IKE SKELTON,
A Representitive from Missouri, and
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Commitee

SKELTON: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us this afternoon.

This is a first. And I'm thrilled to be part of this very first operation, friends and friends in Congress. Thank you for being with us.

General Viggers, General Willis, thank you for remembering me, it's good to see you.

And General Cieniuch, it's good to see you, sir, and thank you for joining us.

The U.K. and Australia have proven themselves to be stalwart allies time and time again. The more recent alliance with Poland is a symbol of our changing world, and it proves that nations who aspired for peace, aspire toward prosperity where people seek each other in times of trouble.

And we should not forget that each of you who serves in the military are renowned for professionalism, capability and competence. These qualities are demonstrated on a daily basis in some very difficult conditions. And we thank you for it.

Where I come from we say that a good friend is somebody is who will get up in the middle of the night to come bail you out. And you folks are certainly meeting that test.

Being good friends also means being able to speak candidly with each other, offering constructive criticism, criticism that's received in the spirit in which it's offered.

SKELTON: And I hope you'll give us the benefit of your unvarnished views -- that's why we're asking you to be with us -- so we're able better to work together to bring success to that troubled region in the Middle East.

They are focused on stability in Iraq, and I believe that will require a good number more forces in the Iraqi theater

But each of our nations is militarily stretched. Additional sources of troops are needed.

I would like to hear your thoughts on where those sources may lie and what the United States ought to move to help secure them.

Furthermore, NATO took the step of deciding an international framework in Afghanistan last year. And we visited some of the folks there.

NATO is deeply involved and is essential in Iraq as a source of additional troops and as a way to internationalize that mission.

Two of the nations are NATO member states. All three of them are from a perspective that would be helpful as we look for ways to engage NATO in a greater extent than what they are today.

Gentleman, thank you very, very much for being with us. We look forward to your comments.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

We've been joined, as you can see, by several other members. And we would like to get right to the discussion, and each of our members will have an opportunity to ask questions or give his or her thoughts as we proceed through the next several hours.

So if it would be appropriate, may I suggest that each of you, perhaps, could give us some insight into how you see operations going in the sectors of Iraq where your forces are involved.

And with that, I guess we can just start with General Viggers, and move across the table.

TESTIMONY OF

MAJOR GENERAL FREDDIE VIGGERS,
Military Secretary of the United Kingdom

VIGGERS: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you for inviting us to join in today.

MODERATOR: If you could pull that microphone just a bit closer...

VIGGERS: Perhaps, by way of a little bit of background about my involvement in Iraq to set the context of what I will say during our discussion, during the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, my post was, in effect, it equates roughly to the deputy commanding general of your FORSCOM.

So I was involved for the two years or so that led up through Afghanistan into Iraq with planning the U.K.'s commitment to the coalition operations.

VIGGERS: And then almost a year ago today, in fact, in May of last year, I deployed to Baghdad, to become one of General Sanchez's two deputy commanders.

Wachukowski (ph) was the deputy who looked after the tactical handling of the troops. My role was to provide the link between the coalition military, CJTF-7, and Ambassador Bremer's civilian structure, the Coalition Provisional Authority.

MODERATOR: Some of our members are having trouble hearing you, General. Sometimes those microphones are not...

VIGGERS: Is that better?

MODERATOR: Fine.

VIGGERS: I was just saying that my background and involvement really flows from this time last year, when I spent about five months in Baghdad, as one of General Sanchez's deputy commanders. He had two: General Wachukowski (ph), who looked after the management of operations within the CJTF. My role was to provide part of the bridge between the Combined Joint Task Force and Ambassador Bremer's Coalition Provision Authority, acting very closely with the senior British diplomat, who of course at the end of my time, was General Greenstalk (ph).

So I was not in command of the British troops in the southeast sector per se, but really provided a link to them.

Over a period of my time there we saw the realization, I think, that this was going to be a very challenging task.

The context of all of this is very important; the lack of a structure to plug into in that country, no machinery of government, no police force, no architecture that we at the coalition would engage with. We then went through the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council, and the beginnings of moves toward extraction in the middle of the Shia.

My only caveat, sir, really is, I am now slightly out of date. I'm now at another job back at the U.K. So, in terms of current events, my visibility of those is much as you would have through what you see in the press and in open reporting.

Thank you very much.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

Major General Willis?

TESTIMONY OF

MAJOR GENERAL SIMON WILLIS,
Head of the Australian Defense Staff

I'm grateful for the opportunity to participate in this opportunity to participate in this issue forum and discuss with you Australia's's military contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom and, indeed, our wider commitment and collective responsibility in defeating terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, last month, when visiting Australian troops in Iraq, our prime minister, John Howard, was asked how long the troops were to remain in Iraq.

He responded, "There are particular tasks, and we intend to see those tasks completed."

Mr.Chairman, Australia has a track record second to none as a reliable ally, security partner and friend of the United States. Our alliance has never been stronger.

In a historical context, Australia is the only nation to have sent combat forces to fight with the United States in every major conflict during the 20th century, including both world wars, Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War.

Since the tragedy of the 11th of September, Australia has been at the forefront in the war against terror. Indeed, following the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Australian government invoked the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty, the cornerstone of our alliance, for the first time since it was signed in 1951.

We were one of the first countries with troops on the ground in Afghanistan. And accordingly, Australian special forces, with their enabled elements, participated in operation to overthrow the Taliban an defeat Al Qaida in Afghanistan.

Since then, Australia has contributed land, air and maritime forces to the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq. And we were only one of four nations to contribute forces for combat operations.

Additionally, we are also making a major contribution in Afghanistan, in aid, and still have land, air and maritime forces operating in and around Iraq.

These specialist roles include an air traffic control detachment at Baghdad International Airport, providing all air traffic control tower services, in and out of

Baghdad, a Navy frigate patrolling a Northern Arabian Gulf P-3C surveillance and C-130 cargo-lift aircraft, and analyst and technical expert supporting the Iraq Survey Group.

We also make a sizable contribution to the coalition military assistance training team providing training and policy support to assist the development of the Iraqi armed forces.

We have personnel in the coalition joint task force headquarters, as well as personnel embedded within the various coalition air, land and sea component commands.

WILLIS: We have also provided representatives to the Coalition Provisional Authority, as well as a number of military personnel integrated within United States units and multinational divisions.

Mr.Chairman, Australiais a good friend and close ally. Like you, we believe the Iraqi people must be helped. We understand that coalition involvement remains a core element of your strategic thinking, and the ability to operate with allies and friends, an indispensable capability.

We give a very high priority to interoperability with U.S. forces, when making capability and doctrinal decisions across the board.

The Australian government has made a major commitment to increase funding for defense, and has embarked on major upgrades in modernization, which include U.S.-source A, W and C aircraft and (inaudible) tank.

Our ability to integrate at all levels with U.S. forces is essential to our capacity to fight together, and this is built on considerable interoperability.

Mr. Chairman, I have provided you and the committee members some notes that detail our role as a partner and friend in global security, as well as highlighting Australia's broader military commitment to Iraq.

I will be keen to discuss this commitment with you in greater detail during the question period. Once again, thank you for this opportunity to inform you in the House Armed Services Committee, of Australia's involvement in Iraq.

We are with you today as we have been with you in the past. We are determined to combat terrorism, and we are also determined to stand together with the United States and coalition partners in defeating it.

MODERATOR: General Willis, thank you very much. It's great to have you here.

General Cieniuch, thank you for being here today. It's great to have all of our coalition partners who are present here today here. But we must say it's particularly a pleasure to have you here with us today, as well.

So thank you, sir, and the floor is yours.

CIENIUCH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the House Armed Forces Service Committee.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for the invitation to appear before this committee. I'm honored to be here today.

For over 50 years, the Polish armed forces have been involved in (inaudible) operations led by international organizations, the U.N., NATO, an recently, the E.U. We have also taken part in multinational coalition of the willing operations.

MODERATOR: General, could you pull that microphone right up close to you.

Sir, thank you.

CIENIUCH: We have also taken part in the multinational coalition of the willing operations, such as the ongoing mission in Iraq.

Such engagements with Polish (inaudible) brings political, diplomatic and military advantages, but also (inaudible)

These are not new factors for our military. Sixty years ago today, Australian, British, Polish and U.S. forces together broke the Nazi lines at (inaudible) opening the road to (inaudible)

Today, Australian, British and Polish generals appear with you to discuss the operations of our coalition forces in Iraq.

Poland's support of the international coalition in the combat and stabilization phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom reflects our commitment to international security.

Our ongoing participation in the stabilization process in Iraq with nearly 2,500 Polish soldiers and another 9,200 soldiers from other countries deployed to the center-south sector is consistent with the key tenants of our national security policies and reaffirms Poland's readiness to meet current and future threats.

Last year, on September 5th, Poland assumed (inaudible) responsibility for the central-south sector Iraq. Since March 2003, three Polish military elements (inaudible) special operations unit and logistics ship have taken part in combat operations within the coalition and the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

CIENIUCH: When Operation Iraqi Freedom entered phase 4 last May, Poland already had two military contingents in the region, in Kuwait and in Iraq.

Leading the multinational division in Iraq has been a most challenging task for the Polish armed forces. We are very aware that this great responsibility and honor was entrusted to our armed forces only four years after we became a member of NATO. To meet the demand of post-Saddam Iraq, Poland and other coalition nations have agreed to participate in the process of stabilizing the country. And despite of withdrawal of some partners, we remain committed to continuing our mission.

Forming, preparing, deploying and commanding the multinational division with contingents from more than 20 countries in a very unstable region has been a significant challenge. Many experts predicted that this mission exceeded our abilities. But time has proven them wrong.

We have demonstrated that we are capable of successfully forming and commanding such a complex formation with a demanding mission. To date, approximately 7,000 Polish soldiers have taken part or are currently involved in this mission.

The mission required us to modernize the soldiers' individual equipment and adapt our battlefield systems to the extreme climate in Iraq.

We also gained extensive experience in the logistics associated with deploying forces on such a large scale. We sent over 800 vehicles, nearly a dozen helicopters and over 10,000 pounds of materials to Iraq.

Our zone of action is not an easy one. The main purpose of our mission is to re-establish security and stability in the multinational division's central-south area of responsibility, including Al Kut, Najaf and Karbala.

The division continues to implement civil support projects with funding from the Commander's Emergency Response Program.

Multinational division central-south expects to spend about $42 million U.S. dollars on such projects before the end of May of this year.

CIENIUCH: To date, we have completed more than 500 projects including projects providing assistance to civilian administration, infrastructure, construction projects, et cetera.

In executing its fine tasks the multinational division helped established that Iraq Civil Defense Corps, the new Iraqi army, the Iraqi police and bodyguards.

So far nearly 20,000 soldiers and security force personnel have taken part in the coalition's actions to restore an effective Iraqi security system.

The Polish armed forces don't have a mandate to conduct combat operations in Iraq. Their mission is of a stabilization nature. The actions conducted by the multinational division central-south are closely monitored and continuously analyzed, giving out the feedback for improving the force's tactics and equipment.

This feed bag is useful, not only for preparing for the next operation, but it's used real time to optimize current operations in Iraq. This feedback is also key to our ongoing efforts to transform and modernize the Polish armed forces.

The effectiveness of our forces in Iraq depends on the level of efficiency with weapons systems and military equipment on the troops for deployment, training and on the location of necessary funds from our defense budget.

Moreover, our success in such missions depends on out-of-the- theater strategy, which is the major weakness of the Polish armed forces.

CIENIUCH: Thanks to projected U.S. security assistance that will help us acquire a few upgraded C-130 aircraft, we anticipate that our capabilities in this area will improve over the next several years.

We must also emphasize the armed forces modernization program, both structural and technological, is built on Poland's commitments to NATO.

To undertake the mission in Iraq, we were required to develop resources that had been projected for force modernization, thereby failing to attain (inaudible)

We appreciate the U.S. security assistance, both financial and material, that have helped mitigate the adverse impact of this and which have helped keep several critical priorities of our armed forces modernization program on track.

Operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan affirm our armed forces are ready and stable to participate across a full spectrum of missions, not only combat operations, but also stabilization and humanitarian ventures.

We are fully committed to continuing the mission and to accomplishing our fine tasks, despite less than 50 percent public support rate and the many challenges remaining in Iraq.

I'm only a soldier and not a politician. And I know that it is vital to inform public opinion about the positive aspects of our involvement in this venture.

Thank you very much for your attention.

MODERATOR: Thank you, each, for you very articulate statements.

Let me just begin the questioning with this question: When I had the opportunity to visit in Iraq in November and then, again, in February, it was fairly obvious to me while I was in the country that the -- well the people we talked to would say over and over again there are several things that we want to make sure happen here.

MODERATOR: One is that you make sure you get Saddam, because we're afraid he'll come back.

Another is, we want to make sure that the coalition doesn't leave before we're able to provide security for ourselves.

And perhaps a third is that we really need help in establishing a growing economy.

Those are the kinds of themes that we heard from people there. And yet, when we came back here, the message that the American people hear is quite different.

Your forces, your part of the coalition forces are very much responsible for security and achieving those kinds of general goals, and what appears to be about the southern third of the country, from Iraq to the southeast, to the south, and to the southwest of Baghdad.

That area obviously is very important to us. There are many Shia in that area. In many of the cities there, it's the primary population.

And so I guess my question is just this: In those areas, are the people's goals still the same? And how do you see our operations moving forward, to achieve those kinds of goals?

Anybody want to volunteer to start, or should we just go in the same order? General Viggers?

VIGGERS: Your estimate of the popular view chimes very closely with the feel that we got during my time there.

I think it's worth starting by saying that there are a number of different pressures and perceptions that run in Iraq. We found that in the southeast, and indeed in the area the general referred to in central-south, essentially a Shia population, broadly supportive of what the coalition is doing, I would say to the 90 to 95 percent level. There were spikes of activity against us, the coalition.

VIGGERS: But day on day, the population remains supportive, but I think that still applies today, other than the very spikes of activity and the actions of people like Muqtada al-Sadr.

If you go to the North, to the area that was occupied by the 101st Airborne, in my time, General David Petraeus, Kurdish, essentially, again very supportive and stable and wanting to go forward.

The issue, though, was in the center. The issue was Baghdad and the Sunni area toward Tikrit, Aqaba, Fallujah, Habbiniyah, those areas,which were always the heartland of the Sunni area and, of course, the area which Saddam and his regime thrived. And that was always then, and I think, still is the most difficult area.

If you can get through the fear that, regime had oppressed people with and talk to the people on the street, they would say, "We want what you were talking about. We want a safe and free Iraq. We want our resources to build this country. We want our country back."

And they were very supportive of our wish to say that we share that objective; we don't want to be with you for a moment longer than we need to be to get the country to a sustainable situation so we can leave.

The perception outside the country, of course, is affected by the media. And I found that in my time there, that very often elements of the media would focus on what I would have described as tactical evidences (ph): a soldier was shot, a soldier killed, that is regrettable.

But these instances were very often elevated to become an issue of strategic importance and indicated that the strategy that was being followed on the civil side, on the military side was failing. And, of course, that was not the case.

There was very little effort to promote some of the good news that was happening. For instance in my time exams were held. All of the kids who were eligible to take exams took exams. Now, the buildings might not have been great, in very good condition, but they took those exams.

We got the oil production running. We started to get a control of smuggling. We started to control ingress from pretty open borders.

VIGGERS: So I think in balanced terms one of our lessons is: How do we use our information campaign to get the truth out into the country and into the border region?

MODERATOR: General Willis?

WILLIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I endorse basically what General Viggers said. I haven't been there, I haven't served there, but I have access to a considerable amount of information in the way of reporting, et cetera. And a lot of that portrays a different picture than what you might read on the front pages of the newspapers. And that point was made very eloquently by General Viggers.

Get Saddam: Certainly. I think that's something that we all wanted, and that's been achieved.

Ensure we will not leave: Well, that's our government's commitment, that we will stay there until the job is done. It's seen as part of a global war on terror, and it's very much believed that we should stay there until that is achieved.

We also believe very much in the growing of the economy, the children at schools, the breadwinner of the family with a job, local security, basic utilities are very important. And there's a lot of work being done along those lines. And once again what I see, the provision of such utilities above what they were prewar days now.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

General Cieniuch?

TESTIMONY OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CIENIUCH
First Deputy Chief
of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Services

I would like to say that each region, each zone in Iraq are different. South part of Iraq is, I can say, safer than the central zone of Iraq. I mean, around Baghdad.

But I would like to tell a little about central-south zone, because I think that I am more familiar with its problems than with problems in the Kurdish region or close to Baghdad.

Central-south part of Iraq is, we can say, more stable than central zone of Iraq. But we have met a lot of problems in this zone. And, of course, if we don't solve these problems, the situation will be more difficult than today in central-south area of responsibility.

CIENIUCH: First of all, I would like to underline that we should continue our stabilization operations. (inaudible)

MODERATOR: May I ask you to pull that microphone just a bit closer to you?

CIENIUCH: OK.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

CIENIUCH: Secondly, I would like to say that cooperation with local authority, local government, is the issue which can improve our ability to combat the stabilization operation.

Economic cooperation -- it's a very poor region, central-south zone of responsibility. Many people don't have a job. Very high rate of unemployment. This means people spend a lot of time on the street. They have no job. This means it's easy to organize some groups which will fight against the coalition.

But the cooperation with local communities is quite good. A lot of information about terrorists in our zone of responsibility, we have got from ordinary people, from the street.

People don't need war. They want to work and want to live in normal conditions.

Education system: Education system should be improved because children should spend their time in the school, not in the street.

CIENIUCH: And we stress very much for education system in our zone of responsibility. And we organize many schools, from primary, secondary schools, to high level schools, universities.

And these are things which we have to do as quickly as possible because if we don't do it, the situation the central-south zone of responsibility will go down.

Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Thank each of you.

Mr. Skelton?

SKELTON: Let me direct my questions to General Viggers since the other gentleman have commented on it, but since he's been there.

In the news, General, my recollection is this morning, it appears that the Shia under the cleric al-Sadr and the Sunni in the Fallujah area are combining their forces to fight the coalition. What, if anything, is the significance of that?

VIGGERS: Thank you, sir.

We had some indicators when I was there last year that this sort of thing might well arise.

Muqtada al-Sadr, as we all know, is a young hot-head with some support in the area of Najaf and in Sadr City in Baghdad, the youth, if you like, the so-called Mahdi Army.

It is significant in that it can be stabilized. My understanding is that the broader Shia community, however, up to and including the top levels, do not support what Muqtada al-Sadr is trying to do. So I think he is not speaking on behalf of a majority of the Shia community.

VIGGERS: He does have the ability, though, as you've said, to link to those other elements, be they the former regime, those who live in the Sunni area who would wish to continue to foment discontent.

So I think it is something that we need to watch very carefully. And we need to ensure that -- and again, it really goes back to ensuring that the people of Iraq realize the risks of allowing that sort of linkage to develop.

I'm sure that over there now a lot of the intelligence effort is being put into ensuring that that sort of unhealthful alliance can't be allowed to develop.

SKELTON: Do either of the gentleman have a comment on that?

Let me ask General Viggers: If you had a crystal ball in front of you and your duty was to bring absolute stability, or I should say, stability within reason to that country, how many more troops would you need for the coalition, would you ask for for the coalition?

VIGGERS: I repeat my initial statement. I'm not on the ground. I'm not...

SKELTON: We understand that. But assume you were there.

You had a high-ranking position there for five months...

VIGGERS: And we looked at it on a daily basis during my time. In fact, during my time in the British sector and in the American sectors we reinforced. But in your case, you delayed the return of troops.

The issue to me is not about numbers, though. The issue is to be clear on the effect we are trying to achieve by having more military on the ground.

I don't necessarily hold with the view that more troops equals more success. In many areas, advance on the political or the social or the economic fronts can produce a quicker result.

So I would urge that we be careful about thinking that just by pouring more troops into the country, it produces a better result.

During our time, there I know for a fact, when I was involved in a discussion with General Sanchez, we looked at the troop levels on a daily basis. On occasion, new tasks would emerge; for example, the training of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which required more troops to deliver that effect without removing troops from other tasks.

VIGGERS: My own view now, it's a personal view, is I think we have broadly gotten the right degree of troop level there. We might need to surge troops in for short periods and to bring them out again to achieve an effect.

SKELTON: General, the news media indicates that there are 4,000 American troops being withdrawn from Korea. My understanding is, that's a brigade full from Korea that's being sent to Iraq. What do you make of that?

VIGGERS: Mr. Skelton, I've not seen those reports. I'm not, of course, involved in the political/military decision-making process in this country. I would assume that if that is the case there is an identified requirement for that additional brigade for the specific tasks in the week ahead, but I have no knowledge of the background for that report.

SKELTON: Thank you.

MODERATOR: The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons.

SIMMONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here today.

First and foremost, for General Willis, I wish to share with you, I'm a Vietnam veteran, and that prior to the Tet Offensive, in 1968 the Australian task force at Nuydot (ph) was relocated to the Dong Nai sensitive zone, which was the area where North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces intended to launch a very substantial 122 rocket attack onto 2nd Field Force headquarters, which is where I was located.

However, the Australians did such a good job of screwing it up that the anticipated barrage did not take place, and as a consequence infantry forces that were poised to attack after the barrage waited until first light before they realized the barrage was never going to come. And as a consequence they were unsuccessful in overrunning our position. So I simply want to extend my thanks 30 years later to you and your countrymen for the good job that you did.

WILLIS: If I can extend my thanks to your countrymen, because I was there at Nuydot (ph) and I served in Vietnam alongside American forces, so I understand what you're saying. And I'm sure that action was reciprocated about tenfold from your side to our side over the period of our commitment.

SIMMONS: Well, we work well together. And I appreciate the fact that the two countries continue to work well together.

I also had a wonderful R&R in Sydney, Australia, but I better not get into the details of that.

(LAUGHTER)

That being said...

MODERATOR: You're in a good mood today.

SIMMONS: It's the coffee.

That being said, of course, the media constantly is drawing comparisons between our involvement in Vietnam, our involvement in Iraq. Words like "quagmire" are tossed around, "no light at the end of the tunnel," "dead end street," et cetera, et cetera.

I personally see many differences, but I wonder if you would want to comment on that issue.

WILLIS: Thank you very much.

Yes, from my perspective, there aren't too many similarities. If you look at Vietnam, it was very strongly supported by a superpower externally. And a lot of the main fighting force toward the end was coming into south Vietnam from outside of south Vietnam.

Vietnam, there was a considerably more local support, I would suggest, than there is evidence in Iraq. And I think a lot more effort is being placed, drawing into line the lessons that were learned out of something like Vietnam in certain areas, such as counterinsurgency.

But as far as there being great similarities, it is of my view that they end pretty shortly after the start, the start of the comparison that is.

SIMMONS: Thank you very much for that comment.

And for the other panelists, I'd be interested to know what is the state of popular support or lack of popular support in your respective countries for the involvement of your military forces in Iraq?

VIGGERS: Shall I start it?

SIMMONS: Anyway you want to go.

VIGGERS: We're heartened, actually, by the amount of support on the street for the British army and the air force and the armed forces that are out there. There is no sense that the population is against the armed forces or what it's trying to do. In fact, the statements we've seen and we continue to see daily the reporting that they are entirely with us.

There is, of course, as there is in your own country, a debate out there about the methods and so on. But in terms of support to the soldier on the ground, the British public is entirely with us.

SIMMONS: Thank you.

Australia?

WILLIS: Yes. I would say somewhat similar. You've got probably a mix across the political spectrum, plus and minus. But when it gets to the people on the ground and the support for the service men and women that are operating in Iraq, that's probably 95.999 recurring, very good support from the citizens of Australia for the troops.

SIMMONS: Poland has a substantial number of military forces and a very substantial area of operations. What is the level of support at home for Polish forces in Iraq?

CIENIUCH: Thank you.

I would like to say that in Poland we have slightly below 50 percent of population supporting operation in Iraq, but one situation in our division make more difficult, for example, last week two Polish soldiers were killed in Iraq.

Population supported more this, for example, during one week the rate of supporting grows about 8 percent. The first.

The second, population supporting military operations and supporting Polish armed forces, but in Poland we are before the election. This means this issue is very important for political parties. And that is why a lot of problems and articles, articles in media and so on.

SIMMONS: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Mr. Simmons.

Dr. Snyder, the good gentleman from Arkansas?

SNYDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Willis, you mentioned -- I think you had raised -- I think it's "interoperability." Is it -- were you saying "interoperability" or "intra?" It's "inter," I think.

WILLIS: "Inter."

SNYDER: Between forces.

WILLIS: Between forces. That's right, sir. Yes.

SNYDER: I want to tell you an anecdote and have you tell me what went wrong.

I have to assume -- well, I'll just try the anecdote for you.

About four weeks ago or so, it was during a week when things were really not going well in Iraq, when it looked like there was a lot of flare-ups all over the country, and it was a very disturbing week for everyone. It was Friday afternoon here in Washington, and my staff member who's in the back of the room there got a call from a woman in my district whose husband is a contractor in Iraq. She had just gotten a phone call from him on a satellite phone. They were in a Ukrainian sector -- had been under fire for some time. He was having to participate in the return of fire, according to this call that the Ukrainians were not coming or unable to come. And her basic question to my staff member was: Can you do something?

And so my staff member got on the phone, called the -- this is late Friday afternoon -- called the CPA headquarters here in Washington, who called the CPA headquarters in Baghdad, communicated with Combined Joint Task Force 7. And in a short time after that, still that afternoon, we got a report back that we think they did, indeed, respond to it. And I've sent the e-mail from fellow who was under fire who related this whole episode. And he thought there was (inaudible) them having some U.S. helicopters and a C-130 gunship appeared overhead and escorted them out.

Now, I have seen a lot of diagrams in my eight years here of the army of the future with satellites and communication on the ground and laser spotters and communicating with planes. It really doesn't involve a satellite phone call from a husband to a wife back home with almost a desperate call to a congressional staff member who calls the CPA -- I don't think that's the way we're supposed to be calling in support from one sector to another.

SNYDER: Now, you know, someone may come to me later and say, the facts are all wrong. But those are facts as we understand them.

What went wrong there? How good is your interoperability in that kind of a situation? Or are you so geographically -- is there a sense of geographic constraint that you feel like your (inaudible) in your sector that you don't really call for help...

WILLIS: Dr. Snyder, I can't really comment on the particular.

SNYDER: And I wouldn't ask you to.

WILLIS: You can't legislate for everything to go right. And quite clearly in my mind, and I think for the military people sitting at this table, the more you practice together and work together and train together and exchange ideas together over time, the less chance there is of something like that happening.

I know in our case we've been working with your armed forces constantly since the second World War both in training and operations. And I would suggest the Brits have had as many, if not more, exchanges, liaison offices and the like, learning to work together, learning each others foibles, different ways of doing things, and trying to standardize them as much as we can.

Additionally, interoperability may well mean what equipment you're using. It may be that the Ukrainian you mentioned may not have had the appropriate equipment on hand to link in with the U.S. or other allied network.

SNYDER: Or our contractors may not...

WILLIS: Or contractors may not have that.

And that is difficult. But the more you work with each other, the more you train with each other, the more you know how to work and rely on each other, the better it will be.

But the bottom line is interoperability starts in the heart. It doesn't start with equipment.

And I think countries that are close together and work closely together as these ones at the table do with you have got most of the problem solved. There are technological issues, but it takes patience and time.

VIGGERS: May I add?

SNYDER: Yes, sir, General.

VIGGERS: It was an issue that we thought a great deal about during my time out there last year. Of course, it's not just the contractors, KBR and others who are delivering a huge amount of our life support. There were all the other contractors who were rebuilding the power stations, maintaining the oil fields. We needed to coordinate with those guys, too.

VIGGERS: Then you add in all of the other nongovernment organizations. And you have quite a complex matrix of quarters and movement and command and control. And we spent a lot of time last year in Baghdad and at the outstations trying our best to ensure that people had awareness of where people were when and who to contact when the issue became difficult.

And I personally got myself involved with the United Nations and the Red Cross to ensure that they looked into our military establishment to say, "You need to know, we're in your area."

A lot of the contractors who were delivering the -- and to give you a sense of scale, if you drove, you've probably done it, but if you drive from Baghdad to Basra, in a 4X4, that's a 7.5 hour journey. It's a long way. And, of course, you cannot cover the whole length and breadth, but what you can do is develop an arrangement where you know when convoys are leaving and when they're due to arrive, and that enables you to trigger then responses. And that was the sort of practical thing that we were doing out there to...

SNYDER: And from the convoy's perspective, would it be helpful to know when they have passed from one contractor to another...

VIGGERS: And the phone number to ring. So there were lots of practical things, but as we were saying, you have to fight your way through these difficulties and make sure that you do situational awareness.

SIMMONS: I wanted to ask each of you, and if you don't know the answer to this that I would probably prefer you just not answer it. But there has been, obviously, a whole lot of discussion now for almost two weeks about the whole issue of the prison in Iraq and detainees.

Can you all describe for us what happens when your troops detain someone that you think needs to be held for questioning, further evaluation? And the answer may be different for each of you. What happens from the time you're troops on patrol stops someone, where do they end up, and what's the route for getting there, and what are the standards of care?

(UNKNOWN): (OFF-MIKE)

SNYDER: If those have changed recently, if you could articulate any changes that have been made.

VIGGERS: In terms of processes that go on -- and I would say there is no evidence yet to suggest that those processes have been broken -- there are inquiries ongoing and they might turn things up.

You're aware that the recent allegations that we faced in the media back home have been proved to be found false -- utterly false.

Other investigations are going on.

But in our training and preparation for deployment such as this, our soldiers are taken to a correct things to do according to the laws of armed conflict according to the Geneva Convention. And we ensure that there's an appropriate command and control structure there to monitor detainees as they're arrested on the street, as they're taken into holding areas, as they're interviewed and processed.

So there is a well-kept up process within the commanding generals chain of command. That is the extent of my own personal...

SNYDER: Do you all do your own holding and interrogation? Or are your detainees transferred at some point to American...

VIGGERS: We have, in the southeast, during my time there, in the southeast sector, there was a detention area in the British area, which we controlled and manned and guarded.

SNYDER: Do you all have any...

WILLIS: If we have the requirement to detain someone, we pass the individual or individuals off to the U.S. forces very soon after capture.

CIENIUCH: I would like to say that in Polish (inaudible). But the most important in this issue is to require very good standard operation procedures. And after that, all commanders should very carefully look after this stops.

Thank you.

MODERATOR: Dr. Snyder, thank you.

Mr. Cole, the gentleman from Oklahoma?

COLE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, before I begin, let me state the obvious. All three of your countries have been tremendous allies and friends in a very complex and difficult operation. We appreciate that more than I can express.

And we know the measure of your sacrifice hasn't just been in materiel, but it's been in the lives of your soldiers. And we extend our sympathy to those families and certainly to you.

And, again, I appreciate your friendship. You're wonderful partners to have. So thank you very much.

COLE: Let me begin by asking all three of you, if we can, we have another ally on the ground that we haven't spoken of, and that's really the Iraqis, and the Iraqi security forces in particular, that you operate with on a regular basis and that we're all trying to stand up to one degree or another, increase their capability.

So I would like to get your respective judgments on the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces -- army, police, various security arms -- how well we're doing in that, and how long you think it will be before -- not before we can, quote, "go," I wouldn't put it quite that way, but before they become capable enough to operate independently, whether we're there or not.

If I could begin with you, General Viggers.

VIGGERS: Yes, sir.

As I referred to right at the start, it was one of the things I think that took us back, frankly, as we want through the end of combat operations and into the reconstruction phase, to realize how little there was by way of a security structure in the country.

There were no border guards. The Iraqi army had melted away. There was no sense, you hear sometimes in the reporting that we, quote, "disbanded" the Iraqi army. They weren't there.

There was no police force as you or I would recognize it. There never had been. The prisoners had been let out of places like the Abu Ghraib.

The borders were open.

So one was starting at a fairly low base of capability. And an awful lot of energy was put in last year to training up the police and the border guards, creating the Civil Defense Corps from those who had been in the Iraqi army.

We found that there was no -- technologically they were very, very low level. Things like cars and radios had to be brought in. Kuwait did a huge amount to help us, and even Jordan did a huge amount to help us. Kuwait also was keen to help.

And I think a lot of good stuff was done last year to get them to a basic level of structure with a command-and-control organization that it could begin to make a difference.

I would pay tribute to the Iraqi police, particularly in Baghdad under the guidance of Bernie Kerik and others, who were prepared to go up against some very hardline people, in plain clothes, with very little by way of technical support.

VIGGERS: I think we're off to a good start. How much longer have we got to go, I think some way, frankly. I think there's another year's probably, year's worth of work to get these people to a point, and it's more about commander control and equipment than it is about sense of commitment. They've got that. But there's quite some way to go before one can genuinely stand back.

COLE: General Willis?

WILLIS: I can't add that much, other than to say that it's very important to win at that level. And whatever you can do to win at that level must be done.

The establishment of relevant police forces is probably the most critical thing in that sort of environment. And I believe that we are making great strides. And evidence of that is the fact that more trainers are being put into that environment to try to move them along much more quickly.

COLE: General Cieniuch?

CIENIUCH: I would like to add that in the operations that police is the most important issue in central-south zone of responsibility.

We prepared about 15,000 policemen, but unfortunately, they are not well-prepared for many reasons. And unfortunately they are not well-equipped. They have not communications equipment, and sometimes lack of weapons. And that is why effectiveness, police is not good enough in our sector.

But we think that we have no choice, we have to give them weapons, equipment and more responsibility for a safe life in this sector.

Thank you.

COLE: Let me ask, basically, the same question with a slightly different twist about our adversaries. We've clearly come to a period here where we're suffering a higher casualty rate, we have been told some of this is part of the lead-up to the transfer of sovereignty, but you also wonder well, is this is spike in violence similar to what you referred to earlier, General Viggers, or is this now an enemy that has a sustained capacity and stronger ability to oppose us than we were seeing the first few months after the end of major military operations?

VIGGERS: I think, watching it from about this time last year to now, one has sent that the threat has become more sophisticated and more coordinated as time has gone on. There is now a cocktail of those who are part of the former regime, those who are discontented anyway, those who come in from outside the country in order to attack America, for whatever agenda reason they have.

We've seen a different level of capability now than in the early days. It used to be the odd AK-47 and RPG, but certainly during my time one saw more evidence of coordination.

But I would say that it's at a local level. We never picked it up that this was something being organized at a national level. It was very regional. Fallujah, for example, has been hard going from the beginning of the reconstruction phases.

So I think they are improving in confidence and coordination, but I would still see it at a broadly local level.

I would also say that our response has been increasing and improving incrementally as well to deal with these things.

WILLIS: I would only add, Mr. Cole, that it seems that these individuals, if they cannot convince by sound, reasoned argument, they turn to the tactics of terror, of murder and destruction and chaos. And that seems to be what's happening in some elements there in those pockets of resistance.

CIENIUCH: In my opinion, the most dangerous are terrorists who arrived outside of Iraq, because they are well-prepared for this attack, they are better equipped than Iraqi terrorists. In the central sector, central south sector, we can say that even terrorists from north, I mean, Sunni are more than dangerous than the Shia.

COLE: One last question, Mr. Chairman.

Again, your respective armed forces have been simply magnificent through this entire endeavor, so I'd like to get your assessment of their morale and their situation. Again, they've made an enormous contribution. And we care as deeply about them as we do about our own. So we'd love to get your assessment of how they're doing and what their attitude is.

WILLIS: Mr. Cole, the attitudes from the forces on the ground, those about to replace them and those that have come home, obviously with very minor exception, is very positive. We are not seeing any dips in recruiting or retention figures, which is generally a good indicator. That is not happening. And the morale is high.

CIENIUCH: In our sector, we haven't had any problems with morale, and we hope that everything goes well.

COLE: General Viggers.

VIGGERS: Exactly the same. It's obviously something we watch very carefully, and, particularly, in terms of impact of this level of operational tempo on our ability to recruit and to retain people.

We do have certain key areas which we're watching very carefully. We would call them niche capabilities, specialist trades, perhaps pilots and policeman, those that we don't have a great deal of.

I think the only other point I'd make is our reservists are also showing tremendous willingness to get involved and to get the job done. There is a sense that we have to finish this job, and the best way to do it is to get involved.

COLE: And, again, I just want to thank you, gentlemen, and through you, your respective countries have been tremendous allies and friends. And thank you for your support. We couldn't be working with better people.

MODERATOR: Mr. Cole, thank you very much.

Let me turn now to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner?

M. TURNER: Well, let me echo the appreciation that has spoken by Mr. Cole and our chairman for your participation and the importance of your presence.

Having you here today to speak of the global war on terror, I think, emphasizes so much that this is not an American war, but this is a global war on terror, of which there are many partners.

M. TURNER: Tony Blair, when he was here receiving the congressional medal of honor, indicated that this was a war that was to be fought by the civilized world. And your participation and commitment to it and the commitment of your country is certainly in evidence that this is a global effort.

When I listen to your comments about working together and the forces of integration and interoperability and the issues of the war on terror, I think that we look at Iraq and lesson learned there and how Iraq is going, but also we have to look at the broader issue of the global war on terror of which all of you spoke.

I wondered if you could give us your insight as to how you believe that this coalition has undertaken this issue in Iraq, as to what we've learned and how we've become better prepared to work together on the worldwide issue of the global war on terror, how our operations, the issues, the things that we're facing in Iraq are advancing our abilities of working together on the overall global conflict.

WILLIS: Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Well, the major lessons, as we see it, would be the great amount of contact. And the more contact you can have with your coalition partners before the event, the better. And I guess it's not a lesson; it's a confirmation of what we've known about for many years in the past.

Our pre-operational deployment, we had troops go in there just for acclimatization, into the region before the government committed forces. They were going there on the understanding that if they were committed, if Australia did commit troops, they would be as familiar as possible with the operational area.

So when the decision was made by the government, our troops, sailors and airmen, that were going to be employed in the operations, and many of them were in the region and had been for sometime acclimatizing, learning a little bit more about the culture, learning about it more about the training and the operating procedures of the locals -- I think that's terribly important.

It's reinforced in our mind the importance of pre-deployment training, the importance of not only having the basic military skills, which we all expect day to day, but also focused education and training about the region, about the country, about the people before one leaves to deploy on operations.

WILLIS: We don't let one soldier leave Australia on operations, or sailor or air man, air woman, for that matter, unless they've undergone predeployment training.

And I think all this is reinforced by the high percentage of liaison and exchange officers we have with the United States and the important lessons they bring to us daily, and hopefully the lessons that we can bring to your staffs daily from our experiences outside the continental United States.

VIGGERS: I would echo all of that. I think on the military side of the coalition, the interoperability is very good. After all, we are all military people. Our uniforms might be slightly different in color, but we're all soldiers, and we all think like soldiers, and we train together and we work together.

I guess if there are two areas of interoperability which I think need to be improved as we go through this process, the first is to look at how we can improve our cooperation on an interagency basis, pan-government, to ensure that the political objectives, the economic objectives, the military ones are all in sync, are synchronized within an overall campaign plan. And I think that is something that we have seen through this that we needed to do better at.

I think the other thing that this operation is showing is that we have to be able to pull together our intelligence and information effort in a much more coordinated way. And I saw that DeBlasio as I was out there, the need to share more if we are to ensure that our own decision-action cycle keeps us ahead of the sort of threats we talked earlier about, about the young Muqtada getting together with another group somewhere else.

So I think those are the sorts of areas of interoperability that I would stress. But as regards to the operations of the military on the ground, given that we have different languages and different concepts and doctrine, it's more on an interagency basis. At home we are adjusting our own military doctrine for peace support operations, to emphasize that the contributes, it is not the only -- it's not the whole answer.

CIENIUCH: I can say that interoperability is really a very important issue here. And we can say that interoperability between people, staff and unit, is sometimes in our sector not fully a solved issue, because in our sector, we have troops from many countries, more than 20, which -- troops using different kinds of procedures and they have different doctrines. Sometimes problems with language. And they are prepared and trained in different programs.

This means interoperability between staffs, people, we can achieve by common and integrating training before troop deployment.

Interoperability of equipment, of course, in our sector we use equipment produced by different countries.

And as you said before, sometimes communications equipment which is used by Ukrainian troops is not interoperable with communication equipment which is used in our outpost. And sometimes we have problems.

But of course we exchange grades (ph) and officers in each unit, and it seems that this coordination is much better.

CIENIUCH: Thank you.

M. TURNER: One of the things that I think makes the increase in the conflict in Iraq difficult is that it's not just attacks that are occurring against coalition forces, but also attacks that are occurring against the Iraqi people. Could each of you speak for a moment about the conflict?

And it appears to me that certainly since Iraqi interests are being targeted, the United Nations has been targeted, others have been targeted who are even just bringing in relief to the Iraqi people, that we're dealing with a conflict, or terrorists, that have a much broader goal than just attacks against the coalition forces. Would you care to comment on that?

VIGGERS: Yes, well, during my time, one saw that as those who were determined to prevent progress were realizing that coming up against the military part of the coalition, they were going to get hit hard, they started to turn their attention onto the softer elements of the coalition and indeed the Iraqi people themselves.

And at the heart of this is the confluence and the consent of the Iraqi people. If you could undermine that, then you are preserving what you want to preserve, be it rights or privileges, or an unreasonable share of resource.

And so the maintenance of the Iraqi -- the confluence of the Iraqi people was very important to us, and it was one of the reasons why it was important to us to get more and more of the Iraqi security structure in place, so that they could demonstrate that they were indeed capable of looking after themselves.

But it was something that we rushed a lot, was to make sure that we did get enough power, enough water, enough electricity, to the various parts of the population, despite the efforts of a few to stop us doing that.

WILLIS: I would just like to add there that what my Polish colleague mentioned earlier on, about the terrorists arriving from external to Iraq and emphasized what we would see as part of the global war on terror. Terrorists, by nature, they want to achieve their aim.

WILLIS: They cannot achieve it by sound argument. I think I mentioned before, their aim is to foster fear, division and self-doubt in the other side. And they do this by any means available to them.

And I see that's part of their technique at the moment, to try to create that fear, self-doubt and division, not only within the coalition as such, but also within the people of Iraq, and the division and self-doubt amongst the different groups in Iraq, whether they be religious or ethnic, and it just takes commitment, energy and resources to work through that.

CIENIUCH: I can add to that, terrorists, they attack less protected objects, and if we had better protected troops and forces, this means civilians will be more and more often attacked by terrorists.

And it's a new consideration, I think, in our sector, that more and more terrorist attacks are against a civilian population.

M. TURNER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Mr. Turner.

If Mr. Akin will indulge me for just a moment, this is a subject that I was going to visit later, but this is a good time to do it, because we're already involved in the subject.

Let me just say, it seems to me that as we watched the progress of various activities in Iraq, particularly violent activities involving suicide bombers, that in the beginning, we saw some Iraq-on- Iraq violence, but in the beginning, it seemed to me that most of the violence was -- it appeared to be from former military-type people.

And as time moved forward, we saw an escalation of suicide types of attacks, and at the same time, an escalation of more and more attacks on Iraqis, which suggests to me that people who carry out suicide attacks are, at least for the most part, trained over a long period of time to do that by someone else.

MODERATOR: And it seems to me, also, that the Iraqi mode of operation, as far as the people who were in the military and predisposed to carry out attacks of some kind, were trained to survive in a number of ways, for a number of reasons.

And so, I've never heard anyone come to this conclusion, other than myself, that it seems to me that the suicide-type of attacks that occur with some frequency today and in the recent past could likely be people who were trained to carry out these types of attacks on Iraqis -- carry out these kinds of attacks which are now occurring on Iraqis by perhaps some of the neighbors of Iraq -- and I could name them, but it's probably counterproductive, so I won't. Is that a valid line of thought?

General Viggers, you were there during much of that period of time when all of this was evolving. What do you think?

VIGGERS: I think there's a lot in what you say, sir. Yes.

But Iraq is a huge country, with huge borders, which were open. And we had evidence of people coming into the country from other states, not necessarily from the states next door, actually, to pursue an agenda which goes beyond just Iraq. The issue was more about the United States and A.Q. and so on.

So I think it is plausible that people will be trained and brought in to deliver that sort of attack. And, of course, it is very difficult to counter that sort of determination.

So I think there is a lot in what you say, sir, yes.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin?

AKIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had a couple of questions here. I thought what I might do is toss three questions out, and then whoever wants to respond to either or any, kind of let you choose as you feel the answer's been covered.

AKIN: The first question is, as perhaps you're aware, today, there was the first use that we've seen now of nerve gas and perhaps the discovery of mustard gas. And I guess we don't know whether that was done intentionally or whether one of those shell casings was mismarked or whatever, but there was nerve gas.

Does that in any way change your operations? And second of all, does it surprise you? That's one question.

The second one -- I would be particularly interested in your answer in that -- and that is, as we are involved over there, it seems to me that there is always a certain common-sense balance of how tough we are going to be or how strongly we're going to respond, as we're challenged, to the extreme of leveling some particular town or to something as mild as just apprehending a person or two at the door of their house or however it is. Seems like that's an ongoing sort of a judgment kind of thing.

My question is, are the standards of how severe our responses are, is that set theater-wide? Or is a lot of that left up to the local commanders, to try to assess that within their own area? And your overall sense, are we hitting a good balance of winning the minds and hearts, at the same time letting them know that we mean business?

So those are the two questions. Thank you.

WILLIS: Mr. Akin, I'll take the first question, that about the nerve gas and mustard gas.

I know no more about it than you know, but I can say that it probably wouldn't change the standing operating procedures in as much as the troops there have been trained from the very beginning to cope with this sort of activity. It may have gone on the back burner, but they would have the equipment and the tactics, techniques and procedures to manage it. There may be a higher alert status issued across the area of operations because of this discovery. It might make people rethink. But that's all it should do, because the soldiers should be trained and prepared.

WILLIS: And does it surprise me? No, it doesn't surprise me.

CIENIUCH: I would say that before going to Iraq, we have prepared our troops and we were fully equipped them with NBC equipment, because we have thought that we will need NBC weapons in Iraq. And today, we can say that we didn't make a mistake.

But as you said, that we are not through. It was intentionally -- intentionally attacked, or not. In the near future, we will have additional information about it.

VIGGERS: I would have nothing first.

On the second, the balance can only be delivered at the ground level. I saw my time, in all the divisional areas, divisional commanders, brigade commanders, dealing with a humanitarian operation in one part of the their sector, opening up a water supply route, with a law-and-order issue in downtown Tikrit, and then a significant action against a convoy coming to its area.

And so the context of how you operate can only be determined by the local commander. In our language, we call it mission commanders, where the senior commander declares an effect that he wishes to see achieved, and then allow the local commander -- and that can be as local as a corporal -- to get on and do it as he best sees fit, or she best sees fit.

If you try to impose the ways to do things from a strategic level, it cannot work. The strategic level declares the ends. You must then allow the local commander to determine the ways and means to do that.

AKIN: So, a follow-up on that then. For instance, if you've got maybe a captain -- and I don't know how many men he might have, 20, 30, 40 people working for him. And he gets into some place like a Fallujah or something, and there's people hiding in a mosque or something, he's the one that's doing to have to make a decision: Are we going to shoot the wall out of this corner of the thing to get their attention? Those decisions are made pretty much on the ground kind of level.

VIGGERS: That could well occur. Yes, absolutely.

AKIN: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

Let me just ask one final question from my point of view, and then others of my colleagues may want to ask another quick question. We're keeping you here a long time, and we apologize for that.

But let me just ask you this. We used to have a political leader here in this country who was a member of the Republican Party. And when we'd find ourselves in a particularly difficult situation -- political situation -- he would stand up and he would say, "Whoever said governing was going to be easy? This is hard."

And leaders of all of our countries at the onset of this conflict said words to that effect.

President Bush said words to that effect shortly after the attacks on the Trade Center and the Pentagon here. Prime Minister Blair said the words to that effect when he was here to address the Congress.

And while I haven't heard that from the Australians and the Polish officials, I'm sure that everybody understood doing in that this was hard.

One of the things that made it hard was our, as we all recognize by this point, less than perfect intelligence going in.

And when we arrived in the country, we found that things like the oil infrastructure were in worse condition that we thought they would be, and therefore, more difficult, hard to rebuild the economy -- essentially an agriculture and an oil-based economy, and so when you take away the oil capability that we thought had but we didn't have when we got there, it makes it hard.

I'm not sure what anybody else thought, but I didn't anticipate that the army would vanish into thin air the way it did.

MODERATOR: I didn't know that the other Iraqi security forces were, as you have described them today, I think it was General Willis who kind of surprised us of the lack of security that we could bring to bear to bring on our sides.

When I visited in Iraq, I had no idea of the condition of the schools until I got there. But our U.S. training and planning capabilities are now based on what we call effects-based planning. In other words, what is it that we're going to do to achieve the right effect?

And the last thing that we didn't know, that Mr. Skelton and I were just chatting about here just a minute ago, we don't understand and didn't understand that we didn't understand -- let me say that again: We didn't understand that we didn't understand the Iraqi culture.

And that means that we didn't understand the Iraqi mindset. And that means that, perhaps we didn't give enough credence to the information that we did have that said that the government provided everything for them, and therefore their expectations of what a government would be were different than what our expectations were and are of what a government would be.

And so if we are to do effective effects-based planning, so that when we are planning to carry out some phase of civil operations or some phase of military operations or some phase of government operations, it seems to me that the old political leader that used to be here that would stand up and say, "This is hard," is made very hard by those lack of understandings.

Would you comment, General Viggers? You were there for five or six months on that and lived through a very steep learning period I would suspect, if you're like me, on some of those kinds of things.

VIGGERS: First, it's something I said as I left back home, actually, people who in February, March, April of last year, thought that this was going to be a straight-forward exercise, post the conflict phase, the combat operations phase clearly, had very little idea of the nature of the country and what the regime had done to it.

VIGGERS: There was absolutely no architecture, as I said earlier, to plug into.

But I guess more importantly, there was a psychological bridge that we had to put in place to encourage people to step up to the plate.

If for 30 years you have been encouraged not to use your initiative, not to take ownership of a challenge because it might not connect with what the regime wanted, the risk is you would be killed.

And so there was an awful lot of work that had to be done on the civil side, particularly, to encourage experts to come forward. And that needs to be brought into the planning before we start.

The fourth phase is more complex and more challenging than phase three, which was the offensive operation.

I think the success of the third phase was staggering much faster than anyone here or in London anticipated. To a degree, that kind of worked against us. We got to where we wanted to be a lot quicker than we anticipated.

MODERATOR: General Willis?

WILLIS: I would just like to add that you never hear about the intelligence successes. I'm not covering them at all. But I think regardless of the technology available to us these days, sometimes we forget the value of human intelligence. And with good human intelligence, you may be able to tap into some of those questions that you raised.

Now, I think we all may be at fault over time for drifting in the wrong direction on that. But from all I can see and read about, I think that problem is being addressed.

But it is a big problem, and it takes time. And some Sioux (ph) said, "Know your enemy." And the best way you can get to know your enemy is to really know him from the inside.

CIENIUCH: Thank you.

Before the sending our troops to Iraq, we organize special time for them to learn about Iraqi culture, about history, about people and so on.

We used Iraqi people who immigrated to Poland many years ago -- not many -- five, six years ago.

CIENIUCH: And these people have very good knowledge about culture, about customs in Iraq, and each soldier was trained in this matter.

I don't know, but we haven't any big problems in Iraq in this area about culture, about customs, habits and so on.

Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

The ranking member has a final statement that he would like to make. Does anybody else have a question?

SIMMONS: I have one more question.

MODERATOR: Mr. Simmons.

SIMMONS: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was interested in major General Viggers making reference to stepping up to the plate. And I just want to share with him that many of the problems in Iraq are sticky wickets.

(LAUGHTER)

VIGGERS: I learned quite a lot from General Sanchez. That was one of them.

SIMMONS: How long were you at the U.S. headquarters? That's what I want to know.

VIGGERS: Not to long, sir. It was a great, great experience.

SIMMONS: We've learned in recent weeks that American soldiers in Iraq have, if you will, bounties placed on their heads, that it would appear that some of the terrorists that we're confronted with are being paid a certain amount of dollars for the death of and American soldier. And perhaps it's just a function of our own media and the fact that we see and hear these stories thorough our own media.

But my question to each of you is: Do you feel that your own forces have been similarly targeted? Is there as much publicity value to killing an Australian or a Brit or a Polish soldier as there is to a U.S.? Is this something that you've encountered, or is it simply that all westerners in uniform in that country are targets? And how does this affect your operations?

VIGGERS: Yes, we did get some indictors last year of that sort of tactic, of a bounty being put on the head of an American soldier in Iraq.

I don't recall in my time any similar tactic being employed in the southeast of the sector.

There have been, of course, very recently in the last few days some unhelpful clerics saying in the light of the photographs in the media, we would now encourage you as part of your faith to go and capture British soldiers. But that's been very recent. I don't recall it coming up before this last event.

WILLIS: I don't think I can add much to it, but I think it may be difficult sometimes to discriminate between the forces because a lot of their uniforms are very similar. They look very similar. But they could well be a hierarchy. I just don't know.

CIENIUCH: I can add that, in my opinion, all of the Westerners are a target. It doesn't matter civilians or military. Maybe military a little more than civilians. But all Westerners are targets in Iraq.

We have found in our sector a special price, how much terrorists pay for captured soldiers. Polish soldiers is $14,000 (ph) U.S. dollars.

Thank you.

SIMMONS: Thank you, gentlemen, very much. And speaking as somebody who has served in uniform, I really appreciate the fact that your countries and your people are participating in this very important operation in the Middle East.

Thank you for that service.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

Mr. Cole?

COLE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just one last question, over the course of -- we'll find out what our will in our respective countries is through pretty established political processes. But I'm very interested if this, at some level, I assume it is, a contest of wills. Your assessment of the Iraqi people, who are facing enormous challenges, a very difficult situation, are trying to construct a country almost from scratch. They're trying to bridge enormous gaps, historic and cultural, and re- assemble themselves and do this all in the midst of an armed struggle going on with foreign military forces.

COLE: So they have an enormous challenge in front of them. And they have, clearly, a very determined adversary that don't want this process to work its way through.

So what's your respective assessment of their ability to see through this very tough challenge in front of them and their commitment to arrive at some sort of democratic, some sort of civil solution, if you will, to their problems in the face of these kind of difficulties? How do you see them working themselves through this process?

VIGGERS: The sense I got in my time talking to the Iraqis that I met, and I didn't get the chance to meet many, but there was a very powerful wish to regain control of their country, which they've not had for 30 years.

The Baathist regime was over. They wanted to run their country in a modern, democratic way. And they wanted to be allowed to get on with it. And that was a sense of a shared objective. They said: We didn't want to be there for a moment longer than we had to be there either.

And I sense that despite all of the turbulent water that we go through with attacks and the upsets and so on, there was, certainly in my time -- and I've seen nothing really to change that in reading or reportings -- that they still want to do that. They want to be responsible for their own country and be a positive contributor to the region and the wider world.

WILLIS: I endorse what General Viggers has said. And whenever I see the news polls that come out, it says that a lower percentage of the Iraqis want the occupiers to leave; a much greater percentage, a significantly greater percentage happier that what has happened has happened. They're looking forward to a bright future.

CIENIUCH In my opinion the key issue is the reconstruction process of Iraq, the stabilization operation will sooner or later finish, but reconstruction process of Iraq will go for many years.

CIENIUCH: And in our sector, we try to organize many -- more than 500 different kinds of reconstruction projects.

As I said before, about $42 (ph) million U.S. dollars were invested in the reconstruction projects, especially projects providing assistance to civilian administration, projects connected with infrastructure, water supply and so on.

COLE: Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service to your respective countries. And thank you for your country's partnership in this great international coalition against terrorism. We deeply appreciate it in the United States.

Thank you.

MODERATOR: And gentlemen, Ms. Bordallo had to leave the room, and she's back, and she would like to ask one concluding question?

BORDALLO: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking member, Mr. Skelton.

I represent the U.S. territory of Guam. It's the small island in the Pacific -- very important to our country. And during these very difficult times for our country, our nation, I want to thank you, generals, representing you respective countries for your great support for our country, sending your troops to the troubled areas.

I just wanted to go on record to say that we surely appreciate it very much. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Mr. Skelton?

SKELTON: Two thank yous. Number one is for breaking ground and being the first non-American generals to testify before this committee.

Thank you for doing that. And on a personal level, it's good to see two of my friends here testifying.

On a broader scale, a special thank you for your country for what you're doing. This is terribly important, and we all know that containing this type of scourge that we're facing now in Iraq must turn out successfully for us, or else we may very well end up with a snake pit of terrorists in the decades to come.

So be sure and carry our appreciation back to your countries, to your military, to your civilian leaders, for we do appreciate it very, very much.

SKELTON: Thank you.

MODERATOR: It's long been said that parliamentary forms of government, democracies, will only be able to achieve their goals if those who are involved in the government are well-educated and when the people whom they represent have an opportunity to hear firsthand, learn about, events that are important.

You have certainly helped to achieve those goals today, of bringing to us your perspectives, as well as to bringing the perspectives, I hope, to a wide swathe of public, who will be able to view these proceedings today on television.

So you've provided a great service for us. And your countries have been great allies with the U.S. And we hope that we've been great allies with yours.

So thank you for being here today. We appreciate it very much. And we look forward to our ongoing relationships. Thank you.

END