U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ

Hearing Before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee

March 1, 2002

OPENING STATEMENT OF

DANIEL AKAKA
A Senator from Hawaii
and
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation
and Federal Services

SEN. AKAKA: The committee will please come to order. This subcommittee has held hearings over the past five months on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the globe and the threats they pose to the United States and our allies. We have discussed how non-proliferation programs, multilateral regimes and export controls can prevent the spread of WMD to other countries and terrorist organizations. Today, we face the question of what to do once a nation -- in this case, Iraq -- has such weapons.

The United Nations inspections between 1991 and 1998 were successful in uncovering and reducing much of Iraq's WMD capabilities. Economic sanctions have prevented Iraq from acquiring materials to restore its military industrial base and have severely limited clandestine arms acquisition. However, Iraq continues to pose a significant national security threat to the United States. It continues to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. If the U.N. sanctions were completely lifted, its weapons program would accelerate.

We may have hindered or prevented upgrades to Iraq's WMD capabilities, but what should we do about the capabilities they already possess? Even this may not be the case, as one of our witnesses today will state his assessment that Iraq's biological weapons program is stronger today than it was in 1990.

These are the facts. Iraq had a sophisticated WMD program, including a nuclear weapons program. Iraq used chemical weapons against its own people and its neighbor, Iran. Iraq had and has a missile program which can deliver WMD. We believe that Iraq continues to have and develop WMD warheads.

Now, the question -- questions are, how worried do we need to be, and what should we do about it? Should we become more aggressive militarily and more active in our support of the Iraqi opposition groups? There has been considerable discussion about whether or not the United States should invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

There has been much talk about invading Iran, although Iraq, Iran and North Korea are described by President Bush as the 'axis of evil', yet the WMD programs in Iran may be more advanced because they have been able to proceed without the restraint of U.N. sanctions. Iran is believed to be developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. We also know that our own Department of State lists Iran as an active state sponsor of terrorism and is systematically abusing its own people. We hope Iran can change from within, but there are no guarantees, and anti-American hard- liners appear to be still in charge.

Can we attack one country and not the other? That question is among the many I hope we'll address today. For example, another Gulf War will likely require many more troops than are now deployed in Afghanistan, and may result in chemical and biological attacks against our forces.

My view at this time is that we should continue to push to get U.N. inspectors back on the ground -- both to constrain the Iraqi WMD program and to gain a better understanding of the scope of current Iraqi efforts. Keeping Saddam Hussein bottled up and forcing him to confront obstacles in every direction is not a bad outcome as we consider our long-term strategy while we're rebuilding our military arsenal.

I have asked our witnesses to describe the current Iraqi WMD threat. They will also discuss the impact sanctions have had on the weapons programs, and how international opinion of the Iraqi WMD threat has changed. I have also asked them to discuss policy options and their consequences.

Our witnesses are the Honorable Robert Einhorn, David -- Dr. David Kay, and Dr. Richard Spertzel.

Robert Einhorn, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies was assistant secretary for non-proliferation in the State Department from November 1999 to August 2001. He was responsible for non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, and advanced conventional arms. His experience will serve us well in our discussion today.

Our second witness, Dr. David Kay of the Science Applications International Corporation, once the United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector from 1991 to 1992, and led many inspections into Iraq to determine the nuclear weapons production capability. He will share with us his insight and expertise on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

Our final witness, Dr. Richard Spertzel, is a retired Army colonel, and former deputy commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease at Fort Dietrich, and is an expert on biological weapons. He has served as the head of the United Nations Special Commission, Biological Weapons Inspections Team in Iraq from 1994 to 1998. I look forward to hearing his views on Iraq's biological weapons prospects.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us today and helping us to make sense of the numerous reports and speculations about Iraq's WMD capabilities. And I would like to yield to my colleague, Senator Thompson, for his statements.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

FRED THOMPSON
A Senator from Tennessee
and
Ranking Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

SEN. THOMPSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And while we often thank our chairman for holding hearings as a matter of course, I really do thank you for having these hearings today. I can't think of anything more timely and more important than -- although it's a Friday and some of our colleagues are beginning to think about greener pastures, I'm glad we have this opportunity with such distinguished gentlemen here to help enlighten us.

This is clearly a situation where the status quo can -- is not satisfactory, because while our policy might be status quo, what's happening in Iraq clearly is not. Iraq has used weapons of mass destruction. It's has invaded its neighbors. It has violated international arms control obligations. It's lied and concealed at every step of the inspection process. It's defied the United Nations. It's continued to build up its weapons of mass destruction. It's headed by a person who is unpredictable and who will not necessarily follow our notions of logic. Clearly, it all makes for an extremely dangerous situation.

If Saddam obtains the weapons of mass destruction that he apparently is working on, it is not only a threat to Israel, it is not only a threat to oil supplies in the region, it's not only a cause for countries like Iran to build up their capabilities, but apparently all he lacks is sufficient fissile material, and a little more delivery capability and he'll be able to hit the United States one of these days with nuclear weapons.

So, the threat is growing. The sanctions are a sham. We've lost our allies in the process with regard to this matter. And we're losing the PR battle. So, clearly something has to be done. We've got a situation where Russia and France and other countries are vetoing any efforts to get any positive results out of what the United Nations has been trying to do. Dozens of countries fly in and out of there, you know, violating the air ban. It's not only bad policy, it's disrespectful.

And to me, I think the worst thing in the world that could happen is for Saddam to let inspectors back in. I know that's what the administration is calling for. I don't know whether they really want it or not, but I hope not, because if in fact we got back in there, it would be the same old song and dance. It would take months and months to gear up, to get people back in there. It would all -- the inspections are based on the notion that someone is not doing something and wants to be able to prove it. We clearly know that's the case. Therefore, it just means another cat and mouse game, at which point he would run to the United Nations and get his friends there to protect him with regard to whatever he's doing. And by that time, months if not years have passed, and actually it puts off any chance for a regime change, which is the ultimate resolution, it seems to me.

But anyway, it's important that we understand and the American people understand the seriousness of the issue, and we need all of the help and wisdom we can get, and I'm sure we're going to get some today. So, thank you again for holding these hearings today.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Senator Thompson, for your statement. We'd like to proceed now with the testimony. I just want to apologize for our lateness. I think you know we had a vote call at about 10:00 a.m. and for that reason we were slightly delayed. But we certainly welcome you and look forward to your statements.

Mr. Einhorn, we would welcome any opening statement or comments you may have. And may I ask you -- to tell you that we will include your full statements in our record of the hearing and also will ask you to try to summarize your statements to us. Thank you very much. Mr. Einhorn.

STATEMENT OF

ROBERT EINHORN
Center for Strategic and International Studies

MR. EINHORN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Senators Thompson and Domenici, for this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee.

In his state of the union speech, President Bush vowed to prevent regimes that seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. He said that he would not stand by as peril grows closer and closer. Most experts believe that the peril of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction is very close, and indeed in some respects it already exists.

Today, or at most within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological weapons at its neighbors. Within four or five years, it could have the capability to threaten most of the Middle East and parts of Europe with missiles armed with nuclear weapons containing high-enriched uranium produced indigenously. Within that same period, it could threaten U.S. territory with nuclear weapons delivered by non-conventional means. If Iraq managed to get its hands on sufficient quantities of already produced fissile material, these threats could arrive much earlier.

We have an enormous stake in stopping Iraq's WMD programs. If we fail to stop them, we'll have a much more difficult time heading off Iran's efforts to acquire comparable capabilities. And a nuclear arms competition north of the Gulf will certainly stimulate interests in such capabilities elsewhere.

We must also be concerned about Iraq's links to terrorists and about the possibility that Iraq might share WMD-related materials and expertise with terrorist groups. But Iraq's illegal pursuit of weapons of mass destruction capabilities is a sufficient basis independent of whatever role it may be playing in global terrorism, to treat it as a dangerous threat that must be neutralized.

But one thing should be clear after over a decade of effort trying to disarm Iraq. The current regime in Baghdad will not voluntarily come clean about its current programs or give up WMD and missile-delivery capabilities for the future.

The importance it attaches to those capabilities can be measured by the well over $100 billion in national income that the leadership has chosen to forgo rather than to meet its disarmament obligations and have the sanctions removed.

No inducements or blandishments, not even the growing prospect of military action by the Bush administration, are likely to produce a genuine change of heart and a decisive and credible change of behavior as far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned.

Given these considerations, one must conclude that the only reliable and durable way of preventing Iraq from regenerating and enhancing its WMD and proscribed missile capabilities is to replace the current regime with one that is prepared to abide by its international obligations.

A consensus seems to be developing in Washington in favor of regime change in Iraq. The debate is no longer over whether but over when and how. This hearing has not been convened to discuss the questions of when and how, but because the strategy for regime change is likely to take additional time to develop, to prepare for and to execute, anywhere from several months to perhaps a year or even more, we should give consideration to the interim steps we should be taking now to address the Iraqi WMD threat.

An important interim step is scheduled to be taken May 30th. It's to revive the current U.N. sanctions regime so as to expedite the delivery of a wider range of civilian goods to the Iraqi population while focusing the trade restrictions more narrowly on dual-use items that could contribute significantly to proscribed weapons programs.

By reducing the workload for U.S. reviewers, these smarter sanctions could enable them to give closer scrutiny to the most sensitive cases. And by reducing delays in the approval of goods for the Iraqi people, they could help shore up international support for the remaining, more tightly-focused restrictions on Iraqi imports.

Another interim step would be to minimize Iraq's illegal oil sales. The proceeds from these sales go directly to Baghdad rather than to the U.N. escrow account. They give Iraq the income to purchase clandestine imports for its military programs. Because Iraq makes these illegal sales at heavily-discounted prices, it will be hard to get the purchasers, including Syria and U.S. friends Jordan and Turkey, to limit them or to put them under the oil-for-food program. But it's important that we press them to do so.

The U.S. should also seek to reduce Iraq's illicit imports. It should urge Iraq's neighbors to adopt a much more serious approach to monitoring border trade and should offer them technical and material assistance to help them screen cargoes more effectively.

The administration should also press key states that trade with Iraq, including Russia and China, to exercise much more rigorous scrutiny and control over exports to Iraq. And we should be working aggressively with other governments to interdict sensitive cargoes headed to Iraq when we receive information about such shipments.

Another possible interim step would be the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq. In recent weeks, President Bush and his advisers have repeatedly called on Iraq to readmit the inspectors. But at times, including in Secretary Rumsfeld's recent appearance on "Face the Nation," administration officials have expressed skepticism about the value of resuming U.N.-mandated verification in Iraq.ong the concerns expressed by -- among the concerns expressed about U.N. inspections is that the inspectors wouldn't have the same intrusive inspection rights as the U.N. teams that operated before December '98. Another concern is that they wouldn't find or learn much of value and that they would end up giving Iraq an unwarranted clean bill of health and actually facilitating the removal of sanctions.

Much of this concern is exaggerated. The new U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, would have the same inspection rights, at least on paper, as their predecessors.

U.N. resolutions make clear that Iraq must cooperate in all respects and make progress in resolving key remaining disarmament tasks before the Security Council can even give consideration to suspending sanctions. And sanctions cannot be lifted altogether until all outstanding disarmament issues are resolved.

Moreover, suspending or lifting sanctions would require an affirmative decision by the U.N. Security Council. And, of course, the United States will have a veto in any such decision.

Now, it is true that inspectors would rarely, if ever, be able to find anything that Iraqis have taken pains to conceal. If they approach anything incriminating, we would expect the Iraqis to deny them access. But even if the inspection teams are unable to ferret out and expose hidden capabilities, they may nonetheless be of value in terms of understanding and constraining the Iraqi WMD threat.

In particular, the installation of sophisticated monitoring equipment at hundreds of locations and the constant movement of inspection teams around the country would complicate Iraq's covert programs, making it somewhat harder and more expensive to keep those efforts hidden and probably slowing the pace and decreasing the scale of those programs.

Monitors would give us a better appreciation of Iraq's missile programs and their breakout potential. They would also provide assurance, as long as they had access and their equipment was operating, that illicit production was not taking place at known dual- use and other suspect facilities.

But this brings me to the most serious shortcoming of renewed U.N. verification. At the very best, the inspectors can complicate, constrain and slow down Iraq's clandestine efforts and give us a better picture of what's going on in Iraq than we have today. But they cannot compel Iraqi compliance, and therefore cannot put an end to the WMD threat posed by Iraq. In other words, they can contain the problem but they cannot solve it.

Moreover, having the inspectors in Iraq could complicate a strategy of regime change. It would give other countries, including the Europeans and states of the Middle East, an excuse for arguing that military action should be deferred while inspections are given a chance to resolve the WMD problem.

All this said, the debate about whether the inspectors should return is probably moot. So far, Iraq has given no indication that it's willing to allow the inspectors to go back on terms that the U.S. could conceivably support. However, we can't rule out the possibility of a reversal by Iraq. Especially the Bush administration's tough posture has made the Iraqis nervous. We will see when the Iraqi foreign minister comes to New York and speaks to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan next week.

If Iraq says the inspectors can return, the administration will be hard-pressed to say they shouldn't, especially in light of the position it has been taking recently. But it would have to insist on a clear understanding on the part of the P-5 members that U.N. verification activities must be carried out in strict accordance with existing U.N. Security Council resolutions rather than on the basis of any new ground rules that Iraq could try to establish. And the P-5 should agree that there would be a firm, unified response in the face of any Iraqi failure to give its full cooperation to the inspectors.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as President Bush warned in discussing the growing WMD threat, time is not on our side. This is especially true in the case of Iraq. We should therefore take interim steps to contain the threat. But such steps, even if successful, would only buy us some additional time. We need to use that time to prepare an effective strategy for the only approach that can be expected to stop WMD programs and prevent them from regenerating, and that is to change the current regime in Baghdad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Einhorn, for your insights. Dr. Kay, we invite you to give your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF

DR. DAVID KAY
Science Applications International Corporation

MR. KAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will quickly summarize my statement and, with your permission, enter the full statement into the record.

It's been more than a decade that the international community has confronted, and unsuccessfully, a long-term solution to Iraq led by Saddam Hussein with WMD. In fact, as I say that statement, I realize that it's been almost 11 years to the day since I first led an inspection team into Iraq. I spent two weeks running through the country to finally identify a part of their nuclear weapons program. My appreciation for the movie "Groundhog Day" is much less, although my understanding of it is much greater as a result of those 11 years that I did not expect this problem to be around.

I think, in trying to understand where we are today with regard to Saddam's nuclear program, it's important to understand the assumptions that proved to be false, that we based UNSCOM's inspection zone, and indeed I would say U.S. policy at the beginning.

The first assumption was that Saddam's rule would not survive the disasters suffered by Iraq as a result of its invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. It was hard to imagine, certainly those of us coming from democratically-ruled countries, that any regime could have survived such a disastrous policy.

Second was that Iraq's WMD capacities were not (safe ?), not really significantly indigenous. I still remember the intelligence briefs I received as we were spinning off the nuclear side of the inspections about what Iraq had. It was a program that had spent a lot of money, had accomplished very little, and most of which had been taken care of anyway by the air campaign.

Thirdly, it was a post-Saddam Iraq -- and that was the assumption of most people as we entered the inspections -- that a post-Saddam Iraq would declare to UNSCOM all of its WMD capacities; and fourthly, that UNSCOM would be able to destroy, remove or render harmless, in terms of the U.N. resolution, Iraq's WMD capacity, leaving an Iraq that did not have such a capacity. And the assumption going in was this was probably a 90-day effort, or at most six to nine months. How wrong assumptions can be.

Let me just dwell on one of those assumptions that is still bedeviling us today. We did not understand the impact that the discovery of such a gigantic spread and indigenous WMD program would have on our future efforts to, in fact, contain that program.

Iraq's nuclear program -- and it's true of the BW, chemical and missile program as well -- spanned over a decade, spent over $20 billion, employed 40,000 Iraqis, and accomplished much -- all of the technical steps on these programs were well-understood, and most of the production steps where the real problems arose, in fact, had been overcome.

Iraq is not like a Libya. Iraq that we face today is much more like Germany at the end of the First World War under a Versailles regime and inspectors. It's an indigenous capability.

The capability to produce weapons of mass destruction that arises from a national program on this scale is one that, to eliminate by inspection, is, quite frankly, a fool's errand. We've underestimated entirely what inspections -- we overestimated at the beginning what inspections could accomplish. And let me hesitate -- stop here to say inspectors accomplished a great deal.

In the nuclear area, for example, U.N. inspections destroyed more nuclear facilities than were destroyed by the coalition air force during the Gulf War, simply because we were able to find facilities that were not known before.

But to compress a lot of history, in December of '98, when the U.S. conducted military actions against Iraq, all inspections ended. It took a year later to bury UNSCOM, but quite frankly, inspections had been necked down to an almost insignificant point by '96 and '97. The ending of UNSCOM was almost a humanitarian effort.

The regime that replaced UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, which it took a year to negotiate, was to be more acceptable to Iraq, led by a commissioner that Iraq, and Iraq sympathizers on the Security Council, would find acceptable. Indeed, the secretary general's first choice for that job was rejected by the Russians and the French. Even under these more favorable inspection regimes, Iraq has still refused to this day to allow inspections into Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, you posed a series of what I think are critical questions about the Iraq nuclear program, that's where it is today, what impact U.S. sanctions has had on it, and what are the options for dealing with this in the future. Let me try to just quickly give you my views on that. And I think the first and most serious point about this is to recognize that this program is an indigenous program. It is a program where the Iraqis understand the technology of producing nuclear weapons. It has engaged not only in the technical side, by Iraq really beginning in the mid '80s engaged in a major effort of deception and denial, of hiding their facilities, of understanding them. They certainly studied our inspection techniques well enough to know how we proceed, and to compensate for that.

When we got close to penetrating their web of deceptions, they resorted to physical force and denial. I had the fortunate privilege I guess one would say of spending four days in an Iraqi parking lot as a guest of the state -- not a hostage -- because we got close to discovering, and in fact did seize the basic documentation on the Iraqi nuclear program. So it's a layered program of protection, and Iraq has learned much more about that.

Let me try, based on the very sketchy insights we have in the more than three years since inspections ended, and limited number of defectors, try to give you my view of where that program is today. Iraq's pre-Gulf War program ensured that if they had fissile material of a sufficient quantity and quality they would today be able to fabricate a nuclear device. Certainly as Senator Domenici understands because of the state he represents, the hard nut for any nuclear- wannabe to crack is the acquisition of fissile material. Once you have that, Iraq knows the rest of the fabrication steps.

The German intelligence agency publicly -- and it's always easier to cite a foreign intelligence service than your own, for those of us who continue to do professional work -- the Germans last year cited that because of major Iraqi procurement efforts that were continuing at least through the end of last year, that in the worst case, without external assistance on new fissile material, insurance would have nuclear weapons in three to six years.

Secondly, you can have great confidence that Iraq will, in the three years since inspectors were in, have carried out a major deception campaign of hiding and scattering key nuclear facilities. I am somewhat more fortunate than my colleagues. It is a little harder to shield nuclear and hide nuclear facilities -- but not impossible -- and we have real experience with the Iraqis on that.

Thirdly, Iraq understands the methods used by inspectors, and how we operated. And they also understand the methods used by national intelligence services. These are very smart, determined adversaries. I had the great privilege, when I was sleeping in a parking lot, of having a hotel room in Baghdad that had 24-hour video and audio monitoring. They looked at how we did -- they used local Iraqis to penetrate it. They penetrated the inspection mechanism itself.

The next is that Iraq has not abandoned its efforts to acquire WMD. Recent defectors stated as recently as August of '98 -- that's while inspections were still going on -- a formal order was issued to proceed with a nuclear program at full blast.

And, finally, economic sanctions no longer play any significant role in limiting Baghdad's nuclear ambitions. Oil prices have gone up, smuggling methods have increased. And, in any case, Saddam gives a priority to his WMD program. If the Iraqi population has to do without medicine, you can be quite sure the WMD program does not starve for material because of a lack of money.

Let me turn to the attitude, and in many ways for me this is I think the most regrettable one, because I think it shapes our possible action -- certainly shapes my negative prospects on inspection. And that's the attitude of states in the region and our European allies towards Iraq's WMD ambition. By 1996, the real aim of the inspections -- that is, eliminating Iraq's WMD capacity, and installing some long- term monitoring capability -- had started to slide away in the face of absolute Iraqi determination; but, more importantly, an attitude among regional and European allies of the United States that this was no longer as important as short-term economic and political gain. And I am particularly speaking of the attitude of the Russians and the French.

We also have to credit -- and it's a discredit on ourselves, I must say -- a very successful Iraqi propaganda campaign, which convinced most of the world's population, including many in the United States, that sanctions and UNSCOM inspections were responsible for the devastation, health and welfare wise of the Iraqi population. That is simply not the case. Iraqi -- the starving and lack of medicine of the Iraqi population was a result of Saddam's determination to use the money available for his weapons of mass destruction program. It was not the result of economic sanctions. And though you may tell I believe this with vigor, I think it is largely irrelevant. They won the propaganda game, and Americans as well as Europeans and many in the Middle East believe we are responsible for that suffering.

SEN. DOMENICI: Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? Might I ask Dr. Kay to hold for one minute and ask if I might have one minute to comment? I have to be at another meeting.

SEN. AKAKA: Certainly.

SEN. DOMENICI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd ask that my statement be made a part of the record as if read.

SEN. AKAKA: Without objection, it will be included in the record.

SEN. DOMENICI: And I want to comment to you and Senator Thompson with reference to this hearing. I only wish that millions of Americans would get to hear the testimony we are hearing here today. There are so many that listen to our president talk about Iraq and what must happen sooner or later that have no idea what's being said here as the reality in Iraq with reference to weapons of mass destruction, and what they are doing to make sure that they reach the right level to continue to be the very, very major nuisance that they are. I think the hearings are very worthwhile, and I thank you for them and thank the witnesses. Thank you, Dr. Kay --

SEN. AKAKA: You may proceed, Dr. Kay.

MR. KAY: We do face a situation where we are left with allies in the region that really lack sufficient military power to stand up to a rearmed Iraq, and are increasingly unwilling to provide us with the political and operational support necessary to directly confront Iraq. The same splintering of the alliance has occurred among our European allies. The French are no longer willing partners. The Russians can no longer be bribed or coerced into cooperation. And, finally, it's a psychological war that we have lost. What choices do we have left? And I know that's what you, Mr. Chairman, challenge us all to think about.

Let me say there are few choices -- they are mostly bad. The easy solutions that we have talked about -- support the opposition, contain as we did the Soviets, or the secretary general of the U.N. in 1998's statement: "I can do business with Saddam." These are expensive, risky and at best only partial answers.

The reintroduction of inspectors into Iraq now under the guise of UNMOVIC I am afraid will result not in constraining the Iraq WMD program but in fact freeing them of all restraint. I think it is underestimated by people who have not served as inspectors in Iraq the difficulty of re-baselining a program that has been free of inspection for more than three years. It is a significant technical challenge that can only be done if you have the unrestricted right to go anywhere anytime with anything, and the cooperation of the world's national intelligence establishments to help you. I do not think that is the situation that we will find if UNMOVIK inspectors were let in.

I think the Iraqis have in fact convinced a sufficient number of the permanent members of the Security Council that the purpose of inspection is to quickly declare compliance and allow Iraq to be free of sanctions. I am absolutely convinced that if the inspectors indeed were to be given the support and were to probe Iraq, that first of all they would face this huge web of deception they would have to deal with; and, if they got close to the truth, they again would meet physical restraint, just like all of their colleagues who for 10 years conducted inspections into Iraq. I am seriously worried, however, that we could be faced with a judgment: Iraq has allowed inspectors back in -- let's get off their back. And that -- let me remind you of the German estimate: three to six years the worst case Iraq rearmed with nuclear weapons.

The opposition -- the best hope of the opposition in Iraq was quite frankly in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War. We stood aside, and we allowed many brave Iraqis to be slaughtered by Saddam's force. There may have been a chance in '95, early '96, when major coup attempts were attempted. There again the U.S.'s attitude was at best not supportive. Indeed, as I look at the history of U.S. support for democratic opposition around the world, I am reminded of nothing more than the dance of the black widow spider: attractive, but ultimately fatal to the male.

I don't think it's true that we are genetically incapable of helping oppositions effectively; it's just that we are so inept at it the genetic pool of opposition is likely to be drained before we get the lesson right. I do not view the opposition as likely to play a major role in the goal of regime change.

Containment I think is a nice ring -- it worked in the case of the Soviet Union. It took 40 years, well over $20 billion, and reshaping European societies to do it. I don't think those conditions exist in the Middle East.

I am afraid there are no alternatives but a U.S.-led -- and U.S.- led means maybe the U.S. leading itself, and hopefully our stalwart British allies -- to use military force to end Saddam's rule in Iraq. Now, let me be clear: as long as Saddam is in power, the WMD aspirations and capabilities of Iraq will continue to develop. And while you referred to it, we have largely have not today in our testimony referred to the issue of Iran. An Iraq that is continuing to seek WMD ensures that there will be an Iran seeking to acquire WMD. And that makes that territory the most dangerous spot in the world.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying I think Iraq is unfortunately of that class of problems where all the easy answers seem to have been in the past, and all are left are near-term options that aren't really answers. Now, because I was there in the beginning, let me tell you the answers that were there were not easy either, and we have forgotten how difficult they were. But there is no alternative to the replacement of Saddam and the regime if you want to deal with the WMD problem before in fact WMD weapons are used on the United States and our allies in the Gulf. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and senators.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you for your strong statement.

Dr. Spertzel, your testimony.

STATEMENT OF

DR. RICHARD SPERTZEL
Head, United Nations Special Commission, Biological Weapons Inspections Team in Iraq from 1994 to 1998

MR. SPERTZEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to start out by saying I 100 percent endorse what Dr. Kay has just said. I have not addressed some of those particulates for the time constraints, but I could not have said it as well as he did. They are absolutely true when it comes to the whole issue of sanctions and inspections in dealing with Iraq.

Iraq's biological weapons program was among the most secretive of the weapons of mass destruction programs. It's BW program began in the early 1970s under the auspices of Iraq's intelligence service, and is probably presently under the special security organization. From its inception, Iraq's BW program included both military and terrorist applications. The terrorist component of Iraq's program was not actively pursued by the Special Commission.

In 1991, Iraq's BW program was in an accelerating expansion phase, and was not obliterated as has been stated by Iraq, including a recent submission by Iraq to the U.N. Security Council. Its bacterial BW capabilities were well-established, including its ability for production, concentration, spray-drying and delivery to produce a readily dispersible small-particle aerosol. Iraq had demonstrated an anti-crop and a mycotoxin (ph) capability, and was developing a viral capability. Iraq was developing both short-range and intermediate- range weapons delivery capability for biological agents, including it would appear a supergun.

Agents included lethal, incapacitating and agricultural biological warfare agents. Iraq's interest in Aflatoxin was in its long-term carcinogenic and liver toxicity effect, rather than any short-term effects. One can only wonder what was the intended target population.

Field tests encompassed both point source releases, small area contamination and large-scale line source release, and were evaluated both for tactical and strategic use. The weapons and range of agents considered provided Iraq with a variety of options for their use.

During the inspection and monitoring regime, Iraq continued to expand its BW capabilities, by acquiring supplies and equipment that would enhance its BW capability. This came about by the continued import of equipment and supplies, including a 5,000-liter fermentation plant that we have no idea where it's located in Iraq.

Iraq also developed a capability to produce critical production equipment and supplies, such as standardized growth media to direct importance to its BW program, as well as fermenters, spray dyers and centerfuges. This is the indigenous capability that Dr. Kay talked about.

Iraq's experienced senior BW personnel remained intact as a unit throughout the inspection period. Iraq still retains the necessary personnel, equipment and supplies to have an expanded capability. We were only able to destroy the equipment that we could identify was definitely part of the past program. That allowed such things as a critical spray dryer, multiple large fermenters to still remain in Iraq.

Iraq's program can be expected to be more advanced than in 1990, particularly its viral and genetic engineering capability, because the evidence suggests that those two efforts continued to grow in the 1990s. There is no doubt that Iraq has a much stronger BW program today than it had in 1990. But perhaps of most concern would be such agents as anthrax and tularemia bacteria, and smallpox virus, as well as anti-animal and anti-crop agents. We cannot forget the economic devastation that could be wreaked upon the U.S. with the import of anti-crop and anti-animal agents.

Iraq clearly placed a very high priority on its BW program -- not only the monetary cost but they considered it was vital to their national security, and perhaps more important the security of the regime. A senior ranking official stated that BW was perceived as a power weapon, and would influence its neighbors to see things Iraq's way. Senior Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated that BW was a vital armament step, at least until it had a fully develop nuclear capability.

The continued Iraqi interest in BW terrorist research and development would undoubtedly evolve to meet changing situations and can be expected to be retained even after the development of its nuclear capability.

The opinion by international experts after Iraq's program was disclosed has not significantly changed. But at the political- diplomatic level, some countries' experts' concerns were not reflected in the verbiage and actions by the respective leaders and diplomats that Dr. Kay touched upon.

In spite of the lip service that is given to getting inspectors back into Iraq, there does not seem to be any material change in the disparity between the experts' concern and the diplomatic imperatives, and consequently in the support that an inspection regime might expect from P-5 members.

Most of the proposals for getting inspectors back into Iraq are based on the premise that any inspectors are better than none. To be blunt, that is pure garbage, just an illusion of inspections. Iraq's past behavior in restricting monitoring inspectors' activities is likely to be repeated. Such limitations would make a monitoring regime a farce, which would be worse than no inspectors at all, because it would provide an inappropriate illusion of compliance to the world community.

I was told by a senior diplomat in 1998 it would not matter if a BW-laden Al Hussein warhead were placed on the Security Council table. It would not change opinions about lifting sanctions. He added further, if the CW and missile files are closed, the world will not care about biology.

It appears to me that this may still be the viewpoint of several nations. This attitude does not address the terrorist threat posed by Iraq's WMD programs. One would think, after September 11th, a more realistic appraisal of Iraq's capability and willingness to use WMD as terrorist weapons would be forthcoming.

The public rhetoric is not encouraging. Iraq's BW component, from its inception, I'd like to remind this panel, included a terrorist component. Sanctions had very little impact on the maintenance and expansion of Iraq's BW capability. New equipment and supplies were continuously being seen at sites under monitoring by both resident as well as non-resident BW inspection teams.

Such items should have been declared to the special commission but were not. Items included bacterial growth media, state-of-the-art general laboratory equipment and genetic engineering equipment and supplies, including the appropriate restriction enzymes. Large-volume production and safety equipment were imported but were never seen by the special commission. Critical BW supplies and equipment are not difficult to smuggle into a country where the country is an active participant.

I would not expect sanctions, smart or otherwise, to have any significant deterrent to Iraq's continued development of its BW program. I do not expect much success from the return of inspectors to Iraq. The success or failure of inspections and monitoring depends too much on uncontrollable elements.

What will be the conditions under which the inspectors return? What support will the inspection regime have, given Iraq's recalcitrance and the likely lack of unanimous support in the U.N. Security Council? Will Iraq truly cooperate and reveal or destroy all its BW activity? Or will Iraq continue its established pattern of deception, denial and concealment? And like Dr. Kay, I expect the latter to be the case.

Implementation of monitoring was predicated on Iraq fully and willingly cooperating with UNSCOM -- that did not happen -- or Iraq providing full and complete disclosure of its proscribed BW program -- that did not happen -- and on Iraq making full and accurate disclosure of all facilities containing dual-use equipment and capability. That did not happen. It is most unlikely that Iraq will now be any more cooperative.

A fundamental requirement for monitoring to be effective would be full support by the U.N. Security Council. Even under the best of circumstances, it would be almost impossible to detect small-scale research, development and production of BW agents by a state determined to conduct such activities.

Should Iraq use mobile production facilities, several additional magnitudes of difficulties would exist. Such laboratories were proposed by one of the senior Iraqi officials as having been considered in 1988. It has been recently reported by the German Intelligence Service that Iraq also possesses such mobile laboratories for their BW now.

Without a sense of certainty by Iraq that there would be severe repercussions by a united Security Council, monitoring does not have a chance of true success. For any chance to succeed, there must be a harsh penalty for non-compliance that is supported in advance by all P-5 members of the Security Council.

Should Iraq be allowed to retain its BW and other weapons-of- mass-destruction programs, it will remain a menace not only to its neighbors but to the world at large because of the concomitant instability it would create in the region. The regime is unpredictable. The Gulf states would need to judge all their actions in light of the Iraqi threat.

Iraq is already openly supporting the Palestinians. Would Iraq risk using WMD on Israel? If this happened, what would be the repercussions from such a foolhardy action? Iraq's bioterrorism potential poses an enormous risk to any of its perceived enemies. While much attention is focused on bioterrorism against people, the economic devastation that could be wreaked on the food-animal or food- crop industry may be far greater in the long-term effect.

Should Iraq use its BW expertise in bioterrorist activities, it may be impossible to find a smoking gun that would implicate Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much for your statement. I want to thank you for your statements and for the work you've done for our country to help stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction really around the world. Thank you for that.

I have -- we have some questions for you. My first question is to Dr. Einhorn. Both you and Dr. Kay state that the key obstacle to Iraq constructing a workable nuclear device is access to bomb-grade nuclear materials, such as highly-enriched uranium. The National Intelligence Council, in its annual report to Congress, gave a strong warning that -- and I quote -- "weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials have been stolen from some Russian institutes," unquote.

Is there any indication that Iraq might have been the destination for any stolen material from the former Soviet Union?

MR. EINHORN: Mr. Chairman, I think we just don't know the answer to that question. Is it possible that the Iraqis would be interested? Well, it's certain that the Iraqis would be interested in obtaining that material. Could they have? It's possible. I'm not aware of any hard evidence that they have succeeded in obtaining fissile material.

SEN. AKAKA: Dr. Kay, since 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency has been reporting that Iraq no longer has a nuclear weapons program. How did the agency arrive at that assessment? And do you agree with it?

MR. KAY: Well, the reports I'm familiar with are the result of routine safeguard inspections, which go to known sites that were known before the war. And what they're very careful these days -- they were not always before the war -- to report is that of what they observe, they do not see any signs. The IAEA, to the best of my knowledge, has made no general -- has been, in fact, very careful not to make a general characterization of whether there is something there.

The continuing inspections the IAEA conducts in Iraq today have nothing to do with the arms control inspections required under the cease-fire resolution that ended the Gulf War.

SEN. AKAKA: Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel, Iraq and U.N. officials will meet next week to discuss inspections. In the past, Iraq declared certain facilities off-limits to inspections. If inspections are restarted, how can we be sure that Iraq will not revert to past actions? Previously some observers suggested the U.S. strike Iraqi facilities that Iraq refused to allow to be inspected. Would such a policy be effective in supplementing the effectiveness of any new inspections?

MR. KAY: Well, let me just take a crack at the start of it. I absolutely believe, if the inspections were to begin, nothing is off the table -- should be off the table. Am I confident that that will be the ground rules? No, I'm not.

With regard to the use of military force as a means of striking facilities that they deny access, I confess at times, in confrontations with Iraq, I have raised that prospect. Do I believe that is the appropriate action now? Absolutely not. The only way to end the Iraq WMD program is to end the rule of Saddam Hussein. The appropriate application of military force is to achieve a regime change.

You will never accomplish limiting the WMD program by striking facilities -- deception, denial and all. And I must say, I do not think time is on our side in this regard. I am convinced that if Saddam believes we are going to end his rule, he will use WMD. I do not see any advantage to giving him additional time to prepare for that use of WMD against U.S. troops.

SEN. AKAKA: Dr. Spertzel.

MR. SPERTZEL: I pretty much agree with what Dr. Kay said. If -- I believe Iraq would actually set up a confrontation just to have -- if they though the U.S. would do that, and have the U.S. end up bombing a nursery school. They've been known to do that in the past. There's no reason to believe that they would do otherwise in the future. Furthermore, this requires, again, you knowing or the UNMOVIC knowing a site needs to be inspected. I don't see that happening.

SEN. AKAKA: Dr. Spertzel, U.N. Resolution 1284 states that the new U.N. inspection team will be staffed by mostly new and therefore inexperienced personnel. Under these conditions, how effective and how reliable do you think the new team's findings will be?

MR. SPERTZEL: The new teams -- I should start out by saying that I helped to teach the first team. It's a question mark how new that first group of trainees were, because I knew them all on a first-name basis. But having said that, they have received additional new ones and they have gone through extensive training.

The value of that training to the real situation in Iraq, I think, is pretty much of a moot point. New inspectors are going to fumble in the beginning. I think I can illustrate this best by stating what happened on one of our inspection teams when we got out of Iraq and a new member, who had been in Iraq for the first time, said, "Why were you so tough as a team on Iraq? They sounded perfectly plausible to me, the explanations they were giving."

We had this same individual on another inspection about two months later. And about halfway into the second day, they turned to me and said, "Now I know why you were so tough the first time." It takes that learning curve that is only gained by actually being on the ground doing it.

So a simple answer to your question is, in the beginning it's going to be a tough job for them. This comes back to a statement that Dr. Kay made about rebaselining. I don't think they can do it in six to nine months' time.

SEN. AKAKA: Dr. Einhorn, Mr. Einhorn, there have been reports about Iraq developing an unmanned aerial -- (inaudible) -- program. How concerned should we be at this time about this program, especially as it relates to biological or chemical-weapon-agent delivery?

MR. EINHORN: Mr. Chairman, I think we should be concerned. We're aware that the Iraqis have taken trainer aircraft and sought to adapt it for unmanned use. I believe they've had special modified spray tanks that they've tried to hook up to such a vehicle. And the assumption is that this was for delivery of chemical or biological weapons. I think we ought to be concerned about that program.

MR. SPERTZEL: Could I comment on that, sir?

SEN. AKAKA: Dr. Spertzel.

MR. SPERTZEL: I'd like to add that, of course, Iraq had such a program which they claimed was for bio, but it appears it was actually for bio and chemical delivery both. And that was with converting a MiG to an unmanned vehicle.

The continuation with the trainer that was mentioned just a few minutes ago involved the same Iraqi experts, engineering experts, as those involved in adapting both the drop tank as well as attempts to modify a MiG fighter to be an unmanned. So, absolutely, there's major reasons for being concerned about the development of such a weapons- delivery system.

SEN. AKAKA: At this time I'd like to call on Senator Thompson for his questions.

SEN. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, let me ask you to -- after stating that Saddam is unpredictable and sometimes irrational, I'm going to ask you to put yourself in his shoes, even though there seems to be a rough sense of logic, Saddam logic anyway, that pertains sometimes -- and you all have watched him for a long time -- and ask you what you think he's thinking about this situation right now, in light of the fact, if you agree, as I do, I think with most all of you, that the worst thing that could happen is for us to get back in there under some idea that things are going to be different.

Yes, we can slow him down a little bit, but he knows us better; he's better at deception even than he was before; he's gone to school on us the first time. He knows that ultimately he can count on his friends in the U.N. Security Council if things get tough or when he decides to shut things down. Then the battle becomes over which building are you going to be able to go into and very narrow issues. "Surely this is not worth going to war over" we'll hear over and over again.

I believe this is the case. If it is the case, why would not Saddam -- and I hold my breath, hoping he will not allow inspectors back in there -- but why wouldn't he? Does he feel so secure that he does not feel any necessity to make any movement even to engage us in this charade and cat-and-mouse game, which he could have, it seems like, just like that and buy himself a year or more if he wanted to and undergo a little aggravation, but almost guarantee, it would seem -- well, hopefully not guarantee, but do you believe him to think that with all of the support he'd get in the region, with the European support and all of that, he could be assured that there would be no strike against him?

Is he so secure that he doesn't feel any necessity to engage us in what I believe would certainly inure to his benefit in the short term? Dr. Kay, can you comment on that?

MR. KAY: Senator Thompson, first of all let me say I think the first reason he will not do this is he has some unsatisfactory experience with inspectors from his point of view. I remember -- and I had the dubious pleasure of leading three of the more confrontational inspections with Iraq -- that in the end I had an Iraqi foreign minister tell me that if we had understood that you were not going to behave like the IAEA did before the war and a U.N. diplomat, we would have never agreed to this. With all the troubles inspectors had -- people like Dr. Spertzel and the other teams -- unmasked a program that was unknown to national intelligence officials in the scope, depth and degree that the inspectors unmasked. So he has a positive hate relationship with regard to the idea.

Secondly, inspectors were always a political threat to the regime. We represented a failure -- a visible failure running around Baghdad in our white buses and our white Land Rovers that he -- although he can torture and know the rest of Iraq into submission, here are individuals who were behaving like they were immune to Saddam's threat. For a totalitarian dictatorship, that is a virus that you do not want to get started. It starts people inside your own regime thinking about changes.

And finally I must say I fear he has lost his fear of the United States. The period in which one believed that six or seven cruise missiles fired into an empty building at 3:00 a.m. in the morning was an appropriate response for an assassination attempt on a former president of the United States, is not one that engenders great fear in a sadistic fanatical dictator like Saddam. So those are my reasons. But I must say I have the same worry every morning as you.

SEN. THOMPSON: Dr. Spertzel, it seems to me that -- well, let me ask you to comment on that, and then in addition whether or not you think if Saddam was convinced that we were about to strike him or invade in -- strike him in a significant way or invade him, then do you think his calculations would change? In other words, if he comes to the point of agreeing to an inspection regime of some kind, does that mean he's convinced that we are about to do that?

MR. SPERTZEL: Yeah, you would have found that would have been part of my response, is that I don't think he is yet convinced that the U.S. will act unilaterally in opposition to the Europeans as well as the other Middle Eastern countries. And certainly those countries -- and the Europeans are giving ample reason to believe that he may be right.

Now, further indications of that coming into his discussions with Kofi Annan is that the head of the Iraqi Baath Party in the last four days made a statement in a speech in Baghdad in which he commented something to the effect that the U.S. was the real terrorist nation, because it prevented Iraq from reclaiming its rightful territorial integrity in 1990; i.e., the march onto Kuwait.

Another senior official in Iraq's Foreign Ministry also stated that, Yes, they are flexible, but inspections would have to include lifting of sanctions and inspections for weapons of mass destruction of all countries in the Middle Eastern region -- clearly an indication that nothing has changed in Iraq over the last several months.

SEN. THOMPSON: Mr. Einhorn, would you care to comment on this?

MR. EINHORN: I don't think we can really predict what Saddam Hussein would do under extreme duress. I would tend to doubt that he is going to agree to admit the inspectors. He knows -- because he knows his own behavior -- that sooner or later if the inspectors are back there will be a confrontation. Things may go smoothly for a few weeks or months, but sooner or later I think the inspectors will be prying, will be demanding and so forth, and Iraq will not be cooperative, and there will another confrontation. And Saddam recognizes that that will be used by the administration as a very good reason to use military force to try to resolve the problem. So he can look down the road and see that this is not going to lead anywhere very --

SEN. THOMPSON: Even if we can't get unanimity in the U.N. Security Council?

MR. EINHORN: I think he knows -- he may be confident, as Dr. Spertzel says, that the Bush administration will be dissuaded by some of the concerns of Europeans and so forth. He may feel that now. But I think as time goes on he will recognize that this administration is committed to move forward. And that will put him eventually in a pretty tight spot. And I wouldn't rule out his making certain conditional offers to admit inspectors. I don't think he's there yet, but I think he will make those offers.

SEN. THOMPSON: That's very interesting. Could I ask -- indulge my colleagues for one more quick question? And this is the idea, Dr. Kay, that you alluded to, or the point you made concerning the public relations battle that I believe we are losing, if not lost, in terms of the starving children. I have had people from Tennessee come up and say that they have talked to Iranian officials -- some of them have been down there -- and, you know, pointed out the effects that what we are doing are having on the poor people down there. Is there any objective thing that we can point to? Is the oil-for-food account set aside with money in it under the auspices of the United Nations, that you can point to it, and say, Here's a billion dollars he is not using? Obviously we know he's importing -- he is smuggling oil in and getting a lot of money from that. I mean, maybe that's a little bit more difficult for people to buy. But what do we do about that? That's the mantra that you hear all the time now in terms of our terrorist activities.

MR. KAY: Senator, it's a very sore point. There are factual things you can point to. The program was never -- the limitation of imports never applied to food and medicine. In fact, sometimes I resort to pointing out what he has actually imported. A liposuction machine. One would not think that a liposuction machine in Iraq would be a high priority import. Although, if you look at some senior Iraqi officials you can understand their desire for it. (Laughter.)

But, look, I confess, Senator Thompson, this is a battle I think we didn't fight -- we certainly at least didn't fight well. It's a battle that's lost. I think we now need to focus on the main issue -- that's getting rid of the regime. The thing that will improve the health and well-being of Iraqis today more than anything else is the removal of Saddam Hussein and his family from power.

SEN. THOMPSON: Mr. Einhorn, did you want to --

MR. EINHORN: Yes, Senator Thompson. There are some objective things you can point to. You are correct, the oil-for-food program allows Iraq to export oil, but the proceeds must go into a U.N. escrow account. And those funds are to be used for the civilian, humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The balances have remained very high. At the beginning the Iraqis drew down those funds for civilian products. Now they have let those funds sit in the escrow account rather than use those funds for the needs of the Iraqi people. I don't have exactly the numbers in front of me, but we were impressed -- when I was in government, I was quite impressed with the very cynical nature of the Iraqi approach to this problem, where they continued to complain publicly about the effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi public, but they failed to use the funds that they could draw upon to meet those needs.

But I agree with the other witnesses: we have lost this propaganda battle. It's very hard to change minds by showing them this data.

SEN. THOMPSON: Dr. Spertzel?

MR. SPERTZEL: Yeah, I agree with what's been said. I just have two comments to make, because they are points of severe irritation with me, and that is the business of medicines and food to Iraq. At a time when Iraq was making a great deal of progress in winning this public relations battle, the issue was settling around medicines and vaccines for children. Well, the bio people -- we monitored the central distribution point for biologicals to the medical community, and we were watching donated medicines and vaccines for children sitting on the shelves, going out of date intentionally not being distributed. As inspectors we couldn't do anything about it. But it became a major sore point with us.

The other one has to do with food. Our inspectors would buy food at the local market. And one day they went out to buy and there was nothing on the shelves -- everything was gone. And they asked what -- and the person said -- the shop owner said, Tell me what you want, I'll get it for you -- we were instructed to clear everything off our shelves, because there was some foreign newsmen coming today.

SEN. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you for your questions, and the responses we received.

Senator Cochran.

SEN. COCHRAN: Mr. Chairman, we obviously are confronted with a very troubling situation in Iraq. I have made some notes for an opening statement, which I will ask to be printed in the record as this point.

SEN. AKAKA: Without objection, it will be printed in the record.

SEN. COCHRAN: If I could ask the witnesses about the U.N. inspection situation, the key to success, as I understand, for these U.N. inspections has always been the support of the international community. We can't just do this by ourselves and make it work -- especially the cooperation of the countries that make up the United Nations Security Council is very important. But there seems to have been considerable hesitancy among some of these members in creating this new inspection regime, the UNMOVIC regime. Several countries, including France and Russia, didn't vote, didn't actively support this initiative. Can we expect these U.N. inspections to have any chance of success without the cooperation of our allies and friends?

MR. SPERTZEL: At the risk of being undiplomatic, I'll take that one on. Without the full support of the P5 members -- France, Russia, China, U.S. and the U.K. -- the inspection system doesn't have a chance, no matter what their authority might be in Iraq. And I have seen nothing that would suggest any change in the attitude and the expressions being stated publicly in the media right now by a couple of those countries that would indicate there is going to be any change in their support.

Yes, they were -- France and Russia abstained in that vote, because it did not meet Iraq's satisfaction. Iraq was actively encouraging them, requesting and pleading with them to veto it, and they compromised by abstaining. And I don't see anything that has changed.

SEN. COCHRAN: Mr. Einhorn?

MR. EINHORN: Let me go one better than that. Dr. Spertzel says that without their support, you know the P5 unified, the inspections can't succeed. If success means disarming Iraq and forcing compliance, that even with its support, the unified support of the Security Council, they won't succeed, because it's very difficult to compel compliance -- and especially with this regime. So if one sets that high standard -- and we must -- then as all the witnesses have said, the only way of compelling compliance is to change the regime and get a regime that is prepared to comply. I think that's the answer.

But I would say with strong support by the Security Council, inspectors can do some useful things, perhaps only for a short period of time before confrontation sets in again.

I asked a number of my friends in the intelligence community, you know, what they know about Iraq now, and what they feel about the inspectors not being there. And they are losing touch. They used to have a feel for what was going on in Iraq. They are losing that feel now. I asked them, Would you like to see the inspectors back on the ground, recognizing that the Iraqis are not going to give them access to anything incriminating? They said, We'd still like them there. We would still like them there. We could get some useful information. It would update us on a number of useful things -- certain suspicious facilities we could at least get access to; that is, you know, the U.N. inspectors could get access to those facilities, resolve certain doubts. But they would have no illusions that the inspectors would ever be able to find what the Iraqis have worked hard to conceal. So there are limited things the inspectors can do, but a success is disarming Iraq, forcing compliance. They can't do that.

MR. KAY: Senator Cochran, I can give you a very practical answer, because I failed diplomacy 101. (Laughter.) Talking about support from the Security Council in broad terms does not get you very far when you are talking about inspectors. The Iraqis will manage the individual confrontations at points where much of the world that is not focused on disarming Iraq -- they are focused on getting rid of sanctions and getting on with business -- will not understand.

I led an inspection, because we had good intelligence that the Iraqis were hiding documents related to their nuclear centerfuge program to a hospital for amputees. Now, can you imagine how many Security Council members I would have behind me if the Iraqis had chosen -- fortunately this was on the first inspection and they had gotten very smart -- but if they had chosen to say, We can't have you traipsing through a hospital that has amputees from the war with Iran there. I probably wouldn't have gotten the support of my own government, quite frankly, at that stage. And that is how they managed the confrontations. It's not on the high ground. It's on individual cases -- access to Saddam's palace, access to a Baath Party political headquarters -- well, you know, would we like them traipsing U.N. inspectors through the RNC or DNC? I mean, they do it in ways that guarantee you will not keep.

That we managed to in the early days in this current condition I think is absolutely assured that we would not keep the Council through really tough inspections.

SEN. COCHRAN: On another subject, I think Mr. Einhorn and Dr. Spertzel have testified that Iraq deployed Scud missiles with biological weapons warheads. There are several reports that we've received, unclassified, that Saddam Hussein continues to retain interest in missiles of longer-range than those permitted under U.N. Resolution 687. Do you think he is likely to try to equip long-range ballistic missiles that he may develop with weapons of mass destruction?

MR. SPERTZEL: I'll start out by yes. We found plans -- drawing plans -- for a container to fit into a missile warhead -- I'm not enough of a missile expert to tell you which one -- that the size of which could have only been for bio application. It was much too small for either chemical or nuclear devices. And certainly the -- all the indications we had during the inspection period was that they are interested in acquiring a longer-range capability. The intent of at least one of the two superguns, which was designed to hit much of Europe, or so the propaganda said, that the smaller of those two was clearly designed to carry a biological warhead or missile I guess in this case being fired from the supergun. So, yes, there is. There was and undoubtedly is a continuing interest in developing longer- range missiles capable of delivery of small payload, which is easier for them to do. That would imply bio, and perhaps later on a nuclear.

SEN. COCHRAN: Dr. Kay, would you respond to that?

MR. KAY: If he had the capacity to do it, I have no doubt that in fact he would do it. This is an individual who has sought it every stage. For example, in the nuclear program, although they were starting with an early program, they were already carrying out research on how to use thermonuclear boosting to increase the size and yield of the weapon. So, no -- the aspirations are unlimited. Given the time and the money, and Saddam still in power, they will certainly proceed along that course.

SEN. COCHRAN: Mr. Einhorn?

MR. EINHORN: Just to add something, Senator Cochran -- no question they would like longer-range missiles. I -- one of the failings of Resolution 687, the cease-fire resolution, was that it allowed the Iraqis to have missiles up to 150 kilometers in range. I think that was very unfortunate, because under the guise of permitted short-range systems, they could do a lot of work to help them get a leg up on future, more capable systems. And they're doing that right now.

This al Samoud liquid-fueled missile is supposed to be below 150 kilometers. I have my doubts about that. They have a tactical short- range solid-fuel missile called the Ababil that I think is being used to develop a solid propellant infrastructure that can then be used in the future for more capable solid-fuel missiles. So I think they're laying the groundwork.

But it's important to recognize the embargo, the current sanctions, as porous as they are, do have an impact on restricting what they can do. No doubt they're trying on the black market to acquire ingredients for their missile program, and they are succeeding to some extent. But, you know, an important aspect of a missile program is to be able to flight-test. And, sure they're conducting short-range flight tests that they're permitted to do, but they can't fire a missile at long range. They know that would be detected.

Look at Iran. Iran is flight-testing this medium-range ballistic missile, the Shahab III, and they're making a lot of headway on acquiring a delivery capability that can go throughout the Middle East. Iraq is more constrained because of the inability, you know, to have an overt flight-test program at long range. That's an important constraint on what they can do.

SEN. COCHRAN: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you, Senator Cochran. Dr. Spertzel and Dr. Kay, on Sunday Secretary Rumsfeld said that international inspectors were limited in what they could do and that their ability to find out what's actually taking place was minimal. He noted that -- and I'll quote from him -- "the real information that they were able to get as inspectors came from defectors who left the country and provided inspectors with information, and in a few cases were able to discover some things and destroy some capabilities," end of quote.

The question is, were all substantial discoveries made as a result of defectors?

MR. KAY: Senator, in my case, that's not the case. I hesitate to disagree with Secretary Rumsfeld, A, because I don't want to become the subject of an afternoon press briefing. But more importantly, I was actually flying back from Honolulu on Sunday and so didn't hear what he said on "Meet the Press" or "Face the Nation."

Inspectors and -- Bob Einhorn referred to it -- there is no substitute for people on the ground. We certainly used information from defectors. We used information, at least while I was there, from any source we could. But we made genuine discoveries. The Iraqis made stupid mistakes and we unraveled them. They lied and we detected those lies and pulled them apart. It is not true that all the information was discovered as a result -- at least in the nuclear area -- as a result of defectors, although I welcome defectors, let me be clear.

MR. SPERTZEL: And with all due respect to Secretary Rumsfeld, thank you for asking that question, because I welcome the opportunity to reply to his statement.

In bio, that absolutely is not the case. If I had to cite one single item that may be the most important, it would have been the import of supplies and equipment, the records that we were able to obtain from suppliers. That became the crucial item that forced Iraq to acknowledge their program. And the information that we had up until 1 July of 1995, when Iraq first acknowledged their biological- warfare program, none of it came from defectors.

Now, as Dr. Kay said, certainly I'd welcome defector information. Now, Hussein Kamal Hassan's defection did not add anything to the bio program other than perhaps stimulate Iraq to make further elaboration. But it wasn't information that we obtained from him.

Now, there were later defectors and one very, very crucial one that would have led us to a site in January of 1998 that the information received from that defector, as well as corroborating evidence from other sources, would have indicated an active bio- research and development facility, except the whole system came to a screeching halt, challenge inspections, in January 1998, and unfortunately got billed as a palace issue, which it had nothing to do with palaces. We had arranged to have three bio teams in country at the same time, and we were going to join the inspection team of Scott Ritter to go to that site, but they got blocked the day before.

So, yes, defector information is valuable. But I think they played a minor role, not a major role.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you. Mr. Einhorn, an Iraqi defector said he personally worked on renovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in underground wells, private villas, and under a hospital in Baghdad as recently as a year ago. Do you believe that these sites are used primarily to hide activities or to discourage military action against the sites in the future? And what recourse does the U.S. have against such facilities?

MR. EINHORN: Mr. Chairman, I'm not aware of the specific reports. They're certainly plausible to me, given past Iraqi behavior. They may feel that by hiding proscribed materials in places like that, places that it would be difficult to inspect without arousing public opinion, that they could have some degree of immunity from the effects of inspections. So it's entirely plausible to me that they would adopt that strategy. These gentlemen are probably familiar with many cases where they have adopted that strategy in the past.

SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Kay and Mr. Spertzel -- Dr. Spertzel -- U.N. resolutions governing UNSCOM activities permitted on-site inspections with full access, including no-notice inspections and sample analysis. How frequently did you, as an inspector, did you implement these measures?

MR. SPERTZEL: In the case of bio, our resident inspection teams, to my knowledge, always functioned on a no-notice basis. That was the instructions to them. They also worked on a variable schedule that was devised -- and I'd prefer not to say publicly what the basis was -- so that it was sufficiently random, that hopefully Iraq would not know.

The limitation we had, however, was the minute a bio team headed beyond Samarra -- obviously we're only going to three sites in the north; similarly in the south. And one of the proposals that has been made for a new inspection regime is that they have satellite inspection teams full-time in the north and the south and elsewhere in Iraq, in addition to Baghdad, if necessary, because that essentially provided notification to Iraq.

The non-resident teams always functioned on a no-notice basis, whether it was revisiting a declared site or an undeclared site.

MR. KAY: Mr. Chairman, I conducted actually the first no-notice inspection by any of the teams in Iraq. It was a result of having, for a week, tried to give the Iraqis, under instructions, notice of 24 to 12 hours. Not surprisingly, they moved everything, and so we resorted -- and after that point, no-notice became the standard.

Now, it seems -- no-notice sounds easier in theory than it is. There are logistic opportunities like Dr. Spertzel referred to. There's also the fact that all your meeting rooms were audio-bugged. I spent a number of hours jogging around Baghdad with some fit and some not-as-well-fit inspectors as we planned out how to conduct inspections, because that was our only privacy.

The Iraqis, we now know because of a defector, had penetrated a number of the inspection teams and actually gained notice. It was a constant struggle. Without no-notice inspections, there are absolutely no hopes of finding anything.

SEN. AKAKA: Dr. Kay, why has the International Atomic Energy Agency been able to continue its inspections in Iraq? Is it due to their inspections being more narrowly-defined, or are they seen as less political and more independent than the U.N. teams?

MR. KAY: The Iraqis, from the beginning, have tried to drive a wedge between UNSCOM as the tough guys and the IAEA as the soft technical inspection. It was always a problem, one that was managed. The current inspections that have continued since 1998, though, are because they're more narrowly focused. They're focused on sites which were pre-Gulf War permitted nuclear-activity areas. They go only there. They don't go anyplace else.

There's a narrow technical -- and so it gives the Iraqis the appearance of maintaining compliance with the non-proliferation treaty, and yet it does not threaten their hidden program.

So under those ground rules, you could conduct biological inspections or anything else. It's just not threatening to their program.

MR. SPERTZEL: If I could add, I believe those inspections are also aimed at essentially recertifying that a known quantity of nuclear material that Iraq had in 1990 is still there and that the IAEA teams can come in and still say, "Oh, yes, there's 'x' number of pounds of substance 'x.'" And it's aimed at that, not whether they've accumulated anything else.

MR. KAY: That's absolutely the case.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you. Senator Thompson.

SEN. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: More questions?

SEN. THOMPSON: Yes, sir.

Dr. Spertzel, you made reference to the fact that, from the very beginning, their WMD program -- perhaps you were referring specifically to the biological program -- had a terrorist component. What did you mean by that? Could you elaborate?

MR. SPERTZEL: Yes. And I was referring to the bio, although, at least initially, it was true for the chemical as well. When the bio program was established by Iraq in 1973, perhaps late '72, under the Al-Hazen Ibn Al Haithem Institute, that the program was established totally by the intelligence organization, with some technical input as well by the military. But all funding and guidance came through the intelligence.

The nature of the studies that they were conducting, the types of organisms that they were evaluating, and so on, indicated two types of delivery; those that would be of interest to the military for tactical and strategic reasons and those that would be of only a value used in a clandestine terrorist fashion. And, in fact, the initial efforts with the wheat smut, wheat-cover bunt anti-crop agent was developed to be delivered covertly and was the initial efforts in an unmanned, albeit in this case a very small drone, as a delivery means.

The initial efforts appear to have been aimed at Iran, but later the interest changed. There was also a variety of interests in other agents that are of only utility for terrorist application.

SEN. THOMPSON: Their biological program is still under the intelligence organization, isn't it?

MR. SPERTZEL: Yes, sir. There was a period perhaps from about 1979 to 1983 -- I'm sorry, '86 or '87 -- when the military piece was under DOD -- ministry of defense. And then in 1987 it was brought back under the umbrella of the intelligence service. By that time, the intelligence service had split into two different organizations, and this time it was under the special security organization that is currently headed, I believe, by -- I think it's headed by Saddam's oldest son.

SEN. THOMPSON: So you attach significance to that, the organizational structure, in looking at it from a terrorist or potential terrorist standpoint. That would be the main reason you think that it would be organized that way, because it would not strictly be military or defense usage.

MR. SPERTZEL: That's right. The program, as it appears to be designed, is for the last-gasp, if you'd like, protection of the regime, as well as the second side, which appears to be, from the very beginning, aimed at terrorist application -- terrorist usage -- wherever the regime felt necessary.

SEN. THOMPSON: Well, could you elaborate on that a little bit? I guess, to me, that issue would depend upon, of course, its usage. Developing the biological weapons themselves, I suppose, could be done under any structure. But is there anything that you see in terms of their usage or their preparation that would indicate an offensive intent?

You mentioned maybe a last-grasp situation where it's a fall-back to be used in case they're about to be overrun or something, which would be serious enough, in and of itself. But is there anything, in addition to that, that would indicate to you some potential offensive usage?

MR. SPERTZEL: From a military standpoint or a terrorist standpoint? The military --

SEN. THOMPSON: From a terrorist standpoint.

MR. SPERTZEL: From the terrorist standpoint, because the commission made almost an active effort not to delve into the terrorist side of it, we have very little information to go on.

SEN. THOMPSON: Why was that?

MR. SPERTZEL: It was deemed that it was not part of the mandate of 687.

SEN. THOMPSON: So we don't know as much about potential terrorist capability or intention as we perhaps could have.

MR. SPERTZEL: Absolutely.

SEN. THOMPSON: That leads me to something else you mentioned. I think, Dr. Kay, it was you who indicated that in terms of what they were doing from a nuclear standpoint, that our intelligence estimates were off. Could you elaborate on that a bit, and Dr. Spertzel also, in terms of bio?

How did what you found -- or maybe, Mr. Einhorn, also -- how does what we found when we were in over there, or anything that we may have determined later, compare with our intelligence estimates that we had going on? We know from the Rumsfeld Commission, for example, that we were off quite a bit in terms of some countries, in terms of some capabilities. Dr. Kay, I assume that was the case that you alluded to. Could you elaborate on that a bit?

MR. KAY: Well, in the nuclear program, the prevailing intelligence estimate was that the Israeli action against the Osirak reactor, which occurred in June of 1981, had substantially derailed the Iraqi nuclear program, that the principal evidence seen in the period from 1981 to the Gulf War was a shop-until-you-drop mentality; that is, Iraq had a lot of money and they were buying a lot of things, and there wasn't substantial doubt that they were trying to pursue a nuclear program, but that it seemed to be chaotic and not very close and not focused. And there were less than a dozen facilities identified as target points during the course of the coalition air campaign as being decisively known to be nuclear facilities or thought to be nuclear facilities.

When we got on the ground, we found that instead of that, what the Iraqis had done is they had pursued a systematic Iraqi Manhattan Project designed to procure high-enriched uranium using literally all the known methods. The Tormea, the central -- the first place we found the centrifuge -- pardon me, the calutron program, the EMIS program, electromagnetic isotope separation program, was, Senator Thompson, you'll be happy to know, an exact duplicate of a facility that exists in your state.

What the Iraqis had done is come here and quite openly, because it was unclassified, buy the blueprints of where we produced high- enriched uranium at Oak Ridge, using calutrons, and just built a plan. They had also had a centrifuge program that had produced a building, a place called Al Furat, that was not known to U.S. intelligence until inspectors discovered it. And let me make this point: this was not as a result of a defector. We discovered that in the course of inspection, because an Iraqi official made a mistake in how he described a program, and we went there. It was largely than any centrifuge plant that exists in Western Europe or the United States; that if the war had not intervened, right now we would be facing an Iraq, if they had overcome the production problems, that would be producing a very large amount of highly-enriched uranium.

They also produced a chemical-enrichment program. They were trying laser-enrichment, which probably would have only consumed a large amount of money and not produced nuclear material -- that's been our experience with it. But it was an all-encompassing program. The scope, scale and dimension was much larger than was known by anyone.

And let me not throw stones at the U.S. intelligence community. I did not receive a briefing from any other country's intelligence community that indicated they knew that scope.

SEN. THOMPSON: This plan with regard to the Oak Ridge facility, was this a blueprint you discovered? Or what was it did you say?

MR. KAY: We actually discovered the plant, and --

SEN. THOMPSON: They had duplicated the plant?

MR. KAY: They had duplicated the plant. They had built it to the plan. And the way we discovered it is a testimony to actually the knowledge in the U.S. nuclear program, although the individual has since passed away. We brought the photos back, spread them out on a table, asked one of the Oak Ridge designers who was still alive and still working at 80 years old in that plant -- didn't tell him what it was except a facility in Iraq. He walked around, looked at the pictures, and said -- and I'll never forget this statement: "I know this plant. I work in this building every day in my life." And, sure enough, as we took the plant apart, and then we discovered the blueprints later, it had been built to a set of U.S. plans.

SEN. THOMPSON: Well, how do you account for that?

MR. KAY: Oh, the plans were openly available. You could go today and buy them. We declassified -- the calutron program, the EMIS program, was one that the U.S. abandoned because gaseous diffusion came on line and was far more efficient. When we were doing calutrons during the course of the Second World War, it took approximately one half of the available U.S. electric supply, and all the silver that was stored by the Treasury to use to wrap magnets in. It was a very inefficient way. The Iraqis had improved on it. They pursued it, because they correctly guessed that no one would think that anyone would be so stupid as to use that means of enrichment. And in fact the first assessment that came back to the U.S. -- two Nobel Prize- winners were asked to evaluate it, and they -- their exact comment was, It can't be that -- no one would be so stupid to do that. There are better ways to produce.

There is a lesson for us here. There were some very old ways, and still are very old ways of producing weapons that are quite destructive --

SEN. THOMPSON: It was older, but it was easier for them to do?

MR. KAY: It was easier to hide and disguise. They still struggled with that process as well. That's why they were developing centrifuges, which are genuinely easier for everyone, once you produce centrifuges.

SEN. THOMPSON: So they have plenty of uranium, I take it -- it's just a matter of enriching it?

MR. KAY: That's correct. There is abundant uranium in Iraq. It is not in the concentrations you would like to have or you would find in Canada or other places in the former Soviet Union, but there is plenty of uranium. Money doesn't constrain their program -- and this is the hard lesson everyone has learned: just because it's expensive to do, or not the best way, doesn't mean the Iraqis won't pursue it. They'll spend the money.

MR. SPERTZEL: In the bio program, clearly the intelligence was sufficient to know that Iraq was at least attempting to weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax, which is what prompted the use of vaccines against those for the coalition forces. But the intelligence was not good enough to know where the production plants were, because of the four sites that we could identify as actually being involved in the production of biological agents, not a single one of them was touched by even one bomb. So, yes, the intelligence --

SEN. THOMPSON: Could that have been on purpose?

MR. SPERTZEL: No. They simply didn't know.

SEN. THOMPSON: There was no danger to the civilian population or anything like that that would have come into play?

MR. SPERTZEL: Certainly the major production plant, which was the al-Haytham facility out in the desert -- that could have been blown up with absolute no qualms whatsoever, particularly if it was a daylight strike.

SEN. THOMPSON: So is it fair to say we knew basically what they were doing -- we just didn't know where they were doing it?

MR. SPERTZEL: They certainly had -- we certainly had some indication that they were investigating both botulinum toxin as well as anthrax. And my guess is a lot of that probably came from import information, because it was a basis for -- would have been a basis for questioning