Mr. Chairman, Councilman Skelton, members of this committee, I would also like to thank you very much for your great support. It means a great deal to those young Americans deployed throughout the world.

In the last month I had an opportunity to visit Marines, soldiers and sailors in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, I was in Fallujah. And I can report to you that their morale is high. They are focused on the mission. And I believe there are three main reasons for that.

HAGEE: They are well-equipped. They know that they are well- trained. And they know that they have the support of this Congress and the American people.

And I cannot stress that latter point enough. That is the most often question I receive, is, "Do the American people understand what we're doing and do they support us?" I'm always happy to be able to report that in fact they do.

Just 10 days ago, I was in Hawaii and Southern California and had an opportunity to talk with the spouses and families of our deployed Marines and sailors. Are they happy that they are separated from their Marines and sailors? Obviously not.

But I can also report to you that they are quite proud of what they're doing. They understand the importance of what their Marines and sailors are doing. And they strongly support what they are doing.

So once again, sir, thank you very much for you support, and I look forward to your questions.

HUNTER: Thank you very much, General Hagee.

General Myers, we've got about 38,000 troops in Korea. We're going to be moving out roughly a tenth of those troops for deployment to Iraq.

Obviously, the defense of the Korean Peninsula depends primarily on the South Korean military, and as I understand, we've got some 19 infantry divisions, three mech divisions. They have approximately the equivalent of about seven wings of TACAIR; some of it modern, much of it less modern. Nonetheless, it appears that it's vastly superior to any air power that the North Koreans have.

HUNTER: Just giving us your view of the evolution of the South Korean military, which in the past has had big numbers but hasn't been modern, I'd like you to give us your take on whether you think they've got the wherewithal to carry this burden increasingly.

And, General Schoomaker, you, obviously, have the bulk of those troops that are in-country. Could you give us your view on the capability on the South Korean forces and the capability of the American forces that will be in place after this move of the approximately 3,800 personnel to Iraq.

MYERS: Well, Chairman Hunter, it's a great question. Remember that all of our moves in Korea are centered around our overall study of our global basing posture. This is part of it. It's looking at a situation on the peninsula where, in many cases, we're in the same locations we were when the cease-fire was signed back in '53. And so, as you mentioned earlier, part of it's a consolidation move.

Also part of it is to give more responsibility to the Republic of Korea armed forces. As you mentioned, they have a total of 41 divisions, 21 active, 11 reserves, seven homeland divisions.

General LaPorte, our combined forces command and U.N. commander and U.S. Forces-Korea commander, thinks that these forces are well- trained and generally very well-equipped, well-motivated. And we've been passing various tasks that used to be only U.S.-only tasks, in terms of some of the command and control and some of the missions over time...

HUNTER: Now, General, you said they have -- the information I saw was that they've got 21 active divisions, and of those they've got 19 infantry, three mech -- or 22 active divisions, I think is it. But you say they've also got a substantial reserve or homeland divisions?

MYERS: Yes, they have seven homeland divisions that, basically, the rear area security. And then they have, my information is, 21 active, 11 reserve.

And the mix between (OFF-MIKE) to them. So over time, over the last couple of years, we've been doing that.

MYERS: It's been, I think, welcomed by the ROK military and the senior leadership in the Republic of Korean. We think it's the right thing to do as well.

We do not think taking this brigade out is going to leave the security situation on the peninsula any less than it was when they were there. We think, you know, one brigade with all those forces we just talked about, our remaining forces there, that we have a very robust presence to counter any threat from North Korea.

As I think Secretary Wolfowitz testified to, there's about $13 billion in enhancements to our forces that are committed to the peninsula in the next several years that are going to make our forces even more robust in terms of their capability to handle the threat.

We're deploying additional Patriot systems to deal with the extensive missile threat that North Korea has, and we're going to rely on those things that we know where we have an asymmetric advantage, and that is in our tactical air. And in a classified setting I can talk to you what we're going to do in that regard, too, but there'll be some adjustments.

HUNTER: General Schoomaker?

SCHOOMAKER: Yes, sir.

I would just add to the chairman's statement here that, since the first time I served in Korea, which was 1974, you know, in the intervening 30 years the situation on the peninsula, in my view, has changed enormously, not only the standpoint of the development of the ROK army and air forces and navy, but in terms of the way the terrain has changed there, the way which the peninsula has developed. And it's fundamentally changed the way conflict would occur there, if, in fact, conflict does occur.

And in this forum it's probably not appropriate to talk about that, but I will tell you that I share General LaPorte's confidence that, you know, should we have to fight there, it would be a significantly different fight than it would have been 30 years ago.

SCHOOMAKER: And I share his confidence that this move of pulling a brigade off of there is -- should not be of concern.

And other than that, I fully support, you know, what General Myers said here. I think that there are other dimensions of our capability over there that play a far more important role than they have in the past.

MYERS: I may have misstated, Chairman. It's 23 active divisions. It should come closer to adding up the -- I think I said 21.

HUNTER: Well, thank you very much.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton?

SKELTON: I don't know who to ask the question of, but have you considered backfilling the 4,000 numbers, the brigade that you're moving out of Korea into Iraq, backfilling them with either Guard or Reserve?

MYERS: In Korea?

SKELTON: Yes.

MYERS: No, sir, we haven't. That's not been part of the calculation.

SKELTON: We seem to be getting two pictures of chances for success in Iraq. In speaking with you and in our trips to there, we get a pretty positive picture in talking with the troops that are there and talking with the leaders and, of course, some Iraqis. Things seem to be moving along, in particular the reconstruction portion. And then here, we are bombarded with negative images of what is going on in Iraq. So let me touch on a few of those, if I may.

How damaging is this prison situation, General Myers, in relation to winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis?

MYERS: Well, obviously, you know, the Iraqi people, I think, deserve to see how we handle this. And they got a glimpse of that, I think it was yesterday or the day before, when we had the first court- martial.

There will be more of that. Obviously the results of those sorts of events will be made public. And I think that most Iraqis whose contact is with our service men and women who are out there throughout the land, from basically north to south, understand that they're only there for one reason and that is to -- and it's a very noble cause -- and that is to give the Iraqis a chance for peace and prosperity, a chance they haven't had for a long time.

I think the majority of Iraqis understand that. I think they probably understand that this -- whatever abuse has occurred will be worked very hard by this government, by our military.

A process we have in place to work this, by the way, is a process that has been around for a long time, has stood the test of time. And I would just note, this has been -- the detainee issue has been an issue here for the last three, three and a half weeks. But this investigation started back in January, and we already have one court- martial completed, others going on, other investigations to look at every little thread that we can possibly find here to see if there are other situations where abuse could have occurred that maybe have went uncovered yet.

But I think the Iraqi people will look at our process -- General Abizaid tells me, as he talks to not only Iraqi leaders but other leaders in the region, that what they want most out of this is justice for those who have perpetrated any of these activities. That's the most important thing to them.

I think they understand that the security situation in the country of Iraq is not something that Iraqis can handle today; that they're going to need coalition help. And as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we want to take that help and turn it into a partnership with the Iraqis. And that's why we stood up this new Multinational Force-Iraq, so we can start to create that partnership with the ministry of interior, ministry of defense and all the way down to their tactical units; that we're working with them, in concert with them against the common enemy to progress in Iraq.

SKELTON: I'm not sure you know enough to answer the question about the Chalabi situation, but is there anything you can touch on regarding that?

MYERS: What I can say about the Chalabi situation is that it was the -- my understanding is, and the reports to me say that it was the Iraqi minister of interior that wanted this action to happen, that it was Iraqi police who conducted the activity, that the role for U.S. forces was as an outer cordon, not part of the activity in any of the facilities or that business, and that the Coalition Provisional Authority was notified of this. That's the limit of my knowledge.

But I think it's important that this was an Iraqi minister of interior initiative, done by their police. And my understanding is that the evidence is now in an Iraqi court.

That's a good process. It's Iraqis doing what they should be doing. And I don't know about the facts in the case about Chalabi and so forth, but to have the minister of interior, the police and the court connected, doing things they think are important is a good sign.

SKELTON: Do you see a potential positive change or uplifting change in attitude of the Iraqi people come the June 30 sovereignty turnover?

MYERS: Personally, I think that, as the U.N. helps set the stage for this turnover of sovereignty, and we know that the first folks that are selected to be the executive part of this new government will probably be temporary, but I think...

SKELTON: It's called an interim government. Is that correct?

MYERS: Interim, right. Interim government.

I think the Iraqi people will have to take hope in that, that Iraqis are now going to be responsible for their own decisions and they're going to have to make those decisions. They'll need help along the way, and we should provide help.

I think we'll be particularly strong in the security sector. That's where we need to cooperate for some time to come, because there will be those -- and I'll just point back to Zarqawi.

The assassination of the president of the interim governing council the other day is a terrible blow, and there will be people that will try very hard, with tactics like that and other tactics of intimidation to families and so forth, to keep from having political progress in Iraq.

There are a lot of forces, though, on the side, and I think most Iraqis are on the side of, "Let's progress, let's get our interim government going, let's elect a national assembly, let's get our constitution going." And I think there is reason for great hope that the Iraqi people will take this and run with it.

It will not be without its challenges, both from a security standpoint and from a political standpoint. But I think it's time to get going. I have been in favor of moving this faster rather than slower.

So I think there's cause for hope. I think anytime you give people a chance to decide their own destiny, people will have the responsibility for these very important decisions they'll be making, it's a good thing.

SKELTON: Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions, but I'll reserve them until later. Thank you.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman for his very thoughtful questions, and I would turn to the chairman of the Terrorism Subcommittee, Mr. Saxton.

SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, General Schoomaker, General Hagee, thank you for being here this morning, and thank you for continuing to do the great work that you do. At every chance I like to thank the folks who are in the field doing a great job as well.

General Myers, you were just -- let me put it this way. It's real easy for us to talk about the past and what's transpired so far in the war on terror. It's a little more difficult to talk about the future. But I'd like to talk about the future from this perspective.

Some months ago, I invited a well-respected columnist by the name of Tom Friedman to my office to talk about some columns that I had seen him author that were printed in the New York Times on Iraq.

SAXTON: And I called him because I found that it was unusual -- what he was saying in the New York Times was, kind of, unusual for the New York Times.

And, basically, he was saying that the Iraqis will find a way to make a government work in Iraq, but they have to do it. And put as bluntly as he did, he said, "We've got to get our of their face."

Recently in Fallujah, we have stepped back and put an Iraqi peacekeeping force, if you will -- I'm not quite sure what we'd call it -- we put an Iraqi unit in charge of security in Fallujah. And that Iraqi force has been in place now for, I'm just going to guess, a couple of three weeks.

I guess the question is: How is it working? And if it's working relatively well, does it lend credence to the fact that we can, kind of, look forward to stepping back, but still being there, of course, outside of the cities, turning security in cities like Fallujah over to an Iraqi force.

MYERS: Representative Saxton, that's an excellent question.

I've read a lot of Tom Friedman articles. I don't know that I've read that one. He is very thoughtful. In fact, we asked Mr. Friedman to come lead a breakfast discussion the last time we had the combatant commanders in town for a conference and give us his views like that.

I'm not the tactician here or the strategist in Iraq.

MYERS: That's General Abizaid's responsibility. But I can tell you that I think we're all in agreement that we need to turn Iraq over to Iraqis, and there is always risk in that. And there's risk in the Fallujah situation, but it's a risk I believe we must take.

So far, the situation in Fallujah is working out OK. It does not mean that in three days from now or a week from now that we're not going to have to use force to achieve some of the objectives that we set out to achieve in Fallujah. That may still be the case, but we're working with Iraqis, the so-called Fallujah brigade led by General Latif.

He is working, I believe, well with General Conway, the three- star Marine who is responsible for operations in that sector. I'm sure they've had many conversations; maybe General Hagee can comment in a minute on that.

My personal view is this is the right way to do it. Like I said, there are risks with this approach. But we have our goals in Fallujah and so far, the people of Fallujah seem to be responding. General Conway is responding with lots of reconstruction projects for that area, which is something that has not been consistently applied. That's very, very important. The unemployment, as you might imagine, would be very high.

I think General Conway and the Marines out there are probably the largest employer now in Fallujah with the money that you have made available for them to use in these kind of situations.

So I would say the trend is going in the right direction. We need to know when to use force. We need to know when to back off. We need to know when to let the Iraqis help with the solution.

But I'm of the school that the more the Iraqis can do, the better, and the faster we can get them to do that, the better as well.

And Mike, you may want to -- Mike's pretty fresh, having just talked to some of the folks out there.

HAGEE: Yes, sir.

Like the chairman, I'm also not the tactician or the operator over there, but I did talk with General Conway this morning. And I can tell you that over the past couple of weeks, it has been very quiet in Fallujah.

HAGEE: Not only is the Fallujah Brigade doing relatively well, but, most importantly, the people in Fallujah are supporting that particular brigade.

As General Myers mentioned, the leader of that brigade, in a news conference yesterday, along with the mayor of Fallujah, talking with the Arab press, supported what was going on.

And, in fact, I have this secondhand, but I believe it's correct that the mayor of Fallujah apologized for what happened to the Americans in Fallujah to the Arab press.

Over the past couple of days, some of the heavy weapons have been turned in to the Fallujah Brigade.

But, as General Myers said, this is a day-by-day process. We're optimistic, but there will probably be downturns as we move forward.

We not only want to put -- I say we, the Department of Defense, the American government -- an Iraqi face on this; we also want to put an Iraqi chain of command in place there. And right now, it's working quite well in the Al Anbar Province.

SAXTON: Thank you very much.

HUNTER: I thank the gentlemen.

The distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.

REYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, welcome.

We definitely appreciate the hard work that everyone is doing on this issue and on the support of our military troops.

I want to start off by asking: Has the security situation in Iraq deteriorated to an extent that CODELs cannot be supported, because the staff was telling us that there's a question of whether or not we're able to go in next week into Iraq?

MYERS: Congressman Reyes, I haven't gotten a good update on that. And I'll get back to you -- during the hearing, we'll have somebody research that question and get back to you.

REYES: All right, thank you.

The next question I've got is, earlier this week we were told that we've got about 210,000 Iraqis -- combination of security, army, police -- that are being trained and prepared to take over their own security.

My question is: What kind of a system do we have in place to evaluate their effectiveness, their ability to stand up against attacks, to be able to repel attacks? What method of evaluation do we have regarding those 210,000 Iraqis that we're training?

MYERS: Congressman Reyes, it depends on what segment of that security force we're talking about, will dictate what kind of system we have. With the Iraqi police, for instance, there is a formal certification system that certifies them after they're trained. And there is a mentorship program that we want to continue for some time where we do joint patrols with them and so forth.

There's a lot of leadership training that has to go on past even the formal eight-week school that is being conducted now. And we think that can be done by coalition forces to help, you know, instill the sorts of traits we want these police officers to have as they go about their daily business.

Of course, in the Iraqi army, the coalition is training them, and they'll be certified like any armed forces. With the civil defense corps, each army unit that trains one of those, or certifies them, and it's compared to the police or the new Iraqi army, it's a level below that, and so on. It goes all the way through, but there are certification regimes for each of those.

I might mention that in this new organization, how we train, how we equip and how we mentor once they get back to the field are very important questions. And we have put General Petraeus, who was the commander of the 101st, and I think just turned over command probably -- last day...

SCHOOMAKER (?): Three days ago.

MYERS: ... three days ago. And he will be in Iraq between the 2nd and 3rd of June. So he's coming from Iraq, changed command back in Kentucky, and he goes back to work, the training and equip of these forces. And he did a superb job up north in this capacity. And we put our very best to go back over there and work this -- the very issues you're talking about to make sure we have a certification program.

If I may, as has been said I think before, when people aren't properly trained, aren't properly equipped, and if there's not a chain of command that is an Iraqi chain of command, it's not surprising that some of the performance when the going gets tough is less than perfect. But the equippage issue, I think, has been solved.

That does not mean everybody has their equipment today, but the equipment is on the way. For instance, I think in the case of the police, they will be 94 percent equipped with their vehicles, their communications gear and their weapons by December, 94 percent.

We should have done this earlier, but it was somebody else's responsibility for a while, and now that'll come under General Petraeus. But this equipment is on order. It's delivering. And that'll be, I think, a very important component of allowing these people, then, to do what they're supposed to do to protect their citizens.

So I think we can be pretty positive about those developments.

REYES: Thank you.

The other area I'd like to ask a question on is the use of contractors.

REYES: And I asked this question because last weekend when I was in El Paso, Halliburton was there recruiting for contract drivers and a few other duties, particularly in Iraq.

And a number of questions came up that I think it would be beneficial to get your perspective on. The first question is where are we on allowing contractors to be armed, to carry weapons?

I know a number of their families of those contractors that are already in Iraq that are from El Paso have asked me why contractors are not allowed to carry weapons in a combat zone.

And I see the red light is on, so I'll stop right there, if you can answer that question.

MYERS: I will attempt to answer. I think part of it I'm going to have to get back to you for the record on the arming of contractors.

I have not seen the final policy. Based on a lot of issues that you know about and that you've raised, we have had an extensive review of the policy of arming contractors, because there's so many different types of contractors in country and the needs are different.

So let me get back to you. I haven't seen the final policy. My guess is it's probably close to being fully-developed. I know General Sanchez is the approval authority for that in country and has a very practical view toward that. In fact, we got one of those questions when we had our town hall meeting in Baghdad, and General Sanchez was the one that answered it.

But let me get back to you for the record specifically. It is a concern; I understand why the families of contractors might be concerned. I need to see where our policy is. And it should be pretty close to being promulgated, and I'll get you a copy.

REYES: All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, thank you, gentlemen.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman. I think that's a very important question.

And, General, the facts and the figures I saw were to the effect that Halliburton has had 34 people killed in action, mostly running those ambush alleys, bringing food and supply up to our people up in the bases in the Baghdad region.

So, obviously, having the wherewithal for defense and also having the requisite firepower attending those convoys is, I think, extremely important to this committee.

So if you could let us know what the state of play is here; that's important.

MYERS: The other thing I would mention, Chairman, when you brought up the convoys and our major supply routes -- the major supply routes were a target in the April time frame, looked like a fairly coordinated tactical approach to taking on our major supply routes, trying to interrupt the convoys, as you said.

Since that time, General Sanchez and the division commanders have changed their tactics and their techniques and their procedures with respect to the major supply routes.

MYERS: And, I think, the overall situation now in terms of convoys and their security is much different than it was just three or four weeks ago, because of the tactics, techniques and procedures that have been changed.

(CROSSTALK)

HUNTER: OK, off the record, it might be useful for us to engage with you folks on a classified basis and take a look at that.

MYERS: You bet.

HUNTER: I think that's real important to us.

MYERS: It is important. And General Sanchez and his folks thought it was important, and they've done some pretty smart and aggressive things in that regard and I think cut down the incidents where convoys were being disrupted.

But we ought to have that discussion. Yes, sir.

HUNTER: OK. Thank you very much.

I thank the gentleman for his questions.

The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Davis.

J. DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I know that you're under a lot of fire and a lot of questions and I know you must get tired of it, but there's still some that we need answered. And I do thank you for your service.

General Myers, I appreciate the fact -- I think you were talking about the Iraqi forces when you said 94 percent of the equipment and all that they needed...

(CROSSTALK)

MYERS: I was talking about the Iraqi police service, specifically in that case.

J. DAVIS: Well, let's go to our men and women: Do they have everything that they need?

And, you know. recently, a lot of our units over there had their extended stays another 90 days. And I think General Abizaid is contemplating even extending them even more.

And now with taking 3,500 or so forces out of Korea and over to Iraq, is that -- getting to the end strength, do we have the troops that we need to do the rotation so that our young men and women who are over there who are doing a dynamite job -- but, you know, it gets to a point when you're living in that kind of stress and that kind of situation that after a while it has to get to you and maybe you don't make the right decisions, or maybe you don't make the best decisions, because you're just tired and you're working 12 to 14 to 20 hours a day.

Are we giving them everything they need, number one? And number two, do we have enough folks that we're not overworking the ones that we have?

MYERS: On the -- you mentioned that you thought maybe General Abizaid said that we might extend the folks that we extended for 90 days some more.

MYERS: And that's -- I've never heard him say that. That's -- to my knowledge, that's not going to happen.

What we have said is that we will backfill those approximately 20,000 that were held over -- and primarily the 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Cav -- held them over. And we're going to backfill them with forces that would have gone in later. We're just going to move them forward, and their support units. And I don't know all the numbers of the support units, but they're just as important as the combat units, obviously.

By the way, let me just make an advertisement for the 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Cav. Those folks who were replaced, they were basically in the Baghdad area. They were replaced there by the 1st Calvary Division out of Fort Hood, primarily in the middle of this big increase in violence that we had in April that started in Fallujah and Sadr's folks.

During that time frame, they were repositioned in many different places. So they showed great mobility, great tactical confidence. They took the fight to the enemy in terrain and positions that they weren't familiar with, terrific leadership at all levels, no doubt down to the individual soldier level.

They are still there. They are fighting hard. They've done a terrific job.

I'm going to go see some of the families of the 1st Armored Division when I'm in Europe for the Normandy services here coming up the 1st of June. And I'll try to get a firsthand feel for how they are doing. But all indications, they are doing fine.

But there is no plan that I know of to extend them beyond the 90 days. We're just -- we're going to replace them, but not extend them.

Also, in terms of equipment, far as I know, there are no equipment shortages that have been brought to my attention. I will tell you this: The requirement for up-armored Humvees is likely to continue to grow. We have indications -- while they're not a formal requirement yet, but that they're going to -- I think right now they're around 4,400 or 4,500 are required in Iraq -- in-theater -- let me say in-theater. That number could grow. It could grow by several more thousand. And we're paying attention to that because that will dictate how we facilitize the plants and so forth, so we continue to produced the up-armored Humvees.

Other than that, I don't know of equipment shortages that the Guard, the Reserve or the active forces have. I think we're sending them over there with everything they need.

J. DAVIS: Do we have the right people, enough of the right people for the jobs they're trained for? Or are we being put in a position where we're putting our young men and women into jobs where they don't have the training?

MYERS: Well, I'll start off the answer, and then I'll turn it over to General Schoomaker and General Hagee.

But we have -- obviously, as we know what specific task has to be performed, we take units and train them to those tasks before they go into theater. And that is the ideal world: We know what task a unit is going to do and we train them to those tasks.

Occasionally, we get into theater with the force and the mission changes a little bit, and people have to adapt. And I think the flexibility that our forces have is essential to be able to do that. But in the perfect world, we'll send them over well-trained for the tasks they're going to do.

I think in the case of the active units, not much of an issue. In the case of the Reserve and the National Guard, more of an issue because you've got to mobilize them to train them to get them to go there. And we've got to make sure we mobilize them in time. We're trying -- there's a tension here. We don't want to mobilize them too early and have them spend a lot of time here either training or in unproductive time.

MYERS: But at the same time, we want to send them over well- trained. So that is something that General Schoomaker and his folks and the Army Reserve folks worked very, very hard to make sure we mobilize them in an efficient ways, train them for the tasks that they're going to be asked to perform and move forward.

Clearly after major combat there were units in-theater because of the swiftness of the victory -- which was a good thing -- the swiftness of the victory of major combat there were units that had to do things that perhaps they hadn't felt they were going to be asked to do.

But as the situation is unfolding now, I think we can predict, for the most part, what we are going to ask units to do. And they should be properly trained before they leave wherever their home station is, be it the Pacific or Europe or the United States.

SCHOOMAKER: My answer is going to be quite complex. And a lot of it will go back to much of the testimony that we've had here before the committee in the past.

I said our strategic vectors in the United States Army are to support the global war on terrorism, as we have been, based upon what the combatant commander requests, and at the same time to transform our Army to the 21st century.

And a great portion of this transformation is taking out of our Cold War constructs and the unreadiness, in particular, that we've vested in our Guard and Reserve forces in the way that we resourced in the past and to build our army in a way that gives us the kind of numbers and brigades and support units that are required to sustain this level of effort over time.

And much of what we've come to you and have received great support on is assistance in both the funding and other authorities to be able to do this transformation.

Now, we are operating at a very high level of effort right now to support the war. And this gives us real tension as we support the war to also do that other vector, which is to transform.

And the short answer to your question: In my opinion, we have ample numbers of soldiers. Our challenge is organizing, training and equipping those soldiers into the kind of formations we will need for the future and the kinds we need today.

SCHOOMAKER: I don't think we did a particularly good job in mobilizing last spring. I think that we compressed things, we did some things and people worked very hard to do it right, but we saw that we had some problems in terms of equipping and training. And I think we did a much better job last fall, because we started with greater lead time and anticipation, especially with the 30th, the 39th and the 81st Brigades that we deployed; we did a much better job in preparation there.

I can tell you for sure that we're doing a better job now. I mean, we have had alerts now four and five months in advance. I know we've got programs going right now. We had some 2,000 National Guard soldiers that are going through MOS qualification prior to mobilization, which really helps us post-mob to do the kinds of things collectively we need.

We're doing a better job with medical readiness. We're doing a fantastic job getting our rapid fielding initiative and the equipment, the new body armor, the new weapons, the new helmets, night vision, and all the rest of that, on those soldiers. And we'll continue to improve in this regard.

The longer we support this transformation, the broader the base of available units will be, and the greater the number of units. As I told you before, here in testimony, we're moving toward an army of somewhere between 77 and 82 brigades. That number of brigades, active, Guard and Reserve, are going to allow us to sustain this level of effort indefinitely, with adequate lull times between deployments. But right now we're not there yet, and so this tension is great.

As you know, we are supporting the effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan at a higher level than we anticipated doing six months ago. And so this is frustrating, a little bit, our efforts to transform. But I'm happy to tell you that, in spite of that, I think we're making some great progress.

As you know, by the end of this year, we will have three more brigades that we did not have last year in the active force. At the end of next year, we will have six more brigades. That's the equivalent of two divisions of combat power over and above, within the same constraints.

And again, as I have testified here, we requested 30,000 people, using temporary supplemental authority to fund those. The purpose was to prime the pump and to give us the head space we needed to do this transformation, yet we anticipate being able, once we've transformed, to bring it down within the levels that we're authorized under statute, in terms of end strength.

And we think this is important because of the extraordinary cost to people today. We cannot afford, in the future, to be burdened with personnel cost in excess of what it takes for us to man the force.

And so, I know we're still in a lot of discussion about all of this, but that's about how simple I can make it in the short time that we've got available to us. But it is a very complex situation.

J. DAVIS: Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder?

SNYDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We appreciate you being here on such short notice.

As the chairman mentioned, the defense bill is coming up. And I hope as you all study it, you'll let us know if we need to do more things or do things differently, because we certainly want to be partners with you all in helping you in this very challenging time.

General Myers, one quick question: Would a two-year delay in the base closure process be helpful or harmful to the national security of the country?

MYERS: My view, a delay in the base realignment and closure process would be very harmful to our national security.

SNYDER: Thank you.

You mentioned earlier, General Myers, with regard to the issues of the prisoners and the detainees, that we are being watched how we handle this, and we have a process that is being worked by the military. And Secretary Rumsfeld has made mention of investigations are going on, apart from criminal investigations, to figure out what happened.

It seems to me that these are the three criteria for judging how well we do on these investigations, or do we get the facts out? Are people held accountable with justice so that both the perpetrators and the ones that are allegedly hurt are treated fairly? We don't want to overreact and do things to the alleged perpetrators to somehow make a point if justice doesn't require it.

But the third part of it is the part that I have the most concern about, is that the process will have to be perceived by as many people in the world as it can as one worthy of a transparent democracy.

And my two questions are: In terms of the investigations that you know are going on, how will the perception -- when these investigations are concluded, will it be perceived as complete and factual and transparent with regard to civilians and OGA and CIA alleged perpetrators in some of these incidents?

MYERS: Well, Congressman Snyder, I believe it will be. And there have been -- there's some things that I am not cognizant of in terms of OGA and others that are going to have to be worked very hard. But in terms of what I know about the military piece of this, that absolutely, that'll be transparent. And there's some things we're looking at.

SNYDER: My concern is -- excuse me for interrupting you, General, we have a very short time.

And I believe that, I believe that the military side of it will be transparent. My concern is that the OGA side of it will not, and will end up with months and years of conspiracy theories. And I have fear that your processes that you and General Abizaid think are important, as you think this is important here today, but will not reach to the OGA/CIA part of it.

MYERS: The only problem I have is I really can't speak for the other government agencies that might be involved. They're going to have to speak for themselves.

It is important, though, that all of this is surfaced, the facts are known, and we work as this, as you said, as swiftly as you can without prejudicing the process against those who may have been alleged to do something. I mean, you've got to give it time to work in a thorough manner.

Again, we have a time-tested way of doing this. And we will let that process work.

But my hope -- we have to do that, the perception. We can't leave any stone unturned.

MYERS: It all has to be on the table.

SNYDER: I agree with that.

One of the issues of transparency, in October there was a press report that former senior Iraqi Air Defense Commander General Mowhoush had been detained, and then, at the end of November, there were press reports that he died in interrogation, and I'll just read part of it.

"Was being questioned on Wednesday when he lost consciousness after complaining that he did not feel well. The military said he was pronounced dead by a U.S. Army doctor. The cause of death and interrogation techniques are under investigation, but General Mowhoush was not hooded during questioning, the 82nd Airborne said."

Has that press report been updated publicly or is that still considered accurate? As you know, we've had...

MYERS: I'll have to get that for the record. I'm familiar with the case. I don't know if it's been updated. I don't know if it's been closed out. I have some reference material here, and if I have a second I'll go through that and then come back to you and see if it's in that reference material. But we can get that for the record.

SNYDER: As you know, the Denver Post a few days ago had a concerning story specifically regarded General Mowhoush that in fact he had died of asphyxiation while being head first in a sleeping bag.

I actually have, I think, a copy of the Pentagon report that the allegation is that someone was sitting on his chest while he was in a sleeping bag with a hand over his mouth and he was asphyxiated.

MYERS: I don't know about that.

SNYDER: It seems different than the report that was released at the time of his death.

MYERS: Right. I have read through summaries of all of those reports, and some of those investigations are ongoing. I never remember reading anything like that. That was not any of the allegations that I've read.

But I can get that to you for the record.

SNYDER: I wanted to ask, Dr. Hamre was involved in a study, the report came out in the middle of July, and he reached seven conclusions. In fact, I think Secretary Rumsfeld asked him to do the study.

Seven major areas need immediate attention:

The coalition must establish public safety in all parts of the country.

Iraqi ownership of the rebuilding process must be expanded at national, provincial and local levels.

Idle hands must be put to work and basic economic and social services provided immediately to avoid exacerbating political and security problems.

Decentralization is essential.

Number five, the coalition must facilitate a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind from centralized authority to significant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope.

Number six, the United States needs to quickly mobilize a new reconstruction coalition that is significantly broader than the coalition that successful waged the war.

And number seven, money must be significantly more forthcoming and more flexible.

Secretary Rumsfeld has talked about desiring to have good matrix for measuring success and progress. Those seem like pretty reasonable ones, but to me it seems like a lot of those are out of the hands of what we think of as traditional military functions.

SNYDER: How is the rest of the efforts going as far as putting idle hands to work and rebuilding and those kinds of efforts that are perhaps out of your hands?

MYERS: There is, I think, great progress on all fronts.

And, Dr. Snyder you're absolutely right in my view, and I've said this before and it applies to the war on terrorism, it also applies to the efforts in Iraq from a military standpoint. We can't lose militarily, but we can't win with the military alone. It's going to take the effort on the political and economic fronts as well, which means reconstruction and so forth.

From the military point of view, these funds that we provide commanders to take action and employ people and fix things as they see they need to be fixed is extremely important, and you all have been very good about providing those funds and the flexibility to use them in the way that our commanders need to do that.

I think that's a crucial element -- not the whole of it, but a crucial element of what we're talking about here.

I think the progress in the other areas has been very, very good. If you look at the power production, some of the other -- water and sanitation -- all of that seems to be doing very well. The marsh areas in the south that the Saddam regime wanted to dry up have been reflooded. There's lots of that kind of thing that is going on in the country that I think give us great, great hope.

As time goes forward with some of the funding that has been provided by Congress, with some of the funding that the Iraqis are going to have from their own resources, they need to start making their own decisions in these areas. They need to start figuring out how to protect their oil infrastructure, which is under attack in a more sophisticated way today by those that don't want progress in Iraq. I mean, they're not just picking on the pipelines; they're picking on the key pumping stations. So that's what I mean by more sophisticated. And Iraqis more and more need to participate in how they're going to address that threat.

We can help. We can help train, we can help equip, we can provide advice, we can provide intelligence. But in the end the Iraqis are going to have to do it.

But I would agree that across a wide range of activities -- which we measure, by the way, and I think we provide documents over here on the Hill every week on how we're doing and how we're coming against some of these metrics.

I think we're doing very well, but this is going to have to continue. We haven't got to the end of this, and as we get closer and closer to 30 June, the Iraqis are more and more going to have to take charge of their own affairs.

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, many of the ministries have already been turned over to Iraqis. They're responsible now. They'll need help. The coalition will help, various countries will help them through this process.

But I think we've done a pretty good job of measuring this, and I think there's been a lot of progress made in other fronts. Clearly the most critical right now is the political front.

MYERS: And that's the one where the U.N. envoy, Brahimi, is in there working with Iraqis to decide what this interim government is going to look like and who the personalities are going to be.

We don't have visibility in that right now, but I think shortly we will. And we'll know who that's going to be and we'll be off and running, hopefully.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The next gentleman is the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

KLINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

I've said privately and I want to say now publicly and as often as I can how proud I am of our troops. We have shown the world I think for some time that we have the best soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in the world. And I want to thank you and commend you, because I think that you gentlemen here in front of us today are showing the world that not only do we have the best troops, but we have the best leaders in the world.

And I think that your testimony, your appearance before camera, your presence, is very reassuring to our troops and to the American people. So thank you for that.

We're here talking about how we're doing in Iraq, and we've had a number of terrific questions here today and I appreciate your answers.

One of my colleagues on national television said the other day that we have suffered defeat in Fallujah because we have put an Iraqi brigade in and the Marines have withdrawn.

And, General Hagee, you haven't had nearly enough opportunity to speak today, so if you could address that and give me your assessment of this defeat that we've had in Fallujah.

HAGEE: Once again, I'm not the -- as you know, Congressman Kline, not the operational, tactical commander there. However, over the last couple of weeks, it has been quiet in Fallujah. The number of attacks have gone down, not only in Fallujah but around Fallujah. The economy is starting to -- people are starting to come back out in the streets.

There is support by the citizens of Fallujah for the brigade that's there. As I mentioned, at a news conference yesterday, conducted by the mayor of Fallujah and the leader of the Fallujah Brigade, for the Arab press, they were very supportive of what the Fallujah Brigade was doing and very supportive publicly of what the U.S. forces were doing.

It's Friday evening in Iraq right now, and from the mosques in Fallujah during prayers yesterday they were also supportive of what was going on.

If that's a defeat, we need more defeats like that.

As both the chairman and General Schoomaker have said, there's probably still going to be problems. This is risky. But I believe that this helps put an Iraqi face on it. We're allowing the Iraqis to conduct their own security and stability in that area, and they are taking that mission on.

We had to turn away individuals who wanted to join the Fallujah Brigade, just because we did not have enough room to house everyone there. Hopefully, if this continues in this particular direction, we will be able -- and when I talk about "we," I'm talking about General Metz and General Sanchez over there -- expanding this particular concept in that area.

So I'm actually quite optimistic about what is happening in and around Fallujah, sir.

KLINE: Thank you, General.

It doesn't sound at all like a defeat to me either, and it underscores something I think we all of us need to be careful of.

You've made the point, General Myers has made the point, General Schoomaker has made the point that you're not the tactical commanders there, nor are we. And I believe it's very important that we, in Congress, while exercising our appropriate constitutional oversight responsibilities, don't decide that we're tactical commanders either and become critical or suggestive of every decision that's made by the commanders in the theater.

And clearly to me there was a wise decision made and we've seen what appears to be terrific results from it.

I'm going to run out of time very quickly. I know how this works. And I know, General Hagee, you have addressed this already, but I remember very well a discussion with you which you're reiterated here today where you said, as you've traveled around the world talking to our Marines and their families, that the most often asked question is, "General, are the American people still with us?" And you testified today that you were always very pleased to be able to say, "Yes, they are."

But I'm troubled that that is the question that they're asking, and I wondered if you would take another minute or two to talk about that. Clearly this doesn't come out of thin air. They have some concerns or they wouldn't be asking those questions.

HAGEE: Sir, I'm not so sure it's a concern. I would say that it's more that the young Americans that we have in the armed forces today are really quite sophisticated. They are well read. They keep up on the news. They know how things work. They also remember what it was in Vietnam. Sir, you and I both served in Vietnam, and we know the reception that we got when we came back.

So these are sophisticated young men and women out there, and I think that is a good question that they have on their mind. It's also a really good answer that we're able to deliver to them.

I've had the opportunity, as I'm sure everyone on this committee has, to be able to travel throughout the United States and talk to civilian groups. And it doesn't matter what part of the country I go to, what their political persuasion is, the support of what we're doing over there is very, very strong. And I'm happy to report that to the young men and women we have over there.

KLINE: Thank you very much, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

And, General Myers, I know you had to -- you have a hard stop I think at 11:15, but if I could ask your indulgence, the gentleman from Tennessee is next, Mr. Cooper. Maybe we could let Mr. Cooper have his question before you take off. Have you got...

MYERS: Just a minute, I think it's...

SCHOOMAKER: I had the hard stop, Mr. Chairman.

MYERS: I think I'm good to go.

HUNTER: OK. Is it General Schoomaker who's got the hard stop?

MYERS: General Schoomaker, right.

HUNTER: OK.

In that case, the gentleman from Tennessee is recognized.

And, General Schoomaker, if you've got to take off, thank you for being with us today.

HUNTER: Obviously, we've got a lot of work to do with you. And you have a big investment in this bill. There's a big piece of money in this bill for this new modularity that you are achieving, both with respect to personnel and equipment. And we want to work with you as we walk this thing down through conference.

SCHOOMAKER: Sir, thank you very much. We've got some time yet. I'll depart at 11:15 if we're still going.

HUNTER: OK, excellent.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper?

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We support our troops, and we support you gentlemen. It's your civilian bosses in the Pentagon I'm increasingly worried about.

If you look at the front page of today's paper, you'll see a picture of Mr. Chalabi. You'll also see a picture of him seated right next to the first lady of the United States at this year's State of the Union message.

You read the paper and do you see that the Defense Intelligence Agency has been paying him and his political party $335,000 a month for years. We've terminated those payments apparently a week ago.

But today we hear in the news that someone ordered the raid of his headquarters and ransacking in Baghdad yesterday.

There are even allegations that he may have been an Iranian agent all of the time. We don't know.

The New York Times is saying that the interior minister in Iraq did not order the raid and no one can determine who did, but here we have a gentleman who's pictured in the paper with Secretary Wolfowitz, apparently very close to Vice President Cheney.

This seems to be a substantial development in the war when one of the most highly paid and trusted advisers may have deliberately misled our nation for months and years and some of our officials may have swallowed it hook, line and sinker.

To me this is one of the most disturbing developments of the war. We don't have answers to this question.

General Myers has said that the interior minister did order the raid.

MYERS: That's the information that I have.

COOPER: Were there Americans present during the raid?

MYERS: The only information that I have is that it was ordered by the minister of interior, that it was carried out by the Iraqi police service, that U.S. forces or coalition forces provided an outer cordon, so they weren't involved in going into the facilities -- I mean an outer cordon away from the facilities -- and that the evidence is now resident in an Iraqi court. And that's the information that I've been told.

I asked about that before we came over to make sure we had the latest information on that.

COOPER: Well, if this man was on the U.S. payroll until last week, what has changed in the last few days to make him the subject of a raid of this type?

MYERS: That I can't tell you. What I can tell you is that the organization that he is associated with has provided intelligence to our intelligence unit there in Baghdad that has saved soldiers' lives. So I know that at least that part of it has been beneficial.

I cannot comment on the rest. I just don't know.

COOPER: Do you know who invited him to sit next to the first lady of the United States at this year's State of the Union message in January?

MYERS: I have no idea.

COOPER: Has the overall intelligence that has been offered by Mr. Chalabi been accurate?

MYERS: As I said, I can only say what has been said to me by the intelligence leadership in Baghdad that works for, then the combined Joint Task Force-7; is that intelligence was accurate and useful in many cases.

COOPER: Many cases?

MYERS: Sure.

COOPER: What has changed in the last few days to make this man almost subject to arrest?

MYERS: Sorry, can't answer that.

COOPER: In response to Dr. Snyder, you gave some clarification on a statement that you have made in the past that, I think, has probably been misinterpreted when you said that there's no way that we can lose militarily in Iraq; there's no way that we can win either. If you would care to further elaborate, because I think most of our troops need to here that their role is important.

MYERS: Oh, their role is extremely important. Their role is extremely important. We haven't lost a tactical fight we've been in in Iraq; for that matter, Afghanistan. The troops are doing superb work. Their work is absolutely essential to success in Iraq.

At the same time, unless you have progress on the political front, if you don't have progress on the economic front, then it can't all be done by our U.S. forces and our friends and allies who are in there with us. And that's what we mean when we say we can't lose militarily, but we can't win it either.

No, our forces are doing a superb job. Everything we ask of them, by the way, and more. We have asked a great deal of our forces. We have asked young men and women to do things that you would never suspect, in helping set up, you know, a municipal government, to aid in that, to make judgments that you could never train anybody for. They have to do that with the values they carry forward from America into that country. And they're doing that.

COOPER: We in Tennessee are particularly proud of General Petraeus and the outstanding service he has already rendered and regret that the nation has to call on him again. But he is one remarkable individual.

MYERS: It's a big deal. You bet.

When somebody comes back that's served in Iraq for a long time and to come back and then change command in his division and then go right back, that's a true public servant that has only one thing on his mind, and that is to try to make that situation better in Iraq. He will, I think, be enormously successful.

COOPER: Amen.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

And, General Myers, I think the discussion about General Petraeus and the number of experienced hands that we've developed in this war against terrorism I think raises a good point, and that is that you have some great folks, many of whom we've met with when we've been over there in-country, in Iraq, in Afghanistan.

You've got now in the active duty in our military leadership circles a lot of what you would call old hands. Do you ever think about putting -- I understand when these folks come back, and they've got assignments and they've got duty stations in CONUS and around the world.

HUNTER: Have you thought about putting together a little group of old hands and some of these former division commanders and other leadership and talking with them a little bit, getting their take as we walk down this road towards the transition?

And since they've been in those shoes and they've been in country, their experience is usually more insightful than people we might pull out of think tanks to give advice on this new very important era in this transition.

MYERS: Well, some of those old hands are still in Iraq.

HUNTER: I understand.

MYERS: General Rick Sanchez is...

HUNTER: But how about those that have come back here who might be available to...

MYERS: Right, and let me tell you how we're trying to use those.

Everybody that has experience in Afghanistan or Iraq -- I think I can say this without exception -- we very carefully manage between the services and myself and the secretary, in terms of where these people go to be effective. And it's a little different than your question, but -- and I can't get ahead of myself because some of these haven't been announced, yet. So we're going to try to ensure that they're in places where they can affect major decisions on the way forward on the war on terrorism befitting their backgrounds.

And so, we look at that very, very carefully. And some of them are in those positions now. Some will be nominated to be in those positions here shortly. I just -- I can't -- it hasn't been announced, it hasn't been approved by the president yet.

But you bet. It's very important. And I know both services look at that very carefully. We talk and try to make sure we have the right folks in the right places so we can take advantage of that great experience they have.

HUNTER: Yes, you've got a lot of talent, and just to have them available for comment as new phases are engaged in...

MYERS: You bet.

HUNTER: ... and just to have some insights in certain areas could be invaluable.

MYERS: Well, that's one of the reasons, again, why General Petraeus -- not to dwell on General Petraeus, but that's one of the reasons he's going back.

MYERS: He was so successful overall where he was located in Iraq, but specifically on these issues, that now he's going to work Iraq-wide with all his contacts, with his knowledge, with his enthusiasm. That's why he's going back there, to be a major part of this effort.

HUNTER: Thank you.

The distinguished gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks?

FRANKS: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen. I know that you've already received words of appreciation this morning, but it's my own perspective that you can never be thanked enough for your noble efforts.

I realize that in any war circumstance there are always going to challenges and difficulties. Nothing can ever be a perfect operation. But you've come very close.

And I believe with all of my heart that the councils of history and eternity will deem your efforts worthwhile if we're able to see a beachhead of freedom established in Iraq that could see the whole of humanity turn in a better direction. And so I just want to add my own expressions of appreciation to you.

Having said that, I'm sure that most of your focus is on this next paradigm shift that will occur on the 30th of June. And I guess I have two questions related to that.

You know, the hope is -- all of us hope that the seed of freedom will germinate in the hearts of Iraqis and that we can see this really go forward as we all believe it can.

After the 30th of June, two questions: What do you believe will be the posture of the insurgency there, the terrorists, the enemy in general? How will that change given the new Iraqi leadership, even if it's an interim structure?

And secondly, how do you think the command structure will work? I mean, will it be strictly civilian sovereignty? Will our troops, will our generals be subordinate in any way to the Iraqi leadership? Will they be there as partners if there are conflicts in strategy or if there are emergencies or if, indeed, ultimately we were asked to leave?

FRANKS: I know these are pretty sweeping questions, but how will that command structure work? And will our own generals be subordinated to Iraqi orders, as it were?

I'm sure that that has a lot of reticence on the part of all of us, including yourselves. But give us some perspective on that. I know that you've thought about it a lot.

And your answer may outrun my time, so I'd just express again my appreciation to all of you.

MYERS: Thank you, Congressman Franks. I'll start out, and then my colleagues can join in anytime they want to.

The threat after 30 June -- I think there will continue to be a big security threat to progress in Iraq past 30 June, clearly. Those that are dedicated -- and I'm talking about the Zarqawis of the world, who are working a bigger issue; they're working the issue of extremism versus a more moderate approach to governance -- that that threat will continue to intensify.

I think also, though, that the threat, once you have an Iraqi interim government, that it will be seen as legitimate by more and more Iraqis -- not only Zarqawi and the foreign fighters, but the former Baathists and so forth will be seen as more illegitimate. It should help, I think, in working the security problem.

At the same time, we have these Iraqi forces who will be, as every month goes by, better trained and equipped to deal with this.

In terms of the command-and-control arrangements, the way we view this is we want to partnership with Iraqis. We want to be able to share the threat situation with the Iraqi leadership so that as they view the threat and as the coalition forces view the threat, that if we view it the same way, if we can agree on the threat, then reasonable people can come to conclusions about what you need to do.

So the first thing we have to do is ensure we have the mechanisms to share the picture. That is already being done by General Fast and her people in Baghdad. We need to -- at least to be more intense, more regular, and a regular way of doing business. That will happen as soon as we have the right interlocutors on the Iraqi side so we can.

And then I think under the current U.N. Security resolution, 1511, under the Transitional Administrative Law, that the coalition forces have the authority to take whatever action they need to take.

But my view, again, is that we ought to view this as a partnership and we ought to work with Iraqis on how we take whatever action is required.

There'll be some action that only coalition forces can do, because we're the only ones that'll be trained and equipped to do it. There'll be other actions that the Iraqi police or the civil defense corps or the border force and so on can do. And they ought to do that. Or maybe they need to be helped. Maybe we need to be with them and support them.

We see a partnership, not -- and to work through the issues.

MYERS: To be sure, there'll be differences. To be sure, there'll be challenges. To be sure, there'll be risk. And I can't tell you how it might work out, but I do know that there'll be differences of opinion on how to handle issues.

Another Fallujah -- there'll probably be great differences of opinion. But like this last Fallujah incident, if I may use that phrase, this was worked out with the Iraqis and General Sanchez and his folks and the 3rd MEF out in the west. That was worked out over time to come to this situation we have now, which we think is going in the right direction. Time will tell.

But that's the notion.

SCHOOMAKER: I would add to that very simply, I had the opportunity to meet with Ambassador Negroponte two days ago and listen to his view in a private way and a view of his thinking on the way ahead. And I think the establishment of an American embassy in the more traditional role of an embassy, versus the CPA kind of role, is an important dimension of this.

The establishment of the Multinational Forces-Iraq, which will continue to provide the command and control of U.S. forces that are there. And, of course, underneath that having General Petraeus' effort, which will support and mentor and train the Iraqi security forces in concert with the Iraqi governmental structures over there, is very important.

I'd just like to add, you know, to the Fallujah discussion here, General Petraeus, in a different circumstance up north, employed precisely these kinds of techniques that are being employed in Fallujah to great success. And it's for that reason that I feel that the risks are worthwhile in Fallujah and the approaches being taken there is worth the risk, because I think this is precisely what it is we want to do.

And finally I would say, those hard-core people, regardless of their persuasion and the reason they're hard core, are going to take this opportunity to try to derail the efforts of the transition. I think we should anticipate that there will be increased levels of effort in a variety of places from a variety of people, but that this transitional period has to happen and we've got to get to it.

And so, therefore, I think that I have a certain sense of optimism that we will see some progress through it, even though it will be difficult.

HAGEE: I would align, myself, Mr. Congressman, with the chairman and the chief of staff of the Army. I really have nothing significant more to add.

FRANKS: Well, thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

The distinguished gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor?

TAYLOR: Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and giving us your valuable time, and thank you for your service to our nation and for all the young people that serve under you.

A couple of things. As you know, we've had a huge rotation of National Guard and reservists into Iraq. I recently met with the C.O. of a returning unit, an engineering unit, who told me that every piece of equipment in his heavy engineering unit was left behind, and I understand the reason for that.

SCHOOMAKER: What was left behind?

TAYLOR: Every piece of heavy equipment in his engineering unit was left behind. I would presume that's the norm and I understand the reason for that.

But since they are dual-hatted as National Guardsmen to serve both a state role and a national role, and since they are, in effect, the first responders in a part of the country that regularly gets hurricanes, my question is, will the supplemental address the replacement of equipment for this unit and the other units who left their equipment behind?

TAYLOR: Again, I understand the need to leave the up-armored Humvees in-theater. Are we taking the steps to replace what is left behind?

Second question, General, I picked up an article from about a year ago, dated April 28th, and it is about the time American were first being captured in Iraq. The president responded to that probability by saying, and I'm quoting, "We expect the Americans who are captured, them to be treated humanely, just like we'll teat any prisoners there that we capture humanely. If not, the people who mistreat the prisoners will be treated as war criminals." That's the commander in chief.

The congressman from Arkansas just mentioned a report in the Denver Post that I'm also aware of that speaks of the head of the Iraqi air force, who turned himself in in November, apparently was placed in a sleeping bag head first, and suffocated while being interrogated. And, again, apparently within the Pentagon, it confirms that.

This troubles me for a number of reasons, but number one, I think it puts young Americans at risk when they're captured. I think it provides our enemy with stories to make our intentions in Iraq look less than noble.

And so for a great many reasons this troubles me. If the commander in chief is saying, "They will be treated humanely," at what point was the message lost? Because, again, I can understand five or six bad apples in one prison. This did not occur at that prison. And if someone who surrendered is treated like this, I fear it is going to lead to fewer Iraqis surrendering, not more, at a time when we want them to surrender rather than prolong this conflict.

Please, I would welcome your response of all of you gentlemen.

MYERS: OK. Let's do the first question.

SCHOOMAKER: The fist question is more appropriate for me, I think. And I will take this for the record, because I don't know the specific instance. I don't know whether we're gong to convert that engineer unit to some other capability.

TAYLOR: If I may, sir, so you don't have to look it up, it is the 890th.

SCHOOMAKER: 890th?

TAYLOR: Yes, sir.

SCHOOMAKER: OK. And we will get that to you. But if we're going to retain it as an engineer unit, that's precisely what we use supplemental money to do. And most likely we will redirect equipment that's here in CONUS to backfill that equipment that they've taken. But if we're going to convert it to some other capability then, of course, we will use supplemental money to do that.

But we'll take the 890th and get back to you specifically on what the plan is.

MYERS: It's not lost on this committee, but when we talk about equipment we -- just one more time, and I think my colleagues would agree with this -- we are using up equipment at a very rapid rate. We have lost many helicopters. I think...

SCHOOMAKER: About 70.

MYERS: ... about 70 helicopters have been lost in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The equipment that we leave is being used very hard and more than we've ever used in in peacetime.

So as we look at future budgets and supplementals and so forth, we have to program in, and we intend to do that, the ability to fix this equipment if it can be fixed through depot, or replaced if it has to be replaced.

I know nobody's more sensitive about that than this committee, and we appreciate it. But I think it's important to talk about that.

SCHOOMAKER: I think, and one of the reasons we asked in the supplemental funding that you just talked to have procurement in it at this time, because we do have about 70 helicopters in the Army to replace. We have over 200 wheeled vehicles to replace that we lost. We've lost some 20 large systems tanks, Bradleys, these kinds of things. And so that's why we've asked for some procurement money in the supplemental that's coming.

HAGEE: And even though our numbers are, obviously, not as great, we face the same challenge in replacing equipment and the equipment being used very, very hard.

TAYLOR: On the breakdown between what our commander in chief has said how the Iraqis would be treated and how, unfortunately, in some limited instances they were treated...

MYERS: A couple of points on that.

First of all, you're exactly right, Congressman Taylor: How we treat detainees, we can expect, of course, that others might treat us the same way. And that's why it's important, even though it was decided that the Geneva Convention didn't directly apply to -- I'm not going to go into all of the detail, but I'll just use that in general -- in Afghanistan, we did say that we would treat our detainees humanely and in accordance with the tenets of the Geneva Convention.

MYERS: The breakdown is what we're trying to figure out. And we have the issue at Abu Ghraib.

One of the key reports that has to be done is the General Fay report, which is looking at the military intelligence piece of that to see how that was involved with the military police part. And we don't know that yet because we haven't see his report. He is back in the United States. He has been in Iraq, he's been in Germany. He's back here now. And I think we're on a several week timeline for him to finish that report.

It, again, is administrative in nature. It can result in administrative action against people. And so there'll probably be some time for people to respond to some of the things that will be alleged in that report. So it will have to go through its process, but that's part of the answer.

The other part, as these individual cases come up -- and I think they're all being looked at by the folks in the Army that do the criminal investigations -- that people have to be held accountable for that. And we've got other things going on to see if there's any guidance that was issued by anybody that would lead people to believe that that kind of behavior was appropriate.

So far, we haven't found that guidance that says that's appropriate behavior. Just the opposite, in fact.

But we have a lot of things going on. And as we talked about with Congressman Snyder, we got to get this up on the table and everybody have a look at it.

TAYLOR: Again, thank you, General.

HUNTER: Thank the gentleman.

And just wanted to let you know, General Schoomaker and General Hagee and General Myers, we have placed a lot of money in this supplemental that we've bolted on to our bill.

We tried to get ahead of the curve there. We've got over $500 million in the bill we passed last night for helicopter replacement for Army aviation alone. And we've got -- similarly have money for the Marines in that category.

So we're moving ahead, and we'll try to get you a readout on the precise dollars that we have for war losses across the board before you get out of here today.

The next gentleman in our lineup here is the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Cole.

COLE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me begin, if I may, be associating myself very strongly with my colleague Mr. Kline's remark, and Mr. Franks'. We are very appreciative of the job that each of you do, and more importantly even, the outstanding men and women that you lead.

COLE: So I think you've just conducted yourselves magnificently. And I know this is a particularly difficult and troubling and trying patch that we're going through, but you have enormous respect on this committee and certainly appreciation for what you do.

Let me, if I can, sort of switch the focus a little bit, because we spend a lot of time, as we should, talking about ourselves and talking about our allies. I want to talk a little bit about our enemies and get your impressions on that and make an observation and get a comment.

As I look at the enemy, you know, I break them down into three different categories. We've got foreign fighters, maybe even state- supported, but foreign fighters, Al Qaida types, associated with terrorism that are there. We've got the Saddamists, the remnants of the regime. And we have maybe some folks like al-Sadr that are sort of Shia extremists. And they don't really have a common theme between them. I mean, they're all -- we're having to contend with them, but they're not linked by a common ideology.

They really have a very different vision, each one of them, for Iraq. Some people want an eternal jihad. Some people want a sort of Shia theocracy, like Iran. Other people want to go back to the old Saddam regime.

And all the information we have is that none of those alternatives are particularly attractive to the Iraqi people, speaking broadly.

We have, for all the problems and difficulties that we face, a pretty attractive vision out there that we're working toward: a democratic country, a free country, a country that runs its own affairs, a country that at some point would be free of our direct involvement in any way, shape or form.

I believe the president very firmly when he says we want to stay there as long as it takes to get it done and not a day longer. We want to come home as soon as we can, but not leave something behind us.

So I would like you to talk from your perspective, if you would, I'd love it if all three of you could address it -- just describe the nature of the enemy as you see it; how it has evolved over the last year, because obviously it's changed, in some ways become more sophisticated; and how you assess how we line up with them and how the Iraqi people view this conflict between us, Iraqi security forces as our allies, and these very different types of enemies that you're dealing with?

MYERS: Congressman Cole, I think you've done a good job of pretty much outlining the threat that we face. And it does have different elements.

We are seeing, I think, more coordination between them, coordination of convenience, not of end states or philosophical agreement, but tactical agreement that they can help one another, share weapons and so forth.

I think there's probably great dislike among the various elements for the other elements, but they're willing to cooperate to some degree. And I think we're seeing some of that.

I think we saw some of that on the attacks on the major supply routes, some of that cooperation. Again, more of convenience, certainly not to be looked at as a popular uprising in Iraq, nothing like that. But at the tactical level, some cooperation.

And you're right: In the Shia population, there's not homogeneity in their view of how Iraq ought to go forward. There's lots of different thoughts in that community.

We think Sadr and his thugs are more and more isolated. And again, the strategy there, we haven't talked much about that strategy, but the strategy there is to let Iraqis try to solve that problem.

He is wanted in connection with the murder of one of the clerics, al-Khoei. And Iraqis need to bring him to court and determine what his involvement was, and I think they're interested in doing that. I think they know they have to do that.

Our role is to make sure that his thugs aren't disrupting security in other parts of the country or in Karbala and Najaf without being right there in their holy places. And so, we've tried to work that much like Fallujah, with Iraqis. And so, there's that part of it.

The foreign fighters, probably characterized -- and Zarqawi, we can't ignore him. We think he's still in Iraq. He's working a different agenda and it's the bigger agenda that is being worked in Iraq, beyond the former regime elements -- and I'll get to them in just a minute.

And that agenda, if you go to a 30,000 foot view, that agenda is that extremism should win out.

MYERS: And part of the tenets there, as we've heard from Osama bin Laden and others -- and Zarqawi is, while not Al Qaida, is affiliated with them and has the same view, and many other extremists do as well -- and that is that they want to bring down our way of life. They've said it, and they want to do it.

They certainly do not want an Iraq that is in any way democratic, is in any way where the people have a say in their future. They would like to see it apparently in anarchy, because he's the one that talked about: Well, we can't make the coalition leave, I guess, so we'll start a civil war between the Sunni and the Shia here.

That view is the one that's threatened Europe, that's threatened us, that results in the Madrid bombings, that results in the bombings in Riyadh, that resulted in 9/11. That threat is still there.

While we've been very successful in addressing it from a military standpoint, and in some cases diplomatic standpoint, and we've done away with safe havens and a lot of the leadership has been rolled up, and we've stopped lots of attacks, it's still there.

There are people that believe so strongly in it they're willing to commit suicide. And so, there is that element, not only in Iraq, but throughout the region -- for that matter, throughout the world. We know those cells.

COLE: If I could ask you, would it be fair to say, General, we'd be dealing with those people whether we were in Iraq or not? In other words...

MYERS: In my view, that's absolutely right.

This is a view of the world, and Iraq is a convenient place for them to be, but it's a view of the world that, with or without our involvement in Iraq, would be out there and would have to be dealt with, absolutely.

MYERS: And it pervades many, many countries, and you know the story.

But that's the 30,000-foot view. It's also why we in America and American people ought to care mightily about how successful we are in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

We've got about 1,000 troops in the Horn of Africa and other places in the world. Why we need to be successful and why it also can't be just a military, it's all instruments of national power that have to carry this fight.

To the former regime elements -- we've had various names over time for them, but the people who were part of the Baathist regime -- part of the solution there is to give them hope that they have a future in Iraq and that hasn't been done perfectly.

I think what you're seeing in Fallujah now is part of that process, to give these people that provided a lot of the senior leadership to Saddam's regime, you're giving them hope that there is a way forward without just fighting the coalition, that there is economic hope -- and that's why I mentioned that the Marine Expeditionary Force out there is perhaps the largest employer right now, as they use their funds that our commanders have to help establish work for a lot of people that are out of work.

And then they have to be coaxed into the political process. These are not going to be their natural instincts, but they have to be coaxed into that process. And I think in fact the coalition forces can help, certainly the U.N. can help, the Iraqi interim government is going to have to help make them see that there's a future here, that they can be part of that decision-making process, however it works out, for their future. And that's a big part of it.

But I think you've named the threats.

It's not the same throughout the country. If you look at the north, the north is relatively stable, relatively prosperous. Somebody brought up the fact that Petraeus, that the success General Petraeus had in the north was very high. And we saw that during these recent attacks in April. There were lots of demonstrators that stormed up to the government buildings in Mosul.

MYERS: And who turned them away? And who settled the issue there? It was the mayor, it was the police and it was the Iraqi civil defense force that we trained.

Iraqis took care of their own situation up in Mosul, which could have been a very dynamic one if they hadn't acted.

SCHOOMAKER: I could very quickly add. I agree with the chairman and with your description, in general, of the foe, but I would -- and I'm speaking, basically, from a past life here and some experience -- I would caution that we rushed too quick to -- while it's very important for us to attempt to define and understand the threat, I would caution about rushing to judgment and closure on that, because I think this is a very dynamic threat.

And I think there will be some surprises yet to come in the wood pile, so to speak, in terms of what might be some of the motivations or what might be some of the sources. And I think, you know, depending upon how things go, we need to think about this in a broader context than just Iraq, that there are all kinds of other possible motivations. And we need to keep our aperture pretty wide to recognize how this may develop in the future.

And, in my view, when we talk about this, as I think about it, I think it is global. I think it's going to be long. I think it's not just defined by Iraq. And I think this is something that we're going to have to learn as we go and just be careful we don't end up stereotyping and buying into definitions here that may limit our understanding about what it is we should be doing.

I hope that didn't over-confuse the issue. But I'm worried about our tendency to want to always come to closure and over-define or stereotype and kind of then stick our stake in the ground and miss the obvious for that reason.

I'm sorry. Go ahead, Mike.

HAGEE: Mr. Cole, I'll try hard not to pile on even though I agree with both of my colleagues here.

The elements that you described, I think, are out there. I sort of put them in one pile, call them hardcore. They're not really for anything in my mind. They're against what Iraq is trying to do, what Afghanistan is trying to do, what a lot of other countries over in that area are trying to do.

HAGEE: And I think Tom Friedman calls some of the other people over there, individuals standing around. In other words, they're attracted to whoever they think is going to win.

And as the chairman talked about, I think that's where our focus needs to be. It's where our focus was in Fallujah, to separate this hard-core element from the average Iraqi, if you will, and give them something to fight for rather than something to be against.

I think that's what you're seeing now with the great work that the 1st Armored Division has done, and you see the support waning for al-Sadr down there, because they're starting to see that there is actually something that might be worth fighting for.

So I agree with him, look at it just a little bit differently.

COLE: I just -- in closing -- and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. I think it's just really important we remember who the bad guys are and the good guys are in this particular confrontation. And we certainly have our difficulties and our challenges, but our people have done a tremendous job.

And the elements that we're dealing with do not wish the United States of America well and do not wish the Iraqi people well, because the future that they would impose upon them, whether they're the hard- core Saddamists or the jihadists, would be a terrible fate for them.

So I just hope as we work our way through the challenges, we always remember that. I really do believe you gentlemen are associated with a very noble cause and doing great things for our country. And frankly, you're doing great things for people in other countries, to provide them with some security, some freedom and some opportunity, some hope for a future.

So, again, thank you for what you do.

HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.

And you know one point that I think has flowed from all these comments, one message is that -- and we've gone back to Fallujah a number of times and the successes up north. It's apparent now that some of these solutions are custom-made and they're solutions that depend on the creativity and the talent of the military leadership that happens to be in that A