UNITED STATES POLICY AND
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Hearing Before the
House Armed Services Committee

September 25, 2003

OPENING STATEMENT OF

DUNCAN HUNTER
A Representative from California, and
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

HUNTER: The committee will come to order. And I'd like to welcome Secretary Wolfowitz, General Abizaid, Ambassador Bremer and General Keane to the committee today.

Given your frequent appearances before the committee in closed session over the last couple of months, I don't think formal introductions are necessary.

Can folks hear?

(UNKNOWN): Now we can.

HUNTER: Most of the members of the committee like it a little better when my mike is turned off here, but let me introduce our witnesses once again: Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz, who is deputy secretary of defense; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority; General John Abizaid, United States Army commander of CENTCOM, United States Central Command; and, of course, also General John Keane, vice chief of staff of the Army.

And General Keane is going to welcome us -- or is going to help us with any issues that might come up, although he doesn't have an opening statement, as I understand.

It's been six months since the coalition forces crossed the Iraqi border and began combat operations to depose Saddam Hussein, and it took three weeks for our military to reach Baghdad and topple the regime and then a few more days to conclude major combat operations, but that didn't end the war.

And that shouldn't surprise us. After all, Hussein and his people ruled through terror. They've got nothing to gain, everything to lose, from a peaceful, stable and democratic Iraq.

So regime die-hards, criminals and foreign fighters attack coalition forces in the forlorn hope that they can drive us out, that they can retrieve power through terror against our military, against the United Nations and against defenseless Iraqi civilians.

Instead of a strategy, they have terror. It's not going to beat us on the battlefield, which they can't do. Instead, our enemies are using terror to create the perception that Iraq is chaotic and ungovernable in the hope that we will lose heart and cut our commitment before the job is done.

And you know, I was just reflecting on perhaps the instruction that has been given to terrorists over the years, that is that the killing of the Marines in Lebanon did not invite a strong response from the United States during the Reagan administration. The Khobar Towers, similarly, and the strikes on our embassies in Africa, at the most produced a response that consisted of several cruise missiles aimed in general directions. But there was no strong response, as we've had since 9/11.

So we have -- I think we have a strategy on the part of those who wish us ill to proceed on the basis that Americans don't have patience and that we don't have perseverance.

And if the combination of their die-hards and criminals and jihadists succeed, we're going to leave prematurely and Iraqi democracy will die before the people of Iraq are ready and able to defend it.

HUNTER: And that's what's at stake today, whether our staying power is stronger than that of the terrorists, that's the question. And for the sake of American security, I think it must be.

Now our military is up to the task, and that's been strongly demonstrated. We've taken losses. They're particularly painful because these soldiers are the best America has to offer. But everyone over there, civilian or military, is now serving on the front lines in the battle between terror and civilization, and that's as noble a responsibility as the fights against fascism and communism were in the last century.

There are some who would pass that responsibility off onto the United Nations or who criticize the coalition mission in Iraq because it hasn't unfolded as neatly as a Hollywood screenplay.

But I might just say, having watched "Patton" the other night and watching the drive of the 3rd Army through Europe, it was a pretty strong similarity, when you watch those American Marines, 101st Airborne and our other uniform people, driving to Baghdad with that advance. It was so rapid, that we seized many of the bridges and strong points before they could be blown and seized oil fields before they could be taken out of action.

And if people want to look for all the things that we look for and what I think are the good Hollywood reflections of war, that is bravery, enormous talent, integrity and sacrifice for country, we saw it in that drive to Baghdad.

But Iraq isn't like the peacekeeping or stability operations of the 1990s. There the United States ought to keep warring parties apart. We tried to be fair and impartial. In theory, if not practice, other states in the U.N. could also play that role.

In Iraq, the stakes are much, higher. Regime holdouts and foreign jihadists aren't flocking to Iraq to defend its people. They're flocking to Iraq to kill Americans and restore a terrorist regime.

The forces of terror are genuine enemies to the United States and all that we value and that makes this a war in which we are active participants, not a peacekeeping exercise in which American resources are interchangeable with those of the United Nations.

Because our security depends on victory, we cannot entrust either to the dictates of others. We can, should and do welcome allies in the fight against terror. Indeed, some 32 nations committed military resources to building a secure, stable and viable democracy in Iraq. The contributions are important and more allies will be welcome. Nevertheless, our security demands that we prevail with or without them.

We're at war with terror. It's a war that terrorists started, but it's a war that we must finish on our terms. As the president noted before the United Nations just two days ago, peace comes from freedom and we secure that freedom with courage.

HUNTER: We have years of hard work before us in Iraq. We need to demonstrate the courage to do it.

Gentlemen, we all look forward to your testimony and appreciate your appearance before the committee this afternoon.

And just one other thing, before I recognize my partner on this committee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton. I was reflecting on something that Rob Simmons, one of our great Vietnam veterans, member of the committee, made the other day when he talked about a term that was used in Vietnam, and that is the term "wasted." Some people use that to describe how if a GI was killed, he was wasted. And the theme that was often put out in this country was that somehow the Americans who fought in Vietnam weren't fighting for something of value.

Any time you look at what this regime did, you understand, whether you're looking at the Kurdish mothers killed by poison gas, where they ran, literally in place, holding their babies to their breasts, how they were killed, by the thousands, incidentally; you look at the mass graves; you look at the executions on television with the graphic descriptions of the Iraqi officer of Saddam Hussein's people putting a bullet through each person's head who happen to have a little movement left in them after they faced the firing squad; we realize that what did in deposing that regime was something of value.

And I think it's important to remember, as we talk about rebuilding Iraq, that every time we turn on electricity, we turn on our water supply, we stand up a school, we stand up a hospital, we're only able to do that because of what people in uniform did. That's the product of our servicepeople. And the two are not unrelated; they are very much related.

And so, Mr. Secretary and Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid, as you tell us about the state of play in Iraq, I hope that you'll mention the status in these important areas of standing this country up again, both in terms of government and in getting the wheels of commerce moving, because that is the product that American soldiers bought with this enormous effort to take Iraq.

So, once again, thank you for being with us.

And at this time, let me recognize my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

IKE SKELTON
A Representative from Missouri, and
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee

SKELTON: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary Wolfowitz, Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid, and thank them for testifying today.

It's also good to see General Jack Keane with us again.

Just a few days ago, seven of us from this committee returned from a most enlightening trip to Iraq. This nation's mission in Iraq is one of the most important international efforts we have ever undertaken.

If our mission is successful there, we will bring self-government -- a responsible self-government to a fractured nation, encourage stability throughout the region and prevent terrorists from taking advantage of the current instability.

Our American forces, along with a few allies, especially British, were magnificent on the battlefield, demonstrating the joint vision that those of us who worked on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation knew was possible.

Our forces in combat reflected the superiority of the education and training they received from basic training to the war colleges.

But it is the conflict's aftermath that has given us a challenge of monumental proportion. On September the 4th, 2002, and March 18th of this year, I wrote the president and various secretaries involved in national security issues warning of the dangers in planning for the aftermath.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that both the letters be placed in the record at this time.

HUNTER: Without objection.

SKELTON: To quote Sun Tzu: "To win victory is easy, to preserve its fruits difficult." In order to preserve our victory I pointed out the importance of managing Iraq's transition to a post-Saddam regime. My advice went unheeded. Little attention was paid to the postwar Iraq.

To say that the assumption, made by many in the administration that the Iraqis would welcome us with open arms was incorrect is an understatement. It was a downright blunder. Worse yet, it's a blunder that could have been avoided by taking into consideration the ethnic and tribal strains that existed, particularly the Baathist Party's persistence.

It breaks my heart to see troops wounded and killed due to the lack of foresight in the post-victory planning.

SKELTON: I need not recount the short tour of duty of retired General Lieutenant -- General Jay Garner, all the problems that resulted under Ambassador Paul Bremer. But I can tell you this: America needs to win this effort. Failure is not an option.

That's why I support the administration's request for funds for Iraq, as well as for Afghanistan. Congress must hold the administration accountable for every penny, but we must provide it. Just like the idea that second place doesn't count on the battlefield, there is no other choice but to finish the job and to finish it fully.

On September the 14th, 2003, our delegation flew from Baghdad back to Kuwait. We had the honor of escorting a body of an American soldier. This fine soldier who was killed in a guerrilla attack in the valley of death in Baghdad was performing his daily duty with honor and integrity, ingenuity and dedication of which we can all be proud.

That American soldier and all his brothers in arms in this conflict put me in mind of Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem, "The Charge of the Light Brigade." His second stanza is as follows:

"Forward the Light Brigade.

Was there a man dismayed?

Not though the soldier knew,

Someone had blundered.

Not theirs to make reply.

Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do and die.

Into the valley of death rode the 600."

This poems says more eloquently than I that the cost of poor planning isn't just in dollars, it's the lives of our best men and women. It's because of these soldiers that we must win the peace in Iraq.

We have no other choice. There are other reasons, too: for the good of the Iraqi people, for the safety of the American people, and for the credibility and leadership of this nation. It's also as simple as saying that we owe it to these soldiers who have chosen to do and die.

So, Mr. Chairman, we have no choice. We're there. We're in Iraq. We can't unring that bell. We must be successful and, in my opinion, this effort can be won, but it can be lost. It's like a teeter-totter; it can go either way. To lose this historic mission would be to let down those amazing American troops who serve, and those who have died in this cause.

SKELTON: So let us go forward with commitment and with accountability, with better planning to honor our soldiers, bring this mission to its victorious conclusion.

Thank you.

HUNTER: I thank the very distinguished gentleman from Missouri.

Secretary Wolfowitz, thank you for being with us, sir. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT BY

DR. PAUL WOLFOWITZ
Deputy Secretary of Defense

WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee, and on such an important subject.

I have with me some pretty remarkable Americans, two real heroes on my right, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and General John Abizaid, who can give you the word direct from Baghdad, and I know that's what you want hear, and you want to ask your questions, so I'd like to keep my comments relatively brief here. I have a longer statement I'd like to submit for then record.

And General Jack Keane, who...

HUNTER: Without objection. In fact, all statement will be taken into the record without objection.

WOLFOWITZ: General Jack Keane is another American hero who, unfortunately, is nearing the end of a incredible career in the U.S. Army this year, to help answer what I know are going to be questions from this committee about the demands being placed on our both active duty and reserve component and National Guard forces.

I'd just like to make two specific comments and one general one as we open this. First of all, on a piece of bad news, I would like to express my own personal sorrow at the death of Aquila Hashimi, the member of the Iraqi Governing Council who was -- who died of wounds suffered a few days ago in an assassination attempt.

I had the privilege of meeting her back in July. It was a remarkable experience to talk to this woman who has spent years in no less a position than deputy to Tariq Aziz, who expressed with enormous sincerity and conviction her belief in the future of a free and democratic Iraq.

It's a cause for which she has now given her life, and it is a noble cause.

On a piece of happier news, I'd like to just share with you as an example of the kind of thing that we see frequently, almost every day, a dispatch that came in from one of Ambassador Bremer's representatives in the province of Salahuddin, reporting on the elections of the new governing council for that province.

That name may not mean much even to people in this room, but if I point out that the capital of Salahuddin is Tikrit, then I think you'll understand why this dispatch was titled "A Ray of Democracy in Iraq's Heart of Darkness," in Saddam Hussein's own hometown.

WOLFOWITZ: "The process for selecting Salahuddin's interim governing council has ended, by and large successfully," this report says. The provincial judge, accompanied by an American officer instructed the delegates in the voting process, which was by secret, individual ballot.

While far short of Athenian democracy, the selection process in Salahuddin is a firm but small step on the path to participatory government, something inconceivable in Saddam's hometown just a few months ago.

"While it remains to be seen," this report goes on, "how effective this diverse group can be in tackling the daunting challenges facing Salahuddin, for the moment the predominant feeling among the members is one of constant optimism and appreciation for what the coalition has made possible."

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, including, I know, a great many of you who have taken the trouble to travel to Iraq, along with the bad news, there is a great deal of good news, and this is one example.

If you'd permit me to just to make a general point, it seems clear to me that some people just don't get it. They just don't understand the lessons of September 11th.

September 11th should have changed the whole way we look at the world, and in particular the way we look at terrorism in the world. September 11th was a wake-up call. It wasn't just a wake-up call that Al Qaida was after us. The war on terrorism is more than just the war on Al Qaida, although that is obviously a very important part of that war.

But we shouldn't kid ourselves that if we could only catch Osama bin Laden and the top leadership of Al Qaida, that we could go back to sleep the way we have for the last 20 years, treating terrorism as an evil, but a manageable evil, and continuing to live with a status quo in the Middle East that's been breeding terrorists by the thousands.

That's why the president has said over and over and over again that the war on terrorism will be a long and difficult one. It requires eliminating global terrorist networks and getting governments out of the business of sponsoring terrorism.

But it also involves what the president referred to in his State of the Union message last year as building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror, particularly by supporting moderate forces in the Muslim world.

WOLFOWITZ: September 11th should have brought a recognition that the old way of dealing with terrorism, that you deal with terrorism after the fact by catching the perpetrators, proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and if they're individuals, putting them in jail, and if they're countries, bombing them, as we did occasionally after the attack on the American discotheque in Berlin or the attack on our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam -- in other words, that terrorism is an evil but a manageable evil, one that we can deal with by the weak deterrence of legal punishment and occasional retaliation. But we cannot.

September 11th demonstrated, first of all, that we're dealing with people that can't be deterred. But also, it should have been a lesson that we're not dealing with just one individual group of terrorists, that these terrorists work together, that they get support from states, that state sponsorship of terrorism is simply no longer tolerable. We've got to eradicate those international terrorist networks and end state sponsorship of terrorism.

Afghanistan was a very important place to start and Iraq was an important place to continue.

But the other thing we need to recognize is that dealing with terrorism is more than just killing and capturing terrorists. It also means winning the battle of ideas, demonstrating to the Muslim world, and particularly to the Arab world, that progress along the lines that has been so successful in this country and in Europe and increasingly in East Asia can also bring success for them.

And the terrorists understand that. That's why they write, as they did recently, on an Al Qaida Web site, that defeating democracy in Iraq is for them the most important battlefield in their campaign to impose their twisted way of thinking on the world and on other Muslims.

Why? "Because," they write, "if democracy succeeds in Iraq, it could teach Arabs that a good life is possible on this Earth. And they could come to love life too much and fear death and be unwilling to become martyrs."

What twisted logic. What sick minds. That tells you the kind of people we're dealing with, but it also tells you that success in the battle for democracy in Iraq will be a major victory in the war on terrorism.

WOLFOWITZ: The brave young Americans who liberated Iraq from the clutches of one of the bloodiest and most sadistic tyrants in modern history have brought us to the possibility of a major victory in the war on terrorism.

Completing that victory requires not just winning the war in Iraq, but winning the peace, as well. That is the best way we can honor the memory of the heroes who have sacrificed to bring us and the Iraqi people to this point.

We are here today, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, to ask the Congress, as you have done so often before, to give us the tools so we can finish the job.

Thank you.

I'd like to ask Ambassador Bremer to...

HUNTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Ambassador, welcome.

STATEMENT BY

AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER III,
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority

BREMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your visit to Iraq and the visit of so many of your colleagues. I look forward to welcoming any and all of you, because I think it's a wonderful experience for people to see what's really going on on the ground.

I welcome this opportunity to appear in support of the president's budget. I want to, before I begin, pay tribute to the magnificent men and women of our armed forces who had the superb victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

And if I may take a personal note here, Mr. Chairman, it's a particular pleasure for me to welcome my nephew, Captain Max Bremer, here, who served in both the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns.

HUNTER: Thank you very much.

(APPLAUSE)

BREMER: Mr. Chairman...

HUNTER: Take the next 15 minutes off and back to work.

(LAUGHTER)

BREMER: No, I don't give him permission, Mr. Chairman. He's going to have to sit through this.

I know how awful it is for all of you to wake up and hear another American service man has been killed overnight in Iraq. I learn about those deaths before you do, just because of the time change, and I can tell you nobody regrets them more than I do.

But these are not the senseless deaths that sometimes they're described as in the American press. They are part of the price we pay for the fight for civilization, the fight against terrorism, the fight against genocide and weapons of mass destruction.

These people who ambush the coalition forces and who assassinated Aquila Hashemi last week are trying to thwart constitutional and democratic government, as the quote that Secretary Wolfowitz just read from Al Qaida makes clear.

Mr. Chairman, they may win some battles, but they are fighting a losing fight against history.

BREMER: History is not on their side.

President Bush has a vision that provides for an Iraq made secure by the efforts of Iraq, an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles, bolstered by a substantial infrastructure and, finally, a plan that provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest possible time.

If we fail to recreate Iraq as a sovereign democracy, sustained by a solid economy, we will have handed the terrorists a precious gift. We must deny terrorists the gift of state sponsorship, which they enjoyed under Saddam, and must deny them the chaos, such as they survived on and thrived on in Lebanon in the 1980s.

That's why the president's request has to be seen as an important element in the global war on terrorism.

Our national experience, Mr. Chairman, teaches us how to consolidate a military victory. We had to learn the lesson the hard way. After the First World War, many here had opposed that war and wanted to solve the problems at home. We won the war and we did not consolidate the peace.

We all know what happened: Extremism, bred in a swamp of despair, bankruptcy and unpayable debts, gave the world fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, and another world war.

After that conflict, America showed that it had learned that military victory must be followed by a program to secure the peace. In 1948, America's greatest generation, having won the war, responded with the boldest, most generous and most productive act of statesmanship of the past century: the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan was enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support in both houses here. It set war-torn Europe on the path to freedom and prosperity, which the Europeans enjoy today.

After 1,000 years as the cock pit of war, Europe became the cradle of peace in two short generations. The president has a similar vision for the role of securing the peace in Iraq.

Let me make a few points about the supplemental.

First, we have a definite plan, and we have milestones and dates which we are executing and which you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, have been briefed on in detail during your visits to Baghdad.

Secondly, no one part of this supplemental is more important than another part. It is an integrated request for $87 billion.

Thirdly, this is urgent. It's obvious how the urgency affects military operations, but it's also equally obvious to me that it is urgent for the non-military part.

Most Iraqis welcomed us as liberators. A Gallup poll, which you may have read about in the paper yesterday, shows that almost two- thirds of Iraqis continue to believe that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the war and the hardships that have come after that.

BREMER: But just the same, the reality of having foreign troops on the streets is beginning to chafe. And the population's view of us is directly linked to their cooperation in hunting down those who attack us. Early progress on reconstructing Iraq will give us an edge against the terrorists and save American lives.

Finally, this money will be spent with prudent transparency. Every contract of the $20 billion will be subject to open competitive bidding.

The president's priority in this supplemental and first priority is security: first, to create a police force that can police the country; second, to create a national defense system based on a new Iraqi army and a civil defense corps; and thirdly, to put behind that an effective justice system, which is fair, objective by building courts and prisons.

This security assistance helps America in four specific ways.

First, Iraqis will be more effective than we are at gathering intelligence about the enemy. No matter how talented and courageous the coalition forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, knows his people, the language, the customs and the rhythms of the people. Iraqis want Iraqis to provide their security and so do we. That's why almost $5 billion is in this supplemental for that goal.

Secondly, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace coalition troops in the roles that often generate frustration, friction and resentment: conducting searches, manning checkpoints and guarding installations.

Thirdly, Mr. Chairman, this frees up coalition forces for the more mobile, sophisticated operations which they are so well-equipped to undertake.

And finally, of course, these new Iraqi forces will reduce the overall security demands on the coalition, and thereby speed up the day when we can bring our men and women in the armed forces home.

Of course, security is not enough, and the second thrust of this supplemental is the economy. A good security system cannot persist on the knife edge of economic collapse.

Saddam, when he scurried away in April, left behind an economy ruined not by our attacks, but by decades of neglect, theft and mismanagement. And the entire time he was in office, Mr. Chairman, 35 years, he never prepared a national budget.

The Iraqis must now refashion their economy from the Soviet-style command economy Saddam left them. That poor model was further hobbled by cronyism, theft and pharaonic self-indulgence by Saddam and his intimates.

In this reform of the economy, important changes have begun.

BREMER: You may have read that the Iraqi minister of finance in Dubai this weekend announced a sweeping foreign direct investment law, the independence of the central bank and a very simple one-fee tariff policy.

The Iraqi government has thereby put in place the legal infrastructure for a vibrant private economy, but those policies will come to nothing if they don't rest on a sound infrastructure. That's why the remaining $15 billion of this supplemental is focused on putting back into place the necessary infrastructure.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there's been good news on the front of moving towards democracy. We have laid out a clear seven-step process. Three of the seven steps have been taken.

As Secretary Wolfowitz implied, over 85 percent of the towns in Iraq now have town councils or city councils -- 85 percent. Democracy is on the march in Iraq, and it's on the march from the bottom up, and it's on the march from the top.

The only path to full Iraqi sovereignty at the end of the seven steps we have laid out is through a written constitution, ratified by the Iraqi people, followed by elections. At that point, the Coalition Provisional Authority will hand sovereignty back to the Iraqi people.

Mr. Chairman, you can see, if you examine this supplemental, that it fits together with those priorities.

And make no mistake: These requested funds represent an investment in America's national security. Iraq may seem far away today, but it only seems far away today. Iraq is a focal point in our global war on terrorism, and failure there would strengthen the terrorists morally and materially.

As Congressman Skelton said, failure is not an option.

This supplemental and the policies to carry it out will require the combined support of the American people and of both parties here in Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.

HUNTER: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

General Abizaid?

STATEMENT BY

GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID,
United States Army commander of CENTCOM

ABIZAID: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee, it's an honor to be here, and thank you for the opportunity to testify.

First of all, as you know, the Central Command is really at the heart of the global war on terrorism. We've got over 200,000 troops that are deployed throughout our area of operations. They serve in the east as far as Kyrgyzstan and in the west as far as the Horn of Africa.

Foremost of our jobs is prosecuting the global war on terror. We do that in numerous ways and numerous countries, and we're having good effect. But there's a lot left to do.

ABIZAID: Included in our operations is a requirement to bring stability to Afghanistan and also to Iraq. And, of course, Iraq is the reason that we're here today primarily to talk about. And the mission there is tough and the mission there is essential to the success on the global war on terror.

Our troops are tough, they're dedicated, they're confident and they very much appreciate your support in every way. A lot of people have talked about the greatest generation, that generation being that of my father, that fought World War II. And I do, in fact, believe that that is the greatest generation.

But as we look at our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving in these tough places in Afghanistan, in Yemen, in places like Iraq and Baghdad in the north and south, I would say they're our next greatest generation. They deserve our confidence. They deserve our support. They know they're winning and they know that they are making a great deal of good happen in Iraq and they're giving Iraq a chance for a better future.

Mr. Chairman, this supplemental is about giving our troops, the great people in the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqis the opportunity for success and we appreciate your support.

I look forward to your questions.

HUNTER: I thank you, General.

And I understand, General Keane, that you're available for -- to answer any questions that we might have in your area.

KEANE: I am.

HUNTER: Mr. Langevin, last couple of hearings, you've been close to getting a question in but we ran out of time, so let me start off by yielding my time to Mr. Langevin.

LANGEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for being here, gentlemen. Like many of my colleagues, we're following this situation in Iraq very closely and we're all very concerned as to what we're seeing. I've heard your testimony.

But let me just say that I'm proud of the many troops that are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan from my own district, and recognize that most members of the reserve component are proud to serve when called upon, despite the sacrifices that they and their families surely make.

LANGEVIN: A significant number of my constituents have been calling, sending letters with reference to the frequency of Reserve action. Now, if the U.S. can't persuade the international community to send additional forces, what effects is that going to have on our troop rotation schedule and especially with regard to the Guard and Reserve?

KEANE: Congressman, I can answer that question.

The fact of the matter is, it would have some impact on the reserve components. We have options currently that we're looking at right now and that we'll recommend to the secretary of defense for his consideration if the multinational division support that we're expecting to get, want to get, doesn't materialize.

What that would mean is that we will deploy more reserve component brigades to that theater. And also, we will deploy active component forces with them as well.

LANGEVIN: OK, thank you.

Right now, we're also seeing an escalation in attacks against not only U.S. forces but also now U.N. components and latest, today, was the attack on a news network headquarters.

Do you feel that this is a coordinated effort by former Saddam loyalists or is it a broader attack on anything or anyone that's supporting the United States or Western entities in Iraq?

ABIZAID: Thank you, Congressman. There's no doubt that there is a level of organization at the regional level, in particular in the region Tikrit/Baghdad/Ar Ramadi, that has been to some extent coordinated by former regime loyalists, former Saddam intelligence officers, special security officers, soldiers from the Republican Guard, officers from the Special Republican Guard, et cetera.

There's also a clear indication that terrorist groups, such as Ansar al-Islam, have moved down into the Baghdad area and are operating in other places throughout Iraq. And we have foreign fighters that infiltrate in from primarily the Syrian border area, that add to an extremist, anti-American group or series of groups that have taken up arms against the coalition.

ABIZAID: And again, this area is primarily in the Ar Ramadi/Fallujah area.

All that having been said, I would not characterize the level of attacks as escalating. As a matter of fact, as I look over how things have gone, where they've gone well, where they continue to show a lot of resistance, we are seeing a geographic clarity develop, where certain areas are more difficult for us than others.

This is good news, because it means in much of the country we're gaining the upper hand. And as you know, in the south and in the north in particular, things are stable.

So we should not underestimate the fact that we are facing resistance. we should not discount the fact that it is to a certain extent organized. And we must continue to conduct operations that defeat the resistance where we find it.

But as you also know, Congressman, there's no strictly military solution to the problem in Iraq or to the resistance in Iraq. It requires movement not only on the military arena, but also with regard to governance, economics, diplomacy and politics.

LANGEVIN: Can you tell me, with respect to these attacks, what additional steps you're taking to improve the security situation, particularly in regard to the U.S. military personnel conducting security operations?

HUNTER: And I remind my colleague that our time is almost expired here. We've got a lot of folks that need questions. So if we can abbreviate the answer, gentlemen, we'd appreciate it. And I thank the gentleman.

ABIZAID: Most recently, we've moved out the 3rd Infantry Division from their area of operation and moved in the 82nd Airborne Division. We have conducted a new series of offensives in areas that we're having difficulty, Ar Ramadi, Fallujah, and it's beginning to show some effect even at this early stage. And we've moved more troops out to the border area.

But most importantly, we have increased the capacity of Iraqis to serve in the police, in the civil defense corps, in other arms of Iraqi security capacity.

LANGEVIN: Thank you, General.

Thank you gentlemen.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Skelton?

SKELTON: Mr. Chairman, I have, in light of the time constraints that we have, only one question.

Mr. Secretary, when we were visiting with Ambassador Bremer in Iraq a few days ago, he thought our mission could be completed in four to five years.

SKELTON: In talking with one of the generals there, he thought our mission could be completed in two years. And I understand there was a recent meeting within the administration that a decision is being made to withdraw our forces in late spring of next year.

Which of the three is correct, sir?

WOLFOWITZ: Congressman Skelton, I think we ought to be cautious about making any such predictions. I recall when we went into Bosnia -- and it's something I supported, I'd point out -- some people said we'd be out in a year. We are hoping there might be a chance eight years later of being close to being out.

I think the important message -- and it's fundamental -- the Iraqi people need to understand that we will be there until the job is done. There's an extraordinary suspicion that borders on paranoia, burned into their minds by, in many cases, the experiences of 1991, that we will somehow leave before the job is finished and Saddam and his henchmen will come back. And that very fear inhibits our operations today. People who want to come forward with information are sometimes afraid to do so. Indeed they are sometimes murdered for doing so.

So I think predictions in this area are extremely hazardous. I think the important point the message has to get out that we're there to finish the job. The sooner the Baathists and the terrorists understand we're there to finish the job, the sooner the Iraqi people understand that we will finish the job, the sooner the job can get done.

SKELTON: So we are committed to staying there until the mission is complete, is that correct?

WOLFOWITZ: Yes, we are.

And I would point out that a very important part of that is putting Iraqis in a position to be on the front line. Unfortunately, as we saw with Aquila Hashemi, being on the front lines can mean being killed. And some 58 or so Iraqis have been killed on our side -- fighting on our side in the police and other security forces, just since June 1st.

I'd like to just make a comment about this lack of planning, because I think it's an extremely serious issue.

WOLFOWITZ: And I think it -- people should be extremely careful about suggesting that somehow young Americans are dying because of a failure of planning.

There's been an enormous amount of planning. Some of it, frankly, has bordered on the brilliant, and I'm not claiming any personal credit; it's done by other people. We've avoided any number of catastrophes that were predicted that would happen in this war, including massive street fighting in the city streets of Baghdad and elsewhere; including environmental disasters that would have not only poisoned the environment, but poison our troops; including ethnic conflict between Turks and Arabs that was predicted in the north or fighting among Shi'a in the south.

There's been a lot that's been avoided. A lot of it has been avoided by careful planning and it includes planning for the so-called postwar environment. I say "so-called" because we're not postwar; we're stilling fighting a low-level war and that's what is most painful here.

But to have gone from zero Iraqis on our side when Baghdad fell, to 60,000 in the field today -- 40,000 or so in the police and 20,000 in the civil defense corps and border forces and facilities protection services -- is not something that happened just magically. It happened as a result of planning.

And planning includes, I think, the very careful thought that went into the structure that's represented by the two extraordinary leaders next to me, so that we have, I believe, for the first time an operation of this kind, the civilian side and the military side, knitted together tightly and coordinated and able to move in response to inevitably changing conditions on the ground.

So I'd rather not have to say the planning was wonderful, but I think when I hear people say so glibly that it was wrong, I think it's wrong.

I know Congressman Skelton, you made some extremely helpful suggestions before the war and we've tried to follow up on many of them. And I certainly agree on the importance of winning the peace. That's what we're about. But a lot of thought and planning has gone into it.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon?

WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for coming in today and, most importantly, for your service to the country.

I was heartened today by the results of the recent poll that came out by Gallup which basically showed that in a very -- perhaps, the most intense private interviews ever conducted in Iraq, 62 percent of the residents believe the ousting of Saddam justified any hardships that might babe been personally incurred by them.

WELDON: And 67 percent believe their country will be far improved in five years. That's good news and news that we can all take to heart.

In terms of the cost, I think it's also important for us on this committee to reflect upon where we are. And I want to start out by giving the administration credit for being candid. They haven't hedged their bets. They've come out with what they think they need in terms of dollars.

I would just remind my colleagues on this committee who sat through the 1990s what happened time and time again, as we were asked to respond financially to 38 separate deployments of our troops -- and that's how many there were, 38. More of them, I might add, were paid for in advance, except for Desert Storm when the president got a commitment from our allies to reimburse us $52 billion.

How do we pay then for these deployments in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Somalia, in East Timor, in Macedonia, in Columbia? I'll tell you how we paid. We paid for it by forcing the Pentagon to eat into their decreasing budget to shore up the costs that were necessary.

I chaired the R&D Committee for six years. And each year, I had to incur a 25 percent across-the-board reduction in R&D spending to tax those R&D accounts to pay for the costs of deployments.

Now, if we had been honest with the American people, we'd have told them how much these deployments were going to cost. But instead of doing that, the administration simply passed on those costs to the Pentagon and said, "Eat them. Find a way to pay for them."

What did we do? We postponed modernization of our equipment. We postponed R&D investment. We postponed the investment that today we're trying to pick up the cost for.

So when our colleagues look at the cost -- yes, $87 billion is a lot of money -- and I want to ask the tough questions as well. In fact, I have a couple of tough comments I'm going to make in a moment.

But let's be realistic. In the 1990s, starting with former President Bush and continuing through 2000, we largely ate the cost of the 38 deployments by forcing the Pentagon to eat into their budgets, push aside programs of the future and use that money to pay for all the deployments, including reimbursing countries for putting their troops in theaters where they would not come in and pay for the costs on their own. And that's all verifiable in the record.

Now the one area where I do have some concern -- and Secretary Wolfowitz, I want to address this to you -- is back in March, I felt we were not doing enough to lay the groundwork for the private energy sector worldwide to come in, using our own resources to build Iraq's energy industry.

And, in fact, in March of this year, the former secretary of commerce and I addressed the World Oil and Gas Forum in Houston, and we challenged the CEOs of 30 of the largest energy corporations in the world to put together an international advisory forum to be ready to assist us in the rebuilding of Iraq after the war was over.

WELDON: That group has, in fact, made suggestions. In July of this year, in fact, on July 24th, we had an all-day conference on the Hill. The vice president assisted us in getting some speakers. Chalabi came over from Iraq. We had John Hamre speak; he had just returned as secretary of defense's representative to meet with Ambassador Bremer.

He spoke, the head of the Army Corps of Engineers spoke, and the 30 or so CEOs of companies like Kuwaiti Oil, Aramco, Tata Industries from India, the Singapore energy industry, the Russian oil company LUKoil, the Russian pipeline company Soytransgas (ph) -- they were all there.

And their common theme was, "We're ready to invest our own money. We've been in Iraq before the war. We know the people there."

And, in fact, I introduced General Franks that day to both Duncan Hunter and to the CEO of Soytransgas (ph), who said, "We're willing to spend our own money. We don't want U.S. money. And we'll follow the guidelines that the U.S. lays down for us. We know the pipeline industry in Iraq. We helped build it. We'll come in with our own money and help you rebuild it, as long as we can have a stake in the outcome of whatever develops there."

The CEO of LUKoil, Alekperov, said the same thing -- Chairman Alekperov.

My concern is that we haven't done enough to enlist the private sector energy leaders worldwide to come in to use their own money, especially where they've been involved in Iraq in the past, under our guidance, under the leadership of Ambassador Bremer, to help us rebuild the energy infrastructure of Iraq.

And that's the area where I think we should be focusing our effort. These CEOs are ready to respond. In fact they have formed an international energy advisory council. They're not looking for any money in providing consulting. They're willing to do it on a gratis basis.

And so, my only suggestion as we approach the support of these financial dollars which you've requested -- which I, in fact, will support -- is to quickly supplement the effort you've put forward, and to hopefully allow you, Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Wolfowitz, to create a more aggressive relationship between these energy leaders that are willing to spend their own money and have been, in fact, involved in the past in helping to rebuild as quickly as possible specifically the energy infrastructure in Iraq.

Thank you.

BREMER: Thank you, Congressman, for that.

I would only make two points. I welcome it and I would suggest that they plan to attend the private sector conference which we're going to hold parallel to the donors' conference in Madrid at the end of October, where we're going to try to encourage private sector engagement across the board in the major areas of Iraqi economy.

BREMER: The one proviso is, of course, at least for now there is no foreign investment allowed in the Iraqi oil sector. That may change, I'm encouraging the Iraqi government to change that policy, but there still will be ways in which people can participate, and the conference in Madrid would be a very good place to start.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt?

SPRATT: General Abizaid, General Keane, to a person our CODEL came back last week saying, I believe in unison, "Thank God for our troops," and in particular for the Army.

They had to fill a gap, they had to fill a vacuum in the aftermath of the war. They had to react ad hoc to tasks that they're not trained to handle, they had to improvise, and they rose to the challenge in a splendid way.

And it's to your credit and to their credit that that performance is there, and the situation could be a lot, lot worse were it not for their performance.

Mr. Wolfowitz, we have discussed before the cost of these endeavors. And I'm not a bean counter, I'm not here to do that with you. I am the ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee, and the numbers we're talking about, $83 billion, $87 billion, are consequential. They have consequences, they have trade-offs entailed by them. And they raise the question, should we try to offset this package in the broader budget somehow so that it doesn't have the impact on the bottom line? Because this request couldn't come at a worse time with regard to the budget, which is bordering on $500 billion in deficit next year already.

I'm not saying that's a consideration here. We've got to do whatever it takes to complete this mission successfully and to support our troops, but in a broader sense we have to be conscious of the budgetary implications.

I have written Mr. Bolton at OMB -- Mr. Skelton and I did, at the end of July -- and asked for an accounting of the $80 billion that was appropriated in the April supplemental. We would like to get an accounting of that, a justification on the major cost element basis of this request. And we'd like to have a fair estimate of the cost to complete.

I don't think that's asking too much. We would like very much the opportunity to sit down with Mr. Zakheim in the near future, soon, so we can get our hands around these essential elements.

Let me show you one thing that concerns us. I'm going to give you this pack with this information in it. In the absence of getting the information from you, we did our own study, three different scenarios, best case, mid-case, worst case, of what of might cost, run out over 10 years because that's how far we extend the budget, adding interest because we're assuming it'll be charged up to the deficit, go to the national debt, it won't be paid for now, offset, although I think it should be. And the numbers are pretty astounding when you do that with modest assumptions.

For example, case A, we're assuming that we'll be out in 2006.

SPRATT: Our forces will gradually decline to two division equivalents and we'll get out. We'll spend about $5 billion more than the $23 billion we've spent, $20 billion plus $3 billion in the last package for economic assistance.

In the next package, the next scenario, we assume that we won't get out completely until 2008 and we'll spend a bit more, $20 billion, assuming if we're there that long they have problems, we'd probably have to spend more to get the economy up on its feet and running.

This may be wide of the mark in your estimation, but we would very much appreciate your response to what we've done as to whether or not it's accurate, and, if you will, your take: three cases, best case, worst case, mid case, what the cost is likely to be and what the impact on the budget is likely to be. Can we have that commitment?

WOLFOWITZ: We'll certainly work with you and answer your first question to show you where the money has gone from the supplementals that have been passed already.

When it comes to making projections, I mean, I look at how you made yours, I frankly -- we find it hard to foresee the future much beyond six months to 12 months. We do think that we know what we need for this coming fiscal year. Even there, it's based on assumptions. And when you start to go out to 2008, the range of assumptions, as you know, is very, very broad.

But we're happy to work with you to try to get better...

SPRATT: Can I offer one thing here to show that we're trying to be scrupulously fair, and it might help you too in the presentation of your own argument?

Although $87 billion is the number commonly used, when you back out what goes to Afghanistan, which we would be spending in all cases and wouldn't even be debating with this kind of deliberation, and when you also adjust for savings due to the fact that we won't have Operation Northern Watch and Southern Watch and we back out Pakistan aid, it's really about $71 billion for Iraq. It's still enough for sticker shock for the average American and for all of us, but nevertheless is not quite as big as $87 billion, and some of the money would be spent anyway.

Can I ask one last question? Given what I just said about the troops, what's in this package for the troops? This $87 billion, are we going to be able to do something for R&R, for mid-tour leave, separation pay, family separation pay, imminent danger pay, something to help the reservists? Because they're all writing us, their families are, their employers are, and they've got an unexpected burden imposed upon them. And I'm afraid the Army may be paying something forward, in terms of recruitment and retention down the road. What are we going to do for the troops in this package, in terms of quality of life?

WOLFOWITZ: There is a lot in this package that addresses those issues specifically: imminent danger pay, family separation allowances. Also, and I think you and Congressman Skelton, you gave us a lot of homework to do in the letter you sent with 22 questions. We'll work on them. I appreciate the conversation we had the other day.

WOLFOWITZ: I think we need to look systematically at what we can do to make conditions for the troops in the theater better. There is money to cover R&R. That's a clearly recognized need.

General Abizaid might want to comment further. But I agree with both of you that that is an important issue. We're asking an enormous amount of these young men and women to go over there and serve for a year in conditions of danger. We should make the conditions as tolerable as we can.

SPRATT: General Abizaid, General Sanchez told us last week that R&R was absolutely necessary.

ABIZAID: I agree with General Sanchez. And we've conveyed that to the department. It is necessary.

We also have a Fighter Management Program, we call it. That's a local program that allows troops to get out to places like Qatar and other regional locations where they can relax and be away from the tough conditions in Iraq. And as you know, I believe you were up seeing General Petrais (ph) up in northern Iraq. You've seen some of the work that he's done on his own to make life better for his troops up there.

So we favor the Fighter Management Program and we also favor the R&R. It's very important for all of our troops.

SPRATT: Is that in this package or is it provided for...

KEANE: I can comment on that, Mr. Congressman.

Yes, it is. It's $300 million in the package devoted to the R&R program.

By the way, the first flight left Iraq today with 270 soldiers. About 85 are heading toward Germany and the remainder are heading toward Baltimore, Maryland. And we continue to increase that throughput, up to about 600-plus per day.

To be frank about it, we will not be able to get the soldiers currently serving in Iraq -- all of them to have an R&R program, prior to their departure, most of whom will leave in the February-March time frame. But we're striving to accomplish that goal for the next rotation that begins about that time frame, somewhere in their year's experience to get them to an R&R site.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

So you're sending how many again, General?

KEANE: Right now, on the airplane, that's 270, and we're going to increase that to about 600 is what our goal is. And we'll do that over the next 30 days or so.

HUNTER: OK.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton?

SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And first, let me express my personal appreciation for the great leadership that you gentlemen are each showing in carrying out the daily activities that you carry out.

There's been a lot said this morning about daily reminders that we have that the war on terrorism is so serious. One set of reminders come from very qualified people who write books for us. And I just would to frame a question for you, using some of these writings.

One book that I recently received, entitled "A National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants and Weapons of Mass Destruction," written by a guy by the name of Larry Korb, points out, in some detail, why we need a strategy in the war against terrorism.

SAXTON: Another book by a person who's really a household word here with the committee, Ken Alibek, entitled "Biohazard," describes in great detail the offensive biological weapons capability developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, where they actually were able to weaponize dozens of types of diseases, including plague, tularemia, Marburg, smallpox, anthrax and others.

And the final thought in this book is that these weapons are no longer just in the countries where they were developed. They have been dispersed to various parts of the world.

And Kurt Weldon just showed me another book, which I haven't had an opportunity to read yet, entitled "Black Ice," a description of the potential threat in the area of cyberterrorism, which I look forward to reading, Kurt.

And of course, all this is funded somehow. A book by Rachel Ehrenfeld, entitled "Funding Evil," describes in some detail how she and -- actually in collaboration I guess with James Woolsey, who wrote the foreword to this book -- how terrorism is funded.

And finally, a book that I'm just completing, "Terrorist Hunter," written by an anonymous Jewish woman who was born and spent the first four or five years growing up in Iraq, and following the 1967 war, when the Iraqis became embarrassed because the didn't do better in that war, they began to look for somebody to blame, and they found some Jews living in Iraq, arrested her father, tortured he and his mother -- and her mother, until her father just gave up and admitted erroneously -- admitted that he was, even though he wasn't, a spy. And then, of course, they hanged him.

And I guess I point out all of this because each of these writings goes to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation in which we now find ourselves involved.

And so my question, I guess, is posed by Larry Korb early in his book. He says in his foreword, "The tragic events of September 11th, the increase in terrorism and the possible threats from countries that are capable of developing weapons of mass destruction, make it imperative to develop a new security strategy to safeguard the citizens of the United States."

I guess my question is -- or my -- give you an opportunity to talk about our strategy and how Iraq fits into it in the war on terrorism. That's really my question.

What is our strategy, and how does the current set of activities ongoing in Iraq fit into our new national strategy?

BREMER: I could on at length, but I think it might be better to hear from General Abizaid who is, in addition to his many other credentials, by the way, a real Middle East expert. I met him when he was colonel commanding an Airborne battalion in Northern Iraq in 1991. And he was speaking Arabic back then.

I guess you learned it as a (inaudible), right, John?

ABIZAID: Yes, sir.

Sir, as far as a strategic construct for getting at the broader terrorist menace, it's absolutely essential that we further develop international and interagency opportunities to get at the problem. The points that you bring up about financing, about various support networks that are developing here and there, about the borderless nature of the problem, clearly show that we've got to have not just a regional strategy but a global strategy to deal with it.

In the CENTCOM area of responsibility, we've got three task forces that are designed to deal with the problem in various locations.

CJTF-180 in Afghanistan operates along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. And, as you know, that's one of these ungoverned spaces to which the terrorists have migrated and through which we have to continue to fight.

In Iraq, we know that we've had terrorists move into Iraq. They were there before we got there. They're there now. And they are absolutely dangerous to the mission, and we confront them there with General Sanchez and CJTF-7.

In the Horn of Africa, we have another task force that's less well known but it's the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa. And they conduct operations not so much direct operations, but operations to enhance the capacity of the local nations to deal with what they perceive as a growing menace.

It's a tough issue. The strategy has got to be actually broader than the Central Command area. And it requires our full attention and constant reassessment.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Ortiz?

ORTIZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses for being with us today.

And I have a question for General Abizaid. I understand that we have several ammunition dumps or depots throughout Iraq so that our troops can use the ammunition or weapons.

ORTIZ: Have had any reports of anybody breaking in and stealing ammunition or weapons from those sites?

ABIZAID: Congressman, there's our ammunition, which we have secure, and then there's about 650,000 tons of ammunition, which is an astronomical amount of ammunition, that exists throughout Iraq, all of which is not secure.

ORTIZ: You say it's not secured?

ABIZAID: I would say certainly not all of it is secure, because some of it is in the hands of our enemies.

ORTIZ: But if they're not secured, you don't think that they will break in and -- you know, because we see all the time that they're using rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition and different kinds of weapon to harm our troops. You're not afraid that they might break into these sites and steal these weapons or ammunition?

ABIZAID: Congressman, there is more ammunition in Iraq that is available for people that would do us harm than we can secure. We are doing our best to find every cache that we can. In the 4th Infantry Division area alone, General Odierno has identified 3,000 caches. We blow it up. We move it. We get it under our control, to the best of our ability.

But there's also a lot of ammunition that is out there that we don't know its location, but people are using against us. And there's probably places where we've put Iraqi guards that may be vulnerable also to people that would come in, bribe the guards or whatever.

So I would not want to mislead this committee to think that the ammunition situation in Iraq is under control. There is more ammunition per human being in Iraq than any nation on Earth. And we will work very, very hard to get it under control, but it won't come any time soon.

ORTIZ: My second question is this now, as members of this committee, we get, at least from my people back in the National Guard and Reserves, about activation. Are you hearing anything from your local leaders at the National Guard and Reserves about the many activations of the National Guard and Reserves?

ABIZAID: Let me take the first part of it, and I'm sure General Keane would want to comment on it.

ABIZAID: Certainly as I go around the theater and I talk to our National Guardsmen and reservists, they all understand that we can't get the job done in Iraq without them. They are extremely dedicated and they're just absolutely essential to the success of the mission.

One thing we must do, and we'll work with the Army to do this, is to ensure that they all know their go-home date. Our active forces know their go-home date, but we've got to work harder to make sure that our reservists clearly understand how long they will serve, when they'll come home, et cetera.

And I think you all know that where we find capacity that is unneeded, we move very quickly to redeploy it. Unfortunately the nature of the threat is such that we haven't been able to redeploy much.

KEANE: Mr. Congressman, we have asked much of our reserve components, not only in the last two years, but in the last 12 years, we've had seven call-ups of our reserve components in various operations, from Desert Storm to Haiti to Bosnia. You're familiar with the list. And here we are facing another major call-up.

But I think the morale of our reserve components could not be higher, in my judgment. I've seen them at the ports where they are leaving at airports, as well as in Iraq. And they understand what this is really all about, as do all of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. And the simple fact of the matter is, it's about America.

In my lifetime, wearing this uniform for 37 years, we have never ever deployed our soldiers directly for the American people except post-9/11. That was the first time that I've been wearing a uniform we've ever done that. In the past it was always to help another beleaguered nation.

This is all about our people. This is all about protecting our way of life and what we stand for in this country. And our reserve component is -- the great citizen soldiers that they are, truly understand this. And they're committed to doing this.

And what we're trying to do is be as fair to them as we possibly can by giving them predictability, in terms of the length of their rotation. And a year is a long time in Iraq, to be sure. But it is worth it, it is worth it given what we are up against and what our opponents are after.

They want to destroy the moral and political will of the American people and force us to leave. Our soldiers know that and they're putting their shoulder into this.

And I know you know that. And I just want you to know how strongly we feel about their level of commitment and what they're doing to support our national policies here. They're doing just a remarkable job under very tough, demanding conditions.

ORTIZ: My time is up. We thank all of you for your services and your commitment.

And, General Keane, I know that you are going to be retiring soon. We want to thank you for your services to this great country.

KEANE: Thank you, Congressman.

ORTIZ: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman. And I thank him for all of his time that he has spent with the troops. Probably nobody else on this committee spent as much time as Mr. Ortiz, from all of the Middle East operations to the Contra base camps in Central America.

HUNTER: When the 82nd Airborne jumped in, you were down there with them.

Solomon, I appreciated that. You didn't jump, but you were there when they got there.

Another gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry?

THORNBERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Bremer, my district certainly has supported the military efforts so far, but they are more skeptical about reconstruction. Partly they are skeptical about all foreign aid and how helpful it really is. But first, I guess I'd like for you to tell me if you think my response, when this comes up -- and it has come up a lot -- is on track.

Part of what I argue is that the reconstruction of Iraq is a critical battle in the war on terrorism just like the military actions were important battles. Some of the reasons you've already given, but in addition the whole world is watching how this goes, and if we can be successful in creating a country where there is some form of representative government, people have a say on their future, as well as some form of market economy where they have some investment in the country -- and it's even better if they can own property and actually pass along what they work for to their kids -- if you are invested that way, then you have some hope and you're not that likely to go blow yourself or your neighbors up.

If, on the other hand, you don't have that sort of hope of a better future, then there's no amount of money that we can ever spend for homeland security that's going to keep all the terrorists out of our country.

Hope for the average 20-year-old male in this region is a lot of what this boils down to, in my view. Is that right?

BREMER: Thank you, Congressman.

Yes, that is right. And it's a good point that brings out an important element of this supplemental, which is that $5 billion of the $20 billion is quite clearly and understandably linked directly to security, because it involves the new Iraqi army and the police force.

The other $15 billion really addresses the point you're making. And it's the point that, I think, the Marshall Plan addressed in the case of Europe.

To win the war is not enough.

BREMER: To win the peace means putting in place the important elements you touched on.

The element of a vibrant private sector, so that the government is no longer the only employer in the country. This is one way to break down the temptation to tyranny.

Putting in place a constitution, which is the essential political framework for a vibrant political life leading to an elected democratic government.

You can't expect these things to happen in the kind of situation which obtains in Iraq today. Progress is being made, but in order to win this war these $15 billion are an essential part of security. They are directly related not only to the war on terrorism in the broadest sense, but they are related to achieving victory in Iraq and making Iraq a safer place for Iraqis in the long run and for our servicemen in the short run.

THORNBERRY: Let me ask you this: Do you have the authority you need to spend this money effectively?

Because many of us believe that if you have to go through all of the government rigamarole that we normally go through when we're trying to help another country, that you're not going to spend this money we're about to approve for who knows how long and when you do spend it it's going to be so tied up with red tape it's not going to be effective.

BREMER: Well, Congressman, I hope that doesn't happen.

We have some experience in spending the $2.45 billion that Congress appropriated to us back in April. We had some bumps along the lines that you referred to, some red tape and stuff. I think we've pretty much cleared the field of that, and I'm satisfied -- I have a very clear mandate from the president that I have authority over all U.S. government resources in Iraq and all civilian and those military who do not serve under a theater commander.

I have very substantial authority. I think I have complete agreement in the executive branch and hopefully with Congress on how we can move quickly to obligate and spend this money.

THORNBERRY: Well, I would just invite you that if you run into a roadblock that we can deal with, that you can immediately come and tell us. Because I think it would be a tragedy to let some bureaucratic snafu prevent this money from being used as effectively and as quickly as it possibly can.

BREMER: Thank you, Congressman.

THORNBERRY: Let me ask one other question, briefly.

Secretary Wolfowitz and perhaps General Keane, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your remarks the national security personnel system, having more flexibility with the civil service so you can free up military people, and deal with some of the concerns, frankly, that we have been hearing with OPTEMPO, and so forth.

THORNBERRY: If either of you would like to briefly address that, I'd appreciate it.

WOLFOWITZ: Let me just say briefly, we're looking at every possible way that we can relieve the stress on the force, because the stress is real.

We are at war. You can expect stress when you're at war, but we need to look at what things we can do to relieve that stress. We're looking at our worldwide deployments, places that we've, sort of, assumed forces have to be deployed. Well, maybe they don't when you're in a wartime situation.

One of the things we've looked at is that there are a lot of uniformed men and women serving in jobs that could be quite well performed by civilians, and that that could free up some flexibility to let us have those people doing the jobs that only military can perform.

And the House -- and we're very appreciative -- gave us the authority we think we need to make those conversions more rapidly. We appreciate that. Of course, it's now in conference with the Senate. We wish you all the success in that endeavor.

General Keane, do you want to comment further?

KEANE: Yes, sir.

We know we have some challenges, Mr. Congressman. You know, for example, our active component/reserve component balance we know is not right. And what that has done is put a disproportionate stress on some of our reserve component forces, and we have to correct that imbalance.

You know, for example, in the active component we don't have enough infantry in the Army, we don't have enough civil affairs, we don't have enough military police. We have to fix that. And we're about putting those plans together to fix some of that.

So those are major issues that we're facing that will help us with long-range OPTEMPO. It's not going to help us in the short term; that's the reality of it.

And from the Army perspective, the other services are also coming to our assistance, in terms of our deployment to Iraq, where they can help us with certain functions that heretofore the Army has been doing but they may be able to do some of those functions for us, like CBs can do engineer work and the Air Force also has people that can help us with various operations to reduce the stress that we currently have. Thank you.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor?

TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all four of our guests here today for what you do for our country.

Three things I'd like you to touch on and, General Abizaid, you touched on it once, but I was with the group that was there about a week ago, and was somewhat amazed by the comments of David Kay, who is there heading up our nation's efforts to find the weapons of mass destruction, when he talked about specifically 55 unguarded caches of weapons that he felt like the Iraqis were sneaking into at night, stealing weapons and using them against Americans.

His observation was it was a lack of manpower on the part of the American forces that you didn't have the troops to guard those sites, and therefore it became a vulnerability.

And I would like to hear specifically your thoughts on that, because it flew in the face of what the commanders we had the opportunity to visit said. They said we have plenty of troops, and this was 180 degrees from that.

Second thing that I have noticed with great dismay, and that is the very efficient use by the enemy of improvised explosive devices, things as simple as a cell phone being used to detonate a shell. I'm told sometimes a garage door opener -- remote control garage door opener, even things as simple as a remote control doorbell.

I have been told that the technology exists, and has actually been fielded in some instances, to jam many of those signals -- not all the signals, but many of those signals, and therefore save some American lives.

This is the committee that decides what we buy, and how many we buy of them.

TAYLOR: If it is a funding problem, I would hope you would tell us. If it is an industrial base problem, I still think even that can be solved with funds. If you spend enough money, someone will run the second and third shift to make enough of those devices so that we can one on every Humvee and every vehicle young Americans are riding. And, again, I want to hear your thoughts on that.

Third thing, I think would simply fall into the snafu category, but I would hope we could solve it with this supplemental.

Our colleague, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, wrote every member a letter expressing his dismay that the young soldiers who are in the hospitals as a result of wounds incurred in Afghanistan or Iraq are actually charged for their meals. And to charge the young American who's lost an arm or leg, their vision even $8 a day for their meals while they're in the hospital I find appalling. I would hope that it would be the DOD's request, as a part of the supplemental, that we fix that.

And the other unintended consequence -- and again, this is something I believe your people did trying to help folks that had unintended consequences. I'm told that in many instances people were listed as medically retired prior to their death in an effort to see to it that the surviving members of their family could get better benefits.

Fortunately, some of these lived, but were then thrown into some sort of a quagmire of red tape where they no longer were eligible for the benefits they had earned for serving in our military. Again, done with the best of intentions and the worst of outcomes.

Are these things being addressed in this supplemental because they are real problems that need to be solved? And I would welcome your thoughts on this.

ABIZAID: Well, thank you, Congressman.

I can address many of these things, and I would ask General Keane to help me out on a few others.

First of all, I believe I answered the question to the best of my ability with regard to the amount of explosives that are available out there. There are certainly not enough forces anywhere to guard all the ammunition that is in Iraq. So it's not a matter of more forces, it's a matter of prioritization of what the forces do.

There is plenty of ammunition that's in the hands of the enemy, and unfortunately what we need to do in that regard is find them, kill them, seize the ammunition that's in their hands and then destroy it.

So, again, I would not want to mislead the committee to think that we can control all the ammunition that's available in Iraq because we cannot.

And I would also say that Dr. Kay probably has seen some evidence of people tampering with areas that he's looked into. And I'm sure that that has happened on occasion and that security perimeters have been breached, et cetera.

That's also a matter of making sure that the Iraqi security forces that we field do the job that we pay them to do. And we can't, obviously, do everything in Iraq with Americans only. Otherwise, we'll stay there forever.

ABIZAID: With regard to the IEDs, there are technologies available, although we need to be realistic about the IEDs and the way that they are being triggered. There are some that are on certain frequencies. I believe that it's best not to talk about the details of how it works in this hearing.

But I would also tell you that, in my experience in Afghanistan, my experience around the Middle East and certainly in Iraq, that while we have these devices deployed and we can use more of the devices, I think that they are only able to get a small percentage of the type IEDs that we're operating against. So again, there is no silver bullet.

What we need to do is continue, to the extent possible, to increase our research and development, to understand how we can defeat these devices because they are certainly deadly to us. The number one way we defeat IEDs in Iraq is by Iraqis coming up to us and telling us where they are. And that probably happens in 40 or 50 percent of the cases.

With regard to the quagmire of red tape, I think there's always a quagmire of red tape somewhere out there in this great armed forces of ours. We'll certainly look into those problems and deal with them. And I appreciate your bringing it to my attention.

WOLFOWITZ: Congressman Taylor, if I could add that we are taking a hard look back here at new technologies that can be applied to the IED problem. The joint staff is leading an effort and some $130 mill