COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)
WITH NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Hearing of the International Security, Proliferation and
Federal Services Subcommittee of the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

November 14, 2001

SEN. DANIEL AKAKA (D-HI): The committee will please come to order.

The committee is here to discuss the threats we face from insecure critical equipment and discontented scientists from the former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological weapon complex.

I want to thank our colleague, Senator Hagel, for joining us today. I also wish to thank our other witnesses for being here, Ms. Gary Jones, director of Nuclear and Nonproliferation Issues at GAO; Ms. Laura Holgate, vice president of the Russian Newly Independent States Program of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; and Mr. Leonard Spector, deputy director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

President Bush and President Putin yesterday announced historic cuts to the nuclear stockpiles in the U.S. and Russia. For the future of both our nations and the prospect of a more secure world, I hope they are successful in addressing another legacy of the Cold War: the materials, facilities, equipment and people used to make these and other weapons in the former Soviet Union.

We've faced a major security problem since the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union. Control of chemical, biological and nuclear weapon materials was suddenly spread out among a number of newly independent nations. We could no longer be assured of adequate control of these weapons or the people who had designed them. Prior to 1991, international nonproliferation policy stressed keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of a few states. Since 1991, we've been faced with the possibility that the information and materials which would have taken years to acquire, to build a WMD weapon could be stolen in an instant.

Since the terrorist attack on September 11, the problem of preventing WMD proliferation has gained both a new urgency and a greater complexity. The FBI's assessment that the anthrax attacks, which have plagued the Senate and the nation's mail, may have been perpetrated by a lone, disgruntled scientist demonstrates how a weapon, that had only been in the hands of a state can now be wielded by a single scientists. Weapons that we previously worried about being delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile, we now know can be infiltrated into our midst without any advance warning. We are faced with the prospect of spending billions of dollars to protect our homeland against multiple threats from multiple sources. Nonproliferation programs, the subject of today's hearing, are a critical means to prevent weapons, materials, equipment and technology from falling into the wrong hands.

I want to thank again our colleague, Senator Hagel, for being here to discuss this proposal to achieve a national strategy and improve coordination between the various nonproliferation programs. His legislation, the Nonproliferation Coordination Assistance Act, would establish a coordinating body to ensure that nonproliferation activities are efficient, effective and further national interests. The Departments of State, Defense and Energy have asked that their testimony be postponed after President Bush's summit with President Putin. We have agreed to this and will re-schedule their testimony in the near future.

In our discussion of current and future nonproliferation plans and the ways to improve and better coordinate them, we must keep in mind two questions. First, how can we adapt to ever changing WMD threats?

And second, are our plans and policies making the world more secure? I look forward to hearing our witnesses' comments on these two questions.

At this time, I'd like to yield to my friend, Senator Domenici, for his statement.

SEN. PETE DOMENICI (R-NM): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Hagel, I'm pleased to be here adding some positive thrust to your legislation. I want to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. In addition, I want to compliment Chuck, Senator Hagel, for his proposed legislation. It has a very simple title but very profound processes involved in this. It's called Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.

Importance of nonproliferation programs with the former Soviet Union should not be open to question. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, but it also tremendously increased the risk that materials and expertise for weapons of mass destruction could contribute to new threats to global stability. For a country which relied on guards and guns to protect secrets and materials, it was a jolting transition to a new situation, where it was not clear if the guards, that is, if they were even still present and whether or not they were being paid.

The current war on terrorism is critically dependent on minimizing the extent of the threat that terrorists can mount, preventing their access to weapons of mass destruction must be one of our highest priorities. Many nonproliferation programs were created, all with the best of intentions. Each program has well stated goals. But these programs frequently are intertwined and interrelated in various complex and difficult ways. There could be no question that better coordination among the programs would lead to enhanced effectiveness as well as potential cost efficiencies.

In the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation -- it was also obviously a Nunn-Lugar, just follow that by a few years, 1996 -- Congress called for a nonproliferation coordinators for all these programs. The administration at that time chose to ignore that. After the legislation called for a coordinator expired in 1999, I helped with further legislation for this coordinator in amendments to previous defense authorization acts, again to no avail.

There was nobody worried enough about it and clearly, the executive branch didn't think it was a big enough or a powerful enough issue. Numerous committees have called this coordination and have called for it, studied it. John Deutsch chaired one of these committees.

More recently, the superb effort from Senator Howard Baker and the Honorable Lloyd Cutler again called for this coordination. That's a current report, Mr. Chairman. For everybody on this staff that is interested in moving along, that's a must. It's very current, has many current evaluations and studies in it and my friend, Chuck Hagel, is totally familiar with it, I'm sure.

In an amendment to the current Defense Authorization Bill, I offered an amendment calling for tighter coordination. I was pleased to develop that amendment with Senator Hagel, you might recall, building on the same bill that you are discussing here today.

In addition to Senator Hagel, Senators Lugar, Biden, Bingaman, and Landrieu joined us in co-sponsoring it. All I can say, that it was unfortunate that no action was taken on that amendment due to confusion in the minutes before the Senate voted on the Defense Authorization Bill. Now I understand that the Armed Services Committee is working in conference to incorporate the themes of that amendment.

But I'm very pleased that while that is stalemated somewhere, you're giving birth to the idea with your bill here today, and I do hope it's given every consideration. And I hope you pursue it with vigor. It's very, very important. We can start forgetting about that as terrorism gets closer and closer on the television monitors of Americans. But there is an awful lot of terrorism potential when you think about what can be put together with all of that left-over material that came from the Soviet program, and all of the material that comes from the dismantlement programs and, clearly, the risks that come with the Soviet Union turning out to be a very different amalgamation of programs. And, clearly, they had a difficult time, and still are, finding money to pay just the ordinary kinds of expenditures to keep this process of not letting it get all over the world going.

There can be many examples where we needed this improved coordination. And one of the immediate concerns involves the very vital plutonium disposition programs which require coordination between the United States and Russia. The recent suggestion that the national security council, that this program might be modified, along with strong budget signals that we are wavering in our support for the program, have introduced some great uncertainties. Failure to coordinate this complex program has led to some very serious issues which threaten to derail the entire effort in terms of plutonium disposition with Russia.

And we're now seeing the governor of South Carolina, incidentally, refusing to accept plutonium from Rocky Flats, and a German company withdrawing their offer to assist Russia with the MOCS program because the administration has injected some rare, some really serious uncertainty by then saying the program didn't work, but not having one to take its place. We saw the collapse of the efforts to obtain international funding for the program in Russia. Coordination could have avoided all these problems.

In conclusion, I strongly concur, Mr. Chairman, with Senator Hagel and many of our colleagues that a far better coordination is needed across the government on our non-proliferation programs with the former Soviet Union. And I might say that I'm privileged to serve on a board of directors of a non-profit corporation that is called the nuclear threat initiative. That was set up with a $50 million a year pledge. I don't know how many years, but it will be a number of years, five years, $250 million.

And I note that one of those who are working with Sam Nunn is Laura Holgate, sitting in the front row. She's going to be on our next panel. It's been a pleasure working with Mr. Ted Turner, with Senator Lugar, and with former Senator Nunn, and some other distinguished people, and we are going to make some real headway in terms of getting the world moving with reference to non-proliferation.

We commented at our last board meeting that that doesn't mean we don't need government, quite to the contrary. The reasons some of the things that have been done by that non-profit is because our government has failed, and haven't done some things they ought to be doing. And so this is one of them, to get started at coordinating our own programs. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman Thank you, Senator Hagel.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Senator Domenici. Thank you for your statement.

Senator Cochran, I yield to you. Do you have a statement?

SEN. THAD COCHRAN (R-MS): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I ask that my prepared statement, my opening statement, be placed in the record as if read.

SEN. AKAKA: Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

SEN. COCHRAN: Mr. Chairman, let me just welcome my good friend and colleague from Nebraska. I appreciate the fact that he's here today to talk about this new initiative in the proliferation area of trying to control, more effectively, the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I can't think of a more important subject for him to work on than that, and to look at who was co-sponsoring the legislation with him. It makes me realize that we need to take this very seriously. I'm certain that it's a proposal that's been carefully reviewed and thought out, and the Congress should pay close attention to this suggestion. We appreciate you taking time to come and testify before the committee.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.

Again, I want to welcome you, Senator Hagel, and I want to thank you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss S673, the Non- Proliferation Coordination Assistance Act 2001. So, are you ready for your statement? We'd be glad to hear it.

SEN. CHARLES HAGEL (R-NE): I am, Mr. Chairman. Could I become a co-sponsor? Would you let me do that today, and you note it in the record, as senator, I'd like to be a co-sponsor.

SEN. AKAKA: Yes, fine.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And to my friends, Senator Cochran, Senator Domenici, thank you. What I am going to present today, Mr. Chairman, is essentially an effort that has worked from and off of the leadership of Senator Domenici, and Lugar, and Nunn, and Cochran, and so many of my senior colleagues who have been not just working on this general issue, but trying to frame it in a way to call attention to the relevancy and the real dynamic of the threat of terrorism. That, of course, as Senator Domenici noted, has now been moved from a threat to a reality as of September 11th. And hence the timeliness, and the importance of these kinds of issues, most specifically non-proliferation, is beyond just urgent, but it is now of necessity that the Congress of the United States deal with this.

What I have done in the bill that I put together a few months ago, was essentially reframe much of the work of Senators Domenici and Lugar and Biden and Cochran and others, with their support, with their concurrence, and with their encouragement. And so I want to acknowledge them as I begin to lay out what my bill would do, Mr. Chairman, because, essentially, it is because of their efforts and those who have gone before me, that I have been able to do this.

A few months ago I introduced, as you noted, the Non- Proliferation Assistance Coordination Act to address the coordination of non-proliferation efforts in Russia, in the former Soviet Union. Senators Lugar and Biden were original co-sponsors of this legislation, and we will include, of course, Senator Domenici as well.

This legislation was divided into eight sections. Section 4 of this bill establishes a committee on non-proliferation assistance at the assistant secretary level or higher, to be chaired by a senior representative of the National Security Council, and comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce and Energy.

I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that I take no particular pride in my colleagues, or others, efforts to strengthen, improve and restate, restructure, what I have laid out here. And I am certain that that can be done. And I introduce this bill, not because of any territorial sense of prerogatives as to who chairs anything, but rather to try to bring some accountability to this issue. And you will hear from witnesses, especially GAO and other Administration witnesses that you noted later on, that will have their own sense of this bill, and will come forward I'm sure with a more effective way to structure the bills. Section 5 sets out the duties of the Committee. Section 6 relates to administrative support. Section 7 protects confidentiality of information.

Mr. Chairman, it has been 10 years since the Congress took the important step to help reduce the threat of nuclear chaos emerging from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Under the foresight and leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar, Congress established the cooperative threat reduction program authorizing funding to the Department of Defense budget to assist with the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and other weapons in the former Soviet Union.

We are aware that, it has been alluded to us, especially in the remarks of Senator Domenici, and upon that first important piece of legislation we build the next stage of the Nunn-Lugar effort. And as Senator Domenici noted, that came, the next stage of that, came in 1996 when Senator Domenici joined with Senators Lugar and Nunn to further define and refine Nunn-Lugar.

Thousands of nuclear warheads have been deactivated, and missiles dismantled in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia. In the past 10 years, the Nunn-Lugar initiative has grown into a multi-pronged effort by the Departments of Defense, State and Energy, to ensure that weapons of mass destruction, weapons, usable materiel and technology, and weapons related knowledge in Russia in the newly independent states, remain beyond the reach of terrorists in weapons proliferating states.

The investments we have made in this area have yielded an impressive return. By assisting Russia in this area we have reduced, not eliminated, nuclear threats we face in the United States and the world, and have enhanced our national security. But just as the Nunn-Lugar initiative has changed over the last decade, so too has the world changed, especially since the terrorist attacks on this country on September 11th.

Non-proliferation is one of the key components of the war on terrorism. On November 6th, President Bush stated, and I quote, "El- Qaeda operates in more than 60 nations, including some in central and eastern Europe. These terrorist groups seek to destabilize entire nations in the region. They are seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation, and eventually to civilization itself," said the President.

Last January a bipartisan task force, led by former Senator Baker and former White House counselor Lloyd Cutler, which Senator Domenici mentioned, released a report calling for improved coordination within the United States government on non-proliferation assistance to Russia. In particular, the report noted, and I quote,"Coordination within, and among, U.S. government agencies is now insufficient and must be improved. Although the task force focused on the DOE non-proliferation programs, the members heard from many interlocutors that the programs would be improved, and could be improved, as would the counterpart programs of other agencies, if - if there were more coordination at all levels among all U.S. government programs," end of quote from that report.

That, Mr. Chairman, is what my legislation intends to do. President Bush recognized the need for greater coordination in our domestic security policy, as evidenced by the appointment of Governor Ridge as director of the office for homeland security. The Baker report recommended establishing a new position for non-proliferation coordination within the National Security Council, or creating a high policy level non-proliferation czar.

My legislation does not impose such a mandate on the president, but instead calls for a coordination of our non-proliferation programs to a senior level coordinating committee. And, again, I would say that if there are suggestions, particular points, that could improve, and would improve, the structure of this accountability, I certainly would welcome this.

The second aspect of my legislation is the inclusion of efforts undertaken by private sector programs in this area, such as corporations and non-governmental organizations, or NGOs. And, again, Senator Domenici alluded to one of those organizations a few minutes ago.

This subcommittee will hear testimony today in the nuclear threat initiative of private organizations founded by Ted Turner and the former Senator Sam Nunn, to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons. You will also hear from NGOs and their efforts through testimony from a representative of the Russian newly independent states non- proliferation program at the Monterey Institute.

Currently, this private spending is small, but it is registering positive results. It will continue to increase. We should ensure that government, and non-government, spending on non-proliferation programs complement each other and are not duplicated. Our previous efforts have yielded significant results, but there is far more work yet to do.

Yesterday, Senator Dodd and I wrote in the New York Times that Presidents Bush and Putin should use the current summit as an opportunity to discuss effective ways to ensure that weapons and materials of mass destruction in and around Russia remain safe, accounted for, and secure.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the discussions between Presidents Bush and Putin are already yielding agreement in this area. As you noted yesterday afternoon, President Bush noted that the United States and Russia will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons materials and expertise.

Presidents Bush and Putin also announced yesterday that they will dramatically reduce nuclear arsenals in both countries. This will probably require more spending from the United States. If we in Congress are asked to spend more of our budget on this effort, then we must ensure these funds are spent efficiently, effectively, and not on repetitive efforts.

And, again, Mr. Chairman, that is as much the focus of my legislation as any other part. I appreciate the committee's serious review of this timely and relevant issue. And I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if there is anything I can do to further that effort, I look forward to working with you and the members of this committee. Thank you.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Thank you for your leadership in this area. And I really appreciate what you've said. It will be helpful to the committee, and with you too, in looking for ways of preparing us to deal with whatever threats that might be coming. So I thank you very much, again, for your speech.

SEN. HAGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Now you'll hear from the real pros.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you. At this time, we'll call our next panel.

Ms. Gary Jones, from GAO. Ms. Laura Holgate, from the Nuclear Threat Initiative. And Mr. Leonard Spector, from the Center for Non- proliferation Studies. And they have been asked to discuss current non-proliferation programs, how they are coordinated with federal, private and international efforts, and how S673, the Hagel bill, would make these programs and efforts more effective.

Ms. Jones, please proceed with your statement at this time. And I want all of you to know that your full written statements will be entered into the records.

MS. GARY L. JONES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We're pleased to be here today to discuss our recent work on U.S. non-proliferation programs, and to comment on S673, a bill to establish an inter-agency committee to review and coordinate U.S. non- proliferation programs. As others have said, the events of September 11th have heightened the importance of these non-proliferation programs to our national security.

Let me first briefly summarize the results of our work on several of the U.S. government's non-proliferation programs. We have found that they have achieved some success, but more needs to be done to keep nuclear weapons, materials and technologies out of the hands of terrorists and countries of concern.

Successes include improved security systems, which have reduced the risk of theft of nuclear material in Russia, the purchase of weapons grade uranium that is equivalent to 4,000 nuclear warheads that has been turned into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors, and the creation of non-military jobs for some weapons scientists.

But the task is far from over. Hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material remain at some risk because improved security measures have not yet been installed. This is because DOE's program to secure this material has experienced problems with access to sensitive Russian sites. Further, DOE does not know how much, and for how long, additional assistance will be needed to sustain the operation and maintain the new security equipment already installed.

Two DOE programs, and one at the State Department, share the goal of employing Russia's weapons' scientists and non-military work, and thereby preventing them from selling their knowledge to terrorists or countries of concern. With hundreds employed by one program, and several thousand employed part-time by another, these programs are a long way from reaching the 30,000 to 75,000 senior nuclear chemical and biological weapons' scientists without full-time employment. Even when jobs are created, these programs face difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that they are achieving their intended goal of preventing the spread of weapons-related knowledge and expertise. Our reports on these DOE non-proliferation programs made numerous recommendations to improve their overall management, and DOE has addressed, or is in the process of making changes to address, these recommendations.

Let me turn to the bill, S673, that the subcommittee has under consideration. There is some debate among officials both within and outside government about the need for more coordination of U.S. non- proliferation programs. To prepare for this hearing, we spoke with representatives from the departments of Defense, Energy and State, and some private interest groups. They all believe that coordination among federal agencies implementing non-proliferation programs is already taking place, and the mechanism envisioned by the bill may not be needed.

However, based on our work and the findings of two independent groups that recently examined these programs, the Deutsch commission and the Baker-Cutler task force, we believe that additional coordination would be helpful. For example, some officials told us that better coordination is needed between the United States and international programs, such as those implemented by the European Union. Further, program officials, have also noted that although coordination does occur at some level, it is frequently informal and subject to changes in program personnel. We believe that greater coordination could minimize duplication, leverage resources and focus programs more clearly on common goals and objectives.

However, the legislation would not address a number of other problems that I have just talked about, such as limited access to sensitive Russian sites and various program management concerns. However, the coordinating body envisioned by the legislation could serve as a vehicle to share information and best practices for addressing these types of problems. We also believe the bill could be strengthened by mandating development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly identifies overall goals, timeframe for meeting these goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources government- wide, to address non-proliferation concerns.

Both the Deutsch commission and the Baker-Cutler task force believe that such a strategic plan was a missing element from the U.S. government implementation of non-proliferation programs. Building on the individual programs strategic plans, a government-wide plan could also address questions such as, are the end dates for the completion of the various non-proliferation programs, such as securing nuclear materials in Russia, still viable? How can the security improvements made be sustained beyond the completion of the programs? And in light of September 11, do we continue to have the right mix of non- proliferation programs needed to address the varying security problems facing our nation?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Ms. Jones.

At this time I would like to yield to Senator Cleland.

SEN. MAX CLELAND (D-GA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank particularly our colleague, Senator Hagel, and the witnesses who appeared here today to testify about this important subject.

The threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction that are retained in the states comprising the former Soviet Union, is actually mind boggling. I was struck by the fact that a bipartisan taskforce headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler has recently called this the most urgent unmet need, unmet national security threat, actually, to the United States and called for a four-fold funding increase for our threat reduction efforts. In the wake of September 11th, we cannot hesitate to take strong action to implement this recommendation.

We are indeed fortunate that 10 years ago a group of distinguished senators, including my friend and the former senator from Georgia, Sam Nunn, put in place what has become to be known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. The programs that have been carried out under this legislation have, without a doubt, profoundly improved the security of the United States, and may well have prevented a far worse catastrophe than what we've recently experienced.

I reiterate my support for these programs, and call for the enhanced funding recommended by the bipartisan taskforce mentioned previously. To the purpose of this hearing I say that the proposed legislation is fully consistent with the requirement to provide additional resources for cooperative threat reduction and I support it. I also believe that the committee propose, either Non- Proliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001, or lead a highly placed advocate to ensure that its mandate is effectively carried out.

To that end, I endorse Ms. Holgate's recommendation for the creation of a deputy national security advisor committed exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction. This threat is far too grave to go without such an advocate, I'm convinced that our national security depends upon the effective coordination and resourcing that this position will enable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much for your statement and your support.

I'd like to now call Ms. Holgate for your testimony.

MS. LAURA HOLGATE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for the opportunity to testify today about how the United States government can strengthen its efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and keep them from falling into the hands of groups and states who would do us harm.

The world discovered on September 11th that there are terrorist forces in the world who will stop at nothing in their efforts to take innocent lives. The work that the U.S. government does to reduce the threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and materials are our first line of defense in keeping these weapons out of terrorists' hands. Dismantling weapons, securing material, eliminating infrastructure and directing know-how to peaceful pursuits -- all of these play an essential role in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

We've taken important steps towards these problems, but to protect the security of the American people, we need giant strides. So I'd like to thank the chairman and members of the committee for putting the spotlight on this issue and giving me and others a chance to contribute our ideas.

President Bush clearly shares the concern that has been noted by Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler and many others in the introductory comments to this hearing. Two years ago, at the Reagan Library, candidate Bush praised, and I quote, "the foresight and statesmanship of Senators Lugar and Nunn for their legislation to improve security at many Russian nuclear facilities."

And then he added, "a great deal of Russian nuclear material cannot be accounted for. The next president must press for an accurate inventory of all this material and we must do more. I will ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible, as quickly as possible."

Sadly, the administration's actions in the first month of its tenure fell short of the vision and purpose articulated by President Bush.

Earlier this year the administration announced a review of non- proliferation programs, then cut the program budgets back before it even began the review. The review, itself, stopped action in its tracks, travel was halted, work was postponed, momentum was lost, and program managers felt they lacked the authority to go forward. And a review was undertaken without even the courtesy of telling our partners in Russia. Now we are told the review is complete but we have not seen its outcome.

I strongly support a review of our non-proliferation programs. We've not had one since 1993, but it needs to be broad and it needs to be strategic. The review that was recently completed appeared to be aimed merely at finding inefficiencies in individual programs' activities. That is a worthy purpose, in its own terms, but it is no substitute for strategic thinking about U.S. national security goals and how threat reduction programs can help achieve them.

I worked for many years in many capacities. First at the Department of Defense in the cooperative threat reduction program, then at the Department of Energy, and now at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to implement and advance these programs to prevent nuclear, biological and chemical weapons from falling into the wrong hands. It is my view that these programs are critically important, largely effective, and because the obvious urgency, more in need than ever, of high level attention, increased funding, greater staffing and continuous fresh thinking to help speed up the pace and widen the scope of these programs.

If terrorists are racing to acquire weapons of mass destruction, we ought to be racing to stop them. Ten years after the passage of the landmark Nunn-Lugar Act to establish the basis of, the legal basis of non-proliferation cooperation with Russia and other former Soviet states, U.S. government activities in this area approach a billion dollars annually, and involve multiple agencies from Defense, to Health and Human Services, myriad contractors and over a dozen Congressional committees and subcommittees. This growth has been by and large, organic, with each agency pursuing its own contacts and relationships in recipient countries, assembling and justifying its own budget, implementing programs based on its own culture and approaches, and interacting with its own Congressional oversight committees.

This is a complex task. Some point to the involvement of so many agencies as evidence of poor management. It is not. It is evidence that such a program requires wide-ranging expertise and therefore will always be a challenge to administer. A challenge that can be fully met, in my view, only with high level leadership and coordination.

This leadership and coordination has been hard to come by since the early days of these programs. Where it has worked well, it has been a consequence of personalities, committees or commissions that are not endearing features of the organizational structure, either within the U.S. government or in relations between U.S. and states of the Soviet Union. Coordination with non-governmental organizations like mine also occurs primarily ad hoc, based on personal relationships, and are an initiative. Relationships with other countries working in these areas tends to be intermittent and opportunistic.

Despite the complexity of these non-proliferation cooperation activities, programmatic duplication has been remarkably low, and program implementation is in general very effective. In spite of proceeding without a comprehensive and coordinated vision administered from the top, these programs taken collectively, have massively improved U.S. national security. Improving the coordination and accountability of these programs should result in even greater improvements.

What is missing in the process is a definitive statement of strategy and consistent advocacy of administration goals. This must include holding agencies accountable for financing and implementing programs that accomplish these goals. Without this clear high level direction and the interagency process that creates and maintains it, agencies have said and articulated their own priorities, resources have not always been aligned with those priorities even within agencies, and differences amongst agencies' rhetoric and programmatic actions, have created perceptions of inefficiency and contradiction which are exploited by opponents of the programs and missions.

To address these structural flaws, I recommend the creation of a deputy national security advisor, committed explicitly and exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction. This individual would be responsible for leading and enforcing interagency decisions and for creating a unified programmatic budget presentation. In whatever manner Congress and the executive decide to organize our programs, and there are many effective ways to do so, they must have high level presidential attention. Any organizational structure with high level attention, will be better than the best organizational structure with low level attention.

Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Spector, you may proceed.

MR. LEONARD S. SPECTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on improving the effectiveness of U.S. Non-Proliferation Programs in the successive states of the former Soviet Union.

I want to try to emphasize three themes today. The first is that the indecision of the Administration in what, I think, has to be characterized to some degree as dithering, is damaging our efforts to control weapons of mass destruction material and expertise in the newly independent states, especially in Russia. I think this is an especially troubling situation given the new urgency that has emerged to deal with these matters, in light of the September 11th events.

The second theme I want to emphasize is that the programs that are functioning could function much more efficiently and more effectively if they could be better integrated and if there were better planning between them and better oversight from above. And I will support the current legislation in some of my comments in terms of its approach.

And finally, I want to comment on the private public partnerships and just note how important a role they have played historically in this area and how important a role they are playing today. The fundamental goal of the majority of the programs that are operating in Russia today and the other NIS states, especially those whose purpose is to secure and eliminate, disarm material and to provide employment at Soviet -- for Soviet weapons of mass destruction scientists, the fundamental purpose is to prevent terrorists and states of proliferation concern from acquiring these materials and getting access to this expertise. As such, the programs are an integral and highly important component of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.

Osama bin Laden, as we know, has been seeking weapons of mass destruction and of course he recently claimed to possess chemical and nuclear weapons, although most observers, I believe, disbelieve that latter claim of possession of nuclear weapons. He is also known to have extensive links throughout the former Soviet Union. It's worth recalling the scale of the Soviet weapons of mass destruction legacy. The Department of Energy estimates that Russia possesses 603 tons of weapons usable fissile materials, that's plutonium or highly enriched uranium outside of weapons. That's enough for 41,000 - 41,000 nuclear arms.

And to provide a benchmark let's just consider what North Korea may have. It's said by the U.S. government to possess enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons and we all know how serious we take that national security threat. One or two weapons is less than five one-thousandth of a percent of the Soviet or the Russian stockpile of weapons grade material that I described earlier. And I think one shot is to imagine the mischief that Osama bin Laden or terrorists of his ilk, might cause, if they were to obtain a comparable miniscule fraction of the nuclear weapons material in Russia.

Russia also possesses a vast arsenal of chemical weapons that are now currently awaiting destruction with U.S. assistance if we can get the program moving and they also possess the ability to manufacture the Russian -- the world's most potent biological weapons. The bulk of these various weapons of mass destruction materials are not subject to adequate security measures. Despite new evidence of terrorist interest in acquiring and using WMD, the Bush administration has not acted, has not acted to accelerate efforts to improve security over these materials and over WMD expertise in the former Soviet States. Indeed, nearly 10 months after taking office, as Ms. Holgate just noted, 10 months after taking office and really throughout an entire Budget cycle, the Administration is still "reviewing" U.S. Non- Proliferation Programs in Russia and it's apparently unable to decide whether, and or how, to pursue a number of the critically important initiatives that are already under way.

Inexplicably, the one point that the administration has decided upon, is that the programs do not need additional funding and that accordingly no monies from the $40 billion in anti-terrorism -- anti- terrorist funds that will be made available, by the Congress, should be used for this purpose of helping to secure weapons grade materials and expertise in the former Soviet Union.

Let me review with you a few of the programs. I've listed quite a few in my testimony. I'll try to just summarize and only hit the highlights. Perhaps the most salient of the programs for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, the Soviet nuclear legacy I should say, is the material protection control and accounting program at the Department of Energy. As was pointed out earlier by the GAO, to date this program has made great strides, it's I believe, protected about 113 tons of weapon grade material, that's an enormous amount, but it represents only about a third of the -- excuse me, only a sixth of the total amount that needs to be done. Sorry, I think it's actually a higher number. It's about 200 tons. It's roughly a third of the 603 tons that now needs to be secured.

The material will not receive so-called rapid upgrades, the remaining material in the 603 tons, until 2007, and it will not be comprehensively secured until 2011. Surprisingly, the Bush administration's FY 2002 Budget reduced, reduced the funding for this program to a bit below the 2001, FY 2001 levels. Although, two weeks ago Congress increased support for this effort above the administration's request, from $143 million up to $173 million, the events of September 11th call for additional funding.

Now, I was at the Department of Energy when we put together a previous administration's budget on this field -- in this field, and I know that there were other parts of this program that are not going to be addressed in the coming year, because of these lower budget numbers. You know, not every item on the wish list can be funded, but I know that we will be not doing some very important work because of the administration's hesitancy in moving forward.

Now, one way that we can rapidly improve security over tons of material is to complete another one of these material programs in Russia and that's to complete a facility at Mayak known as the Fissile Material Storage Facility. We have already spent $400 million on this facility and it is supposed to be operational in the coming year where we'll secure six tons of weapon grade material, eventually 25 tons. They will load it at a rate of about six tons per year. What's holding up the operation of this facility is, we can't quite come to conclusion with the Russians, on measures for ensuring what goes into the facility and its whereabouts, and for observing it.

This has been a problem for a number of years but it is not moving forward in part because it is not getting high level attention at the Pentagon, where this program sits. It's extremely important when you have a high level official from the Pentagon here, to ask what steps he is taking to make this $400 million investment, good. We have to take advantage of this in the coming year and I think the ball is distinctly in the court of the Pentagon.

Another program which I think has been an unalloyed success and is widely applauded, is the High Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement. This is an agreement under which weapon grade material is blended down to non-weapon grade nuclear power plant fuel in Russia and then purchased by the United States and used at U.S. nuclear power plants. This is where 110 tons of material have indeed been removed from being a problem. They are no longer usable for weapons, these very large quantities. But the program itself will last for many more years and needs to be accelerated. The intellectual father of the program, Thomas Neff of MIT believes that with some ingenuity, we could double the rate of down-blending from 30 tons a year, to 60 tons a year, at a cost of roughly $150 million per year but the bulk of this money will come back to us when that uranium would be sold on the open market some years from now.

The president is looking into this, supposedly. I had an interview with Robert Joseph at the National Security Council, which is an on-the-record interview that we published recently. He said that this program was under review. They were trying to stabilize it in some fashion, but it was clear there was no impetus, no energy to try to make the program move at a faster pace and to try to introduce some new thinking as to how this might work.

Other programs, including one that Ms. Holgate used to run at the Department of Energy, is the Plutonium Disposition Program. This program desperately needs leadership and drive from very high up in the administration, because it requires the participation of foreign governments. Because of uncertainties about funding, and the lack of this leadership, the program has lost a year. An entire year of its efforts to attempt to eliminate and dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian weapons plutonium, which would basically be removed from a concern if we could get the program on track and moving forward. Again, the problem I'd say, lies with the administration and its slowness to come to a conclusion about the program and its reluctance to champion it internationally.

There are several other programs that are worthy of mention. The Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown Agreement would end production of new plutonium. Why do we want the Russians doing that. We have a program to end this. Again it's falling on hard times, in a sense that it is not getting the leadership from the Pentagon that it needs. In particular, a solution was reached to actually get this program implemented under the last part -- during the last part of the Clinton administration. It has not yet been embraced by the Bush administration but it is ready, and a very, I think, thoughtful solution. This needs to be pried out of the bureaucracy and made to move forward.

Let me only turn to one or two other points here, in reviewing some of these programs. A program that I participated in while I was at the Department of Energy was to go around to small research reactors outside of Russia and try to bring weapon grade material back into Russia to be consolidated and down blended. The material is used as fuel at these facilities, and one facility of particular concern was in the former Yugoslavia. Now with the change of government there, the dangers are less great, but it's a significant quantity of material and we need to get this program forward. Also to try to move material out of Belarus and out of the Kharkiv Reactor in the Ukraine.

Tactical nuclear weapons, just to change focus a bit, is another area that has not gotten attention under this administration or the previous administration. There are thousands of them. We have done some work to secure them, but there is no work to eliminate these weapons or to provide transparency to ensure that Russia is complying with undertakings made in 1992. Urgent work is needed here and it is a complete gap in the administration's current initiatives.

If I may, let me turn next to summarize a number of these points, and basically say that in all of these cases, the issue really lies with the administration and its inability to sort of decide where it wants to come out, and to move emphatically forward with these efforts.

Let me turn now, if I may, to a different part of the proliferation threat in the former Soviet Union and this is one that is very germane to today's dangers. This is the threat of biological weapons. As we know, Russia had the most advanced -- the Soviet Union, the most advanced biological weapons program in the world. We have worked, during the Clinton administration, and are continuing to work during the Bush administration, to try to hire as many of these scientists the program has mentioned, so that they do not go off and share their expertise with others.

We have converted some of the biological weapons sites to non- weapons use.

But some of these sites remain completely unknown to us. We are not given any access and we have not had any programs there. These are the programs that are in the Russian military. It's an important gap.

But what came to mind most recently, and what a colleague of mine, Sonia van Rogramm (ph) has brought to my attention, is the so- called museums. These are the collections of extremely potent biological weapon agents, that remain at many of the sites. The work at the sites now, the ones that we have participated in, is no longer offensive biological weapons, but some of the material remains there.

Last night on television, I'm not sure how many may have seen this, senator, but they showed the refrigerator in which some of these vials were sitting. They were barely labeled, there was very limited security and one only hopes that we can do our work at these sites, and it's under way more rapidly than others may figure out how to defeat the rudimentary security systems that now exist. This is a major gap and we really need to move this forward dramatically.

Let me turn, if I may now, to the issue of planning and coordination.

SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Spector --

MR. SPECTOR: Yes?

SEN. AKAKA: You've exceeded your time, but will you please summarize?

MR. SPECTOR: Thank you, I'd be happy to do that.

Planning and coordination has been discussed here and in my testimony and in the accompanying article, I've identified a number of areas where we simply don't have cross program coordination the way we need it. The most clear cut example is that the program to secure nuclear materials uses one number to describe the amount of material that needs to be addressed. Other programs however, are adjusting this amount of material by moving it, destroying it, or eliminating it in various fashions. And we need a kind of government wide analysis of this problem, a government wide analysis of job creation and other areas. If you had this, you could exploit synergies between the programs. You could avoid situations where programs interfere with each other inadvertently, and you could make much more thoughtful planning decisions.

In the interview that Bob Joseph gave, he did indicate that one element of the administration's review could be announced and it was that there would be increased planning, and that indeed the process would take place in a interagency group of the very kind recommended in this legislation. Now if this is announced publicly, in a more formal way, perhaps during your next hearing, it may mean that the need for legislation is less apparent, because the administration, in effect, will have adopted this very strategy. However, I would recommend a number of studies be requested by the committee, that would in fact, push the planning process forward.

Let me conclude, just by noting the public and private activities. It really would be worthwhile spending a bit more time on this, to appreciate the incredible history of participation by private organizations in this very area. The concept of the Nunn-Lugar program, the cooperative threat reduction, was initiated at Harvard by a group up there. My organization has done very important reviews of these programs, has done much training to support them to create a cadre of specialists in Kazakhstan and Ukraine and elsewhere. And the nuclear threat initiative of course, will play a very important role as well. This has been a very successful partnership, and I think it's one that we certainly hope will continue, and where there is much more work to be done and many more contributions to be made by these private organizations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Spector.

I have some questions for each of you. The first question is to all of you. I would just like to ask your opinion on some of the views of the administration. A number of critics have praised the administration for undertaking the first comprehensive assessment of our Non-Proliferation Programs in decades. At the same time, they fault the administration for failing to develop a strategic plan for these programs.

Do you agree with these views? And if so, what should our strategy be?

Ms. Jones?

MS. JONES: Senator, I think part of our testimony today was basically to say that the legislation currently being considered, could be improved by requiring a strategic plan. And that strategic plan would talk about the overall goals that we're after, government wide, for the Non-Proliferation Programs. It would enable us to measure progress, hold particular agencies accountable for meeting those goals, but it would also provide a forum to set relative priorities, particularly from a funding standpoint. So I would agree that a strategic plan is something that we should be looking for here.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Holgate?

MS. HOLGATE: I would certainly associate myself with the views that you express, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the contrast between a review of existing programs and a strategy for how to move forward and match programs to goals. That strategy can only be created in the context of interagency coordination, led by a firm hand at the White House, and is desperately needed.

SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Spector?

MR. SPECTOR: I would agree, because I have, among others, have been urging such planning to take place. When you do such planning, certainly in the fissile material area, you look across a whole spectrum of challenges. I would say, by the time the last administration left office, pretty much every challenge was addressed in some fashion. Sometimes more successfully, sometimes less successfully. And you need to have that across-the-board approach, which a senior level review that attempted to do the work strategically, could achieve.

So I would certainly support that, and I support the comments of Ms. Holgate that the administration has not done this. They have looked program by program at some of the policy issues and not at the big picture.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Jones, in terms of proliferation threats from Soviet chemical and biological weapons facilities, we are concerned with dual-use materials and equipment and expertise being sent to suspected proliferating nations. To what extent can these concerns be met by formal non-proliferation activities, and how can such activities be coordinated with multilateral agreements and treaties?

MS. JONES: I think if we're talking about expertise going from weapon scientists in the Soviet Union possibly to other countries, I think the programs that the Department of Energy has in place have been dealing with that as well as the Science Center programs at the State Department I think that are coordinating a committee that we're talking about today in terms of this legislation could go a long way to bring those programs together and possibly leverage those programs and we could be more efficient in terms of other delivery.

SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Spector, there has been concern that too much of U.S. assistance was going to nuclear weapons complex. Some have called for a new program dedicated to chemical weapon scientists and engineers.

Do you believe that federal programs have paid enough attention to chemical and biological weapon scientists?

MR. SPECTOR: This was really one of the occasions on which the programs worked extremely well together. There was a very specialized program during the previous administration which I know is continuing to try to address these biological weapons and chemical weapons scientists institute by institute and to take every job creation program we had, Science Center, DOD, DOE and surge that in. There were always interagency teams that would make the visits and so forth.

I would say that the job here is to keep these programs going, they have received adequate funding, I think, for the present year, and here you had excellent planning, it's really a model for what you wanted to see elsewhere. So I think the job -- this is a job we have done very well and with great caution, so that we were not supporting improper activities at these locations.

I would also have to say I was very familiar with the danger of spending too much money in the United States, which I think was the early part of your question, and I think most of the jobs creation programs now have ceilings on them which are somewhat difficult to meet if I recall, but they are being met so that the bulk of money is spent in the former Soviet Union, and I think these are good guidelines for us to have.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Holgate, in Sunday's Washington Post, Russian President Putin is quoted as saying categorically that he denied that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons originating in Russia or the former Soviet Union. He also states that in the unlikely event that the terrorists in Afghanistan have weapons of mass destruction, and I quote, "They can't be of Soviet or Russian origin. I'm absolutely sure of that," unquote.

What do you think of President Putin's comments, and is he making a distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear material, as some have suggested that nuclear material is missing from Russia?

MS. HOLGATE: It's an awkward position to criticize this head of state currently visiting in the United States, but I will say I have no basis myself to be as certain as he is. I think he's not in a position to say anything other than the statements that he made. I don't think he could possibly be seen to be admitting that there are challenges, so I think he made the statement you'd expect a president to make.

Based on what I know of the Russian inventory, of their weapons, their materials, and the people that are involved with them I can't imagine how anyone can make a categorical statement that every gram of weapons-usable material is accounted for and every individual with knowledge is safe in their beds in Russia.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Jones, Mr. Spector recommends that our subcommittee use its oversight authority to request that the administration prepare its three baseline studies to improve planning and coordination process. These studies would include an inventory of cross-program relationships, a year-by-year projection of inventory of Russian nuclear material not in weapons, and a year-by-year projection of the employment impact of all U.S. non-proliferation programs.

Would such an exercise improve planning and coordination, and how useful would this be?

MS. JONES: Senator, I believe that it would provide a baseline for the administration to begin setting goals. I think the kinds of things that Mr. Spector has pointed out here could be used as part of the goals for this overarching strategy that we're talking about and the administration could then be measured on an annual basis in terms of how effective the programs are in meeting those goals. So I would sign on to the fact that these studies might be useful.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you.

Ms. Holgate, some U.S. non-proliferation goals have been hindered by Russia's strict secrecy standards. The GAO reported in May that U.S. officials had yet to gain access to 104 of 252 nuclear site buildings requiring improved security. While we can appreciate Russia's concerns, access is required to ensure that U.S. tax dollars are being spent appropriately.

In your opinion, how do we resolve this conflict?

MS. HOLGATE: This is a tough one that a lot of smart people have been working on for quite a while, senator. And it's in some ways a measure of the success of the programs that we are encountering this challenge. The easy stuff has been by and large completed and we're getting into the more difficult areas where we're talking about the most sensitive facilities and the most sensitive materials in Russia. And this has happened at a time simultaneously where Putin's rise to power has given a boost to the security services within Russia, and at the very same time our own national security labs have had their security posture raised in the wake of the Wen Ho Lee problems.

The challenge here therefore is, even when there can be reciprocal visits, it can be almost more difficult for Russian scientists to visit our facilities for cooperative research than it is for our scientists and implementers to visit Russian facilities. So it's a kind of an upward ratcheting process on both sides simultaneously with the increased calls and increased political attention for access.

The first thing that's needed here is a clear statement from both presidents, and Senator Nunn has called for this to come out of the summit, I don't know whether it will or not -- that the mutual monitoring of each country's weapons, excess materials and weapons and stocks, could assure the world that these are taken care of, and that will give the Russian system an ability to have access to some of the U.S. systems that will help make it possible for U.S. officials to have access to Russian systems.

So the first step is a presidential determination and enforcement through the bureaucracies that puts the onus on the security people to explain how it can work as opposed to taking the easy way out about why it shouldn't work.

SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Spector -- and I would like to have Ms. Jones also respond to this question -- environmental and local public advocacy groups have gained influence in the former Soviet Union.

What problems is this creating for American aid efforts and how can the U.S. resolve them?

MR. SPECTOR: Well, I think this really varies program by program. In some cases, such as the material protection program, the environmental concerns are really non-existent, there are no environmental impacts, this is just improving security. In other settings where you're moving around radioactive materials or you're proposing to irradiate materials in reactors and so forth, local opposition is very significant and it really must be taken into account. We're observing the Russians now adopting a licensing and environmental impact statement process somewhat like our own.

So one program I was involved in we were hoping to have a result in, you know, two years. It was for storing spent fuel and we gradually were advised that it's not going to happen in two years. We're going to have to go through by the book and make sure we looked at all of these issues.

I think, virtually every program that I was associated with, you know, is very environmentally attuned and does not cause serious consequences and I think we can make the case, where we need to, to local Russian groups or through Russian government officials, make the case. But it is a fact that has to be weighed and I think we should be sensitive to it. We don't want to have a steamroller here that creates a backlash.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Jones?

MS. JONES: Just one other point to add to what Mr. Spector had to say, and that's, as these environmental groups are becoming more active, as he noted, it could delay certain activities that the U.S. might want to have happened over the facilities, something like that. And I think that as part of the strategic plan, as part of the funding requirement, you have to look at the sequencing of these activities and whether or not the timing is going to be different now because of these environmental interactions. And again, we have to make sure that we can spend the money effectively and efficiently and if a schedule is going to be stretched out, then let's only put the money in that can be spent during the time frame.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Holgate, Presidents Bush and Putin have agreed to significant reductions in nuclear weapons.

One expert on non-proliferation issues, Kenneth Luongo, said that, despite the widespread belief that the U.S. is helping Russia to dismantle its nuclear weapons, it is not true, there is no dedicated program to assist Russia with warhead dismantlement.

Will you please share your thoughts on Mr. Luongo's statement?

MS. HOLGATE: His statement is technically accurate, Mr. Senator. The challenge comes in with the confusion in how we talk about these dangerous pieces of equipment. It is true that there is no dedicated program to deal with the warhead dismantlement itself. And sometimes people use the word "nuclear weapon" to talk about the warhead. Sometimes they use it to talk about the entire delivery system: the missile, the silo, the submarines, the bomber, and while there are massive programs under way in the Department of Defense, aiming at the delivery systems, the Russians have so far refused offers of U.S. assistance to help actually dismantle the warhead.

The Defense Department, when I led the cooperative threat reduction program, we orchestrated a package to offer the Russians to help them achieve this and they were so concerned at that time about what kind of information and sensitive knowledge might be gained by the U.S. because of our access requirements that they knew would follow from that money that they refused to accept our assistance to do that. I would expect that, if you asked current Department of Defense officials whether that offer would either be reiterated or whether it's still on the table, you would find that it is. But it is not part of a budget and it is not part of a program at this time.

SEN. AKAKA: I have a question for all of you. Prior to that, Senator Carnahan has asked me to place a statement into the record and so, without objection, Senator Carnahan's statement will be placed in the record.

To all of you, yesterday, President Bush said, "Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons material and expertise."

From this statement, what changes do you see with respect to U.S. non-proliferation programs in Russia?

Ms. Jones?

MS. JONES: I think that statement calls even more for the kind of committee we're talking about to coordinate the efforts. I think it also underlies the importance of the strategic plan so that we can look at: do we have the right mix of non-proliferation programs, are we providing the funds to those pieces or those programs that could tackle the risk. So I think that really underscores the need for a strategic plan and its coordinating committee.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Holgate?

MS. HOLGATE: Mr. Senator, my fear is that the current efforts to deal with the specific challenge that the president referenced in that statement focus almost exclusively on the demand side of the problem and totally inadequately on the supply side. The current counter- terrorism activities are trying to identify, locate and root out terrorists where they currently are located. But it has no component that addresses how you protect your material that those terrorists might be trying to get access to.

As Dr. Spector mentioned, the $40 billion emergency appropriation to address counter-terror activities in the wake of September 11th contains absolutely no money to add to or increase or accelerate these programs of cooperation with Russia, designed specifically to get at the supply of the materials and the weapons that so concern us all.

SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Spector.

MR. SPECTOR: I think that's right. I think there's a disconnect between the president's statement and the actual activities of the administration. And we saw it in the way they handled the budget this year, where these programs tended to be trimmed rather than boosted up. We're seeing it now in this on-going review that never seems to end, so that some of these programs are just mired in uncertainty and it really is, I think, just as I say, there's a gap, a gulf between what the president's aspirations are and what his administration is actually doing at this time. And I think that that's very unfortunate.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Jones, in your testimony, you note that the Congress has authorized in excess of $5.5 billion for U.S. non- proliferation programs to Russia and other newly independent states.

How much of this money has been spent in Russia and the newly independent states and also would you share some success stories regarding the non-proliferation programs?

MS. JONES: Senator, I'm not sure that I would have the numbers for you. I can certainly try to provide them for the record in terms of how much has been spent in Russia. Two of the programs that we've looked at, the Nuclear Cities Initiative and the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention, for both those programs, we looked at them. We had noted, as Dr. Spector had mentioned, that a great portion of the funding was initially spent at the weapons complex here in the United States. That has been changing and it is evolving so that more money will be going to Russia. But for the whole $5 billion, I'm not sure that I have that breakdown for you.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Holgate, are there any routine joint U.S.- Russian strategic planning meetings and if so, how successful are these meetings?

MS. HOLGATE: At the current time, I am aware of no such meetings. In the history of U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, I would say that the bi-national commission established by Vice- President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin offered one of the few venues in which Cabinet level colleagues in U.S. and Russia would interact every six months and the preparation for that interaction, the attention that was brought from the vice-president and his office to delivering on commitments made at the previous six months' meeting really did create a mechanism for senior level global interaction, whether it's Defense, Energy, State Department, other departments involved.

And that provided probably not what it was quite planned to do, but in this non-proliferation field, it did provide a good mechanism to be sure that senior people knew what was going on and to give impetus to bureaucracies that might get mired down in working level concerns.

SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Spector, you recommend that Congress should require that the president report on the status of its efforts to accelerate the Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement.

Do you feel that the current focus on proliferation risks of nuclear material from Russia will accelerate the administration's review of the agreement?

MR. SPECTOR: I wish I could say yes. I must say that that's not been my impression. My impression is that this is a slow but steady effort and it seems to be dragging on. When I interviewed this National Security Council official, I asked him in many different ways what was being done in this sphere in light of September 11th and in many different ways, he sort of deflected me, in effect to say, we're still reviewing these programs. This High Enriched Uranium program is one of them.

But nothing was set with a sense of urgency, or a statement that we've had the review but it's going to be finished next week because we're so concerned about these matters. It was much the opposite, a sort of, you know, no change, they're just going to go about their business as usual.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms Jones, the Department of Defense is responsible for assisting former Soviet states with destroying their nuclear and chemical weapons stockpiles.

Were biological agents stockpiled? If so, are there plans to destroy these stockpiles, as well? Which agency should take the lead for U.S. assistance?

MS. JONES: I'm sorry, Senator, I don't have the information to be able to respond to that question. I'd be happy to do it for the record.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Holgate?

MS. HOLGATE: I can shed a little bit of light on that question, sir. There was very minimal stockpiling of actual delivery scale biological agents in Russia, in the Soviet time frames.

They've mainly depended on having massive production capability to allow for surge production, in the case of an order given from Moscow, that then tons of anthrax could be created, just as an example, within months of a direct order if a need was identified. So there was very little actual stocks in place.

Many of those stocks were destroyed in the wake of President Gorbachev's announcement that, in fact, the Soviet Union had violated the biological weapons convention, and that they were now coming clean, in the late '80s. And the Soviets then destroyed many of those stocks. Some of the way that they destroyed them was to bury them in the island called Resurrection Island in the Aral Sea, in the territory of what is now Uzbekistan.

And there is a project under way through the Department of Defense, under the cooperative threat reduction program, to go back and make sure that those stocks were actually permanently destroyed. There was concern that they were not fully destroyed. And so that's one of the few examples where stocks have been addressed. Mostly, the DOD activities have been focusing on eliminating the massive production capabilities.

SEN. AKAKA: Can you answer the question about which agency should take the lead for U.S. assistance?

MS. HOLGATE: I would say the Department of Defense is already engaged in this area, has good relationships, and has ability to get the funding when they're ready for it.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you. Ms Holgate, cooperative threat reduction efforts have tended to experience mission creep, in which funds are used for other activities, such as infrastructure and support costs. How have these tendencies affected the efficiency of these programs? And could a coordinating body make these programs more efficient?

MS. HOLGATE: Sir, I certainly think a coordinating body can make the programs more efficient. But I would suggest that the inclusion of U.S. government funds to support some of the infrastructure and supporting activities has actually increased the efficiency of these programs. Rather than representing mission creep, they represent a recognition of the total mission.

The reason that many of these activities have been undertaken in Russia has to do with resource limitations within Russia. And what these program managers were finding was that they might have funding to do a very narrow slice, but somehow the most exciting slice of the project, but it was not moving forward because they had inability to provide the support, funding for the support activities, that would actually make the achievement of the non-proliferation goal possible. And so they began to incorporate into budget requests the supporting requirements to achieve the goals. And that's made the achievement of those goals much more efficient in the time since that's been done.

SEN. AKAKA: Ms. Jones, the brain drain prevention programs within the Department of State, and again Defense, have enabled former USSR weapons scientists to remain in their states without having to sell their weapon-related knowledge.

To what extent can these programs be combined with weapon and materiel storage and disposal activities? Could former Soviet chemical weapon scientists be employed in the construction of Russian chemical weapon of destruction facilities?

MS. JONES: I think that's again where a committee that would be coordinating the various activities of these programs could look for those kinds of synergies. Are there skills and abilities that weapons scientists have, or are they specialized in biological weapons, or nuclear weapons, that could be used for some other program? Just as a simple example, DOE also runs a program to improve the safety of Soviet designed reactors. When we look at that program there was a need for fire doors, metal doors rather than wooden doors in these particular facilities. Let's look at the brain drain programs. Are there people already in Russia that could help design and build those doors? Again, looking for leveraging with the different programs. So I think there is room for that, Senator.

SEN. AKAKA: I have a final question to all of you. As I said earlier, we will reschedule the administration's testimony after the Bush-Putin summit. As experts in this field, are there questions you would ask of our administration witnesses, when they appear before this subcommittee in a couple of weeks? That's my question to you.

Well, if you want to reserve that, please give us the questions, and that might help us have better insight into some questions to them.

Again, I want to thank all of you for being here, for your responses, for your testimonies. And I want to thank you, Ms. Jones, Ms. Holgate, and Dr Spector, for being with us today. I believe that the Russian government wishes to be a responsible steward of its weapons of mass destruction. I also believe that President Bush recognizes the importance of threat reduction programs.

However, I share our witnesses' concerns that the administration, even with new evidence of terrorist interests in acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction, has not acted to accelerate efforts to improve security over critical materiel and expertise in the former Soviet states. Indeed, coordination, management and attention is needed from senior levels in the administration.

Unless this attention is concentrated exclusively on non- proliferation and threat reduction objectives, the relationships between U.S. and Russian counterparts will continue to weaken, and opportunities for cooperation in new areas will continue to be lost.

Ms. Holgate recommends the appointment of a deputy national security adviser devoted to addressing these programs. This is an interesting concept, and I look forward to the administration's comments on your proposal, Ms. Holgate.

The record will remain open for questions from members of the committee for one week.

And we ask that the witnesses respond to any questions in a timely manner.

And I remind you again, if you have any questions that we can ask to the administration, we would certainly want to receive them.

Again, I thank all of you very much, and the hearing is adjourned.