do not meet him again on our own streets here in USA."

The choices involved in prosecuting this global war have been difficult, and not all nations have agreed. But I applaud our president for reaching out as he has done this week and continues to do, not only in the United Nations but elsewhere. We invite their participation. If we, together with those who join us, succeed, we will have done this region of the world a whole change of direction toward freedom and some measure of democracy for the peoples.

The decision to confront Saddam Hussein was made not without careful deliberation, extensive diplomacy and substantial efforts to find a peaceful solution. By the time U.S. troops crossed into Iraq on March 19th, it had been the conclusion of three consecutive administration of our government, countless other nations and the United Nations, that Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime had used weapons of mass destruction, had threatened them against others in neighboring countries, and represented a clear and present danger to regional and world peace. It had been the conclusion of the Clinton administration that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, was actively seeking more and would ultimately use them.

WARNER: The United Nations Security Council passed 17 resolutions dating back to 1991, 12 years, which required full Iraqi cooperation in the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein's response was defiance, deception.

October 2002, after an unprecedented amount of debate, the Senate voted 77 to 23 to authorize the president to utilize force in Iraq. The House of Representatives also voted overwhelmingly in favor of authorizing the use of force. By that act, it became our war and the American people's war, not the president's war.

At this critical junction, it is our responsibility to continue to support the president in this operation which we overwhelmingly supported, and to provide the resources necessary for him to finish the job together with our coalition partners.

American armed forces, together with coalition partners, achieved extraordinary, rapid military success in Iraq with minimum casualties and damage. This is a clear tribute to the professionalism and the dedication of our young men and women in uniform and those who support them.

We have succeeded in ridding the world of a brutal tyrant and have revealed the extent of his barbarism. We should be congratulating our president and our armed forces on a job well done. And I so do this morning.

Despite the pockets of resistance in Iraq, that feeling of gratitude and good will toward the United States seems to grow. A Gallup poll conducted earlier this week found that 62 percent of Iraqis believe that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they have endured since the invasion, and two-thirds think Iraq will be better in condition five years from now before that invasion. And that will be a direct result of your efforts, Mr. Ambassador, and those of the armed forces of the United States under our military commanders and the coalition partners. We must build on this good will and seize this historic opportunity to help build a thriving democracy and ally against terror in Iraq.

American forces and coalition partners have already done a remarkable job restoring basic services. And I think if there's anything that's been understated, Mr. Ambassador, and you have that opportunity this morning, you had a plan. Do not be reserved in telling us, in your judgment, how closely you've achieved the goals of that plan.

You've ended ethnic violence, creating an environment where reconstruction can succeed. Most members of this committee have seen this with their own eyes, and the response of most members who have been to Iraq is concern for the good things that are taking place in Iraq and are not somehow getting that message out, not only to our people but to the Iraqi people.

This reconstruction work is being done in a difficult environment of harsh conditions and significant risks. Those who've been removed from power seek to delay their inevitable defeat and, as terrorists, lash out.

We're ever-mindful of the risk of our forces, General Abizaid, every day and the sacrifices made by their families and communities that support them. What is the best way to reduce U.S. casualties and create better conditions for eventually withdrawing our forces? That's the question before this committee.

WARNER: In my judgment, the key is to improve the security situation in Iraq by restoring essential services, recruiting and training dependable Iraqi security forces, and repairing the infrastructure so that real economic growth opportunity can once again grow.

The emergency supplemental request before this body of $87 billion submitted by President Bush specifically addresses that goal. That is why it merits our support.

It is imperative that we give our president and our troops the resources they need to complete their missions both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The faster money gets to these sources, the faster conditions will improve and the faster our troops will have the opportunity to come home.

And I hope you, with specificity, address as best as you can the schedules that you contemplate as it regards this particular bill and the monies in it.

Lasting peace and security will be achieved when we establish the environment for a democratic, economically viable Iraq. The first steps to democracy have been taken, and a fledgling government is preparing itself to assume the responsibilities of sovereignty.

Senator Levin and I and other senators had the opportunity earlier this week to meet with two ministers: one in charge of electricity, the other water; both vital to this infrastructure. I, myself, say I was greatly impressed with the credentials of their background and professional training. One had left his family, as so many -- you, yourself, and other members of your team have left your families and literally volunteer to let this nation once again take its rightful place in the world community.

So I commend them, and I commend you.

You will talk today about the Marshall Plan, which brought peace and prosperity to a war-ravaged continent. I think that's an important historical precedent. The modest investment has been repaid hundred times more. The funding we are now being asked to provide is an equally important investment that will likewise be repaid many times over in the decades to come.

You have my support. I wish you well.

Senator Levin?

OPENING STATEMENT OF

CARL LEVIN
A Senator from Michigan, and
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me join you in welcoming Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid, to our committee this morning. We appreciate what you and those who work with you, particularly those on the ground in Iraq, are attempting to do at great personal risk and under very different and difficult circumstances.

It's clearly in our national interest for democracy and stability to be successful in Iraq. For this to happen, the stabilization and reconstruction effort needs to become much more of an international effort. Achieving this will lower the risk to our military personnel both by sharing that risk and by changing the nature of the effort from a U.S.-dominated occupation, where the United States is identified and visible as the target, to an internationally-supported transition to a new Iraqi government.

Internationalizing the effort is also the only way that the cost of reconstruction can be shared with other countries so that the burden is not carried so exclusively by U.S. taxpayers.

LEVIN: And we will be able to leave Iraq sooner, rather than later, the sooner that we internationalize the effort.

Recent experiences in other settings illustrate that point. In Bosnia, for example, the 1,800 U.S. troops constitute approximately 15 percent of the 12,000 total NATO stabilization force and the police task force, to which we contributed financial and with manpower, has now been replaced by a European Union police mission.

In Kosovo, the roughly 3,000 U.S. troops make up about 11 percent of the 27,000 total NATO-led Kosovo force and the U.N. mission in Kosovo runs the civilian side of the effort there. The United States pays only 25 percent of the costs for the U.N. mission and the European Union carries most of the burden of reconstruction.

While I was pleased that President Bush went to the United Nations this week, I was disappointed that the president seemed to so severely limit the possible role of the U.N. in Iraq to assisting, quote, "in developing a constitution and training civil servants and conducting free and fair elections," close quote.

In the aftermath of other conflicts, and even at times when as in Iraq the conflict was continuing, the United Nations has been responsible for post-conflict reconstruction, for the conduct of civil administration, for the supervision of civil administration and for executive responsibility for police and the judiciary.

A number of nations have made it clear to us for months that their willingness to provide troops for Iraq or to contribute financially to Iraq's reconstruction depends on the United Nations being given a key role in Iraq.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan told me earlier this month when I met with him in New York, that the United Nations will need to have broad functions in the reconstruction in political development effort, if we are going to have a realistic hope of persuading other key countries to join in the effort.

The president's apparent reluctance to grant a meaningful decision-making role for the U.N. in Iraq's reconstruction means, I fear, that we will not succeed in acquiring the troops and financial resources from other countries that we seek.

LEVIN: What is necessary is not just a vague U.N. resolution of support, but a resolution assuring real power-sharing with the international community over the civil administration and reconstruction effort that results in additional nations, including Muslim nations, joining this effort.

There are a great many other very serious issues that Congress must address concerning the administration's $87 billion supplemental request. Some are life-and-death issues affecting how long our troops will be in Iraq and at what risk. Some will have a long-term impact on our taxpayers and on our deficit. Others are transcendent issues, relative to how a democratic nation can be built and sustained in Iraq in the current circumstances.

There is no reasonable way that these issues can be adequately thought through, much less properly worked through, by next week, as the majority leader currently plans, despite urgent and repeated requests by the Democratic leadership and Democratic members for additional hearings. We take months to consider far less significant matters. The massive and unprecedented $87 billion request has been before us for just two weeks.

Some have compared the Iraq reconstruction effort to the Marshall Plan that led to the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In fact, the differences between the current proposal and the Marshall Plan are dramatic. For instance, the Marshall Plan required countries receiving assistance to contribute a matching amount to their own reconstruction and also included loans that were eventually paid back. Neither of these important requirements are present in the Iraqi reconstruction request of the administration.

There is one aspect in which the Marshall Plan analogy can be helpful. When the legislation went to the floor of the Congress, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of the architects of our bipartisan World War II foreign policy, called the Marshall Plan, quote, "The final product of eight months of more intensive study by more devoted minds than I have ever known to concentrate on any one objective in all my 20 years in Congress," close quote.

Well, we don't need to study the request before us for eight months, but we certainly owe it to the people that we represent, to our military members serving overseas in harm's way and to the institution in which we serve to give the $87 billion request more than a two-week, slap-dash, lick-and-a-promise review.

LEVIN: When it comes to the portion of the supplemental request which supports our troops there should be no issue: Our troops must be and they will be supported.

But when it comes to the request for tens of billions of dollars for the building of an Iraqi nation the answers, and indeed the questions, are far more complex.

Should a time line be established for Iraqis to assume responsibilities for their own safety and security? What are the administration's goals for Iraq's economic reconstruction? What are the time line and costs to meet those goals, including a detailed plan for the restoration of basic services, an estimate of the cost and percentage to be born by the United States and the percentage to be born by other countries?

What is the time line to meet the administration's goals for Iraq's political reconstruction, including the adoption of a constitution, the holding of elections and the establishment of an elected government with broad public support?

What is the likelihood that the administration will be able to assemble a broad international coalition to address the military, economic and political needs of Iraq and how does that affect the need for the $87 billion request before us?

And why shouldn't Iraq invest more in its own future by pledging some of its future oil revenues to the building of its nation? Put more bluntly, isn't it essential that the people of Iraq want to become a unified and secure nation badly enough that they are willing to make that pledge and that financial commitment now, to help raise funds now for reconstruction costs and not simply be the recipient of financial assistance? Would it not be an important step toward independence and self-reliance for the Iraqis to make the same pledge of their fortunes that the founders of our nation made in 1776?

And how do we ensure competition in awarding contracts for reconstruction projects and transparency in budgeting and expenditure of U.S. taxpayers funds?

These and many other questions need careful and thoughtful consideration by the Congress. Getting answers to probing questions on the reconstruction funds is not aimed at shirking our responsibility, but at fulfilling our responsibility.

LEVIN: That is what our constituents send us here to do. That is the job that they expect us to do. And there is no way we can do that job properly in two weeks.

The issue is not whether we are willing to spend enough to defend America; of course, we all are. The issue is whether the huge amount requested for an American reconstruction effort, doled out by an American administrator, an effort that will be seen in some parts of the world as perpetuating an American occupation of Iraq, will make our troops more or less secure and make their job of stabilizing Iraq more or less difficult.

We have expended huge amounts of blood and treasure already. Will the additional $87 billion requested by the administration, effectively reduce our future sacrifice or will it be lost in a deepening and downward spiral of civil disorder and chaos?

I hope that thoughtful congressional consideration of this reconstruction request can lead to sharing the burden with other countries who will benefit from a secure and democratic Iraq and to reducing the risk of American troops being drawn more and more deeply into a jihad-type guerrilla war against Western occupiers. We should take the time to do this right and to do it on a bipartisan basis. These times and the threats surely call for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Senator Levin, thank you. I'd like to ask the committee if we could digress for a moment, that we have a quorum, because we have a number of promotions relating to the armed forces of the United States.

I observe a quorum now present. I ask the committee, first, to consider the nomination of Gordon R. England to be secretary of the Navy. His nomination has been before the committee the required length of time and no objection has been raised regarding it. We had a thorough hearing on Tuesday. Is there a motion? So moved.

(UNKNOWN): Second.

WARNER: All in favor, say aye.

Opposed?

Next, I ask the committee to consider a list of 5,552 military nominations. Again, no objection has been raised among the committee members regarding these noms.

However, I must inform the committee that 705 of these appointments, all for officers below the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral lower half, were not received by the committee until September 22nd, due to the federal government being closed last week. Under the committee's seven-day rule, these 705 officers would not be eligible for consideration unless the committee provided the waiver.

Monday, in my view, would be not fair for the promotion of any of these officers to be delayed, when they would have been eligible had we not had the storm conditions. Therefore, I ask that we now waive the seven-day rule with regard to those nominations.

LEVIN: So moved.

(UNKNOWN): Seconded.

WARNER: All in favor, say aye.

Opposed?

The full slate of nominations have now been acted upon favorably by the committee.

WARNER: I thank my colleagues very much.

Listening to not only the comments this morning by us, but there's a chapter in history that always interests me about the Marshall Plan. Truman is reputed to have said that he was concerned that Congress would not pass this plan and he turned to George Marshall and he said, "Let's name it the Marshall Plan; it'll go through." Perhaps we should refer to this as the Abizaid plan.

Here we go. Mr. Ambassador, would you lead off?

STATEMENT OF

AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER III,
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority

BREMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear on behalf of the president's supplemental.

Before I begin, I, like you, Mr. Chairman, want to pay tribute to the fine young men and women in our armed forces who led a coalition to a military victory without precedent. In roughly three weeks, they defeated an enemy larger than -- defeated a country larger than Germany and Italy combined, and they did so with forces smaller than the Army of the Potomac, a point I make with all respect to the chairman for bringing up memories.

(LAUGHTER)

WARNER: I hear you.

BREMER: Mr. Chairman, I know that you, like all members of Congress, hate to wake up to the news that another American service man has been killed in Iraq. These deaths are painful. I hear about them often before you do, because I'm eight time zones ahead of you.

The deaths, although they're painful, are not senseless. They are part of the price we pay for fighting for civilization, for being part of a world that refuses to tolerate terrorism and genocide and weapons of mass destruction.

Those who ambush coalition forces, who set truck bombs and who assassinate people like the deceased member of the governing council are trying to thwart constitutional and democratic government in Iraq. They will win some battles, Mr. Chairman, but they're going to lose their war with history.

President Bush's vision for Iraq envisages an Iraq that is secure through the efforts of the Iraqis. It provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles and bolstered by a reliable infrastructure. And finally, the president's plan provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date.

The stakes couldn't be higher. If we fail to recreate Iraq as a sovereign democracy sustained by a solid economy, we will have handed the terrorists a gift. We must deny terrorists that gift of state sponsorship, which they enjoyed under Saddam, and we must deny them the chaos, such as they thrived on in the 1980s in Lebanon.

Creating a sovereign, democratic, constitutional and prosperous Iraq deals a blow to terrorists. It gives the lie to those who describe us as the enemies of Islam, the enemies of Arabs or the enemies of the poor. That's why the president's request has to be seen as an important part of the global war on terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, many of you have pointed out our national experiences teaches us how to consolidate military victory. This is a lesson we did not learn at the end of the First World War. Many here opposed that war and wanted to solve problems at home. We won the war, but we did not consolidate the peace. And we know what price we paid: Extremism bred in a swamp of despair, bankruptcy and unpayable debts gave birth to a world of fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany and another world war.

After that conflict, America showed that we had learned that military victory must be followed by a program to secure the peace. In 1948, America's greatest generation responded with the boldest, most generous and most productive act of statesmanship in the last century: the Marshall Plan.

BREMER: When George Marshall first described the Marshall Plan at Harvard, he laid out some truths that resonate anyway to me today. He said, and I quote, "Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy, so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist -- the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

The Marshall Plan, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support by this Congress, set war-torn Europe on the path to the freedom and prosperity which Europeans enjoy today. After a thousand years as the cockpit of war, Europe became the cradle of peace in two short generations. A similar opportunity for transforming the region lies before us in Iraq.

The grants to Iraq the president seeks bespeaks a grandeur of vision equal to the one that created the free world at the end of the Second World War. Iraqis living in freedom with dignity will set an example in this troubled region which so often spawns terrorists. A stable, peaceful, economic, reproductive Iraq will serve American interests by making Americans safer.

I'd like to make just a few points about the supplemental request. We do have -- in response to several comments, we do have a definite plan with milestones and dates.

Second, no one part of this supplemental is more important than any other part. It is an integrated request.

Thirdly, this request is urgent. The urgency concerning military operations is self-evident, but the funds for nonmilitary action in Iraq are equally urgent.

Most Iraqis welcomed us as liberators. And as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, a just-released Gallup poll shows that almost two-thirds of the Iraqis continue to say that getting rid of Saddam makes the sacrifices of the war and the aftermath worthwhile.

Even so, the reality of foreign troops on the street is understandably chafing. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but faster progress on reconstruction can help stem the tide.

The link to the safety of our troops is indirect but real. It is true that the people who ambush our coalitions are small in number, and they're not ambushing us because they don't have adequate electrical power. But the population's view of the United States and the coalition is directly linked to their cooperation in hunting down those who attack us and giving us, in a word, good intelligence. Early progress on restoring basic infrastructure gives us an edge against the terrorists.

This money will be spent with prudent transparency. In answer to the question that Senator Levin raised, every contract of the $20 billion requested for Iraq will be competitively bid.

Mr. Chairman, I know there's been some talk of granting some parts of this as a loan. Initially, this may appear attractive, but once again I'm afraid the facts and historic experience intrude.

The facts are that the Iraqi people have a debt of more than $200 billion hanging over them, a debt incurred by Saddam's economic incompetence and by his wars of aggression against his neighbors. $200 billion. They cannot pay that debt. They can't even service it. And it makes no sense to lay more debt on top of them. Again, a lesson we should have learned from the aftermath of the First World War.

The president's first priority in this supplemental request is security and it has three elements, most of which you and the other members heard about when you came to visit in July.

First, public safety: money for the police to get a professional, well-trained police respectful of human rights on board; funds for border police and border enforcement.

Secondly, a national defense element, which involves standing up a new Iraqi army as quickly as we can, and a civil defense system.

And thirdly, a justice system, so that when criminals are caught there are courts and prisons to look after them.

BREMER: This security assistance benefits the United States in four concrete ways.

First, the Iraqis will be more effective collecting the important intelligence than we can be. As talented and courageous as coalition forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, who knows his people, their customs, their language and their rhythms. Iraqis have asked repeatedly to play a greater role in providing their security and we agree; they should.

Secondly, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace coalition forces in some of the roles that generate frustration, friction and resentment: things like conducting searches, manning check points and guarding installations.

Thirdly, this freezes up coalition forces for the mobile, sophisticated, offensive operations against former regime loyalists and terrorists for which they are best suited.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, building up these new Iraqi forces reduces the overall security demands on coalition forces and can speed up the day when we can bring our troops home.

Security, of course, is indispensable, but it's not enough. A good security system cannot persist on the knife edge of economic collapse.

Saddam left behind an economy ruined, not by our attacks, but by decades of neglect, theft and mismanagement. In 35 years, he never once prepared a national budget. The Iraqis must fashion their economy from the Soviet-style command economy Saddam left behind. That poor model was further hobbled by cronyism, theft and pharaonic self-indulgence by Saddam and his intimates.

Members of the committee saw a number of the palaces in Baghdad. I can tell you those palaces exist in every single city in the country.

The good news is that important changes have already begun on the economic front. As many of you know, on Sunday, at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF in Dubai, the minister of finance announced a bold and sweeping set of economic reform programs: the most open program for a foreign direct investment of any country in the region; a new central bank law which establishes complete independence for the central bank; a tariff policy which is simple, it's zero, except for a temporary, two-year, 5 percent tariff, called a reconstruction tariff, to raise funds for the Iraqi government.

On October 15th, we will introduce a new currency to Iraq. For the first time in 20 years, there will be a unified currency. That currency will float against the world's currencies.

Mr. Chairman, the Iraqi government, by taking these steps, has put in place the legal infrastructure necessary to create a vibrant private sector. But those policies will come to nothing if they don't rest on a sound economic infrastructure in a reasonable security environment.

BREMER: We've made significant progress in restoring these essential services. The widely predicted humanitarian crisis did not occur. There was no major flow of refugees.

You spoke about our plan, Mr. Chairman. All 240 hospitals and 90 percent of its health clinics are open today. All of the schools finished their school year. All 22 universities in Iraq held final exams in late May and early June, despite the difficult circumstances, and they will reopen again in a few weeks.

There is an adequate food supply, and there is no evidence of epidemic. We have cleared thousands of miles of irrigation canals. Electric service will reach pre-war levels within a month.

But there are remaining demands that are vast, and that is why most of the president's non-military, non-security assistance is focused on critical infrastructure.

The third major element of our overall strategy is to move toward a democratic Iraq, and here too, Mr. Chairman, there's good news. We have laid out a seven-step process for Iraq to return to full sovereignty through elections. Three of the seven steps have already been taken.

Governing council took office on July 13.

Second step was then when they appointed a committee to make recommendations to them on how to write a constitution.

The third step was the appointment of the cabinet on September 2nd. You met, and some others met, two of the very impressive members of this cabinet when they were here earlier this week.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, that an Iraqi friend pointed out to me last week that this is the best educated, most qualified cabinet in Iraq's history. And as I probed a bit, I learned that 17 of the 25 cabinet members have Ph.D.s, which makes them probably the best educated cabinet anywhere in the world.

And these are not just Ph.D.s in subjects like I'm an expert in history, these are Ph.D.s that actually, really count. The minister of agriculture is a professional agronomist. The minister of water resources is a hydrologist. The minister of electricity, whom you met, has had almost 30 years experience running power companies. They are a very competent group of people and they have lots of responsibility.

The remaining steps on the path to Iraqi independence and sovereignty are to write a constitution -- we hope a constitutional convention will be convened shortly, in the next month or so.

That constitution will have to be ratified by the Iraqi people; the fifth step.

The penultimate step will be holding of free elections.

And finally, the seventh step is when the Coalition Provisional Authority hands sovereignty back to the Iraqi people. And no one looks forward to that day more than I do, except perhaps my wife.

Some, including a few members of the Iraqi Governing Council, suggest we should give full sovereignty to an Iraqi government immediately or anyway very soon.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that such haste would be a mistake and so do the Iraqi people. The same Gallup poll I cited earlier shows that 85 percent of the people of Baghdad believe that an immediate departure of coalition forces would lead to chaos.

And no appointed government, even one as honest and dedicated as the Iraqi Governing Council, can have the legitimacy necessary to take on the difficult issues the Iraqis face as they write their constitution, elect a government and, I might add, undertake a major economic reconstruction effort.

The only path to true Iraqi sovereignty is through a written constitution, ratified and followed by free democratic elections.

BREMER: Shortcuts are potentially dangerous.

As you examine the president's plan, as I hope you will, I am sure you'll see that every part is connected to the others. The need to protect the coalition and the Iraqi people alike against terrorists and common criminals is obvious. The United States must take the lead in restoring Iraq as a friend and democratic model.

There is, as you have mentioned, a donors' conference in Madrid in late October. And we, the United States, must set the example before then and work to show that we must avoid together the near anarchy in which terrorists will feel right at home.

Mr. Chairman, make no mistake, these requested funds represent an investment in America's national security. If, after coming this far, we turn our backs and let the Iraq lapse into factional chaos, we will have sewn the dragon's teeth which will sprout more terrorists and eventually cost more American lives in Iraq or even here at home.

You may think I exaggerate. But I ask you to look at what happened in Afghanistan, another country which, after it was debilitated by decades of war and mismanagement, became easy prey to the Taliban and Al Qaida.

The reconstruction of Iraq may seen distant from American concerns today. Eight time zones and two continents separate where we are in the East Coast from Iraq. The West Coast is effectively half a world away. But Iraq only seems far away.

Today Iraq has become a focal point in the global war on terrorism -- a point I make with some trepidation because it means we are on the front line of the global war on terrorism. But failure there would strengthen terrorists morally and materially.

And, Mr. Chairman, I think you said in your opening remarks, it is extremely important for the world to understand that we have the staying power to see this through. All of this requires the combined support of the American people and of both parties in Congress. This is a large, serious, important and urgent matter. It must be done quickly, and it must be done well.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I look forward to answering your questions in support of this request.

WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for a very thorough and strongly delivered statement, with your own personal conviction resonating every sentence.

General Abizaid?

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID,
United States Army Commander of CENTCOM

ABIZAID: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. It's an honor to be here. It's an important opportunity to testify before you.

As you know, CENTCOM stands at the center of the global war on terrorism. We're at the heart of it. We've got over 200,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that are out there serving in the east, all the way from Kyrgyzstan, to the west in the horn of Africa.

They've had important tactical success in the past two years on the broader global war on terror. And they have, in conjunction with friendly nations in the area, done much to help defeat and disrupt the terrorist threat.

But there's much work that needs to be done in that broader war. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, our troops are involved in combat operations to attain stability.

In Iraq, our focus continues to be that of increasing Iraqi security capacity, looking for opportunities to integrate international forces into the coalition, building a stronger intelligence system to enable us to get actionable intelligence against the various enemies that we face there, building the infrastructure and working an information campaign that tells the Iraqi people what we are doing, why we are doing, in order to bring them more strongly to the side of the coalition.

ABIZAID: I've said on numerous occasions, and I know all of you know it, there is no strictly military solution to the problems in Iraq. We must move together, hand in hand with the Coalition Provisional Authority and Ambassador Bremer. We must synchronize the power of the United States government in diplomatic, economic and political measures, along with the military, in order to achieve success.

Our young people are capable and they're confident. Much is made of my father's generation being the greatest generation, but I will tell you the next-greatest generation is out there serving in the Central Command area and fighting and winning, and representing the American people in an absolutely outstanding manner. Their work will continue to be difficult, and it will continue to be dangerous. We will need both patience and courage to see the mission through.

Likewise, the Iraqi people have shown great courage. Many of them serve with us day after day to make their country a better place. They have put their lives on the line in the battlefield, and they continue to show optimism about the future.

This battle for Iraq is a battle of moderation versus extremism. We've got to give Iraqis a chance to succeed. This supplemental is about giving our troops, the great people that work in the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqis the tools necessary to succeed.

Mr. Chairman, it's an honor to be here. I look forward to your questions.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

Colleagues, it would be the desire of the chair to try and achieve two rounds of questioning. We'll start with five minutes each on the...

PROTESTER: (OFF-MIKE)

WARNER: Would the uniformed officers secure the room, please?

PROTESTER: (OFF-MIKE)

WARNER: For those who may be interested, a similar incident occurred with this individual yesterday, so we were prepared for this.

I'd like to do five minutes a round in the fervent hope that we can achieve two rounds for all of our members. And I urge the clerk to talk to the chair and make sure I stay within the five minutes. But I'd like not to be charged for that outburst.

(LAUGHTER)

ABIZAID: Actually, it makes the ambassador and I feel right at home.

(LAUGHTER)

WARNER: First, Ambassador Bremer, each time I listen to you I develop a greater respect for your professionalism and the team that you're with, recognizing so many of them have been uprooted very quickly. And like the men and women of the armed forces, you're all volunteers. And well done to you and indeed those of the coalition with whom you work.

WARNER: And on that point, I'd like to start off. The perception is given that this money will be under the control, adopted by the Congress, of yourself. But my understanding is that, each day, other departments and agencies of our government, and indeed the coalition partners, have a very strong voice in how these funds are utilized.

Would you address that point?

BREMER: Yes, that's correct. Mr. Chairman, I have on my coalition staff now representatives of 17 other countries. I have representatives from 15 executive branches here from Washington. And there are more coming. It is very much an integrated effort by not only the United States government but also coalition governments.

WARNER: Good.

On the question of the discussion by many and, I must say, well- intentioned members of Congress, with regard to structuring some type of security for the $21.3 billion part of this budget request, I personally think -- I don't know that there's a real precedent in history. I would hope that we could do further research on the comments made by my distinguished colleague about the Marshall Plan and whether portions of that had some security interest.

But what concerns me is, number one, you pointed out the first part, the debt now owed Iraq, their total inability for the foreseeable future to do anything about that. There is no legal structure in Iraq by which it could be a borrowing authority, in my understanding, until the constitution is adopted, the election is held.

But perhaps the most disturbing potential problem is that we would play into the hands of those who have repeatedly, since day one, said the coalition forces are not there for peace, it is not there to allow democracy to begin, they are there to seize the oil.

Do you share that view?

BREMER: Yes, I do. And the oil revenues are a sensitive subject in Iraq, quite understandably. It is the major source of government revenues.

And in the new foreign direct investment law, which the Governing Council asked me to sign a week ago today, they have explicitly excluded foreign investment in the oil sector for now, until they have an elected government which can decide how they want to proceed with oil.

BREMER: And I think we have to be respectful of that political sensitivity.

WARNER: But there's been a unique partnership between your organization and that of the coalition military headed up by General Abizaid. Let's just have a frank assessment: Is that working?

BREMER: Yes, sir, it is unique, because the challenge of stabilizing Iraq after the war is a challenge of bringing together the civilian capabilities and the ongoing military capabilities in a way that is really require challenging.

The commander of the joint task force in Iraq, General Sanchez, has colocated his headquarters with mine. Each of us have as our first meeting of the day meeting together to discuss the plans for what happened overnight, what the plans for the day are.

It is a totally integrated operation. All of the public affairs people who work for the military, for example, work under my direction.

WARNER: Do you share those views, General Abizaid?

ABIZAID: Sir, I was the person that said to General Sanchez, "Move your headquarters and colocate with Ambassador Bremer."

WARNER: Let me throw out an idea that indeed I read a good deal about and done some of my own study. I see the presence of Dr. Walter Slocombe here, who has been before this committee many times, and I commend him and his team for what they're doing to try and construct a security arrangement, drawing up on former Iraqi military and the likewise.

Are you giving consideration to perhaps utilizing this force earlier than anticipated as a part of the integrated security to augment the police?

The problems that I see and others are that our soldiers do not have the language capabilities; maybe some have fragments. There's always the presence of a U.S. uniform facing the disparate elements that threaten them.

Would it not be better if quickly you could put together from the remnants of their former military -- and perhaps other sources -- an Iraqi force to go out and we change roles; rather than the occasional Iraqi being an adjunct person to our military forces that we are more or less the advisers to an Iraqi force? Is that achievable?

BREMER: Yes, it is. And if you look at the president's request, $5.1 billion of it is directed at security, and as part of that, we intend to raise four separate Iraqi forces. The new Iraqi army is one which you mentioned. If this supplemental is approved, we'll be able to produce an Iraqi army of 27 battalions by a year from now...

WARNER: The point is, can it be now used to confront the threats?

BREMER: That's right.

WARNER: So this is a new concept in this plan.

BREMER: That's right.

WARNER: We want to bring that to the attention of all.

BREMER: That's right.

WARNER: A new initiative.

BREMER: That's right. And there's an Iraqi civil defense corps which is also in this supplemental; also puts Iraqis in place of Americans.

WARNER: My time is up.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you.

General Abizaid, in your opening statement, on page three, you point to a more dangerous threat from radical Islamist extremism than before.

Just to quickly read this, because you did not in your oral presentation, "The enemy's ideological base, financial networks and information networks remain strong. Indeed, the demographic and economic conditions that breed terrorists may be worsening, and those conditions are heightening the ideological fervor associated with radical Islamist extremism."

In view of that assessment, what's the strategy for dealing with this threat -- this worsening threat, apparently?

ABIZAID: Of course, Senator, what I was referring to there is not specifically Iraq, but the broader Middle East. And I think, actually, if you look across the Muslim world, all the way from Morocco to Indonesia, you see that there are ideological movements that are very anti-Western, that are very anti-American, in particular. And while we are having good tactical success against this phenomenon, we are continuing to see growing strength in it.

ABIZAID: Now, having said that, I do believe that we have to continue to re-evaluate the way that we will approach this internationally -- not only internationally, but also interagency.

LEVIN: Would it help if the governing council requested or endorsed foreign troop participation in addition to what's already there, particularly from Muslim countries, in terms of getting Muslim countries' troops there? Would it help if the governing council went on record as endorsing it?

ABIZAID: As far as my point is concerned, yes, it would.

LEVIN: Have we asked the governing council, Ambassador, to do that?

BREMER: We've had some discussions with them, Senator.

LEVIN: Have we asked them to do that?

BREMER: Yes...

LEVIN: Are they willing to do that?

BREMER: We have -- let me try to be more precise. Some of the countries that have been talked about have expressed an interest in either having the U.N. resolution pass or in having a governing council invitation. We've discussed those two in combination with the governing council.

LEVIN: And what has been their response to requesting other countries to send foreign troops, including Muslim countries?

BREMER: Their response has been varied. Some of them are in favor of doing that; some of them are more reluctant. I would say at the moment...

LEVIN: Will they be taking a vote on this issue?

BREMER: I'm sorry?

LEVIN: Will they be taking a vote?

BREMER: They might.

LEVIN: Would you encourage that?

BREMER: Yes, but I don't run it. Senator, I just saw...

(CROSSTALK)

LEVIN: You would encourage it, though?

BREMER: Of course. Absolutely.

LEVIN: You will ask them then...

BREMER: I have encouraged it.

LEVIN: And one other question about the council, and that has to do with the seven steps which you've outlined. Have they formally endorsed those seven steps?

BREMER: The majority of the governing council endorses those steps.

LEVIN: Have they taken a formal action to endorse them?

BREMER: No, but they've acted in conjunction with it, because they're following it.

LEVIN: I think it would be very helpful if you ask the governing council, since you've appointed it -- it's supposed to represent the people of Iraq -- if they formally endorsed the seven steps which you have laid out as what you believe to be the correct path. Makes sense to me, but I don't live there, and it would be very helpful, it seems to me, to avoid this impression that somehow or other we are laying down the law and we are laying down the path, and we are doing this and we are doing that, if you ask the governing council to formally endorse those seven steps. I'm just asking you simply would you do that.

BREMER: Yes.

LEVIN: Now, on the question of Iraqi oil, we were told by Secretary Wolfowitz a number of months ago that Iraqi oil would be used in the reconstruction, I believe he said in a matter of months. Why should not we ask the governing council to pledge some of their future surplus now to collateralize it?

LEVIN: We want them to control their oil, right? We don't want to control their oil. They control it.

Now the only answer that I've heard to that is, "Well, there's no government there that can technically make that pledge to collateralize that oil."

BREMER: Right. Correct.

LEVIN: But there is a government that is being asked to put up $20 billion that could guarantee that pledge. That's us.

And if the governing council were asked to pledge a portion of its future oil surplus -- it would be up to them, but if they were asked to make that commitment, to show just how badly they want to contribute financially to their reconstruction, which would help, it seems to me, us here in terms of persuading the American people, "Hey, we're not alone in this, the Iraqi are pledging their own oil surplus," we could then, if we simply guaranteed that pledge, help to collateralize that and produce current funds for reconstruction.

Will you at least consider that possibility?

BREMER: Thank you, Senator.

Yes, I will consider it.

Let me just clarify one point. Effectively, oil revenues will be used for reconstruction next year because oil revenues are funding the 2004 Iraqi budget. We may have a couple of hundred million dollars in revenues from taxes, but effectively oil revenue's what we've got.

In the Iraqi budget for next year, approved by the Iraqi ministers and the governing council, there are some reconstruction projects. If I remember correctly, it's on the order of $1.5 billion; it's not a lot of money.

So the question of what you called excess revenues really doesn't arise...

LEVIN: I said future...

BREMER: No, I know. I just wanted to, sort of, put some numbers around it.

It doesn't really arise until 2005, by which time we hope that the revenues will generate about $5 billion a year more than are needed for expenses. So the question arises in a couple of years.

LEVIN: I think you missed my point. But my time is up.

Thank you.

WARNER: Senator McCain?

MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid for the outstanding work they are doing. And I know that they share our sorrow and regret over the murder of Akila Hashimi, who served her nation and the cause of freedom with valor and distinction. And her name will go down, I think, as an Iraqi hero. We regret her loss.

With only five minutes, I'd like to try to get in two questions real quick.

One is that we had an interesting poll this morning. Seven out of 10 Iraqis say they expect their country and their personal lives to be better five years from now; 66 percent versus 27 percent do not want an Islamic government; 74 to 18 percent Saddam's henchmen should be punished; and two-thirds of the Iraqis say that the coalition troops should stick around for at least another year.

I think that helps us put into perspective -- that's the first significant poll I've seen the Iraqi -- I think that's an indicator of great success and a testimony to the magnificent job that is being accomplished.

But my first question, Ambassador Bremer, suppose that in the very unlikely situation we decided not to extend this reconstruction aid -- my distinct view is that the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people are still up for grabs -- what would be the implications, as briefly as possible, of our failure to approve not just the military aid but most important the reconstruction aid, which most impacts the Iraqi people most significantly?

BREMER: Well, it would be directly contrary to America's interest -- obviously, it would be contrary to the Iraqi people's interest, but it would be contrary to our interest, because it would create a situation of much greater insecurity. I think we would find more of the population turning against us. I think we would find more attacks on coalition forces.

Eventually, Iraq would, as I suggested in my opening statement, recede into a situation of chaos, not dissimilar from what was experienced in Lebanon in the 1970s and '80s, and we would find another breeding ground for terrorists. So I think it's a rather grim outlook.

MCCAIN: You share that view, General Abizaid?

ABIZAID: Sir, I do. I think it's very important that we move together on all fronts...

MCCAIN: And quickly.

ABIZAID: ... simultaneously.

MCCAIN: And quickly. Time is not on our side, is that correct?

ABIZAID: I agree.

MCCAIN: Thank you. I'm a little concerned to see the article today: "Pentagon May Call up Additional Reservists." Quote, "'We've had one piece of bad news after another to share with families this year, and at some point, it's got to take a toll,' said one senior Army National Guard official, who spoke on the condition that his name not be used. 'Our people don't sign up to be full-time soldiers. If they did, they would join the regular army.'"

General Abizaid, in Sunday's New York Times, Tom Friedman wrote, "The resistance from the Saddamists in Iraq is getting stronger, not weaker. It's becoming so strong that a new war needs to be mounted against the Saddamist forces in the Sunni Triangle near Baghdad."

Friedman also wrote that an Iraqi internal security force is the only way to fully rout out the Baathist threat. And I think we both agree on that.

When do you expect to deploy such an Iraqi force in sufficient numbers to go on the offensive against the Baathists? Until that time, don't you think we need more American forces, in addition to better intelligence from Iraqis and aggressive training of an Iraqi security force?

ABIZAID: Well, thank you, Senator.

Actually, we are on the offensive in the Ar Ramadi-Fallujah area, and we just moved in the 82nd Airborne Division into that area. We moved them in there, along with one brigade from the 82nd, plus a brigade from the 1st Infantry Division.

ABIZAID: You will see an upturn in combat in the Ar Ramadi- Fallujah area, no doubt about it, and you probably already have.

There are many Iraqis in what we call the Iraqi civil defense corps that are with them. They are not fully capable yet. In about four months, we'll have about 20 battalions that are fairly capable, serving alongside our forces.

I believe that the offensive action that we are undertaking, the increase that we've had over time with Iraqi forces of both police forces, the Iraqi civil defense forces and others, gives us the opportunity to maintain a stable environment to the best of our ability and also conduct combat operations.

I am confident that we've got enough troops at the right time, right now. I talk to my commanders in the field about this all the time. And I think we're OK, Senator.

MCCAIN: My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Senator Kennedy.

KENNEDY: Thank you very much.

And to Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid, we all want to congratulate you and are very aware that your lives are at risk, as well as those you represent, and we have enormous admiration and respect for those individuals. That's why we believe it's so important to get it right.

Part of the trouble, I think, for many of us, not only as members but also our constituents, is to hear sort of the rosy picture that you're describing, Ambassador Bremer, which is very similar to what the secretary of defense has described, and also read about what is happening on the ground and try to understand the difference.

We read in the New York Times, September 17th, "New intelligence assessments are warning us the United States' most formidable foe in Iraq in months ahead may be the resentment of ordinary Iraqis, increasingly hostile to American military occupation. Good will is wearing thin. Indications are that hostility is going well beyond the Sunni heartland of Iraq, which has been the main settlement" (ph).

Just two days ago, the New York Times said, "Ambassador Bremer came to tell the president, among others, that the situation was bleak in Baghdad."

We hear one rosy story from you; we read something else.

We look at the newspapers this morning. And this is, I think, the indictment of the administration's current policy. First of all, in The Washington Post: "Bush fails to gain pledges of troops or funds in Iraq." We look at the front page of the New York Times, here: "The American leading the hunt for banned weapons in Iraq says his team has not found any of the unconventional weapons cited by the Bush administration as the principal reason for going to war."

KENNEDY: Notice on the -- look on the front page, again, of The Washington Post: "Crossed Wires Deprive Iraqis Of Electric System. War plans Ignored Worn Infrastructure."

Many of us who were concerned about the rush to war by this administration anticipated this various product that you are going to find out, the worn-out infrastructure. Now you're saying to us, "Unless we do this, it's going to be more and more of a breeding ground for terrorists." Well, welcome to the fact that we're finding that out now, because many of us believed that that was going to be the case previously.

And then if you read in the New York Times, as has been mentioned, "Stretched Pentagon says it may need to call up thousands more reservists to serve in Iraq." And you wonder why there is concern that we don't have a plan.

This is what we have as the plan from the administration that was provided to us. It's 28 pages. It's a draft form, "working document, July 23rd." This is an insult to the troops and an insult to the Congress. We want to know where the policy is -- where the policy is.

You could just review some of these items -- in security: "August 1st to October 3rd, locate and secure and eliminate WMDs. November 3rd to January 1st, continue to locate and secure weapons of mass destruction. February 4th onward, continue to locate and secure, eliminate weapons of mass destruction."

Is this the best that this administration could do in terms of developing a plan that is going to have not only the support of the American people, but the international community, and that offers us the best hope to provide some relief to our troops and to bring democracy to Iraq and hopefully bring our troops home with honor?

Mr. Ambassador?

BREMER: Thank you, Senator.

First, just let me react to one of those citations, which I somewhere missed about I was coming back to say there was -- the situation was bleak. I don't know where that came from. It certainly was not...

KENNEDY: That was in the New York Times.

BREMER: Well...

KENNEDY: Elizabeth U. Miller (ph), New York Times. I believe it's 8/14.

BREMER: OK.

(CROSSTALK)

BREMER: All I'm saying is that's not my message. Anybody who quotes me as saying the situation is bleak is inaccurate.

(CROSSTALK)

KENNEDY: ... in fairness to you, just indicate, and I'll ask that the record be in, "Iraq (inaudible) Bush aides on edge."

KENNEDY: And then it says: "The new concern began this summer, one official said, with Bremer, the American, traveled to Washington to tell Mr. Bush, among others, the situation was bleak in Baghdad. He needed billions of additional dollars for the kind of security and reconstruction.

"Led the administration to begin a troop withdrawal within a year. Although no administration official says so explicitly, the White House goal is to show substantial improvement in Iraq before next fall's elections."

Next fall's elections, that bothers a lot of us.

That's completely -- that's inaccurate?

BREMER: Yes, sir. That bothers me as much as it bothers you.

KENNEDY: OK. You're saying that you...

BREMER: It's not part of my considerations.

KENNEDY: ... didn't talk -- that you didn't have the conversation with the president?

BREMER: I never said the situation in Baghdad was bleak. I've had many conversations with the president. I'm just objecting to somebody else characterizing how I report to the president.

We have difficulties in Iraq. If we didn't have difficulties, I wouldn't be here before you asking the American taxpayer to put another $20 billion up.

And we've heard some citations from some polls. I do not believe it is accurate to say that resentment is growing. I think it is correct to say that we need to move urgently now to head off a problem of not being able to have essential services and security for Iraq.

The main thrust of this request, Senator, as you have pointed out, is for security to get the Iraqis to take more of the security on board and to restore essential services. That's the main thrust. And I believe it's urgent. I believe we must do it. In answer to the previous question from Senator McCain, I said I think if we don't do it, the consequences for American troops and American interests will be severe.

KENNEDY: Thank you.

WARNER: Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McCain talked about the poll that was out yesterday. And I wasn't at all surprised when I read that this morning that 74 percent of the people believe that they should be punished, they appreciate our presence there and getting them out from under tyranny. And this is consistent with informal polls that we heard about when you and I were together -- all of us were together over in Baghdad.

And I suspect that the majority of the members sitting before you in the United States Senate here at this table have been to Iraq. And I would suggest that the senior senator from Massachusetts pay Iraq a visit, talk to the troops, talk to the people, talk to the citizens who come up to us in the street thanking us for what we've done in this liberation.

I -- it disturbs me a little bit when we have a hearing like this -- and we've had many. And I agree with the chairman: I appreciate so much your making yourselves available, both of you.

INHOFE: But people are watching. And when you hear the term, which has been mentioned three times so far since we started this hearing, "cut and run," I just hope that the American people know that probably I would suspect the majority of us up here would say that if there is one thing that should be taken off the table, it would be cut and run.

Senator Akaka and I started the Army caucus a couple of years ago that yesterday morning we had General Schoomaker, the new chief of staff. He made a statement. He said, "This war is about the will of the American people." He said that, "Those attacking our troops are attacking our will, and we cannot afford to cut and run."

And I strongly suspect that now the American people, after having seen the results of cutting and running, which is essentially what happened in 1991, realize, after looking at the mass graves, after knowing about the 328 kids under 12 years old lined up and executed summarily, about the school buses where the kids were buried alive -- I can recall that first freedom flight in 1991 after the war was over, several of us -- about five of us went over there. In fact, they didn't even know the war was over. But seeing the torture chambers, seeing a little boy with his ear cut off for carrying around an American flag, I don't think any American should ever think about cutting and running.

Ambassador Bremer, when we met, you provided us with a rough time line. And it happened coincidentally that while we were there, they had the bombing of the U.N. facility. And, of course, obviously that changes time lines. And I applaud you for your event-driven time line and would encourage you not to come up and be forced into any kind of a time-driven time line because that's not the way it works over there. This has to happen, and it has to happen right.

General Abizaid, I've read some things in some of the newspapers about the 101st Airborne in the north and the 1st Marine Division in the south and perhaps some kind of a lack of coordination with the Coalition Provisional Authority. Do you have any comments to make about that?

ABIZAID: Sir, I think that the 1st Marine Division, of course, just recently left. And the 101st has been up in the north in Mosul for a long time.

In the early days, it was clear that we had the capacity to do a lot of work. And so, I wouldn't call it lack of coordination. I would say before Ambassador Bremer got there, that they were essentially moving out on their own azimuth to achieve what they thought was the right thing to do.

ABIZAID: And over time, Ambassador Bremer has set the policies and we've had to bring the policies in line. Sometimes that necessarily hasn't been in the interest of what some of the commanders up there wanted to do, but they know who they -- whose policy line they follow.

So I think today coordination is good. Ambassador Bremer visits up there are the time with all the commanders, as do I. What the commanders want more than anything else is Ambassador Bremer's money.

INHOFE: Thank you, General.

Ambassador Bremer, there was some discussion over there when we were there about whether or not the Coalition Provisional Authority has the adequate organizational infrastructure to accomplish your goals and missions. Do you have any comments to make about that?

BREMER: I think it is the case that the buildup of the civilian part of the coalition authority was somewhat slow in the May-June time frame.

But since the visit of, for example, John Hamre, who was over doing a study on behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld -- he was there in late June, and noted that we didn't have enough people in the Coalition Provisional Authority -- I have now got six times as many people working for me as I did on July 1st.

INHOFE: Thank you very much.

And then lastly -- my time has expired, but, General Abizaid, Senator McCain talked about the force structure there in your area. I would like to have you, for the record, since there isn't time in my time here, to respond to my concern and the concern of many people at this table that the overall end strength and the overall force structure, in terms of all the way around the world and other potential problems we might have, and with specific emphasis on the Guard and Reserves -- so if you could give me your analysis of that for the record I'd appreciate it very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, very much for asking that question be put into the record.

Senator Akaka?

And I appreciate the cooperation of all members. We will be able to get to a second round.

AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my thanks to Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid for your great service to our country. And I want to tell you that we owe both of you a debt of gratitude for your efforts under very, very difficult circumstances.

And I want to ask that my statement be included in the record, Mr. Chairman.

General Abizaid, I understand that the supplemental request assumes that there will be a continued presence of -- already committed, two multinational divisions and possible contributions of up to two additional divisions from other nations.

What are your expectations about the rotation base for the international forces? And are the coalition members expected to continue their source future rotations at the same level, and if so how realistic are the expectations to be?

ABIZAID: Well, thank you, Senator.

The two multinational divisions that are currently serving, the British multinational division in the south and the Polish multinational division in the central south, are both expected to continue to source forces over time. Certainly, the British will continue as long as the mission continues; so I've been assured by British military leaders at the highest level. And they also assured me that the members of their coalition will continue to bring troops in as a part of the British force.

Now, the Polish forces are a little bit harder to say, although it's clear that the Poles are committed. I talked to the Polish commander a couple of days ago down in Agila (ph). He told me that his nation is committed for the long run. You know, it's hard for me to say exactly what that means, but I believe certainly the Polish part of that contingent.

But as you know, that is a very large mixed contingent. There's a brigade of Spanish troops, a brigade of Ukrainian troops that form the core of the division. I could not say for sure that they are here beyond a year, but I believe that most of the nations that are part of the Polish division are committed.

As far as a third division is concerned, I have been hopeful that we can get a third division -- and as I have said to the committee before, I have been hopeful that we can get a third Muslim division, led by either Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans or another major Islamic country that has a large degree of military capacity. We could certainly use them in a lot of different places and we're hopeful that over time they will be able to include a third multinational division on the force.

As of now, we don't have that commitment, which is one of the reasons you see CENTCOM saying to the joint staff that we need to maintain our commitment of forces of total brigades, which has then caused them to go to the National Guard and reserve component to look for how they're going to source.

AKAKA: Mr. Chairman, I also want to indicate that I will certainly support additional funding for troops in Iraq and wherever it's necessary.

General Abizaid, we have not received very many details about the level of effort -- and I'm shifting a little bit -- the level of effort involved in Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. Can you provide a brief description of the mission there, its relationship to operations elsewhere in the theater and how many people are involved?

Acknowledging that, of course, you cannot predict the future, but do you expect this mission will remain at about the same level of effort during fiscal year 2004 or will it be growing?

ABIZAID: Senator, it will be my recommendation to the department that Joint Task Force Horn of Africa continues its mission. There's about 1,400 people on that task force. They're based in Djibouti. They primarily work with the local nations in the Horn of Africa to increase their capacity against terrorism.

For example, the other day I was in Yemen visiting with our special forces trainers that are working with the Yemeni army to increase their special forces capacity. I've also seen them do civil military projects and training projects with the Ethiopians and the Kenyans.

ABIZAID: It is a small task force that doesn't have a direct combat role as yet. They do have the capacity to execute a combat mission should a terrorist target appear in their region, but for the most part they are designed to increase the confidence and capacity of those nations in the Horn of Africa that are beginning to see the influx of some foreign fighters.

AKAKA: Mr. Chairman, my time...

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.

AKAKA: ... has expired, but I want to clarify, Mr. Chairman, that I have the utmost respect for my colleague, Senator Inhofe, who is co-chair with me of the Senate Army Caucus.

In response to his comment about members suggesting that, quote, "cut and run" -- we cut and run, I've not heard that sentiment on this side. I believe we have been very thoughtful on how best to support our troops.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Roberts?

ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a former newspaper publisher and editor, and as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I would make the observation that, while the New York Times and the Washington Post are very respected newspapers and fountains of self-asserted knowledge in this city, they are not 100 percent accurate in terms of actionable intelligence. We don't rely on the Times and the Post exclusively for intelligence, in terms of the decisions that are being made.

Let me say that I think the key to this hearing is something called staying power and resolve. And I'm going to quote Winston Churchill, who said something after Pearl Harbor -- we call 9/11 the Pearl Harbor on the global war on terrorism; I think that's accurate.

He said, "Silly people, that was the description many gave in discounting the force of the United States. Some said they were soft; others that they would never be united, that they would never come to grips, they would never stand bloodletting, that their system of government and democracy would paralyze their war effort.

"Now we will see the weakness of this numerous but remote, wealthy and very talkative people. But I have studied American Civil War fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark made to me years before: 'The United States is like a gigantic boiler; once the fire of freedom is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate.' It is a matter of resolve."

I am just wondering, in terms of the criticism -- not wondering, I'm very concerned that if the criticism is so harsh as to create the impression of lack of resolve, I wonder what goes through the minds of President Karzai, President Musharraf, Prince Saud, King Abdullah, President Mubarak, not only our men and women serving in uniform, but the very terrorists who are killing our troops and their fellow Iraqis. And it concerns me a great deal in that I think we have a leaky boiler, and I think we better fix that leaky boiler real quick, and, as Senator Akaka has pointed out, make doggone sure what we're saying is interpreted in the right way in regards to the global war on terrorism.

So, General Abizaid, I think you put the Iraqi challenge into perspective when you said, and I quote, "If we can't be successful here, we won't be successful in the global war on terrorism."

ROBERTS: So based on your expertise and experience, can you give us a sense of how the Baathists, and the foreign fighter terrorists in particular, would benefit from the adoption of a mere timetable? We've heard a lot about a timetable here for the coalition departure, as opposed to a set of milestones such as outlined in the much- criticized Ambassador Bremer's CPA strategy that did come to members over two months ago. What would be the effect on the global war on terrorism?

ABIZAID: Senator, I believe that you always run the risk when you set a timetable to send the wrong signals. We need to have a conditions-based strategy that allows us to get at our objectives in a coherent and a synchronized fashion. And I believe with regard to Iraq, that militarily and politically we are probably lashed up better there than any place I've been before.

With regard to the broader war on terrorism, I think we have to continue to look at the various movements throughout the theater that show the danger continues to grow and we need to develop a more unified international and interagency strategy to deal with the broader problem.

BREMER: Senator, may I pick up on something you just said?

ROBERTS: Certainly.

BREMER: The fire of freedoms are lighted in Iraq and I've got -- we have newspapers here today. There are 186 new newspapers since liberation. These are two of them. This particular one happens to be very critical of me and the CPA -- that's freedom of the press. This particular one happens to support us. But there are 184 other newspapers being produced in Iraq today. There are 85 new radio stations. There are more than 20 television stations.

The fire of freedom, that Churchill talked about, has been lighted in Iraq and we need to nurture it forward to democracy.

ABIZAID: Senator, if I just might add one thing, this notion of will and how we're seen in the theater -- I talked to President Karzai and President Musharraf and others -- that the best manifestation of our will in the theater is the work that our young soldiers do out there. And when you see that work that a young captain does on the Afghan-Pakistani border and you see the confidence in his eyes, you know there is no problem with understanding our will to get the job done. And I believe those leaders see that.

ROBERTS: My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Pryor?

PRYOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Bremer, I'd like to follow up on a couple of statements that you made in your opening comments, if I may. One was you said something to the effect that Iraq is the focal point of the global war on terrorism. I can't remember the exact words that you used, but that was the gist of it. Tell the committee what you mean by that.

BREMER: What I mean by that -- and I think the term I used, or anyway meant to use, was it's really become the front -- the main front in the war on terrorism.

What has happened, Senator, is that Saddam Hussein supported terrorism. He was identified as a state sponsor of terrorism for almost 20 years.

BREMER: He played host to terrorists to Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas. There were connections with Al Qaida over the last decade.

There was particularly a strong connection with an Al Qaida- related group called Ansar al-Islam. You may recall, in the early days of the war, we attacked a camp in the northeast of Iraq. We killed quite a few of the terrorists, unfortunately not enough of them. Several hundred of them escaped into Iran and what we found was they reconstituted themselves and started to reintegrate back into Iraq in roughly early July.

We now estimate that there are several hundred of these trained, professional Al Qaida-type terrorists in Ansar al-Islam back in Iraq. We have captured several dozen Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaida terrorists in our military operations. So we have a serious terrorist threat in Iraq.

PRYOR: Now has that terrorist activity increased since U.S. troops have been present there?

BREMER: I would say it has increased, as I suggested, since they reconstituted and came back in. And the reconstitution seems to have taken them a couple of months. And they started coming back in July.

PRYOR: What were the terrorists doing before we came into Iraq because, apparently, they were not attacking the Saddam Hussein regime? What were they doing there?

BREMER: Well, they were supported by the Saddam Hussein regime. What they were doing was killing Kurds.

PRYOR: OK. So it's terrorism mostly against the Kurds.

BREMER: It was. It is now a very serious threat to not only us but we've seen attacks against the U.N. We've seen attacks against religious leaders. We don't know at this time who conducted those attacks, but we certainly have seen an increase in terrorism.

PRYOR: And have you seen an influx of new individual terrorists and new terrorist organizations in Iraq since we've been there?

BREMER: It's a bit hard to parse it.

We know that during the war a number of countries sent what they said were volunteers to fight along side Saddam, foreign fighters. We have captured 278 of these people since the war. Most of them are Syrians. We have seen rat lines established across the Syrian border where we have more of these people coming in, foreign terrorists and foreign fighters.

PRYOR: Now let me switch gears to another thing you mentioned in your -- believe it was your opening statement; it may have been in response to a question -- and that was you mentioned you wanted to have transparency in the money allocated to rebuild Iraq. And you said something to the effect -- again not trying to quote you exactly but pretty close here -- you said that all the contracts in the future will be by competitive bid. Is that right?

BREMER: That's correct.

PRYOR: My question for you is have all the contracts in the past been by competitive bid?

BREMER: Senator, my understanding is that 95 percent of the contracts that we have let have been by what is called a full and fair, open, competitive bid.

PRYOR: OK, 95 percent of the contracts or 95 percent of the dollar amounts?

BREMER: Contracts.

PRYOR: Of the contracts.

Do you routinely meet with the private companies who are operating in Iraq today?

BREMER: Do you mean the American...

PRYOR: Yes, the Americans.

BREMER: Yes, I do.

PRYOR: You do? And how routine are those meetings?

BREMER: Well, one of the major contractors is heavily responsible for our efforts on restoring power, and I meet with them every morning.

PRYOR: OK. Which contractor is that?

BREMER: Bechtel.

PRYOR: Bechtel.

And do other members of your staff meet with contractors as well?

BREMER: Oh, yes. Sure.

PRYOR: And how, in your view, have the contractors been performing in Iraq to date?

BREMER: I think they've been performing very well. You know, one must remember it's not an easy environment. There are security concerns.

But given everything, we expected to see these big contracts begin to really develop some momentum toward the end of August. It takes months to get a big contract going. And, in fact, that happened; we're really seeing a buildup here in the last couple of weeks.

PRYOR: You know, specifically --and I'm out of time here, but specifically, there have been a lot of questions asked in the U.S. about Halliburton being in Iraq.

PRYOR: And I was just curious about what they're going over there and how large of a contract they have and whether it was offered by competitive bid.

BREMER: My understanding is that there is a Halliburton contract. I think the amount in that contract is $1.2 billion, but I may be off a bit. And their main job is working with the Army Corps of Engineers to restore the oil field production.

PRYOR: And was that by competitive bid?

BREMER: No, I think that was not by competitive bid. I believe that was a contract that was let even before the war.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Sessions?

SESSIONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I too am concerned about the nature of some of the criticisms we've had from people who oppose this war from the beginning, even though we voted over three-fourths to support it. The president supports it. The American people have supported it. We are committed as a nation and it is important that we have staying power and go through it.

I just want to take a minute to say how much I appreciate Chairman Warner's leadership. He's been a person who puts America first. When President Clinton was in office, he supported him on every single foreign policy matter that came up that I know of, because he puts America first.

He served in the Navy as a young sailor in World War II and Korea and was in the Department of Defense, in Vietnam and secretary of the Navy.

But I think he set the example -- and the Marines, too, Marine Pat Roberts says -- he set an example for us that politics ought to stop at the water's edge. And legitimate criticism is fine, but some of this criticism, in my view, has gone beyond legitimate to destructive comments.

I want to be on the record about that.

I want to ask quickly, General Abizaid, you, I think Alabama has one of the highest numbers of reservists and guardsmen in Iraq. I've met with two of those units directly. There's an article that has been out quoting General Pace, I believe, as saying that we may call up additional reservists.

One thing I'd like for you to clarify. It suggests in those headlines that we're going to be having an increased number of American troops in Iraq and those would be guard and reservists. As I understand it, it's saying in the future, to replace existing troops, we may need to call up more guard and reservists. Can you clarify that?

ABIZAID: Sir, in order to rotate the troops that are there, we will call up additional guard and reserves. They will not increase the overall number of troops.

SESSIONS: The headline suggests we are calling up more guard and reserves because we are having a terrible time in Iraq and we've got to increase our troops strength is not accurate?

ABIZAID: That is not accurate. But, as you know, Senator, we cannot do the job without the Guard and Reserve.

SESSIONS: You are certainly correct, and I was so proud of the troops that I met with. On active duty too -- but I was particularly had the opportunity to be with some Guard units that are performing superbly.

With regard to this supplemental and the need for -- Ambassador Bremer, you suggested to me when I was in Iraq the critical need of speed. Is it your view that if we delay stepping forward with this infrastructure improvement, particularly electricity, that it jeopardizes General Abizaid's soldiers among other risks that we undertake?

BREMER: Yes. As I said earlier, Senator, I think it will increase the security threat to our men and women in the armed forces and to the Iraqi people.

SESSIONS: In other words, it could undermine confidence of the Iraqi people and the ability of the coalition leadership to be effective.

BREMER: I believe that's correct.

SESSIONS: And that could be destructive in a number of different ways.

BREMER: It would be destructive and it would be basically -- and as I said in my opening statement -- leaving the job unfinished that we started.

SESSIONS: Now I know you about gotten electricity back up to prewar level, but there's still a -- what? -- 2,000 megawatt shortage.

BREMER: Exactly.

SESSIONS: Is that the right word?

BREMER: You remember the briefing.

SESSIONS: And, Ambassador Bremer, our main contractor, Bechtel, has received a lot of money on this and I'm not sure they understand this is life and death for American soldiers. People in this area right now are up in arms because electricity in some areas have been off eight days.

Are you confident that this corporation is intensely interested in moving quickly? And would you be prepared to terminate their involvement if they don't show the sufficient intensity of interest in bringing this electricity on-line?

BREMER: Yes. Let me just make three points.

I am convinced they are moving very quickly; it is the major part of their contract.

Secondly, we have a group brought in at General Abizaid's request and it's with his assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers to undertake an urgent additional effort on power over the next three months.

And of course, in the supplemental, we have almost $6 billion for power generation. That will be done in a free and open bid -- we'll see who bids on it -- that'll be an open contract.

But, of course, if Bechtel or any contractor were not performing up to the standards of the contract, we would not hesitate to take the appropriate action.

SESSIONS: Well, I thank you for your service and leadership. I believe we need to keep the heat on everybody on that issue and if they don't perform, they ought to be out of there.

Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Ben Nelson?

BEN NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We appreciate very much the opportunity to discuss these critical issues with you.

One of the concerns that my colleague from Alabama just mentioned is the further call-up of Guard and or Reserve units. During their reappointment hearing in July, I mentioned to Generals Myers and Pace the concern that I have about rotation deployment and not knowing the date when the deployment is to end.

With these future call-ups, can we be assured that there will be a termination date, that they will be communicated to the Guard and Reserve units so that they know how long the deployment will be, even if it is extended?

Thus far, the criticisms that have come from the family more than from the troops is that they don't know, and they can't plan accordingly. Their lives are on hold, their jobs are on hold, their potential advancements are on hold. Can we assure them with these future call-ups that we can communicate to them when the deployment will end, even if extended?

ABIZAID: Well, thanks very much for that, Senator.

One of the most important thing for any soldier to know is when are they coming home. They need to know that. And unfortunately, I can report to you that not all of them know that.

BEN NELSON: That's the problem.

ABIZAID: And it is a problem. I was out talking to reservists just the other day, not only in Baghdad, but also around the country and also in Qatar and other places.

ABIZAID: And there is a problem that the reservists do not understand when they're coming home because of the one-year boots-on- the-ground policy. Well, I've talked to the Army, our active forces, they know when they're coming home. Everybody that's there needs to know when they're coming home.

I take it as my responsibility, I will work it and I will ensure that the new guys coming in know when they're coming home. Nothing more important. It is not right now and it needs to be fixed.

BEN NELSON: Well, as much as I appreciate it, I know they'll appreciate it a lot more. So I thank you very much.

Ambassador Bremer, as you know, there has been more than a slight amount of criticism and major inquiry into what the cost of reconstruction might be and who's going to pay for it. Can you tell me if there's been any consideration of securitizing the oil revenues from Iraq over a period of time, subordinating the debt of the other countries that have not participated with us to date, to be able to make sure that the revenues pay for the Iraqi reconstruction don't come to the United States for other offsets but go to the reconstruction of Iraq?

Because if we're able to do something in that -- with that construct, it seems to me that we can avoid paying as much as we would otherwise pay out of American taxpayers' pockets for the reconstruction of Iraq.

BREMER: Thank you, Senator.

We had a brief conversation with Senator Levin about that earlier. On the face of it, the $200 billion or so which Iraq has in debt and reparations hanging over it is -- could be colored as odious debt. When you look at...

BEN NELSON: At least that.

BREMER: Well, but it's a legal term.

BEN NELSON: I know.

BREMER: And it apparently -- I'm not an attorney, but apparently it allows some possibilities for what you do with that debt.

BEN NELSON: Exactly.

BREMER: We have -- with our lead, the American government's lead, we have got agreement from the G-7 and, in turn, therefore through most of the large creditors of the government debt, an agreement to toll the debt servicing until the end of 2004. The intention is to try to come up with some kind of an agreement on a substantial reduction of Iraq's government debt by the end of next year. That is going to be a very, as it always is, complicated negotiation.

The reparations, which represent about $100 billion of the $200 billion, maybe a little less, is essentially a political issue that the Iraqi government is going to have to address at some point with its neighbors, because these reparations, of course, were incurred because of Saddam's aggressive wars against his neighbors. Mostly, the reparations are owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, particularly Kuwait.

The governing council has already begun to be seized of this issue, because it is so important, and has encouraged us and we have encouraged them. We agreed to start looking at a major effort to get rid of the reparations overhang.

But both of these efforts, Senator, which are laudable and which we support, are going to take time. They're going to take probably a year and a half, maybe even longer. The history of debt renegotiations is fraught with great delays, and we don't have a year and a half to wait.

Until that happens, in my view, it is not wise to seek to put any more debt on to the Iraqis, even if it's in the form of collateralizing future oil revenues. Which also has the disadvantages, I think Senator McCain may have mentioned, of making it look as if we -- even no matter how you do it -- we are in some way taking a lien against oil revenues and therefore that's why we fought the war.

So there's a political problem, and there's most of all a timing problem.

BEN NELSON: But there's a political problem here at home...

BREMER: I understand.

BEN NELSON: ... paying American money to reconstruct Iraq in light of loans to other countries, but no loan to the United States. I mean, I have a real difficult time -- I don't want to load them with debt, but they're already loaded with debt. I don't want to also unload the potential for debt by gifts from the American people in the form of taxes to reconstruct Iraq if we can avoid doing that through debt.

BREMER: I understand.

BEN NELSON: And it seems to me that there is a threshold here for subordination of the other debt if we want to push it hard to get reconstruction accomplished today in the midst of the turmoil that exists at the present time.

BREMER: I was...

BEN NELSON: Subordination is a common practice in the investment world, and this looks to me like if we're going to make it an investment for Iraq, we can invest their money in this way and it's not money coming to America, but it is not outflowing from America in that process.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator, very much.

BEN NELSON: Thank you. My time is expired.

WARNER: Senator Collins?

COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, General, let me begin my questions by thanking you for your extraordinary service. Your leadership and courage are inspiring, and I do want you to know that we do very much appreciate your efforts and your leadership.

COLLINS: I'm going to begin my questioning, Mr. Ambassador, by following up on the questions just raised by Senator Nelson.

I do not contest at all the urgent need for the supplemental and in the amount that you have recommended to us. But I think that it is appropriate for us to raise questions and look to see if there is a way to lessen the impact on the American taxpayer.

The American taxpayer is very generous. We understand that in the short term Iraq clearly cannot repay the money that is necessary to help construct the infrastructure that's needed to boost the economy. But in the long run Iraq will be a prosperous country. Therefore it seems logical to many of us to come up with a way to structure part of the construction costs as a long-term loan.

One of the arguments that you put forth this morning and previously is that Iraq is already burdened with an estimated $200 billion in debt and reparations from Saddam Hussein's regime. But what is often left out is that the largest holders of that debt are Saudi Arabia, France, Germany and Russia, and if the leaders of three of those nations had had their way, the Iraqi people would still be suffering under Saddam Hussein's regime.

The American people will be justifiably outraged if a dime of their money is essentially used to finance the repayment of debt to those nations. And I am very concerned that at a time when we're asking the American taxpayer to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure of Iraq, these countries will be repaid part of the debt that they're owed. So how are we going to prevent that situation from occurring?

BREMER: Thank you, Senator. I was going to answer this -- effectively, the debt is already subordinated because I said yesterday in testimony that not a penny of this money will go to repaying those debts.

COLLINS: Yes. But money...

BREMER: It isn't going to happen. In effect, no.

First of all, you got to remember, let's look at the timing. The debt servicing has been told (ph) until the end of 2004, so Iraq is under no pressure to pay any debt servicing or any debt repayments before the end of next year.

The supplemental we're asking for will be -- all of money will be obligated, and most of it will, in fact, be spent, before we even get to the end of 2004.

COLLINS: When I was in Iraq, I was struck by how little damage there really was from the war. So what we're talking about is not really rebuilding Iraq, we're talking about constructing an infrastructure that had been looted by Saddam for decades and that now is often the target of sabotage.

Wouldn't it give the Iraqi people more of an investment in their own infrastructure for us to structure at least part of the supplemental, just that part that is being used to rebuild the infrastructure, as a long-term loan?

I just don't see why the administration is so opposed to that. I'm not talking about a short-term loan. I'm talking about after Iraq is back on its feet and producing oil revenues and once again a prosperous, democratic country.

BREMER: Well, the part you identified is not a small matter. It's $15 billion out of the $20 billion. It's not a small loan.

I think it's important to remember that the -- I think in answer to an earlier question, the Iraqi people are already paying for their reconstruction through the -- somewhat the 2003 budget, but a lot in the 2004 budget. And as I suggested earlier, by 2005, they will be generating excess revenues, which will help fill the gap between the $60 billion the World Bank says is needed over the next four to five years and the $20 billion that we are asking for over the next 12 to 18 months. And so, the Iraqi people will, in fact, be paying that money.

But if you then say, "No, instead of that, you're going to have to use that $5 billion to pay back the American loan," then necessary investments that the Iraqis should be making in their country will not happen and we will not be closing the gap.

WARNER: Thank the senator.

BREMER: The numbers here -- the facts here are rather compelling, I think.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Clinton?

CLINTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with my colleagues in thanking each of you for your service.

Ambassador, when you appeared before the Democratic Caucus on Tuesday, you were specifically asked whether there would be any further requests for funding, beyond the $20 billion that has been requested now.

CLINTON: Your answer was, "No, this is it." Is that still your answer?

BREWER: Yes.

What I said was we will not ask for a supplemental like this. If there is any further need, I would anticipate -- and I made this point to the Appropriations Committee yesterday -- any further requests will be done through the normal appropriations process. In other words, it will come forward as part of the regular appropriations process, the 2005 budget presumably, early next year.

CLINTON: So, in other words, what many of us heard in the caucus, which is that the $20 billion was the end of the requests with respect to financial resources, means somewhat differently today that it was to be construed as not a request for additional supplementals but there may be additional money for reconstruction and related costs that would come through the regular budget system.

BREMER: Yes, Senator.

And I'm not trying to be cute here. There are a lot of unknowns. We know there's a big gap. We know that the World Bank says there's going to be a need of $60 billion over the next four to five years. We're asking for $20 billion here.

We're hoping we'll get a substantial amount from the donors' conference, but that's an unknown.

The Iraqi government is going to have to do its own 2005 budget, which hasn't yet been started. We just finished the 2004 budget.

So there are a number of moving parts here that will have to be pinned down in the next four to five months before the administration puts together its regular 2005 budget request. But I would anticipate if we need any more money, it will come through the regular appropriations process.

CLINTON: Well, Ambassador, I join with both Senator Collins and Senator Nelson in urging the administration to look for a way that there can be some assurance to the American people that we will be in line at least to receive payments from a future Iraqi government.

And given all of the talk about the Marshall Plan, I think it is instructive that President Truman required a dollar-for-dollar match from beneficiary countries. So we would hope that you would be more open to such a possibility than we've heard thus far.

I just want to ask a few specific questions. You know, also at the Democratic Caucus, you said that 535 copies of this coalition provisional authority plan were sent to members of Congress in July. I can only speak for myself; I didn't see it until this week.

But in looking at it, with respect to the security section and the specific points that are included -- to defeat internal arm threats, undermine support for paramilitaries, deter external aggression, locate secure, eliminate WMD, eliminate munitions caches -- we need more specific information. Those are all very laudable goals. We all want to do all of those things, and we know that you are working very hard to achieve them.

But let me just try to get on the record so that I have some benchmark against which to judge this. First, how many members of the Iraqi army are there at this moment?

BREMER: The Iraqi army has one battalion, which is about 750.

CLINTON: Seven hundred and fifty.

How many troops do you plan to train for the Iraqi army in the next year?

BREMER: You won't find it in that plan because we've updated it. We plan to have 27 battalions ready by August next year.

CLINTON: And for the purpose of the record, how many people are we talking about?

BREMER: Forty thousand.

CLINTON: Forty thousand within the next year?

BREMER: That's correct, Senator.

CLINTON: OK.

Now, in May or June, I know that there were press reports that while members of Congress were visiting Iraq, a previous estimate was that you would have 7,000 trained. How have you increased that number so dramatically?

BREMER: Because, Senator, one of the things we are trying to do now is get the Iraqis more responsible more quickly for their own security. That's why you find the large number of $2 billion in the supplemental to train the army. We want to do what we were planning to do in two years, in one year.

The same is true for the police. If you looked at our planning back in June, July, we were planning to train a police force of about 75,000 to 80,000, but I was told it was going to take almost six years and I said "That's simply too long. We have to do it faster."

BREMER: So the plan now is to do it in the next 18 to 24 months. And you have another $2 billion in the supplemental to make that happen.

CLINTON: And the goal for the number of police is what?

BREMER: About 75,000 to 80,000 in the next 18 to 24 months.

CLINTON: Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

That's an important question. It follows on the Warner-McCain issue about the use of these troops ahead of time for internal security. Not on my time, but address it when you can.

Thank you.

Senator Dole?

DOLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I've regarded the war against Saddam Hussein as a righteous cause. This man thumbed his nose at the world community. He violated 17 U.N. resolutions over a period of 12 years. He gassed 5,000 men, women and children; his own people.

And as you've said so poignantly, Ambassador Bremer -- and I've quoted you many times on this -- gone are Saddam Hussein's torture chambers, gone are the mass graves and his rape rooms, gone is his threat to the United States and to the international community.

And I certainly want to take this opportunity to express my admiration to you both, my tremendous respect for the job that you are doing and our young men and women who are serving around the world.

Earlier this week, a proud grandmother handed me a letter from her grandson, who's currently stationed in Baghdad. Different points of view have been expressed in this hearing and I'd like to just read a couple of lines from what this soldier on the front lines had to say.

He says: "I was invited to meet with a local Iraqi who works the engineering for our building's electricity. He graduated from the Baghdad University in engineering and showed me his class picture from 1979.

"We talked about what it was like then and the difference now. You could see the suffering in his eyes as he talked about the years of terror that people lived with while Saddam was in power.

"I felt the same emotions of sadness for these people when I first rolled up here from Kuwait. To see their cheering faces of relief, many a soldier's eyes were filled with tears that day. I pray that we finish the job we started."

Defeating terrorism is more than removing the leaders of an evil regime from power. Terrorism must be torn out by its roots so that there's no toe-hold for its sponsors to reestablish their violent ways. More than words, more than negotiations, the president's significant spending request sends an unmistakable signal to these sponsors of terror, to the liberated Iraqi citizens and to the world that the United States is staying the course, lest the fight return again to American soil.

Failure to follow through in our mission could leave a lethal void, a void that would rapidly be filled by terror and its supporters.

Of course the American people must know how this money will be expended, and I'd like to ask several questions.

General, as part of the Department of Defense supplemental request, military personnel costs come in at approximately $18 billion. The specific details mentioned call for enhanced special pays, imminent danger pay, family separation allowances and hardship duty pay that come in above the standard expected personnel costs for a typical budget year.

In the '04 defense appropriations conference, $128 million was provided to continue the rate increase for imminent danger pay and family separation pay. Was this rate increase figured into this request?

And the $18 billion also includes salaries for servicemembers retained on active duty through stop-loss. Does it include salaries for activate Guard and Reserve members? And has an additional call-up also been calculated in this figure?

ABIZAID: I know that in terms of the calculation for Reserve and Guard call-ups, yes, I believe it is included.

In terms of the additional danger pays, et cetera, I can't answer that question and I'll have to get back to you on the record. And the reason is because there is some debate within the administration as to how that will be paid for.

So, with regard to your other questions, the answer is yes, it was factored in. With regard to danger pay, I'll have to get back to you.

DOLE: Thank you.

And within the Department of Defense's military construction request, over $100 million is requested for airfield ramps at Qatar and UAE. Are these governments providing any matching funds for these projects?

ABIZAID: I can't answer specifically whether they're providing matching funds for those projects. But they provide substantial funds for other projects that we have been very anxious to get done.

For example, as you know we've our forces from Saudi Arabia that were in the combined air operations center from there to Qatar and put them in the combined air operations center there.

ABIZAID: And the Qataris paid a great portion of that cost. The same in the United Arab Emirates; they have paid for substantial costs to upgrade facilities.

I can't answer as to whether or not there's matching funds on these projects, and I'll have to get the answer to you.

DOLE: I think my time is expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Bayh?

BAYH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service.

Regardless of where any of us were on the commencement of hostilities in Iraq, we have no choice but to be successful now. I think there is unanimity of opinion with regard to that.

I think the American people share that sentiment and are willing to be both patient and generous as we pursue this, but there are limits to both the patience and the generosity of our people.

The patience will be tested, Ambassador, by the existence of a strategy that is coherent, detailed and persuasive, in terms of bringing an end to this eventually. And as a couple of my colleagues mentioned, I think that this still appears to be a work in progress and that more progress needs to be forthcoming, otherwise the patience will wear thin.

With regard to the generosity, I think it depends upon the equity of the program that you put forth. My guess is that the American people would support just about anything -- would support anything for our troops, would support just about anything for the security of the Iraqi people.

The economic assistance is another matter. My back-of-the- envelope calculations indicated that the value of proven or potential Iraqi oil reserves is between $5.5 trillion and $2.8 trillion, clearly enabling them to bear part of this burden themselves.

My question -- and I want to follow up on Senator Nelson and Senator Collins' line of inquiry -- Ambassador, my question to you, and I understand that -- I've listened to your testimony here today -- the lack of a functioning government limits our ability somewhat and the existence of $200 billion of debt, although $100 billion of it is reparations and it seems to me that ought to be waived, so we're really dealing with $100 billion of other debts here.

My question very simply is, how do I explain to my constituents that those who helped to prop up Saddam's regime, the French, the Russians, and others, could potentially be repaid, but those who financed the war to liberate the Iraqi people will not be repaid? How do we explain that?

BREMER: Well, Senator, I appreciate the difficult situation this puts legislators in but, again, it's a question of timing. I agree and I've said, and I was the first administration official to say it back in early July, that there must be a substantial reduction in Iraq's debt. And that is the position of this government, it is also the position of the Group of Seven when they met in Evian in June. So there is no contest there. We understand that there has to be a significant haircut, as they call it on Wall Street.

And incidentally, we're into this game for about $4 billion ourselves. There's about $4 billion -- $2 billion in principal and $2 billion in interest -- from the American taxpayers.

There's going to have to be a very substantial reduction in debt.

BAYH: I don't want to interrupt, but could I ask about the question of timing? Maybe this gets to the heart of the matter somewhat.

We're expected to pony up the money, while we continue to negotiate with the same people who diddled us around at the United Nations and elsewhere and expecting them to ultimately do the right thing. Can you understand why the American people would be a bit skeptical about that?

BREMER: But I can and I think we're going to have to work with the Iraqis. It's, after all, their debt. It's their country we're talking about here. We're going to have to work with the Iraqis.

Hopefully, we will have, before too long, a legitimate Iraqi government that, in fact, can enter into contracts and agreements. But again...

BAYH: Well, let me ask...

BREMER: ... my problem is timing. We've got an urgent need to get this reconstruction started.

BAYH: Let me ask about that legitimate Iraqi government. You an understand the position this puts the U.N., where we are potentially honoring the commitments that Saddam Hussein made, but are given in the current governing council no authority to make alternative choices. That is ironic, to say the least.

BREMER: Well, there are lots of ironies in the situation in Iraq.

BAYH: Well, I must also say I agreed with Senator Collins and I understand the timing issue here, Ambassador. But money, to some extent, is fungible. And to the extent that we're making grants today that does increase the new Iraqi government's capacity to repay other obligations later and it would be more than ironic. I agree with her characterization: It would be outrageous if the American taxpayers were indirectly repaying even a single franc or ruble to the French or to the Russians.

BREMER: I agree with that and I have said so yesterday and I repeated it today. I agree.

BAYH: General, perhaps a question for you. Ambassador, I hope you'll forgive me, if I turn my attention elsewhere.

BREMER: Yes. It was (OFF-MIKE)

BREMER: Ansar al-Islam. Ansar al-Islam -- that was on our radar screen for a long time. We knew that we were going to go in there and do something about them. We knew that they were located close to the border; the possibility of flight into Iran was an obvious possibility. How did so many of them escape?

ABIZAID: Senator, I'm not sure how many of them escaped. During the war, the strike that we had on their facilities up on the northeastern border with Iran was very, very devastating. A large number of them were killed there.

Many of them were -- many of them that are currently operating in the country are probably survivors that were in position in places such as Baghdad, elsewhere. Some of them went into Iran and moved up into the mountainous regions there and then figured a way to infiltrate back.

We think that the number of Ansar al-Islam is somewhere between 200 and 400 perhaps within the country. We remain concerned about the capacity of Ansar al-Islam. We remain concerned about their ties to Al Qaida.

Certainly, we should also have expected that some of their other people from abroad would have returned to join Ansar al-Islam as things have developed in Iraq, as well.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

BAYH: Thank you, Ambassador.

WARNER: Senator Cornyn?

CORNYN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid for being here. I know you've been through several of these hearings this week. We appreciate your testimony and your service and your stamina.

I just want to make sure I understand the choices that you're telling us we have. Do we really have any alternative but to finish the job in Iraq? In other words, what is the alternative and what is the message that America would send to our enemies in the war on terror?

BREMER: Senator, I don't think we do have a choice. And I don't think, when the American people think it through, they'll decide not to finish the choice.

I have said before, we are not a nation of quitters. In the 18th century, we didn't quit until we'd got the British out of here. In the 19th century, we didn't quit until we'd freed the slaves. And in the 20th century, we twice didn't quit until we had freed Europe. We will see this job through, I am confident.

CORNYN: General Abizaid, I know there's some who would like to separate the monies being requested in this total $87 billion supplemental between assistance to our troops in the field and economic assistance and the reconstruction of the Iraqi people.

CORNYN: In your opinion, is the economic assistance and the reconstruction that's being requested essential to the success and security of our troops in the field?

ABIZAID: Senator, I think they're inextricably linked, and there's no doubt about it in my mind.

First of all, you have the supplemental portion necessary for sustaining the armed forces over time, but just having that will only keep us the way it is. What we need is to have immediate improvement, and that requires the $5 billion in particular for security so we can build Iraqi security capacity.

The many other parts that Ambassador Bremer has talked about are essential for the security environment. After all, this mission is about achieving consent within the Iraqi populace that will allow them and us to work together to build a more prosperous and more representational Iraq. And I believe that this is absolutely essential to keep it together.

CORNYN: I share my colleagues' concerns and their sense of fiscal responsibility when dealing with taxpayer dollars, and I know you share that concern as well. I just wish that that concern pervaded all aspects of our responsibilities in this Congress because, of course, spending continues to be a problem for the American taxpayer, in terms of the deficit.

But to put this in context, there was an article in USA Today just a couple of days ago that says that, "If the cost to defeat Saddam was less than 0.5 percent of America's annual income, measured as GDP, if spending continues at the current pace, our involvement would cost us 0.4 percent of our income for the rest of the year. If President Bush's request for $87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan is approved, the cost on these two fronts will amount to about 0.8 percent of our income next year."

Now these numbers are hard to grasp, but to boil it down for the American taxpayer the article concludes, "Each year American households spend about 1 percent of their income on alcoholic beverages and another 1 percent on tobacco products. We spend about 0.7 percent of our money on cosmetics." In other words, our combined operations to combat terror in the Middle East costs a bit more than we spend on makeup and shampoo and a bit less than we spend on booze and tobacco.

And I think it's important for the American people to understand that we are talking about taxpayer money and we are the stewards of that trust that's placed in us. But we really, in my opinion, have no alternative, and I think you testimony supports that.

Finally, let me just ask Ambassador Bremer, perhaps. I know there was reference made to the New York Times and The Washington Post and the perhaps mischaracterization, if not misstatement, of certainly Ambassador Bremer's conversations with the president and testimony here today.

But I do note that there are at least two other newspapers. In addition to the fact that now the oil minister of the Iraqi Governing Council has participated in OPEC proceedings recently -- foreign minister accepted at the Arab League. But the Los Angeles Times and USA Today both point out that the president's efforts to turn around -- perhaps is too strong a word -- but to reach some rapprochement with the heads of the German and French government on Iraqi reconstruction have shown some signs of success.

CORNYN: And I think in order to make this picture complete and to put it in proper context that we ought to talk about the great successes that we've seen.

And I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Byrd?

BYRD: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, and thank you, General Abizaid, for being here and for the work that you are attempting to do.

I have been, I suppose, one of the fiercest opponents of our going to war in Iraq. I didn't vote for the -- I believe it was the October 11 resolution that gave to the president the power to determine when and where and how to use the armed forces of the United States in dealing with Iraq.

I am just as fierce -- if I may use the word that has been used -- an opponent today as I was then.

I do, however, try to be realistic. Our troops are in Iraq. I always support our troops and shall continue to do so. They don't ask to go. And we are responsible for getting them back home again and, for me, their needs while they are in war.

Now when it comes to the other part of the request that deals with infrastructure, I think that's an entirely different matter. Now I'm willing to listen. I've had a hard time, however, getting some other people to listen.

Now you, Dr. Brewer, earlier said something to this effect. All -- I can't write very well because I have benign essential tremor, but as I make out my own writing, the effort requires the cooperation of both parties in Congress. And I want to complement you on that statement that the efforts you're talking about in which you caused me to write that down was this effort that's going on here and that has been going on in the Appropriations Committee, of which I have been an active part.

I think that you do need the cooperation of the minority. I think you have it. I think you'll get it.

But we don't agree with everything that's being done, naturally. And the American people, if they were asked to vote on some of these matters, I doubt that you'd get a majority.

I wish that you would do whatever you can do to have the Republican leadership here slow down this train a bit.

BYRD: And we were brought into hearings -- this is not your fault, Mr. Chairman. We were brought into hearings on Monday of this week. Members on our side were not, to my knowledge, informed that there would be a hearing on Monday morning. And the chairman very -- the chairman of the committee reset the hearing until the afternoon, because I couldn't be there on Monday morning. But here we were on a Monday, when most members of the Senate are elsewhere or coming from far points of the compass.

Now we're expected to have a markup next Monday. It appears to me that my friends on the other side of the aisle are being a little too fast, and I don't think it works to the betterment of what you are trying to accomplish. It would seem that you have more goodwill on my side of the aisle -- and I shouldn't make this sound like it is a personal when I say you, but you're here asking for funds.

Now, here -- you see, my time has already expired and I don't complain about that, except to say that's the way it is. And yet the administration's people here in the Senate -- the administration's party, I should say, is pushing this matter to the extent that it will not get the attention that it may deserve.

So I guess this leads me to this question, and I believe you said that you didn't need the money until January, I believe you said that in the Appropriations Committee, or in the Democratic Caucus, whichever it was. Is that the fact?

BREMER: No, Senator. We need this money right away.

I think there is some confusion. I was asked a specific question which was, "When does the Iraqi government run out of money?" and I said, "Some time in January."

That's not the same as this. We've got to get these reconstruction programs right away, as quickly as possible. There's nothing more urgent.

BYRD: As I understand -- my time is up.

WARNER: But that's an important question that you raise. I had intended myself to raise it, so why don't you finish it out because that should be clarified, and to give the ambassador adequate opportunity to inform the Senate?

BYRD: Mr. Ambassador, I believe also that the House is not marking up this bill until next week, if -- next week. And their markup will be next week or later. So it leads me to say, I just feel that it would be in your interest and the cause which you are here to represent to lend a good word to this administration to slow down.

I've never seen any -- I don't remember seeing any measure so important as this one, important because it has $87 billion in it on top of the $79 billion that we appropriated earlier this year. And it would certainly help me to better understand the request if we had a little more time.

Now, it's also that portion of the request here that deals with the troops; I intend to support that. But the other, I think there ought to be a lot of questions asked. I think we're going down a long road when we start to establish a democracy in Iraq and from there to democratize the Middle East.

BYRD: The American people didn't go into this war with that understanding; they weren't told that.

WARNER: Well, thank you, Senator Byrd, I have to...

BYRD: I certainly hope you use your good authorities to impress upon this administration the need to slow down this train. You don't need that money -- if you need it at all, you don't need that money all that fast.

We should have time, Mr. Chairman, to ask questions.

WARNER: Well, I thank you, Senator Byrd. I'm told that the leadership is trying to work out a schedule to accommodate that bipartisanship as we hold hearing today.

Senator Reed?

REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Bremer, do you have accurate expense reports for the expenditures you've already made in Iraq?

BREMER: Yes, we do.

REED: And who has custody of those reports?

BREMER: Well, it depends on which funds we're talking about.

REED: I'm talking about everything, since you're the authority.

BREMER: Yes, I know, but there are different pools. There's the appropriated funds, there are frozen assets, there are seized assets...

REED: I'm talking about appropriated funds, Mr. Ambassador.

BREMER: OK, yes, we do. Well, the custodian of that is, I guess, OMB is the place you would go for the ultimate authority.

REED: They would have detailed reports of all the expenditures, to date, OMB?

BREMER: Yes, they would.

REED: Thank you.

One reason I raised that is that, as you're here in Washington the Iraqi Governing Council has been in New York the past few days, and one of the members -- in fact, speaking I think not just for himself, but for others -- has complained that the Americans are spending here to secure themselves to a rate that is two to three times what they are spending to secure the Iraqi people. It would better for us if we'd be in charge of how to spend this money, and, of course, they could monitor how it is spent.

The article alludes that -- claims, apparently, that this gentleman made that $20,000 a day to feed Americans at the hotels, laundry being sent to Kuwait, overhead from supporting/protecting large American, British presence, less efficient fees that American contractors charge, premiums.

Is this Mr. Ahmad Al Barac (ph) inaccurate, irresponsible?

BREMER: The story is inaccurate. I don't remember which part he was quoted on.

I think I answered in testimony the other day that the spending amount for food is actually $17,500 a day. That feeds 3,000 people, therefore at an average cost of about $5.50 which, as I pointed out to that committee, is $2.50 less than an MRE costs. And I might add, it's only marginally better than an MRE.

BREMER: Is he incorrect, though, in terms of his charges that they would be better prepared to spend the money?

BREMER: I'm sure there are plenty of people in Iraq who would like to spend $20 billion, but he is incorrect if he thinks that the Iraqi government can spend it in a better and more responsible, more transparent and accountable way than we can do it. Yes.

REED: Let me ask another question. Is any of the money in the supplemental for the oil industry in Iraq?

BREMER: Yes, there's $1.2 billion for reestablishing the infrastructure so that we can get the Iraqis to a point where they can generate oil revenues, which you'll see in the supplemental, $1.2 billion.

REED: And as we're here today talking, the Iraqi oil minister is in Vienna inviting foreign oil companies, international oil companies to invest in Iraq. So it seems to me that we are restoring the infrastructure so that foreign oil companies can come in and, essentially, and probably securitizing and doing all the things you think are terrible, securitizing this oil so they can invest and make a profit.

BREMER: I'm not sure what the ultimate policy will be on foreign investment in the oil industry. The foreign investment law which they asked me to sign a week ago today explicitly excludes investment by foreigners in the oil industry. This is an extremely sensitive subject, as you can appreciate...

REED: Well...

BREMER ... and then the oil -- excuse me. The governing council explicitly excluded the oil industry for the time being.

REED: Well, this is...

BREMER: So we'll just have to see how that evolves. I honestly don't know what they'll do. I think they should allow foreigners to invest, but it's...

REED: Well, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal -- in quoting the journal, the oil minister, Mr. al-Uloum, said, "Baghdad welcomes proposals from foreign oil companies about how to develop Iraqi's fields and said he plans to talk with representatives from several international oil companies in the coming days." So apparently, he has decided that...

BREMER: Well, good.

REED: Good. So we will be preparing the infrastructure for foreign investment.

BREMER: Well, if we're lucky, we'll get -- if he is able to carry his government, and I point out that he is -- as you read that, he said he was inviting proposals. He didn't say they were going to invest.

Let's see what happens. Let's see what happens.

I hope that the government will, in fact. I think they should. I've told them, if they're going be successful economically, they must at least double their oil productions, because even if they get back to the pre-war level, which is where we hope they can get in a year, it means a per capita income of less than $1,000 per Iraqi. That's not very impressive for a country that should be wealthy.

And the only way to substantially change that wealth is to greatly increase oil production. That's going to cost them $30 billion to $40 billion that they're going to have to get, I presume, from foreign investment. But that is a decision that I think they have to make.

REED: But, Mr. Ambassador, we seem to be only investor that's not taking any future receipts or future claims on the oil, because I can't think of any international oil companies that's going walk in and invest a nickel unless they are assured that they're getting something back.

BREMER: Well, as I said, they don't have a policy of letting anybody invest in oil yet. That's the policy. I signed the law. I know what in it, Senator.

REED: Well, I'm sure you...

BREMER: It does not allow investing in the oil industry.

REED: You've picked the oil minister also and he wants invest funds (ph) from foreign...

BREMER: Actually, I didn't pick him. The governing council...

REED: Oh, you didn't. You just picked the government who picked the oil minister.

BREMER: I feel very -- he's a very good man. He's a petroleum engineer. He's another example of what I said to the chairman earlier about the competence of this government. They are extremely competent people.

WARNER: Gentlemen of the committee and ladies, I certainly thank you for assisting me and Senator Levin in running this hearing on time.

I'd like to acquaint you with the following information. At 1:15, the Senate will be voting on the defense appropriations conference report. We'll all want to make that vote. We have two colleagues who have not had their opportunity for the first round, so we'll proceed to recognize those two colleague now, with the understanding that I will return, and perhaps the distinguished ranking member, for such remnants as we have, so that our witnesses are on their way at about 10 minutes to 1, because they have a 1:30 appearance before the House Armed Services Committee.

So Bill Nelson?

BILL NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

BILL NELSON: And welcome, gentlemen.

WARNER: Oh, excuse me. Yes, 1:15 votes. I guess we're out of the opportunity for a second round. Well, we'll go to 1:15 with these two colleagues, yes.

REED: What time is it now?

WARNER: My understanding, it's -- I think I have misspoken. You're right. And I correct myself. So we'll recognize our two colleagues and the note didn't reflect the time.

Senator Nelson?

BILL NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome.

General, you're my home-state Floridian and we think that you're doing a great job and you will have this senator's support and I support the judgment of the commanders on the ground, as well, and your military structure.

But I need to make you aware that I am receiving evidence of increasing fatigue in the units that participated in the major combat phase of the operation; evidence such as increased accident rates. This is one way that I receive that information. That's all e-mails. E-mails from the troops that are there in Iraq, as well as e-mails from the family.

BILL NELSON: I've got a couple of questions that I want to ask you, if you could comment for the record. But I want to first give you one example.

Company C, the 2nd Battalion, the 124th Infantry of the Florida National Guard, before the war actually dug by hand through the berm that marks the Jordanian-Iraqi border. And then they went into Iraq -- this is before the 19th of March -- in support of the 5th Special Forces Group.

And since then, in Iraq, Charlie Company has been passed around the theater from command to command about 10 times. From the 5th Special Forces Group to Special Ops Headquarters, to V Corps Headquarters, to the 3rd Infantry Division to the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and now to the 1st Armored Division.

And Charlie Company is still there. They've suffered two fatalities. One, gunned down at the university in Baghdad; it was a Gainesville, Florida, National Guard soldier. Another in a vehicle accident, also from Gainesville, Florida. And a third has been wounded in the neck.

Other companies of the three Florida National Guard battalions have been passed among headquarters all over the theater no less than 40 times since arriving in the area of operations.

Now, I can tell you, and you probably know the reputation of our Florida National Guard, they are justifiably proud of their contribution to the war.

We in Florida have the third-highest number of Guard and Reserve soldiers mobilized and deployed globally. Florida has deployed the second-highest number of Guard soldiers to the Iraq theater, and only exceeded by Alabama by 38 soldiers. Alabama and Florida, among the Guard, are in a class by themselves, mainly supplying those troops. And then, no state has provided more infantry from its Guard than Florida.

General, the sense that I'm getting is that they are fatigued. So the question I want to ask is, you, as the commander, you have to be concerned about fatigue and replacing with fresh troops, and yet this new policy has come in, 12 months boots on the ground, which is going to allow some Guard units to go back having been there 11 months but is going to cause some Guard units, such as Florida, to be extended all the way out close to a year and a half.

So I would ask for your comment for the record. What is your assessment of fatigue in the current force? And when, in your judgment, do you have to have fresh troops? Let's take that one first.

ABIZAID: First of all, let me comment on the 124th. One reason they've been passed around a lot is they do a pretty good job.

ABIZAID: People want to have them. You know how it is: Sometimes when you're good, what happens to you?

Fatigue in the force exists no doubt in those areas especially where there's a lot of fighting going on. And the 124th has been in an area, in the Baghdad/Ar Ramadi/Fallujah area, which is really one of the most geographically hot areas that our troops experience.

I know that we have to address the issue of fatigue and we're doing that in a couple of different ways. One way is we are allowing what we call the Fighter Pass Management Program to go ahead, which allows troops to go into the local area, for example, into Qatar, for a few days, where they get away from the combat zone. They can relax, take a shower, have a beer.

We're also getting ready to start an R&R program that will allow troops to get away for a couple of weeks, back into Europe and, in some cases, back as far as the States if the transportation system will support it.

So we are mindful that it is a tough mission. It's a fatiguing mission. And we're also very mindful of the sacrifices of our soldiers. And God bless our soldiers that have given the full sacrifice.

We do everything we can to be equitable. There's no difference in my mind between what the Guard and Reserve and the active forces do. They all have to serve their country.

You weren't here before, Senator, but I said clearly that I'm not satisfied that we have alerted our National Guard soldiers and Reserve soldiers to their go-home date, which is essentially for every soldier to have. And I take responsibility for doing that and I will fix that.

So let me close by saying thanks to them for their great service and all the National Guard and all the Reserve and all the active troops that are out there.

This is a tough environment. It's a deadly environment in some cases. But whenever I talk to the soldiers -- and I talk to a lot of them -- it's clear to me that they know why they're there, they know it's going to be long and they know they either fight there or they fight here.

BILL NELSON: Well, then I will be following this up privately, Mr. Chairman, on the question of the equity of some units less, others more, where this could be extended all the way to a year and a half.

ABIZAID: Thank you.

WARNER: Senator, you have been consistent in raising these important questions, not only on behalf of Florida but other Guard and Reserve units across the country. And I thank you for that.

Senator Dayton?

DAYTON: Thank you, sir.

Ambassador, General, I want to thank you both for your very distinguished service.

And, Mr. Ambassador, I am respectful of what you said before our caucus the other day that you'd rather be with your family. And you're both making that sacrifice as our 138,000 Americans, and many Minnesotans, who also miss their families.

I will support your request -- the president's request. I may join with my colleagues and try to fine-tune the economic recovery part of it. But I believe that part is equally indispensable to getting our troops home as quickly as possible with a lasting victory secured, which ought to be our objective. That's certainly my objective.

When I was in Iraq, the brief time with the chairman, I couldn't keep up with him there. You know, he wouldn't take me to Liberia. He said I slowed him down in Iraq.

It's occurred to me that the economic rehabilitation is essential. And I guess I would say, editorially, that I think that much of what is in this request should -- for economic rehabilitation, should have been in last spring's request. And it should have been anticipated, not every specific, but certainly the fact that we have been delayed in getting these projects fully under way is affecting our troops and their safety as well as the attitudes of that country to report our own.

So I support it. I just have a couple of questions regarding. And I'll try to be brief in my question. Ask you to be concise with your answers so I can get through before my time has expired.

But, Mr. Ambassador, the bottom line is, to elaborate here, how many Iraqis are we paying and out of what source of funds? It said here that 250,000 Iraqi officers will receive a monthly stipend, salaries; that the authority is paying teachers, health care workers, pensions, emergency payments, 39,000 electrical workers. Another one here says that 92,000 Iraqis are receiving social security and welfare benefits four times higher than they received under Saddam Hussein; good. And 1.3 million Iraqi civil servants are drawing salaries.

What does all this add up to?

BREMER: The total number of people that the Iraqis are paying, not the American taxpayer -- these funds come from Iraqi funds -- is about $1.5 million, and our monthly payroll is about $200 million.

DAYTON: So we're paying 1.5 million Iraqi citizens for various duties or just for survival?

BREMER: The kinds of people you mentioned, right. They're salaries.

DAYTON: And that money is entirely out of the Iraqi revenues.

BREMER: That's right.

DAYTON: OK. Presumably, if Iraqi revenues were used for something else, then there'd be fewer dollars that would have to be drawn down in the United States. I won't quibble with you on that. All right, thank you.

General, we get these different statements about what is really occurring over in Iraq.

On September 6th, Secretary Rumsfeld, being over there, said that the impact of continued attacks against U.S. forces have been overstated and likened them to, quote, "isolated terrorist violence in every country in the world."

Four days before that, September 2nd, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz said that the international extremists and terrorists are coming into Iraq to take part in something they think will advance their cause. He said that in the last month, more than 200 foreign terrorists who came to Iraq to kill Americans, do everything they can, had been captured by the United States, they must be defeated and they will be.

Are we talking about something that's just run-of-the-mill, are we talking something that's different from that? And what is the extent to which there are foreign terrorists infiltrating Iraq now? I apologize if this question was asked before.

ABIZAID: No, Senator, I think it's an excellent question for me to answer.

There's nothing run-of-the-mill about what we're going in Iraq with regard to fighting a low-intensity conflict. It is a very dangerous place, and I would summarize the various groups that we are fighting as, first of all, being the former regime loyalists, the Baathists that are primarily operating in the Tikrit/Ar Ramadi/Baghdad area. Although over time we are isolating it geographically more and more.

I would characterize that threat as diminishing, primarily because they understand that there's no hope to bring Saddam back and there's no hope to reestablish the Baath Party. Nevertheless, it is a threat.

The next threat, which is growing, is that of what I would call extremist anti-American -- I hate to use the word "Islamist," because they certainly aren't Islamists; they're just the opposite. They're anti-Islamic.

But these extremists that are now starting to develop in the Sunni area are probably increasing in strength, although not at an alarming rate. But it is something we have to watch.

DAYTON: I'm sorry, General, my time has expired. I'll have to cut us both off here.

But I did promise a constituent I would ask: Is combat pay being continued for both Afghanistan and Iraq?

ABIZAID: Yes.

DAYTON: Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Colleagues, we've now completed the first round. Again, our witnesses are due to testify before the House at about 1:30. As a courtesy to the other body of the Congress, I would hope that we can release them here at about 12:45, and that will enable us to have a second round.

I personally will take no more than three minutes.

First, Ambassador Bremer, in response to Senator Byrd's important question about the January issue, have you sufficient time to have clarified that?

And, if I could go a step beyond and say, to the extent the Congress acts early on the decision on these funds, is the extent to which you can accelerate certain programs, which programs, be it electricity, water, or the most important, $5 billion for security, that can be accelerate those program?

And then, General Abizaid, is there a correlation to that acceleration to your hypothesis that the two parts are integral and that we would hope that there would be less threat and injury and harm to U.S. troops and coalition forces?

BREMER: Yes, Senator, the most important thing that is accelerated by the supplemental are the security parts. The part where we can speed up the training of the Iraqi army -- instead of taking two years, take one -- we can't do that without more money. Speeding up, in particular, the training of the Iraqi police force, which will require almost $2 billion.

Every month that goes by where we don't start those projects is a month longer before those guys go out and potentially can relieve our troops of some of duties that I've outlined in my statement.

The same is true for the infrastructure projects. We need to start letting contracts, we have to have open bids, but it's going to take time. If we can start those bids now, quickly, we can get the repairs started quicker.

WARNER: Is there a correlation, in your professional judgment, General Abizaid?

ABIZAID: Sir, there certainly is. The more Iraqis that are policing, that are patrolling, that are doing the security work to defend their own country, the sooner we'll be able to draw down our forces and the sooner we'll be able to turn over the country to the rightful owners, which are the Iraqis.

WARNER: It has a correlation to the tragic situation of deaths, loss of life and limb by our forces and coalition, am I correct?

ABIZAID: Sir, there is a correlation. But we should all make sure we understand that as long as American troops are in Iraq, there will be casualties. It is a violent place and it will remain violent for some time.

WARNER: Thank you.

My second goes back to the earlier question that I asked, Senator McCain asked, and I think Senator Clinton was also trying to urge that in this $5 billion for security, and particularly the funds related to the national army, if you'll look at the Sunday New York Times, there's a very interesting article by Tom Friedman indicating to the extent you can put forces in Iraqi army uniforms directly in confrontation with the threats faced by our forces and coalition forces the less likelihood, because of the language barriers and other things, of casualties.

Is this directed toward expediting that?

BREMER: Indeed, it is. Both in the respective police and army, and I would also add the civil defense corps, where we hope to have 10 battalions by the end of the year.

WARNER: But you said, it's a new initiative.

BREMER: Yes, it is. It is a new and urgent initiative.

WARNER: Fine. If you could further define it, I think it would be helpful.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you.

Ambassador Bremer, I raise with you the question of collateralizing some of the future sales of Iraqi oil where we expect they will be in surplus to the needs to run the government on an ongoing basis. This is not a loan.

LEVIN: This is a collateralization, which would be guaranteed by the United States, which is the opposite of our lending them money. As a matter of fact, we would be taking risk for them by guaranteeing that loan.

Senators Collins and Clinton and Ben Nelson raised this same question in a perhaps different form, but it's essentially the same question.

And when I asked you that question, you indicated that you would be willing to think about the possibility of that pledge of future surplus oil to be sold now by collateralizing it and with our guaranteeing that, so that even though there is no government there at the moment, it could be sold.

Now when I ask you would you give consideration to that approach, you indicated you would. Did you mean it?

BREMER: Of course.

LEVIN: Because in answering to some of the other questions that followed, it sounded as though you had already made up your mind.

BREMER: No, Senator. I'm perplexed as to how it would actually work. I'm concerned that if we are not careful, we wind up with two problems. One, we wind up, in effect, taking a lien against the resources which we want the Iraqis to put into their own reconstruction in the years ahead. They can't...

LEVIN: We're not taking a lien. I didn't make any reference to a lien, Ambassador.

BREMER: Well, effectively, it is a lien if you collateralize it.

LEVIN: I said we would guarantee it. I didn't say we'd take a lien on it.

BREMER: Well...

LEVIN: Basically, are you willing to look into that -- obviously, we're troubled here by the fact that we're being asked to put up $15 billion for reconstruction funds and that the Iraqis have this huge asset. They're going to have surplus sales, in a few years, of oil. And you could collateralize it now with our guarantee, not a loan but our guarantee, which supports the Iraqi government, which makes them contribute to their own reconstruction. Now I'm not talking about ongoing operation.

And if you can at least openly address that deep concern that we have it would be progress, in terms of trying to see if we can't get some ideas exchanged around here which address the concerns of the American people.

BREMER: I took your suggesting as a helpful one, and I agreed to look at it.

LEVIN: All right.

Now, General, I agree with almost everything you said. Not everything quite. Almost.

But one of the things you said, kind of, troubles me. And that is, that the mission of the 15 -- OK. My time is up.

DAYTON: I'll cede my time to him, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Continue on.

LEVIN: I want to thank Senator Dayton.

When you talked about the $5 billion of the $20 billion, I agree with you totally. That's training an army. That's building police force. I'm with you; I'd vote for that tomorrow.

But then when you got to the other $15 billion, you said that its mission is to achieve the consent of Iraq's people. That troubles me.

We cannot buy that consent. That will, which we need -- and, by the way, I share that. I think we need willpower here. This is a very difficult situation. We need willpower. But the Iraqi people need willpower as well. We can't buy it.

As I said in my opening statement, here I'm going to just quote myself, which I don't usually do, but I meant it so deeply, I want to just repeat one line, that "It's essential that the people of Iraq want to become a unified and secure nation badly enough that they're willing to make that pledge and that financial commitment, to raise funds now for their reconstruction."

That would be addressing a major concern which a lot of us have. We've given huge amounts in blood and treasure. We want the Iraqi people -- we know they're sacrificing, in terms of they're at risk, obviously, to terrorists and the Baathist remnants and so forth.

But when they've got an asset such as they have and future surplus of oil sales in the very near future, which can be collateralized, pledged and sold now with our guarantee, I think it's wrong to look at that $15 billion as a way of buying their consent or achieving their consent. I just think it's wrong. I think we've got it wrong. They got to want it badly like our folks wanted in 1776 to be independent. Pledged their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor. That's what we need, this government, now that they have, to do.

LEVIN: And one way to do it is to work something out relative to that future oil surplus. Again, not necessarily alone from us, even though I don't think that would be so bad, either because I think we ought to subrogate the other loans. But in terms of our supporting that pledge, that sale.

So I just wanted to express that, General. You and I have had agreement, I think, on most things. And I surely -- I just think you're doing an absolutely superb job and have a real command of the history of the region, which is essential, as well as language, which is so essential, I think, to our success.

But on that one comment of yours, particularly, I wanted to just tell you I'm troubled by stating it that way, that $15 billion is part -- the mission of that is to, quote, "achieve consent of Iraq's people," just to let you know I disagree -- give you a chance to comment on it, if you want.

ABIZAID: Well, thank you, Senator.

First of all, I don't believe we can buy the Iraqi people. And I do believe that in these difficult times, in these formative times, they need the help. And perhaps my choice of words didn't convey what I really mean, because I have great faith and great confidence in the Iraqi people to expend their own blood, sweat and tears in this endeavor.

They're doing that, but when you look at the structures that exist to allow them to be able to organize themselves in this particular time, they don't much exist. That's what -- well, that is what Ambassador Bremer is building.

And I don't think that this needs to be an endless amount of money that flows into Iraq. I believe that this supplemental give us a chance to get the security moving in the right direction, get reconstruction moving in the right direction and give the Iraqis a chance to help themselves.

LEVIN: Thank you for that.

I think they need our support. We need to get the world involved much more deeply than they are. That's going to take certain actions on our part. But we need the Iraqi government, such that it exists now, to find that way that they can pay part of the reconstruction cost, so it's not just us delivering assistance to Iraq, but it's them pledging their fortune in the same endeavor, which is an important endeavor.

Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Talent?

And thank you, even though this is your first round, for agreeing to the three-minute...

TALENT: Yes, that's fine, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate your -- I had to step out, although I was here for your statements earlier. I want to congratulate you on the progress that you're making. You know, I agree: To do what we've done in fourth months is, I think, a testimony to the quality of the people we have on the ground and your leadership and I'm grateful for that.

A couple of points. First of all, I'm rather pleased, it seems to me, on the fairly broad range of consensus that I've heard in the committee about this request. I mean, the difference really seems to be not over whether we ought to provide the money, but whether part of it ought not to be surely some kind of grant. And I think, actually, the bespeaks a rather great amount of unity.

Now, as I understand what you're saying, and certainly, this is my understanding of the situation, we're not spending this money for the electrical system and the other things, you're not proposing that, purely or even mostly out of a desire to be charitable to the Iraqis, how ever laudable that may be. We're doing this because we think this helps protect American security and freedom, because it's going to help Iraq become a reliable and stable ally in the war against terror. Is that a fair statement to you?

BREMER: Yes, that's right, Senator. It's -- when we spend American money, it should be in America's interest.

TALENT: Yes, I -- we do a lot, as a nation and privately and publicly, for charitable. That's not what we're talking about. And it does seem to me that if that's a correct thing to do, which we all seem to agree that it is, we ought to do it in such a way that makes it most likely Iraq will indeed become an ally in the war against terror or not do it.

I mean, to me, if we don't think it's necessary to accomplish that goal, then let's not spend the money. If we do, let's spend it in a way that makes it most likely that there'll be a reliable ally.

Another point I wanted to make -- and I think you've touched on this before -- Iraq already has a lot of foreign debt. We're asking other countries, are we not, to contribute? And directly, in the form of grants to Iraq, it's going to be, kind of, hard to ask them to make outright grants to Iraq if we're conditioning our money as a loan, isn't it?

BREMER: Yes, that's correct. There's a donors' conference at the end of next month in Madrid, where we're hoping for substantial grants from other countries.

TALENT: Yes. I hope we're repairing our relationship with old Europe, but I don't expect it to be at such a point where they're going to be willing to give money to Iraq if we're loaning it to Iraq. I don't think we can expect that much from the French.

And finally, I'll just close, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your -- would you restate again the urgency of this, in your mind?

TALENT: I mean, I think that's an important point here. The reason you're trying to get this done as quickly as possible, both because we want an ally in Iraq as quickly as possible, and also because there are dangers if we don't move quickly. Would you just restate that again, please?

BREMER: Every day that goes by where we are not speeding up the army, speeding up the civil defense corps, speeding up the training of the police, is a day when our soldiers, men and women, are not being substituted for by Iraqis. So that's the security part of the supplemental, about $15 billion -- about $5 billion of the $20 billion.

Every day that the Iraqis do not get power, do not get water, do not get sewage treatment is a day when their quality of life is such that they're less inclined to view us as liberators and more inclined to view us as occupiers, and that also increases the danger to our men and women.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Byrd?

BYRD: Mr. Ambassador, you said today that the CPA's better able than the Iraqi government to spend this $20 billion request in a manner that is, quote, "responsible, transparent and accountable," close quote.

Yet when asked for detailed expense reports for appropriated funds, you referred this committee to the White House, in other words to OMB. And we're not going to hear the OMB; I wish we would, especially in the Appropriations Committee. I think we should, but we're not going to get to call any outside witnesses, "outside," quote/unquote.

Let me say that again: You referred this committee to the OMB for that information. If you're so committed to transparency and accountability, why can't you provide detailed information about your expenses directly to Congress? Can you do that?

BREMER: Well, I believe these funds belong to the Executive Office of the President. That's how they were appropriated, Senator, and I'm not an expert on reporting requirements, but my understanding is the reporting requirements attached to the legislation required the Executive Office of the President, in the form of the OMB, to be the channel which these funds are reported to Congress. But I'm not an expert in these matters, sir.

BYRD: Well, I'll let the record stand as it is, because I don't have time to pursue it.

In your opening statement, that every reconstruction contract awarded using this $20 billion request will be competitively bid, does this mean that you will not exercise any national security waivers to cut short the competition process?

BREMER: That's not my -- it is my intention not to exercise any such waivers.

BYRD: It is your intention not to do so?

BREMER: That's right.

BYRD: Will you also commit to providing this committee with information about these contracts after they're awarded, so that the committee can monitor the costs of reconstruction and make sure that the taxpayers are not being fleeced by companies? And, as you know, Halliburton's very much in the news, very prominently displayed in the front pages and so on. So that's what I'm driving at.

BREMER: Senator, we will follow whatever reporting requirements Congress puts in the legislation.

BYRD: Is my time up?

WARNER: Yes. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

(UNKNOWN): Senator Byrd, would you like my time? I would yield it to you.

BYRD: Well, that's very nice of you.

BYRD: The White House has stated that in your position as administrator of the CPA you report directly to the secretary of defense. However, the administration has given you a very long leash with which to work, and the CPA appears to be exercising its own independent authority in its day-to-day operations.

The first regulation you signed in Iraq contained the following statement, quote, "The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483," and so on and so on. "This authority shall be exercised by the CPA administrator," and that's the end of the quote.

Now, that's a very powerful statement. Does this authority mean that as CPA administrator you are the person who is ultimately accountable for the policy and spending decisions being made on the ground in Iraq? In other words, does the buck stop with you?

BREMER: Yes, it does.

BYRD: So, in answer to that first question, you are the person. What is the basis for the broad authority that you are claiming in this regulation?

BREMER: The basis for that authority, Senator, is international occupation law and the U.N. resolution you cited, 1483.

BYRD: Did the president issue any specific order giving you this authority?

BREMER: Yes, that order relates to the international legal implications of being the occupying power in Iraq. My authority within the executive comes from a letter from the president which is consistent with letters and legislation that are issued to every American ambassador overseas.

BYRD: Do I have any further time?

WARNER: You have about a half a minute, sir.

BYRD: Very well, thank you.

General Abizaid, if we have contractors coming in to take over the jobs that our National Guard has been doing, does that mean that our guardsmen will be coming home sooner?

ABIZAID: Sir, we have contractors moving in to do various things. And with regard to some of our logistics units, whether they be active or National Guard, if we contract out that function, those units will not stay. They'll come home.

BYRD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.

WARNER: Senator Byrd, I thank you very much for cooperation and that of all senators here.

Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Was advised during my absence that one of the questions I was going to ask was has already been asked.

For either one of you: There's been some criticism that there's too much concentration of authority in Baghdad, and that perhaps some of the areas in the north and the south might feel that's too much centralized control. Do you have any thoughts about that?

BREMER: It's a legitimate concern, Senator, and one of our objectives as we move forward -- our broad political objectives -- is try to get away from an overly centralized government and try to devolve power to the governances, to the municipalities, and we're doing that.

INHOFE: Good.

Lastly, and you can take whatever time you want to answer this or either one of you respond to it: You have been attacked in many hearings about not having a plan. And you clearly do have a plan. And this plan that we have seen outlines four areas -- I'll read those. "Security, essential services, economy" -- then when it gets down to "governance," if I understand this correctly, that's where your seven-point plan comes in. Is that correct?

BREMER: That's correct.

INHOFE: All right. On the first three, not now, but for the record, I'd like to have maybe a percentage. For example, security -- establish a secure and safe environment, you know, where are you along that road, approximately?

And the same under essential services. And under services, I hope that we'll keep talking about -- we're not talking about putting a country back into services it never had before, and didn't have before the liberation. And I think that's a very important part to keep reminding people. So perhaps where we are on that road.

And then lastly, "creating the conditions for economic growth," where we are there.

Now, you mentioned under governance you are into what, Point Four, now?

BREMER: Yes.

INHOFE: Do you feel that that's pretty much on schedule of where you thought you would be at this time?

BREMER: No, I think we've slipped about a month. And I don't know -- now, at this point, the preparatory committee is due to report back to the governing council by Tuesday on their recommendations on how to convene the constitutional conference.

BREMER: I was hoping we would have that conference convened in September or October. I, frankly, just don't know what the recommendations will be and, more importantly, how long it will take the governing council to make a decision.

INHOFE: I understand that and if you recall in my opening round, I commented that you were there when the unfortunate thing happened at the U.N. building. So things like that are going to change and if you were in the position to say when four, five, six and seven would be completed, that would change.

Since I feel you have been unfairly challenged on the plan, is there any final comment that you'd like to make...

BREMER: Well, let me just make one point on the plan, because senators have been looking at it this morning and yesterday. The plan that was sent to the Hill July 23rd is obviously, by definition, already two months out of date, and those of you who visited Baghdad know that Baghdad time is different than normal time; two months is a lifetime. We review this plan formally once a month and it gets updated.

To answer your question, how are we doing against the metrics? We change our targets from time to time. We're in a very fluid environment. I use the term when I talked to the president that I call a lot of audibles. I get up to my staff meeting in the morning and I look over the defense, and I say, "We're going off tackle right today, not off tackle left."

But we keep the strategy the same. Those four areas are the heart of our plan and we will execute to that plan.

INHOFE: An excellent plan. Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Reed?

REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Abizaid, if there is a terrorist attack on the United States, is it more likely to emanate from Baghdad in Iraq or along the Pakistan/Afghan border where bin Laden is hiding?

ABIZAID: Senator, if there's another attack on the United States, it would be organized, planned and executed through a worldwide network of connections that are borderless. It would difficult to say where its geographic center would be. There are certainly places on the Afghan/Pakistan border that are semi-havens for terrorists in the Waziristan area that the Pakistanis are working to clean up. There are other ungoverned spaces where this is also possible. It is possible that a terrorist groups working in Baghdad or New York for that matter could organize the attacks.

So there is no geographic center that I would point to, other than to say that we've got a lot of cells and a lot of locations that require careful, difficult work to uncover and destroy.

REED: Well, I seems the president has clearly identified Iraq as the center of the war on terror. And my point of the question, obviously was, I concur with your vision that this is an international phenomenon and its act is less likely I think to emanate from Baghdad than it would to emanate from the Afghan/Pakistani border regions, if anywhere.

And there is a real concern here that underlies our overall strategy not just what we're doing in Iraq, but whether this $87 billion of Iraq might be missing the point. Afghanistan is deteriorating, we've got now a drug culture and a drug industry that's fueling the rearming of the Taliban and they're reasserting themselves in that country and giving direct aid and comfort to the individuals that attacked us.

And I commend the president for at least recognizing that the Saddam Hussein regime was not involved in the September 11 attacks. So I think there's a serious strategic issue here as well as just the dollars.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your answers: as always, very well composed and very thoughtful.

Mr. Ambassador, one final question: I understand from press reports that the U.N. staff is advising Secretary Kofi Annan to withdraw his presence or the presence of the U.N. from Baghdad. What do you propose to do to try to prevent that, if you can?

BREMER: Well, I've seen those press reports. I don't know if they're accurate or not.

I would find it deeply regrettable if the U.N. chose to draw down the rest of its staff there. They've been extremely helpful to us in the period since the war. We've had a dozen U.N. specialized agencies who have been very actively supporting reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and so forth.

I worked, as you may know, very closely with the special representative of the secretary general, who was killed in the bombing. And I certainly hope the U.N. will continue to be present in Iraq and I would regret it if they left.

REED: Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Roberts?

ROBERTS: General, I believe you said after your last visit to Washington words to the effect that after being in the U.S. a week and a half and listening to news reports on the conditions in Iraq, it was as if you would be going back to Iraq to, quote, "find someone to surrender to." What part of the Iraq picture do you worry that the public is not getting -- still not getting?

ABIZAID: Sir, it's difficult to get the story here, because we concentrate on every bad incident and we don't seem to get through the wonderful work that is being done, not only by the folks in the military, but also at the Coalition Provisional Authority. For every one combat operation, there's probably 50 civic actions that are absolutely amazing in their organization and the good that they do and the capability that they provide a better life for the Iraqis.

So it's difficult for us to get the word out. We've put out press releases that talk about the good work we do. But the nature of life in the States is you concentrate on the bad, as opposed to the good. This cynicism does not help the troops.

ROBERTS: You mean that's not in the New York Times or The Washington Post? I can't understand that.

ABIZAID: Well, sir, I'm an optimist and I know what our troops are doing. And everybody around this table and in this conference room here knows what our troops are doing. And we need to be optimistic for them and for the Iraqi people.

There are tough times ahead and I don't want to ever mislead this committee that the war is necessarily over any time soon. There will be more casualties; there'll be more expenditure of treasure. But ultimately, we will win. We will win because we can persevere in our very, very difficult tasks.

ROBERTS: And, Mr. Ambassador, in the very short time I have left, I'd like for you to connect the dots. That's the euphemism we use in the Intelligence Committee.

And we have an inquiry on regional stability, human rights, terror sanctuary, WMD, historical precedent, resolve to stay the course. You're both at a town hall meeting in Dodge City and you're with me -- Dodge City Kansas. And some old cowboy stands up and says, "Now, General and Mr. Ambassador, what the hell has this got to do with me? How does this affect my daily life and pocket book?"

I would probably tell him -- well, I know who would answer the question and I would say -- or ask the question. I'd say, "Now, Kirby, just, you know, control your temper here a minute. Basically, if we allow the sanctuary to continue and the global war on terrorism continues, somebody may kill you."

Now he might understand that. But would you connect that final dot, as to what they means to the individual person in Nebraska or Minnesota or Alabama or, you know, wherever" What does it mean to them?

ABIZAID: Sir, I'll just tell you that -- what all of our soldiers tell me, when I talk to them: Fight them here or fight them at home.

ROBERTS: Simple as that.

ABIZAID: Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Sessions, will you wrap it up?

SESSIONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And you know, there've been comments that we need to have the United Nations more involved in maybe even taking a lead in this -- some from this Congress, which I am very dubious about. I'm convinced that if we want it to take longer, to be less efficiently, to be done with more corruption and at great expense, we should turn it over to the U.N.

But I was, in fact, particularly distressed that the U.N. -- I'm looking at this little item here -- Dan Engelen (ph) told 10 non- permanent Security Council members in a closed-door meeting today that they weren't -- they didn't perceive coming back in significant numbers.

Now what I -- that says to me is it's another example of why, in a matter of this seriousness, in which the United States had made such a significant commitment and is so important to the future of the world and to the United States foreign policy, it the U.N.'s going to leave after one attack, we can't -- it would be unwise for us to put your confidence and faith in them.

Ambassador Bremer would you comment on that?

BREMER: Well, I think -- let me first say, as the president has said not only Tuesday, but before, we think the U.N. can play a vital role in Iraq. And I certainly, for one, welcome it. I've already, in answer to Senator Reed's questioning, pointed out how useful I think they can be.

But it is true that there's something of a contradiction behind the people who are anxious for the U.N. to play a leading role and the U.N.'s apparent decision -- we don't know if it is a decision -- to draw their people out of Iraq.

The people of Iraq are going to still need electricity.

BREMER: They're still going to need security. They're still going to need water. They're still going to need sewage in the next two to three months. They need it now. And if the U.N. is going to spend some time out of the country thinking about whether they can go back, that's time that's lost. That's more dangerous for our soldiers. It's a time when we are losing time getting Iraq reconstructed.

SESSIONS: I couldn't agree more. And thank you.

The question about the commitment of the people of Iraq, I met the police chief there, who was personally leading raids, had been shot in the leg the week before. An attempt was made on his life not long after I got back here. He lost the female cabinet member.

The people that are leading your city councils, police, are each one of them expressing courage and commitment to a new Iraq every day they go to work?

BREMER: That's right. The fire of freedom has been lit, to use Winston Churchill's...

SESSIONS: And they are at risk just as American soldiers are.

BREMER: Yes, they are. They are a courageous group of people like the woman who was killed last week.

SESSIONS: General Abizaid, I asked you when we were there about more up-armored Humvees for our personnel. I think some steps have been taken to improve that situation to give them more protection as they do their patrolling and also the Stryker vehicle.

Can you assure us that we're making progress with getting better armament for those troops and guardsmen that are there?

BREMER: Sir, we are making progress on individual protection; for example, the protective vests: By November, every soldier in the theater will have the newest and latest version of that.

We're making progress on the number of Humvees although that will take longer to fix with regard to the up-armored Humvees, but they are coming in at a rate that's probably 100 or 200 vehicles a month.

And as far as the Stryker is concerned, I am looking forward to the arrival of the Stryker. I know the Army has looked at some difficulty with certain parts of the armor, and I am confident when the Stryker arrives that it'll be a great addition to the battlefield.

SESSIONS: And provide more safety for the soldiers?

BREMER: Absolutely.

SESSIONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: When you referred to vests, it's the flak vests. And you've addressed that problem. And I'm delighted you have.

Senator Levin, I thank you and your colleagues. I thank my colleagues.

LEVIN: We do have a question, if we could ask Ambassador Bremer.

WARNER: Yes.

LEVIN: Could you send us August update of that July 21st or 23rd plan? You say that you update it, or modify it, monthly. Could you send us the August update? Plus can you send us each monthly update as you adopt them?

BREMER: Well, Senator, not only on this committee but other committees have asked for more visibility. Let me make it a more general commitment to keep you informed.

We may want to change the format. Actually, the August one, of course, is out of date. We've just...

LEVIN: The September one.

BREMER: And we will have a major review of the quarter starting next week. I will keep you informed, but I want to reserve some latitude on how I do that.

LEVIN: Well, but I think it is important that since the August, and apparently September, modifications have been made, that we get copies of those.

BREMER: I will keep you informed, but I want to keep my hands free as to how I do that.

LEVIN: Well, there's no reason that I can imagine why this Senate should not get a copy of your August and September modification, just the way you...

BREMER: Well, maybe you will, sir. I just want to go back and...

LEVIN: Not maybe. No. No. Not maybe. I can't think of a reason why. If it's classified, send it to us in classified form. But there's no reason why we're not entitled to that.

BREMER: I will keep you informed, sir.

LEVIN: Well, I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. On that one, that's not good enough.

Are you asserting some kind of a privilege in sending this thing?

BREMER: Well, I'm not, Senator. I just want...

LEVIN: There's no reason why we're not entitled to a document which you have prepared.

BREMER: Senator, I just remind you that within a week, which is the time frame in which I can send you anything, I will have the first quarter reviewed.

BREMER: And that is more useful than going back to August, which is out of date. Even the September one is out of date now.

LEVIN: You sent us the July one. We finally got that a few weeks ago.

BREMER: No, Senator, let's not go over that again.

LEVIN: Excuse me, this is not a matter of argument. This is a matter of whether we are entitled to those documents.

BREMER: You are entitled to be kept informed about our planning and our progress, and I will commit to do that.

LEVIN: I'm sorry, Ambassador, we are entitled to those documents. I thought that was a routine question. I did not intend that that was anything other than a routine question. Now it's no longer a routine question.

We are being asked to spend $20 billion of American taxpayers' money. You've said you had a plan, you pointed to the July document, which most of us never got until a few days ago. If there were modifications, which you said there were, in that plan, in August, and you said recently in September, this Senate is entitled to that, those documents.

Now, if you want to get some legal advice on that question, you can get it. But you can't just say you're going to keep us informed. That is not good enough. I don't think anyone on this committee, Democrat or Republican, is going to accept that from any member of the executive branch.

Now, I would suggest you get advice on that before you stick to that position.

WARNER: Senator, we will, and I will join you in trying to reconcile what appears to be some difference, which I'm not sure what it is, and we'll give you adequate...

BREMER: We can resolve it.

WARNER: We can resolve it.

Let us -- I wish to have this hearing concluded on what I perceive is a -- have been a very thorough, in-depth and tempered exchange of viewpoints. And that's what the American public expect from a Congress working with the executive branch, particularly when it relates to matters of our national security, and the life and the limb of our brave soldiers and their families here at home.

So I think I can speak for this committee that each of you are discharging your duties as public servants consistent with the finest traditions of our country.

Thank you.

LEVIN: Mr. Chairman, there's a markup on Monday. I think we're entitled to those documents before that markup in the Appropriations Committee, and I think we need a formal answer from the administration on that issue by tomorrow.