Hearing of the International Security, Proliferation and
Federal Services Subcommittee of the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

November 7, 2001

 

AKAKA: Committee will please come to order.

Welcome my friend, Senator Cleland, the committee, and our first panel.

Today's hearing about export controls and weapons of mass destruction is not a new topic for this subcommittee. Senator Cochran, our distinguished ranking member and good friend, also held hearings on export controls when he chaired this subcommittee.

It is not a partisan issue. I think it is fair to say that our witnesses today, who are all noted experts on the subject of proliferation and export controls, reflect the bipartisan nature of this discussion. Since September 11, however, developing an effective approach to controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction for both state and non-state actors has taken a new urgency. The terrorists of the 21st century are not intent on using one bullet to assassinate political leaders, as did the lone Serbian nationalist who triggered the First World War at the beginning of the last century with the shooting of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Twenty-first century terrorists try to cause the maximum amount of damage to the maximum number of innocent people. Their weapons of choice are amazingly simple and astounding deadly. But they are still the few against the many.

As one of our witnesses today notes, contemporary terrorists have a mystical fascination with chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Osama bin Laden and his followers would use these weapons to harm us all without regard to age, gender or nationality. Men, women and children from over 50 nations died on September 11. We cannot forget this fact as we prepare for future conflicts during the rest of this century, which has begun as sadly as the last.

The technology that has made us rich, however, also threatens to be the technology that destroys us. High-speed computers, Internet access, dual-use materials, equipment and know-how are essential ingredients of these simple but deadly devices. Unfortunately, we know from sad experience with the recent anthrax attacks that these threats are real.

Our hearing is about how we can prevent more laboratories with dangerous weapons capabilities from being developed. Some might argue that it is too late, technology is loose, dual-use items are too difficult to control, or trying to control dual-use exports will only hinder our own economy.

I don't think we have the luxury of indulging in any of those arguments anymore. Our enemies are using our own technology and our own open society against us. We cannot declare war against international terrorism while saying at the same time that we should conduct business as usual. There is no more time for business as usual. We need to examine every aspect of our society to see how we can harden ourselves against terrorist attack and we need to examine every aspect of our international transactions to see how we can inhibit our enemies from gaining technologies to use against us.

In World War II, export controls were not, quote, "dirty words," unquote, they were an essential part of our defense. In today's war, there is also a role for export controls, because if we do not do everything we can do to deter our enemies from gaining deadly weapons, then we all will pay the ultimate price in our own backyards.

This is the terrible message from today's terrorists. This hearing is an effort to start identifying those technologies and the means to prevent them from hurting us later.

So I'm pleased to welcome my colleague Senator Cleland and ask him for an opening statement.

CLELAND: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And members of our panel, thank you for coming.

I'm pleased that this committee is addressing this critical issue today and that we are further scheduled to address the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act next week.

I note that a dear friend of mine, former Senator Sam Nunn, in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, called once again for enhancing the cooperative threat reduction measures that he helped put in place several years ago.

I strongly support such action. There's no more important topic for our national security than addressing the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I've long advocated a comprehensive national strategy for dealing with this threat, and I believe that our strategy must be based on a likelihood of each type of incident, as well as our vulnerability to it. For many years, I've argued that we were too focused on low- probability, high-tech threats and not focused enough on high- probability, low-tech threats.

Regardless of the threat, I'm convinced that we must enhance the mechanisms for coordinating our response to WMD. Coordination is essential. It is my conviction that we must better coordinate the efforts of all players that led me to develop legislation I'm introducing today, the Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act.

CLELAND: This act puts in place a procedure that allows clear assignment of responsibility in cases where the public health is threatened. It further mandates the exchange of information between institutions primarily responsible for public health, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and those primarily responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities.

We must also resource these agencies to enable them to carry out this essential coordination. Coordination is particularly important in the tough areas where the lines of responsibility and definition blur.

This hearing addresses another such arena: the dual-use technologies that lie at the heart of chemical, biological, even nuclear infrastructures that exist around the world today. To achieve the necessary coordination, we must tackle the hard questions that arise when talking about technologies that provide legitimate commercial opportunities, which in the wrong hands can also mask potential threats.

It's no longer enough to throw up our hands and walk away from the table. We need to establish (inaudible) enforcement of necessary counterproliferation protocols conflicts with legitimate commercial interests. We've got to find a way to strike a balance that allows commercial enterprises a reasonable degree of autonomy while ensuring the greater public good is not compromised.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

AKAKA: Thank you for your statement.

Senator Stevens?

STEVENS: I have no statement, Senator. I wish I could stay longer. I'm just here for a little while. Thank you very much.

AKAKA: Thank you for being here.

We're glad to have our panel this morning. I'm pleased to welcome you. Dr. Moodie is co-founding president of Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, and former assistant director for multilateral affairs of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

And Dr. Johnathan Tucker is director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, and was a member of the biological weapons inspections team in Baghdad, Iraq, with the United Nations Special Commission.

And Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. You hold a joint appointment, the Russian and Eurasian program and global policy program, and is former deputy undersecretary for defense, nuclear nonproliferation, in the U.S. Department of Energy, and former assistant secretary for nonproliferation and national security.

I would like to, at this time, before I call on Dr. Moodie, yield to Senator Thompson for any statement he may have.

THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any statement to give. I'm looking forward to hearing the testimony of these fine witnesses.

This is, of course, a continuation of a series of hearings that this committee and subcommittee has had for a long time on this subject. And, of course, it's much more timely now in a lot of people's mind than it has been in times past. But I commend you for keeping the spotlight on this important area. Hopefully people will now pay attention.

Thank you.

AKAKA: Thank you very much.

Dr. Moodie, we'll welcome any opening statement you may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

MICHAEL MOODIE
President of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute

 

MOODIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee as it addresses this very important topic.

In the summary of my statement, in the few minutes that I have, I would like briefly to address three interrelated issues: the need for better threat assessments, the linkage between state and nonstate threats, and the need for a strategic response in which export controls continue to play an important role. My remarks today will focus on the chemical, and especially the biological weapons threats.

My starting point is the recommendation of the Gilmore commission that we must improve our threat assessments. This is true not only with respect to the chemical and biological terrorism threat, but also for the challenge of proliferation at the state level.

Traditionally, threat assessments have been overly simplistic. They have tended to focus on only a single factor, such as the agent that might be used or the motivations of the state or terrorist who might use them. In addition, these more simple threat assessments have emphasized vulnerabilities rather than genuine risks, which are a combination of vulnerability and likelihood.

But conducting more complex threat assessments is not easy. It demands good intelligence and creative analysis. But better threat assessments would do three things.

First, they would describe a threat envelope that identifies the most plausible contingencies.

Second, they would provide a means to identify those contingencies that require hedging, in that due to the severity of their consequences some preparation for them should be undertaken, even if they are relatively unlikely. And this combination of a plausible threat envelope and the hedging contingencies should give to policy-makers some measure for making decisions regarding policy priorities and resource allocations.

Third, a good threat assessment will highlight the fact that the threat is not unidimensional; rather, that it is composed of several elements, including the actor, his motivations, intentions regarding casualties and capabilities, the agent involved, the target, and issues regarding the mode of attack and other operational considerations.

The key to a successful threat assessment is disaggregating the threat into these component elements and assessing the possibilities that various combinations of them produce. Some combinations of factors will yield significant consequences; others will produce no consequences at all.

This approach to threat assessment leads to important conclusions that should inform policy decisions. First, the degree of risk declines as the level of desired casualties increases, insofar as the contingency involving higher levels of casualties become less likely.

Second, we should not take great comfort from this conclusion, because despite the low probably of catastrophic attacks in the United States, there is still ample cause for concern, because we do not know how massive a mass has to be. Worse case scenarios did not happen to stress the response system to the point of collapse. Moreover, the danger and harm inherent in the use of chemical, and especially biological, weapons is not limited to physical casualties. As we have seen with the anthrax attacks, psychological impacts and social and economic disruption are also potentially severe.

Third, the events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax attacks, suggest that the connections between state and non-state actors warrants increased attention. Analysts have tended to conceptualize and address the state CBW proliferation challenge and chemical and biological terrorism along separate tracks. Today, the distinction between war and terrorism has become blurred, and they have become inextricably linked.

Our adversaries have declared war on the West, and the United States in particular, and they are using terrorism tactics as part of their campaign. We confront an adversary that is not necessarily a state, although it might be, but nevertheless has chemical and biological weapons potential at a minimum.

As this war unfolds, then, the United States may find itself at war against one or more chemical- and biological-armed adversaries, whether it's state or non-state. How do they think about the strategic and tactical utility of such weapons?

Saying that chemical and biological capabilities will be part of an asymmetric strategy of either a state or a terrorist is not enough. Different strategic goals point to different chemical and biological weapons uses, and a number of possibilities, each of which has both a limited and an ultimate form, suggest themselves as examples.

One, the desire to generate fear among the U.S. population, ultimately pushing such fears to the point that it raises questions about the integrity of U.S. society.

Second, slowing military action or ultimately crippling U.S. strategies that depend on power projection and coalition warfare.

Or third, disrupting the U.S. economy or ultimately undermining it by attacking such critical components as the agricultural sector -- a threat that I believe has received insufficient attention -- or the financial centers of the country.

The willingness of terrorists or states to resort to chemical or biological capabilities depends on these kinds of strategic objectives, and our response depends in part on understanding what those strategic objectives might be.

MOODIE: What does this approach to defining the threat suggest about the needs for responding effectively? First, that because the threat is a multidimensional one and a complex one, an effective response must be strategic in nature; one that address requirements that span a spectrum from deterrence, through prevention, defense and preparedness to responses.

To perform each of these strategic missions effectively, difficult challenges must be overcome. Effective responses, for example, whether on the battlefield or in terms of homeland defense, demand meeting both short-term needs, such as adapting military concepts of operations or upgrading the public health system; and long-term measures, including an effective research and development program.

Second, the strategic response is also a multifaceted response. A range of tools must be exploited. These include intelligence, defenses -- both active and passive -- diplomacy, legal measures, preparedness, financial measures, military options and arms control. Each of these tools of policy contribute something to an effective response to the CBW proliferation challenge. But each tool has shortcomings that must be overcome, and none of them constitutes a silver bullet that provides the total answer.

In this context, export controls have an important role to play. But it is not necessarily the traditional contribution of the past. Export control regimes can be effective in delaying the acquisition of sensitive technologies by a committed proliferator. But in the longer term, they cannot realistically be expected to stop the transfer of technology that may be used for weapons purposes, particularly since so much of that technology also has legitimate commercial, medical and other uses.

This doe not mean that export control should be abandoned; they perform other functions. Regulation through export controls, for example, facilitates the global dissemination of materials and equipment. By defining the rules of the game by which companies must abide, for example, expert controls make it easier for those companies to engage in international trade and cooperation.

It is this kind of newly defined role for export controls that should be emphasized in the future. At the same time, the United States must maintain open markets and employ neoprotectionist practices that deny or severely limit access to markets or appropriate technology which would make key states less inclined to pursue cooperative measures.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

AKAKA: Thank you for your statement.

Dr. Tucker, your opening statement?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

JONATHAN B. TUCKER, Ph.D.
Director, Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

 

TUCKER: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee and guests, many thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today on a topic of great importance and concern in the aftermath of September 11, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to states and terrorist organizations.

The recent series of anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail indicates that the global spread of dual-use technologies, materials and scientific know-how relevant to the production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons poses a clear and present danger to U.S. national security.

The anthrax that was mailed to Senator Tom Daschle's office contained dried spores that were milled to an extremely fine powder and treated with chemical additives so they would readily become airborne and infect through the lungs. These facts suggest that the perpetrators, whoever they are, had access to specialized military technology and expertise related to the weaponization of anthrax. Although to date the exposures have remained limited, a large-scale attack with a chemical or biological agent against U.S. targets at home or abroad is now a real possibility.

Because the senders of the anthrax-tainted letters may have received assistance from former weapon scientists or from a state sponsor, it is important to assess which states possess chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and the extent to which trade in dual-use materials and technologies contribute to clandestine CBW programs.

Evidence from open sources indicates that roughly 13 countries are actively seeking biological warfare capabilities and closer to 20 are seeking chemical warfare capabilities. Proliferant states of particular concern to the United States include Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. And more information state-level proliferation is contained in a table attached to my written testimony.

Furthermore, over the past decade, sub-state groups have been increasingly interested in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. The Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, the Kurdistan Workers' Party and bin Laden's Al Qaeda are only a few of the groups actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction capability.

In recent years the growing availability of dual-use technologies, materials, information and expertise associated with production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons has exacerbated the problem of CBW proliferation. Indeed, the relative ease of acquiring these weapons, when compared to advanced conventional or nuclear weapons, has increased their attractiveness to states that cannot afford more advanced weapons or are technically incapable of developing them. Nearly all the materials and equipment used to make chemical and biological weapons are dual-use, complicating the control, detection and interdiction of proliferation- relevant exports.

Attempts to regulate trade in dual-use technologies to countries of proliferation concern are extremely difficult. They face intense opposition not only from non-aligned states that claim that such controls are discriminatory, but also from international suppliers, companies and research institutes that benefit from the commercial sale and transfer of such technologies.

The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group, an informal forum of 33 exporting countries, restrict trade in chemical weapons precursors, dangerous biological pathogens and certain types of dual-use equipment. Even so, proliferant states have often been successful in circumventing these controls by purchasing the materials from unscrupulous suppliers and evading interdiction efforts by means of transshipment points and front companies.

Given the dual-use dilemma and the rapid diffusion of legitimate chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries around the globe, strengthened dual-use export controls can buy time, but they do not offer a long-term solution to the CBW proliferation problem.

Accordingly, export controls should be seen as one of a set of policy tools for addressing the proliferation threat, together with active interdiction efforts, passive and active defenses, strengthened consequence management capability, cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union, and multilateral arms control.

Although the Bush administration has taken a skeptical attitude toward arms control, a strengthened international legal regime banning the possession and use of these weapons, backed by a credible threat of economic sanctions and military actions against violators, offers, in my view, the best hope of reversing the spread of these heinous weapons.

Because of the dangerous precedent that has been set by the actual use of biological weapons against civilian targets in the United States, it is vital for the international community to continue to strengthen the existing international norm against possession and use of chemical and biological weapons.

Although the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention impose a blanket prohibition on such weapons, both regimes have serious weaknesses that undermine their effectiveness. Accordingly, both regimes must be strengthened if they are to promote the international norm of nonuse and nonpossession by states of concern and, by extension, sub-state actors as well.

For example, the United States has repeatedly accused Iran, a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, of systematically violating its treaty obligations. To date, however, the United States has failed to request a challenge inspection of Iran, as permitted under the Chemical Weapons Convention, undermining the credibility of this key element of the treaty's verification regime.

With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Bush administration decided in July 2001, earlier this year, to withdraw from a six-year effort to negotiate a legally binding compliance regime.

TUCKER: Although the administration has recently proposed an alternative package of voluntary measures, they appear insufficiently intrusive or effective to deter violations or to enhance compliance with the treaty.

The administration should work with our European allies to make legally binding the proposed measure for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons and suspicious outbreaks of disease.

To achieve these goals, the United States should devote greater political and financial capital to strengthening the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, make more effective use of existing treaty instruments -- for example, by requesting a challenge inspection of Iran and other suspected violators -- and seek to brand the possession and use of chemical and biological weapons as a crime against humanity under international law.

That concludes my oral testimony and I'd be happy to answer your questions.

AKAKA: Thank you for your testimony.

Ms. Gottemoeller?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER
Senior Associate of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

 

GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the honor of appearing today before the subcommittee, before you and Mr. Thompson.

Suddenly, the press is full of terrible scenarios: of suitcase bombs spewing detonation in the middle of the Golden Gate Bridge; a radiological bomb spreading plutonium over the White House, creating a "keep out" zone in central Washington that could last for many years. After reading about threats such as these and scenarios such as these, many people are worried. So I commend this subcommittee for confronting these complex and difficult issues in the search for new answers in export controls, as in other areas.

A simple device of the Hiroshima design is actually not the easiest nuclear capability for a proliferator to acquire, be he a terrorist or a rogue state actor. A simple device of this kind actually requires a large amount of nuclear material to achieve a nuclear explosion. We assume that 15 to 30 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or three to four kilograms of plutonium are needed for a sophisticated nuclear device, and for a cruder device a great deal more material may be required. For this reason, international nonproliferation policy has stressed keeping nuclear material production and enrichment technologies out of proliferators' hands.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the possibility that large amounts of weapons-usable material could be stolen from former Soviet nuclear facilities has also become a major concern for nonproliferation policy worldwide. What would have been achieved through years of arduous and expensive production, enrichment and separation work -- that is, a sufficient amount of material to build a bomb -- could be acquired in an instant through thievery.

Therefore, in the past decade an enormous amount of attention and significant U.S. dollars -- $173 million in FY '01 alone -- have been spent on cooperating with Russia and the other states in the region to enhance the physical protection of weapons-usable material in facilities that housed the Soviet weapons complex.

In contrast to bombs that would produce a nuclear detonation, however, radiological weapons are a simpler capability for a proliferator to acquire, if only because the threat in the case of a radiological device exists across a wide spectrum. The spectrum could range from a low-level nuclear waste package planted in an urban location, through a highly toxic nuclear material explosion in the form of a dirty bomb using conventional explosives to spread material over a wide geographic area. At the very end of the spectrum could be an aircraft attack on a nuclear facility that would turn the facility itself into a radiological weapon.

It is important to stress in looking at this spectrum the different types of radioactive materials that might come into play in a radiological attack. Since 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency has tracked 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear materials, and 201 cases of trafficking in radioactive materials. These are the kinds of materials used for medical and industrial purposes. Of all of these cases, only 18 involved small amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium -- the so-called weapons-usable material that is required to make a nuclear bomb.

But even a small amount of low-level nuclear waste, if planted in an urban setting, would have the potential to sow considerable panic, unless authorities were quickly able to neutralize the incident in the public mind. For that reason, I believe that quick action to analyze and clarify for the public the nature of radiological threats should be an important goal of public policy in the current environment, whether here in the United States or in other countries around the world where such incidents might occur.

Now, let me turn my attention quickly to nuclear and radiological threats deserving more attention. In my view, we must now strike a balance between the most dangerous nuclear threats and the less lethal, but profoundly disruptive, radiological threats. I would like to suggest in my spoken testimony today that we focus immediately on four priorities as threats that would deserve more attention, and I will pay a little more time on the radiological threat because I think that is essentially a new priority coming to play now. But I also wanted to note that, given the demand on U.S. budgetary resources, we should also be considering new methods of funding such projects, which I will specifically remark on as well.

The four priorities that I would suggest are: halting the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia; securing nuclear facilities that remain vulnerable in the former Soviet Union on a quick-fix/quick turnaround basis; closing down nuclear warhead production plants in Russia -- that is, the production of warheads and maintenance of warheads at plants in Russia; and improving the security at nuclear reactors and other sites where lower-level, that is non-weapons-usable, nuclear material is stored. I offer these four in no particular order of priority. That's not a relative list, but I do believe that all should be given serious and urgent attention.

Before I turn for a moment to the radiological priority, the fourth on my list, I'd like to mention a new kind of funding that I think we should consider, given that there are many demands on the U.S. budget at the present time. One good idea I believe has already been suggested by Senators Biden and Lugar in some recent legislation. That is the so-called "debt for security" swap. Under this concept, we would forgive Soviet-era debt that the Russians are holding in exchange for Russia putting more rubles into nonproliferation programs. And, sir, I believe that should be an overall priority for U.S. policy at this point, emphasizing urging Russia to put more of their own budgetary resources into these important programs.

Now let me say just a few words about my priority with regard to improving security at nuclear reactors and other sites where lower- level nuclear material is stored or used, because, as I mentioned at the outset, I believe it addresses the radiological threat that has taken on new importance in the wake of September 11.

Traditionally, U.S. cooperation with the countries of the former Soviet Union to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation has emphasized so-called higher-value nuclear materials and facilities -- sites associated with the weapons complex, and especially with nuclear material that can be used in the manufacture of weapons. But given that radiological threats have taken on new importance, programs should be emphasizing these particular kinds of threats.

And I believe that one simple step the United States could accomplish would be to restore funds for international nuclear safety in the federal budget. For nearly a decade, the United States has been working with countries of the former Soviet Union to upgrade the safety of Soviet-built nuclear reactors and prevent another Chernobyl- style incident. This has been a largely successful program, and, in fact, the permanent shut-down of the last unit at Chernobyl occurred in December of last year.

For that reason, the program is slowly ramping down, dropping from over $30 million in FY '99 to just $10 million in FY '02. The program, I believe, could be quickly ramped up in order to improve security at nuclear reactors and other sites where low-level, non- weapons-usable nuclear materials are stored, and these efforts could be undertaken not only in Russia and the former Soviet Union, but also other countries around the world where such facilities are vulnerable.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to note what I believe is a potential important development in nuclear technology that will, I think, impact in important ways on the future of export controls with regard to nuclear systems.

Increasingly, those who are engaged in nuclear technology development, particularly for electricity-generation purposes, are interested in new approaches that would limit the crossover between peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the weapons sector. They want to avoid the kind of situation that has been inherent, for example, in the Soviet Union where the Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk reactors produced plutonium for the weapons system at the same time they were producing heat and electricity for the local urban areas. And this continues today. In fact, the civilian use of these reactors continues apace, while these reactors are still pumping out plutonium that adds to stocks of plutonium available potentially for weapons purposes in Russia, although Russia, of course, says that no longer they are used for that purpose.

For that reason, the nuclear industry today here and around the world is beginning to concentrate on developing so-called proliferation-resistance technologies, particularly in the reactor arena, that will minimize the production of weapons-usable material in their cycles.

GOTTEMOELLER: Ideally, proliferation-resistant reactors, for example, would burn plutonium, dispose of plutonium, rather than breeding it.

Although such reactors may be 20 years or more from commercial application, I think it is important that there is a new strategic approach developing in the nuclear industry. The industry is emphasizing proliferation-resistance, along with attributes such as minimization of nuclear waste and stringent design for safety and security.

If this trend develops successfully, it will simplify the export control problem for nuclear technology and, in fact, may also prove to be the best way to fulfill the promise of peaceful nuclear uses under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Thank you, sir, for this opportunity.

AKAKA: Thank you for your statements.

I would like to yield to the ranking member and friend, Senator Cochran, for his statement. Following his statement, I'm going to ask that we -- and before the questions, that we recess. There's a vote that's on now on the floor. And then we'll be back shortly.

Senator Cochran?

COCHRAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I congratulate you for organizing the hearing and calling the hearing. It's a very important subject for us to learn as much as possible about.

And I wonder, while we're over voting, whether the panelist can be thinking about whether the recent experiences that we've had with the anthrax attacks have led you to reach any new conclusions about proliferation of bioterrorism capabilities, and what, if anything, we should plan to do about it. One of the major efforts that we've made is to reach agreements with other countries to try to prevent the export of weapons or things that can be made into weapons of mass destruction. In the chemical and biological areas, we have conventions, agreements, and whether or not you think any of these can serve as guides for the future. And have we prevented any terrorist attacks or activities by reason of these conventions and agreements that countries have joined together to use as a way to combat proliferation of weapons. Particularly the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, have they kept states or terrorist groups form acquiring weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. Chairman, I think the fact that we have the jurisdiction over the proliferation subject, it is certainly important for us to begin a set of hearings on this subject. And I congratulate you for leading that effort.

AKAKA: As I mentioned, that you have worked on this before. The committee is still continuing this.

We all have questions for you. And I would ask that we recess and come back to ask you the questions. Meantime, I want to say that your full statements will be printed in the record. Are there any further comments before we recess?

Committee recess.

(RECESS)

AKAKA: The committee will be in order.

AKAKA: I want to thank you again for your testimony. I am impressed with the work you have accomplished on nonproliferation issues. So let me begin with some questions.

Dr. Moodie -- and you mentioned this, so I'm asking the question about this. I agree that the threat of agriculture terrorism has been given little attention, as you've mentioned. Do you believe that USDA has access to the intelligence reports and information required to perform a full risk assessment of American agriculture?

MOODIE: Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the inner workings of the Department of Agriculture to the point to be able to say exactly whether they have access to that material or not.

I do think that the appreciation of the agricultural dimension of this problem was slow in developing. And therefore, the Department of Agriculture, as a player in the development of our response, was slow to, come to the table. And as a consequence, I think they are still trying to establish the kind of relationships among the other players, probably including the intelligence community, that they need to do the job that they have to do.

And so I -- while I can't be specific, my hunch would be that they probably need to improve their access, not just in terms of looking at the information of the intelligence, but dealing with the intelligence community on an ongoing basis so that they have an ongoing, evolving appreciation of the nature of the challenge that they confront.

AKAKA: You suggest that smallpox is unlikely to be a threat. And you had mentioned something about that, again. And which kinds of chemical and biological threats do you see as more likely at this time?

MOODIE: Well, first, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the smallpox threat, I would put smallpox into that category of -- within the threat assessment that I talked about, of contingencies against which we have to hedge. And certainly the consequences of a smallpox attack are potentially so great that we have to have taken some measure of preparation. But you can have a smallpox scenario that either is -- that is so horrific that it either causes policy paralysis because it's too hard to do, or that you put so much money against it that you never have enough.

And I think that for those of you who are responsible for allocating limited resources, this kind of open-ended vulnerability assessment that has huge consequences is not the best scenario on which to do your planning and to make the kinds of decisions with respect to limited resources that you have to make. Having said that, as I mentioned, I do think you have to get a hedge against that possibility.

I think, though, that we have not necessarily, in our focus on smallpox and anthrax, necessarily examined the full range of other biological agents that are -- have traditionally been examined as potential biological weapons, including hemorrhagic fevers, plague, tularemia and things of that kind. I also don't think that we have necessarily looked at some -- especially in the chemical side, looked at some of the low tech threats.

We've been fascinated by the higher end, VX, sarin, the nerve gases. When, in fact, a contingency -- or a couple of contingencies that we haven't really looked at in as much detail as perhaps we should are simple things like somebody hijacking a chlorine tanker and blowing it up outside Wall Street. Or somebody trying, on a deliberate basis, to produce the kind of consequence at a chemical production facility that we saw in Bhopal, essentially a deliberate Bhopal that caused enormous loss of life.

Those don't involve sophisticated or exotic agents, but they are the use of chemicals to create mass disruption and potentially mass casualties.

AKAKA: Dr. Tucker, in your testimony, you mentioned that newly developing countries have obtained or might develop chemical and biological weapons capabilities as a result of foreign investment by chemical and biotechnology industries. Just as we have laws against bribery by American companies in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, should we be considering restrictions on American companies investing in certain countries?

TUCKER: I think we should with respect to countries of proliferation concern. Though it may be difficult if we do not invest in such a country, it's very likely that our competitors will do so. So the problem with unilateral U.S. action in this area is that we can be very easily undercut by other countries; not only our allies, but also countries that are not friendly to the United States, but that are increasingly investing in the developing world.

So that is why I view the utility of U.S. export controls with some skepticism. I think this is a threat that has to be dealt with in a multilateral context. We have the Australia Group, but that encompasses only 33 countries -- like-minded countries that export chemical and biological relevant materials and equipment. But there are other countries that are now in a position to provide equipment and materials to countries of proliferation concern.

So it's a broader problem that we need to look at in a multilateral framework.

AKAKA: You mentioned several times in your testimony about the Bush administration. The Bush administration has recently made proposals to enhance the enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention. You recently stated that these efforts are insufficient since they would not be part of a treaty with rights and obligations. What other measures would you recommend the administration take in this area or in regard to other unilateral actions?

TUCKER: Well, I should say that the proposals by the Bush administration would be useful. I don't criticize them. I just don't think they go far enough.

For example, the idea of urging countries to pass uniform domestic laws that would regulate access to dangerous pathogens to make sure that these materials are only accessible to legitimate scientists and not terrorists or people who would misuse these materials to make weapons, I think that's a very desirable goal and should be encouraged.

But, as you know, the United States withdrew in July from a six- and-a-half year effort to negotiate a formal treaty that would provide measures to enhance compliance and deter violations of the Biological Weapons Convention. And I don't think that these measures, at least as far as we know; the details of these measures have not been released yet, but from the press release that the White House released last week, it appears that these measures are all voluntary. They are not legally binding. And hence, they really depend on the good will of the participating countries.

My concern is, for example, if we set up a mechanism to investigate alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease, and this is done, let's say, within the context of the United Nations but not in a treaty context, that any country that's accused could simply refuse access to the investigation team. It would have no legally binding obligation to grant access to the inspectors or investigators to determine that it is, in fact, in compliance or non-compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

So my concern about the Bush administration approach is that it is too weak. And clearly we are facing a real threat. These anthrax attacks have made it very clear that this is not a hypothetical threat, that this is a real threat. And the actual use of anthrax against civilians is challenging the norm that has existed for many, many years. And we must reinforce that norm. If we do not, then I think a growing number of states and terrorist groups will be attracted to these weapons and we will face a much more serious proliferation problem in the future.

AKAKA: Thank you.

Ms. Gottemoeller, you mention the danger of a terrorist developing a so-called dirty bomb using nuclear waste. There are about 240 nuclear reactors in the world and countless facilities with other types of nuclear materials. What should we do -- should we be doing now to secure those plants or to monitor their use so terrorists cannot take them? Do we need a new international agency, or a new agreement?

GOTTEMOELLER: Sir, I think the International Atomic Energy Agency already has responsibility for many related types of missions.

GOTTEMOELLER: And the director general of the IAEA, Mr. El Baradei, called last week for enhanced funding for surveillance of nuclear sites around the world -- nuclear reactor and research sites, related industrial sites as you stated.

So I think for certain missions certainly there is already an international agency well experienced in this arena. I don't think we need to create anything new.

I do think that we need to set some priorities. I mentioned that the IAEA would like to enhance its capability for surveillance of threats around plants. I think we also need to pay attention to those research reactors, for example, where the highest level of nuclear material is stored.

Few people know, for example, that there is a research reactor at Belgrade where not so long ago U.S. bombs were dropping in the vicinity. And at that site is stored a significant amount of highly enriched uranium to fuel that reactor.

So I think it is important to look at some of the higher-priority sites in order to get that material out of there. I would urge for Soviet-built research reactors in Eastern Europe, for example, that such materials be moved back to Russia and down-blended so they no longer pose such a proliferation threat in the future.

And then in regard to the radiological threats that I mentioned, again, you do point to a good fact, and that is there is an enormous amount of sites around the world where such materials might be stored or used in one way or another. So it does require some prioritization as well. But I think particularly with regard to training of facility operators and some other perhaps lower-cost options, there are ways to proceed that would not cost an enormous amount, but could overall increase and improve the security at these sites.

AKAKA: Thank you for those.

Senator Carper is here. I would yield to senator for any statements or questions.

CARPER: I have no statement. A question or two if I could, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome one and all. Glad you're here and thank you for -- obviously I've missed your statements. And I would just ask, if I could, for each of you just to maybe take a minute and share with me, with respect to the issues that are before us today, what should -- what should the Congress be doing? What should -- what is our appropriate role?

And Dr. Moodie, we'll start with you if you will.

MOODIE: How much time do you have, Senator?

CARPER: I have about five minutes if the chairman's in a good mood.

MOODIE: I think first of all, conceptually, we have to recognize that the problems that we're dealing with with respect to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons are a single problem now. It's not the state problem on the one hand and the terrorist on the other; they're two sides of the same coin. And to begin from that point.

Secondly, I think we have to focus on a strategic response that ensures that, first of all, all the tools we have in our toolbox, intelligence, diplomacy, defenses, military options, arms control, export controls, each individual tool is as strong as it can be. But at the same time that our strategy is one in which we allow those tools to work together to achieve the same objective, not at cross purposes. That is not an -- always an easy task.

Thirdly, I think the Congress, in terms of its own organization, should look at where it is. The Congress suffers from the same problem the administration does in terms of the vast number of people who have -- who are stakeholders in this and who have responsibility for doing it. And just as the administration is being called on to streamline their decision-making processes with respect to some of these issues, the Congress may take a look and streamline how it does its business in this area as well.

CARPER: Good. Thanks very much.

Dr. Tucker?

TUCKER: Yes. I would endorse everything that my colleague Michael Moodie has said. And I would add that the United States really can't go it alone in the field of nonproliferation.

CARPER: You said can or can not?

TUCKER: Cannot go it alone in the field of nonproliferation. I mean, we could enhance our defenses. We can make it -- improve our intelligence, develop better consequence management in case we're attacked. But if we're going to try to get this -- attack this problem at the roots, we need to do it through multilateral instruments and mechanisms, including existing treaties that are in force -- the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention -- that are potentially useful tools, but have been under- utilized by the United States.

TUCKER: For example, they've been underfunded. We have instruments such as the opportunity to request challenge inspections of countries that we believe are violating the convention, and we have not used those instruments. And as a result, they can actually...

CARPER: Why do you think that is?

TUCKER: I think there's a number of reasons: concern that there might be a retaliatory challenge. If we challenge Iran, for example, which we have openly accused of violating the Chemical Weapons Convention, they might challenge us back. And I think that has been some concern about a harassing type inspection. But I think we should be able to deal with that contingency.

There are mechanisms within the Chemical Weapons Convention to manage access and to protect legitimate national security information and proprietary information. There is a provision under the treaty for a three-quarter majority of the executive council to block a frivolous or abusive inspection request. And if we make a compelling argument that a retaliatory challenge is, in fact, frivolous and abusive, then it could be blocked.

I also think that there are some concerns that if we challenge a country and the inspectorate has not come up with a smoking gun, very compelling evidence of a violation, then we will create a, sort of, a false sense of security that that country is in compliance. And I think we have to, sort of, lower the bar of expectation about what can be accomplished through challenge inspection.

But I still think it's a very powerful mechanism. Even if it does not find a smoking gun, I think we can find a pattern of evidence that is indicative of a treaty violation. And it's probably the most powerful instrument within the Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime. If we do not make use of it, it will atrophy, lose its credibility and any deterrent effect it might have on would- be violators.

CARPER: Good. Thank you, sir.

Would you pronounce your last name for me?

GOTTEMOELLER: Yes, sir, it's Rose Gottemoeller. I try to make it as phonetic as possible.

CARPER: Good. Thanks.

GOTTEMOELLER: Senator, I believe that the Congress now has both an opportunity and a responsibility to draw together the struggle against international terrorism with regard to weapons of mass destruction, and our already established cooperation with Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union to address what we commonly call the loose nukes problem, but it also refers to loose biological agents, loose chemical agents, as well.

And I think up to this point, quite frankly, there has not been sufficient attention to placing new resources to the service of this particular fight against terrorism; that is ensuring that all of these weapons of mass destruction resources are safely and securely held in facilities where they can be responsibly guarded by the countries that currently own them or hold them in one way or the other.

I want to underscore, I believe that in general Russia is a responsible custodian, for example, of nuclear materials. But they are short on resources to ensure that those materials do not go walking out of those facilities and into the hands of those who might use them as instruments of terror.

So I think the Congress really has an important role to play in drawing together the counter-terrorism struggle with our struggle to ensure threat reduction in the nuclear, chemical and biological arena.

CARPER: Great. Thank you.

Thank you each.

Mr. Chairman?

AKAKA: Thank you very much for your questions.

CARPER: You bet.

AKAKA: I have further questions. Dr. Moody, we've been talking about bilateral -- multilateral arms controls and you mentioned that classic multilateral arms control, such as a Chemical Weapons Convention, is unlikely to yield significant results. So my question to you is, how would you strengthen the CWC? And just as importantly, what would you propose in terms of new multilateral approaches?

MOODY: Mr. Chairman, my comment really was to the biological side. And to me the Chemical Weapons Convention is classical arms control and I think it's appropriate for dealing with the chemical weapons problem. I had the good fortune, I guess it is, to have worked on negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention during the administration of the former President Bush. And I think that we accomplished something in that.

But I think to take the same approach in the biological area is not going to accomplish what we were able to do in the chemical area, because I think the chemical problem and the biological problem are quite different, and the politics and the science and technology and the language of the treaty that surround the biological side to me are so complex that classic arms control isn't the way to go forward.

MOODIE: I think what we have to do is redefine the problem and redefine the environment within which solutions can be found. And what I mean by that, is to take it out of being a classic security arms control problem, but define the biological weapons as part of a broader challenge that has to do with the appropriate use of the life sciences to serve public safety and security. And to do -- and to create an environment in which the misuse of that science is diminished to the point that you can manage.

And it includes not just biological weapons, but other kinds of challenges that we have in looking at where the incredibly rapid advances in the life sciences are going to be going in the next two decades.

And I think that if we approach the problem from that redefinition that we will, in fact, find more acceptable mechanisms for dealing with the problem.

One of the issues, for example, is the -- in the arms control approach and the protocol negotiations that was mentioned earlier was a difficult relationship between industry and the negotiators and the role of industry in this. I think if we set the problem on a different footing, we will have a different basis in which to engage industry to ensure that their contribution in this area -- because they are such a driver of the science and technology at this point, that if we redefine the problem in that way, we will have a better basis for engaging industry in looking at solutions.

So I think the -- some of the measures that the Bush administration has proposed to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention move in this direction. I think they provide a basis for moving forward. They're not the total answer. They're not where we want to go or should go. But I think they begin -- they give us a starting point for that kind of redefinition of the problem that will lead -- yield some more creative solutions.

AKAKA: Thank you so much for that. There is a need to review these and come out with other solutions.

Dr. Tucker, you just stated that export controls buy time for diplomacy but do not offer a long-term solution. Are there any changes to our current export control policies you would advocate?

TUCKER: Well, I think the -- some of the controls probably could be made more targeted on technologies that are really critical, that provide bottlenecks to the acquisition of chemical or biological weapons. Increasingly, of course, these technologies are becoming widely available as they diffuse to more and more countries in the developing world.

So we have to identify those really key critical technologies that are the ones that are not widely available, that are really, sort of, still a monopoly of the highly advanced countries and that which, by withholding, we will place significant impediments in the path of proliferators.

So it's, maybe, a form of smart export controls or more targeted export controls, which I think will be welcomed by industry because they will be less affected by more targeted controls. And that will require quite a bit of thought, I think, because, you know, it's -- the conventional wisdom that this technology is all dual-use, that is not strictly true. There are some specialized technologies in areas of know-how and certain types of pathogens, for example, weaponized pathogens that -- whose access should be very tightly restricted. And I think there is a need to rethink export controls in a way to make them more targeted and hence more effective.

AKAKA: Thank you.

Ms. Gottemoeller, in your written testimony, I think you raised a good point on the priorities we should take to prevent further proliferation of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union. Many are also concerned about the proliferation of nuclear expertise and know-how. We are familiar with examples of nuclear scientists being offered substantial sums of money either to train others or to develop nuclear weapons.

AKAKA: The subcommittee is going to hold a hearing on this subject next week, but some would suggest that it is already too late. For example, there is no doubt Iran's nuclear program, being developed with Russian assistance, has a weapons component or potential. What should we be doing to ensure that Iran complies with its Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty obligations?

GOTTEMOELLER: Sir, I hesitate to say what the future will bring. But I would say the first step -- if U.S. relations improve with Iran, as there has been some hints recently in Washington they may improve, I think the first step we should undertake is to take up these issues directly with Tehran.

We have been working this issue through and with Moscow. It has been a difficult issue. Apparently, President Putin, in an interview that will appear this evening on television, has denied pretty firmly that there's any official Russian government involvement in nuclear technology trade with Iran.

While I think we've long felt that it's not a matter of an official Russian government policy, but that there are some organizations in Russia that are perhaps not paying the attention to export control logs that they should be paying attention to, first of all. And second of all, I believe there is also disagreement among some Russian experts about the danger inherent in particular doing these technologies. And so there's a disagreement and discussion between the United States and Russia in that regard.

I believe we should continue very vigorously to pursue these issues with Russia. And I hope that we will do so at the upcoming Washington Crawford Summit. But I believe in addition to that that should our relationship improve with Iran, this is something we need to take up directly with the Iranians as well.

AKAKA: Thank you.

Senator, do you have any...

CARPER (?): No, I don't.

AKAKA: Well, thank you very much. I thank you, Dr. Moodie, Dr. Tucker and Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you for all of your testimonies and for your cooperation also. And some of what you said will certainly be helpful to us in what we're trying to do here. So thank you again and you may be excused.

I just received a call that there's another vote on. But I want to prepare for the second panel, and ask the second panel to come forward please.

The committee will be in recess.

(RECESS)

AKAKA: The committee will be in order.

AKAKA: Thank you, Mr. Christoff, Dr. Cupitt, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Millholin, for being part of our second panel. And I would like you at this time -- I invite you to make any statements or comments you wish, beginning with Mr. Christoff.

Mr. Christoff?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

JOSEPH CHRISTOFF

 

CHRISTOFF: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I am pleased to be here today to efforts of the United States and the international community to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Historically, the United States has used four important tools to combat WMD proliferation: international treaties, multilateral export control arrangements, U.S. export control laws and security assistance to other countries.

My bottom line is that each tool is important to U.S. non- proliferation policy but each tool has limitations. And I would like to briefly describe and comment on each of these tools.

First, the international community has established treaties to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Three treaties are of particular importance: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention.

These treaties share similar objectives, they are legally binding and they include most countries. However, their effectiveness depends on the mechanisms for verifying and enforcing them and the integrity of those countries party to them.

For example, the Biological Weapons Convention lacks the inspection and enforcement provisions that might have detected the Soviet Union's massive biological weapons programs in the 1970s and the 1980s.

Limitations in membership also constrain the effectiveness of these treaties. Key states remain outside the treaties. For example, India, Israel and Pakistan are not party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, while Iraq and Syria have not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The second tool for controlling sensitive technologies is multi- lateral export control arrangements. Both the executive and legislative branches have affirmed support for strengthening these arrangements. However, their effectiveness has been challenged in recent years.

As part of GAO's ongoing work on these arrangements, we are examining the following important questions. Does the voluntary nature of these arrangements and the dependence on member nations to impose export control limits affect their effectiveness? Do member nations abide by their commitments to refrain from exporting items other members have denied? How do member nations share information about their export decisions? And how do the arrangements ensure that non-member nations do not transfer sensitive technologies to countries of concern?

The third tool is U.S. export control policy, which is intended to constrain the transfers of WMD technology. In GAO's past work, we have identified problems with U.S. policy.

First, the executive branch has not assessed national security risks for important dual use items such as high-performance computers, and semi-conductor technologies.

Second, the government does not adequately screen proposed recipients of sensitive U.S. technologies. For example, the government does not always have complete intelligence information on licensed applicants who may serve as fronts for proliferators or terrorists.

And third, the government cannot always ensure that recipients of sensitive comply with the conditions of the license. This is most important in countries of concern such as China, which restrict U.S. officials' access to facilities that house U.S. technology.

And finally, the fourth tool is the security assistance to other countries that we provide, and most importantly to the former Soviet Union. At the time of its collapse, the Soviet Union had, by some estimates, 30,000 nuclear weapons, 40,000 tons of chemical weapons and an extensive biological weapons program. The collapse also left 30,000 to 75,000 Soviet weapons scientists without full-time employment.

Since 1991 the United States has helped Russia eliminate and secure weapons of mass destruction and provide part-time employment to former Soviet scientists. U.S. efforts have helped make large quantities of WMD-related materials more secure and they have supplemented the incomes of several thousand former Soviet scientists.

However, it's been difficult to assess the effectiveness of these programs, which have cost about $5.5 billion since 1991.

CHRISTOFF: Russian officials continue to limit U.S. access to certain WMD facilities. GYU

In addition, the part-time employment provided by the United States may not necessarily deter Russian scientists from selling their weapons knowledge to rogue states or terrorists.

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the events of the past two months provide the impetus for reexamining all of these tools that are used to restrict the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Ten years ago, the international community made major changes in its controls over nuclear technology after revelations about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. We may be at a similar point today. We need to reassess the adequacy of our current policy tools to address the vulnerabilities and the changed perceptions of the threat that we currently face.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Christoff.

Dr. Cupitt?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

RICHARD T. CUPITT
Associate Director,
Center for International Trade and Security,
University of Georgia and Visiting Fellow,
Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

CUPITT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling and organizing this hearing on what I think is a very important topic. I've submitted some additional remarks that represent my personal views on several of the broader export control questions raised by the committee staff, so I would like to focus this testimony on some problems the U.S. government will face in coordinating nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls with its allies and on some possible steps to address these difficulties.

AKAKA: At this time may I say that all of your full statements will be made part of the record.

CUPITT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The tragic events of the last two months not only emphasize the need to reform the multilateral export control system, they've shaken the international community sufficiently, I believe, that reform initiatives may actually succeed. So this is a moment of opportunity for us, because the importance of limiting the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of terrorists and states that support international terrorism has never been more clear.

Nonetheless, many of the same problems that plagued efforts to improve multilateral coordination of proliferation-related export control systems in the late 1990s will hamper attempts to coordinate nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls now.

Let me mention five likely problem areas. And I'll be happy to go into detail about them perhaps in the question-and-answer period. And then raise some possible responses to these problems.

First and foremost, there is a very weak infrastructure for coordinating nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls internationally. The Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, for example, have pretty primitive methods and mechanisms for gathering and sharing information, resolving disputes and enforcing group norms.

Second, the list of sensitive anti-terrorism items appears to be based mainly on delaying state-sponsored weapons of mass destruction programs and not with a view toward delaying or preventing the development of non-state weapons of mass destruction programs.

Third, there are very divergent national nonproliferation anti- terrorism export control systems now, even among key U.S. allies.

Fourth, there are divergent views on the targets of nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls.

And finally, there are very divergent approaches to industry- government cooperation on nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls.

Based on these concerns, I would like to take the opportunity to recommend this government consider five steps in the near term to begin to address these problems.

First, I think the U.S. government should consider doing more extensive assessments of foreign export control policies related to nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls, starting with the policies and programs of the G-8 and other key members of prior arrangements. Frankly, we simply don't know enough. A critical lack of information and analysis of these policies as well as broader export control policies exist. There is -- we need to do more.

The U.S. government should consider providing more funding, technical assistance and critical information to help U.S. partners implement and coordinate their intelligence, licensing and enforcement activities related to nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls. This includes an increase in efforts and support for U.S. export control outreach programs worldwide.

We do have an extensive program through the Department of Commerce and also the Department of Energy to do work in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. And there has been some work now in China and even India. But it needs to be much more extensive in order to -- and U.S. has to take the lead on this.

CUPITT: Thirdly, the U.S. government should consider creating priorities in its list of items of greatest nonproliferation anti- terrorism concern, as a basis for international negotiations.

It's not clear from our current list of, for instance, dual-use items which items are more important than others to control for anti- terrorism purposes. There are very few items that are controlled for anti-terrorism purposes alone. And most of the others are -- it appears that basically, there is a requirement related to chemical- biological proliferation, nuclear nonproliferation or missile proliferation. We just tack anti-terrorism on to that as well. And I'm not sure that that's an appropriate way to address the problem. Some items may be more important to control than others. And if we don't see that maybe some of our allies will.

Fourthly, the U.S. government should also consider creating priorities for a list of terrorists and terrorist organizations that pose the greatest weapons of mass destruction threat as a basis for negotiations. One might start by differentiating among those individuals and entities on the specially designated terrorist lists or the foreign terrorist organizations list according to the weapons of mass destruction risk they present.

Finally, I think the U.S. government should consider creating new standards for industry export control compliance programs, including certification of the substantive knowledge of export administrators regarding nonproliferation anti-terrorism controls.

Export administrators in several of the national laboratories, for example, have expressed keen interest in certification as a means of ensuring the highest standards of compliance with nonproliferation export controls. And I think this would also hold true for related anti-terrorism controls.

Thank you. Again, let me thank the committee both for holding the hearing and for allowing me to present my views. Thank you very much.

AKAKA: Your statement, Dr. Lewis?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

JAMES A. LEWIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

LEWIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important subject.

I think that, since September 11, we have an opportunity and a need for a new look at nonproliferation and controlling exports of technology. Changes in international security in the global economy have made export controls less effective in preventing technology transfer. In particular, technological change and economic integration pose real challenges for both nonproliferation and counterterrorism.

This decline in effectiveness is less noticeable in the nonproliferation regimes because of their strength. The Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group has a strong support from their members. They focus their efforts on key proliferation technologies and they have good mechanisms for information exchange.

In contrast, there's another arrangement called the Wassenaar Arrangement. It's ineffective. There's little consensus. This would be a problem except for the fact that most of what Wassenaar controls is unimportant for nonproliferation purposes. And I think we would get more benefit if we paid less attention to Wassenaar and more attention to strengthening both our own national catch-all controls, and helping foreign countries strengthen their catch-all controls as well.

Another problem that we have with the export control debate in the U.S., Mr. Chairman, is that we have not spent enough time perhaps looking at some of the larger problems. First, the rationale for nonproliferation export controls needs to be reexamined. And hearings like this are very helpful in advancing the thinking of the United States.

Export controls were designed, as many of my colleagues have said, and it's amazing to me how, at least with the first panel, I think some of the others, I'll be repeating the things they said, which is the problem of being last. But export controls for nonproliferation were designed to make programs more costly and to buy time for diplomacy. This worked very well for the last 10 years, but we're now facing a hard core of countries -- Iraq, Iran, North Korea -- where export controls are going to be very less effective, and we'll need some new approach.

In addition to that level of problem, we face new problems with non-state actors who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. They pose a serious challenge to current nonproliferation controls which are aimed at countries and large government programs.

Nonproliferation is now more than an arms control problem that can be approached in the traditional diplomatic and military context. Export licensing will be less important for dealing with terrorist organizations.

LEWIS: Terrorists will not be applying for licenses, and they may not even try to export materials. The more plausible scenario is that terrorists will attempt to acquire WMD-related materials in the country where they intend to use them, bypassing all of our current export control mechanisms.

For example, many of the previous speakers have noted the dangers of radiological weapons. While all countries have good export controls on nuclear fuel, it's not clear that they've all taken the necessary steps to safeguard this fuel from theft, and this includes Western European countries. A terrorist organization could steal spent nuclear fuel and use it to build radiological weapons.

Similarly, security measures at U.S. and foreign laboratories may not be adequate to prevent the theft of dangerous biological samples. And in this sense, internal security measures are as important to nonproliferation as are export controls.

Nonproliferation must become part of the larger system of homeland defense in the response to terrorism that the administration is building. Proliferation regimes can make an important contribution to this by identifying the key WMD-related items that need additional safeguards and by coordinating effective security measures.

Efforts to ensure that WMD does not fall into the hands of terrorists must become part of the multilateral defense against terrorism, and the support we've received since September 11 could be channeled into reinvigorating nonproliferation.

Let me just touch on one of the issues that your staff raised, which is deemed exports. Making nonproliferation a part of the larger counterterrorism and homeland defense effort has implications for deemed exports. Students coming to the U.S. to study and do research have been a problem for proliferation here and in other countries for many years.

The important thing to realize is that the benefits we receive from having these people in the United States probably outweighs the cost of any potential leak of technology. And when I say this, I'm reiterating a conclusion that the Reagan administration came to in its National Security Decision Directive 189.

The answer to deemed exports may lie less in export controls, but thinking in terms of a larger approach to homeland security. Immigration control is one of the most serious vulnerabilities revealed by September 11. All of the terrorists were able to enter the United States, passing through multiple checkpoints both here and in allied countries. Some sort of improved screening for people coming to the United States that included some nonproliferation criteria would probably be more useful than export licensing.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think export controls can still play a role in nonproliferation and national security, but this role is shrinking. In looking at where we might want to move ahead, it would help to reexamine the fundamental approach to nonproliferation export controls. It would be good to find ways to use the strengths of the three nonproliferation regimes to support homeland defense and counterterrorism. Deemed exports would probably be better treated as part of a broader solution to screening immigrants.

And finally, when we move ahead with building export controls, picking up on what Dr. Moodie and Dr. Tucker said, we probably should start with the lists and procedures of the regimes, the use of catch- all controls, and improved immigration procedures.

I'd like to thank you, and I'll be happy to take any questions.

AKAKA: Thank you very much, Dr. Lewis.

Mr. Millholin?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

GARY MILHOLLIN
Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School
and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

 

MILLHOLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's both an honor and a privilege to appear before this distinguished subcommittee and testify on this important topic.

I'd like to address my remarks to four points: first, whether export controls are succeeding in protecting our security; second, whether they are now being weakened; third, whether violations are being punished; and fourth, what could be done to make export controls stronger.

First, it's very important to realize that export controls can work if they are given a chance. There are success stories in the world that export controls can claim. Argentina and Brazil decided to give up nuclear weapons because, in large part, export controls were imposing great costs on the development of those counties. Iraq -- we know from U.N. inspections in Iraq that Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapon developers could not make -- could not import certain parts, they have to reverse engineer them, which took time, and it's not even clear that they worked.

MILLHOLIN: Also, export controls pretty much stopped Saddam Hussein's most ambitious rocket program.

Today, export controls are slowing down India and Pakistan in their efforts to miniaturize their warheads and to build more effective long-range missiles. As long as we have export controls that work decently, that will be true in the future.

However, despite clear successes, American export controls are now weaker than they have ever been in history. Since 1998, when Saddam Hussein was building his mass destruction arsenal, export controls in the United States have been cut about 90 percent. Today we are receiving -- that is the Commerce Department is receiving about a tenth as many applications as it received in the late 1980s. And when the applications do come in, they are almost always approved. In the last fiscal year, only 4 percent -- 4 percent of the applications were denied.

This system imposes virtually no burden on industry, and it's a system that seemed to please us quite well in peacetime. Now, however, we're not in peacetime any more, and we know that there are terrorist organizations that want to do us harm, and we know that weapons of mass destruction in their hands would threaten our way of life.

I would just like to give you some examples of cases in which our export control system has allowed technology -- American technology to threaten American armed forces. Perhaps the most recent case is that of Huawei Technologies, a Chinese company that was caught earlier this year helping Iraq improve its air defense network. These air defenses are designed to shoot our pilots down. This Chinese firm helped Iraq in defiance of the international embargo against this kind of transaction.

At the time the assistance was discovered, Motorola had an export license application pending at the Commerce Department to help this company improve its ability to build high-speed switching and routing equipment, which would be ideal for an air defense network.

In the past -- the recent past, the Commerce Department has licensed a series of sensitive items to Huawei Technologies. Huawei was allowed to buy high-performance computers from Digital Equipment Corporation, IBM and Hewlett Packard and Sun Microsystems. In addition, Huawei got $500,000 worth of telecom communication equipment from Qualcomm. Other U.S. firms have helped Huawei by setting up joint operations. These include Lucent Technologies, AT&T and Motorola and IBM.

As a result of all this American assistance, Huawei sales are projected to reach $5 billion in 2001. This company began as a $1,000 startup in 1998. So the result is that U.S. technology, some of which is controlled for export but licensed, other technology going to joint operations, has built out of virtually nothing a Chinese company that now is able to help Iraq improve its air defenses and put the lives of U.S. service men and women at risk.

These exports no doubt made money for American companies, but at a cost of threatening our pilots.

Huawei, unfortunately, is not an isolated case. There are two others mentioned in my testimony. One is a situation in which the Commerce Department approved exports to a company in China that is -- that supplied anti-ship missiles to Iran and was sanctioned for missile proliferation. We -- the United States sold that company computer equipment for simulating wind effects. If you're building anti-ship missiles, a computer to simulate wind effects is quite useful.

Also, only last month, The Washington Times reported that Iran was installing another large JY-14 radar near its border with Afghanistan. This radar is a very aggressive and powerful air defense radar. It was sold to Iran by a Chinese company called China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation. Before that sale occurred, the United States government approved a series of exports to that company that would be very useful for making that very radar.

MILLHOLIN: So again, we are facing a situation where our pilots, if we ever get in a fight with Iran, will have to face equipment probably made with our own technology.

The second point I would like to make is that export controls are now being weakened. In response to the attacks on September 11, the United States government dropped export control sanctions on a series of Indian and Pakistani companies. In my testimony, I provided descriptions and photographs of some of the companies that were dropped from the control list. One of them is Hindustan Aeronautics. It makes major components for India's largest rockets. In my testimony there is a photograph of nose cones made by that company.

Another company is Godrej & Boyce. It also makes components for India's largest rockets. It makes a rather powerful liquid fuel rocket engine, also which is depicted in a photograph in my testimony.

A third firm is India's National Aerospace Laboratory. It conducts missile research. In my testimony I have a picture of a missile -- a rocket being tested in this company's wind tunnel.

And fourth, there is Walchandnagar Industries. It produces major components for Indian nuclear reactors that are not inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. What does that mean? It means that the plutonium that those reactors make is free for use in atomic bombs. This company makes major components for India's plutonium- producing reactors. It, too, was dropped from export control sanctions.

So we have this curious situation where we have a terrorist attack on American soil, and in response to that attack the U.S. government drops export controls on companies in developing nations that are making weapons of mass destruction. It seems to me that that's probably a mistake; that's not the right way to respond to a terrorist attack.

Also, I would like to draw the committee's attention to the problem of export enforcement. It's very rare for a big company that breaks export control laws in the United States to be punished. I have cited two cases. One involves a company, Silicon Graphics. In 1996, it sold high-performance computers without the required export license to one of Russia's leading nuclear weapon laboratories. After the computers arrived, one of Russia's leading nuclear scientists announced that the Russians were going to start doing simulations like we did with computers, instead of doing actual tests. This is a case where it's undisputed that the export needed a license, it was made without the license, and nothing has happened. It went to a grand jury years ago and it simply disappeared.

More recently, in 1999, the Cox committee found that Hughes Electronics and Loral Space Communications -- I'm sure the committee is familiar with that case -- the Cox committee found that they deliberately acted without the legally required licenses and violated U.S. export control laws. That case has been in a grand jury for nearly four years without any results.

AKAKA: Mr. Millholin, there's a vote that has been in progress. How much more time do you need?

MILLHOLIN: I need about one minute, perhaps two. Perhaps I can do it one, all right?

AKAKA: I have questions, but go ahead.

MILLHOLIN: I think there are things we can do which would be very easy. In my testimony, I have indicated that we could list the dangerous companies abroad that are trying to make weapons of mass destruction. We know who they are. Their names are well known. I have attached to my testimony a list of 50 Chinese companies that could easily be added to the federal register list of dangerous buyers. I recommend that that be done as soon as possible.

That concludes my testimony.

AKAKA: Thank you very much, Dr. Millholin.

I'm so sorry we have a rash of votes going on. So let me ask this question of Mr. Christoff on GAO. Has GAO ever looked at which items are of greatest concern for WMD? Is it your experience that an industry compliance program, voluntary or obligatory, can work?

CHRISTOFF: Mr. Chairman, let me just talk to you about what we have done in GAO.

CHRISTOFF: I think one of the important areas that we've addressed is how to balance the risk in determining what are the national security implications when you try to decontrol an item, and balancing it against the market availability.

The work that we did for this full committee on high-performance computers is a good example, in the sense that executive branch agencies, I think, do a good job of determining that many of these high-performance computers are available elsewhere. And they do a good job of market availability, kind of, assessments, but they don't look at the national security implications.

And I think we said in the past, that's an important balancing act that oftentimes doesn't occur within the executive branch.

AKAKA: Thank you. Let me ask a final question. I have a few minutes left to get to the floor.

Dr. Cupitt, in your written testimony, you made a strong argument for a comprehensive study of the anti-terrorist export control policies of key U.S. allies. Should we make changes in the way our current government agencies charged with dual-use export controls work? Do we need a new agency or new interagency process?

CUPITT: As you may know, I think Senate 149, for instance, was going to set up an Office of Technology Assessment that would have as part of its mandate a requirement to assess the export control systems of other countries. I think that might be an example of one of the things that might be done.

Even though we spend -- I know in our center, we spend a lot of time assessing other countries' export control systems, we're frequently asked, "Have you assessed country X?" and we have to say, "No." And we have to say, "No one else has," and -- at least in a comprehensive or systematic way.

And for us, I think, to make good policy decisions and good strategies, in terms of build a coalition of partners that would have complementary export control systems, we need to know a lot more than what we currently do.

Related to that I want to mention that I think Dr. Lewis' point about catch-all systems, one of the successes that we've had in recent years is to promote catch-all as a means of addressing some of the items that may not be listed, or may have moved off the list, not only here in the United States, but in other countries. And that's been an important step.

But even there we don't know that much about who's implementing the catch-all control policies. And even very basic data like that, we don't really have a good idea. And I think that would be something that would be very useful. Again, I think the Senate 149 setting up that Office of Technology Assessment in the Commerce Department is an example of one of the ways that this might be achieved, that we might improve our data capabilities.

AKAKA: Dr. Lewis, would you make any comments on the same question?

LEWIS: The question being do we need a new export control agency? Is that the...

AKAKA: Yes. Whether we need a new agency or new interagency process?

LEWIS: One thing that would help, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the question, is we could definitely use a new law. The law we have now dates from 1979 and so it's an interesting, historical artifact. But it doesn't work very well in this system of export controls it sets up with national security and regimes. And it's complicated and ineffective. So that would be one area that I hope the Congress will be able to return to next year.

We've looked in a couple of studies about whether or not there would be a benefit from having an individual agency that was responsible for export controls. I would agree with anyone who said that none of the agencies now do a particularly good job. It's very hard to get consensus on where you should move it.

And a new agency may not have the power or clout of an office that's linked to a Cabinet member. So it probably wouldn't hurt to shake up the system, but I'm not sure we're ready to identify what the outcome would be.

AKAKA: Well, I have to go, so we have questions for you. We will send the questions to you for your responses. But I want to thank you so much for coming today and appearing as our second panel and for sharing your statements with us. There's no question what you've said will help us do a better job here in the U.S. Senate. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.