Let me welcome Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace back to this committee. We appreciate your being before us and your testimony.

SKELTON: Mr. Chairman, recent revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, the continued attacks of insurgents against our forces, as well as the questions of how well the new interim Iraqi government will be able to govern all highlight the difficult and dangerous and uncertain situation in that country.

What is paramount now is that we need to have a concrete plan to ensure success in Iraq. And I'm not sure today we see such a plan. We broke it; we must do our best to fix it.

Last July, the department came up with what amounted to a strategic plan for Iraq. The four pillars of this plan were: establishing security, restoring essential services, creating conditions for economic development, and enabling the transition to democratic governance.

It's clear that these goals have not been achieved, at least not to the extent that we had hoped, largely because we haven't established security, and rebuilding Iraq requires a stable security environment.

It seems to me that there's some steps that the United States needs to take so that the world can have some confidence that the way ahead holds some prospect for ultimate success.

First, we have to do a better job of internationalizing the situation in Iraq, so it's just not the face of U.S. military that's primarily occupying that country.

The administration should also specify the steps that will be taken to train the Iraqi army, police and civil defense forces so that we can accelerate their ability to provide security and so that we can be assured that we won't see a reoccurrence of the problems those forces have experienced in the past.

SKELTON: I know General Petraeus is doing his best. And by the way, I think he's an outstanding American leader. But I think it would inspire confidence if more specifics about his efforts were widely known.

In my view, we should also have an understanding now about what happens if the new sovereign government seeks to dictate our military operations in Iraq.

I don't think the Iraqi government should be able to limit what our forces can do to hunt terrorists or to protect themselves. Conversely, I would have real concern if the Iraqi government were to ask our forces to enforce that government's imposition of martial law, which the new interim prime minister is presently considering.

I've been saying for some time we need to have some kind of status of forces arrangement which will be binding upon the new government, and I'm not convinced that existing authorities are adequate.

You'll recall a status of forces agreement was to have been had by March the 31st, but that date came and went.

And finally, I think we need a comprehensive public investigation into prisoner abuses. America's world image has been tarnished and we need to prove to other nations, as well as to the Iraqi people, that the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison are not standard operating procedure for our military and do not reflect the values we stand for as a nation.

Looking longer term and in a broader sense, I see at least four potential strategic approaches that can be had to the Iraqi situation.

First, we can stay the current course. We can continue in the present vein trying to provide security, rebuild infrastructure and trying to create the conditions under which a new representative government may flourish. However, this approach brings with it the certainty of continued violence against our forces, as well as the new government, and it will slow down the reconstruction process.

Second, we could cut and run. We could begin a relatively rapid withdrawal of our forces upon the appointment of the interim government and leave it to the U.N., NATO or Iraqis to provide security and stability to Iraq. This approach could result in Iraq descending into ethnic or religious squabbling or both, and national and regional instability, and the prospect that Iraq will become a terrorist haven.

Third, we could increase our military presence, as well as that of other nations, and induce NATO into a significant military and political role until the United Nations can assume more responsibility and until security and stability ensue.

SKELTON: Under this proposal, the number of the U.S. forces in Iraq would increase at least until after the elections and a more permanent new government may be installed.

Obviously, though, if we assign more forces to Iraq, there's the possibility that we will suffer more casualties.

Realistically, we will not be able to increase our force level in Iraq by very much over the short term, frankly, just because we don't have the troops.

And fourth, we can embark on a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over time and we can maintain a less visible presence in the interim. Our forces could withdraw from any urban places and cease aggressive patrolling in favor of safeguarding Iraqi infrastructure and securing the border against foreign incursions.

At first, the model the Marines used in Fallujah seemed promising. Our recent experience suggests their approach may not hold promise for use in other urban areas.

Some national security experts have even suggested setting a date certain by which our forces would ultimately withdraw from Iraq. I think there's value in deadlines and perhaps a deadline for the withdrawal of our forces could foster stability and give the Iraqi confidence that we do not intend to occupy their country for an indefinite period.

I suggest these various approaches to the way forward in Iraq only because I'm not aware of any specific plan that the administration has for long-term success and for an ultimate end to our military presence in Iraq.

That's the question I get when I go home: "How much longer are we going to be there?"

What puzzles me is that just a year ago the administration was talking about reducing our forces in Iraq. Now, unfortunately, we've still got 138,000 troops in Iraq and I see no end in sight.

So, Mr. Secretary, do you see an end in sight?

I do see the transition date of June 30 as a new opportunity. It gives us a potential fresh start toward a better Iraq. But if that goal is to be reached, the administration will have to do things better.

There will have to be better planning for how to rebuild Iraq and how to provide a stable government once elections are held. There will have to be more and better international participation than we've had. We in Congress will need better information about the cost of the war, the status of our forces and about the prisoner abuse situation, as well as the kind of equipment the troops do and don't have.

We need to perform able oversight so we can be confident that your actions are wise to our country's needs.

SKELTON: Mr. Secretary, I don't think anyone here questions your resolve or questions the resolve of the president to succeed in Iraq, but there's a difference between a resolve on the one hand and competence on the other. I think the American people need to understand that.

Regrettably, what's happened in Iraq so far, aside from the outstanding performance of our troops in the field -- and I must say they're outstanding -- persuades me that we've gotten the situation into a security quagmire.

Mr. Secretary, I welcome your thoughts about the way ahead in a strategic sense, and I'm also interested in what the department is doing to ensure our forces have the operational flexibility they need to remedy the damage to our international standing caused by the prisoner abuse scandal.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Secretary, with that optimistic send-off, thank you for being with us today, and we appreciate your coming to report to us on the status of this transition.

The floor is yours, sir.

ABERCROMBIE: Mr. Chairman, before we begin, Mr. Chairman, I notice that the statement here from Mr. Wolfowitz is 25 pages long. Is it your intention to have all 25 pages read or are we going to get a summary, perhaps under the five-minute rule so that we can move on to the questions?

HUNTER: Mr. Abercrombie, both statements, as always, will be taken to the record, and the witnesses are allowed to proceed in the manner they best see fit. And so we'll leave that to the discretion of Mr. Wolfowitz and General Pace.

Mr. Secretary?

WOLFOWITZ: I hope I'm not disappointing, Mr. Abercrombie. I know I'll please Mr. Skelton. I'm not planning to read the statement at all. I'll put it in the record.

I'd like to just make some...

HUNTER: Without objection.

WOLFOWITZ: ... observations about my recent trip. And your comment on the perspective in Washington versus the perspective out in the field brings to mind the fact that we were standing around in northern Iraq talking to a couple of sergeants who were taking a few days of well-earned leave from very, very tough duty in the Baathist town of Uija (ph) in central Iraq. And they said, "People back home just don't seem to see what we see out here. We're making enormous progress in this town that used to be a stronghold for Saddam Hussein."

WOLFOWITZ: These are just two sergeants standing by the pool volunteering, and it's something we heard almost everywhere from Iraqis, from Americans, from a British general down in Basra.

Doesn't mean that things are -- there aren't serious problems in Iraq. We all know about the problems. But I think what doesn't get through in all the reporting on problems is there's also been enormous progress.

I visited, Mr. Chairman, all five U.S. divisions, visited the British division down in Basra and visited with the Polish commander of the Multinational Division Central South.

It's inspiring to talk to our troops from the PFCs on up to the generals. They're doing a magnificent job. They do it with enormous courage. They do it with enormous skill. And I think they really believe that they're making substantial progress, and I think they are.

In fact, I think we're at a point now of a change that is properly described as historic.

For the first time in almost half a century, Iraq is about to have a sovereign government that is committed to the rule of law, to the values of freedom and democracy; a sovereign government that is committed to undoing the enormous abuse and damage that has been inflicted on that country by Saddam Hussein.

With all respect to the ranking member, we didn't break Iraq; Saddam Hussein broke Iraq -- broke it in a vicious, horrible way almost beyond imagining.

It is going to be a big job to repair it, but I feel much more confident than before this trip, after spending many hours with the new prime minister and members of his government, that there is an Iraqi team ready to take charge on July 1st and committed to fixing that damage.

We spent almost eight hours in discussions over the course of three days with Prime Minister Allawi and his national security team, including his new defense minister, his new minister of the interior and his national security adviser.

WOLFOWITZ: I also had meetings with the new president of Iraq, with the deputy prime minister of Iraq.

When I say "we," it was a multinational team. I was accompanied on the American side by our vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, General George Casey -- whose nomination, as you know, is now before the Senate to become commander of Multinational Force-Iraq -- and by the current deputy chief of mission in Iraq, Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, who will take over on July 1st as the DCM to our new ambassador, John Negroponte.

We were also accompanied by representatives of the British government and the Polish government. The talks were wide-ranging.

I think one of things that's very impressive: There was no question who was in charge in those talks. It was the Iraqi prime minister. He spoke forcefully for his delegation and he laid out his plans, which are ambitious plans, for an Iraqi national security strategy that will confront what he correctly describes as an evil enemy, and build up Iraqi security forces to deal with that challenge.

I would confess, going into those discussions there was some concern on our side that his plans might be too grandiose, it might be more idea than substance, that they might reject the considerable progress that we believe we've made already in our own efforts to build Iraqi security forces.

I'm happy to report that the conclusion of our discussions I think was a very realistic meshing of our existing plans with his adjusted plans and his somewhat more ambitious plans.

General Petraeus, whom you mentioned earlier, commented that building Iraqi security forces has to be approached as steering a large supertanker not a high-speed power boat. It can't turn on a dime.

Prime Minister Allawi does not plan to turn it on a dime. He plans to turn it in a reasonable way with, in my view, a very clear sense of priorities.

One of his recurrent themes was the Iraqi army as a symbol of national strength. He continues to say that he believes it was a mistake to have disbanded the old army. And it would not surprise me if, at least as a symbolic move, he were to undo that order when he becomes prime minister.

WOLFOWITZ: But he's interested in something much more than symbolic gestures. He's interested in constructing an Iraqi army that reports to Iraqi officers through an Iraqi chain of command that is responsible to a sovereign Iraqi government.

I think we put in place some important building blocks that he can do that with. One of the building blocks is an organization that we've been working on called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. We talked about this a lot, because to the Iraqis the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps has a lot of problems, starting with its name. As translated into Arabic at least, it sounds more like a branch of the fire department than a branch of the army.

I think also its performance around the country has been mixed and very disappointing in some areas, including areas I think the prime minister was most familiar with.

Significantly, it has performed extremely well in two parts of the country, in the far north in the city of Mosul where General Petraeus is, in fact, responsible for organizing. He introduced some concepts that were unique to that area, but I think are now going to be applied throughout the country; much more effective ways of organizing the Civil Defense Corps than was done in most other places.

And that Civil Defense Corps up in Mosul performed outstandingly on the night of April 9th, when the enemy attacked the government house in Mosul. The governor of the province, who was a Sunni Arab by the way, stayed in the government house all night while it was under attack. While the Iraqi police initially refused to come on duty, and I think one might forgive them because they were definitely out-gunned by the enemy, the Civil Defense Corps and the facilities protection service people stood their ground, beat off the enemy attack, and eventually the police came back.

I think it's significant, also, that General Carter Ham of the 2nd Infantry Division in charge up in Mosul, General Petraeus' successor, made sure that the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps knew throughout the night that if they got into really deep trouble, U.S. forces were there to help out.

That is what General Petraeus described as embracing Iraqi security forces, letting them do the job as much as they possibly can but making sure that they have the courage that comes from knowing that there is a backup.

WOLFOWITZ: I think that's a model for the future. The more rapidly we can move to that model, the more rapidly we can not only bring our numbers down but, I think more importantly, bring our people off the front lines. That is good for us and it's good for the Iraqis.

The prime minister is also organizing a new unit called the Iraqi intervention force, which will basically be a division created out of the army structures that we were training, but oriented toward urban security. That, in fact, is his first priority.

And I would emphasize here one of the things that was also impressive, as we talked about funding requirements, is this is a man who understands that you need to have a sense of priority; that some of his requirements may exceed what is currently available, or at least what is currently available in our supplemental funding.

There is Iraqi funding -- by the way, I would point out there is some $20 billion of Iraqi funds, both oil-for-food and oil revenues that have already put into the Iraqi budget since the liberation of Baghdad, and more on the way. But those funds have many demands on them.

One of the things we hope to get from the international community is more support for training and equipping Iraqi security forces.

His first priority, as I mentioned, is his Iraqi intervention force.

His second priority is something they call the Iraq special operations force, that will consist of a counterterrorist force similar to what we could call a SWAT team with some 760 troops, and a supporting commando battalion that's similar to a ranger battalion of slightly over 800.

The third priority is this new Iraqi national guard, which as I said, is built on the old civil defense corps, but with, if I might call it, the Petraeus concept of organization and very importantly, from Prime Minister Allawi's point of view, with a much stronger officer structure.

It would be organized into 50-plus battalions organized into 18 brigades; that makes one brigade for each province. Organized in turn into six division headquarters, which turns out to be one division headquarters for each multinational division that's in Iraq.

Each of these headquarters presents both a requirement and, I think from the prime minister's point of view, an opportunity to bring back officers from the old Iraqi army who are clean and who are committed to a new Iraq. I believe he sees that important not only in terms of building capable security forces and restoring Iraqi pride in their army, but also in reducing potential sources of dissatisfaction among the former officers that the enemy can feed off of.

His fourth priority is to continue the development of two divisions of the regular army: troop strength of some 27,000. He's also interested in adding two more divisions, as well as potentially three corps headquarters to the national guard. But they agreed that both of those are lower priorities that can be deferred until we get first things first and second things second.

WOLFOWITZ: This is definitely further down the list.

General Petraeus will be leading the effort in Baghdad to determine the resource implications of these enhancements and to make allocations among them.

As I said, there may be requirements that go beyond what's currently budgeted in our supplemental. We will look to Iraqi resources, we'll look to the international contributions and we'll see as we go. But there is a great deal that can be accomplished already within the present framework.

We also had a lot of discussion about command-and-control arrangements. The Iraqis proposed and we accepted the creation of a joint operations center at the national level, as well as joint coordinating centers at the regional and local levels.

These centers will perform two functions: first of all, making sure that the operations of our forces and Iraqi forces are well- coordinated and well-integrated; but also it helps -- until they've filled in the gaps in their own chain of command and communications, it enables them to have effective chain of command by working in parallel with us.

We committed ourselves in the letter that Secretary Powell sent to the United Nations in parallel to the letter that Prime Minister Allawi sent tot he United Nations to have close coordination and consultation with the Iraqis on sensitive security issues, including the initiation of sensitive offensive operations.

We committed, again, in these meetings that those consultations will be serious consultations. It's a process that one might say started with our visit, but I think will be carried forward on an almost daily basis by Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey when they arrive.

Finally, the Iraqis also expressed an interest in getting support from the international community and are particularly eager to support our requests to get international troop contributions to support the United Nations' presence in Iraq and additional functions the United Nations may take on such as supervising the elections.

There's much more that we can discuss in the course of questions, Mr. Chairman, but I think -- I just like to summarize by saying what an impressive group of people we were dealing with. They are intelligent. They know their country in a way that no American can every expect to know their country. That kind of knowledge is, obviously, essential in making the kinds of decisions that confront them and us going forward. And they are clearly people who have prepared to step up to making tough decisions.

In fact, I'd like to just conclude finally, I opened by commenting on the bravery of our forces; I'd like to comment on the bravery of Iraqis.

We visited Fallujah, were the U.S. Marines have just awarded Navy commendation medals and Navy achievement medals to five Iraqi Civil Defense Corps members who rescued and saved the life of a Marine private first class under enemy fire at the risk of their own lives.

During that visit, we met with the new head of the Iraqi intelligence service who lost three of his sons to Saddam's executioners.

Up north, our interpreter was an incredibly engaging young Kurdish woman whose sister had recently been assassinated because she was working with our forces.

WOLFOWITZ: And when we asked her, "Why do you continue working when it is so dangerous?" She said, "Because my father told me after the assassination, 'You must never retreat in the face of evil.'"

We met with the deputy prime minister, Barham Sali, who many of us had known for a long time, who was a target of an assassination attempt by Al Qaida elements back in 2002 that were supported in northern Iraq by the Saddam regime.

We met with the president, Sheik Ghazi al-Yawer, who became the acting president of the interim governing council because his predecessor was assassinated in a car bomb that exploded right outside of the so-called Green Zone.

And, of course, the prime minister himself was a target of an assassination attempt by Saddam's thugs in London in 1979, nearly chopped in two and just barely realized the attack in time to get out -- get his head out of the way of the axe. He was hospitalized for a year. His wife suffered a permanent nervous breakdown. He was pursued by Saddam's killers for years after that.

He knows that he is now number one on the enemy target list. There is no one they would like to assassinate more than Iyad Allawi. He is doing this because he's a patriot. He is doing this because he knows what his country has been through.

We have Iraqis by the thousands who are signing up to fight for their country. More than 400 by our own count -- and General Petraeus thinks the real number is twice that -- more than 400 have died in the line of duty since May 1st of last year.

We have courageous Iraqis who have prepared to take on this fight for their country. The key to success, the key to victory, I think the answer to most of Mr. Skelton's questions lies in Iraqi self- government and Iraqi self-defense.

We've met this new government. They're prepared to step up to their responsibilities, and I think we owe them all the support we can give them.

Thank you.

HUNTER: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Second, to once again thank the families of the incredible folks we have serving our country overseas. Their sustained support makes all the difference in the world to those who are wearing the uniform. And in the case of the Guard and Reserve, to thank their employers for their patience, understanding and support.

And although this particular hearing is about Iraq, on Friday this week, on the 25th of June, the great Americans who have been serving our country in Haiti will complete their mission and turn over to a U.N. force led by Brazil. But the folks who have been serving our country in Haiti, along with some terrific partners in French forces that are there, Canadian forces and Chilean forces, have done this hemisphere and the people of Haiti a great service.

PACE: And I wanted to thank them publicly on the record.

With that, sir, we'll take questions.

HUNTER: Thank you, General.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for I think a very good summary.

Let's talk about the security apparatus for this fledgling government that is standing up. Obviously they are targets. There have been assassinations. There have been lots of attempts. And one thing that General Petraeus talked about in his remote hearing last week was the standing up of Iraqi security forces for the protection of government to make sure that we could -- this new government has a shield behind which they can operate.

From your discussions, just give us a little insight from your discussions with this new leadership, Iraqi leadership. What is the threat doing to these folks?

Are they -- you said they're standing up to it, but are they -- in your estimation, is the apparatus that we're training right now, the military forces who will be charged with defending the government, just keeping this government, do you think it's moving along well? Do you think it's adequate?

WOLFOWITZ: It's an excellent question.

In fact, our people told us that their first priority, in fact, is protection of the new government. They're going to depend on us to a considerable degree for a certain period of time.

We want to, for a lot of reasons, as rapidly as possible give them their own capacity, especially for close-in protection. There are a lot of reasons why that's a better way to proceed.

But we're not going to take any chances. Until they're fully ready to deal with their own personal security, they'll have all the support they need from us. And I think that's probably all I ought to say in a open session.

But you're absolutely right, it's a matter of utmost importance.

And we also ought to recognize that there are no guarantees out there. It's a dangerous place. Those of you who have tried to get us to arrange visits understand how dangerous it is; there are real problems. Although we continue to try -- we think it's very important for members of Congress to visit. We try to arrange that.

And as I say, none of these very brave men are under any illusions that there are guarantees to their safety, but we need to do everything we possibly can to ensure it.

I might say in that regard, Mr. Chairman, it would help a great deal I think if we had more flexibility in how we define force protection when it comes to the use of our own funds.

WOLFOWITZ: We've been at this subject several times. We have a request up here for $500 million of authority to use DOD funds to train and equip Iraqi forces.

I think that needs to be understood as every bit as important as body armor and up-armored Humvees. It is part of force protection. And I think this committee understands that. And I hope we will get the support we need for that request.

Similarly, I think this committee, particularly those of you who have visited Iraq, have come to understand how important it is to support the CERP program -- the Commanders' Emergency Response Program -- which pays for things like rehabilitating schools and hospitals, which may not seem initially like force protection, but our troops understand it is exactly that because it helps to improve significantly their relationship with the population.

Why do I mention all of this? Because in this visit, I learned about one other thing which is in this boundary line of who has the authority, who has the responsibility. That is the question of creating some kind of biometric identity card that could not be forged.

It's apparently fallen between the cracks of whether it's a CPA authority or a CENTCOM authority. But when I think about how to protect the new Iraqi government, I can think of very few things that would do more than to develop a reliable means of identifying people throughout the country.

So I don't have a specific proposal here, but I'd like to be able to work with this committee to figure out ways in which we can get the flexibility and funding to make those kinds of things possible.

HUNTER: Thanks, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, as we hand this thing over, you're going to have -- we will have many instances where the Iraqi government -- at least I would think we would -- where the Iraqi government would request American forces to move to certain locations to undertake certain missions to do things that they think are important to their survival and to the maintenance of this government.

In some cases, we're going to be able to say yes. In other cases, we're going to be able to say no.

I think it's very important that we've got a lock on this process, that we know exactly how we move it and that we don't have American military commanders who feel that they're compelled to do certain things because there are Iraqi requests to do it. But rather they are in fact, clearly vetted with our diplomatic leadership, but also that they have a veto in cases where they think that American force protection is going to be degraded substantially.

HUNTER: And I've seen operations over the years -- thinking of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the first question I asked Colonel Garrety (ph) was why he was down in the low country there taking those incoming artillery shells, and he said, "State mandated our location down here rather than up there in the high country."

You're going to have many instances where the call's going to be between Iraqi requests and American interests. You'll have Ambassador Negroponte in place. You'll have General Sanchez and General Casey. Are you satisfied that the process for making the decisions on these requests is well in place and is well scrubbed?

WOLFOWITZ: I think it's well-designed, Mr. Chairman. Until it's actually in place, the ambassador's there and the new multinational force commander -- assuming Senate approves them -- General Casey is there -- you only know when you exercise it.

But we have actually been exercising a very similar mechanism for over two years now in Afghanistan with exactly those kinds of issues that your raise.

Not infrequently, the Karzai government has asked us to do things on its behalf, and we've questioned whether they really know what they're doing and whether we should get in the business of enforcing the edicts of the government. We've tried to make sure they understand realistically that they should relate their own desire to direct things relate it realistically to their capacity to enforce their will.

And I think over time it's worked about very well. And there's no question Afghanistan -- there will be no question in Iraq -- that American forces report through their commander to the president of the United States. We'll be getting input from all directions, including from our good ambassador, including from the Iraqi political authorities. But the ultimate responsibility for the safety of our forces rests with their commander and with their commander in chief.

HUNTER: OK. And lastly, Mr. Secretary, we've had, in some cases, offerings from other states in the neighborhood of sending forces in. And it's clear, whether it's the Egyptians or the Turks, the Saudis, you have resources in the neighborhood and military resources that could be utilized, and in some cases could be utilized to displace American forces.

To date, our understanding is that this has been strongly resisted by the Iraqi leadership, the idea of having a contingent from Egypt come in, for example, military forces, Saudi, Turkey, other locations.

HUNTER: Do you think it's wise to continue to basically go along with this resistance and for the Iraqi government itself to resist this help from neighboring states, which could provide very substantial forces and obviously have logistical lines that would be much shorter than those -- than the ones that are currently being exercised with this coalition of some near 20,000 forces from around the world?

What do you think about this? Are we going to see any change here? And is there any other more diplomatic way to invite this participation?

WOLFOWITZ: We talked about this specifically, and the prime minister is quite prepared to join us in requesting other countries to participate, with the important exception that they do not want any troops from neighboring countries because that raises large political issues. And I think if you -- one neighbor doesn't raise all the issues it opens it up to other neighbors.

But beyond that, including Egypt, specifically, they are quite prepared to work with us to encourage international contributions. They understand its importance. At the same time...

HUNTER: Saying they will entertain contributions but not personnel?

WOLFOWITZ: No, no. Contributions of forces...

HUNTER: OK.

WOLFOWITZ: ... absolutely. No, contributions of forces.

But they would also say the highest priority is standing up our own people, getting them equipped and establishing Iraqi pride that they can defend their own country. Those are not mutually exclusive objectives, and I think we'll get help in bringing in -- certainly this new Iraqi government will do everything it can to encourage other countries to contribute forces, particularly for the U.N. protection missions and those missions associated with the United Nations.

HUNTER: Thank you.

Gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton?

SKELTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned a number of positive accomplishments in your opening statement, and I agree there certainly have been a number of good things that have happened in Iraq this last year.

SKELTON: The deficiencies seem to be centered at one, and that is the security quagmire that we find ourselves in.

I think that prevents so much of continued good things. For instance, the $18 billion that we appropriated for reconstruction, only $3.7 billion has been spent because of the security situation that's there.

I see, Mr. Secretary, two Iraqs. One is the optimistic Iraq that you describe, and we thank you for your testimony; and the other Iraq is the one that I see every morning, with the violence, the deaths of soldiers and Marines. I must tell you it breaks my heart a little bit more every day.

You used the phrase "the face of evil, it is there." The security situation is a Damocles sword that hangs over this entire positive work that you and our country are trying to achieve there.

It seems to me that because of this and allowing it to get started has caused us to fall short.

Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Bremer commented in this last Sunday's Washington Post on mistakes he thought he had made as the CPA leader relative to what was happening in Iraq.

May I ask you from your perspective, as one of the architects of this engagement, what are the lessons that you have learned in the last 15 months? Or what should have been done better? What should have been done differently?

WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Skelton, let me start by -- you said I presented an optimistic picture. Maybe it's optimistic compared to the total gloom and doom that one otherwise hears, but I in no way mean to minimize the security problem.

I agree with you: It is the obstacle to all the other progress that's being made. It is incredibly serious.

I gave you a recital of every Iraqi we met with is under some degree of death threat. We know about the horrible killing and wounding of our wonderful Americans. And there's no way to adequately describe how violent the situation is there and how threatening it is.

I think it's also, though, important to stop and think about the nature of the enemy.

The enemy consists primarily of two groups. One are the people who kept Saddam Hussein in power for 35 years. He did not kill hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and torture even more singlehandedly; he had some thousands of people in his so-called Mukhabarat, the so- called intelligence service, which is probably best described as the modern-day equivalent of the Nazi Gestapo.

He had other even more horrendous killers in something called the Fedayeen Saddam, which I guess is like the Hitler Youth, or like the S.S. perhaps.

This was a regime that depended for its survival on absolute terror, and it had thousands...

SKELTON: Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt if I may. I understand, but my question is what lessons we have learned, you have learned the last 15 months?

WOLFOWITZ: But I'm trying -- this is part of the lesson, if I may.

SKELTON: Please.

WOLFOWITZ: It was a regime that survived with thousands of killers and it was a regime that began making alliance with another group of killers, those people associated with bin Laden and particularly this man named Zarqawi, who has now emerged as probably the most significant author of suicide bombings in Iraq today.

WOLFOWITZ: That's the enemy we're fighting. It is a truly evil enemy. And if you want to say what might have been underestimated, it was probably too great a willingness to believe once we got the 55 people on the black list, the rest of those killers would stop fighting.

The key to defeating them, I believe, before the war, I believe now, the key to defeating them all along has been getting Iraqis trained and equipped and capable of fighting them as quickly as possible.

In fact, we went through some of this argument before the war about whether it was necessary or not to train free Iraqi forces. As you may recall, we did, in fact, set up a base in Hungary to do it. There was so much resistance to the idea within our government that by the time it -- the war began, we had only trained a total of 71 people. It could have been much more. We could have started on that whole project earlier.

But we're on that project. It is the key to success. Getting Iraqi forces up and fighting for their country is the answer. There are plenty of them who want to do it. And if you have any doubt about it being the answer, then go and read the letter that Zarqawi sent to bin Laden in Afghanistan, in which he says explicitly that, "It will be suffocation for us" -- "suffocation" is the word he uses -- "when we are fighting Iraqis who are fighting for their own country and their own brothers."

SKELTON: Were there other mistakes besides thinking that if you got the 55 people that would put an end to the violence -- other mistakes that or things that you would have done differently...

WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Skelton, there's a litany of things of might- have-beens...

SKELTON: ... over the last 15 months?

WOLFOWITZ: You know, there's a list of might-have-beens, and all these lists of might-have-beens and reasons why we're having trouble, I've never heard anyone mention the name of Abu Ibrahim.

Abu Ibrahim is a leader of the so-called May 15th Organization. It's a Palestinian professional killer group that's been harbored by Saddam for 25 years in Baghdad. He is one of the world's masters in plastic explosives, and he's still out there making bombs today to kill Americans.

That has got much more to do with why we're having trouble than with whether or not there were enough State Department people in the CPA headquarters in Baghdad.

WOLFOWITZ: And by the way, there were plenty.

The fact is you can second-guess a lot of decisions. There were some that we might have done differently. There were some that were done brilliantly.

Let me talk about one in particular. I hear constant comment that we didn't have enough troops. I'll say two things about that.

First of all, there was a very deliberate decision -- and I believe it was the correct decision. And I think General Franks was probably the key author of it and deserve credit for what I think was a brilliant plan, a plan that moved in so quickly that Saddam did not have time to explode -- to burn the oil fields. He did not have time to organize massive killing fields in Iraqi cities.

I think we have achieved a substantial degree of surprise and saved a lot of American lives and Iraqi lives in the process.

If we had waited for a much longer, much bigger build-up that might not have been necessary, I think we would have given him time to prepare some terrible things.

We'll never know for sure. But it was a conscious decision. I think it was the correct decision.

I'm not sure how having any more troops would have helped us to root out these elements of the old intelligence service once they had scattered out to cities like Fallujah. They are killers. Let's recognize that they are instead of trying to figure out where we did something wrong to create them. We didn't.

We've got to get them. This new government understands we've got to get them. And we understand the way to get about doing it.

I can tell you another mistake. Another mistake was not giving our people the funding flexibility to field Iraqi security forces faster. It's disappointing to me that it's taken so long to get equipment into their hands. It's finally arriving. It's arriving in large quantities.

But if we had been a little less fussy about competitive contracting and a little more eager to get guns and radios in the hands of Iraqi police, it could have been done faster.

SKELTON: From your description, Mr. Secretary, I don't see an end in sight. We're stuck.

WOLFOWITZ: We're not stuck, Mr. Skelton.

SKELTON: Tell us what your measurement is for success, for Americans to say "We've succeeded," and to bring the troops home. At what point?

People ask me this. I have no answer.

WOLFOWITZ: When it becomes an Iraqi fight and the Iraqis are prepared to take on the fight, they're prepared to join their security forces. We are prepared to arm and equip them to do it. I can't tell you how long that's going to take. It's dangerous.

WOLFOWITZ: I remember when people were up here eight years ago, saying we'd be in Bosnia only for a year. We are finally about to end the Bosnian mission -- what is it? -- eight years later.

This is a vastly more important mission for our national security, and it's important to stay and finish it. But there is an end. The end is when Iraqis are governing their own country.

And the great advantage we have is that, while those killers are incredibly evil and incredibly ruthless and generate enormous terror, by their very nature they're not people that appeal to a broad population.

The overwhelming number of Iraqis want success in this venture. You're absolutely right in your earlier comment: What scares them most is the lack of security. But I think they can provide their own security and I think that is the key to success.

SKELTON: Is it your testimony you think we might be there then a good number of years?

WOLFOWITZ: I think it's entirely possible.

But what I think is also nearly certain is the more they step up -- and they will be doing so more and more each month -- the less and less we will have to do. We will begin to -- as they take over more responsibility, we will be able to let them be in the front lines and us being in a supporting position.

That example I gave from the April 9th attack in Mosul, where the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps was able by itself to defend the governor and the government house, because he knew that American forces were there, that's a success story. If American forces, simply by being there and without having to enter the combat, can enable Iraqi forces to succeed, that will be huge progress.

SKELTON: Switching to the present investigation, the Army has decided to appoint General Paul Kern, four-star general, to oversee all the investigation. Was this an Army decision?

WOLFOWITZ: I've been away. To the best of my knowledge, it is an Army decision.

Do you know, General Pace?

PACE: Sir, General Sanchez asked General Abizaid to ask the Army to appoint another officer to oversee Major General Fay's investigation, because General Sanchez felt that he needed to be part of the answers to the questions that needed to be asked.

So it was an Army request up the Army chain, and an Army decision. Specifically, Acting Secretary Brownlee appointed General Kern.

SKELTON: Will he have the ability to question civilians within the chain of command regarding this investigation?

PACE: Sir, I do not know the answer to that question. I'll find out.

SKELTON: Would you?

I'm concerned, Mr. Secretary -- I mentioned it a few moments ago -- about the prime minister's announcement that he was considering the imposition of martial law after June 30th. And there we have our troops over there, and who's going to enforce it but our troops? And, of course, that flies in the face of American common sense.

I ask whether we would be ever in a position of enforcing Iraqi martial law.

WOLFOWITZ: I think we would have to know what he means by that.

As I recall, the statement he made actually was in selected areas and I think it would depend on what areas. It might actually be something that we might mutually agree was necessary to bring order in a particularly difficult place.

But as in Afghanistan, we are certainly under no obligation to enforce edicts or decrees of the Iraqi government that we don't agree with. I think that's why it's so important to have these consultative mechanisms that have been agreed on. Most of the emphasis in talking about them has been to give the Iraqis an input to things we might do that might cause problems for their government. But equally, it's a mechanism for us warning them about things they may do that we would not be in a position to support.

At the end of the day, we have complete control over our forces and our forces will not do anything that their commanders and their commander in chief do not believe is appropriate.

SKELTON: My last question, Mr. Secretary: Ahmed Chalabi has been all over the news recently, and we paid him and his National Congress millions of dollars. Is that correct?

WOLFOWITZ: Yes.

SKELTON: I think it would be a good idea to seek an accounting of where that money was spent, in light of the fact that we've cut him off and that we assisted in the raiding of his quarters and, obviously, he has been discredited.

Could you provide us with an accounting, either classified or unclassified, as to how that money was spent?

WOLFOWITZ: Sir, we can provide a classified one.

I would point out that there's a mixed picture there. And we know from our commanders that some of the intelligence that his organization has provided us has saved American lives and enabled us to capture some key enemy targets.

So it is not black and white. Nothing in Iraq is black and white. I don't think I know of any figure we're dealing with who hasn't had in one way or another to compromise with the incredibly difficult circumstances of the last 35 years of that country's history.

Let's bear in mind there was a long period of time, right up until the Gulf War, when it was U.S. government policy that we weren't allowed to talk to members of the Iraqi opposition. I guess that was because of the Iran-Iraq war.

It's not surprising that many of them -- and Chalabi's not the only one -- made contacts with countries like Iran or Syria or others.

We deal with a lot of people. Contrary to what I see over and over again in newspapers, Chalabi was not a favorite of the Pentagon. We do not believe in having favorites. We believe the Iraqi people have got to choose their own leaders, and that means Americans shouldn't have favorites.

I am surprised that he seems to be the target, for many years, of particular animus from some parts of this government. But on the other hand, there are aspects of his recent behavior that are puzzling to me.

You certainly deserve, as best we can, an accounting of what's happened with our money. I would point out, too, he is by no means the only person that we've been paying for intelligence. And I assume you'd be disappointed if we weren't going to all possible sources.

SKELTON: We would appreciate the classified information that you said you would furnish.

PACE: Mr. Skelton, if I may, sir, just clarify a bit more my answer to your question about General Kern.

General Sanchez was the officer who was the convening authority for Major General Fay's investigation. General Sanchez asked to be replaced as the convening authority of his chain of command.

Secretary Brownlee appointed General Kern to be the new convening authority. That does not mean that he would be the person conducting the investigation. He will work with General Fay to determine whether or not General Fay has the authority or if he needs to appoint someone else new.

I will get the information for you about civilians, sir.

HUNTER: I thank the gentlemen.

One thing, Mr. Secretary: When we've discussed these fora that we're going to have to make sure that when requests come from the Iraqi government, as they came from the government of Afghanistan, as to how -- whether we respond, decide to undertake missions in their behalf or not undertake them, and we have these forums put together where we work together with the Iraqi military, how quickly will those things move to a head and a decision at a higher level when they appear to be very close questions?

HUNTER: You understand what I'm talking about? I mean, we may have some tough ones that need to go up and be resolved at the top very quickly. How will those proceed?

WOLFOWITZ: I hope they will proceed quickly. I mean, one of the things sometimes is that, you encounter this in government at all levels, people, sort of, feel it's their obligation to try to work out an agreement instead of elevating the disagreement and getting a decision.

I know Secretary Rumsfeld and the president both encourage people to bring them decisions. They're not afraid to make them.

And I think your point, implication of our question is a very good one, that we're not looking necessarily for compromise, we're looking for clarity. And sometimes that clarity needs to happen very quickly.

You want to add anything, General Pace?

PACE: Sir, from the commanders' standpoint on the ground, the connectivity, both by secure telephone and secure VTC, with General Abizaid, General Sanchez, if confirmed, General Casey, General Metz and all the division commanders, is very quick, very rapid. And we use it daily for very sensitive targeting, for example.

So I am very confident that if the commanders in the field need to bring questions up the chain of command they will be able to do so very quickly.

HUNTER: OK.

ABERCROMBIE (?): Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a moment?

HUNTER: Certainly. Certainly.

ABERCROMBIE (?): Thank you.

General Pace, the question that the chairman's asking, however, refers to page 16-plus in Mr. Wolfowitz's testimony. This is not a question about what you're doing now. You have the joint operating centers. What the chairman's asking is, how was the joint operating center going to operate? Who's in charge?

PACE: Sir, U.S. commanders are and will remain in charge of U.S. troops. The joint operation centers are being discussed with our Iraqi counterparts right now, and we will find a way to move forward on that that works for the Iraqis and for ourselves. But we will cede no authority nor responsibility to anyone other than U.S. commanders.

ABERCROMBIE (?): So the answer to the chairman's question is you haven't arrived at a modus operandi between the Iraqi sovereign government and yourselves as to how you're going to conduct military operations, nothing exists and we're turning it over on the 30th?

PACE: I would not say it that way, sir.

ABERCROMBIE (?): You don't have to say it that way; I just said it. Is that correct or not?

WOLFOWITZ: No, it's not correct.

When they operate in joint operations, they are under the command of the multinational force commander, which means the American commander.

Joint operations center is to coordinate so that the forces operate together in a coherent way.

ABERCROMBIE (?): Who's in charge of the center?

WOLFOWITZ: The center is not in charge of anything. It's a coordination center. It is the American commander that is in charge of the troops.

ABERCROMBIE (?): So the Iraqis aren't in charge of their own operations?

WOLFOWITZ: If they go into a joint operation with us, they are committing their forces to a unified command just as the Poles are or the British if it's a joint operation. They have the authority...

ABERCROMBIE (?): Who's in charge of the unified command? All you got to do is answer the question.

WOLFOWITZ: The multinational force commander, who is an American general, at the moment.

ABERCROMBIE (?): So the Americans are still in charge, that's the answer?

WOLFOWITZ: The multinational force sanctioned by the United Nations with a U.S. commander is in charge. It is actually a United Nations-sanctioned force.

HUNTER: The key question here was simply as this walks up, some of these questions are going to be very tough and they need to get up to the top quickly to Ambassador Negroponte and General Sanchez, soon to be General Casey. And that's the question, Mr. Secretary.

But I think that's been well answered, that that's going to move -- those questions will move quickly to the top when they have to.

ABERCROMBIE (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: Is that your understanding?

Thank the gentleman.

But that is my understanding, that those questions will move very quickly when the circumstances compel it.

PACE: Yes, sir.

WOLFOWITZ: That's right.

HUNTER: OK. Thank you.

The gentlemen from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon?

WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here.

I'm not going to try to second-guess our actions in Iraq, because I've been supportive of them and I am very proud that our troops and their leaders have done.

Having visited the theater, I am continually impressed with the quality of leadership that has been provided.

WELDON: However, this hearing regards the future of Iraq, and the topic that I think will have the most bearing on the long-term success of Iraq has not been discussed -- and I raised this issue last week with the State Department and I will continue to raise this issue because I think it's at the heart of the problem we're experiencing right now -- and that's Iran.

The problem, in my opinion, with our instability in Iraq, is being caused by the Khamenei regime in Iran. Over 15 months ago, we started providing information to the intelligence community that the Iranians were, in fact, under Khamenei, setting up a separate entity, separate from the legitimate government.

In fact, the first $70 million of funding to Sadr occurred eight months ago before anyone knew Sadr's name. We knew that was the case, or at least the intelligence community did.

If we look at what's happening in Iran right now, only 9 percent of their population came out to vote in elections this year. It's not a problem with the Iranian people. It's a problem with Khamenei's regime.

Khamenei's seeing on one side Afghanistan stabilizing; on the other side, Iraq about to be stabilized. And then we see right down the road Colonel Gadhafi giving up his weapons of mass destruction without us firing a single shot.

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that Khamenei understands his days are numbered. If Iraq, in fact, is successful in controlling their own country, and in securing their own borders and securing their own civilization, then eventually the Khamenei regime will fall.

Just recently, in fact last month, the Revolutionary Guard took over an airport outside of Tehran -- a brand new airport that the government of Iran had actually contracted Turkish authorities to run. The Revolutionary Guard took over that airport and in a statement they issued said it would be a bad signal for Iran to allow a Turkish entity to come in and operate that airport.

We saw Khamenei last month put several dozen legislators, all members of the Revolutionary Guard, into their parliament as an effort to destabilize and have significant influence in the parliament. We have seen significant efforts at developing a crash program on a nuclear weapon -- in fact I'll tell you where the work's being done. It's being done at Isfahan.

There are 17 enrichment operations under way right now in Isfahan. Their goal is to have a nuclear bomb within six months.

Now, I'm not giving classified information, Mr. Wolfowitz because I gave this information to the Intelligence Committee in a document that thick including our own Intelligence Committees over the past 15 months.

In my opinion, we are not putting enough focus on Iran. In fact, there was just a meeting of Khamenei's separate entity that he's established, separate from the government, just last week, where the head of the terrorist action in Iraq informed Khamenei that during 10 days 12 suicidal attacks were carried out inside of Iraq and he was congratulated by Khamenei.

WELDON: So, in my opinion, the bulk of what we're seeing in terms of unrest in Iraq is being carried out both by Iranians, by those groups being supported by Iran's money and by those organizations that are determined not to have Iraq be a stable nation. In fact, most recently, Khamanei has announced $3 billion for an internal program inside of Iran to control his population by using mosques.

And so my question is the same one I posed to the State Department: What is our plan to deal with Iran, because we don't want another Vietnam where neighboring countries, when we are finished and have done our job -- and I think done it quite well -- then have the constant barrage of impact by a neighbor that sees the long-term success of Iraq directly jeopardizing the capability of Khamanei's regime to stay in power?

That's where I think the problem is. And so my question to you -- and I realize this is really a State Department issue, but obviously it has to have your input -- what are we doing about Iran? And what are we doing about Khamanei's activities in fomenting so much unrest?

In fact, right now, the major goal of Khamanei's regime is to increase the price of oil to $50 a barrel. He has said it privately to his own people, $50 a barrel, because he thinks that's the greatest way to invoke unrest in America and the West.

Now, if these factors are, in fact, true and taking place -- in at least five of the major suggestions provided to me by these people have all come true, including their crash program on a nuclear weapon -- what is our plan to deal with Iran? Because, I think in the long term, that's going to be the ultimate determination of the success that we'll have in Iraq.

WOLFOWITZ: I think I'll take your invitation, Mr. Weldon, and say it's a State Department issue.

But it is only -- it is a big issue. Everywhere we went in Iraq we heard strong expressions of concern about destabilizing activities by several of their neighbors, particularly Syria and Iran. And there's no question in their minds -- and I think you're right -- that neither of those countries want to see success in Iraq. They're, in many ways, terrified of it. And I think part of an effective strategy has to be to figure out dealing with those two neighbors in particular.

I think it's important to recognize that this whole problem is a multi-faceted problem. I agree with you, Iran is important. I wouldn't say it's the key to everything. I think Iraq is important. I wouldn't say it's the key to everything.

Saudi Arabia is incredibly important.

WOLFOWITZ: It is under assault right now, probably by some of those same people who want to get $50 a barrel for oil. Syria's part of the problem. The Arab-Israeli issue is part of the problem. Afghanistan we know is part of the problem. Pakistan and potential instability there is part of the problem.

We are facing an unholy alliance of killers and terrorists who want to take the Arab and Muslim world backwards as far as they can take it, and want to bring us down in the process.

And I think we sometimes make a mistake of thinking we can split hairs and say, "This group is against us but that group isn't really," or, "Zarqawi is against us in Iraq but he isn't really a member of Al Qaida."

These groups work with one another and I think the president has been right since he first said that we need to deal with terrorism systematically, with all the global terrorist networks and all the state sponsors of terrorism. And clearly Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, and we're seeing some of that effect today.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt?

SPRATT: Mr. Secretary, General Petraeus told us last week that the Iraqi army that he's training will number around 35,000. And this is, obviously, insufficient to hold this violent, fractious country together. And you have to be struck by the contrast: We maintain 140,000 troops, they have 35,000 troops; a fourth our troop level.

I know they have other forces, but General Petraeus also told us, for example, with respect to the border police -- I can do the math, I know the number of kilometers of border here, and I know the number of border police forces, and I just don't see them able to do that mission.

Let me ask you several questions in that regard. Does the small size of the Iraqi army, relatively small, require the United States to have a sizable deployment in Iraq for some years to come?

Secondly, given the necessity of the army in making this country more stable and more secure, why is its training lagging behind the training of the other security forces?

And then, finally, if we have to maintain substantial troops there for some years to come, are you concerned about our forces, and in particular about our Reserve and Guard components? We have 168,000 on active duty now, we're implementing stop-loss orders, we're extending tours. Are you worried about the effects on our all- volunteer forces, if we're there for some period of time to come?

WOLFOWITZ: Let me just ask one thing. Did you say, why is the army being trained relatively slowly compared to the other forces?

SPRATT: As I understand, there are about 9,000 trained military. If you look at the other security force components, they're much more fully trained and sooner than any of the others. Now, I know it takes awhile to get the army up and trained, but nevertheless we've been there more than a year.

Are we concerned that if we build up a strong army that it might take advantage of the unstable situation and a strong man and authoritarian figure might seize control again?

WOLFOWITZ: Those are all very good questions. Let me try to start with an answer and you can ask some more.

First of all, on that specific question, the army, as designed by us, at least, takes longer to train because it was in a force oriented toward external defense, whereas the civil defense corps is basically, sort of, an initial three-week training and the rest is on-the-job training.

I think we had the wrong design for the army, myself. And I think the prime minister is changing that orientation. With the kind of international presence that's in Iraq today, he doesn't need to worry about external defense. And it's in our interest to have them concentrate on dealing with a real enemy, which is this internal one.

I think for that, the Iraqi army doesn't need to be as elaborately equipped or as elaborately trained. And I think we can probably stand up capable army units for the internal defense...

SPRATT: Surely you don't think 35,000 troops is sufficient to hold this country together...

WOLFOWITZ: No, I don't.

SPRATT: ... ourselves deemed that 140,000 to be pushing the envelope itself.

WOLFOWITZ: I don't, Mr. Spratt, and I don't think that 75,000, which would be the 35,000 plus the 40,000 in the national guard, are enough.

In fact, I've been asking questions for a long time about what is the right number and keep being defeated by people who say, "Well, we aren't at the 35,000 yet. We aren't at the 40,000 yet. Wait until we get there."

I think we will find, and I hope sooner rather than later, that we get there and we need more.

And let me say there is no shortage of Iraqis to serve in those armed forces. The shortage is going to be equipping them. And I don't think that should be beyond capacity to handle. The Iraqis have funds.

WOLFOWITZ: We're spending $4 billion a month, as you know very well, on our own forces. It would be a huge saving to be able to substitute Iraqi forces, which are much cheaper. And our European allies and rich Gulf countries I think have some obligations to step up and help supply that.

So I think I'm, kind of, with the premise of your question: 35,000 plus 40,000 may well not be enough. I'd say it probably isn't enough.

SPRATT: Well, then the question becomes do we take up the slack? Or if not, what do we do?

WOLFOWITZ: I think we should -- they are capable of fielding much more than is our plan, and if more is needed, we should make plans to do more. That's my view.

I accept the point that first things first and you need to start along the path we're on. But I think we should be prepared to expand beyond it.

I do not believe it makes any sense to have Americans defending Iraq when Iraqis are prepared to step up and do the job.

The border enforcement issue which you raised is -- I mean, in the long term it's their problem, and there is a question whether any country can provide the sort of security to stop anyone from coming across the border. You can make it more difficult, but you also have to keep in mind I think the greatest border problem still today is the ability of people to come legally through border crossings.

And that's one of the reasons why the initiative I mentioned earlier to have some kind of biometric identity card so that people can't hide so easily once they're in the country, would be a very important step forward; probably as important as border enforcement.

But again, to come back to the basic point of your question and to come to your point about what we can sustain in the long term, the key to reducing our presence in Iraq is getting Iraqis to step up. They are ready to step up in enormous numbers. I don't think there's a shortage of manpower. I don't think there's a shortage of willingness to risk your life and die. We see that in large numbers.

There is, unfortunately, a shortage of funding to equip them. And I hope if we find that we don't have enough of them, we aren't going to find another shortage in funding.

That's one of the reasons why we asked for this $500 million in authority -- not funding, but just authority -- to go into DOD funds to train and equip Iraqi armed forces.

And I think we still encounter a, sort of, old Cold War mentality that somehow security assistance should be a State Department function; it isn't.

SPRATT: Could I ask a last question? The light is red.

But you said one of your concerns is foreign infiltration. It's a concern we all have. It changes the nature of the conflict there. But isn't one solution to go ahead and strengthen the border patrol so that you can make the borders less porous, less penetrable by these foreign elements?

WOLFOWITZ: Absolutely.

But recognize what kind of borders we're talking about.

WOLFOWITZ: Especially on the Iranian border, you're talking about miles and miles of mountainous terrain. There's no way you can seal off that kind of a border. You can make it more difficult. And the border enforcement, the border police force should be strengthened.

But I come back to my other point. The best way to control borders is on either side. Congressman Weldon's point, the Iranians and the Syrians could do a lot to control the borders if they felt it was in their interest or we compelled them to think it was in their interest.

And the Iraqis could do a lot more to control infiltration on their side if they had a way of tracking who is legitimately where they are and who is not. Everywhere I've talked to Iraqis and to American security people, they all agree that some kind of nonforgeable identity card would be a huge step forward in that regard.

So you need to look at border security, I think, in a broad way. I'm not arguing about better security on the borders themselves, but it's not the main part of the answer.

SPRATT: We have some questions about the budget which we'll submit for the record. We appreciate your answers. Thank you, sir.

WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Mr. Spratt.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton?

SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Secretary, General, thank you for being here today and being so frank with us.

Over the past year and a half or so, we have had many discussions about progress and the kind of progress that we'd like to see in Iraq. We've seen progress to a degree in rebuilding infrastructure, and we know how important it is to rebuild the oil infrastructure in particular.

We've seen progress in Iraqi society, particularly in schools opening and schools being rebuilt, health care institutions being reopened and equipped and put into operation.

We've seen the economy -- just last week Petraeus was here via satellite and he talked about plants opening. And he was particularly proud of one asphalt plant that had been opened up in the northern part of the country.

And we've seen progress in standing up governments as well. The first time I visited Iraq last November, again General Petraeus hosted us in Mosul. And we saw local people for the first time in decades taking part in their local government and in security for the northern part of the country.

In spite of the fact that we have seen progress in all of these areas, the nature of the questioning this morning strongly suggests that we'd like to see more. And that depends, we think, on more success, more progress in terms of the security that we're able to provide there.

SAXTON: So my question is this: Knowing that this has been a particularly difficult time in terms of violence in Iraq because people were trying to stop the Iraqi people from standing up to their own government, and recognizing as well that it's unrealistic for us to expect the violence to subside after June the 30th for some period of time, what do you see in terms of the progress over let's say the next six months in terms of security forces, in terms of what we might expect to see, in terms of the Iraqi people being able to provide the kinds of security that will really make a difference, not only on security side, but on the infrastructure rebuilding side, on the Iraqi society side as well as the economy and success of the government?

WOLFOWITZ: I know General Pace has something to say, and I will turn to him in just a minute.

But I think Mr. Skelton's point earlier that all the progress that we made on a whole range of things on the civilian side is fundamentally threatened by the lack of security. In fact, I think most Iraqis would say the lack of security is their greatest personal concern.

Electricity's starting to be fixed. Health care is 30 times higher expenditures than it was under Saddam. Schools are being fixed.

By the way, significantly, a lot of that work is being done with Iraqi money. Some $800 million of Iraqi money has gone to our commanders and to local governments to fix school and to fix hospitals. That's just one example.

But as long as the security situation remains as bad as it is there's enormous anxiety. And moreover the enemy is targeting a lot of that progress. It's not an accident. It's harder to hit Americans, so they go after electricity, they go after the oil infrastructure.

I think -- I'll let General Pace speak now, but I think it would be wrong to suggest that the violence is going to suddenly subside after June 30th. I think the enemy is going to be targeting this process all the way through elections. And elections, of course, create another opportunity for intimidation and terror, which this enemy will work at.

WOLFOWITZ: But I think as we go forward, we may not see a reduction in enemy activity, but I think we will see a steady increase in Iraqi capacity.

General Pace?

PACE: Yes, sir.

I would echo that, Mr. Saxton.

First of all, as you know, sir, about 250,000 Iraqis are required, by our estimates, for their own security, and about 226,000 of those are on duty now in one capacity or another. Many of them need further training.

Examples: the police force. We're training about 1,000 police a month in Jordan -- the Jordanians are. That's going to increase about to 1,500 a month. There are police academies inside of Iraq that are producing about 500 a month now and will increase to about 1,000.

They're looking to countries -- NATO countries, for example, there's a NATO summit the end of this month, we're hoping that more countries outside of Iraq will offer to help train. So as we focus on number one priority, which is to make the Iraqi security forces of all flavors more capable, I think you will see a sustained increase in that capacity.

I would also -- and what I really wanted to say most was that we should expect more violence, not less, in the immediate weeks ahead, as our enemies understand that the Iraqi people are about to do what our enemies most fear, which is to take control of their own government and start making representative decision about the future of their own country. And this is a great threat to our enemies, and we can expect that they will try to disrupt that in any way they can.

SAXTON: If I can just have one quick follow-up question, you know, it's very difficult for us, from our vantage point here in the U.S., to gauge progress in these areas, because, quite frankly, you know, it seems to be the tendency to report on bad news rather than good news, for whatever reasons.

And I'm wondering if, Mr. Secretary, any thought has been given to how we can convey the true nature of progress in Iraq that the American people have been unable to gauge for themselves because of access to that information.

WOLFOWITZ: It's a constant challenge to us, and I wish I knew a silver-bullet answer.

WOLFOWITZ: It certainly makes a difference when members of Congress visit. I think they bring back a firsthand perspective that is invaluable. And often you can bring some press along with you, that I think help also. Because frankly, part of our problem is a lot of the press are afraid to travel very much so they sit in Baghdad and they publish rumors. And rumors are plentiful.

I think, as our soldiers come back and they get an opportunity to get around the country and tell their own stories, that may help.

But we are up against some heavy competition. The Arab media, like Al Jazeera, have no interest in telling the story straight. And I think our own media have some responsibility to try to present a balanced picture, instead of always gravitating for the sensational. And the violent is admittedly sensational.

SAXTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

SKELTON: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder?

SNYDER: Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Abercrombie was in the room -- I think he did get in the room.

Am I right, Neil?

ABERCROMBIE: Yes.

SKELTON: We'll take the gentleman's word for it.

The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie?

ABERCROMBIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolfowitz, you've indicated -- one of the things you've said was, "We shouldn't have favorites." And I have read your testimony. One of the things you have on page four is that you call the supporters of the cleric Sadr "gnats." The Coalition Provisional Authority...

WOLFOWITZ: That's a typo, Mr. Abercrombie. It should be "gangs."

ABERCROMBIE: OK, "gangs."

WOLFOWITZ: Thank you for catching it.

(LAUGHTER)

It may have been a Freudian typo, but...

ABERCROMBIE: I really read your testimony. I can do proofreading, apparently.

WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.

ABERCROMBIE: Let's say "gangs." I'm not sure that that improves the problem you have there.

The Coalition Provisional Authority has done polling recently. I mentioned in the last hearing, Sadr right now is second only to Sistani in terms of favorability throughout Iraq: 67 percent favorability.

At the same time, you say on page three, and extend on into 15, 16, "full partnership." Now, I'm going to go back over the questions that I've raised in previous sessions with you because I still don't have an answer and I believe the chairman's question has not been answered yet.

Who exactly is going to be in charge after June 30? If we have this full partnership and we're not picking favorites, who is going to be in charge? Whether it's the prisons, trials, prosecutions, Iraqi army actions, border patrol activity, the special operations that are supposed to -- the Iraqi intervention forces that are supposed to be operating in the urban areas -- who is going to be in charge of issuing the orders with respect to attacks or responses to the violence that General Pace says is bound to increase?

WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Abercrombie, I think it might help to think about the fact that in a country like Korea even today we have a clearly sovereign government with enormously capable armed forces...

ABERCROMBIE: None of which -- excuse me Mr. Wolfowitz -- the time is short. I'm not interested in Korea because it's not a parallel situation. South Korea does not have the same elements that we're talking about here. What I'm trying to get...

WOLFOWITZ: In the event of a war, it would have very much the same elements, and Korean armed forces would be under U.S. command as U.S. forces are both in peacetime and in wartime.

And it is the tension between a sovereign country that is sovereign in its own country and it depends on the United States and the international community for critical security support that they can't provide for themselves.

And the only way -- there's not a formula for working it out. It has to be worked out in partnership. But I'd say two principles of the partnership are that our forces...

ABERCROMBIE: Right now, Mr. Wolfowitz, is it being worked out?

WOLFOWITZ: I can...

HUNTER: Mr. Abercrombie...

WOLFOWITZ: I can explain at great length that it's being worked out.

HUNTER: Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Wolfowitz, suspend for second.

WOLFOWITZ: Our forces are...

HUNTER: Mr. Wolfowitz, would you suspend for just a second?

Mr. Abercrombie, you're asking good questions. They're somewhat complex questions. You got to let the witness be able to answer the questions. If you don't get him more than two or three seconds to start his answers, we're not going to be able to have a good, constructive dialogue.

ABERCROMBIE: I don't want the answers to get started. I just want the answers.

HUNTER: And I think it's a...

ABERCROMBIE: Chairman, either we are having this process completed before June 30th or we don't. If we don't, the answer is that we don't have it done.

HUNTER: Well, Mr. Abercrombie, you can dictate your questions. You can't dictate his answers. And you have to give him an opportunity to give his answers. And we're going to give him plenty of time.

ABERCROMBIE: All right.

HUNTER: Let's let him answer fully.

WOLFOWITZ: After June 30th, all operations of U.S. forces and the multinational forces, part of the MNF, will be under U.S. command -- clear U.S. command, reporting ultimately to the president of the United States.

Iraqi forces that are committed to joint operations will be under the same command, that is a joint command headed by the multinational force commander.

Iraqi forces, if they choose to undertake independent operations, are free to do so. It is a sovereign government. Although they are obliged under the terms of these letters to coordinate with the multinational force commander, and where there are sensitive issues of policy, we are committed to reaching agreement on what to do.

Similarly, where we planned to undertake sensitive offensive operations that cause issues for the Iraqi government, we are committed to consulting with them on matters of policy to reach some common understanding.

I think that's a very clear arrangement. It's as clear as it's possible to be. It's going to depend on circumstances and on concrete cases that I would say based on just a few weeks' experience of working with this new government even before they're sovereign, I'm quite confident the mechanisms will work.

ABERCROMBIE: So if the troops that you outline in your testimony here about, for example, the border police, 20,000 by July, fully equipped by September; the other forces -- facility protection service, 74,000 are on duty, final number to be determined, but fully equipped by September; the Iraqi army, 35,000 soldiers and 27 battalions trained and on duty by October, et cetera; then you should have some idea about when we can expect this to end for us.

I'm not asking you for a specific date, but I'm saying -- I'm asking you when can we expect this fully trained and equipped elements, from special operation forces to border police, to be able to assume authority in Iraq and begin the process of withdrawing troops, particularly those in the Guard and Reserve, back to the United States?

ABERCROMBIE: Where's the end in sight?

Because -- and I'm not trying -- I want you -- I'm not asking for a specific date, but if all of this is taking place and you made testimony, as you do every time here, that everything is moving along and if not right on schedule, almost on schedule, surely we can have some understanding of then when our obligations are going to be taking another level.

WOLFOWITZ: We can do our best, Mr. Abercrombie, but let's think about Bosnia, which is a vastly simpler case. Nobody was shooting at us, and yet, eight years ago people said we'll be out in a year, and I don't think anyone would have been able to tell you in eight years we will be out, which is where we're about to be...

ABERCROMBIE: But we had, if you're going to use...

WOLFOWITZ: This is a war. This is a war. We're fighting an enemy, which is a very determined enemy, which is determined to try to upset this process, and I think is going to make a particularly determined effort over the next six months or so because once there's an elected government I think they're going to face a very, very serious defeat, which they're trying to prevent.

ABERCROMBIE: You continually use Bosnia as an example, but you don't represent it accurately.

On the contrary, where Bosnia's concerned we had specific times of draw-downs, which we have met. We've gone from thousands of troops with specific numbers of troops being drawn down at specific times, and all that has worked because we had the infrastructure there in place.

I suggest to you that what you're proposing here is virtually schizophrenic. On the one hand, "You're saying everything is working according to the plans that we have, if not exactly on time almost on time," and yet when it comes to the United States being able to extract itself in an honorable fashion and in an orderly fashion it suddenly disappears.

If you're going to use Bosnia as an analogy rather than a parallel, then it seems to me that you should stick with is as an analogy, and this is the draw-down parallel.

(UNKNOWN): Will the gentleman yield? Will the gentleman yield?

ABERCROMBIE: Certainly.

(UNKNOWN): My good friend and colleague, I just have to state for the record, I can fully remember, because I've given the speech probably 30 times, the president of the United States telling us we'd be out of Bosnia by Christmas of 1998; emphatically, end of the record, that was what he told us, Christmas of 1998. This is June of 2004, and we're still in Bosnia.

ABERCROMBIE: Reclaiming my time...

HUNTER: Let the chair reclaim time for just a second.

I'd say to my good friend from Hawaii, we've got about 30 folks here that need to ask questions. The gentleman's had a pretty good run at the secretary, and I'd like to recognize...

WOLFOWITZ: I did not claim Bosnia as...

HUNTER: Let the secretary answer.

WOLFOWITZ: ... an analogy. I said Bosnia is vastly simpler because there wasn't an enemy trying to defeat us.

WOLFOWITZ: And it's the enemy in Iraq that makes things unpredictable.

And I also didn't say that everything's going swimmingly on schedule. I said our equipping of Iraqi security forces is sadly behind schedule, partly because of our cumbersome contracting procedures.

I think it is finally on schedule. I am hopeful. But I think we are reasonably confident, reasonably confident about the numbers we'd given you about what we expect they'll be capable of feeling by the end of this year. And that should make a significant difference.

I can't tell you how big a difference, and I am with Mr. Spratt in saying I'm not convinced that it's enough. But it will get us substantially improved over where we are today.

And I think there's no question in my mind that at some point, a relative handful of killers, no matter how ruthless they are, can be defeated by an Iraqi people that in the vast majority does not want to see a return to the old horrors.

ABERCROMBIE: Well, I'll conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that does not answer the question with respect to the responsibility of the United States, then, to keep on providing military forces when we don't have them, when we continue to have stop losses for Guard and Reserve and when we do not have a clear understanding of what our deployment schedules are going to be or requirements are going to be. And this committee is going to have to deal with that. Thank you.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman for a very fulsome question.

And the gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh?

MCHUGH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome.

I'm tempted to ask to demand what our exit strategy is from Germany, seeing as how we're still there half a century later.

I can't help but express my frustration when I hear members of this committee demand an exit strategy when we'll be done but don't need a date to tell us that.

I think the strategy has been outlined. I suggest perhaps our debate should be focused upon the fact of whether or not the strategy will work. I don't think any of us know the answer to that at the moment.

But having said all of that, Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to your opening comments. People like to say what mistakes were made. I happen to believe a mistake is something that you know should not be done, that all evidence suggests if you do it, you're stupid, but you do it anyway.

I think there have, rather than mistakes been made, lessons to be learned. As we look back, I can't imagine a military engagement of this or any other side that suggest after the fact that had you known then what you hold in your intelligence now, you would be doing some things differently.

MCHUGH: I think the disbandment of the Iraqi army in its totality was probably something, as a lessons learned, we might have done differently.

You commented that you believed or suggest the possibility that Prime Minister Allawi may, in fact, issue a recision of that order. Given where we are today I'm not sure now that that's the right thing to do. I'm not sure that it's not.

But could you tell me from your perspective what the political reaction of that would be amongst Muqtada Al-Sadr and his supporters, particularly the Shia population, Ali Sistani, the grand ayatollah, and others to the reconfiguration of that army that, by and large, was a Sunni instrument of suppression?

WOLFOWITZ: You've just described the very dilemma that led Ambassador Bremer to decide to dissolve the army, which, by the way, had largely gone home anyway. It was a conscript army and heavily overweighted with officers, which is where the issue arises. But most of that army were getting $2 a month, and they had no interest in coming back on duty.

But the issue has to do -- and it's a legitimate issue -- as to whether or not that order may have alienated some significant number of army officers who otherwise would have been cooperative.

But again let's be under no illusions: It had nothing to do with the fact that the members of the old Gestapo -- and I don't know a better word for it, because if you say Mukhabarat it doesn't mean that much; maybe Gestapo doesn't mean that much anymore to people who don't know their history -- but those people didn't decide to fight us because we disbanded the army.

They'd been -- Saddam Hussein was out there funding fights against us until December. He didn't make that decision because of our decision on the army. So let's be clear: The core of the enemy are the hard core killers, and they've been there since the beginning.

This issue about the army has to do with whether some officers who otherwise are decent people might have provided some at least passive support to the enemy because they were disillusioned. And I think prime minister's trying to pull those people back and at the same time do it without his -- as your question properly suggests --, providing ammunition for somebody else, Sadr or maybe a more reasonable person, to say, "This government's bringing back the old regime."

I am absolutely certain this government has no intention of bringing back the whole regime. I gave you a recital earlier of how Allawi, himself, suffered from the old regime. I was very struck, in fact, when General Latif, who was the initial man in charge of the Fallujah Brigade, who's an army veteran himself, spoke with eloquence, not too far along the lines of Mr. Weldon, that, "Our neighbors do not want us to succeed in this (inaudible), because they know that a free and democratic Iraq is going to be a threat to them," and he clearly meant particularly I think Syria and Iran.

He believes in it. He doesn't want to go back. But after what Iraq has been through there are a lot of people who will be fearful that bringing back old army officers might represent a return to the past.

The prime minister has a challenge. It's much better that this challenge be faced by an Iraqi than by an American administrator. I'll imagine he'll make mistakes, or at least he'll make errors of judgment, that he'll go in one direction and the political process will scream and say, "You've gone too far." I think he's a smart enough man to tack and change a little.

I think that's what democratic process is about is the ability to correct mistakes through a process of public debate and transparency, and I see Iraq heading into that era, and it needs it because this issue of how do you handle people who served their country honorably but under a totally dishonorable regime, how do you treat them appropriately, it's a big challenge, and I'm glad there'll be an Iraqi government to make those judgments.

MCHUGH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PACE: Sir, if I might add, with regard to timing, I can't give you a precise timeline. But I do know the things that must happen.

First of all, we must have a well-trained, competent Iraqi security force. That will take time. We are behind for the reasons that have been stated. But that needs to happen.

When they are well-trained and competent, then they need to take, for example, Baghdad, where they should be -- Iraqis should be standing the police beat downtown Baghdad. They should be doing the patrolling downtown Baghdad.

And we should initially move back from the center of the city to the outside of the city so that if they get in trouble that they can't handle, we are in close proximity to respond and support. And as they become more capable and they take over the outer cordon as well and we move back even further. And then as they become totally capable and competent, then we can leave the country.

But this should be event-driven not calendar-driven.

MCHUGH: Mr. Chairman, if I might -- I couldn't agree with you more, General, and that was my point about cannot establish dates.

But I would just say to my colleagues, if there's any doubt in any of our minds that the key to the success here lies in the Iraqi people and the standing up of these various security forces, just look at where more and more of the bombings are occurring. They are occurring in army recruitment centers. They are occurring at police stations where Iraqis are on duty.

I think the enemy and those who wish this fledgling democracy ill understand that as well.

So I would suggest, as I started to say earlier, the strategy is what should be debated here. And at least our enemies, in part, feel this strategy is very achievable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

And now the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder?

SNYDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Pace, for being here.

Mr. Secretary, do we have a parts problem in Iraq?

Just in the last 30 minutes, I got an e-mail from someone I know over there. And their platoon has three of their six dozers down because of equipment and maintenance problems. Two of their front-end loaders are down because of parts and maintenance problems. And these are machines that are used for filling in containers and proving protection from blasts.

Do we continue to have a parts and maintenance problem on our vehicles?

PACE: Sir, there may be spot problems for specific units getting resources down to them. I'm not aware of those. But I do know that this Congress has provided sufficient resources for us to have all the spare parts we need to continue this mission.

If you could give me off-line the name of the units so I can you specificity on why that particular problem exists.

SNYDER: You think it's rare and spotty problem, not a systemic problem we're having with equipment and vehicles, maintenance and parts.

PACE: I do believe that, yes, sir.

SNYDER: Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you about this issue of the equipping of the Iraqi army. We've had ongoing discussions about these troops. And for the -- I don't know -- six or eight months or so, Secretary Rumsfeld has said multiple times when he would list the coalition forces the numbers of troops that he would add in -- and they were impressive looking numbers.

But then today, both in your oral statement but also in your written statement, you spend quite a bit of time talking about the equipping.

And on page 21 of your statement you say that, "Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point."

SNYDER: But candidly, Mr. Secretary, when you had listed these charts in the last six, eight months that would list those troops, I think most of us assumed that if they were on the list and they were considered part of the coalition, that they had been properly equipped.

You go into detail now about getting these troops equipped. Are we on track now to have this equipment? Who is responsible for what went wrong that they were not equipped at this point in time?

WOLFOWITZ: We'd have to look at particular numbers -- I've tried always to be careful about saying, for example, we have large numbers of police but the great majority of them are not well-trained. And the big challenge has been, and it remains, to get police training up and also equipping.

I think -- and this is something we're monitoring closely, and having General Petraeus there is a key factor. But I was told just this past week that large quantities of equipment are now arriving under...

SNYDER: He told us last week that though. He says the contracting process, in his words, is "up and in high gear"; that there was originally a problem, he thought, on his end of things in Iraq with the contracting process. And you know you talk about what might-have-beens we're trying to learn from this, we had problems with SAPI plates, we had trouble with up-armored Humvees, I'm hearing from folks in Iraq we have parts and maintenance problems with vehicles.

And then your statement says we're behind in our equipping of Iraqi troops. And you made reference to the Congress being at error, but I read General Petraeus' statement to say that the contracting is up and running. And perhaps this is an area where advance planning could have foreseen that we were going to need so many troops or we want to have Iraqi troops well-equipped.

Another question...

WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Snyder, what I think is important -- advance planning is great, but when you're in a war, flexibility is also essential. And the Congress has given us a lot of flexibility on things like up-armored Humvees and SAPI plates. I think we were able to move about $2.5 billion, thanks to the flexibility you've given us, against those force protection needs.

As I think you know -- and