FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Comittee

March 9, 2004

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOHN WARNER
A Senator from Virginia
and
Chair, Senate Armed Services Committee

SEN. WARNER: Good morning. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to receive the annual -- we do this at least once a year -- the annual testimony from the director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, and the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Jacoby. We've received from them their current and forecast for the worldwide threats as directed towards our nation here at home and abroad.

So I welcome -- I join with the committee in welcoming the witnesses back before the committee, and I personally commend each of you for your leadership. There are few if any precedents for the challenges you face in your positions in this post-9/11 world. In my view, our country is more secure because of the vigilance and efforts of hardworking civilian and military professionals who comprise the intelligence committee which you proudly lead.

The circumstances of this hearing are compelling. In the aftermath of 9/11, our military forces, working hand in hand with the intelligence community and coalition partners, have successfully defeated brutally repressive regimes and fosters of terror in Iraq and in Afghanistan. This magnificent military force -- active, Reserve, and Guard -- and civilian -- continues to prosecute on an all-out global war to defeat terrorism. They depend -- and I repeat, depend -- on the intelligence that you collectively and individually provide them.

While there's been much discussion in recent weeks about certain intelligence failures, I think in fairness we should point out the many intelligence successes. As a result of this community, we have caught or killed 45 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq, we've captured Saddam Hussein, we continue to find and eliminate key al Qaeda operatives, we have witnessed recent revelations about nuclear proliferation in Libya and Iran, as well as clandestine networks selling nuclear secrets indiscriminately. The U.S. intelligence community was key to these revelations.

Clearly, as a result, our nation, in my judgment, is a safer and -- a safer country as we confront and stop these proliferation activities, activities which could put weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists.

However, dangerous threats remain. Much remains to be done to defeat the forces of terrorism and tyranny in the world.

The successes we have witnessed over the past year would not have been possible without the tireless, hardworking commitment of our intelligence community. A number of planned terrorist attacks have been deterred, disrupted or defeated because of sound intelligence work. The witnesses before us today don't speak of those very often, as they should not, because it's in the best interests of continuing that strong intelligence detection that not much be said.

Such is the nature of the intelligence business -- best estimates and judgments drawn from available and often incomplete information. We ask intelligence analysts to make hard calls. They do it with total commitment to freedom.

I'm not suggesting we ignore the errors that are occasionally made, but we must always keep in mind that we have an extraordinarily capable intelligence system, the best in the world, the envy of the world, and it's led by dedicated, hardworking public servants. We must not lose sight of that current debate. Our forward-deployed forces and our intelligence system that supports them are and will remain our first line of defense.

In the same hearing last year, I directed a question to Director Tenet, as I have to all of the witnesses that have come before this committee. And I asked what would the likelihood be of finding caches of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq following the major military operations. The director's response, I find, was very straightforward, based on the facts that (sic) he understood them at that time, and I quote him. The director said, "I believe we will. I believe we will find research and development. We will find stockpiles of things he, Saddam, has not declared, and weapons he has not declared," end quote.

In my view, this response was entirely consistent with the intelligence we have been receiving in this country over a decade. It came from the many agencies to the U.S. Intelligence Committee, entirely consistent with the intelligence of other nations and entirely consistent with the findings of the United Nations.

I see no evidence of exaggeration or manipulation, Mr. Director, in your response. Yours was a judgment based on many years of irrefutable facts, including Iraq's possessions of chemical and biological weapons, the use of those weapons. This was confirmed by U.N. inspectors, confirmed by, again, the actual use of those weapons by Saddam Hussein in Iran and against the Kurds, and confirmed by Iraq's development of ballistic missiles that violated international agreement, and intelligence that suggested continued Iraq deployment, production and deployment of chemical and biological weapons.

Without this benefit of hindsight, members of this committee, members of the Senate, as well as past and present administrations, reached the same conclusions: Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.

The Senate unanimously agreed in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 that Saddam Hussein's continued possession of weapons of mass destruction was a threat, a threat so dangerous that U.S. policy would be a policy of regime change in Iraq. This act, Public Law 105, stated, and I quote it: "It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime." Those steps have been taken and yesterday we witnessed a dramatic signing of the transitional administrative document that will serve Iraq for the indefinite future.

It is time that we -- it is true that we have not found some of the stockpiles which our best estimates indicated would be present in Iraq. However, I point out, the work of the ISG is ongoing and we look forward to General Dayton's and Dr. Duelfer's interim report at the end of this month. But what he have found in the aftermath of the liberation of Iraq is as follows: evidence of Saddam Hussein's intent to pursue WMD programs on a large scale; actual ongoing chemical and biological research programs; an active program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon, a program that was interrupted only by the start of the military action in March; operational ballistic missiles that were deployed in clear violation of international agreements accepted following the first Gulf War; and evidence that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his fledgling nuclear program as late as 2001.

This committee took the initiative to bring Dr. Kay to this very room and have a public hearing, because under the leadership of myself and the distinguished ranking member we look upon it as a function and a responsibility of our oversight to bring forward all of the facts, irrespective of how they may cut. In testimony in January before this committee, Dr. Kay, former special advisor to Director Tenet, told us that based on the intelligence available to the president, not only U.S. intelligence but that of U.N. and other nation, the president could have reached no other conclusion. Iraq had caches of chemical and biological weapons, has used them in the past and was likely to use them in the future.

As Dr. Kay stated in this room, I quote: "It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than in fact we thought it was even before the war," end quote.

Dr. Kay also told us that he found absolutely no evidence of any intelligence being pressured to change or exaggerate any intelligence conclusions. On the contrary, he reminded us all that the basic assessment of Iraq's possession of WMD had been consistent since 1998 when U.N. inspectors left Iraq.

Dr. Kay as well as many others have reminded us that intelligence assessments often differ from what is later actually found on the ground. The important thing is, when they differ, to understand why. And I'm confident our two witnesses will bring to light their views on that subject now.

Undoubtedly, the world is a safer place and Iraq is a better place because of U.S. and coalition military actions. A real and growing threat to the world has been eliminated. We did the right thing to rid Iraq of this brutal regime.

In the weeks and months ahead, we will continue to go through a process of reviewing prewar intelligence, what went wrong, what worked well and what needs improvement, and that is being done.

The important work of our intelligence community must go on. It is critical that we keep our intelligence community focused on current and future threats. The members of this committee must understand the nature of current and future threats to carry out our responsibilities to the brave men and women in uniform who defend this country. Even though we tend to focus, quite properly, on current military operations, we must not lose sight of the other, nontraditional threats that are bound in this uncertain, complex world: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information warfare, ethnic and religious conflict and overall global trends. Our security demands vigilance in these areas, and our military forces must be prepared to confront such threats.

We look forward to your frank assessments of the many wide- ranging threats to our national security.

Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

CARL LEVIN
A Senator from Michigan
and
Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join you in welcoming our witnesses to the committee this morning.

The confidence of the American people and the world community in assessments of our intelligence community depends upon the credibility of those assessments. That credibility has been badly damaged by the intelligence fiasco relative to the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war. The need to examine the intelligence that guided our nation into war with Iraq is essential to avoid future mistakes which could weaken our nation's security, and it's essential to reestablish confidence in our intelligence agencies.

The intelligence community was so wrong about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that it understandably raises questions about what they say about other looming issues. For example, what are the prospects of a civil war in Iraq if there is no consensus within Iraq on the entity to which sovereignty will be transferred on July 1st of this year? As members of the Armed Services Committee, we may need to make critical judgments in that event. We will hopefully be soliciting the help of the international community. Owning up to, critically examining and correcting our failures are necessary first steps to assuring ourselves and our allies that our intelligence is objective, of high quality and reliable.

The intelligence community told the nation and the world before the war that Saddam Hussein had in his possession stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons; that he was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program; that he had mobile trailers for producing biological agents; that he had small, unmanned aerial vehicles intended to deliver biological weapons; and so on. The nation and the world were told that Saddam was in actual possession of weapons of mass destruction and was producing more; not just that he intended to get them, not just that he had a program for weapons of mass destruction or that he was engaged in WMD-related program activities, and not just that Saddam had satisfactorily -- hadn't satisfactorily explained what happened to the weapons of mass destruction that we knew he had after the Gulf War 10 years earlier. No, Saddam's possession of stocks of weapons of mass destruction was what made the threat so immediately ominous.

Initiating a war on the basis of faulty or exaggerated intelligence is a very serious matter. That's just as true if one supported the war or not, and that's just as true if Iraq ultimately turns out to be a stable democracy, which we all hope and pray that it does. Life and death decisions are based on intelligence. The fact that intelligence assessments before the war were so wildly off the mark should trouble all Americans.

And it won't do to say, well, maybe the weapons of mass destruction disappeared across the border. The 120 high- and medium- priority suspect sites of weapons of mass destruction are still there to inspect. The mobile trailers are in our possession. The UAVs are in our possession. We cannot and should not delay critical self- assessment until every possibility, no matter how remote, is excluded.

In terms of its assessments that Iraq was in actual possession of weapons of mass destruction before the war, so far the intelligence community is batting zero. Moreover, some of the public pronouncements of the intelligence community before the war were actually inconsistent with its own underlying classified documents.

Compare, if you will, the unclassified October 2002 white paper on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the classified October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, on which the white paper's key judgments were based.

For instance, in one paragraph in the now-declassified portion of the NIE states the judgment of the intelligence community that Iraq is quote, "capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such BW agents, including anthrax for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers and covert operatives. However, in the unclassified white paper issued at the same time, the clause, quote, "including potentially against the U.S. homeland," close quote, was added at the end of the paragraph. That clause wasn't in the then-classified NIE on which it was presumably based.

Another example. The then-classified NIE said, quote, "Baghdad could make enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the other materials and technological expertise necessary to build production-scale uranium-enrichment facilities." Close quote. Even that cautiously worded assessment was called in that classified NIE a "less likely scenario." And there was even more caution added by a reference to Iraq's, quote, "inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium, and its challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise." Close quote.

But the unclassified white paper, issued by the CIA, provided to the public, sounded a very different and a more ominous note. It said, quote, "Baghdad may have acquired uranium-enrichment capabilities that could shorten substantially the amount of time necessary to make a nuclear weapon." Close quote. Nothing in that public paper about "less likely" or "inexperience" or "challenges."

Exacerbating the CIA's inconsistencies between its public and classified statements was the existence of an intelligence assessment office in the Defense Department outside of the intelligence community. According to press reports, that office, called the Office of Special Plans, working for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, found in Iraq al Qaeda collaboration, where the CIA didn't. This office had its own direct access into the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President. Its analysis was reportedly critical of the CIA for not finding collaboration between Iraq and al Qaeda, and that seems to have affected what the CIA was avoiding saying publicly, compared to what it was saying in the classified documents.

In its then-classified NIE assessment, the CIA had real doubts that Saddam would supply weapons of mass destruction to terrorist surrogates. The CIA talked about Saddam transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups its classified document as a, quote, "extreme step," which he might take only if, quote, "desperate."

Listen to that caution and the nuance in the CIA's then- classified assessment. "Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States. Fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war, Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the U.S. homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks, more likely with biological than chemical agents, probably would be carried out by Iraq's special forces or intelligence operatives. Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as al Qaeda could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct. In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of assisting the Islamic terrorists in conducting a CBW attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him," close quote.

But none of those then-classified judgments were included in the CIA's public white paper. The CIA's doubts about Iraq's collaboration with al Qaeda were buried in classification from the public eye on the eve of our going to war.

How different the CIA's classified judgments sound from the president's very public warnings to the American people that, quote, "Saddam would like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind," close quote, and that, quote, "each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group," close quote.

Why was the skepticism in the then-classified NIE about the possibility of Saddam transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorists left out of the public white paper of the CIA?

Was it because the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans was putting on a full-court press for the existence of an Iraq-al Qaeda collaboration? Was the administration listening to the Office of Special Plans rather than the intelligence community? We need to find the answers to these and many other questions.

This committee has a special responsibility to the men and women of our armed forces to look at the prewar intelligence, because planning for military operations is based on intelligence; flawed intelligence can put our troops and our nation at risk. Our credibility globally has taken a big hit because of this massive intelligence failure, and as a result there is less support from people in nations around the world for the United States and for the war on terrorism. Serious consequences can follow because we depend on other people and other nations to provide us with valuable tips and information. We need their cooperation in fighting terrorism.

When we face future international security crises we will undoubtedly seek the support and cooperation of the international community based on our intelligence community's assessment that there is a threat. It will be harder to secure that cooperation if our intelligence is not viewed as credible and objective. For the sake of our future safety as a nation we simply cannot accept intelligence being as far off the mark as it was before the Iraq war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Levin.

Director Tenet.

MR. TENET: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I'm going to proceed with our threat statement --

SEN. WARNER: Yes.

STATEMENT OF

GEORGE TENET
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

MR. TENET: -- and we will go to questions.

Mr. Chairman, last year I described a national security environment that was significantly more complex than at any time during my tenure as director of Central Intelligence. The world I will discuss today is equally if not more complicated and fraught with dangers for the United States, but one that also holds great opportunity.

I'll begin with terrorism.

The al Qaeda leadership structure we charted after September 11th is seriously damaged. But the group remains as committed as ever to attacking the U.S. homeland. But as we continue to battle against al Qaeda, we must overcome a movement; a global movement infected by al Qaeda's radical agenda. In this battle we are moving forward in our knowledge of the enemy, his plans, capabilities and intentions. And what we've learned today continues to validate my deepest concern: that this enemy remains intent in obtaining and using catastrophic weapons.

Military and intelligence operations by the United States and its allies overseas have degraded the group. Local al Qaeda cells are forced to make their own decisions because of the central leadership's disarray. Al Qaeda depends on leaders who not only direct terrorist attacks, but who carry out the day-to-day tasks that support operations. Over the past 18 months we have killed or captured key al Qaeda leaders in every significant operational area -- logistics, planning, finance and training -- and have eroded the key pillars of the organization, such as the leadership in Pakistani urban areas and operational cells in the al Qaeda heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The list of al Qaeda leaders and associates who will never again threaten the American people includes Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al Qaeda's operations chief and the mastermind of the September 11th attacks; Hambali, the senior operational planner in South Asia; Abu Zubaida, a senior logistics officer and plotter; and many others. We are creating large and growing gaps in the al Qaeda hierarchy, and unquestionably bringing these key operators to ground disrupted plots that would otherwise have killed Americans.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda central continues to lose operational safe havens and bin Laden has gone deep underground. Al Qaeda's finances are also being squeezed, and we're receiving a broad array of help from our coalition partners, who have been central to our effort against al Qaeda.

Since the May 12th bombings, the Saudi government has shown an important commitment to fighting al Qaeda in the kingdom, and Saudi officers have paid with their lives. Elsewhere in the Arab world, we're receiving valuable cooperation from Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, the UAE, Oman and others. President Musharraf of Pakistan remains a courageous and indispensable ally who has become a target of assassins for the help that he's provided us.

We have made notable strides, Mr. Chairman, but don't misunderstand me. I am not suggesting al Qaeda is defeated; it is not. We are still at war. This is a learning organization that remains committed to attacking the United States, its friends and allies. Successive blows to al Qaeda's central leadership have transformed the organization into a loose collection of regional networks that operate more autonomously. The sites of their attacks span the group's broad reach, from Morocco, Kenya, Turkey to Indonesia.

You should not take the fact that these attacks occurred abroad to mean that the threat to the U.S. homeland has waned. As al Qaeda and associated groups undertook these attacks overseas, detainees consistently talk about the importance the group still attaches to striking the main enemy, the United States. Across the operational spectrum -- air, maritime, special weapons -- we have time and again uncovered plots that are chilling. On aircraft plots alone we have uncovered new plans to recruit pilots and to evade new security measures in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 11 September remain within al Qaeda's reach.

So far I have been talking about al Qaeda, but al Qaeda is not the limit of the terrorist threat worldwide. Mr. Chairman, what I want to say to you now may be the most important thing I tell you today. The steady spread of Osama bin Laden's anti-American sentiments through the wider Sunni extremist movement and through the broad dissemination of al Qaeda's destructive expertise ensures that a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future, with or without al Qaeda in the picture.

Even as al Qaeda has been weakened, other extremist groups within the movement it influenced have become the next wave of the terrorist threat. Dozens of such groups exist. One of the most immediate threats is from the smaller, international Sunni extremist groups who have benefitted from al Qaeda links. They include groups as diverse as the Zarqawi network and Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These far- flung groups increasingly set the agenda and are redefining the threat that we face.

Beyond these groups are the so-called foreign jihadists, individuals ready to fight anywhere when they believe Muslim lands are under attack by those they see as infidel invaders. For the growing number of jihadists interested in attacking the United States, a spectacular attack on the U.S. homeland remains the brass ring that many strive for, with or without encouragement by al Qaeda's central leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I have consistently talked about and warned about al Qaeda's interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Acquiring these remains a religious obligation in bin Laden's eyes, and al Qaeda and more than two dozen terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials.

Over the last year, we've also seen an increase in the threat of more sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability. For this reason, we take very seriously the threat of a CBRN attack. Extremists have widely disseminated assembly instructions for an improvised chemical weapon using common materials that could cause a large number of casualties in crowded, enclosed areas. Although gaps in our understanding remain, we'll see al Qaeda's program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate terrorist CBRN threats we are likely to face. Al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability. It remains interested in dirty bombs. Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such weapons would be used.

I focus correctly on al Qaeda and related groups, but other terrorist organizations also threaten American interests. Palestinian groups in Israel and the West Bank. Lebanese Hezbollah cooperates with theses groups and appears to be increasing its support. It is also working with Iran and surrogate groups in Iraq and would likely react to an attack against it, Syria or Iran with attacks against the U.S. and Israeli targets worldwide. Iran and Syria continue to support terrorist groups, and their links into Iraq have become problematic to our efforts there.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to Iraq, we're making significant strides against the insurgency and terrorism, but former-regime elements and foreign jihadists continue to pose a serious threat to Iraq's new institutions and to our own forces. We witnessed the bloodiest single day since the war, which left more than 120 Iraqis dead last week at the hands of terrorists, and more than 300 others wounded. All 25 members of the Governing Council, at the same time, on a positive note, signed the transitional administrative law on the 8th of March.

Such delays, while unfortunate, we need to remember what the Iraqis are trying to accomplish here is monumental. They are creating a democracy from the ground up. This process will be difficult, will witness delays and setbacks and be marked by violence. Sovereignty will be returned to an interim government by July 1, although the structure and mechanism for determining this remain unresolved. The emerging Iraqi leadership will face many pressing issues, among them organizing national elections, integrating the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure, and determining the role of Islam in an Iraqi state.

Saddam is in prison and the coalition has killed, as you said, all but 10 of his 54 cronies, Mr. Chairman, but the violence continues. The daily average number of attacks on U.S. and coalition forces had dropped from its November peak but is similar to that of last August. In the past two weeks, violence has been on the upswing. As we approach the transfer of sovereignty on the 1st of July, terrorists will try to complicate the transfer and intimidate Iraqis who are working to make it happen.

The insurgency consists of multiple groups with varying motivations, but all with the same goal: driving the United States and our coalition partners from Iraq. Intelligence has given us a good understanding of the insurgency at the local level and this information is behind many of the successful raids you may have heard about. U.S. military and intelligence community efforts to round up former-regime figures have disrupted some insurgent plans to carry out additional attacks. But we know these insurgent cells are intentionally decentralized to avoid easy penetration and to prevent the roll-up of whole networks. Arms, funding and military experience remain readily available.

Mr. Chairman, the situation as I've described it, both our victories and our challenges, indicates we have damaged but not yet defeated the insurgents. The security situation is further complicated by the involvement of terrorists, including Ansar al-Islam and Zarqawi, and foreign jihadists coming into Iraq to wage jihad. Their goal is clear; they intend to inspire an Islamic extremist insurgency that would threaten coalition forces and put a halt to the long-term process of building democratic institutions and governance in Iraq. They hope for a Taliban-like enclave in Iraq's Sunni heartland that would be a jihadist safe haven. Ansar al-Islam, an Iraqi Kurdish extremist group, is waging a terrorist campaign against the coalition presence and cooperative Iraqis in a bid to inspire jihad and create an Islamic state. Some extremists even go further. In a recent letter, terrorist planner Abu Musaad al-Zarqawi outlined his strategy to foster sectarian civil war in Iraq aimed at inciting the Shi'a. The massive lethal attacks last week against Shi'a worshipers in Baghdad and Karbala were consistent with the plans of Zarqawi, but we have not conclusively identified the perpetrators.

Stopping the foreign extremists from turning Iraq into their most important jihad rests in part on preventing loosely connected extremists from coalescing into a cohesive terrorist organization. We are having some success. The coalition has arrested key jihadist leaders and facilitators in Iraq, including top leaders from Ansar al- Islam, the al-Zarqawi network and other al Qaeda affiliates. And we're concerned, Mr. Chairman, that foreign jihadists and the former regime elements might coalesce. At this point, we have seen few signs of such cooperation at the tactical or local level.

Ultimately, the Iraqi people themselves must provide the fundamental solutions. As you well know, the insurgents are incessantly and violently targeting Iraqi police and security forces precisely because they fear the prospect of Iraqis securing their own interests.

Success depends on broadening the role of local security forces. This goes well beyond greater numbers; it means continuing work already under way -- fixing equipment shortages, providing training, ensuring adequate pay -- to build a force of increasing quality and confidence that will support the Iraqi people.

It is hard to overestimate the importance of greater security for Iraqis, particularly as we turn to the momentous political events slated for 2004. Iraqi Arabs and many Kurds possess a strong Iraqi identity forged over a tumultuous 80-year history, and especially during the nearly decade-long war with Iran. Unfortunately, Saddam's divide-and-rule policy and his favored treatment of the Sunni majority aggravated tensions to the point where the key governance in Iraq today is managing these competing sectional interests. The majority of Shi'a look forward to the end of Sunni control which began with the British creation of Iraq. The Shi'a community nevertheless has internal tensions between the moderate majority and the radical minority. The Kurds see many opportunities to advance long-term goals, retaining the autonomy they enjoyed over the past 12 years and expanding their power and territory. The minority Sunni fear Shi'a and Kurdish ambitions. Such anxieties help animate Sunni support for the insurgence. The Sunni community is still at a very early state of establishing political structures to replace the defeated Ba'ath party.

I should qualify what I've said, Mr. Chairman. No society, and surely not Iraq's complex tapestry, is so simple as to be captured in three or four categories -- Kurds, Shi'a and Sunni. In reality, Iraqi society is filed with more cleavages and more connections than a simply typology can suggest. We seldom hear about the strong tribal alliances that have long existed between the Sunni and the Shi'a or the religious commonalities between the Sunni, Kurd and Arab communities, or the moderate secularism that spans Iraqi groups. We tend to identify and stress the tensions that tear communities apart, but opportunities also exist for these groups to work together for common goals. And if we focus on events like the attack last week in Baghdad and Karbala, we should remember that the perpetrators who are seeking to incite inter-communal violence, and that the affected communities have instead replied by pulling together and refusing to demonize each other.

The social and political interplay is further complicated by Iran, especially in the south where Tehran pursues its own interests and hopes to maximize its influence among the Shi'a after the 1st of July. Tehran also runs humanitarian and outreach programs that have probably enhanced its reputation among Iraqi Shi'a, but many remain suspicious.

The most immediate political challenge for Iraqis is to choose the transitional government that will rule their country while they write their permanent constitution. The Shi'a cleric, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, has made this selection process the centerpiece of his effort to ensure that Iraqis will decide their own future and choose the first sovereign post-Saddam government.

Sistani favors direct elections as the way to produce a legitimate, accountable government. His religious pronouncements show that above all else, he wants Iraq to be independent of foreign powers. Moreover, his praise of free elections and his theology reflect, in our reading, a clear-cut opposition to an Iranian-style theocracy.

Once the issues resolving the selection of a transnational government are settled, Iraq's permanent constitution will take shape.

I want to briefly touch on the Sunnis and federalism in Islam, Mr. Chairman, because I think it's important.

The Sunnis are at least a fifth of the population, inhabit the country's strategic heartland and comprise a sizable share of Iraq's professional and middle class. The Sunnis are disaffected and a deposed -- as a deposed ruling minority, but some are beginning to recognize that boycotting the emerging political process will weaken their community. Their political isolation may be breaking down in parts of the Sunni Triangle, where some Sunni Arabs have begun to engage the coalition and assume local leadership roles. And in the last three months, we have also seen the founding of national-level Sunni umbrella organizations to deal with the coalition and Governing Council on questions like Sunni participation in choosing the transitional government. But there is a long way to go here.

Federalism, the relationship between the political center and Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious communities, will frame the future constitutional debate. To make a federal government stick, Kurdish and Arab leaders will need to explain convincingly that a federal structure benefits all Iraqis and not just the Kurds.

The traditional -- transitional administrative law makes Islam Iraq's official creed but protects religious freedom. It also creates a legal system that is a mix of traditions, including Islamic law.

Security will be very important over the next year, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to underestimate that. But reconstruction and economic vitality and employment is also important. Reconstruction progress and Iraq's own considerable assets, its natural resources and its educated populace should enable the Iraqis to see important improvement in 2004 in their infrastructure and quality of life.

The recovery of Iraqi oil production will help. Production is on track to approach 3 millions of barrels a day by the end of this year. Iraq has not produced this much oil since before the Gulf War.

But much more needs to be done. Key public services, such as water, sewage and transportation, will have difficulty reaching prewar levels by July and will not meet the higher target of total Iraqi demand.

Electric power capacity approaches prewar levels but still falls short of demand. Looting and sabotage may make supplies unreliable.

And finally, unemployment and underemployment, which afflicts about half of the workforce, will remain a key problem and a potential breeding ground for popular discontent.

Mr. Chairman, in my proliferation section, I summarized the fact that Libya is taking steps toward strategic disarmament; North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at least a bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and influence; and that Iran is exposing some programs while trying to preserve others.

I will not go through the Libyan case, Mr. Chairman. This was an intelligence success in terms of our engagement over the last many months, and Libya is now talking to the international organizations of the United Nations and we will watch carefully whether it lives up to its obligations.

North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear weapons program into international legitimacy and bargaining power, announcing its withdrawal from the NPT and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent. Since December of 2002, Pyongyang has announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and expelled IAEA inspectors. Last year Pyongyang claimed to have finished reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods that have been sealed by the United States and North Korean technicians and stored under IAEA monitoring since 1994.

The intelligence community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two nuclear weapons. The 8,000 rods the North claims to have reprocessed into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several more bombs. We also believe that Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by A.Q. Khan. This would give North Korea an alternative route to a nuclear weapon. The North Koreans continue to deny that they have an HEU program and say their offer of a nuclear freeze does not cover civilian use of nuclear energy.

Iran is taking yet a different path, acknowledging work on a covert nuclear fuel cycle while trying to preserve its WMD options. The good news is is that Tehran has acknowledged more than a decade of a covert nuclear activity and agreed to open itself to an enhanced inspection regime. It, for the first time, acknowledged many of its nuclear fuel-cycle development activities, including a large-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment effort. Iran claims its centrifuge program is designed to produce low enriched uranium to support Iran's civil nuclear program. This is permitted under the NPT. But here's the downside: the same technology can be used to build a military program as well. The difference between producing low enrichment uranium and weapons-capable highly enriched uranium is only a matter of time and intent, not technology. As a result, it would be a significant challenge for intelligence to confidently assess whether that red line has been crossed.

Mr. Chairman, I go on to talk about the A.Q. Khan network. You know that we've unraveled that.

And I want to just say for a moment, the one other area that concerns us is Russian WMD materials and technology remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. We're also concerned by the continued eagerness of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers, which makes Russian expertise an attractive target for countries and groups seeking WMD and missile-related assistance.

Mr. Chairman, I think I will stop there. I talk about a lot of other things -- internal developments in Iran, the current situation in Afghanistan, our understanding of the current situation in Colombia and other places and other transnational issues. Since this is largely the same statement I issued when I talked to the Senate Intelligence Committee in open, I think we'll go to questions and reserve the rest of the time for the members.

SEN. WARNER: We'll put the entire statement, without objection, into the record.

Admiral Jacoby.

STATEMENT OF

VICE ADMIRAL LOWELL JACOBY
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

ADM. JACOBY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee. I appreciate this committee's strong support and sustained support for defense intelligence, its men and women deployed around the world.

My statement for the record addresses a number of challenges and threats that you asked me to focus on in the letter of invitation. I'd like to take just a few minutes to highlight some of the present and future threats and developments over the last year.

Last year I testified that defense intelligence was at war on a global scale. That war has intensified. Defense intelligence professionals, active duty military, reserves and civilians, are providing the knowledge and skills essential to defeating enemies in Iraq, Afghanistan (in/and ?) the global war on terrorism.

In Iraq, the security situation varies by region. The north and the south remain comparatively quiet. Attacks in central Iraq account for approximately 80 percent of the incidents and center in the Sunni- dominated areas, particularly west of Baghdad, around Mosul and along the Baghdad-Tikrit corridor, which are the homes for many of the former military and security members.

I believe that the former-regime elements led by Ba'ath Party remnants are responsible for the majority of the anti-coalition attacks. That said, it appears that much of the Sunni population remains focused on concerns relating to security, employment and the availability of goods and services. Those issue areas become extremely important in that security situation that Director Tenet is talking about.

Foreign fighters, to include members of the al Qaeda-associated movement, are a continuing threat. They're motivated by Arab nationalism, extremist religious ideology and opposition to U.S policies and beliefs. They have perpetrated some of the most significant attacks. For instance, we believe al Qaeda and associated Sunni extremists were responsible for the 2 March Karbala and Baghdad attacks. The method of operation -- simultaneous suicide bombings against multiple targets -- is an al Qaeda trademark.

A mid-January arrest of an al Qaeda-associated operative in Iraq yielded a letter he was couriering from al-Zarqawi to senior al Qaeda members. That letter clearly stated Zarqawi's intention to conduct attacks against Shi'a targets in Iraq in order to foment sectarian violence. He indicated that the next four months were the time to strike, prior to the planned transition of power to Iraqi authority. Left unchecked, Iraq has the potential to serve as a training ground for the next generation of terrorists.

Turning to Afghanistan, last spring attacks by opposition groups reached their highest level since the collapse of the Taliban government in December of 2001. Although activity has subsided somewhat, attacks continue. The Taliban insurgency that continues to target humanitarian assistance and reconstruction organizations is a serious threat.

At least 11 of these attacks have occurred this year, and some of the organizations have suspended operations. They play a key role in bringing stability and progress to this troubled nation.

Additionally, President Karzai remains critical to stability in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun, he is the only individual capable of maintaining the trust of that ethnic group while maintaining the support of other minorities.

Notable progress has been achieved in the global war on terrorism. We have shrunk operating environment for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, captured al Qaeda senior coordinators, and also disrupted operations. Nevertheless, al Qaeda remains the greatest terrorist threat to our homeland and our overseas presence. Al Qaeda continues to demonstrate it is adaptable and capable. Mid- level operatives are filling leadership voids. Many have demonstrated a capacity and capability to carry out complex operations. Rather than the hierarchical centralized organization that al Qaeda was in 2002, it has become a more broadly based Sunni extremist network.

While al Qaeda planning has become more decentralized, it has shifted to softer targets. They continue attacks, and most recently those attacks in Istanbul and Riyadh show this soft-target orientation. And al Qaeda continues to enjoy considerable support in the Islamic world. Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, and I would highlight that hijackings and attacks by manned portable missiles against civilian aircraft remain of specific concern.

A number of factors virtually assure a terrorist threat for years to come. Despite recent reforms, terrorist organizations draw from societies with poor or failing economies, ineffective governments and inadequate educational systems. Demographic or youth bubbles further burden governments and economies. Let me explain what I mean by youth bubble. For instance, if we look at the percentage of population under 15 years of age, 43 percent of Saudi Arabians, 41 percent of Iraqis, 39 percent of Pakistanis, 34 percent of Egyptians, 33 percent of Algerians and 29 percent of Iranians fall into this under-15-year age group.

I'm also concerned over ungoverned space. These are areas where governments do not or cannot exercise effective control. Such spaces offer terrorist organizations sanctuary.

I remain concerned about the Islamic world. Many of our partners successfully weathered domestic stresses during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, challenges to their stability and their continued support for the war on terrorism remain. Islamic and Arab populations are increasingly opposed to U.S. policies. The loss of a key leader could quickly change government support for U.S. and coalition operations. For instance, President Musharraf was recently the target of two sophisticated assassination attempts. His support for the global war on terrorism, Afghan policy, restrictions on Kashmiri militants and attempts to improve relations with India are all important initiatives that have increased his vulnerability.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I'll stop at that point. Also I would just comment on two questions that I regularly receive.

One is with respect to the security situation in the Taiwan Straits as Taiwan approaches the 20 March election -- presidential election. There are no movements by Chinese military forces nor preparations for exercises to attempt to influence events on Taiwan.

And just to conclude with questions about Haiti. The situation -- security situation is slowly improving, as is the humanitarian situation.

And at this point, sir, we see no preparations for large-scale migrations out of Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my comments.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Admiral.

We'll now proceed to a round of six minutes per member.

Director Tenet, I felt you gave a very comprehensive and pragmatic review of the situation facing Iraq in the basically 120 days, or a little less, between the turnover of the sovereignty to Iraq as scheduled on July 1st. As I look through your statement and study other sources of information, I think we should receive from you your best estimate as to the probability -- what level of probability is it that significant civil war, civil strife could break out such that the turnover of sovereign just cannot be achieved on July 1st.

MR. TENET: Sir, I think I would say at this moment we see the probability as low. We're concerned, very concerned about what Zarqawi and some of the jihadists are trying to do in attempting to foment sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi'as. The reaction to the Karbala and Baghdad bombings did not go that way. People understand -- or at least our judgment is, is people understand that the facts on the ground did not lead people to demonize each community.

So, at this moment in time, while we know the jihadists want to create this kind of situation, and perhaps what's left over of the Ba'athist insurgent elements may want to do so -- the same, the political process that has emerged and the apparent intent on all sectors of this community to participate in this process I think mitigates. We have to watch this very carefully, however. Trends here change very, very quickly. Today I would say low probability.

The other piece of this that we have to watch carefully, while in my statement I said that there is the beginning of a political exchange between elements in the Sunni community who are organizing themselves in umbrella organizations, they still consider them -- that's a positive development. We need to see how far that develops, and we need to develop it much farther. They need to believe that they have a stake in this, in an ultimate outcome. The political process has to go hand in hand with our ability to make security a better situation, and economic reconstruction, and putting projects in the Sunni heartland that employs people, young men who are standing on the streets.

So, we've got a ways to go. It's a question that we're going to watch very carefully. But today I would say a low probability today, on the basis of everything I know.

SEN. WARNER: And on July 4th (sic) when sovereignty is handed over -- excuse me -- July 1st -- describe as best you can the structure of that government that will receive it.

MR. TENET: Well, we don't know that with any precision at this moment in time. It may be a governing council, an expanded governing council, a broader range of notables. We don't know the answer to that question today. That is a subject that Ambassador Bremer and others are dealing on the ground. Clearly, the transitional administrative law did not address that question.

SEN. WARNER: Do you wish to add anything further than that?

ADM. JACOBY: No, sir.

SEN. WARNER: I think Ambassador Bremer and his team and the coalition partners deserve a lot of credit for this administrative law document that was created against a background of a great deal of dissension. But I hope that same leadership can prevail on structuring such a group, presumably a continuation of the current Governing Council in some form, that will have credibility within the overall Iraqi people. Do you think that's achievable?

MR. TENET: Well, I think that's what we have to strive for sir, particularly in terms of Sunni representation. That credibility has to be present, and I think that's what they're working on.

SEN. WARNER: Now, let me turn to a subject at hand and that is the question, and I touched on it in my opening statement, and that is the clear difference between what we are discovering by virtue of the weapons of mass destruction program today -- to the extent that has been achieved by the ongoing work of the force we have over there, and we made it clear that that work is far from complete. But I'd like to have you describe how you view your role in gathering the facts and the intelligence, preparing the estimates; and how your role differs from that of a policymaker, be it the president, secretary of State, Defense or others, who take that intelligence and then extrapolate it in such a way as to make policy judgments. I find there's a clear difference in those roles.

MR. TENET: Well, sir, our job is to portray our knowledge and to make the best judgments we can about what we believe to be, in this context, our judgments with regard to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. Our community gathers, puts together a community document; it makes key judgments and findings and presents a broader range of views in the document; where dissent is created we portray that dissent.

In this instance, we obviously said, and the key judgments have been declassified, we said that we believe that they had chemical and biological weapons. We believed his biological weapons program had been energized. We believed he was reconstituting his nuclear program. Most agencies, even DOE, believe that, even though there was a difference of opinion on the aluminum tubes. We put this in context; we briefed this to the policymakers. Policymakers' responsibility at that moment is to make a determination of how they assessed the risk, what they believed to be their course of action, and we try to give them the best judgments that we can. Clearly, their responsibility is making a determination of how they judge the urgency or the immediacy and what policy solutions they choose to take; that's not our job.

SEN. WARNER: Admiral, your function?

ADM. JACOBY: Sir, my --

SEN. WARNER: Much the same, I presume.

ADM. JACOBY: Yes, sir.

SEN. WARNER: You provide your facts and findings and assessments, basically, up through the military chain.

ADM. JACOBY: Sir, actually, I join in the intelligence community assessment process, and we participate as an agency. That also includes our service intelligence capabilities and our theater intelligence capabilities into the process that Director Tenet just described.

I also have responsibilities for providing direct military intelligence-related information and support to our decision-makers inside the department. That --

SEN. WARNER: That's the Department of Defense?

ADM. JACOBY: Yes, sir. And that focuses much more crisply on specific informations to support planning for or military operations that may be under way.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Levin.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

You've testified, Director Tenet, that there's a low risk of civil war between now and July 1st, in your judgment. If there's no consensus on the entity to which sovereignty would be transferred on July 1, do you believe that there is an increased risk of civil strife at that time? And secondly, if there is no consensus by July 1 on the entity to which sovereignty would be transferred, do you think it might be wise to consider delaying that transfer until there is such a consensus?

MR. TENET: At this moment, I'm just speculating. At this moment, I can only say that nothing I see today -- I will reiterate low probability.

SEN. LEVIN: Even if there's no consensus on July 1?

MR. TENET: Well, let me -- I was going to go to part two. Obviously, between now and July 1, the factors that we have to consider is security environment; how well we're doing against the insurgents and the jihadists; whether -- whether, for example, this fellow Zarqawi, in his letter -- who says: March 1 is the kick-off date. We have four months until this interim authority is transferred. We have to work very, very hard to disrupt this.

So there's some indicators, Senator, that between now and then -- I believe that if you had an interim government or somebody that you transfer to, that was broadly representative, is seen by the Iraqis as a legitimate group of people, it will mitigate those kinds of tendencies and help us in the security environment.

SEN. LEVIN: Now my question: If there is no such consensus on July 1, do you believe that there -- that increases the likelihood of civil strife?

MR. TENET: I simply can't speculate today.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

MR. TENET: I don't know.

SEN. LEVIN: You and I and many others have talked about the issue of Iraq seeking uranium from Africa. The CIA told the British in September of 2002 that it questioned the reliability of the information about the -- that story, urged it not to include it in the British dossier.

Then on October 1, the intelligence community published its classified NIE, now unclassified, that included in its text something which is very different from what you were telling the British. You said Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellow cake.

Then in early October, you personally called Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley to urge removal of the reference to Iraq trying to obtain uranium from Africa from the draft Cincinnati speech of the president on October 7th. It was removed. The CIA then sent two memos to Mr. Hadley on the same subject.

But then on December 19th, the State Department issued a fact sheet referring again to Iraq's efforts to procure uranium from Africa.

And this is the question that I want to get to.

On January 20th, President Bush sent a report to Congress. That report states, and it's with his signature, that the Iraqi declaration failed to deal with its, quote, "attempts to acquire uranium." So there it appears in a formal message to Congress, July (sic) 20th, under the president's signature. I've asked you before. You didn't know the answer. Do you know now whether or not the CIA approved that report?

MR. TENET: Two parts. No, we did not approve that report. And the second part is, is it is also clear that we were wildly inconsistent in other submissions about this issue.

SEN. LEVIN: All right. The --

MR. TENET: And we may have cleared other documents.

SEN. LEVIN: -- next question, then.

On January 23rd, the White House issued a report entitled, "What Does Disarmament Look Like?" That report states also that the declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from abroad. Did you approve that language on July (sic) 23rd? Do you know?

MR. TENET: I do not know, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

Now in August of 2002, Mr. Feith briefed you in a classified briefing about Iraq's relationship with al Qaeda. That briefing was subsequently given to the National Security Council and to the Office of the Vice President. When were you aware of the fact that the briefing that you were given in August of 2002 was then given to the Office of the Vice President?

MR. TENET: I did not know it at the time, sir. And I think I first learned about this at our hearing last week.

SEN. LEVIN: So last week was the first time that you ever knew that the Feith office was briefing the Office of the Vice President?

MR. TENET: I was unaware of it, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: All right. And then what was your reaction to that briefing?

MR. TENET: As I told you at our hearing last week, I spent about 15 minutes, I said thank you for the briefing, I turned it over to our analysts, who then worked with their analysts, and it didn't go any farther than that.

SEN. LEVIN: Do you have a reaction as to whether that briefing was accurate or not?

MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection, sir. I did not spend a lot of time with it.

SEN. LEVIN: All right.

Is it standard operating procedure for an intelligence analysis such as that to be presented at the NSC and the Office of the Vice President without you being part of the presentation? Is that typical?

MR. TENET: Well, my experience is, is that people come in and may present those kinds of briefings on their views of intelligence, but I have to tell you, Senator, I'm the president's chief intelligence officer; I have the definitive view about these subjects. From my perspective --

SEN. LEVIN: I know you feel that way.

MR. TENET: -- from my perspective, it is my view that prevails.

SEN. LEVIN: I'm sure you do feel that way. But my question is, is that a normal thing to happen, that there be a formal analysis relative to intelligence that would be presented to the NSC that way, without you even knowing about it?

MR. TENET: I don't know. I've never been in the situation. I don't know whether it qualified as analysis or not. I just don't -- I don't recall this piece of paper, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: You recall the briefing, though.

MR. TENET: Vaguely, yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: Finally, did you ever discuss with the secretary of Defense or other administration officials whether the Department of Defense Policy Office run by Mr. Feith might be bypassing normal intelligence community channels? Did you ever have any conversations like that with the secretary of Defense?

MR. TENET: I did not. I did not. I looked at my records, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

My time is up.

SEN. WARNER: I wish to say, Senator Levin and members of the committee, that we requested a copy of that briefing for the committee. It is now in our possession and in our files available to any member to look at it.

SEN. LEVIN: Well, Mr. Chairman, just on that matter, I did request that. It took a long, long time for Mr. Feith to come forward with that briefing.

It is a different briefing slightly, I might say, than the one that was presented to the CIA director. I'll just have to leave it at that. I'll leave out -- because I'm not allowed to say, since that's still a classified briefing -- a very significant little omission in that briefing as it was presented to Mr. Tenet compared to the briefing that was sent to us and was presumably presented to the vice president.

Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Senator Roberts.

SEN. PAT ROBERTS (R-KS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Jacoby, the 2004 Defense Authorization Act called for the establishment of incentives for information leading to the resolution of Captain Scott Speicher's fate or his case. I understand that some within DPMO, that's the acronym for the department of POW/MIAs, have some concern about this. I think this argument is absurd. As a matter of fact, if you go back over the action of the Intelligence Committee for the past five or six years, we have had to take the analytical capability, put it into law and make sure that the intelligence community does an assessment in regards to those that we may leave behind. I would say, with all due respect to DPMO, not the current people who serve there, put people crawled out of train wrecks faster than DPMO responded to Captain Speicher. And their past -- as far as this senator is concerned, their past policy is, if not egregious, almost reprehensible. So I would hope that you would keep us posted, as you have been doing, and that these incentives will be provided to give us the information we needed.

Would you care to just say yes or --

ADM. JACOBY: Yes, sir, I will. And I also would assure you, as we have in previous briefings, that we have, through the Iraqi Survey Group efforts in Iraq, not missed any opportunities in terms of following up information with the authorities that General Dayton has at his --

SEN. ROBERTS: And that effort is aggressive and ongoing?

ADM. JACOBY: It is both aggressive and ongoing, yes, sir.

SEN. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, I have an observation -- and if I go over time, I apologize, but not very much.

There's been an assertion after assertion that we need an independent investigation of the prewar intelligence prior to Iraqi Freedom. Senator Levin has summed up the obvious and real concerns that we have on the Intelligence Committee, on this committee, in his opening statement.

The DCI and Admiral Jacoby spent five hours with us Thursday in the Intelligence Committee, and on Friday spent three hours with the House Intelligence Committee. As of today, you're going to spend at least four hours, and probably a lot more to come, and that doesn't count all the hours you've already spent. Thursday you had 43 people in the committee room, and we about asphyxiated with all the people that we had in there, and they represented the entire 14 agency heads of the intelligence community.

Now, I know that there is another report coming from the President's Foreign Policy (sic/Intelligence) Advisory Board, that's the PFIAB, that's the acronym. You have the Kerr review in regards to the Department of Defense. You have the inspector general in regards to the CIA taking a look at your intelligence capabilities and how you did. You have the Armed Services Committee, both in the House and Senate; the Intelligence Committee both in the House and the Senate; you have the Appropriations Committee both in the House and the Senate -- that's six. You have now an independent investigation headed up by Senator Robb, a former colleague of ours, who is eminently qualified, and Judge Silverman. And you have all four services taking a look at lessons learned on intelligence. That is 14 either inquiries or probes or investigation.

Then you have many press partridges in the intelligence pear tree starring in the Washington version of "Lord of the Links" and receiving awards, you know, from time to time. You have the House and Senate investigation of the 9/11 situation in the last session. You have an independent investigation that should completed in July. You have virtually every armchair expert with 20-20 hindsight and various conspiracies and axes to grind. You have 100 senators, 435 House members, not to mention all the individual groups who have a say in this.

Are we splitting the shingle? That's a Dodge City term where if you hit the shingle about 17 times and you split it -- is there anybody left down at Langley doing their job?

MR. TENET: Sir, I would say that we're spending a lot of time on it. I know it's important. This is a community that believes in oversight -- more than one, this gets difficult, but we'll work through it. And obviously it takes us away from our work, but it's an important issue and we'll do the best we can.

SEN. ROBERTS: Well, let me recommend another target of opportunity for us. I think the only thing lacking is an independent commission to investigate all of the independent commissions and the investigations.

We on the Intelligence Committee -- and it is rather through troubled waters -- working on a bipartisan basis, have 310 pages of our report. We've interviewed over 200 analysts on WMD, on the links to terrorism, on regional stability, on human rights. We have added on prewar intelligence and postwar Iraq. We have added on the quality of the INC, that's the Iraqi National Congress, intelligence that was provided; the much-discussed DOD intel cell that has just been referred to; and then use of the intelligence by all government officials. Note I said "all government officials"; not just the Bush administration, but the Clinton administration and all government officials, and that means members of Congress, some of whom have been so critical, and so aggressive, and so declarative in their statements that it's hard to figure out how they made the same kind of statements over about a year ago.

And then we are going to have our draft conclusions this week. We are going to then go into redaction. Then we are going to be talking with you to see if we can't make that report public, and I hope that we will have it done by April. And basically I am extremely hopeful that we can leapfrog the politics in an even-numbered year, which is probably not possible under the circumstances, but we're going to give it a hell of a go.

And we have a meeting this afternoon on the budget. Now, in the '90s we really cut the funding in regards to intelligence. We got to a bathtub, and now as you well know we have an awful lot of money spent on collection, not as much as we need on the analytical side and in regards to human intelligence. And then you have to rely on supplementals as opposed to the budget. That's wrong, and so the House Intelligence Committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee can make a determined effort to try to fix that, and so consequently I think we bear part of that responsibility in regards to our nation's intelligence efforts to safeguard our national security.

And I'm saying this on behalf of the young CIA employees and officers that we met -- Senator Warner, Senator Levin and myself -- Senator Rockefeller -- in Iraq, in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, and they are second to none. And so I am very hopeful that in our efforts to find the truth here and shine the light of truth into darkness we do not do damage in regards to the esprit de corps of the intelligence community, but we will get our work done.

And I thank you both for the job that you are doing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Roberts.

Senator Kennedy.

SEN. EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA): Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tenet, in your speech last month at Georgetown, you said the intelligence community never said the threat from Iraq was imminent. You defended the agency, talked about the difficulty of obtaining accurate intelligence, but you clearly put some distance between the intelligence you provided and the way President Bush used it to justify the war.

The key issue is whether the threat was serious enough and the intelligence good enough to go to war. The national security adviser said we should (sic) wait for, quote, "the mushroom cloud." The White House press office said the threat was imminent. Vice President Cheney said he was convinced that Saddam would be acquiring nuclear weapons fairly soon.

President Bush himself may not have used the words "imminent," but he carefully chose strong and loaded words about the threat, words the intelligence community never used -- never used -- to prepare the nation to go to war against Iraq.

President Bush said Saddam was "on the verge" of acquiring nuclear capability. He described it as a "threat of unique urgency," a "unique and urgent threat." These are all October 2002 Rose Garden, November 20 NATO -- give you the citations. He described it as a "threat of unique urgency," a "unique and urgent threat," a "grave threat," and spoke of a mushroom cloud. Now, did you ever use those words to describe Iraq to the president?

MR. TENET: Sir, I think that the way we described the threat to the president, and it's clear in our key judgments in our National Intelligence Estimate, we believed that Saddam Hussein, in addition to the key judgments we made on chemical and biological and expanding his BW capability, we believed that he was continuing his efforts to deceive us and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests.

SEN. KENNEDY: All right. Did you ever tell him that he was overstating the case? You see him every other morning after he makes these statements. Did you ever tell him, "Mr. President, you're overstating the case?" Did you ever tell Condoleezza Rice? Did you ever tell the Vice President that they were overstating the case? And if you didn't, why not?

MR. TENET: Well, Senator, I do the intelligence. They then take the intelligence and assess the risk and make a policy judgment about what they think about it. I engage with them every day. If there are areas where I thought someone said something they shouldn't say, I talked to them about it. There are instances, obviously, with regard to the State of the Union speech where I felt the responsibility to say something that the president said should not have been in that speech.

But I will tell you that I've now worked on Iraq in consecutive administrations and I have watched policymakers take language from intelligence and translate it into language where they do the risk calculus. They think about what the policy implications are and then talk about it in ways that we may not necessarily talk about.

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, when do you feel that they are talking about or misrepresenting it? What's your responsibility? I mean, when do you say no? You give them the intelligence. You indicated here this morning that they put the sense of urgency on it, that was the quote. And when you see this intelligence you provide being misrepresented, misstated by the highest authorities, when do you say no?

MR. TENET: Well, sir --

SEN. KENNEDY: You can't have it both ways, can you, Mr. Tenet? You can't on the one hand just say look, we never said that war was imminent, and then have these superheated dialogue and rhetoric which are semantically the same as imminent and not -- and tell us here before the committee that you have no obligation to correct it or didn't even try.

MR. TENET: Senator, I can tell you that I'm not going to sit here today and tell you what my interaction was and what I did or what I didn't do except that you have the confidence to know that when I believed that somebody was misconstruing intelligence I said something about it. I don't stand up in public and do it. I do my job the way I did it in two administrations. And policymakers -- you know, this is a tough road. Policymakers take data. They interpret threat. They assess risk. They put urgency behind it, and sometimes it doesn't uniquely comport with every word of an intelligence estimate.

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, Director, I'm not talking about parsing words.

MR. TENET: No, sir, I understand that.

SEN. KENNEDY: We're talking about words that are basically warmongering. There's a big distinction, I think. These are semantically the same as an imminent threat. People understood that. When you talk about a mushroom cloud, how much more imminent threat could there be? And if you're saying that there was no immediate threat and you hear either the president, the vice president, the secretary of Defense using that super-heated rhetoric, we have to ask: What is your responsibility? When do you say that this is more than just my interpretation, this is clearly going beyond the pale? Or don't you feel that way?

MR. TENET: No, sir, I have a responsibility. I lived up to my responsibilities; I talked to our policymakers. At the same time, you know the context of what we were talking about here -- the fact that in one of our key judgments, whether right or wrong, we felt and stated there was a lot that we did not know and we constantly felt that we might be surprised by our lack of access. There was a history they brought to us, there was use, there was the relationship with the U.N. And at the end of the day, they made policy judgments, and they talk about things differently.

SEN. KENNEDY: All right. On that then -- but do you believe the administration, then, misrepresented the facts to justify the war?

MR. TENET: No, sir, I don't.

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, why not?

MR. TENET: In terms of policy -- in policy judgments -- you know, sir, there are places where I intervened, and I clearly talked to you about the State of the Union address; or a couple of weeks ago after my Georgetown speech, I talked to the vice president about the fact that the mobile BW vans, there was no consensus in our intelligence community. And I think I've done my job the same way in two administrations.

SEN. KENNEDY: Time is up, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Allard.

SEN. ALLARD: Mr. Chairman, thank you. No doubt we're in a political year -- presidential election. You can tell that from some of the rhetoric. But I would just make the observation that I have been -- I have observed rhetoric that was much stronger, I think, out of members of the Senate than was out of the president.

And Mr. Tenet, I want to commend you on your professionalism. I think you've done a good job in presenting the facts as a general rule, and I've felt like you've been a true professional in carrying on your duties. I just want to make that as part of the record.

And I've heard you give testimony as a member of the Intelligence Committee, which I no longer serve on, but also here on the Armed Services Committee. So I'd like to -- there's been some criticism about the collection of the intelligence, and so I want to make this a constructive session. I'd like to know -- and I know you've had some real challenges with intelligence, because, for one thing, you were dealing with a closed society and it was very difficult to get individuals in on the ground that could provide us the information that we needed to supplement what we were getting through our high technology to collect data.

What is it that we can do to help improve intelligence gathering? And perhaps maybe you, Mr. Tenet, as well as Vice Admiral Jacoby, could comment on that.

MR. TENET: Well, sir, I think that we've laid out a vigorous collection program over the last six or seven years that I've been director. And I would maintain my focus on continuing to rebuild our human intelligence, as we've been about. I continue to focus on collection capabilities that allow us to deal with deception and denial. I think that the budget that's before you has a very strong -- will have -- has a very strong emphasis in precisely the areas that we need to continue to make steady progress in, particularly in human intelligence and special collection activities that allow us to defeat deception and denial.

I know that we've had some significant increases in intelligence spending over the last four years. They've allowed us to get back to a base that I think is healthy, and now we have to make sure that we continue to move forward while attracting the best people to our service, because, at the end of the day, they're what make this work.

So keeping the eye on the ball of rebuilding human and real close attack technical capabilities is what this future is all about. I think our budget reflects that.

SEN. ALLARD: Admiral Jacoby?

ADM. JACOBY: Senator, it's clear that we were working in a situation where we had large gaps in information, whether it was because of gaps in reconnaissance coverage or because it was gaps in terms of HUMINT penetration into decision-making and intentions.

So I would ask that we look very hard at our intelligence- collection capabilities and try to move from a period of -- where we do reconnaissance, where there are gaps in coverage, to a situation where we consider our capabilities as a system of systems and look to achieve persistence, which is the ability to linger on a problem long enough to truly understand it.

Human intelligence plays a major portion in that, and we need to be thinking about how we integrate better, so that we don't put the pressure on the analyst assessments and analysis to connect those -- you know, to fill those gaps in coverage.

SEN. ALLARD: Thank you both for your response.

In your testimony, Mr. Tenet, you characterize how much of the proliferation occurs, and I'd like to kind of change the emphasis as to why that is happening. You know, in the proliferation problem, there is two sides of it. There's the supply side and then there's the demand side. And the successes that you've described are based on the intelligence penetration of the supply chain, and the president's Proliferation Security Initiative coordinates efforts to interdict illicit supply activities.

And my question is, could you give us your assessment as to what's fueling the demand for ballistic missiles? And can we decrease this demand across the states of concern and perhaps maybe -- you know, again, Admiral Jacoby, maybe you would have comment on that.

MR. TENET: Well, I think, Senator, one of the things -- that proliferation begets proliferation. My possession of a ballistic missile, particularly in a tough neighborhood, immediately stimulates other countries' immediately wanting to have a similar kind of capability. The Iranians have a Shahab-3. This -- the Near East is a part of the world where ballistic missile capability continues to grow and people acquire it.

The complicating piece of this is in the proliferation arena, particularly in the nuclear arena, where we highlight a man like A.Q. Khan, is -- the nation-state used to be the sole purveyor of technology, and today networks of individuals, loosely affiliated, who may not have an affiliation formally with a nation-state, are now providing technology and components and the wherewithal in a one-stop shopping mechanism that has complicated our life.

But the truth is, the more that you see, the more other countries want to acquire and be in the position to have an equal capability. And then it leads you to weaponization. It leads you down the different paths to cause us so much concern. And the inherent problems with covering dual-use industries that are compatible with chemical and biological industries and weapons make the job a lot tougher.

So the continuum has to start at the front end. Interdiction really is -- as you go down the right-hand side of the ledger, you know, interdiction is a very, very important piece, but we have to work quite hard to stop these networks and countries from giving up this technology.

SEN. ALLARD: Admiral?

ADM. JACOBY: Sir, I'd agree totally with the sort of the -- if you want to use the term "regional arms race," where it's your neighbor's capabilities and it's an escalating kind of a situation; but we also need to be aware of the fact that proliferation and WMD is a mechanism for gaining influence, too, and that's the North Korea type of scenario. And so we have both of those situations. I think we need to be very precise in looking at the motivations, the factors behind them, and try to address those motivations and factors as we go.

SEN. ALLARD: Just one more question. What is the prospect that North Korea, Iran, Syria and others would follow Libya's lead and volunteer to divest their ballistic missile weapons?

MR. TENET: Low likelihood at this point, I would say, sir. It's a good example, but I don't know that others will follow the lead.

SEN. ALLARD: Admiral?

ADM. JACOBY: I agree totally, sir.

SEN. ALLARD: I see that the chairman has left, so I am now going to chair the committee. And I think Senator Akaka was the next.

SEN. DANIEL AKAKA (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tenet, I want to commend the agency for the tremendous job you did in ending the Libya WMD program and uncovering the A.Q. Khan's nuclear smuggling network. That was a great effort by the CIA.

My question to you concerns the seriousness of the Pakistani government in ending Khan's activities. You give the prime -- Mr. Musharraf good grades. And Pakistan has, I think, worked pretty well with us. But going back to Khan's activities, I know he has confessed and he has been pardoned, but my question is, did the government impose any penalties on him? For example, does he still own his million-dollar homes? And also, have we been given access to his interrogation reports, including his confession?

MR. TENET: Senator, let me just say that President Musharraf has been very cooperative in this regard. And I would prefer to talk about some of those questions in closed session.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you.

Director Tenet, a lot of questions have been raised about the quality of our intelligence relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and also as to whether or not Iraq's WMD was an imminent threat.

I do not want to get into those questions. They have been pretty well covered already.

But I do want to ask you if the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq produced in October 2002 was substantially different in its conclusions than the intelligence community document produced in the year 2000?

MR. TENET: Sir, we can provide for the record the evolution of all of our judgments over the course of the last 10 years. And off the top of my head, I just don't have an answer, but I will provide that for the record. I think the committee may have that. But we have been writing about Iraq for 10 years. There were some things in this estimate and data that we acquired that pushed us in some directions on specific systems. But I will provide that to you.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you.

News reports suggest that the Pakistani army is engaged as never before in the search for Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan. As you know, the Pakistani intelligence service has a long history of operating with a different agenda than that declared by the government. And as you also know, the Pakistani military has often been reluctant to go into the tribal areas where we suspect terrorists are hiding.

My question to you is, are you satisfied with the Pakistani counterterrorism strategy in this latest effort to get Osama bin Laden? And if not, what causes you concern?

MR. TENET: Let me say this; I'm very satisfied with what the Pakistanis are doing in the counterterrorism strategy. I don't think it's appropriate to talk about bin Laden or things that have been in the media. We shouldn't be talking about those things, sir. And we can talk about this in closed session, but I don't think it's appropriate in open session.

But the Pakistani government and President Musharraf have been a key ally against al Qaeda, and the gains there have been substantial in terms of our ability to accomplish some of the objectives that I talked about in my statement.

SEN. WARNER: Could I interrupt to say that we will have a closed session, following this open session, in 216.

SEN. AKAKA: Admiral Jacoby, I have some questions on the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan that I hope you can respond to briefly.

Senator Levin has raised in the past concerns about the weapons depot sites in Iraq. I wonder if you could tell me how secure do those sites remain? Have there been any substantial thefts from them? We have heard a lot about trends in violence in Iraq, and how most of those attacks have been concentrated in the Sunni triangle. Can you tell us if there has been an increase or decrease in the number of attacks in the southern part of Iraq?

ADM. JACOBY: Senator, let me just -- let me take the second question first. The situation in the south has been basically unchanged over the last three or four months; quite stable with very small numbers of attacks. And frankly, what's happening in many areas of the south is that the population is coming forward, identifying troublemakers and problems before they have a chance to act, and the coalition is able to take preemptive action against them.

For the question about the weapon storage areas, sir, it's -- we have a broad range of situations. We have some storage areas that remain intact and are guarded. There are storage areas that were looted prior to our arrival. And I believe as General Abizaid has characterized, maybe even to this committee, the large numbers of weapon storage areas, many of them in dispersed areas and very poorly maintained by the Saddam regime remain a major problem. Just the volume and the dispersion of those weapons by itself is an issue, sir.

SEN. AKAKA: What about northern Iraq, in northern Iraq where the Kurds dominate, what is the situation with the Turkoman minority? Has there been an increase or decrease in violence against the Turkoman?

ADM. JACOBY: Senator, there's nothing that's notable in terms of trends. The situation in the north remains basically stable and there have not been any sort of targeted attacks on portions of the population in that area.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Dole.

SEN. ELIZABETH DOLE (R-NC): Gentlemen, I appreciate the immense challenges the intelligence community must overcome to provide accurate and timely intelligence estimates. Our potential enemies attempt to conceal their capabilities and deny the very threats they pose to American interests. Your work, starting with the collection of raw information, followed by its analysis and fusion into a useful intelligence estimate, is truly an art form. I commend the intelligence community for their excellent work and recent successes. These actions can only help make the world a safer place.

From your remarks, I understand that intelligence collection, which has always been difficult against closed and highly secretive societies, is even more difficult and complex than at any time in the past. This is the primary factor driving what you, Director Tenet, stated in your February 5th speech at Georgetown University; in the intelligence business, you're almost never completely wrong or completely right.

With respect to intelligence collection, does the president's budget adequately resource the intelligence community to maintain a broad situational awareness, while also quickly generating the needed intelligence on multiple security issues?

MR. TENET: Yes, Senator Dole, I believe it does.

SEN. DOLE: Today we are here to receive testimony on current and future threats to the national security of the United States. Unfortunately, much of the current intelligence debate surrounds our prewar intelligence on Iraq and whether we were right or wrong.

Director Tenet, I support your efforts, as well as the other inquiries which are examining what our intelligence communities told policymakers compared to what they knew and didn't know at the time.

The work of the Iraq Survey Group is essential toward this end.

Given the amount of work still ahead for the Iraq Survey Group, is it premature to make absolute statements about how right or wrong our prewar intelligence estimates were?

MR. TENET: I think it's too early to make judgments, Senator Dole. I think if you look at the interim report that we got in October and particularly in the biological weapons area, where Dr. Kay talked about clandestine research facilities, human testing facilities, things that were denied to the United Nations. Certainly in the missile area what we found -- and I said in my Georgetown speech on missiles our estimate was generally on target, and Dr. Kay confirmed that.

We have made less progress in the chemical area. That surprises me, but I think that we are operating in an environment where we have a good strategic approach, security environment is difficult, Iraqis are going to have to help us, and I think that Charlie Duelfer -- my new special assistant -- will be coming forward at the end of the month, and he will make a determination about how much time we need. But at this moment, I would say -- I would argue for patience to allow these men and women to do their work. It's important for a number of reasons.

We want to know whether we were right or wrong. We want to know what the disposition of these programs were. We do need to understand whether there was any secondary proliferation, which would be of great concern to us. So some patience is required here, and I think the country will be well served.

SEN. DOLE: Thank you.

Our intelligence agencies have been accused of dismissing reports from Iraqi scientists, defectors and other informants who said Saddam Hussein's government did not possess unconventional weapons. It's understandable that our agencies must filter reports from human intelligence sources and scrutinize those that lack sufficient credibility or originate from sources with questionable motivations. Recently the intelligence community was accused of dismissing some human intelligence because it did not conform to widely held beliefs within the administration and intelligence community that Iraq had illicit weapons programs. Were either of you under any pressure in any way to filter intelligence prior to the war in Iraq?

MR. TENET: No, ma'am.

SEN. DOLE: Admiral?

ADM. JACOBY: Ma'am, I was not.

SEN. DOLE: Would you please clarify how our intelligence agencies handle human intelligence reports?

MR. TENET: Well, Senator, in open session I'll say that we attempt to validate, corroborate, seek other sources of data, carefully evaluate what access the individual has in question, try to test the proposition through other collection means. So we never take anything at face value. And then over the course of time, just because somebody was accurate last year doesn't mean they continue to be accurate, so the vetting and constant testing of access and reliability is built into how we do our work and our professional ethic.

SEN. DOLE: Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Has Senator Reed returned? No, I do not see that, and --

STAFF: No, he has not.

SEN. WARNER: Senator Bayh? He's not back either, is he?

Senator Lieberman.

SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Director Tenet, Admiral Jacoby.

The questions that have been raised about the state of our pre- Iraq war intelligence and what the administration did with it are significant questions. But it does seem to me that it's critically important for all of us -- both parties, particularly in this election year -- not to let the pursuit of answers to those questions distract us from the immediate pressing challenges to our security that are occurring in Iraq, where momentous judgments will be made, as you have testified to, in the next several months, the exact same time period during which the election campaign here will be held; and that those questions about prewar intelligence, important as they are, not distract us from focusing on the kinds of current threats to our security that you both have outlined in your testimony before us today.

And I want my questions to focus on those.

You've said, Mr. Tenet, on page five of your prepared testimony unclassified: "Mr. Chairman, I have consistently warned this committee of al Qaeda's interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Acquiring these remains a religious obligation in bin Laden's eyes, and al Qaeda and more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials. We particularly see a heightened risk of poison attacks. Contemplated delivery methods to date have been simple, but this may change as non-al Qaeda groups share information on more sophisticated methods and tactics."

That's very chilling stuff and it's today. So I want to ask you, first, where are al Qaeda and these other groups pursuing this CBRN capability?

MR. TENET: Senator, let me tell you that if you think about a network of individuals who mix scientists' technical know-how, the search for material, you find that these networks stretch from the Near East to Europe and we find them in very specific compartmented lines, low end to high end, with common facilitators training low-end things they learned in Afghanistan; we know that from chemical and biological manuals. And then what we carefully try and look for is seepage of material, access to scientists; and this network that I'm talking about, whether I'm talking about anthrax or radiological, has all of -- these networks have all of these elements.

And so the concern that we have is, is if high-end, high-impact capability is, is we know that this group continues in its quest for spectacular attacks against the United States or our allies. The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear route obviously provides you that kind of high end. They have technical expertise, they have money and they proceed apace in seeking to acquire this capability. And we can talk about it a little bit more in closed session, but as a worry, this is my highest worry. And I'm as worried about how much we know as how much we don't see.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right.

MR. TENET: And so we're working quite diligently on this. But this is, I think, a very difficult and important issue for the future and our understanding, and our action.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Let me ask this question, and in prefacing it mention that last week General Abizaid appeared before this committee. And we asked him -- someone on the committee asked him what are the major needs that he has; what are the greatest lessons learned at this point from our involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. And he said that they needed greater intelligence. And I'd invite you to respond to this.

As you face these threats, which as you describe the threat from al Qaeda and the other two dozen -- more than two dozen other terrorist groups seeking chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons -- and now having been, and I will allow you to correct me on this, somewhat surprised by the revelation of the A.Q. Khan network, which we found through Libyan cooperation with us --

MR. TENET: No.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Do you feel that you've got adequate support and systems to penetrate the enemy here? Both the worldwide terrorist network and the terrorist insurgent enemy that our troops and coalition partners are facing in Iraq? Or, you know -- the Pentagon comes before us with supplemental requests --

MR. TENET: I do, too.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: You do, too. So are you -- do you have what you need to fill the gaps that we're finding in what we know about this enemy?

MR. TENET: Senator, I would say that -- and part of this enemy, by the way, this fellow Zarqawi, he's -- who's -- he's part of this enemy because he's involved in low-end poisons plotting, and he's inside Iraq.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right.

MR. TENET: I would say that from our perspective, we have walled off and protected terrorism, proliferation in Iraq as major pieces of our intelligence focus and effort.

So the key thing for me is sustaining and maintaining high- quality people to take these assignments. But in those areas, we have intense focus, an enormous resource allocation. And if you were to ask me what suffers, from all that --

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right.

MR. TENET: -- well, global coverage in other parts of the world probably will suffer, because these are our highest priorities. And on terrorism, we can't afford to move anything but forward and more aggressively constantly, because of what we face. Success, you know, begets an unknown, and new people pop up in these networks I'm talking to you about, particularly networks that are springing up as you flatten the pyramid organization and migrate networks throughout the world. We're still dealing with it.

So I see it part and parcel of the same issue. You know, you've got Ansar al-Islam, Zarqawi, terrorists who -- jihad in Iraq shouldn't be separated from jihad in Morocco, Kenya and other places.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right.

MR. TENET: It's all part of the same network. So I think we would say people and focus is there. Sustainability, continuing to be able to operate and bring the best people to bear constantly, is a challenge for us, but we're committed to it.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: So you've got what you need for now.

MR. TENET: Sir, we'll be back, no doubt, for a supplemental. There's no doubt about that.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Admiral Jacoby -- and I know my time is up -- but from a DIA point of view, how would you respond to General Abizaid's statement? I believe I'm doing it justice, which is that there's a need for improved intelligence to help him successfully prosecute on behalf of the coalition --

MR. TENET: Sir, can I take a shot at that first and --

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Sure.

MR. TENET: Look, at the front end, when we first got on the ground, what became key to us is our ability to penetrate and operate in these local areas. And our military has exquisite knowledge of these local areas.

What we've done over time is increase our understanding of organization, people, individuals. And so we constantly -- what General Abizaid needs is more human and technical understanding of how these people operate. And we're getting better all the time. And it's just an insatiable. Appetite that's correct. We have to fill it.

ADM. JACOBY: Senator Lieberman, another piece of it is intelligence embedded in our military services. And General Abizaid's need right now is for people in his brigades and divisions that have the cultural, language, whatever skills that it takes to be able to penetrate sort of at the local level, understand intentions, dynamics and plans for attacks on his forces.

And sir, we're not where we need to be at the tactical level with those kinds of capabilities, and so there is an issue there for us to be able to rebuild back into our service structure tactical HUMINT, tactical CI, some of the other things that allow him to deal with those issues.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Sessions.

SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, we appreciate your service.

I recently had, Mr. Tenet, the opportunity to talk to a young woman who -- employed by the CIA, who had volunteered to spend time in Iraq. She tells me that six hours a day -- 15 hours a day -- six days a week, 15 hours a day they're working.

I know Defense Intelligence is also. There is an intense understanding that the gathering and assimilating and understanding intelligence saves lives of American soldiers, it can eliminate threats on our homeland by your people. And I want to say I appreciate what they do. They