U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

HEARING OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

April 20, 2004

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOHN WARNER
A Senator from Virginia
and
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

SEN. WARNER: The committee meets today in another of its series of hearings on the worldwide threat situation, with emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq.

We welcome our witnesses, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Secretary Marc Grossman, undersecretary of State for political affairs. Each of our witnesses is very well qualified to discuss the full range of the topics before the committee today. All have been deeply involved in the planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Myers just returned Sunday from a trip to the region to visit our troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Colleagues and friends, the past few weeks have been particularly challenging for our nation. We are ever mindful of the risks our troops face every day, those of the coalition forces, and the sacrifices made by the families and the communities that support them as those who have been removed from power seek to delay their inevitable defeat, and as terrorists lash out at the loss of another area in which to train and spawn terrorism throughout the world. We mourn every loss of life and salute those who serve, their families, for their bravery, their commitment and their sacrifice.

The timeliness and importance of this hearing cannot be overstated. We are at a critical juncture for coalition operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I myself just returned several weeks ago from a trip to both of those countries. The brilliant military victories achieved by our armed forces together with the coalition partners have presented an opportunity to fully defeat violence and terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, nations whose previous rulers had perpetrated violence and terror not only on their own populations and their neighbors, but spreading it throughout the world.

The cycle of violence that has gripped this part of the world must end if we are to win the global war on terrorism and make America and our friends and allies a safer place. Deviation from our current course will only embolden those who are intent on bringing about instability and anarchy not only in the region but elsewhere in the world.

We've achieved extraordinary success in a relatively short period of time in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed are gone. The future is hopeful for the Iraqi people. We must continue to send a strong message of resolve to the people of Iraq, to our troops, to our coalition partners and to the rest of the world that the United States will stay its course and get the job done.

As President Bush stated last week and I quote, "Now is the time and Iraq is the place in which the enemies of the civilized world are testing the will of the civilized world. We must not waver," end quote.

President Bush has set a course that calls for the return of political sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30th. It is critical that we end our status as an occupying power and give Iraqis an increased stake in what happens in their future and the nation.

This date was endorsed by the U.N. special representative, Brahimi. Brahimi and the U.N. are playing an important role in the transition to sovereignty and will continue to play a critical role in helping Iraq on its path to democracy. This committee will learn today from this distinguished panel further details on that operation.

The president's appointment yesterday of a trusted international statesman and current U.S. ambassador to the U.N., John Negroponte, as the first ambassador to a free and democratic is another important step in this process. I've had the opportunity through the years to know Mr. Negroponte quite well and have the highest personal regard for him.

Continued U.S. commitment to the June 30th transition date is of enormous importance to the Iraqi people and to the region, and -- for it will be the day that Iraq takes its place in the community of free nations and the day the Iraqis assume a greater degree of responsibility for their future. The coalition forces, however, will remain on standby status and involve themselves in the security of that nation.

A free, democratic Iraq means defeat for the forces of terrorism and instability in Iraq.

Clearly, the recent surge in violence in Iraq is related to the imminent transfer of sovereignty. Those who fear democracy are trying to delay its arrival. Those who incite terror realize their days are numbered. Opponents of a free, democratic Iraq are desperate and will become even more desperate, unfortunately, in the days to come. We will be prepared for more violence as June 30th approaches. We must not waver in the face of terror and intimidation. Our troops, members of our coalition and the people of Iraq need the continued strongest support of the Congress of the United States.

Many countries shared in the military effort to liberate Iraq. Other nations not involved directly in the military have joined in the rebuilding of Iraq. A total of 38 nations are now involved in this overall endeavor. I welcome the increased participation of the United Nations in the political transition process. I applaud President Bush for his consistent efforts, efforts that began in September 2002 at the United Nations, to build and expand the coalition of nations who have the courage and the conviction to fight tyranny and terror in order to make the region and the world a better place, a safer place.

As we are focused as a nation on developments in Iraq, we must not lose sight of ongoing developments in Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition forces continue to eliminate remnants of all al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that harbored them. NATO forces are taking increasing responsibility to provide security and reconstruction assistance across many parts of the country. The recent donors conference in Berlin secured commitments from the international community to provide the assistance Afghanistan will need to recover from decades of war and oppression. A constitution's been approved. An election's been scheduled. These are important steps on Afghanistan's path to full democracy.

The future is finally hopeful for the people of Afghanistan, but challenges remain. Speaking for myself personally, as a consequence of my visit there, I remain very interested in our witnesses' view on how we can help Afghanistan conquer a very serious drug trade, which is growing, not diminishing -- growing at an alarming rate.

The hearing today is an opportunity to review current policies and future challenges. I hope our witnesses can provide insights into a number of questions, among them the issue of this 700,000 (dollars). I will put in today's record the details of the briefings that this committee received -- and it was on a bipartisan basis -- with regard to the use of those funds.

Our committee records show that on the 13th of February, 2003, the JCS-J4 briefed the committee staff.

Later, on February 23rd, 2003, then DOD Comptroller Dove Zakheim briefed the staff. Lastly, representatives from the OSD comptroller provided a classified briefing on April 4, 2003. The questions regarded the use of funds, that is O&M funds, to do what is predominately milcon-type functions. We have in the committee records, for the inspection of our members, a classified document dated April 4, 2003 which details those expenditures.

Nevertheless, Secretary Wolfowitz, I hope you can elaborate on that issue.

Further, the questions before the committee today: Are current troop levels in Iraq, as recently requested by General Abizaid, sufficient? Do our troops have sufficient equipment and correct equipment to carry out and complete the mission? How will an Iraqi interim government be formed? And how are Iraqis reacting to the recent U.N. proposal? What role will the U.N. and other international organizations play in the reconstruction of Iraq after the transition of sovereignty? Will the U.S. seek a U.N. Security Council resolution to cover the next phase of activities, political and military, in Iraq? And what are the details that we have at hand with regard to the all-important Status of Forces Agreement, which spells out, hopefully -- or will, perhaps coupled with a U.N. resolution, which I believe will be forthcoming, exactly how the relationship between the new transfer of power to an Iraqi government and the utilization of our troops and those of coalition forces for further security.

I now recognize our distinguished ranking member.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

CARL LEVIN
A Senator from Michigan
and
Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning; Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Grossman, General Myers. These three witnesses, representing as they do, defense policy, diplomacy and military planning, provide us an opportunity to explore a number of important issues relating to Iraq and Afghanistan.

And I join you, Mr. Chairman, and every member of this committee in expressing our gratitude to our troops, who demonstrate such constancy and courage.

This would be an important hearing no matter when it was held, but events of the last few months have made it even more crucial. Today's hearing takes place in a month that has tragically seen more U.S. military deaths from combat in Iraq than any other month since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is a month that has also seen an outbreak of insurgent violence in Fallujah and elsewhere in central Iraq consisting primarily of Sunnis and foreign jihadists, and militia resistance in several cities in southern Iraq consisting mostly of Shi'a.

Despite the obvious setbacks that we have experienced, I believe that we can succeed in bringing peace and stability to Iraq. It will help to achieve that goal if we're willing to learn from our mistakes. The first step is to recognize that mistakes were made, and that may be the most difficult step of all.

Our uniformed military always conducts after-actions, lessons learned reviews so that the mistakes that have been made are not repeated in the future. That practice needs to be followed by the civilian leadership of the executive branch, including both the Defense and State Departments.

For example, instead of merely tossing off the continuing violence as "a tough period of days," there should be an assessment as to whether we adequately planned for the possibility of post-Saddam chaos.

Most expert commentators agree with former Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq to deal with the situation once the Saddam Hussein regime had fallen. The looting that took place and the damage to government buildings and public infrastructure that resulted might have been avoided or been of less severity if General Shinseki's advice had been heeded instead of his being disparaged by the civilian leadership.

Most experts agree that it was a mistake to totally disband the Iraqi army, beyond, of course, removal of dedicated Ba'athists and Saddam loyalists.

Most experts agree that the de-Ba'athification program went beyond what was needed to assure that the Ba'athist leadership was not maintained. As Mr. Brahimi stated last Wednesday, quote, "It is difficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of teachers, university professors, medical doctors and hospital staff, engineers and other professionals who are sorely needed have been dismissed within the de-Ba'athification process, and far too many of these cases have yet to be reviewed," close quote.

The fact that the widely disliked and distrusted Mr. Chalabi was put in charge of the de-Ba'athification program was a mistake that still needs to be corrected. The restriction of the U.S. military to a minor role in planning for the stability phase, or phase four, of Operation of (sic) Iraqi Freedom, as General Franks described it to Chairman Warner and me several weeks ago, was, in my judgment, clearly a mistake.

And despite all the talk about the Iraqi security forces being the largest force in Iraq and the ones who would soon be the line of defense against the former regime elements and jihadists, the fact is that there's been a failure to adequately train more than 4 percent of the Iraqi police until now. Surely there are lessons to be learned from that.

Perhaps the greatest mistake was the failure to appreciate the importance of securing international support through the United Nations before initiating hostilities against Iraq.

The United States was unable to convince the other members of the Security Council that Iraq posed an imminent danger, and we cut U.N. weapons inspections off before they were concluded. The difficulty following the war and obtaining broad international support, including troops and police from Muslim countries, is the result.

The price we are paying is an extremely high one. Even before our troop rotation we were providing more than 80 percent of the troops in Iraq, a figure that will rise with the impending withdrawal of the Spanish and Honduran troops. And although it is difficult to ascertain the extent of contributions of other nations, we are providing far in excess of 80 percent of the financial assistance for Iraqi reconstruction.

After keeping the United Nations at arm's length throughout the occupation of Iraq, the president finally recognized the central role of the U.N. in finding a way to an interim government which will be accepted by the people of Iraq. When asked last week about the Iraqi entity to whom sovereignty will be restored on June 30th, the president said, quote, "that's going to be decided by Mr. Brahimi," close quote; quite a reversal of the prior posture of the administration towards the U.N. and long overdue.

Formal U.N. involvement in the transition to a new interim Iraqi government as our full partner would help provide essential legitimacy in many parts of the world. U.N. endorsement of a process of selecting an interim government and authorizing a multinational force after the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty might also open the door to troops and police officers from other nations, including Muslim nations, and to NATO involvement in Iraq. Some nations will, however, require a more formal role for the U.N. in the continuing political development of Iraq as a condition for their participation or continued participation there. Conversely, a failure to give the U.N. a major and formal role after restoration of sovereignty would make it difficult for a number of nations to keep their forces in Iraq, not to mention attracting new troops and police.

I visited U.N. headquarters in New York last Friday and met with U.S. Ambassador Negroponte and with the British, French, German and Pakistani ambassadors as well. I attended a Security Council meeting in which Ambassador Negroponte reported to the council on the efforts and the progress of the U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq.

I met with Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and in the course of our meeting he expressed his disagreement with statements in the press that the United Nations would choose the people who would make up the new interim government. He said that the United Nations would hopefully help produce a process by which the Iraqi people would choose their leaders, which is very different from the U.N. choosing them, and far, far different from the United States and the coalition occupying powers choosing them.

In response to my question to him about a Plan B if Mr. Brahimi is unable to help produce a satisfactory consensus by June 30 -- in other words, if there is no credible, broadly supported government to whom sovereignty by that date can be restored -- Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that there isn't enough time to come up with a Plan B, so the only alternative would then be to extend the existence of the Iraqi Governing Council.

I know the administration intends to stick to the June 30th date. But the task of putting together the pieces of a sovereign government which the various factions of the Iraqi people support, by an artificial, and in a relatively short time, is a massive one. If the U.N. doesn't have the pieces together by June 30, the worst thing we could do is to attempt to restore sovereignty to leaders that appear to be our choices instead of the Iraqis'. Even greater chaos and possibly civil war could result.

So while the administration doesn't want to talk about the possibility that the U.N. doesn't succeed by June 30th, I hope the administration has a plan for what they would do in that event, because the possibility is a real one. We cannot repeat the lack of planning which marked the post-Saddam period.

For our military, one of the thorniest issues is whether a new sovereign Iraqi government will be able to change the status of our forces, or will a prior or new U.N. resolution assure continuity? A gap in the ability to do what is required militarily is unacceptable.

Other key issues for our leadership include how many U.S. troops will be required to ensure stability in Iraq in both the short and long term; how will the forces of nations like Spain and Honduras, that plan to withdraw their troops from Iraq, be replaced?

As for Afghanistan, which has received significantly less attention since the start of the Iraq conflict, 2004 started with good news as the constitutional loya jirga was completed and NATO decided to expand its role there. However, the last few weeks have seen a number of challenges to the government of President Karzai from regional warlords and their militias. Additionally, NATO nations have not fulfilled requests for more troops, and the narcotics problem in Afghanistan seems to be out of control. What specific plans are there to address these real concerns?

And finally, I would note that questions have been raised as to whether Congress was adequately informed and involved concerning the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars for construction activities in preparation for war with Iraq. And as our chairman noted, our witnesses need to address that matter.

I look forward to the testimony of those witnesses addressing these and many other vital questions of concern to our committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Levin.

We'll now proceed to hear testimony. Your statements, prepared, which have been submitted to the committee, will be a part of the record. You may address those parts that you think pertinent for your opening statements. And at the present time, the committee intends to have a brief closed session, following this open session, in 222 Russell.

Secretary Wolfowitz, will you kindly proceed?

STATEMENT OF

PAUL WOLFOWITZ
Deputy Secretary of Defense

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, I have quite a long prepared statement which I will submit for the record. In the interest of time, I will just summarize and read some portions of it.

I'd like to begin, though, by citing what a Marine company commander wrote to his father, as this Marine prepared to lead his troops into Fallujah recently. And I quote, "This battle is going to have far-reaching effects on not only the war here, but in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks. There will be no shock and awe. This battle is the Marine Corps Belleau Wood for this war. A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them.

" The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history," this company commander wrote, "as one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world, or we will die trying. The Marines are fired up. I'm nervous for them though, because I know how much is riding on this fight. However, every time I've been nervous during my career about the outcome of events when young Marines were involved they have always exceeded my expectations.

" God bless these great Americans," he wrote, "who are ensuring we continue to fight an away schedule."

Let me add God bless these wonderful Marines and soldiers and all the members of our armed forces. Our prayers are with him and with all of our people -- military and civilian alike -- currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making America, and the world, more secure by helping the Iraqi and Afghan people build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the Middle East. Whether members of active duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our nation -- serving so that others may be free, and so that our children and our grandchildren can be more secure. And we thank them all for the sacrifices they endure.

We also owe a profound debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men and women from our 35 coalition partners, who are also serving the cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the contributions made by civilians from a wide assortment of NGOs and with the Coalition Provisional Authority. They have recently become a particular focus of terrorist attacks. One heroine, Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of Iraqi women, was brutally murdered a few weeks ago for the work she was doing. Though it is small consolation to her family and friends, she wrote to a friend that if she died, she would die doing what she believed in.

And finally, I'd like to thank the members of this committee, and the Congress as a whole, for their continued strong support for our members of our armed forces.

Mr. Chairman, a little over a year ago, we all watched the statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. On that day, some 25 million of one of the most talented populations in the Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last hundred years. According to a theme that one hears often these days, the world is full of bad guys, Saddam Hussein was just another bad guy.

Any time that I hear Saddam Hussein referred to in that way, I know that the person making the statement really doesn't understand who Saddam Hussein was and is. During my career, I've had the experience of working up close and personal with some truly bad guys: Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, President Suharto of Indonesia. To paraphrase someone else on a very different occasion, I knew Ferdinand Marcos; Saddam Hussein was no Ferdinand Marcos.

Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He institutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply unimaginable to most Americans. He ruled by fear, creating a society in which the ideal citizen was a torturer or an informer.

I've traveled to Iraq several times since liberation. I have spoken to hundreds of Iraqis, both there and here in the United States. And one of my strongest impressions is that the fear of the old regime still pervades Iraq. A smothering blanket of fear woven by 35 years of repression, where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death -- or fates worse than death, like the death of one's children or the rape of one's relatives -- that fear won't be cast off in just a few weeks or even just a year or two.

Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the very beginning. In 1979 when he formally assumed power as president, he had a sweeping purge of top Ba'athist Party leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly, Saddam, with tears running down his cheeks, and puffing on a cigar, talked about the "confession" of disloyalty they had received from a top party member, and then continued one by one to name other guilty colleagues. One by one, guards dragged these people out of the meeting. And then Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their first loyalty test: they were required to participate in the firing squads that executed those he'd identified.

And he didn't stop there. He had videos made of the whole event and distributed throughout the Middle East so people would know what kind of a man he was. Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and ensuring that his potential victims understood that his threats were to be taken seriously, in doing that, Saddam Hussein applied the techniques that any FBI agent will tell you are the techniques of a gangland boss, but he did it on a national scale and as the head of an internationally recognized government.

One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost defies belief. Scott Ritter -- the former UNSCOM inspector and an opponent of the war -- described a prison in Baghdad whose stench, he said, was unreal, an amalgam -- I quote -- "of urine, feces, vomit and sweat, where prisoners were howling and dying of thirst." In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers -- their crime being children of the regime's political opponents.

I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has accurately called the "density of evil" that permeated Iraq. In very many ways, its effects are also like a torture that doesn't end. Such evil and fear are so alien to our own American experience that I think it's necessary to talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis today if we are to have a proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges facing us because, Mr. Chairman, this is not just history. Didn't tell these stores in order to educate people about the past. It is the present. When we use this rather anodyne term "former regime elements" to describe the people that we capture and the people that are organizing much of the fighting in Fallujah, my view the more correct term would be the torturers and killers of the old regime.

One example, and I will like to submit the full classified statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, but this is an analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency of one branch of the former Iraqi intelligence service called the M-14, the so-called special operations and antiterrorism branch -- "antiterrorism," it's Orwellian. This branch specialized in kidnappings, hijackings, bombings and assassinations. It was a terrorist branch. These people are in the field today.

As that report says, former Iraqi intelligence service operatives from M-14 have been involved in planning and conducting numerous improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and radio-controlled improvised explosive devices for anti- coalition attacks throughout Iraq. It goes on to say that cells of former M-14 personnel are organizing/conducting a terrorist IED campaign against coalition forces throughout Iraq. The explosives section of M-14 prepared for the invasion by constructing hundreds of suicide vests and belts for use by Saddam Fedayeen against coalition forces. The Iraqi intelligence service established a campaign that was purposely decentralized so that attacks could be carried out in the event that cell leaders were captured or killed. And it goes on to mention that, given their high level of skill, M-14 tactics including explosives are likely to be sophisticated.

I'd like to submit the full -- I don't have page numbers -- it's about a seven-page document, and the detail is stunning in my view.

SEN. WARNER: Without objection, Mr. Secretary, that will be done.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: And given that kind of presence, it's not surprising to me that we get accounts like this one that came recently from the Marines on the battlefront. I guess I should always say that first reports in war are frequently wrong, and even second reports can be wrong, and I don't know whether this is a first, second or third, but it strikes me it is probably true.

The Marines reported a firefight in a small village northeast of Fallujah called Kharma (ph). They basically stumbled across what seemed to be a large enemy position. The enemy swarmed in attack on the Marines. The result of a very intense firefight was over 100 enemy killed in action. The significant thing, which I am looking to confirm, the report says upon termination of hostility, the local townspeople approached the Marines, thanking them for their action because the enemy had taken over their town and had been effectively holding them hostage.

I can confirm more reliably, Mr. Chairman, that a similar situation prevailed in the town of Samarra, further east in the area of operation of the 4th Infantry Division, which is now run by the 1st Infantry Division, a situation not as bad as Fallujah, but in some ways perhaps emblematic of the Fallujah problem. General Odierno and the 4th ID, about two months ago, undertook a cordon and search operation where they closed off the town and systematically went after the anti-democratic forces that had been organizing and terrorizing that town. I've heard different estimates, ranging from 200 to 700 enemy captured and detained. But what is in no disagreement is that once those people were gone, Samarra was a different place. And indeed, it's been a different place during the violence of the last few weeks.

Jim Steele (sp), who is a retired Army colonel with incredibly bravery and also incredible expertise about police forces in third world countries, he's been in Iraq for the last year. He gave a report about a recent visit to Samarra. He said, "It's a different place from what it was during my last visit in December. The number of active police stations has more than doubled. The attitude toward the coalition forces was much improved as well. Samarra is an excellent example of local and regional cooperation."

And in fact, during the recent fighting, the police in Samarra performed well. This is from a report from Major General John Batiste, the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, which now took over from General Odierno. He said, "We stood up a Security Working Group in Samarra in advance of the April 9th-12th Arba'in celebrations to keep the peace, and if necessary, respond with firmness. There was some violence on 12 April in Samarra, but Iraqi security forces were part of the solution and the violence was contained. I am using the Samarra model throughout the region."

I mention all of this, Mr. Chairman, because as bad as the situation is in Fallujah, and I don't in any way mean to minimize it, I think the enemy that we are facing is an enemy that rests on killing and death and terror, not an enemy that has genuine popular appeal. We have to work on our side on improving the belief of the Iraqi people in their future and the belief in what we can do for their future. But we also have to work to overcome the fear that these people implant.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Iraq has been a free country for a single year after decades of systematic abuse. A year after its liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we have accomplished together with the Iraqi people. The indisputable fact is that after 35 years of enduring unimaginable horrors, Iraq has seen the beginnings of a tremendous transformation for the better in the 12 months since its liberation.

For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam's personal fiat. Ba'athists suppressed dissent through murder, torture and arbitrary imprisonment.

Iraqis had no real rights, only temporary privileges subject to the whims of Saddam and his sadistic sons. Today Iraqis have an interim constitution that contains assurances of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement -- provisions that are highlighted in that chart on my right.

Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for life-saving medicines were used by Saddam's regime to buy the means to end life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many of Iraq's hospitals and clinics that did remain open served as ammunition or command bunkers. Today, health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times -- that is 30 times -- over pre-war levels, and children are receiving crucial vaccinations for the first time in years.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption and the systematic misallocation of resources to palaces and weapons and to the favorites of the regime. Today the Iraqi economy is starting on a path of recovery, even though the full effect of the $18.4 billion that the Congress provided is only just starting to be felt. This is still, I would emphasize, an area of great concern to us, but we are making progress in the face of years of neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate.

For 35 years, Mr. Chairman, Iraq's oil revenues helped to build Saddam's palaces and line his pockets and those of his cronies. Today that revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where it helps to build a new infrastructure and a new future for the Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production has reached its pre- war levels, and a total of $7.5 billion has been generated for the Development Fund for Iraq. That, I would add, is on top of the roughly $8 billion from past revenues out of the oil-for-food program. So that Iraq has contributed $17 billion, approximately, of its own resources -- 16.9, to be precise -- to the reconstruction effort already.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's dilapidated power plants were in a state of unimaginable disrepair. Saddam corrupted the oil-for- food program and diverted the wealth of the country for his own power and comfort. Today power generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed throughout the country.

For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam's cult of personality and Ba'ath party fascism. Today that fanaticism no longer pervades the national education system; 64,000 secondary teachers and 5,000 school principals and administrators have been retrained in modern teaching methods; the endless references to Saddam in the textbooks have been removed; and coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools.

After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq's marsh Arabs, the historical marshlands of southern Iraq were on the verge of extinction. A lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been turned into a barren desert by Saddam's vindictive attempt to destroy a people, the marsh Arabs, whose history goes back thousands of years. Today the marshlands are gradually being restored, and that ancient culture is being revived.

For 35 years, the Iraqi people's only link with the outside world was the poisonous propaganda of Iraq's state-run media. Today Iraqis have a wealth of independent news sources, including 170 newspapers.

For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their nation's future. Today more than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs, and one in five belongs to a nongovernmental organization.

I read in The Guardian of London recently, and I'd like to submit the full article for the record, that recently in the overwhelmingly Shi'a province of Diyala in southern Iraq, 17 towns held local elections using ration cards in the absence of registration rolls. Their first genuine elections ever, and in almost every case either secular independents or non-religious parties outpolled the Islamists. Perhaps most important, in the year since Iraq has been liberated, no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of innocent Iraqi men, women and children, capriciously murdered by a brutal regime. And the torture rooms and execution chambers have been shut down for good.

Despite all the uncertainty and violence caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement and anticipate much more. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, despite all the difficulties that are correctly described in Iraq today, 56 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat better than a year ago. And a full 71 percent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'm not here to paint a rosy picture or to view this through rose-colored glasses. There are enormous problems. Some of them are, indeed, the result of what General Petraeus, who recently commanded the 101st in Iraq and will be going back, by the way, to perform a crucial role in building Iraqi security forces, General Petraeus called it the man-on-the-moon phenomenon. That is to say, you Americans can put a man on the moon; how come my electricity doesn't work, how come the sewers aren't fixed, how come everything isn't perfect after liberation? And I believe that it is critical not only for the concrete benefits that come from employing people and fixing their basic services, I believe it's also critical in terms of maintaining faith and confidence in the United States that we have to speed up this reconstruction effort. We're trying to understand -- Senator Levin referred to lessons learned. One of the lessons we are trying to learn is the roadblocks that have made it slower than I believe is acceptable to get projects moving. Some of those roadblocks are unavoidable. They are the inevitable result of an insecure situation. Some of them are self- imposed red tape or, in some cases, I think, legislation. And I hope we can work together with the Congress to eliminate both where there are unnecessary obstacles.

We have a strategy. It has three basic elements. The first one involves building capable Iraqi security forces. The picture there is mixed. We have lessons learned, important lessons learned from the last few weeks. But I believe on balance it is one of the most critical elements. In fact, I will also submit for the record -- I won't read it in length -- but Jim Steele (sp), whom I quoted earlier, also reported visiting police stations in two critical sections of Baghdad in Adhamiya and Sadr City late at night during the recent disturbances and was frankly surprised but pleasantly surprised to find the chief of police there on duty and working.

One of the problems is, through our slowness in getting equipment into the field, many of these Iraqi police were outgunned by the militias that they faced. That is a problem we can fix. In fact, if I were an Iraqi policeman, I guess I'd be asking why didn't you fix it sooner. We are moving to fix it as rapidly as we can.

The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for representative self-government with the aim of creating a government the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of the position of being an occupying power.

Can someone put up the chart, please, that shows that process?

I would emphasize it is a process. Things won't change overnight on July 1st. While many think that July 1 will be a magical date on which CPA will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraqi government, it is actually, like the process in Afghanistan that was started in Bonn in December of 2001, just one step in a process. Already, free Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility for government functions for quite some time. Iraq now has a functioning judiciary. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and running.

And -- I think this is important -- the July 1st transition is just one of three important steps in the future. It will be followed by the elections to establish the transitional government in January of 2005, and let me emphasize elected; not appointed by the Americans, not negotiated by Ambassador Brahimi, but fully elected early next year. That government in turn will be replaced by a permanent elected government under a constitution at the end of 2005.

And the third element of the strategy, Mr. Chairman, involves the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and the restoration of essential services to provide better lives for Iraqis and put people back to work. Again, this is an area where we have got to speed things up. I think things are speeding up, and there's no question that the infusion of money that the Congress provided last year is starting to be felt and will be felt on a larger scale over the course of this calendar year.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at the same time the Iraqis are undergoing a significant transition, we will be transitioning from the Coalition Provisional Authority, under Ambassador Bremer's leadership, to a new American embassy led by one of our most distinguished career diplomats, John Negroponte, our current ambassador to the United Nations, as was just announced yesterday. We have been working closely with our colleagues in the State Department, example of extraordinarily good cooperation.

I have with me retired General Mick Kicklighter, who has been working on these issues for the Defense Department, and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone, doing them for the State Department. We sometimes aren't quite sure whether they're the Bobbsey Twins because we always see them together, but they are here and they are a resource for the committee.

SEN. WARNER: Wonder if they would -- would they stand up and be recognized.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: If they would stand up I think it would be helpful. They deserve at least some recognition for the extraordinary work they've been doing.

Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, in my testimony I give details about the timeline in the transition -- the administrative law on these three phases. I think it's important to understand that there are three phases, and that July 1st is not an all-or-nothing kind of date.

I can't sit here today and predict the exact form of government that will result from this process any more than I could have predicted in December 2001 what would result in Afghanistan from the Bonn process. Iraqis will decide to establish the exact provisions of their permanent constitution and who will emerge as the leaders of a new Iraq. Particularly after 35 years of what they've been through, it's a complicated task.

But Americans of all people should understand that a democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes; it opens up ideas for debate. One need only look back to our own constitutional convention to be reminded that any attempt to establish rule for the people and by the people will involve uncertainty and controversy.

Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20 years in countries that had no prior historical experience of democracy. They are all different; none of them are perfect. Neither are we. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be a light years improvement over what that country has been like for the last 35 years.

And let me say one more thing here. I think it's wrong to assume that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, and Christians and Turkomens, some of the most intelligent people in the world, are incapable of achieving what Lithuania, or Korea or the Philippines or Indonesia or Croatia or other newly emerging democracies have accomplished over the last couple of decades. Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves impressively well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam Hussein's unique level of sadism. And I guess I'd say, well, if someone is sitting there saying, "What on earth is he talking about, when we read these scenes in Fallujah, or we read about Mr. Sadr," let me just give you one example.

We didn't read about the massive Arba'in pilgrimage. I don't know the estimates; I think roughly a million Shi'a pilgrims on the road for that celebration, very emotional celebration of the martyrdom of Ali. We anticipated -- we were afraid of massive violence during that event. There was no news because there was no violence. The Shi'a of Iraq, on the whole, have conducted themselves with incredible restraint in the face of repeated provocations both from the Zarqawi terrorists, from the former regime killers, and from this small-time gangster, Mr. Sadr.

I do want to recognize that we have disappointments with the performance of security forces. We are learning lessons from that. I cite three in particular at length in my testimony. The first is the need for stronger leaders.

The second is that Iraqi security forces need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to feel, and to have their friends and relatives feel, that they're fighting for Iraq, not for the Americans. That is one of the reasons why General Abizaid and our commanders were those who were pushing so hard to accelerate the transition to a sovereign government. That is the reason why they found, and I felt with them, that this label of "occupying power" was not a good one to hang on to for another year and a half, if there was any way to avoid it.

And third, and this is our responsibility, Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment, and they need it faster.

Mr. Chairman, I have some comments about Afghanistan. I'll be happy to discuss that in questions.

I would like to stress that I think the American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq and in Afghanistan; that the efforts of our service men and women are transforming the lives of 50 million people, overwhelmingly Muslims, and transforming two regions that have for too long accommodated despotism and terrorism, to the detriment of its people.

Both our friends and our enemies, and our friends particularly, in Iraq and Afghanistan need to know that this country has the will and resolve to accomplish our objectives. And I suppose it's worth highlighting for the international audiences that the debate in this country seems to be about whether we have enough troops or whether we should have more troops, not about whether we should abandon the people of Iraq or the people of Afghanistan. That is an incredibly important message. It is one of the most valuable messages we can deliver, because it builds confidence in the people, it encourages people to cooperate with our troops, and it will allow us to defeat this ugly enemy sooner rather than later.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I think I'm going to abbreviate here. I do want to say that there are quite a few myths out there, and I cite some of them in this testimony. It is a myth to say that the June 30th date for the transfer of sovereignty is completely arbitrary, and even more of a myth to say it's driven by the math of U.S. electoral politics. There are very good important reasons in Iraq for doing it, and I would note that, in fact, it was our friends in the United Nations, particularly France, that were most critical when we established the Governing Council that Iraq needed a sovereign government, not an American occupation.

SEN. WARNER: Mr. Secretary, I think we can probably perceive the benefit of your additional points in the exchange we'll have --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let's do that. If I could just conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one impressive quote from General Jack Keane at his retirement, because I think this is a message to the world.

The general said that, "The foreign terrorists, the Ba'ath Party sympathizers, the extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from many nations have no idea what they're up against. They think they know us," General Keane said, "because they've heard of Lebanon in '83 or Somalia in '94 or the USS Cole in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our resolve. But their knowledge is superficial, and their understanding is shallow. To understand America and Americans," General Keane said, "they need to understand the Marne in 1918 or Tarawa in '43, Omaha beach in '44 or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a nation that producers Alvin York and Audie Murphy, John Pershing and George Marshall, Chesty Puller and George Patton, Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon produces heroes in every generation. They are out there now performing every day." And the general concluded, "Our enemies are cunning, but they are ignorant. And they're ignorance will be their undoing. They do not our will, our courage, or our character."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. God bless those wonderful men and women who serve our country so well. And I thank this committee for the -- and the Congress for the support you give them.

SEN. WARNER: Well, Mr. Secretary, we on this committee and, indeed, throughout the Senate share those beliefs about the men and women of the armed forces and have the highest regard for General Keane. I hope he's doing well.

General Myers?

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL RICHARD MYERS
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

GEN. MYERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Levin, members of the committee, once again I thank you for your unwavering support of our armed forces and, more specifically, our men and women in uniform as they fight this all- important war on terrorism.

As Chairman Warner said, I just returned from visiting Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly, the spike in violence that we've all seen in central Iraq over the last week is a challenge, no doubt about it. And we mourn every coalition soldier that we lose. But I can assure you today that we are as firm as ever in our resolve to help create a free, prosperous, a democratic Iraq. A violent minority, a small marginal minority cannot be allowed to defeat the hopes of the Iraqi people.

This is no popular uprising. This violence is a desperate attempt by frustrated, isolated groups such as the insurgents in Fallujah as described by Secretary Wolfowitz, and Sadr's thugs to derail the progress that we're making. According to recent polls, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the majority of Iraqi people want Iraq to succeed. And they're positive about what the future holds, thanks in large part to the efforts of our servicemen and -women. I know you all are as proud as I am of how well they're performing. They are so tremendously dedicated. They understand their mission very well. They also understand what a huge difference that they're making.

And the contrast between our troops and the anti-coalition forces they're fighting couldn't be greater. In Fallujah we've seen the enemy unload weapons from ambulances, use mosques as operating bases, deliberately put children in the line of fire as human shields, and attack innocent civilians indiscriminately by firing mortars into marketplaces. Our servicemen and -women, on the other extreme, are going to extraordinary lengths to conduct the most humane operation they can. That means at times we accept greater risk in order to avoid civilian casualties.

Make no mistake, we are hitting the enemy very hard, and we are devastating them. But our troops are also very compassionate. Their strength of character in the end, I believe, will be a major factor in determining Iraq's future. I see the same thing in Afghanistan as well with 12 provincial reconstruction teams now working on security and civil affairs for the Afghani people.

Let me close by sharing a letter a member of my staff received from a private first class. This young man enlisted after one year of college. In fact, he was in college on an ROTC scholarship. But because after 9/11 he saw an opportunity to make a difference. He's now serving in one of the more dangerous areas in central Iraq. He describes how he went on a mission to look at the structural integrity of some of the bridges. In the course of the patrol they talked to many of the Iraqis, especially the children. And he had their medical corpsman take care of some of the children with medical problems. By the time they drove off, everyone in the town was smiling and waving at them. I'll quote, and here's what he said:

" What I'm trying to say to you guys is this" -- and "you guys" are his parents -- "we're making a difference here. An area smack-dab in the infamous Sunni triangle known for its ruthlessness is gradually, patrol by patrol, becoming safe and free."

Patrol by patrol. That means we still have a long way to go in this war beyond the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, and elections in Afghanistan. But let's not forget that our troops are making a huge difference every day, and they know it. We're truly blessed with amazing men and women to do this important work, and I include in there their families, and for the reserve component, the Guard and the Reserve, the employers who support them so well. And again, I thank this committee for its strong support.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, General.

Secretary Grossman.

STATEMENT OF

MARC GROSSMAN
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

MR. GROSSMAN: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, thank you all for the opportunity to testify before you today. And, Senator Warner, I thank you for putting my full statement in the record, and I'm pleased to summarize what I have to say, I hope in a short way.

Before I begin, let me add my voice to the committee's and to my fellows here on this table to pay tribute to all of those, military and civilian, who are today serving our country around the world, and specifically in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

And I also want to thank the committee for their support of the State Department, because without your support and without the Congress's support, we would not have been in a position a year ago, two years ago, to do what we have had to do in Afghanistan and Iraq. And I'll talk a little bit more about that. But I thank you in the very beginning for the strong support of the Congress for the secretary's goals in making the department an effective institution.

I also would like to say, as you did, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Levin, that we're delighted with the president's nomination yesterday of Ambassador Negroponte as our first ambassador to the new Iraq, and we look forward to his confirmation hearings and his confirmation by the Senate. And we thank you for your words of support to Ambassador Negroponte.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, in your letter of invitation to me, you asked me a series of questions about how the transition was going to go between CPA and a new embassy. And I wanted today to take a few minutes to talk about where we stand in that transition and try as specifically as I can to answer your questions.

First let me say that in my view, we have the guidance we need about how to do this; we have the direction we need about what we're supposed to do; and as I hope to convince you, we also have a plan about how to move forward between now and the 30th of June/1st of July, so that a U.S. embassy and a United States ambassador representing the United States of America are there to represent us in Iraq.

Our guidance, obviously, Mr. Chairman, as you have quoted, comes from the president. "Our central commitment," he said last Tuesday, "is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people on the 30th of June. It's important that we meet that deadline."

Our specific direction, as you can imagine, comes from Secretary Powell. And he has set as the goal of the State Department to make sure that we are ready to take on this responsibility on the 1st of July. And I might also say how proud we are of Lieutenant General Kicklighter and also Frank Ricciardone, who are spearheading this effort for us, and now Ambassador Negroponte will come and join us and add effort and add focus to the effort that we are making.

I can tell you that the secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues daily.

We send to the secretary each evening a report on what's gone on during the day to move issues forward. We're also sending him a weekly consolidated summary.

And to execute our plan, we have obviously been working closely with all of our interagency colleagues, not just DOD and JCS. We've consulted the Congress, with our allies, with our coalition partners. So people know what it is that we're doing and how it is that we are moving forward.

As an early step, and one of the I think very best ideas of Ambassador Ricciardone and General Kicklighter, the transition planning team sent out very expert people to Iraq to try to tell us what were the main sectors that needed to be dealt with in this transition. And they came up with 15, 16 sectors that we're now moving forward on every day, and these sectors are broken down into individual tasks or milestones. Every one of them need to be accomplished. And although we list on our major charts, 15 or 16 of these milestones, in fact the sectors relate to more than 500 milestones that we have. And just to show you that, we've got a series of charts that we're using to make sure that those with the responsibility to do these jobs are doing them.

And, Senator Warner and Mr. Levin, I would invite members of the committee or members of the committee staff to come and have a look at these. They're all on the web and at the State Department on our classified systems, and people are welcome to come and look at them at any time and see how it is that we are doing. There is a responsibility. There is a completion date. There is a desire to get these things done, and we intend to do them. It's obviously a living document. New issues come up each day. New responsibilities have to be assigned. But we are doing our very best to keep to this plan.

I'd like to take today, of these 15 or 16 items, four of them just to talk about briefly.

First, let me talk about people. State Department officers, as both Ambassador Wolfowitz and General Myers know, have been in Iraq from the very beginning with General Garner in ORHA and now under Jerry Bremer in CPA, and we have 170 people in Iraq today. And like Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, we are also immensely proud of our people's work that are being done in Iraq. And I can tell you that they have come from dozens of Washington agencies, dozens of missions overseas, foreign service, civil service, from brand-new officers to sitting ambassadors.

The question we are asking ourselves now is how big will this embassy be on the 1st of July, and one of the questions you asked me in your letter of invitation. We at the State Department have so far announced positions for 142 American employees and 155 locally engaged staff. In addition, Secretary Powell has written to all of his Cabinet colleagues, asking them to identify the contributions that they wish to make to this embassy. And to date, he's received 10 replies for requests for a presence in our mission in Baghdad for a total of 254 Americans and 280 locally hired personnel looking forward to the fiscal year 2005. Long term, because these 10 aren't the only people who will look for representation at the mission, we look for a total of between 350 and 400 permanently assigned Americans from probably 12 to 15 Cabinet agencies that will serve under the chief of mission in Iraq. And I'd also note that a number of people who work at CPA today we hope will also move under the embassy and allow us to continue with the great expertise that they have developed.

I can also report to you that, of this announced 142 positions for our new embassy at the State Department, we've had over 200 bidders on these jobs. We have not had any problem at all enticing people to be assigned to Iraq. And of the 142 positions that we've announced, we've assigned 97 people, another 32 are pending, and we will have all of these people assigned well in time to meet our obligations. And we also, Senators, are starting to begin the process to hire locally hired people, Iraqis, which is a big challenge as you might imagine. But we've hired our initial Iraqi employees and they are undergoing training here in Washington so they can help us then hire more.

Mr. Chairman, one of the questions that is around and was in your letter of invitation was what is going to be the responsibility of the American ambassador there, given the obviously large military role that will remain in Iraq after the 1st of July.

And I can tell you that the American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him to Iraq a letter from the president, as all our ambassadors carry letters from the president, that spells clearly his authority. It will say that he, as the chief of mission and personal representative of the president, reporting through the secretary of State, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States government executive branch employees in Iraq except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.

Of course, as Paul and I have talked about a lot, our ambassador and our military commanders will need to work very closely together. We do this around the world. We will be able to do this successfully in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, the second of these areas is security. Obviously, our top priority is security. It was our top priority before the last couple of weeks. It remains our top priority. And we've already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim embassy buildings and have selected a site for a future new embassy compound, based largely on security features. We've got 32 officers from the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service already in Iraq to define the mission's security requirements and begin to meet them, as well as to help protect CPA officers and visitors.

And as you know, Deputy Secretary Armitage and our assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security were in Iraq over the past few days to continue this consultation.

Iraq is, not just for our military colleagues but for us as well and for all of our civilian colleagues, a dangerous place to work. Our people know that. That is worth saying out loud. And protecting our people in a wartime environment's difficult, it's expensive, but we will continue to meet our responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, also, in terms of a building, I have laid out in my statement our plan for creating interim facilities for the 1st of July and then our plan for building an embassy after that. I just want you to know it's there, and I'm glad to talk about it. We're glad to consult about it at any time.

And then finally is the question of finances. How much is it going to cost? And do we have the money? And let me just share with you our current thinking on the financial resources needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad and, if I could, just emphasize as much as can that the costs I report to you today are a snapshot. They're where we are on the 20th of April, because we've got some responsibilities to meet. And we believe that they will be costly, but we can meet them.

In order to open an embassy on the 1st of July, we've got to, as I said, meet basic security needs, technology needs, housing needs for our people. And so far the Congress has provided us money with which to do some of this job. We've got in FY '04 $97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim operations. In addition, we expect to have available in the fourth quarter a portion of the operating expense budget appropriated to the CPA -- that's about $198 million -- and, pursuant to the FY '04 supplemental, up to 1 percent of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund which could be transferred, which is about $184 million.

We're also now working to determine the joint mission costs, which I would say to you are going to be in the range of $500 (million) to $600 million for the balance of fiscal year 2004, and how we'll allocate those costs among the various embassies.

And in addition, we're trying to figure out and look for the amount of money that we need to move forward to operate our mission in 2005, which could be on the order of a billion dollars. We're working closely with CPA, with the Defense Department, OMB to refine these estimates. We look forward to providing you as accurate information as we can. And we'll consult with you and your colleagues before anything is made final.

Mr. Chairman, I've talked in my statement a little bit about Iraq's transition to sovereignty. But I think Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz with his charts and comments has made many of the comments that I would have wanted to do, and also about the Iraqi interim government.

Might I just jump, if I could, to talk for a moment about what -- the United Nations Security Council resolutions, since both you and the ranking member had raised this issue. And obviously, we are looking to go for another Security Council resolution. Both President Bush and Secretary Powell have discussed this. We're now in a conversation inside of the administration about what kind of resolution might be appropriate, how to go forward with it, when to go forward with it, and the possible elements of that resolution. As you both said in your statements, the new resolution should extend a hand to this new Iraqi government. It could also deal and regularize reconstruction activities, including the future of the Development Fund for Iraq, deal with the continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to complete the political process. It could encourage other nations, as you both said, to get involved on both security and reconstruction efforts, and a new resolution could structure a role for the United Nations in this new political framework, particularly in supporting progress towards elections.

Mr. Chairman, you both -- and the ranking member talked about Afghanistan. Let me just be brief, if I could, about those two issues, since I think they are extremely important, and we do need to keep paying attention to them. We have tried to pursue a policy in Afghanistan that has to do with increased security, reconstruction and economic growth and the growth of constitutional, democratic and effective government. These things are all related. And as we move forward on one and have success on one, we believe that they will have positive -- a positive outcome on the others. As you both said, the challenges in Afghanistan remain daunting, and we need to pay particular attention to them.

You asked me in your letter about elections. President Karzai announced that elections for the presidency and the lower house of parliament would take place in September. And we are doing all we can to support the United Nations effort to help the Afghans have a successful election. This announcement is consistent with the Afghan -- with Afghanistan's new constitution, which said that these parliamentary and presidential elections ought to be held together. As you said, there was the Bonn agreement, there was the loya jirga of 2002, the constitutional loya jirga of 2004, and we believe that we can make progress here toward these elections.

The United Nations reports that about 1.8 million Afghans have registered to vote as of last week with registrations so far focused on urban centers, and the number will rise significantly as people reach out to other Afghans. I would say just parenthetically that 29 percent of registered voters are women, and that percentage is steadily rising. And over the past two weeks women have represented 39 percent of those registered.

Finally, a word about narcotics because, as you say, this is a great -- this is a very important challenge to what we're doing in Afghanistan. Narcotics production and trafficking is probably the single most serious threat to our common mission in Afghanistan. And just as you and the ranking member said, all indicators point toward a significant increase in poppy cultivation this year, and we should make no bones about that. This is a real challenge that we are going to have to deal with. We're working with President Karzai. I know that you saw a couple of weeks ago at the Berlin conference he called for a jihad against drug trafficking. And we are doing all we can to fight this problem with him.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the carve-up of responsibilities in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom has the lead on counter-narcotics initiatives. And between the United Kingdom and the United States, we now have a very comprehensive strategy to try to deal with some of this problem.

The United Kingdom's efforts started this month. Ours will start at the beginning of next month. We've put about 40 extra million dollars into a government-led eradication program. We're training teams to do eradication. And President Karzai has set himself the goal of eradicating 25 percent of the crop this year, and we want to help him succeed in meeting that goal.

Just let me end by saying that, although we've talked a lot about Iraq hear and Afghanistan has come at the end of your statement, the end of my statement, this is something we're paying tremendous attention to, and I'd be glad to talk about this and anything else in the question period.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We'll now proceed to a round of six minutes for each member.

My question is going to come down to one sentence, after I make a preliminary observation. What's the status of the American GI on the morning of July 1st? I'm going to assume that there's an Iraqi interim government in place following the procedures that you've alluded to today. I'd like to know what's the probability of the status of forces agreement likewise being in place, and what are the guidelines that will be followed in writing that up?

By way of background, I make the following observations: We're using interchangeably now the terms that on July 1, there will be a transfer of power to the Iraq interim government. Others, including the president, have said there will be a transfer of sovereignty. Well, the word sovereignty is pretty well carefully defined. It can mean everything. So I'd like to know who's going to give that GI the orders, and what is he expected to do?

Now, we have the TAL, Transitional Administrative Law, which says, as follows: Iraqi armed forces will be, quote, "a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under a unified command, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511." So I go to that. And that's very generalized. And by the way, that was dated 16 October, 2003, and an awful lot of developments have occurred since that time. But it generally says, "authorizes a multinational force under a unified command to take all necessary means to contribute to the maintenance, security and stability in Iraq," and so forth and so forth.

I think this has got to be updated and clarified. And to the extent that you can advise this committee this morning, and I put the question to all witnesses, who's going to give the orders to the security forces on July 30th (sic)? And should there be a difference of views between, say, the U.S. military commanders as to what should be done to meet whatever contingency may arise on July 30th (sic) and thereafter, who's going to reconcile those differences between the professional military and a brand new government who will have been in office for but a day?

Mr. Secretary, can you lead off?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I will, and I'm sure that General Myers and Ambassador Grossman can supplement here. The question you ask, obviously, is a crucial on, and we've spent a lot of time studying it. I would emphasize, it's not a unique situation. We went through transition to a sovereign government in Afghanistan, as I noted earlier, in December of 2001. We've been operating with our forces in Bosnia with a sovereign government since the Dayton Accords of 1995.

And indeed, if you look around the world, there are many, many countries where you have sovereign governments and American forces under American military commanders, not least Korea.

Each one of these cases is different. In the case of Iraq, the principal authority is in fact the authority that you cited, provided by --

SEN. WARNER: I beg your pardon. What is --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Case of Iraq, the principal authority is the authority in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which creates a multinational force to provide for security of Iraq until a permanent constitutional government is established, which would be the end of next year, and that that force is under the command of an American commander.

As you also noted, the Transitional Administrative Law has the Iraqi Governing Council placing Iraqi forces under that command, as part of that command. In fact, Iraq is one of the most important if not the most important members of that coalition force. That provides enormous authority and discretion to our commanders. Should there be another U.N. Security Council resolution -- I think Ambassador Grossman can comment on the likelihood; I think it's very likely -- we would I assume either continue that authority or specify it in any further detail if it were necessary or useful.

Further, we have Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 I believe it is that goes into more detail about the rights and privileges and immunities that pertain to foreign forces providing for security in Iraq.

And finally, after an elected government -- transitional elected government takes power, takes office next January and --

SEN. WARNER: You know, we can -- excuse me, Mr. Secretary. We can get to January. I'm still worried that, say, there's a major insurrection that occurs early on in July and our military commanders have to decide to the extent that force must be applied. And we've seen recently in the Fallujah operations where there's been some honest difference of opinion between members of the Iraqi Governing Council, the current governing body, and our military commanders as to the timing, the quantum and otherwise the use of force. Fortunately, as you say, Fallujah may be taking on a brighter status here if these negotiations continue to be fruitful.

But given military operations, you can't sit down and deliberate over an extensive period of time what to do. You've got to react and react very swiftly. And if you're going to give them sovereignty, and at the same time our military commander, as I believe you're saying, has the authority to make those decisions as to how to apply force, I see a basic conflict of interest here.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: But, Mr. Chairman, the issue, as I think your comment correctly implies, is political, not legal. We had that issue today with a different legal framework. The use of force in someone else's country is always got potential political ramifications and political controversy. We've had this on numerous occasions with President Karzai's government in Afghanistan. And the answer there is you have got to be prepared to discuss, to negotiate, and also at the end of the day to use the authority that is granted to us. That is -- I would say describes the way we're proceeding in Fallujah. It's the way we will have to proceed until such time as the Iraq is fully in control of whatever forces are there.

(To General Myers.) General Myers, do you want --

SEN. WARNER: But the safety and welfare of the American GI may be at risk in a matter of hours if there's indecision and a lack of I think specific authority as to who can make what decisions.

General, can you address this?

GEN. MYERS: Sure, I can -- I don't think I'm going to say anything different than what the secretary said, but there is nobody that believes, Iraqi or coalition, that on 1 July the security situation is going to dramatically change. It's going to be what it is --

SEN. WARNER: Correct.

GEN. MYERS: -- and it's going to go over.

SEN. WARNER: Let's hope it improves, that -- that's a goal.

GEN. MYERS: Certainly. Certainly. But from 30 June to 1 July, we don't -- there's not -- there's not going to be a change to the security situation, nor in the responsibility of the coalition forces as outlined in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which is the basis for our action even today and will be the basis for action in the future if we don't get a new U.N. Security Council resolution. And I'll let Secretary Grossman speak to that.

The way we have structured our military forces for the post-1 July period is to have a partnership with Iraqi forces that goes from the tactical level all the way up to the political level in Iraq, to the Ministry of Interior, to the Ministry of Defense. The command and control, the command post that we'll have set up will be in partnership with our -- with Iraqi security forces. And that's the way it's set up. I don't see a problem with our authorities right now, given the transitional administrative law, given the provisional -- Coalition Provisional Authority mandates and the U.N. Security Council resolution we just talked about. Our forces will have the authority and the wherewithal to do what they need to do to provide security, as they must, for Iraq.

SEN. WARNER: So irrespective of the word "total sovereignty" or power going over, that -- General Abizaid or his deputies can make the decision to use or not use force in their own judgment. They may consult the government, but it is their decision as to how, when and where to apply force.

GEN. MYERS: That's correct. And as I said, I mentioned the word "partnership" as this -- as we proceed down this path, we want this to be more of a partnership. But in the end --

SEN. WARNER: But partners disagree, and you can't have a lot of disagreement.

GEN. MYERS: But -- right. And -- but I said in the end, or I was going to say in the end, Mr. Chairman, we're going to have to do what we have to do.

SEN. WARNER: All right.

And Secretary Grossman, do you agree?

GEN. MYERS: And we think we have the authority to do that as well.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Just as we do in Afghanistan, for example, or in Bosnia.

MR. GROSSMAN: I have nothing to add except to say, as both have invited me to, I certainly believe we will be seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution, and one of the elements of it will be to see if we can not just maintain our authorities under 1511, but see if we can get others to join us in carrying them out.

SEN. WARNER: So we transfer sovereignty, but the military decisions continue to reside indefinitely in the control of the American commander. Is that correct?

GEN. MYERS: That's correct.

SEN. WARNER: Senator Levin.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, what options are you looking at should we need an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq?

GEN. MYERS: We have a -- we have done a scrub of forces that could be available, essentially immediately, to -- in the next few weeks to the next couple of months, in case we need more forces. And we have a fairly extensive list of those forces and the support that goes with them. And in the closed session I'd be happy to talk in a little bit more detail. But we have -- we have done that look. That's been presented to Secretary Rumsfeld. And in -- and we're going to continue to refine that list as we look at those forces.

Obviously, we have set ourselves some administrative guidelines to try to protect time home back from overseas, and so forth. And we're looking at that. But that's -- we do have forces that have been identified.

SEN. LEVIN: Has the 3rd Infantry Division been alerted about the possibility of an earlier redeployment to Iraq than had been earlier planned?

GEN. MYERS: Sir, I'll check -- Senator Levin, I'll check. I don't have that list in front of me. But like I said, we'll do it in the closed session. I don't think so. I don't think the 3rd ID has been alerted.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, prior to the war, there was a Joint Staff assessment as to the number of U.S. forces that would be needed, or expected to be needed one year after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. What was that assessment?

GEN. MYERS: The only assessment that I know of is there was an assessment done by Central Command, I think before combat operations began, which had in September of '03 said here's what we think the troop strength is going to be. And this is from the field commander at the time. And as I recall, that number was somewhere around 60,000.

I don't know -- I'll tell you personally, I did not believe that number was correct, and I don't know that many of the Joint Chiefs believed that number was correct. But that was a number on a chart that I recall. I don't know how long that was the number that anybody was standing up to. That's the only number I can ever remember seeing, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: And when you say you didn't believe it was correct, you meant that it was too low, it was too high?

GEN. MYERS: I thought it was too low, sure.

SEN. LEVIN: As things now stand -- this goes to -- this is a question to you, Secretary Wolfowitz, and to Secretary Grossman. The U.N. is attempting to work out a process, through Mr. Brahimi, where the Iraqis will reach a consensus on the form of the entity to whom sovereignty is to be restored on June 30th. It's important that that deadline be met; I think everybody acknowledges that, since it's now been set and it's very clearly the expectation. But the challenge is immense in order to put the pieces together and to get a broad consensus in Iraq among its people for such a sovereign government. We're talking about a sovereign government, a government to which sovereignty is going to be restored; it's going to make critical decisions about who will draft a constitution for the people of Iraq, and other critical decisions.

Now, I asked Kofi Annan last week if the pieces can't be put together by June 30th, then what? Is there a Plan B? He said there's no time for a Plan B. The only alternative would be for the Governing Council to continue until an interim government can be put together which has broad support of the people of Iraq.

Now, we hope that Mr. Brahimi will succeed in putting together that consensus. But if he doesn't, does the administration have a plan for what to do?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Levin, I think it's important to understand what this interim government is intended to do and what it is not --

SEN. LEVIN: I wonder if could just interrupt you because my time is running out. If you could just --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It is not in fact picking the people to write the constitution.

SEN. LEVIN: I don't care -- I'm not asking what is in the plan --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Its main role is to establish a framework for elections so that the government, the transitional government that comes in in January is an elected government.

SEN. LEVIN: I understand. But that plan for a government will draft a constitution, the government that it drafts the plan for.

But my question is --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, it won't. It will provide elections for a group that then --

SEN. LEVIN: I agree. I agree with that.

My question to you is this. If the pieces cannot be put together by June 30th, does the administration have a plan for what it would then do? That's my only question. Either you have a plan or you don't. I know you don't want it to happen. Nobody does.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We think --

SEN. LEVIN: Mr. Brahimi doesn't want it to happen. Kofi Annan doesn't want it to happen. Everybody wants that interim government to be established by the people of Iraq, presumably, that will have this broad support of people. But if the pieces can't be put together, my simple question is, does the administration have a plan?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: There's certainly ways to proceed if it can't be done by July 1st. But the reason for keeping so much pressure on July 1st is, as I said earlier, it will improve the security situation in the country enormously if people stop thinking of themselves as occupied; if they have some consonance, as we have been able to build out of the Bonn process in Afghanistan that Mr. Brahimi also led, a sense that there is a road to full and complete elected constitutional government.

But this is a six-month interim appointed group, based on a consensus that hopefully Ambassador Brahimi will able -- be able to distill out of his many discussions in the country.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. It's important not just because it will devise a plan for elections for people who will draft a constitution, but for the reasons that the chairman and I have mentioned before, is that if a sovereign country may be able to change the status of forces -- those are our forces, and we've got to make sure that they have the military authority to act. And if we put in place a sovereign government, that means that they presumably would have sovereignty to decide what troops can do in their own country. That raises significant issues, and I don't want to go beyond what you've already --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Actually, Senator, that sovereignty is limited by the U.N. Security Council resolution that arranges for the security issues, as I said to Senator Warner.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. One other question. In response to my request from November of last year, Undersecretary Feith promised in February that he would provide me with numerous documents produced by the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. I have still not received the documents that he promised, and I would ask that you intervene and get me those documents, with him.

But relative to the Feith office, last August or -- excuse me -- in August and September of 2002, Undersecretary Feith presented a briefing to the secretary of Defense. And then, after that, it was presented by Secretary -- Undersecretary Feith to the National Security Council staff and the staff of the vice president. And this is relative to a relationship, the extent of it, between Iraq and al Qaeda. It was a briefing which was very critical of the CIA, disagreeing with the CIA's assessment that there was not a strong relationship or a clear relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq.

And my question to you is this. Were you aware of the fact that that briefing was being given to the staff of the NSC and the Office of the Vice President, and that the CIA was not aware of the fact that the briefing was being given to the vice president and to -- Vice President's Office and to the staff of the National Security Council?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I can no longer recall whether I was aware or not. There's nothing unusual, Senator Levin, about different staffs in the government discussing material. And the material under discussion was in fact material generated by the CIA. The issue was how to assess various intelligence reports produced by the CIA. And essentially the same briefing was presented, I believe, previously to a collection of CIA analysts, to call their attention to --

SEN. LEVIN: It was a very different briefing, and a very critical one, but --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: There was one slide that was different, Senator; that's all.

SEN. LEVIN: And that one slide was highly critical of the CIA?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It -- that one slide listed some assumptions that were -- that Mr. Feith's staff thought were at issue.

One of those assumptions, it seems to me, in fact has been proven out to be wrong. That was the assumption that because bin Laden was a secularist -- excuse me, an Islamist and Saddam a secularist, they were incapable of cooperating. We have since seen evidence -- in fact, there was evidence, it turns out, in the sealed indictment of Osama bin Laden issued in February of 1998 that said that bin Laden and Saddam had concluded an agreement not to attack one another and to cooperate with each other. So I think it was perfectly appropriate to ask the question whether one should analyze these reports on the basis of an assumption which in fact has turned out to be a false assumption.

SEN. LEVIN: But you were not aware, in any event, of the fact that -- you do not remember whether you were aware that the briefing to the vice president's office and the NSC staff was being made without the knowledge of the CIA?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think it overstates it. First of all, there's nothing unusual about staffs talking to each other, and the only thing that --

SEN. LEVIN: I'm just asking, you don't remember whether you were aware of it. That's my question.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't remember, but it's also not the dramatic event that I think you're describing it as.

SEN. WARNER: We've got to --

SEN. LEVIN: Well, there were additional slides. There were additional slides to the one that you make reference to --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: One additional slide, and I think I've described it.

SEN. LEVIN: (Inaudible.)

SEN. WARNER: We thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Allard.

SEN. WAYNE ALLARD (R-CO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank the panel for giving us an update this morning.

There have been some who have suggested that what's happening in Iraq has a lot of parallels with what was happening in Vietnam, Secretary Wolfowitz, and for the life of me I feel -- I don't see hardly any correlation at all. And I'm curious to know how you respond to those who try and characterize our efforts in Iraq as that similar to what happened in Vietnam.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm with Senator McCain. I think there's no comparison at all, except I guess it is important to say that our soldiers fought with enormous courage in Vietnam as well, and the Vietnamese people would be better off today if they had won.

But I think, as I've said in my statement, I think one enormous difference, and I hope the killers out there, the enemies of democracy in Iraq have gotten this message, is that the debate in this country is not about whether to abandon Iraq. The debate is about whether to keep 135,000 troops there or to add more troops. That is really where the issue lies.

The other huge difference is that, without being an apologist for Ho Chi Minh or his Vietcong, they at least made credible pretensions to doing something for the Vietnamese people. The people that we are fighting in Iraq today are a combination of killers who abused and tortured that country for 35 years and newcomers -- some from outside, some from inside -- like Mr. Zarqawi, who makes abundantly clear in this infamous letter that we captured that his goal is simply destruction and death. And indeed, he thinks that the goal in life is to worship death and to be willing to sacrifice yourself for martyrdom. He sees democracy as the enemy, makes no pretense in fact of doing anything other than bringing chaos and instability.

And I think it's important not only in analyzing the problem we're up against, but I would be much more concerned if I thought we were dealing with a genuine popular uprising. And I don't want to -- again, I want to be sure not to put on rose-colored glasses. There is a lot of broad dissatisfaction, especially in the Sunni Arab community, partly with the pace of progress, and the terrorists have done their best to slow down the pace of progress; partly because after all of this historical experience I think Iraqis believe that it's winner take all, and if the Shi'a take all now the Sunnis will be abused. It's partly misunderstanding, frankly more misunderstanding than actual fact about the de-Ba'athification policy.

We need to work harder, and we are looking precisely at how to work harder, to win back the Sunni moderates.

And I think they are -- again, I think, the overwhelming majority of that community. But the basic enemy, the enemies of democracy in Iraq are just killers.

SEN. ALLARD: General Myers, if you listen to the papers, or when you read the papers and listen to TV and everything, I think the impression that tends to come across, that we do have a lot of battles and a lot of conflicts going on in Iraq. And I was over in Iraq 30 days ago, about a month. And, you know, I saw a lot of good things happening around Mosul and a lot of the other towns that I was visiting: a lot of reconstruction, a lot of positive things. And I -- what is happening now with the conflict? Just put a general picture there, you know? I've always perceived that north and south was pretty much settled and our real problem was the Sunni triangle. And so I'd like to have you comment about what we're seeing now on TV today and reading in the papers.

GEN. MYERS: Well, in the last couple of weeks what we've seen are really two different events inside Iraq. One was Sadr and his militia, which is fairly small, sent out or rose up in several towns in the south. All those towns, with the exception of An Najaf, where his headquarters is, are back under Iraqi and coalition control. Coalition forces, Iraqi police are on duty in al Kut, Nasiriyah and the other cities where there were uprisings. These were small and easily contained because Sadr is increasingly being marginalized. He is not a popular figure with most Iraqis. He is preaching violence against the coalition. He has come out against the transitional administrative law, which the Iraqi Governing Council has approved. And my view is he will continue to be marginalized. But he is in An Najaf, and the Iraqis are negotiating and dealing with him right now as long as -- as well as some negotiators from the Coalition Provisional Authority and Ambassador Bremer.

The other fight was the fight that Secretary Wolfowitz described, which are these extremists, which, by the way, if you compare and contrast with Vietnam, they are not fighting for an ideology. They're fighting to disrupt progress. They have no ideology other than to go back to the terror of the former regime -- I mean, if that's an ideology. So the why they're fighting I think is an important question when you try to compare it to other events. This occurs in the same area, as you pointed out, that -- where we've had a lot of our instability. Fallujah has been the heart of that. And we've been in Fallujah from time to time, and then we come out.

If you remember, we went in because of the atrocities on the Blackwater security personnel, the four personnel that were killed and later burned and then hung on a bridge. We went in because we had to, and to find the perpetrators. And what we found was a huge rats nest that is still festering today, needs to be dealt with. Right now we're dealing with it through negotiations and through a cease-fire. I will say that the cease-fire is only on the side of the Marines that are in Fallujah, it's not on the part of the folks in Fallujah that are -- the extremists and so forth. They are still firing. They're using -- just, it was -- I think it was yesterday or the day before, a Red Crescent, our equivalent of the Red Cross, ambulance trying to get into Fallujah, was stopped, and weapons were found inside. They were trying to resupply themselves with weapons and ammunition. I mentioned the mosque and the schools and using women and children. They have done that. That was all out of Fallujah.

So that area is still very, very hot, and that extends into Baghdad, by the way. Sadr City is still a problem area, although most -- it's relatively calm today compared to when Sadr was -- those uprisings were going on about a week ago.

In the north, interestingly enough, with events in Fallujah, there were lots of demonstrators in Mosul. The demonstrators were dealt with by the Sunni -- basically the Sunni government in Mosul and the Iraqi police in Mosul and the Civil Defense Corps. So it's a very different picture in the north right now. Relatively stable. Economically doing quite well. It's the central area that has remained the problem. And I could go into it, but I don't want to take any more time. Part of it's going to have to be dealt with by military force, in my judgment. Obviously, a big part of it has to be dealt with in making sure we have a strategy that enfranchises the Sunni population, and that's being worked very hard. I spent a lot of time on that particular subject in Iraq just recently.

SEN. ALLARD: Well thank you for your response.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to conclude by just this one brief statement. This last Saturday I happened to participate in a welcome home for Bravo Company of the 244th Engineering Battalion in Fort Collins, Colorado. And this was the local unit. And, you know, the report that came back from our troops verifies pretty much what you were saying about the morale of our troops in Iraq. They were very proud of what they were doing. They were building a lot of infrastructure, and they felt like they were really doing something to improve the country because they were improving the infrastructure -- you know, that's sewer and water and roads, and doing a lot of -- education, providing an education there.

And one of the comments I think was made at that is you know, there's a lot of pride and a lot of good morale; people feel good about what they're doing. They're professional soldiers. But they emphasized time and time again is the American people need to stand behind us. And so I'm there, and I think that that's a message that we need to know, is that we're very proud of what they're doing and we're standing behind them.

Thank you.

GEN. MYERS: Thank you, Senator Allard.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Kennedy.

SEN. TED KENNEDY (D-MA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Myers and gentlemen, we all do stand behind our servicemen. But we have some responsibilities to find out about the policy and where it's going, that is requiring the presence of those service men and women.

Mr. Secretary, I must say I found your presentation here this morning somewhat disingenuous. I was here when the administration made the case for going to war, and the case for going to war was the threat that the United States was facing from nuclear weapons that were going to be provided to al Qaeda by Iraq. And here we have your statements all about the human rights violations. Everyone knows that Saddam Hussein is a brute, despicable, deplorable murderer. And I'll include in the record the State Department's filing about the human rights violations around the world, about what the Chinese are doing to the Tibetans; what the North Koreans are doing in terms of torture, forced abortions, infanticide; what the Burmese are doing, and the rest of the world. And I want to make that as a part of the record.

There wasn't a word in this presentation about the weapons of mass destruction in this presentation here this morning. Now, Mr. Secretary, you were one of the principal architects of war with Iraq, and it's been on your agenda since the end of the Gulf War, 1991.

It's now clear the Iraq was high on the agenda of the administration from day one, even though the outgoing Clinton administration made it clear in the briefings during the transition that al Qaeda was the most serious threat to our security. Dick Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar, wrote that when he raised al Qaeda in the first meeting of the deputies in April, 2001, you, Mr. Secretary, said, "I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man, bin Laden. At every stage, even after 9/11, it seems that you treated al Qaeda as less than a main threat, as a diversion from the real priority, which was Iraq. And in his book, Bob Woodward says the administration diverted resources from the war in Afghanistan to plan for the war in Iraq.

Now we have in the newspapers this morning, The Washington Post: "Al Qaeda intends to strike, officials say. U.S. intelligence community believes al Qaeda is intent on launching terrorist attacks in this country sometime between now and the November election."

Aren't we paying a high price and isn't the world paying a high price because of the administration's obsession with Iraq?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Kennedy, actually I welcome the opportunity to correct the record on some of these things, although I would have preferred you hadn't used that word "disingenuous." I am trying my best to be candid with this committee and with the American people. But the notion that an invasion of Iraq has been on my agenda since 1991 is simply wrong, sir.

Until September 11th, I thought the problem with Saddam Hussein was something that should be dealt with by Iraqis, although I was consistently critical of the lack of American support for those Iraqis who were prepared to liberate their own country. And we will never know, because history, unfortunately, only tells you what happened on one course of action, but we will never know whether some of our problems today might have been avoided if at earlier times we had enabled the Iraqis to do the job for themselves.

Secondly, Mr. Clarke's book is just full of gross inaccuracies. He has Secretary Rumsfeld attending a critical September 4th meeting that the secretary wasn't even at. He has the secretary in the Pentagon on a secure videoteleconference, a rather dramatic, memorable moment, when the secretary didn't turn up until an hour later. He puts quotes in my mouth that are about 165 degrees opposite of anything I could possibly have said.

And he is simply wrong when he says that I dismissed the threat of al Qaeda or the threat of terrorism. To the contrary, Senator, one of the concerns I had, I've had for many years, was the question of who did the World Trade Center in 1993, the most serious act of foreign terrorism on American soil prior to September 11th, which, it turns out, was done by the nephew of the man who was the mastermind of September 11th. There's a straight line from 1993 to the tragedy of September 11th.

And I was concerned that this was obviously not just a rogue bunch of misfits operating out of a mosque in Brooklyn, that there was international expertise behind it. And when I served on the Rumsfeld commission in 1998, we aske