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PREPARED OPENING REMARKS JOSEPH
R. BIDEN, JR. IRAQ
WEAPONS INSPECTORS' REPORT TO Hearing
Before the January 30, 2003
Secretary Armitage, Ambassador Negroponte – I add my welcome to you. We are eager to hear your testimony. I cannot think of a more critical assignment for the future standing of our country in the world than the one facing you in the immediate weeks ahead. You have been charged with making America’s case to the world and building a coalition to confront and, if necessary, disarm Saddam Hussein. I commend you on your achievements to date. By taking the issue of Iraq’s disarmament to the Security Council and challenging the U.N. to enforce its own resolutions, you have made Iraq the world’s problem, not just our own. You achieved an outcome that your detractors thought impossible when the UN Security Council voted unanimously last Fall to demand Iraq’s disarmament. I look forward to your analysis of the reports issued this week by the UN’s weapons inspectors. To me they clearly show that Saddam Hussein continues to thumb his nose at the world. They bolster the case that the United States has made that Iraq is violating the terms of surrender that it agreed to in 1991. In a legal sense, it is clear that Iraq is in material breach of UN resolutions. But the court of international opinion is not a court of law. You will have to meet a higher standard of proof in order to convince the United Nations Security Council to follow through. While no one trusts Saddam, many are skeptical of US motives. Is this about a new doctrine of preemption they ask? Is it about oil? Is it about the US further strengthening its already predominant position of power in the world? Much of this skepticism is undeserved, but none of it is unfamiliar to either of you given your daily contact with foreign governments. Some may ask why it matters what others think. It matters because while we can do this alone, we are so much better off if we do it with others. Having others with us increases the chances for success; it decreases the risks and lowers the costs; and it invests others in the complicated tasks of the “day after” – or, more appropriately, the “decade after.” To gain international support, the Administration will have to be consistent in its message that this is about enforcing the terms of surrender between Saddam and the UN Security Council. You will need to marshal the best evidence available to our government to demonstrate irrefutably that Iraq is violating its obligations. This is important to do not only for a skeptical international community, but for the American public as well. I believe that there is a compelling case to make. I hope it leads the UN Security Council to pass a second resolution authorizing force to disarm Iraq if Iraq refuses to disarm itself. Otherwise, as Secretary Powell and President Bush have said, the Security Council risks undermining its credibility. I hope such a resolution would make clear to Saddam that, once and for all, he must choose between giving up his weapons of mass destruction and giving up power. And I hope that it would make clear to the world that the choice between war and peace is Saddam Hussein’s to make. Mr. Chairman, last summer you and I held a series of in-depth hearings on Iraq. Our goal was to begin a national dialogue so that the American people would be better informed about the threat Iraq poses, the options available to us, the regional considerations, and finally the requirements of the “day after.” Those hearings, today’s hearing, and those you plan in the days ahead are critical because I believe that no foreign policy, no matter how brilliantly formulated, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. Unfortunately, there has been no informed consent. The American people have yet to hear a clear explanation of why war may be the only remaining alternative and what will be expected of them not only in winning the war but also in securing the peace. In last summer’s hearings we were told that we would have to stay in Iraq in large numbers, for a long time, and at a high cost. I am confident that the American people are willing to bear this burden if it is explained to them. They should not be surprised when two years after a war they still see thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of American troops in Iraq. They should not be sandbagged by a sudden choice, down the road, that requires them to choose between supporting our troops and paying for other priorities. It will be incumbent upon the Administration in the coming days to level with the American people about the commitment that they will be asked to shoulder. What are the risks? Who’s coming with us? What will it cost? How long will it take? Can we afford to remove Saddam and rebuild Iraq and pay for homeland security, pursue the unfinished war against terrorism, give a large tax cut to the wealthiest among us? Raising these questions and others is not and should not be an excuse for inaction. But we owe the American people answers if we want their informed consent. Thank you, and I look forward to the testimony.
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