STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE JOHN D. NEGROPONTE
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

IRAQ WEAPONS INSPECTORS' REPORT TO
THE UNITED NATIONS

Hearing Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 30, 2003

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

Thank you for inviting me to report on the presentations to the United Nations Security Council on Monday, January 27, by Dr. Hans Blix of UNMOVIC and Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA.  The Deputy Secretary has given a comprehensive presentation. I would like to briefly give a bit of context to Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei’s reports.

It certainly has been quite a week. The combination of Monday’s presentations by UNMOVIC and IAEA and the President’s State of the Union on Tuesday have intensified the debate that we are facing in the Security Council. Yesterday, I was in the Council until late in the afternoon. Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei answered follow-up questions and Council Members made national statements based on two-days worth of analysis of the reports. There is obviously a lot of interest in the plans for Secretary Powell’s presentation scheduled for next Wednesday and we certainly predict a period of intense diplomatic activity not only in the Council but around the world in capitals.

As the Deputy Secretary has said, Resolution 1441 presented Iraq with the requirement to disarm and two tests. One - would Iraq submit a  “currently accurate, full and complete” declaration of all aspects of its WMD programs and delivery systems and, two - would Iraq cooperate “immediately, unconditionally and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA?”  In sum, to use Secretary Powell’s phrase, would Iraq turn on the light for the inspectors?

The presentations we heard on Monday confirmed that, in spite of the urgency introduced in Resolution 1441, Iraq did not meet either test.

The declaration was a fundamental test of cooperation and intent and Iraq failed it resoundingly.  On January 27, Dr. Blix again said:  the declaration does not “clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues.

Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number.”  The inspectors’ reports raise the following key issues, still unanswered:

·    Iraq’s declaration stated that VX was produced on a pilot basis only and was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991 because the quality was poor and the material unstable.  UNMOVIC has information that Iraq in fact achieved a high degree of purity and indications that the poison was weaponized. 

·    An Iraqi Air Force document discovered in the late ‘90s by UN inspectors but confiscated from them was only recently provided to UNMOVIC. It indicates that Iraq’s declaration did not account for 6,500 chemical weapons bombs, containing 1,000 tons of chemical weapons, from the 1980s.

·    There are unanswered questions about 122 mm chemical rocket warheads, 12 of which UNMOVIC found in a bunker constructed since 1998.  Iraq has yet to account for thousands of chemical rockets.  Dr. Blix said these 12 could constitute “the tip of a submerged iceberg”. We join him in asking where the remaining warheads are. 

·    Dr. Blix said there are “strong indications” that Iraq produced more than the 8,500 liters of anthrax it admitted to and claims to have unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.  Iraq has provided no additional or convincing evidence on anthrax production and destruction.

·    Iraq did not declare some 650 kilograms of bacterial growth media and deliberately deleted information about the importation of this media that Iraq had previously provided in February 1999.

·    There remain “significant questions” about Iraqi SCUD missiles, and Iraq is developing two missiles (the liquid-fueled Al Samoud and the solid-fueled Al Fatah) which UNMOVIC knows were tested at ranges greater than 150 kilometers – the range limit established in Resolution 687.  Dr. Blix said “The missiles might very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems” and, in reply to a question I put to him in the Council yesterday, he said he expected to make a determination in that regard soon.

·    Iraq has casting chambers for solid-fuel missiles “capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers” and imported other equipment, including 380 rocket engines.  Dr. Blix said that “these items may well be for proscribed purposes”, and we believe they are.

·    Based on a tip, UNMOVIC discovered some 3,000 official documents in a private home that deal with such subjects as laser enrichment of uranium. Dr. Blix remarked that he “cannot help but think” that other private residences may contain troves of documents.  

The declaration is also silent on any steps since 1998 with regard to Iraq’s nuclear program, to mobile biological weapons labs, or indeed any new activities since inspections ended. 

The inspectors acknowledged that there has been Iraqi cooperation on process.  But that is not the substantive and active cooperation the Council requires. 

The Resolution determined that “Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access” and unimpeded movement.  Instead, we see signs of attempts to intimidate UNMOVIC by large numbers of minders – at times as many as five minders for each inspector, as well as “spontaneous” demonstrations, and restrictions masked by concern for safety.  Dr. Blix himself told us that the presence of the minders “bordered on harassment” and described some “recent disturbing incidents” including official allegations that the inspectors are spying.  The Iraqi government now claims it cannot ensure that its citizens will allow inspectors entrance to private property.  And Iraq has refused to allow the free and unrestricted use of U-2s on UN missions, a clear violation of 1441.

Inspectors must also have “immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC and the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNOMVIC’s or the IAEA’s choice.”  But UNMOVIC and IAEA have not been able to obtain private interviews, even after the belated assurance two weeks ago that the government would “encourage” its citizens to accept private meetings.  Inspectors have noted that they have not been provided with all the names of personnel in Iraq’s former and current WMD programs, as required.

On the question of nuclear proliferation, IAEA Director General El Baradei informed the Council that, to date, IAEA has “found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the program in the 1990s.”  That said, Dr. El Baradei was also clear that to date Iraq had only provided passive support – not “proactive support,” to use his words.  It is well to recall, however, that in 1991 the IAEA was on the verge of declaring Iraq nuclear weapons-free, when subsequent inspections based on defector information revealed an extensive, secret nuclear weapons program – a reminder that we can never be complacent when it comes to Iraqi veracity.  The IAEA also has outstanding questions that Iraq’s declaration failed to address.  According to Dr. ElBaradei, these include weapons design and centrifuge development.   The IAEA has not yet completed its evaluation of aluminum tubes.  Dr. ElBaradei indicated that it appears that the tubes would be consistent with Iraq’s claim they are for the reverse engineering of rockets – still a prohibited activity under the sanctions regime -- and unless modified would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges. However, the IAEA is still investigating the matter.   We believe their characteristics are not consistent with a rocket program and are intended for nuclear centrifuges.  Dr. El Baradei also explained that IAEA has yet to determine the relocation or use of certain dual use items, such as the high explosive HMX which was sealed by IAEA in 1998, and which Iraq claims it has used since for mining.  He added that IAEA is still investigating reports of Iraqi attempts to import uranium after 1991, which Iraq denies.

In short, Iraq is not disarming. The Council’s unanimity in support of Resolution 1441 is the important result of enormous diplomatic energy. There was substantial give and take over weeks of negotiation, because we all understood that President Bush had transformed the debate and the importance of the undertaking. Iraq failed the tests set out by 1441 and is close to squandering its final opportunity.