PREPARED OPENING REMARKS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
A Senator from Delaware, and
Minority Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

U.S.-IRAQ POLICY

Hearing of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

February 11, 2003

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for convening this hearing on a topic that could not be more timely.  It marks a continuation of the dialogue that you and I initiated in the Committee last summer to help the American people understand the enormous challenges facing us in a post-Saddam Iraq.

It is appropriate that our first hearing on the “day after” – or more accurately the “decade after” -- concentrates on the critical questions of security and weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman, it is essential that no one be under the illusion that if we go to war, that the experience will be anything resembling Desert Storm.  Indeed, testimonials by many of the key participants in that last conflict with Iraq make clear that the very thorny issues we will be discussing today go a long way in explaining why we stopped short of unseating Saddam Hussein.  In General Schwarzkopf’s words: “Had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit.”

Mr. Chairman, if we want to avoid replacing a dictator with chaos... and precipitating the very problem that may require war – namely, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Iraq -- then we have got to follow through.

I am confident that, if we act, our military will succeed swiftly and decisively. But I’m concerned that the temptation will be there to declare victory and walk away well before we should.  Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation demonstrates what that kind of approach breeds.

I hope Iraq can emerge as a stable, pluralistic -- even democratic society – in short order.  I hope that its rival ethnic communities, and those that seek retribution can contain their anger and focus on building a new Iraq without any outside assistance.  But given Iraqi history and the stakes involved for the United States, basing our plans on such a rosy outcome would be folly in my view.  We can hope for the best, but we should prepare for the worst.

And those who seek to make Iraq a model for democracy in the Arab world should be the loudest voices in favor of a robust American military presence after a war... a major international civilian administration... and a massive infusion of assistance.

Mr. Chairman, maintaining a “secure environment” after a possible war will be the sine qua non for any positive change we wish to bring to Iraq.  I suspect we will discover the definition of security will take on very broad dimensions – patrolling cities and borders, mediating between rival groups, helping refugees return peacefully, remaking a new Iraqi army, helping those discharged find employment, and arbitrating the most mundane local disputes.

And, of course, we cannot assume that a swift military victory will settle the question of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

In the post-war chaos, unless and until we get our hands on all weapons strewn around country, there is a real danger that they could be exported out of country, sold to the highest bidder, or hidden away for later access.  

Secretary Powell, in his presentation last week, said that Iraq possesses two of the three key components to build a nuclear bomb – a cadre of scientists with expertise and a bomb design.  How does that change appreciably in the aftermath of a war when there will be a natural relaxation of vigilance by the international community?  What pressures will Iraq face to pursue weapons of mass destruction given its neighborhood which includes a next door neighbor and former foe with its own nuclear ambitions?

Disarming Iraq will require much more than a resounding military victory on the battlefield and even the destruction of those weapons that we do find. 

Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the American people be informed of the enormous burden that they may soon be asked to shoulder.   Colonel Scott Feil, who we will hear from later today, told this committee last summer that a post-Saddam security force would require 75,000 troops at a cost of over $16 billion for the first year alone.  Other independent studies have estimated that total security costs for the ‘Decade After’ will be between $75 and $200 billion.

The American people must know that this will be a major undertaking.  Because no foreign policy, no matter how brilliant, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people.  I believe that the American people will support a massive commitment to securing, disarming, and rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq, but only if they are informed ahead of time.  Hopefully, we can begin the process of informing them today.