June 16, 2004

DUNCAN HUNTER,
A Representitive from California, and
Chairman, House Armed Services Commitee

HUNTER: The committee will come to order.

This morning the committee continues its examination of Operation Iraqi Freedom with a specific focus on the status of U.S. military forces following the handover of sovereignty on June 30th.

We are also planning another hearing on this topic next Tuesday, June 22nd, with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who is presently in Iraq reviewing these very issues for Secretary Rumsfeld.

To begin the committee's view of this topic, our witnesses this morning are: the Honorable Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense -- thank you, Mr. Rodman for being with us -- General Walter Sharp, director for strategic plans and policy -- thank you, General -- and the Honorable Francis Ricciardone -- thank you, sir -- coordinator for Iraq transition, United States Department of State.

So welcome to the committee, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony, appreciate your appearance before the committee this morning.

Just two weeks from today, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq will hand sovereignty over to an Iraqi interim government. This event marks the latest step in a plan that has been unfolding since last fall.

It will be followed by national elections to a transitional government just after the new year, a popular vote on a new constitution next fall and direct elections to a constitutional government before the end of 2005.

Some people here and in Iraq may be impatient with the process. But I think Jefferson, Washington, Adams and Franklin would be astounded at the speed with which things are happening.

June 30th is a milestone on the road to a stable, democratic and secure Iraq in which Iraqis decide the future of their own country. More importantly, the momentum toward a fully sovereign and democratic Iraq will accelerate.

Already roughly 60 percent of the Iraqi government has been turned over to Iraqi control. The Coalition Provisional Authority has issued an order transferring Iraqi security forces from under the command and control of the multinational force to the Iraqi interim government.

Additionally, the multinational force is continuing its efforts at training the Iraqis to take over the security mission themselves.

Roughly 150,000 Iraqis are on duty on in training to serve on the Iraqi police force and the military as members of the civil defense corps or in the Department of Border Enforcement.

This is a clear sign that the Iraqis are moving forward and taking over the responsibility for securing their country.

And obviously, the news of the sabotage of the pipeline is evidence of the importance of this standup, certainly, of these security facilities, security forces and border forces.

The handover is significant on a strategic scale, but June 30th won't mean much change in the daily lives of our soldiers. They will still be in Iraq. They will face a determined terrorist enemy. They will still work with Iraqis to defeat that enemy.

They will still be under American command. And I think that's an important point to establish. And I would hope, gentlemen, that you will speak to that point, because that's of interest to every American, is that our forces are under American command.

They will need every ounce of support this country can muster to succeed in their mission. And this is where the outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom will be decided. And this is where we must focus our attention in the coming months.

Gentlemen, thanks again for appearing before the committee. We look forward to your testimony.

HUNTER: And at this time, let me recognize my partner, the gentleman from Missouri, the distinguished Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he might want to make.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

IKE SKELTON,
A Representitive from Missouri, and
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Commitee

SKELTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for calling this hearing. This is one that's very important, as we will soon learn from our witnesses. And I welcome Secretary Rodman, General Sharp, Ambassador Ricciardone. Nice to have you back with us.

There's been a fair amount of political progress since our last hearing on Iraq, and the Iraqis now have an interim leadership that will take that country from June the 30th on, on through the national elections.

I'm pleased that the United Nations Security Council was able to pass a unanimous resolution that sets the basic framework in place for the American and multinational forces.

I've had the opportunity to read and study to a limited extent the United Nations resolution, and we will ask you about that shortly. But the wording seems to say the right thing concerning our forces and their ability to defend themselves and to do their job.

The assassinations of government leaders and those associated with improving Iraqi infrastructure, sadly, will continue in all likelihood in the coming weeks and months.

The release today of the results of the CPA-commissioned public opinion poll, of course, are disturbing. Only 10 percent of those polled support American troops, while 55 percent said that they would feel safer if our troops immediately left. This shows the impact both of the ongoing violence and of the Abu Ghraib prison situation that demonstrates quite jarringly that we are not winning the hearts and minds. We have to develop a better partnership with the new Iraqi government.

I'd like to raise two issues, if I may, Mr. Chairman. One is the Iraqi security forces -- clearly we need to make faster progress toward the time when Iraqis can provide for their own security. The appointment of Major General David Petraeus to lead the training of these forces is, frankly, an excellent choice, and I look forward to our hearing with him tomorrow.

I think we need a strategic plan in this area with clear benchmarks that can be measured. That's why I offered an amendment that effect in our defense bill, and I thank the chairman for his support in that effort.

The performance of the Iraqi security forces to date has been uneven. That's probably an understatement. But there's no force more important for Iraqis' future than that.

Second, while the Security Council's resolution is critical, it appropriately leaves a number of issues to be resolved in the soon-to- be-sovereign Iraqi government. Both Secretary Powell and Prime Minister Allawi had letters referring to consultation regarding sensitive operations, but I'd like to understand what additional arrangements we'll be working out over the next few weeks.

I further understand that we will not have a status of forces agreement until after the elections next January. That concerns me a great deal. And the status of forces agreement also would include in it the rules of engagement.

SKELTON: And rather than narrow the protection of U.S. forces that are enshrined in the resolution and existing CPA orders, I think it's critical that those protections be explicit in some sort of status of forces agreement which we look forward to in the near future.

Again, we thank you gentlemen for being with us and look forward to your testimony.

HUNTER: I thank the gentlemen for his statement.

And let me align myself with the last remarks of my good friend from Missouri.

The rules of engagement that go directly to the force protection of our forces are of utmost importance to this committee and I think every member of Congress and every American.

And we want to scrub in detail any prospect for changing rules of engagement from the ones that presently exist as a result of political interaction with this new government in Iraq. Very clearly, this committee will not countenance any accommodations that are made which result in less force protection for American personnel.

So I hope that's understood. And I hope and I believe also, gentlemen, that the administration is fully in agreement with that, but that's an area of great concern to us.

So having said that, again, Secretary Rodman, thank you for being with us this morning. We appreciate your appearance and the floor is yours, sir.

TESTIMONY OF

PETER RODMAN,
Assistant Secretary of Defense

RODMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Skelton, members of the committee. It's a privilege to appear before this committee again. You have a prepared statement which I've submitted, and I hope that will be...

HUNTER: Without objection, Mr. Secretary, all statements will be taken into the record.

RODMAN: Thank you.

And so, I don't need to go into the detail right now. But that statement includes -- it does go into these questions in a certain degree of detail. It describes the U.N. resolution. It describes how the letters sent to the Security Council by Secretary of State Powell and by the new Iraqi prime minister addressing these issues. And those letters reflect an understanding that we have already reached with the Iraqis on basic principles of a security partnership.

And that understanding which we've reached with the Iraqis is incorporated by reference in the U.N. resolution and, in effect, blessed by the U.N. resolution.

So the basic elements of our partnership...

HUNTER: Let me just say, Mr. Secretary, too, I've reviewed those letters and the U.N. resolution, and I think the one thing all Americans would agree on is that we're well served by having a former military leader, that is Colin Powell, in this position where politics and political considerations can very easily result in making military policies that don't accrue to the benefit of our troops.

And I think it's good to have a guy who's done this before I guess is what I'm saying, who knows what it means and knows what it means from both sides, the diplomatic side and the military side, putting this thing together.

So I didn't mean to interrupt you, but I think that is something that I'm grateful for and I think most Americans.

RODMAN: We can discuss, I'm sure in the course of the hearing, more of the details of this understanding that we have worked out with the Iraqis and which the U.N., as I say, has blessed.

The point I would like to emphasize right now at the beginning is just, again, to reiterate the significance of June 30th, because our basic strategy for defeating the insurgency is political as well as military. It is precisely to empower the moderates in Iraq to help them take responsibility for their country and that is a way of marginalizing the extremists politically.

Even while we and the Iraqis are hunting them down militarily, the political strategy is to fill the vacuum left by the old regime with helping Iraqis build their own new institutions and to take charge.

RODMAN: And that is why we're very pleased with the new interim government. We think it's a group of capable and impressive people. And we're confident that we and they already have some basic understandings on a security partnership and the details of that will continue to be fleshed out. And the security partnership is part of that political strategy of helping Iraqis take charge.

I think you've cited the opinion polls which suggest, though, the Iraqis are getting impatient. We understand that. As a political leader, you're familiar with the "What have you done for me lately?" syndrome.

We are absolutely convinced that the Iraqi people overwhelmingly consider what happened last year a liberation from a tyrant. But a year has gone by and there is still some hardships, there are still uncertainties, and it's natural for them to resent the people in authority, especially when the people in authority are foreign forces sitting there under the banner of occupation.

So that is why it was absolutely essential to have this June 30th handover, to begin the process of Iraqis taking charge of their own affairs. And as I say the security partnership with them will be part of the next phase.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General Sharp?

TESTIMONY OF

GENERAL WALTER SHARP,
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy

SHARP: Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee, I'd like to also thank you for the opportunity to address you here today on this very important subject.

And before I begin, I'd like to also thank you for the continued support of the men and women of our armed forces.

Today Iraqi security personnel, the United States and 31 coalition partners are working together to secure, protect and establish peace and justice for all Iraqi citizens so they may enjoy a future of their own choosing.

Establishment of a safe and secure environment is the single most important element for improved Iraqi quality of life, because it enables relief efforts, a free political process, economic prosperity and social opportunity.

Multinational personnel have made significant progress, along with the Iraqis, in recruiting, training, and equipping Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi people have stepped forward. More than 225,000 Iraqi citizens have taken positions of various components of the Iraqi security forces. By the end of this month, over $3 billion will have been committed to Iraqi forces equipment, infrastructure and training.

SHARP: And if I might also add that General Petraeus, as you pointed out, has been on the ground over there for approximately two weeks. And already the emphases that he and we and the Iraqis are putting on the training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces are being noted.

In his meetings that he has had with Prime Minister Allawi over the last several days, he has noted back to us the forward leaning and the desire for the Iraqis to take charge of their security responsibilities.

They are moving forward. They desire to be out and to be seen in front. And we are working together to make sure that they are trained and equipped to be able to accomplish that mission.

By the 30th of June, the United States and its coalition partners will transition control of Iraq to a fully sovereign Iraqi interim government. Our responsibilities will not end with the 30 June transition.

Multinational forces will remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi people and with the authorization of the United Nations after the Iraqi interim government assumes its leadership responsibilities.

These forces, and increasingly Iraqi forces, will continue to conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining anti-Iraqi forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in Iraq in order to create a secure environment in which the people of Iraq can build their own future.

They will also continue the current efforts to organize, train, equip, mentor, certify credible and capable Iraqi security forces in order to continue the transition of responsibility for security from multinational forces to Iraqi forces.

Concurrently, Iraqi and multinational forces will continue to conduct stability operations to support the evolving Iraqi government, the restoration of essential service and the economic development.

According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.

SHARP: This U.N. Security Council resolution further requires that arrangements are put in place to establish a security partnership between the sovereign government of Iraq and the multinational force and to assure coordination between the two.

And Prime Minister Allawi's letter, together with Secretary Powell's letter, both that are part of the U.N. Security Council resolution, serve as the foundation for establishing the coordinating mechanisms that will be essential to this unity of command in Iraq.

The security structures described in these letters will serve as a fora for the government of Iraq and the multinational force to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on the sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between Iraqi security forces and the multinational force through close cooperation and coordination.

I am confident that through this partnership we -- we, the Iraqis, the coalition and the U.S. armed forces -- will succeed in establishing a secure and stable environment in Iraq.

I'm happy to take your questions.

HUNTER: Thank you, General.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being with us this morning. The floor is yours, sir.

TESTIMONY OF

FRANCIS RICCIARDONE,
Cordinator for Iraq Transition, United States Department of State

RICCIARDONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, members of the committee. It's an honor to be with you today. And thank you also for letting me put the more detailed and extended text into the record.

I'd like to begin by paying tribute to the men and women who are serving in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I know you have a son serving in Fallujah with the Marines.

All of us as Americans are very, very proud of our countrymen serving there, with the civilians, our military.

I also wanted to thank our coalition partners who are lending their civilians and their soldiers to the effort as well.

Mr. Chairman, on May 24th, President Bush outlined very clearly what we must do to support the mission in Iraq to achieve freedom and democracy there: number one, hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government; secondly, help establish security; third, continue rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure; fourth, encourage international support; and fifth, move toward free national elections.

We're making progress on all of these fronts. The first one will be accomplished just two weeks from now as the Coalition Provisional Authority hands over power to the Iraqi interim government.

And on that day, our relationship will change fundamentally. What I am here to report to you on, ladies and gentlemen, is the progress we have made in establishing the U.S. mission -- the U.S. embassy that we need in Iraq to get the job done, to support our troops, to accomplish what we need to for the United States in support of the new Iraqi government.

In January, Secretary Powell called me back from Manila to Washington to work with the Department of Defense in a single interagency team. My colleague and good friend, retired Lieutenant General Mick Kicklighter, has just left for Baghdad last weekend, where he's going to be through the transition. Mick and I have established a partnership, and our two agencies have worked together extremely closely, and we have made great progress together.

RICCIARDONE: We now have a team effort that I am convinced will persist well through the transition and beyond.

I'd like to update you, if I may, on the four areas that Undersecretary Grossman covered when he last visited with you at the end of April.

First, on people: Many people are focused on the fact that the embassy in Baghdad will be among our largest in the world. That's true. In fact, it would rank about number three of our 260 diplomatic and consular missions around the world.

But more important than the size of it I think is the quality. Under the leadership of Ambassador Negroponte and others of our most senior and experienced foreign service officers, civil service specialists, and U.S. government employees of other agencies as well, I think Embassy Baghdad is taking shape as one of our very best, not just one of our largest.

We will have about 900 Americans in permanent assignments there under chief of mission authority, and ultimately about 550 foreign service nationals -- that's Iraqi employees -- for a total mission size of something under 1,500.

And that mission will include two temporary organizations, the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and the Program Contracting Office. Those offices will be devoted to supporting the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund management and implementation.

From our global experience, we expect that over time the number of Americans will decline a bit while the number of Iraqi employees will increase, and I will provide more detailed statistics in my formal testimony.

Our diplomats in Iraq will represent the United States and support Iraqi development programs not only in Baghdad, but also in Iraq's provinces. We are planning on -- we will establish -- we are establishing four regional hubs in Kirkuk, Mosul, Hillah and Basra. And we also plan to embed foreign service officers in five United States military commands.

I would note here that our American security rests on our American diplomacy, as well as our military power. And our diplomatic readiness will depend on the continued foresight and support of the president and the Congress to invest in training, protecting and supporting all our people, foreign service, civil service and foreign service nationals.

We've used the recent increases in the department civil and foreign service work force, including new positions planned in the 2005 budget, to meet our staffing requirements in Iraq as part of the diplomatic readiness initiative.

President Bush and Secretary Powell, with the support of Congress, had established the diplomatic readiness initiative to improve the training standards of our people and to address just such emerging foreign policy priorities.

On security: This remains a dangerous mission.

Our top priority is to keep our people safe while enabling our diplomats to accomplish our work with the Iraqi government and people in support of our forces. In the past few days, the deputy secretaries of State and Defense signed memoranda of understanding making clear the security responsibilities and support that each agency will assume.

Meanwhile, the security upgrade of the planned interim embassy buildings is progressing to meet deadlines. We have selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on security. Fifty one armored vehicles of the future embassy are already in Iraq, another 90 are on order, and we expect to receive many more from the Coalition Provisional Authority.

And to complement the security personnel who are already there under the United States military and CPA funded contracts, we have 30 diplomatic security personnel of the Department of State and 10 other Department of State contract people who are already on the ground.

On buildings, we have a building in the Green Zone that will serve temporarily as the embassy chancery until we build a more permanent facility. It's under renovation. It will be ready for occupancy before July 1st for the ambassador and a small number of staff.

Until we build a new embassy compound, we will temporarily use the former Republican Palace where the CPA is now located for most nonpublic purposes.

We will also continue to use another building temporarily as the ambassador's residence.

We have identified a site on which we will build a new embassy, which could include all offices, housing and support facilities.

RICCIARDONE: We would expect to build and occupy the new facility within about two years of receiving the funding.

On the financial outlook, I could share our budget projections for you to operate the embassy.

And I need to emphasize that what I present to you is an estimate. It's a snapshot that we have today. It's subject very much to change depending on conditions in Iraq.

We now estimate the costs of operating the new mission in Iraq for the balance of this fiscal year to be in the range of $483 million.

We will cover the costs in several ways. First, Congress has provided already about $97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim operations in our fiscal year of 2004 supplemental appropriations.

We also expect to have available the existing fourth-quarter portion of the portion of the operating expense budget appropriated for the CPA, $196 million, and under the supplemental up to 1 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund for another $184 million.

We estimate 2005 costs to operate the mission could amount to $1 billion excluding construction of a new embassy facility and the program contracting office.

The largest costs of running the mission are logistics and security. The Defense Department is covering those costs until needs can be assessed more precisely and we can determine supplemental requirements and come back to you and ask for more support.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, I'll be glad to take any questions.

HUNTER: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

And I want to tell the members, I think we are passing out or getting together the U.N. resolution and the accompanying letters from Dr. Allawi and Colin Powell. I think it's clear.

And let me just ask this as a first question, Mr. Rodman.

Usually in working within a country with military forces, a status of fores agreement is negotiated. Obviously, that did not apply in this case. And it is not contemplated that we are going to have a status of forces agreement until we have the elections at the end of the year, first of next year.

So in reality, it appears to me that letters that accompany the U.N. resolution, especially Colin Powell's letter that lays out basically status quo that the structure that's presently in place is the structure under which we're operating, for practical purpose that is the status of forces agreement. Is that not accurate?

RODMAN: That's an important part of the answer. Secretary Powell's letter makes explicit reference to this issue of jurisdiction.

The Prime Minister Allawi's letter refers to that indirectly. And the whole arrangement is blessed by the U.N.

In addition, however, we have the Iraqi interim constitution, Transitional Administrative Law says that existing CPA regulations will stay in effect until rescinded by new legislation.

And that includes CPA Order 17, which is the present document which spells out status of forces protections for our people.

And so by this document, the Iraqi interim constitution is the guiding document that governs the next two years. And CPA Order 17 will remain in effect and give us those protections more explicitly, in addition to having the whole arrangement blessed by the U.N. Security Council resolution, clearly with the consent of the Iraqi interim government as reflected in the letter from the prime minister. So we think we've pinned this down in several different ways.

HUNTER: And so for all of the coalition partners, they can be assured that the status quo with respect to their forces, it's manifest in the CPA policy will be continued.

HUNTER: And so they don't necessarily have to rely on the letter that is attached to the resolution, that Colin Powell issued. On the other hand, he does refer to the multinational force and that basically the rules are going to be status quo.

Have you had any discussions with any of the coalition partners on this?

RODMAN: Well, first of all, you're correct, and Secretary Powell's letter refers to all contributing states being in this position.

Secondly, I'm sure we've had discussions with the British for quite some time as we were developing the concept for the next phase, and I suspect with other coalition partners as well.

HUNTER: OK. Let's say we have an interim government which is now going into place, and we have a security problem, and they make a request for American forces to be moved to a certain location and undertake a certain mission. What happens?

RODMAN: I think I'll ask General Sharp to respond in more detail. But what we have outlined here is a security partnership. And it rests on a very clear sense of common interests of the two countries. It's not a legal contract as much as it is a political alliance, if you will. And as in any relationship of alliance or partnership, when any complicated situation arises, you discuss it.

And if the premise of common interest isn't there, then we shouldn't be in this situation at all.

So every contingency is not spelled out in detail. What is described in the letters is a set of procedures, a set of channels of communication which describe how sensitive problems will be discussed.

HUNTER: Let me pin you down on that a little bit. Let's say you have a specific issue that comes up that is of interest to the interim government. They think there is a substantial security problem in a certain area in Iraq and they make a request to American forces or to coalition forces to undertake a certain action. What is the blueprint for moving this issue with the Americans and for either engaging or not engaging in the policy that is requested?

RODMAN: If it can't be resolved low on the chain of command, it gets moved up the chain of command and could be discussed at a political level.

One of the forums that we have agreed to engage with them in is a ministerial committee for national security. This is the top leadership of the Iraqi chain of command. And our commander will be able to communicate with the leaders of Iraq. But perhaps General Sharp wants to give more detail.

SHARP: Sir, I can just add that at all levels of command there will also be, in the headquarters' elements, both Iraqis and coalition forces. And that has already been established and it has started to be put in place. And these are both in U.S., coalition and Iraqi headquarters.

So from a military perspective on how to coordinate operations and how to, as Mr. Rodman said, establish what the threats are, what the interests are that we have to go after in offensive operations, it's going to be done in partnership as it goes up.

So I believe to directly answer your question, if they ask -- and think the they you refer to in your question is really a group of both Iraqis and coalition forces, working together to determine where this threat are, believe that there's a threat there, then we -- and again, we meaning Iraqis and the coalition, would go after to destroy that threat.

HUNTER: But what is the forum? Colin Powell I think refers to certain fora in which we will work in the fora described by Prime Minister Allawi in his June 5th letter to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues. What I'm trying to do is get a sense of what happens, because precise things must happen before military action takes place. In the general, you don't simply have general discussions with general membership and the Iraqi leadership.

Have you got specific points of contact who are designated to both deliver requests to the Americans and to consult with Americans on those requests? Or is it General Sanchez's shop along with Ambassador Negroponte's shop to put those together? How is this thing going to work is what I want to know.

SHARP: Sir, we are in detailed discussions as Prime Minister Allawi and the minister of defense office and the ministry of interior offices stand up. But what is envisioned is potentially a contact with our commanders' group that will be headed by General Sanchez and, if confirmed General Casey, when he gets in country, that will work with the Iraqi ministers of defense, the senior military representative on the joint force headquarters, which will be the senior military officer there. That will be the top level of operations to work together to be able to do this.

There will also be, out on the division level and the brigade level what has already been set up and will continue, joint coordination centers.

SHARP: In these joint coordination centers are members of the military force, U.S., coalition, the Iraqi ICDC, for example, the Iraqi armed forces, the Iraqi police to make sure that all of the operations in that geographic area are being coordinated and deconflicted so we don't have any problems along those lines.

A lot of that mechanism at the lower level is already in place. And what we're trying to do now is link it from the top to the bottom so that the policy, the security interests of the country are continuous all the way across those realms.

HUNTER: OK. And so, in the meantime, in general, all the prerogatives that have existed prior to June 30th with respect to the ability of our forces to move and to go after the enemy -- and I know that's carried out in Colin Powell's letter. And I'd ask all members of the committee, take a look at that letter from Colin Powell, because for practical purposes it appears to me that is the status of forces agreement at this point. But those are all preserved as they exist now.

Is that your understanding, General?

SHARP: Yes, sir. Absolutely. Especially in, I guess it's the fourth to the last paragraph, where he talks through the specific tasks that include offensive operations in there. And it's referred to also in Prime Minister Allawi's letter. He refers to the tasks that are in Secretary Powell's letter that authorize us to do that. And I guess the last point would be, again, the "all necessary means" that are referred to in the U.N. Security Council resolution.

HUNTER: Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary.

RODMAN: May I add, when Secretary Powell refers to existing arrangements, he's referring to CPA Order 17, which also spells that out.

HUNTER: OK.

Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Missouri?

SKELTON: I felt pretty good about this until our chairman asked you these last several questions.

Secretary Rodman used the phrase, "We think we have pinned this down in several different ways." We have a United Nations Security Council resolution. We have letters between our secretary of state and the interim prime minister, Mr. Allawi. And you said that it's not spelled out in detail.

I look at the letter from Dr. Allawi, the fourth from the last paragraph. It says, "In addition, the relevant ministers and I will develop further mechanisms for coordination with the MNF. Intend to create with the MNF coordination bodies at national, regional and local levels that will include Iraqi security forces, commanders and civilian leadership, to ensure that Iraqi security forces will coordinate with the MNF on all security policy operations issues in order to achieve unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with MNF."

This letter refers to the future, and I'm not sure what the phrase "unity of command" references, or what that means.

People of authority told me some time ago, I think in this chamber, that we were supposed to have a status of forces agreement on March the 31st. Am I correct? Am I correct?

RODMAN: That was last year's political timetable.

SKELTON: But I'm correct?

RODMAN: That was the plan several months ago, yes.

SKELTON: Of course. We don't have a status of forces agreement now, do we?

RODMAN: CPA Order 17 is a detailed document that looks at -- that is the status of forces arrangement. And that...

SKELTON: Excuse me for interrupting, but I'm talking about an agreement between the Iraqis and us. Is there a status of forces agreement between the Iraqis and us which would include rules of engagement?

Let me tell you why I'm worried about this, and I'm not overstating the case. You're going to have some sergeant or some corporal or some second lieutenant at some point not having the right understanding of what his rights and duties are.

I remember so well talking with that sergeant in Beirut who was standing guard without permission to have bullets in his rifle as this truck came barreling through the fence and blew up and killed some 280 American Marines.

And I want to know what will you transmit to the sergeants and the corporals down there regarding the rules of engagement, which should be based upon a status of force? I don't want to argue with you, but to a sergeant down there, it's going to be very, very important.

RODMAN: I want to nail down first of all that CPA Order 17 is a detailed status of forces arrangement which will continue in effect. It has been blessed by the Iraqis and now has even the more exalted status of being blessed by a U.N. Security Council resolution, which is not true of most of our status of forces arrangement.

So I think the SOFA arrangements are nailed down under international law and by very clear-cut bilateral understanding with the Iraqis, reaffirmed by the new prime minister.

So the status of forces arrangements I think are detailed and nailed down.

On the rules of engagement, I mean, perhaps General Sharp can elaborate on how that is covered.

SHARP: Sir, as you know, the rules of engagement have been laid out in the orders that have been given to our troops. Those rules of engagement will continue as they are right now. That's point one.

Point two, is we always have the right to self-defense. And that's inherent in any type of mission that we carry out. So the rules of engagement for self-defense will be there, without question.

I believe, thirdly, when the U.N. Security Council resolution says all necessary means, when Secretary Powell says we will continue to be able to do offensive operations, the tasks that are laid out in order to be able to provide a secure environment, when Prime Minister Allawi in his letter acknowledges that, that allows us to have the robust rules of engagement that we need in order to be able to accomplish the mission, that you all, the president and the U.N. have endorsed and given to us.

SKELTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon?

WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you all for coming. And let me add my praise for our troops. Almost everyone on this committee has been to Iraq and/or Afghanistan over the past several months. And I can tell you that we have been overwhelmingly impressed with the quality of the men and women who are serving America.

And I can just tell you from the troops we met up in Tikrit and Kirkuk, to those in Baghdad and over in Kabul, the K-2 base in Uzbekistan, our men and women are the best.

And let no one be mistaken about that.

But I have the same concerns that my chairman and ranking member have mentioned in regard to the rules of engagement. We have to make sure -- and, General, this applies primarily to our military, and that's our responsibility here, making sure our soldiers and other military personnel are given the proper authority they need to defend themselves and protect their own lives and those of their colleagues.

That is a major concern that I have as well, that it is clear, it's well defined, the military understands what it can or cannot do, and that those rules of engagement are done with the best interests of our soldiers and military personnel in mind.

Let me also share perhaps for our other witnesses, especially from the State Department, my concern. There's been some media reports of the latest poll in Iraq which has not been something that gives me a great deal of confidence.

Granted, this poll was done right after the prison scandal that broke, but I saw one article that said 71 percent of the people in Iraq now depend on their family and friends for security more than they do the provisional authority. And 80 percent said they have no confidence in either the U.S. civilian authorities or coalition forces -- 80 percent.

WELDON: And so I understand this is a difficult task and with the increased acts of terrorism that have occurred in the past several months that would be a reason why the Iraqis would feel this way. But as we transition the authority of the government, it's another major concern that I have.

And let me say that an issue that has not been addressed here, and this is really for the State Department, and perhaps not appropriate in this hearing: Mr. Chairman, we talk about the transfer of power to the new Iraqi government. And all of us want it to succeed, and all of us are happy with the work our troops have done and the work that Paul Bremer's done and General Sanchez has done.

But I don't think any of that really answers the ultimate question of how stable Iraq is going to be after June 30th.

I think the real question that needs to be answered is: What are we doing about Iran? In my opinion, and I don't say this slightly, over the past year I've been working with some informants in Paris who are former leaders of the Shah's government, and almost every one of their predictions has come true -- from their prediction eight months ago that the Iranians would funnel $75 million or $70 million dollars into Sadr. Back then, we didn't even know who Sadr was. And today, everyone knows who Sadr is.

In my opinion, and I'm not talking about the Iranian people. I want to make that clear distinction. Because as the recent elections show with only 9 percent of the Iranian people came out to vote, they have no confidence in their government in, at least in Khamenei, and even to some extent in Khatami.

So I'm clearly distinguishing between the Iranian people who I clearly think want to be our friends and want to partner with us and the radical Islamic fundamentalist regime that controls that country -- Khamenei.

My understanding is that Khamenei has set up a shadow operation separate from the government, a group of eight or 10 people who are a terrorist network that are providing much of the financial and support of, not just Al Qaida, but the radical fundamentalist regimes like Islamic Jihad and Hamas and the other terrorist groups that are fomenting unrest in Iraq.

And if you like at Iran, you could understand that very easily. You have a very unpopular govern in Iran, headed by Khamenei, that only 9 percent of the people even bother to come out an vote in elections this year because of their lack of confidence.

And on one side, you have Afghanistan moving toward a new constitution and a stable government. On the other side, you have Iraq that as of June 30th will do the same. And then you have the symbol of terrorism for the past 25 years, Colonel Gadhafi, giving up his WMD without us firing a single shot.

Well, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that that radical regime in Iran has got to be extremely uncomfortable with what is going on in Iraq.

And, in my opinion, that's where the problem is. It's with Iran, and it's with the funneling of money and support from the radical Islamic leadership in Iran into Iran.

And so my question for the State Department, perhaps it can't be answered today is: What is our strategy in dealing with Iran as the transition of Iraq's legitimate government to its people?

What is that strategy?

And, my own opinion is we haven't done enough to cultivate a stable relationship with Russia who could play the most influential role in helping us deal with Iran.

But I would hope that the State Department, besides the strategy of rules of engagement, the rules of the status of forces, besides the transitional authority, the ultimate election, a convening of meetings in Iraq, the key thing for me is: What is our strategy in regard to Iran a this transfer takes place over the next several months and years?

So, Ambassador, I would just ask for the record: Is there such a strategy specific to Iran relative to this transfer of power and authority?

RICCIARDONE: Congressman, I would like to get back to you on the larger question of Iran strategy, if you're talking about strategy toward Iran with respect to weapons of mass destruction and Russia and Afghanistan, all of the points you touched on, globally.

With respect to Iraq, I would make the point that the Iraqis are at least as concerned as we are. And we are very concerned about Iranian influence and machinations and sending in people and money and so forth.

I know this, personally, from having spoken with many Iraqis. I know its a concern of Prime Minister Allawi.

RICCIARDONE: The overall strategy is really the strategy that the president set forth for strengthening Iraq as a free country, a democracy, a prosperous one, strengthening the rule of law.

All the things that we are doing to help Iraq become strong, not just to protect its internal security, but also to open its economy, are all things that will work as antidotes to what Iran is trying to sow.

Having dealt with Iraq for a couple of decades now, I can reassure you that Iraqis have a very strong Iraqi identity. People often suggest that because a majority of Iraqis are of the Shiite branch of Islam that there's some kind of natural affinity for Iranian meddling or Iranian influence. I have never found that to be true among the most devote Shiites I have known, among the religious leadership that I have met at different times over the years.

That's the main point. The Iraqis are even more concerned about Iranian meddling than we are, and we are extremely concerned, number one.

Number two, our larger strategy for strengthening Iraq, training their armed forces, strengthening the rule of law by strengthening the judiciary, opening the economy, all those things I believe are the best way of confronting what Iran is trying to promote.

Indeed, I think the Iranians fear that we might succeed in Iraq on all those fronts, and it will bleed over and destabilize what the mullahs are trying to do there.

WELDON: Well, if I might, just a quick follow-up. You're exactly right. I mean, that's the whole issue. The radical Islamic regime controlling Iran understands their days are numbered because of Afghanistan, because of what Gadhafi's done, and now because of what Iraq's about to do.

They have the most to lose. When only 9 percent of their people come out to vote in the elections this year, that is a clear indication -- the student revolts that took place in Iran.

Now it's time for us to stop playing games with the Iranian radical leadership and make the case publicly. And this is where the State Department, I think, has to take the lead.

We do not have a problem with the Iranian people. I think ultimately they'll be our friends once again. The problem is with Khamenei and the radical regime that controls Iran.

And we have to call a spade a spade. I mean, we know they're violating the IAEA regulations. We know they're developing a nuclear weapons program. We know they're crashing on that. We know there's been ties to North Korea's nuclear program that they've benefited from. We know they've developed the Shahab-3. It's already deployed. They're working on the Shahab-4. We know they're trying to develop a long-range missile.

It's time to call the Iranian radical regime for what it is. That's where the problem is. And unless we make that statement clear and let Iran unequivocally know we're not going tolerate that -- I agree with all the points you made. We've got to have Iraq be strong internally. They've got to be able to have a strong military force. But we've got to do more to stop the radical regime in Iran.

I happen to think that the only way to do that is through a united front with Russia. Russia has more access into Iran than any other country on the face of the earth. They've been a client state of Russia. But we don't have the credibility with Russia right now to go in their jointly and clean up Khamenei's regime and lay down the case to them that we're not going to tolerate any further involvement.

If we don't do that, I think we're going to see more of the terrorism that's been occurring, more of it coming from Iran and more problem with killing of our troops, innocents.

We just saw the Iraqi oil industry devastated. My understanding is they're losing $1 billion because of this recent attack on that pipeline that just occurred yesterday or the day before. That's going to continue.

So I would just urge you to go back to State and please tell our friends at State that's where I think the focus happens to be. And we've got to take the gloves off. And not to go to war with Iran, but we've got a clear strategy that lets the Iranian leadership know and separate that from the Iranian people that we're not going to tolerate their involvement in undermining this movement of the Iraqi people to a free society that they themselves can operate and control.

Thank you.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

And Mr. Langevin, you were the last guy here for the last hearing and we closed the hearing down before you got your question in. And you're up, sir, and we apologize for missing you in the last round.

LANGEVIN: Not at all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, I appreciate that.

And good morning, gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today and your testimony.

I guess I'd like to begin with troop presence in Iraq. And basically, from conversations -- I'd like to know with the interim government, are there any indication as to what the expected U.S. troop presence will be in the coming years?

LANGEVIN: And I know that's been an ongoing question, and it's been speculated that we will be in Iraq for years.

But what I'd like to discuss this morning is, I want to know about conversations have been taken place with the Iraqi government, troop presence.

But also, if you could talk about the effect, if you were to speculate on the current situation in Iraq if the U.S. declared a date specific by which U.S. troops would be withdrawn in the same way that a date certain was set for transferring authority over to the Iraqis.

If they were date certain set for U.S. troop withdrawal, what would the affects of that be, pro and con?

In addition to that, I understand that the Coalition Provisional Authority has issued an order stating that members of the multinational force were under the sole jurisdiction of their nation and were granted immunity from the Iraqi legal system.

So my question is, has the Iraqi interim government indicated whether or not they will maintain that provision?

And, also, along those lines, under the provisions of relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, does the Iraqi interim government have to sign treaties to joining international organizations such as the International Criminal Court?

If you could take those.

RODMAN: Well, let me start, on the number of troops, have we discussed that with the Iraqis, I would say we're only at the beginning of discussing with the new team in Iraq what the security situation is.

I mean, one thing we obviously won't do is sit down and talk, compare notes about how we see the threat and what the common strategy should be. So I'm just not aware of any discussion that has gotten into that point yet.

Secondly, a date certain, I would think it's not a good idea. I think we have a clear idea of what the goal is, which is for the Iraqis to be capable of handling security themselves.

And the goal is to accelerate training, have them create their own chain of command, motivate their people and help them develop that capability as rapidly as possible.

At the moment, I don't think setting a deadline is a good idea. It might give encouragement to the wrong people that, well, they can wait us out.

So I think we have a goal and a strategy to meet that goal. And, at the moment, we don't think setting a deadline is useful.

On SOFA jurisdiction, have the Iraqis agreed to this? I think the answer is, yes. In the Transitional Administrative Law, which is their interim constitution, they explicitly say that CPA orders continue in effect until changed by legislation. That covers Order Number 17.

The letter of the prime minister to the Security Council refers to the letter of Secretary Powell. All of these things are bound together with the blessing of the Iraqis, as I say, in several different ways. So we're comfortable that this arrangement is firm.

SHARP: I could just add on your first question, on the troop presence, reading from Prime Minister Allawi's letter where he says the government -- he's speaking of the Iraqi government, this is in the second paragraph -- "is determined to overcome these forces, the forces that are against the Iraqi government right now to develop security forces capable of providing adequate security for the Iraqi people."

And then he goes on to say: "Until we are able to provide security for ourselves including the defense of Iraq's land, sea and air space, we ask support of the Security Council and the international community in this endeavor."

And all indications that we are getting from Prime Minister Allawi, from the minister of defense, the minister of interior is they fully understand and they want Iraqis to take responsibility for the security of Iraq and are leaning very far forward in order to be able to make that happen.

And as we move and that partnership develops, in order to be able to have their security forces capable of doing what the prime minister has laid out here and the terrorists, the folks that are going against the Iraqi government right now that are trying to tear this down, destroyed and killed, as that balance grows, then the continuing presence of our forces will be analyzed as we go through this.

SHARP: I guess the last point is, there's also, as you understand, a desire for the Iraqis to get their face on this out into their cities. So there's discussions that says, OK, as Iraqi security forces in specific areas are capable to provide the security for the cities, then they will take the lead, they will take the responsibility there, and we will move in order to back them up, but to have a lot less presence within those cities.

And so, adjustments aren't going to be made troop-wise or presence-wise across the whole country at one time. It will depend upon the security situation in each one of the different areas and the ability of the Iraqis security forces in those areas. And that process has actually already started in many areas.

RICCIARDONE: Sir, did you need me to address the question about the ICC?

LANGEVIN: If you could, yes.

RICCIARDONE: My understanding of your question is: Would the interim government of Iraq have to take specific actions to join the ICC? Is that the question?

LANGEVIN: Yes.

RICCIARDONE: The answers is, yes, they would have to except that in that they are not now members, except that my understanding very clearly is that the consultative process that lead to the creation of the ICC specifically limited its authorities so they could not commit the Iraqi people or government in perpetuity, because it is not an elected government.

And it has deferred the mandate to do that, the authority to do that until there is a permanent Iraqi government in place that could make permanent international commitments such as signing the Treaty of Rome.

LANGEVIN: Thank you.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley?

HEFLEY: Thank you very much. Two or three questions. In light of the polling that Mr. Weldon referred to earlier, as we turn this over to the interim government, they to be successful must respond to the will of the Iraqi people. It's my understanding that -- I think it was Colin Powell in the administration, someone in the administration, I think it was Powell -- who said that if the Iraqi people don't want us here, we'll get out.

Is there concern on your part that these guys who now become politicians, responding to their people, will say: Yes, we do want the Americans out. And if so, what would we do there?

Secondly, the big story of the last couple of days has been the idea that we will turn Saddam Hussein over to the Iraqis and let them do what they will with that.

Well, that's fine to a point, and the point is that if the Iraqis are going to try them, I think they ought to be the ones to try him and so forth. But are we seriously considering turning him over to them with the idea that they might turn the guy loose and then he makes one of those miraculous comebacks again as he's done in the past?

And then, finally, Iraq is kind of an artificial country anyway, it seems to me, put together by the British and held together by a strong-man, much as Yugoslavia was. Is there any thought that we're going to have trouble really putting Iraq as a whole together as a democratic country or that this may indeed break into to two or three countries before we're through?

Whoever would like to respond to those.

RODMAN: Let me try. Opinion polls, as you know, very better than I, are elusive sometimes. We agree with the Iraqi people that it is time for the occupation to end. That's the lesson we draw, and we drew this a long time ago. We knew that it was very unhealthy for us to be there in that role.

And you remember a couple of months ago in April when there was serious military problems, some people said: Oh, we should postpone June 30th. And we correctly said: No, that's the worst possible thing to do.

It makes it all the more important for us to cross this important milestone of turning over authority to Iraqis giving them a sense that it's their own country again and changing the basis for our relationship with them.

And secondly, turning Saddam over to the Iraqis, this is still clearly under discussion between us and the Iraqis. They have set up this special tribunal with our support precisely in order to handle trials of this kind. I think this is something that we will discuss with them. And this government, I think, shares the same objective, first of all, that he's a criminal. And secondly, there ought to be a fair process, you know, a respectable, decent process for dealing with him.

So we think this will be worked out. And if they want him, I'm sure we will respond to that and we'll work out arrangements that ensure his proper detention and security and so forth.

RODMAN: The third, on Iraq as an artificial country, I'm sure Ambassador Ricciardone will want to say something. But interestingly enough, this is the one problem we have not had, or it's one of the most important problems we did not have in the past year.

The country has held together. The governing council held together. Kurds, Sunni, Shia, they have been jockeying for position as they were negotiating the Transitional Administrative Law. There is some of that going on now as these groups jockey for position and as they're working out permanent arrangements.

But I'm impressed by how well they have learned the arts of political compromise. They're all committed to the unity of the country. Zarqawi in his famous letter said one of his goals was to try to produce sectarian war among the communities, and he's failed to produce that result.

So we're pleased by how well over the past year these different communities have worked together politically and learned coexistence and compromise. So that I think as I say is a crisis we have not faced.

HEFLEY: Do you want to add anything to that?

RODMAN: I associate myself with the comments of my colleague from the Defense Department on the first two points, especially, and on the third, as well.

I think Iraq under a dictatorship had a kind of phony or superficial national unity. It has actually a real national unity and identity. And under freedom and democracy, some of the diversity of the different elements of Iraq is coming out. That's natural, it's good, it's healthy.

And at the end of the day it will probably make for a stronger national unity, ironically, than having a dictatorship who compelled the Kurds to submerge their own ethnic and linguistic identity, that compelled the Shia to not celebrate their particular religious rituals and so forth, under a certain sort of sham, that these things made them somehow less Iraqi or less part of the larger unity.

I'm not at all worried about individual Iraqis saying, Yes, I'm an Iraqi. I'm also a Kurd. I'm a Shiite. I'm a Christian. I'm a Turkoman. Those things, as an American, strike me as quite compatible and normal. They're not normal under what Iraq went through for the past 30 years. I think Iraqis will sort this out.

HEFLEY: Thank you very much.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz?

ORTIZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I would like to see this transfer of power work. But when I see this emerging picture coming out, there's a lot of people who are jittery and confused now. To begin with, we started to use some of Saddam Hussein's key people or generals to see if maybe they could help us with the security problems that we have. And the killings continue. Just recently the oil minister from Iraq was killed. And not only that, now we are going to arm some of the people that will hopefully secure the country from all this terrorist attacks.

Now, I hope that I could feel as comfortable as you feel that this is going to work and that some day we will be able to pull our troops out.

ORTIZ: You know, what are the chances that we have that some of these people that now are taking part in this government will not turn against us?

I was there in Beirut when the terrorists killed 241 Marines. All this time, a group of congressman were there in Beirut looking at the scene and we were being guarded by individuals, our military, who were carrying weapons without ammunition. And we asked them why? They said because we don't want to create an international incident. But, my God, we have just lost 241 young Marines.

I mean, I just want to know, do you feel comfortable that in the next few days that once we transfer this power and what we have seen, some of the key people, some Saddam Hussein involved in helping out, maintain peace there, do you feel comfortable that this is going to work?

RODMAN: Sir, first of all, we're not leaving on July 1. I mean, our forces will be there and the process of building up Iraqi capability will take some time. So, if anything, there will be a gradual transition. But we expect to make progress with the Iraqis, building up their national army, building up their police, what we call the civil defense corps, which is a sort of heavy police unit and other forces. That's one of the most important things we have to do in the next period is accelerate this process of training and equipping Iraqis.

I mean, they will have advantages over us. They know the country better. They'll be motivated, we hope, to defend their country. And we think it's better that they're not doing this for the occupying power, they're doing for a government of their own. So we expect them to be motivated differently and better after July 1.

But there is a security problem. This whole process is being assaulted by a determined minority of people who don't want Iraq to achieve this democratic outcome. And so there is a fight going on. But we think we have the overwhelming majority of the Iraqis on our side not because it's our side, but because it's really their own side, their own democratic future.

So after July 1, I think the issue is going to be clearer for Iraqis. It's not about the Americans anymore, it's about which side are they on in terms of their own future.

But it will be difficult, but we think the Iraqis basically, you know, will do the right thing.

SHARP: Sir, I'd just like to address the Beirut issue. Just to be clear, all U.S. forces, and really all coalition forces in the multinational force will be under unity command. For U.S. forces, it will go from the president to the secretary of defense to General Abizaid to General Casey when he gets in theater down to each one of the individual units.

The orders that he gives will be all orders that will include rules of engagement which are robust enough for not only self-defense, but also for the offensive operations that are required out there in theater.

We have learned from Beirut. We train our soldiers, all of them that are deployed, in how to use their weapon, what the rules of engagement are. And we give them robust enough rules of engagement in order to be able to do what they need to do.

I mean, I can personally testify to this from not only Desert Storm, which obviously we were in that type of conflict, but I've also spent a lot of time in Haiti and in Bosnia where if we had the Beirut problem, we would have worried about what we armed our soldiers with, what the rules of engagement were and what they weren't.

Because of the training that the military puts your forces through, that is not an issue anymore. We have rules of engagement. We have sufficiently trained forces in order to be able to properly protect ourself from incidents like in Beirut.

ORTIZ: Well, let me thank all three of you for your services and we appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Schrock.

SCHROCK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General and Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here.

I have really enjoyed the line of questioning today. And I think the comments by the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, have stuck with me.

SCHROCK: He talked about Beirut in general. You just did too. And of course I think of the USS Cole. Certainly there was a sailor on that ship that could have done something, had he been given permission to do it, even if we had the most specific regulations in the world and they were trained to the nth degree, is that soldier, sailor, airman, marine, going to still be afraid to fire for fear of the ramifications that he'll catch from the folks back here in Washington?

You may have done everything right, but you know the political process as well as I do. If somebody perceives he's created a national incident or an international incident, how are we going to be assured that these kids are going to be protected in that?

That's one thing that bothers me.

Somebody mentioned a minute ago about the physical control, or who's going to turn over Saddam Hussein to whom. It's my understanding that they're going to turn him over -- the Iraqis are going to have charge of him for during the trial, but we're going to keep physical custody of him so the bird doesn't get away.

And I guess I'm concerned too about, will the handover of sovereignty also mean that the detainees currently held by our forces in Iraq, will they be transferred to Iraqi custody as well? I'm kind of curious about that.

General?

SHARP: Sir, on the detainees, and you're absolutely correct on Saddam Hussein. The jurisdiction as far as trial, working with the Iraqi government when they have a trial capability to be able to do that, I think the intent is to turn him over to allow them to try him.

But rest assured, we will not turn over Saddam Hussein or any of these other high-value detainees, or really any security detainees until we are confident that the prison system, the guard system is in place, that they're not able to walk out and escape.

On the detainee issue itself, in Secretary Powell's letter he specifically lays out as one of the tasks that we need to be able to continue to do interment where this is necessary for imperatives of reasons of security. So we will have the authority to be able to continue to detain people who have committed crimes against the coalition, who are security risks or of intel value, in order to be able to do what we need to do there.

Do we want to eventually turn some of these over to Iraqis? Absolutely. But again it gets back to do they have the capability to try these people? And they are starting to stand that up now with the criminal court within Iraq. And do they have the ability to be able to detain them properly in prison?

Those efforts are also ongoing, to be able to train Iraqi justice system prison guards, that's already started, in order to be able to give them that capability so they can have that capability in the future.

SCHROCK: General, I think I've been listening fairly carefully and this may have been answered, so excuse me if it was, but how will the requirement to coordinate and cooperate with the new Iraqi government affect the rules of engagement for local U.S. commanders? If push comes to shove, who's going to have the final authority to say yes or not about something that needs to be done? Will we still have ultimate authority over that or will the local folks at that point have that?

SHARP: Sir, for rules of engagement, again, all necessary means gives us the authority to have control over that. Now the cooperative mechanisms -- I mean, we're going to work very closely together. The coalition is really becoming a partnership. So where before it was the U.S. and 31 countries, it's now Iraq and 32 countries all working together to be able to do this.

But to specifically answer your question, it will be our commander on the ground, it will be the commander in the area that has the authority to establish the rules of engagement he needs in order to be able to accomplish the mission that his commanders give him.

SCHROCK: Do they -- meaning the Iraqis -- do they understand that? Or will they understand that by the time the turnover occurs, two weeks from today?

SHARP: Sir, I believe they do now and that they will when that's done. Prime Minister Allawi's letter basically says that when he endorses the tasks that are laid out in Secretary Powell's letter.

The joint coordination centers that are already standing up or already really working out in each one of the areas, where as I described before we have coordination among all the security forces. They are working very closely to understand that.

So yes sir, I believe that it is in place.

SCHROCK: I was going to ask if joint security patrols are going to be undertaken under Iraqi authority or control, so I'm hearing maybe that's not the case?

SHARP: Sir, there will be joint patrols that take place, but the chain of command for multinational forces within those patrols will remain with the coalition -- if it's in a U.S. sector with the U.S., if it's in a Polish sector, with the Poles.

SCHROCK: My time is expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: I want to thank the gentleman for an excellent line of questions.

Let me, if the committee will indulge me make one follow-on to Mr. Schrock's question.

You have a situation where the Iraqi political leadership wants to use the force and effect of American troops in a certain way. They talk to our ambassador and make that request. The commanding general, whether it's General Sanchez or later on a successor, makes a determination that in his view, there is the exposure of American troops, a risk to American troops, and this requested operation overbalances the political value. Who makes the call?

SHARP: Sir, I think it's clear that that multinational force, the coalition, is in command. Your statement's interesting in that if they ask us to do something that we agree is necessary to be done, I'm confident we can work together with the Iraqis to get the sufficient forces in order to be able to accomplish that.

If they ask us to do something that we disagree is necessary, we also have the authority to say we're not going to do that, because we don't think its necessary. They do have the authority to do it with their forces as laid out in the Security Council resolution.

HUNTER: I'm asking the question slightly differently. Let's say Ambassador Negroponte agrees that it is the right thing to do, he wants to do it, General Sanchez feels that there's unnecessary risk to our forces, or overbalancing risk to the forces, between Negroponte and Sanchez, who makes the call?

SHARP: Sanchez, Sir, because the chain of command, again, gores from the secretary of defense to General Sanchez to the folks, to the troopers that are there on the ground.

Now, you know as well as I do, if that situation happened, this would be brought up to the highest levels within our government to make that decision. And, you know, a possibility, again, is the secretary of defense always has the authority to be able to give more forces if he believes at that level it's necessary in order to be able to accomplish this task.

But General Sanchez would never do a task that was given to him by anybody other than the secretary of defense unless he believed he had enough forces to be able to do that.

HUNTER: Thank you.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.

SNYDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to pursue the same line, but from the other end, General Sharp, if I might, which is if you're the person on the ground and you're having a problem and you're trying to get some attention from someone, who are you going to call?

Back in April, I think it was late on a Friday afternoon, my office got a call. I was in Arkansas, but my legislative director got a call from one of my constituents who had just gotten off the phone with her husband who had called her by satellite phone from some place in the Ukrainian sector. He's a contractor there working for a private company.

And they were under attack and had been for some time, and had apparently been very frustrated, not getting the kind of help they needed to get out.

And he now gives my staff and my office some credit of getting someone's's attention that there was a problem there and they were escorted out the next day with helicopters overhead as they made a run and got out.

I asked somebody -- we had a hearing with a British officer who said when those things happen it's key to have the right phone numbers to know who to call and which may not be the most satisfactory solution.

It seems like what you describe as a partnership now can make it more difficult.

We've been talking a lot about rules of engagement for our troops. I think we have thousands, and I would hope that we will over the next decade, have thousands and thousands of foreign contractors there in the process of rebuilding Iraq who may not know exactly what this line of authority is, and they will be put in the position, perhaps, if they have problems of not knowing exactly who to call at what time.

I know you can game this thing to death. And we're all asking these hypotheticals. But have you all considered these issues of the private sector and what they're going to do when they have difficulty?

SHARP: I can start off. And I'm sure Ambassador Ricciardone can add on here. Because this really has been a line of discussion that we and the State Department have worked very closely together on.

And as Ambassador Ricciardone laid out in his initial statement is: They are establishing enters all around the country which are going to be not only coordination centers between what the State Department is doing in reconstruction and what the military is doing, but they will also have elements there from USAID.

SHARP: They will have our civil affairs folks there. There will be a place, from my experience in Bosnia, there will be a place where NGOs, where other people that are trying to do reconstruction come in order to be able to coordinate at that local level.

One of those coordination things that they will do is: OK, what is the security situation? Is it safe for me to come and do this here? What is your all's estimate? Obviously, they've always got the ability to decide that on their own. But then also going in, they say: OK, what are the security arrangements? If I get into trouble what are you willing to come do? Who do I call? Exactly what is the risk?

And then based upon all of that coordination, generally what happens I think is, the companies decide: OK, it's safe enough, I feel confident enough that if we have an issue they'll come and get me. Or if not, you know, because of locality or other reasons, I need to hire my own security people to be able to help out along those lines.

But we have worked very closely together to make sure our boundaries mesh together and that we have a place that we can do some of that coordination.

SNYDER: But hopefully as time goes by, you'll have the Iraqi police; I mean, that's my question.

SHARP: Yes, sir, good point. And these joint coordination centers that I spoke about earlier are also part of that same coordination and structure. I mean, ideally, what we'd like to be able to do is have the people that you're talking about, the contractors, show up and go to the local Iraqi police station and say: Hey, I'm going to be working on the school down the lane here. If I get into trouble or start hearing some problems, who do I call?

And the answer is: You call right here. And oh, by the way, we'll have three times a day an Iraqi patrol, Iraqi police that walk by and see what's going on and provide you the security that way. That's where we would like to be able to get to.

SNYDER: Secretary Rodman, I want to ask you a question about your written statement. I didn't get it until this morning. I don't know if we had it before then or not, but I didn't get it until this morning. And I notice it was put together fairly quickly.

But one of the concerns we have had over the last couple of years in the Congress is the information that we get, and you have a sentence in it that says under the section: Would we leave if the Iraqis ask our troops to leave? And reading from it: "Although we obviously would not stay if the Iraqi people do not want us to, right now, millions of Iraqis are afraid that we might leave prematurely."

Now the problem I have with it, that's a fairly definitive statement, but in fact it's a more complex picture than that. I mean, if I have the results of these polls right, 55 percent think that they would be safer if we left. Ninety-two percent see as us occupiers. On the other hand, 45 percent want us to stay until after permanent elections. And 41 percent want us to leave now. So there is a slight plurality that it stays.

But this is the kind of statement that has caused a fair number of members, I think, and the American public -- and I realize this was just a statement you probably put together fairly quickly -- but in my view it overstates what is a fairly, I would think, complex analysis of trying to figure out what the Iraqi people want. And I don't know if you want to respond to that or not, but I think it is a mixed picture.

You also have this picture of the Iraqi people. Well, relationships often are government to government. And the issue will be if you have the Iraqi government office holders say: We don't want you around. It won't matter even if the predominant position of the Iraqi people is different.

I don't if you have -- you can respond if you like.

RODMAN: That's a fair comment. I think, you know, one shouldn't use phrases loosely unless one can back them up. What I would say in support of it is that all of the moderate leaders of the country, who are brought together in the new government and also reflected, I think, even in the governing council, representing all of the communities, all of the regions, want us to stay.

I think the question, "Will we leave if asked?" didn't come out of Iraqi first. It was asked in Congress. It was asked by Europeans who somehow wanted assurance that we were giving full sovereignty. All the Iraqis we deal with, and I do think they are broadly representative of the country, want us to stay. It's reflected in the categorical statements by the leaders of the new government.

The Kurds, the Shia, who are the majority are part of this political process and support it. And there are a lot of the Sunni -- maybe not enough of the Sunni -- but certainly a lot of the Sunni community are part of this new government. And they want us to stay. I mean, they feel this is a war against extremism that they want our support for.

So I agree. And I shouldn't use the phrase loosely, and it does kind of invite a critical question like yours. But I really think the essence of the matter is, as I described, that the Iraqi, the overwhelming majority of the Iraqis do not want to be run by these terrorists, do not want their hopes for democracy wrecked by these extremist forces.

I think some of the same opinion polls do say that the Iraqi want to see a democratic process unfold, you know, a large majority.

SNYDER: Just in closing, Mr. Chairman, I was struck by a statement of General Petraeus the other day, if I'm quoting him right. I think he said that it's not so important that the conclusion be that the Iraqis love Americans, but that they love the new Iraqi government. And so you can have dissatisfaction with America as an occupying force and still achieve our success of having an independent and democratic Iraq.

Thank you.

RODMAN: That's correct. And I think the president has said something very similar, and I think that's a good way to express it.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes?

HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And first, Mr. Ambassador, for the State Department, what is your vision of our troop strength to the extent that you answer it and the shape of the force as the transition progresses in its early stages?

RICCIARDONE: Congressman, I'm really not the person to make determinations about troop strength. I've never...

HAYES: Maybe not determining, but what would you like to see from the Statement Department's perspective? What type of forces? Special operations, civil affairs, infantry, what is...

RICCIARDONE: American forces or coalition forces?

HAYES: Yes, American forces that work with the Iraqis.

RICCIARDONE: Sir, what I would like to see is precisely what we're doing, and it's not merely the military forces we've got there -- as I say I don't have the expertise to determine the numbers or the mix -- what makes me optimistic or at least confident that we're on the right track is we're standing up there the right kind of United States mission, interagency mission.

RICCIARDONE: That includes civilians, it includes military. It includes civilians from the Department of Defense, to all bear down with the unity of purpose. And specific areas, training of security forces of Iraq. That's a Defense Department MNF responsibility in Iraq, no question. The commander is going to be doing that with the policy guidance of the ambassador.

What is unusual in the Iraq context is that the MNF will be doing that and in addition, will also be directing and implementing the training and equipping of the civilian security forces.

But we're going to be doing this together. We're going to be the supporting force, if you will, in this context although we're civilians. We are going to be supporting the United States and the coalition military in this particular area, and in so many others.

The president has laid the strategy, elections, supporting elections another one. There the embassy, the mission is the leading force, if you will, with the training programs that go along with this. We use USAID. But we will be the supported unit. There the MNF will be helping all over the country to make sure those elections come off right.

So I know you're question, sir, was more limited to military forces. I'm a diplomat. I'm used to marshalling all the resources of the U.S. government, including military forces, with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Department of State.

And when you bring all the resources of the United States government to bear on a problem, we're unstoppable. And I am quite optimistic we're going to be doing that in Iraq.

HAYES: I appreciate your optimism. And you answered my question partially by what you're saying. I heard you say you wanted a significant focus, and that's reasonable, on continued training for both civil and military Iraqi forces and I agree with that.

Now, Secretary Rodman, what is your vision of how the Defense Department wants to shape the force as the transition begins formally on the 30th and then moving forward?

RODMAN: Well, I think General Sharp will be able to contribute to this answer as well. But first of