IRAQ WEAPONS INSPECTORS' REPORT TO
THE UNITED NATIONS

Hearing Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 30, 2003

OPENING STATEMENT OF

RICHARD G. LUGAR
A Senator from Indiana
and Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SEN. LUGAR: This hearing is called to order. Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets to hear testimony from Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and United States ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte. Both are principal actors in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy towards Iraq. And they'll provide comments on U.S. reaction to the 60-day progress report on Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.

On Monday, January 27th, Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Hans Blix, executive chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC, delivered an update to the United Nations Security Council on their efforts to verify disarmament in Iraq. Mr. Blix's assessment -- and I quote -- "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it," -- end of quote -- should not come as a surprise to this committee and those who have watched the process unfold over the last 12 years. Iraq continues to resist United Nations efforts to verify its compliance with a host of Security Council resolutions.

On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 requiring Iraq's immediate, unconditional and active cooperation in verifying the dismantlement of the weapons of mass destruction and the programs that support them. In my opinion, Iraq has failed to comply with these requirements and is in material breach of these obligations.

Iraq continues to deny U-2 overflights, requested documentation, and unfettered access to weapons scientists. Furthermore, the recent discovery of chemical warheads in Iraq, and Iraq's failure to provide proof as to the final disposition of tons of chemical and biological agent are clear instances of non-compliance.

It is Iraq's responsibility to prove compliance with the resolutions passed since the end of the Persian Gulf War. To date, Iraq has failed to do so. Simply stated, previous United Nations inspection reports have listed weapons, materials and programs of mass destruction in Iraq.

Resolution 1441 gives Iraq one final chance to destroy the weapons and materials and stop the programs by showing evidence of that destruction or inviting UNMOVIC inspectors to view items previously listed and to destroy all of them with worldwide observation. To date, Iraq has shown no required evidence nor directed the inspectors to the weapons and materials, even though the Security Council voted 15 to zero that such a monumental defiance of the United Nations would result in grave consequences.

Now, demands are heard in our country and in other countries that the U.N. inspectors produce, quote, "smoking guns," end of quote, or dramatic pictures. The U.N. has listed the "smoking guns" in past reports. Iraqis' apparent persistence in the notion that all these past reports are illusion, that nothing ever happened, that nothing, therefore, can be reported, and that any consequence of that wholesale evasion are unwarranted are the subject of our hearing today.

The report Iraq submitted in early December on the current state of its weapons of mass destruction contains no new information, is largely a reprint of earlier documents, and still Iraqi leaders claim they have given the United Nations full cooperation. As Hans Blix reported to the Security Council, there are glaring omissions and apparent violations that Iraq has failed to explain. And he went on to point these out. Iraq has tested missiles that exceed the permitted range. Iraq has failed to prove that it destroyed all of its anthrax stockpile. Iraq has illegally imported rocket engines and fuel. Iraq has failed to account for 6,500 chemical weapons. Iraq has failed to declare 650 kilograms of bacterial growth medium that could be used in the development of biological weapons. Iraq has rebuilt missile production facilities that were destroyed by previous inspectors. And UNMOVIC inspectors have discovered precursors to mustard gas.

Now, furthermore, Iraqi scientists continue to refuse to meet with United Nations inspectors in private, and to date, those who have agreed to interviews have demanded representatives of Iraq's monitoring directorate to be present. It's apparent that Baghdad is working to discourage private meetings. On numerous occasions, I've asked UNMOVIC and the IAEA to utilize the authority that's been given to hold interviews outside of Iraq. Scientists who agree to be interviewed should be given the opportunity to emigrate with their families. Our experience has shown that these scientists are the best source of information on weapons programs.

As Iraqi intransigence has become more deliberate, President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, Great Britain, have ordered military forces into the region in increasing numbers. And the presence of these military forces in the region and insistence by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair and others on complete disarmament have been the catalyst behind what little cooperation the United Nations has received to date from Iraq.

All Americans -- all Americans -- are hopeful that military action against Iraq can be avoided. Iraqi actions are providing little encouragement to date. The list of outstanding Iraqi obligations and requirements is the same today as it was when the United Nations inspectors left in 1998, and there is little evidence that Saddam Hussein has decided to comply or to cooperate. Now, our nation will and must act when our national security interests are threatened. Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of their transfer to terrorist organizations is unacceptable. Saddam Hussein has launched chemical and biological weapons against his neighbors as well as his own people, and we cannot permit him to maintain these weapons of mass destruction.

On November 8th, the United Nations made a strong statement requiring full Iraqi compliance. Those days of hope and consensus have waned as narrower interests have begun to peel back the Security Council's unanimous support for Resolution 1441. This is unfortunate. The administration should continue to work to build support at the United Nations for full implementation of Resolution 1441, including the need for action in the absence of complete Iraqi compliance. As President Bush noted in September in his speech before the General Assembly, the United Nations faces "a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside, without consequences? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?," end of quote by the president.

In recent days, the administration has begun to consider release of highly sensitive intelligence on Iraq's weapons ambitions. I'm encouraged that Secretary Powell will visit with the Security Council and share some of our intelligence community's assessments of Iraq's behavior. I appreciate the importance, as we all do on this committee, of safeguarding sources and methods in sharing highly classified information, but I believe those risks are now outweighed by both the need to point the United Nations inspectors in the direct of suspect site and by the need to demonstrate to the Security Council and allied governments the seriousness of our purpose.

If, after continued discussions, the United Nations' support is not forthcoming, the United States must consider a different course. We must work with like-minded nations to form what President Bush has called the coalition of the willing, committed to the disarmament of Iraq.

And before I recognize our distinguished witnesses, which we welcome, I want to call upon the distinguished chairman of this committee, who has graciously relinquished the gavel, at least for a period of time, in the topsy-turvy politics of our country. (Laughter.)

I am grateful for his friendship, for his leadership, and I call upon him now for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
A Senator from Delaware
and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SEN. JOSEPH BIDEN (D-DE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I like to think I would have relinquished it voluntarily, but I doubt whether I would have. But if it's going to be relinquished, there's no single person, in my view, in the Congress more qualified to have that seat than you.

And I want to thank you for getting this right under way, not waste any time. This is -- as everyone has been saying in various fora, this is a momentous moment for the United States of America, and a great deal is at stake.

And I say to my two friends, our witnesses, that I never thought we'd get to the point where I'd have trouble seeing you, Secretary Armitage. But I'll tell you, this dais keeps getting extended. I've been here a long time. (Chuckling.) First I walked in and thought maybe my eyes were going bad. And I realized we've extended by about 10 feet; the table's moved back. So either I've been here too long or I'm going to have to get binoculars, if we keep expanding this.

And I do want the record to note that I have been calling for 12 years for a new microphone system in this place, in this, and it wasn't until we had a Republican chairman they arrived! I just -- my only regret, Mr. Chairman, is I wish that this had happened on my watch.

Now technically, we didn't organize -- technically, we didn't organize in the middle of January. These were put in in January. So I'm going to claim credit for the mikes. This is my one contribution to American foreign policy. That is, the witnesses can hear us now, which I'm not sure is a good thing.

But at any rate, let me be serious for a few moments. As we speak, the Judiciary Committee, in which I am a member, is meeting. And we are about to pass a bill that I've introduced, out of committee, providing for the ability for 500 visas for Iraqi scientists and all their families. I would urge you, Rich, to make the point to the administration it would be helpful to get this out and moving. I can't imagine it's not helpful to you, although it's not dispositive of what they may do -- the idea that -- now there's a limit of 100 -- we move it to 5(00) and the entire families of these scientists, if they so choose, to come to the United States.

Secretary Armitage, Mr. Ambassador, Ambassador Negroponte, I want to add my -- welcome both of you. We are eager to hear your testimony, and I can't think of a more critical assignment for the future standing of our country in the world than the one facing you in the immediate weeks ahead. You've been charged with making America's case to the world and building the coalition to confront and, if necessary, to forcibly disarm Saddam Hussein.

I want to commend you for your achievements to date and, in absentia, your -- not your boss --- your boss, Secretary Armitage, but not the ambassador's boss -- but I want to commend in absentia Colin Powell. I think he is the best thing since sliced bread, and I think he is doing an incredible job right now, with both of you.

By taking the issue of Iraq's disarmament to the Security Council and challenging the U.N. to enforce its own resolutions, as the president did in the brilliant speech that he made -- I think the most significant speech, in my view, he's made since he's been president -- have made Iraq the world's problem, not just our own. And I can't emphasize enough how much I agree with you that it must remain the world's problem, not just our own.

You've achieved an outcome that your detractors thought impossible, but as, I'm going to be frank to say, I predicted you'd be able to do; and that is, you got the Security Council to vote unanimously last fall for demanding Iraq's disarmament. And I predict you will be able to do it -- if not unanimously, with the German abstention, in all probability -- you will be able to do that again for a second resolution. At least I hope that is going to be the outcome. And I know you're going to attempt to pursue that, although you're not committed to that position that you must get a U.N. resolution. But clearly, clearly, clearly it would be in our overwhelming interest if that were able to be done.

I look forward to your analysis of the reports issued this week by the United Nations weapons inspectors. To me, they clearly show -- they clearly show -- that Saddam continues to thumb his nose at the world and is in material breach -- and is in material breach -- of the 1441, the most recent U.N. resolution. They bolster the case that the United States has made that Iraq is violating the terms of surrender.

And I want to term them in terms of surrender. I am so frustrated by some other parts of this administration of injecting into this debate a notion relating to preemption that has not a damn thing to do with whether or not we move against Saddam Hussein. I would hope the president and everyone else would stop talking about a doctrine you can't even explain -- you can't even explain -- to the American public, you can't explain to us, because it's confusing the rest of the world. We are not acting, if we act, preemptively. We are enforcing a surrender document. Saddam Hussein invaded another country. The world responded. If this were 1930, he would have signed a peace agreement. It's not. We have the United Nations. He signed on to -- in return for his ability to stay in power, he made a commitment to the world, several commitments. Enforcing that if necessary is not preemption -- is not preemption -- whatever the hell that doctrine is supposed to mean

And so I really think you -- I would respectfully suggest that when you talk about this, you not further confuse the devil out of the rest of the world and make us sound like a bunch of cowboys, that we're going to be out there preemptively imposing our view. This is an enforcement of a binding international legal commitment that a man made to save his skin and stay in power.

In a legal sense, it's clear that Iraq is in material breach, but the court of international opinion is not a court of law. You have to meet a higher standard of proof, not legally have to meet it, but practically, to enhance our greater interest. We have to meet a higher standard of proof in order to convince the Security Council and the thousands and thousands of people out there -- millions -- who do not understand and are not ready to believe.

I'm going to say something that's mildly controversial, but since I said it in front of 500 world leaders the last three days in Davos, every world leader in Europe and the Middle East knows he's in material breach. They know it. Why aren't they responding? We have no -- with the possible exception of England -- significant powerful leader in Europe today. That's not a criticism, it's an observation. And they are unwilling, in my view, to stand up in the face of public opinion in their communities, that run from 95 percent to 70 percent against this war, based upon him being in material breach as defined. So we got to help them. We got to help them because they know, they know he's in material breach.

And I sincerely hope -- and I join Senator Lugar in the -- the best news I heard in the president's speech was on the 5th, the secretary of State is going to go lay out this case.

This is about further strengthening -- the concern that I hear, and I know you have to respond to, and you hear it -- you won't -- I'm not suggesting you should acknowledge it, but I'm going to say it, that people who are our friends, countries who our friends and our allies, they are talking about, well, you can't move based upon a doctrine of preemption. They're asking about, is this about oil? Is it about further strengthening the United States' already predominant position as a world power? Much of this skepticism is undeserved, but none of it is unfamiliar to either of you, given your daily contact with foreign governments.

Some might ask why it matters what other countries think. I'm sure I'll get phone calls and letters saying what -- "Biden, you're talking about caring about what these other countries think. We're America. What does it matter what they think?" Well, it matters a great deal. It matters because while we can do this alone, while we are fully capable of doing this alone, we are so much better off, so much better off if we do it with others. Having others with us increases our chance of success, and by success I mean not just taking down Saddam. That is not the measure of success. The measure of success is that we take him down, if need be; we gather up and destroy the weapons of mass destruction; and we are assured that there is a government in place that is not likely to reconstitute the menace and threat. That is a gigantic undertaking that exceeds merely the military operation. And it also, if we have others with us, decreases the risk and lowers the cost, and it invests others in the complicated matter of the day after, or more appropriately, in my view, the decade after. And it does not make us a target of every terrorist and malcontent in the world, if we are not doing this alone.

It matters. It matters in terms of our naked self-interest.

In my view, to gain international support, the administration is going to have to have a more consistent message that this is about enforcing the terms of surrender between Saddam and the Security Council. I believe, presumptuous of me to say -- well, it's not presumptuous, I've been here longer than most of you -- I believe it's important to marshal the best evidence available to our government to demonstrate irrefutably that Iraq is not only failing to account, but is in violation and continues to demonstrate -- and we have evidence that it demonstrates -- an ability to thwart the efforts of the inspectors. There is a policy of deception that is underway, and the world has to be told it.

This is important to do not only for a skeptical international community but, I'd respectfully suggest, for all our constituents, where we live. The best way, I think, to do this is -- I believe there is a compelling case to make. I hope that it leads the U.N. Security Council to pass a second resolution to disarm Iraq and, if Iraq refuses to disarm itself, I believe, otherwise -- as Secretary Powell and President Bush, as they have said -- the Security Council risks undermining its credibility in a permanent sense.

And I am one of those who believes that there is great promise. The more powerful we are, the more predominant our power, the more we need the United Nations, in my view, not the less we need it; the more we need it, because our motives, as -- Mr. Ambassador, I have never, in all my years of attending international meetings with heads of state and foreign ministers, ever heard our motives questioned as much as they are today. Not merely our judgment. We're used to that. But they're questioning our motives. And that is corrosive. And that's why I believe, if we're smart -- and you are, clearly, and you're doing a great job -- if we're smart, we will be able to strengthen the United Nations in the process here so our motives are not always the thing in question.

I would hope that the resolution would make clear that Saddam once and for all must choose between giving up his weapons of mass destruction and giving up power. And I hope it would make it clear to the world that the choice between war and peace is Saddam's choice, not our choice. I think this is the single best way to avoid war. My unsolicited advice -- well, solicited advice to some of the heads of state that attended this meeting, and foreign ministers, was if you really don't want us to go to war, join us. Join us. Join us in making it clear to Saddam that we're united, we're united in the resolve that he must give up these weapons. Absent that, I think there is no chance we'll be able to avoid war.

Mr. Chairman, last summer you and I held a series of in-depth hearings on Iraq, and our goal was to begin a national dialogue so the American people would be better informed about the threat Iraq poses, the options available to us, the regional considerations and, finally, what was going to be asked of them, the American people. Those hearings and today's hearings and subsequent hearings you have planned, in my view, are critical because I believe that no foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. And unfortunately, and it's not a criticism -- again, it's an observation -- it may not be the time -- but unfortunately, there has been not much informed consent thus far. In my view, the American people have a very distorted but understandable view of what lies ahead.

The vast majority of people in my state assume that if we go to war, Johnny's going to come marching home after a three-week encounter and it's going to be like the first one, and that we're not going to be tied down and engaged for the -- to the tune of billions of dollars; which I support, by the way. I'm not arguing -- this is not a reason not to go if we have to.

But it is a reason to explain to all our constituents, so we're not sitting here two years from now when we're trying to pass an authorization for an additional $20 billion to maintain forces and maintain our effort to maintain a stable government in Iraq to keep that area from imploding, and we are told on the floor, "No, you guys, that's a foreign policy thing; we really have to go out there and take care of the Delaware River dredging an we have to take care of a problem in Tennessee, we have to take care of some other economic and pressing need, whether it relates to education or health care."

The American people have to know up front what we're about to sign them on to. The American people have yet to have a clear explanation of why war may be the only remaining alternative and what authority we are using to go to war and what will be expected of them, not only winning the war but in securing the peace.

In last summer's hearings, we were told that we would have to stay in Iraq in large numbers for a long time at high cost. Now, initially the administration, the White House -- not denied, but suggested it would not mean that kind of commitment. There are reports now -- we were told then it would take 75,000 forces in place for at least three to five yeas, some suggested as long as 10 years, and we'd be engaged in a thing that no one in this administration, understandably -- or any administration -- wants to utter a phrase -- "nation building."

Gentlemen and ladies of this committee, understand we're about to embark in a commitment of nation building. Our warriors will not only win and fight wars, they will be required to build a nation, or at least reconstruct a government. And the American people don't understand that. I'm confident they're wiling to bear this burden if it's explained to them. They should not be surprised when, two years after this war is over, they see tens of thousands or thousands of American forces, American troops, in Iraq, some of whom are being shot at guarding oil wells, some of whom are going to be on a border and going to end up being killed trying to secure that border so Iranians don't think they have part of northern Iraq, and the Kurds don't think they can move into Kirkuk, so that -- and so on and so forth.

It's a big-deal job coming up. They should be -- not be sandbagged by the sudden choice down the road that requires them to choose between supporting the continued presence in Iraq and other vital needs our country has. It will be incumbent upon the administration in the coming days to level with the American people about the commitment they will be asked. The president's made that commitment personally to me and to many of us in the Cabinet room. And I believe he will do it at the appropriate time if there is nothing left, no alternative left but war. They should know what are the risks, what's coming to them, what will be the cost how long it will take, to the best of our knowledge, and can we afford to remove Saddam Hussein and rebuild Iraq and pay for homeland security and all the other things we have to deal with.

Raising these questions and others should not, in my view, be an excuse for inaction, but we owe to the American people to be straight up with them.

I'll conclude by saying to you, although it's a very different circumstance -- that is, the preparation to go in and respond as we had to in World War II and what we know we're about to do now -- we're still talking about a couple hundred thousand forces.

And I'm looking forward to the president and the administration doing what I think all presidents must do in such circumstances, is stand up, as Franklin Roosevelt did, and forthrightly say there will be pain, there will be costs, there will be loss of life, and there will be -- we'll be asking of you for your treasure -- the treasure, our money -- in order to be able to finish a very important job.

I strongly recommend, and sincerely hope, and look forward to, if the diplomatic route is in fact exhausted -- if it is exhausted -- that we will have that frank assessment, because the American people will do whatever is asked of them, but they will resent keenly the implication that we are doing this for a reason that is not real -- and I would argue al Qaeda is one of those reasons; and further, implying to them that this will be essentially a costless, bloodless undertaking. They will do what's asked of them.

I know the two men before us cannot speak in that sense for the administration, but I know them to be men of integrity intellectual and personal, and I know that they will give us straight answers to the questions we have today. I look forward to it. I believe you can count on the support of the vast majority of this committee in your effort to try to diplomatically solve this. And I would suggest you'll get the support of the Congress overwhelmingly, if all alternatives are exhausted, if in fact there is a leveling with the American people and the world community what's at stake here and what we're committing to.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Let me mention three things before we greet our witnesses. As Senator Biden has noted, the table is longer. Ideally there is more elbow room for members and for staff. And secondly, the microphones, mercifully, do work, and members can be heard. The problem is, members will need to press the button in front of them to make sure the microphone works, and then preferably to press the button again when the statement, editorial, or what have you, has been completed.

Thirdly, we will have other meetings of the committee shortly that -- and I appreciate attendance already today of 15 out of our 19 members . Given conflicts, senators have gone back and forth to make quorums in other committees. But this is important business. And next --

SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D-CA): (Off mike.)

SEN. LUGAR: You can't be heard. (Laughter.)

SEN. BIDEN: (Chuckles.) There is no circumstances in which Senator Boxer will not be able to be heard, I assure you.

SEN. LUGAR: It will be remedied, yes. Relief will come.

Let me mention that we are mindful of other policy issues, and next Tuesday we will be discussing North Korea. On Wednesday, we will have a business meeting and, hopefully, mark up legislation on HIV/AIDS, and a very ambitious program that the president has mentioned, that members who are on this committee have helped formulate -- Senator Kerry, Senator Frist in particular, and many others. And then on Thursday, we will have Secretary Powell, in which he will make his initial appearance. And that will be a highlight, as it always is. And then we will be back to Iraq to discuss, as Senator Biden suggested, what happens in the months and years that follow; what are our obligations, what sort of planning is our administration doing. And I know our administration figures will be eager to share with us their thoughts on how other nations and other factors may come into this.

I will not go beyond that, except to say that Afghanistan comes very shortly thereafter, to see what all is going on there now and how we may be helpful in our work.

And then finally, in the course of this month, we will discuss the authorization bill, really one of the essential factors of this committee. And I've asked all members to be creative. This is their opportunity. This is an opportunity, likewise, for Secretary Powell and for you, Mr. Armitage, and for the department to think about robust diplomacy for our country, all the various forms of assistance -- economic, strategic, human rights and so forth -- that we want to do, and to work with our president and with the budget committee and with all the powers that be, so that we are able to fulfill these aims.

SEN. BIDEN: You thought I was aggressive!

SEN. LUGAR: Now we call upon the distinguished deputy, Mr. Armitage, a good friend of the committee. He has been testifying here for over a generation. But this is a very important day, and we welcome you.

MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Chairman Biden. I was contemplating coming up here, Senator Lugar, that you and I have been doing this for 23 years. At least I've had the honor of being in front of you for 23 years, with a short break. But even in the time out of government, I was able to come up at the request of the committee from time to time, and always found myself much better off for it.

And I think, speaking for John and for myself, we're delighted to be at your first meeting as you hold the gavel of chairmanship. And I'm sure the attendance here reflects the enthusiasm that Senator Biden engendered in this committee and which you've carried on.

And Chairman Biden, I'm not going to take the bait on the question of the microphone being the only accomplishment. The fact of the matter is, we could spend all the time allotted for this hearing talking about the accomplishments, but I'd like to signal one. Last year, during your chairmanship, you held a series of public discussions and hearings on Iraq, which really broadened, opened up the discussion to the public, as well as helped the administration to sharpen their thinking. So look, we know the truth and are very grateful for it.

SEN. BIDEN: (Inaudible.)

MR. ARMITAGE: I'd just ask you, Mr. Chairman, if you'll be kind enough to put our statements or at least my statement in the record. I'm not going to read it. I just want to make a few comments, which I've jotted down here.

SEN. LUGAR: With unanimous consent, that will be done.

MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. GEORGE ALLEN (R-VA): You want to capitalize "Mack" in "Mack truck."

MR. ARMITAGE: (Laughs.) Right. Got it. Thank you. (Subdued laughter.)

In October of 2001, less than a teaspoon of anthrax in an envelope brought chaos to this body. Several hundred of your employees had to undergo emergency medical treatment. The building next door was closed. And ultimately two members of the Postal Service died, and the building in which they worked has yet to reopen.

Saddam Hussein, according to UNSCOM, the special commission, has 25,000 liters of anthrax. That's over 5 million teaspoons of anthrax. And he has yet to account for a single grain.

That is why we are so alert to take your invitation up, Mr. Chairman, and get up here, because we feel a sense of urgency. And from our point of view, that's evidence of it.

Now you're absolutely correct; we've had quite a week. Monday Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei made their comments to the Security Council, and on Tuesday the government of Great Britain announced that in their view, what they heard constituted a further material breach -- something that we heartily concur in.

Tuesday night, the president made his -- what I thought a compelling State of the Union address, in which he announced that Secretary Powell would indeed, on the 5th of February, go to New York and present some of this evidence to the Security Council. But let me be clear: This is more than simply an appearance before the Security Council. This will be open; we're going to try to lay this out for the world. There are some leaders, as you suggest, Chairman Biden, that do not want to lead. So we'll try, as you suggest, to make it a little easier.

Now 12 years have gone by in which Saddam Hussein, to use your phrase, sir, has thumbed his nose at the international community. He's thought that he could do just what he pleased; he could have it both ways and not pay any personal price. Those days are over. He felt that because he faced a series of resolutions that had no teeth.

In September, President Bush went to New York and made a very strong case that we would try to get a resolution, and we did. We got a resolution with teeth, a resolution that was backed by a very strong vote of the House and the Senate, Joint Resolution H. 114, which authorized the use of force under certain conditions, which are laid out in the legislation.

And these -- this 1441 had two simple tests. The first was a declaration that was to be full, currently accurate and complete. Saddam Hussein failed that test, and had a second simple test, and that was to cooperate; to cooperate actively, immediately and unconditionally with the inspection regime. He failed that test.

Now, there are many in the international community who call out that we need to give the so-called inspectors more time. And my view is that's the wrong question. The question to ask is -- or to contemplate is how much time has Iraq already been given? In my view, 12 years and two months and several days now. Inspections continue, but inspectors, as Secretary Powell noted the other day, can grope around in the dark. This is not a scavenger hunt; this is not hide- and-seek; they're there to verify, and to verify, they count on cooperation.

The question is not how long should be given for inspectors to grope in the dark, but when Saddam Hussein is going to turn on the light. And I think it's quite clear from the president's comments on the State of the Union that if Saddam Hussein doesn't turn on the light, the lights will be turned on peacefully or forcibly, and you're exactly correct: It's his choice. But one thing I'm going to make clear: He's got to make that choice in a hurry. And I think that was equally clear from the comments of the president at the State of the Union and yesterday in his travels.

In our view, the lack of cooperation -- simple cooperation from Saddam Hussein indicates that he's intent on holding on to these weapons for three simple reasons: He wants them to either dominate or to intimidate or to attack. The president said the other evening in the State of the Union that for us to trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, neither is it an option.

So I welcome the opportunity to be here, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to very vigorous give and take with the members of this excellent committee. Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Secretary Armitage.

It's a privilege to have our ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, veteran diplomat, ambassador, likewise a good friend of the committee -- testified frequently, but very important testimony today.

It's great to have you, sir. And if you'll proceed.B. NEGROPONTE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And it's a pleasure to be before the committee once again.

As the deputy secretary has said, Resolution 1441 presented Iraq with a requirement to disarm, and two tests: one, that Iraq would submit -- and I quote -- "a currently accurate, full and complete" -- unquote -- declaration of all aspects of its WMD programs and delivery systems; and two, would Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

The presentations we heard on Monday in the Security Council confirm that in spite of the urgency introduced into Resolution 1441, Iraq did not meet either test.

The declaration was a fundamental test of cooperation and intent, and Iraq failed it resoundingly. On January 27th, Dr. Blix himself again said, "The declaration does not" -- and I'm quoting here -- "clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues. Regrettably" -- and I'm continuing to quote here -- "the 12,000-page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their numbers." End of quote.

And then the inspectors' reports go on to raise a number of key issues that are still unanswered, and to which you referred to in your statement, Mr. Chairman, and so has Secretary Armitage also, so I won't repeat them in detail, but they relate to the VX; to the Iraqi air force document that indicates that there are at least 6,500 chemical bombs, weapons bombs, unaccounted for; unanswered questions about 122mm chemical rocket warheads, 12 of which were just found by UNMOVIC in a bunker that was constructed since 1998, that is to say since the weapons inspections ended under UNSCOM. So this is evidence of continued activity on their part, after the inspectors were no longer able to operate in Iraq at the end of 1998.

Dr. Blix also said that there are strong indications -- and this, of course, is particularly troublesome -- that Iraq produced more than the 8,500 liters of anthrax it admitted to, and claims to have unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided -- again, and these are Dr. Blix's words -- "no additional or convincing evidence on anthrax production and destruction."

They also did not declare some 650 kilograms of bacterial growth media, and deliberately deleted information about the importation of this media that Iraq had previously provided in 1999.

There remain some significant questions about Scud missiles. And Iraq is developing two missiles, the liquid-fuel Al-Samoud, and the solid-fuel Al-Fatah, which UNMOVIC knows, knows for a fact were tested at ranges greater than 150 kilometers, the range limited established in Resolution 687, which was the resolution that closely followed the end of the war.

Dr. Blix said, and again, I quote, "The missiles" -- I think this is a very important quote -- "The missiles might very well represent a prima facie case of proscribed systems," end of quote. And in reply to a question that I put to Dr. Blix in the Security Council yesterday afternoon, he said he expected to make a determination in this regard quite soon.

Iraq has casting chambers for solid fuel missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers and has imported other equipment, including 380 rocket engines. Dr. Blix said again, quote, "These items may well be for proscribed purposes," end of quote. And we definitely believe that they are.

Based on a tip, UNMOVIC discovered -- an intelligence tip -- UNMOVIC discovered some 3,000 official documents in a private home that deal with such subjects as laser enrichment of uranium. And Dr. Blix again remarked that he, and I quote, "could not help but think," unquote, that other private residents -- residences may contain troves of such documents.

The declaration is also silent on any steps since 1998 with regard to Iraq's nuclear program, to mobile biological weapons labs or, indeed, any new activities since the inspections ended. So they would have us believe that since the inspections ended in 1998, they had engaged in none of these proscribed activities, which is laughable on its face.

The inspectors acknowledged that there has been Iraqi cooperation on process, but that is not the substantive and the active cooperation that the council requires. The resolution determined that, and again I quote, "Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access," end of quote, and unimpeded movement.

Instead, we see attempts to intimidate UNMOVIC by large numbers of minders -- at times, as many as five minders for each inspector -- as well as so-called spontaneous demonstrations and restrictions masked by concerns for safety. Dr. Blix himself has told us that the presence of minders, and I quote, "bordered on harassment," end of quote, and described some recent disturbing incidents, including official allegations that the inspectors are spying. This is hardly the attitude of a government that wishes to cooperate with the inspection process.

The Iraqi government now claims it cannot ensure that its citizens will allow inspectors entrance to private property. And Iraq has refused to allow the free and unrestricted use of U-2s on missions, a clear violation of 1441.

Inspectors must also have immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC and the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice.

But UNMOVIC and IAEA have not been able to obtain private interviews -- not a single one, even after belated assurances two weeks ago that the government would encourage its citizens to accept private meetings. Inspectors have noted that they have not been provided with all the names of personnel in Iraq's former and current WMD programs as required.

On the question of nuclear proliferation, the IAEA director- general, ElBaradei, informed the council that to date, the IAEA, and I quote, "found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the 1990s." End of quote. That said, Dr. ElBaradei was also clear that to date, Iraq had only provided passive support, not "proactive support," to use his words.

It's well to recall, however, that in 1991, the IAEA was on the verge of declaring Iraq nuclear weapons-free, when subsequent inspections, based on defector information, revealed an extensive, secret nuclear weapons program -- a reminder that we can never be complacent when it comes to Iraqi veracity.

The IAEA also has outstanding questions that Iraq's declaration failed to address. And according to Dr. ElBaradei, these include weapons design and centrifuge development. And the IAEA has not yet completed its evaluation of aluminum tubes.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we believe that Iraq is not disarming. The council's unanimity in support of Resolution 1441 was the result of enormous diplomatic energy. There was substantial give-and-take over weeks of negotiation because we all understood that President Bush had transformed the debate and the importance of the undertaking. Iraq has failed the tests set out by 1441 and is close to squandering its final opportunity.

And I might just add as a closing note, as the deputy secretary mentioned, council members, of course, are looking forward with great interest to the meeting that we will be having next week when Secretary Powell will be addressing the council with respect to information and intelligence we have with respect to Iraq's non- compliance with Resolution 1441, and the programs of denial and deception in which they are engaged in order to totally frustrate the inspection process.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Ambassador Negroponte.

Parenthetically, let me just comment, because I think it's relevant. Last Wednesday, I was privileged to witness a conversation between the president of the United States and the secretary-general, Kofi Annan, in which our president affirmed the strong support we have of the United Nations, our prayer, really, that the United Nations will be more and more successful not only in this endeavor, but in several others that we have ahead of us on the trail. And the secretary-general understands the gravity of this situation in terms of the future of the United Nations and the credibility. So that is a firm understanding, face-to-face, between two very important individuals in this world.

I would say to the committee, the secretary-general has asked that I work with the ranking member for a day in which the committee might go to the United Nations.

He would like to be our host and to provide a remarkable opportunity for learning and participation. And so I take that seriously, and I mention that so that we can all think, as it's always difficult to find times for him and for us, but an important mission for us.

SEN. BIDEN: Will you yield on one -- very -- very, very briefly.bassador, thought when you left the role of being out in other hinterlands that you would never hear the words again "here comes a codel". (Laughter.) But --

SEN. LUGAR: With that welcome intervention, why -- (laughter).

Now, let me say that we've consulted briefly here on -- in fact, we have many members here today. The ranking member agrees that our procedure should be that we will move the chairman's question, ranking member's question, then Senator Hagel, and then Senator Dodd -- in other words, in seniority by both parties with a seven-minute limit, and with the veteran Bertie Bowman (sp) on the clock. (Laughter.) For those who have not experienced Mr. Bowman (sp), he has outlasted all of us on this committee -- (laughter) -- a rigorous timekeeper. And the green light will go on at the beginning of the seven limits. With one minute to go, the yellow light, caution signal, and the red, the final termination, hopefully, of both the answer as well as the question. But we will try to be liberal in interpretation.

Let me just say, I've already had an opportunity to give my views on the subject, and I will pass at this point and turn to the distinguished ranking member for his questions.

SEN. BIDEN: And I'll -- I have several questions, but just ask one, if I may. The administration officials, including the president, on Tuesday night have repeatedly asserted that the Iraqi government maintains ties with members of the al Qaeda network. Are you able to tell us what evidence you have to support that claim? And as a follow-on to that, what is this -- why is it that we spend, it seems, so much time on making the assertions that are the least -- or, the most difficult to prove, including the aluminum tubes, when we have such overwhelming evidence of the failure of Iraq to comply with the existence -- with 1441? It seems to undercut our case. We lead with the two things that may be true but are the most difficult to prove. And we seem not to do what you guys did here today; very compellingly talk about VX, anthrax, things we know.

So it's a two-part question. One, what evidence, if you're able to share with us, is there about direct connection between Saddam and al Qaeda? And two, what is the rationale for how we've been leading thus far, and will it change with the evidence we're presenting?

MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you, sir. On the question of al Qaeda in this forum, I'll say that it's clear that al Qaeda is harbored, to some extent, in Iraq, that there is a presence in Iraq. There are other indications of some -- a recent assassination of our diplomat in Amman, Mr. Folley, that was apparently orchestrated by an al Qaeda member who's resident in Baghdad. Having said that, I am not making the case here that this is a 9/11 connection. But I will make the case that the president has made consistently, sir, and that is that it is the thirst for the weapons of mass destruction and our belief that if Saddam Hussein can pass them to people who will do us ill without being caught, he will do it, that gives us so much concern.

And this will be part of the information that Secretary Powell is going to impart in some more detail. They're busy back home right now trying to declassify as much as possible to give him a pretty full case.

On the question of why we spend so much time on things that are difficult to prove, perhaps particularly on the aluminum tubes, we miscalculated. Clearly, there's a difference of opinion in the intelligence community, which we came up and briefed forthrightly and, indeed, deliberately.

SEN. BIDEN: I agree, you did.

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, the reason we did it deliberately was to show you we're not playing "hide the bacon" here; there is a difference of opinion. I believe that, as I indicated to Senator Hagel the other day in a conversation, that the view is shifting on this more toward the side that this has a relationship to nuclear activities rather than rocket motors. But perhaps we miscalculated. And I take your comments as a sign to, as we used to say in the Navy, KISS, "Keep it simple, sailor," go with your strong points.

SEN. BIDEN: I yield back the rest of my time, Mr. --

SEN. LUGAR: I thank you.

Senator Hagel.

SEN. HAGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Negroponte. I add my appreciation to what has already been stated here this morning from our distinguished chairman and ranking members for your leadership, Secretary Powell's. Historic, dangerous, difficult, challenging times, and we -- I believe we're all grateful that the two of you, Secretary Powell and his team are in the positions you are in. So we appreciate your good work. Thank you.

There has been some discussion here this morning about the possibility of a second U.N. security resolution. Mr. Secretary, in consultation with our U.N. ambassador, what is the position of the United States government on a second resolution? And what would be the prospects, in your enlightened opinion, of a second resolution? Not is it required, but what's the position of the United States? Are we opposed to it? And what are the prospects for the French or someone moving in the Security Council on a second resolution?

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator, thank you for your comments about Secretary Powell and his leadership. We appreciate it greatly. I'll start, and I think John will finish.

We find a second resolution desirable but, as you suggest, not absolutely necessary, for all the reasons that Chairman Biden laid out, particularly the Resolution 678, which does already authorize all necessary means. Having said that, Secretary Powell will make his presentation on the 5th, and after that, we'll kind of assess the tone and tenor of the discussions. We'll let this germinate a bit, with Ambassador Negroponte talking with his colleagues, and then we'll make a judgment.

Now, a second resolution could run the gamut from a very -- a resolution that simply finds that Iraq has not complied, to, the far end, authorizing all necessary means. So when we talk about a second resolution, there are any number of subsets of it. But -- John?B. NEGROPONTE: As you correctly -- as Senator Biden, I think, correctly said earlier, 1441 doesn't require nor does 687 require a second resolution. and the secretary said it also. I think there's going to be a lot of diplomatic activity, both now -- we've got Prime Minister Blair coming to meet with the president, then Secretary Powell's briefing to the council.

And then I think we're going to enter into sort of a dynamic phase of our diplomacy and are going to be -- have to be taking the temperature of how our colleagues on the council feel about this, faced with both the determined position of the United States on this question, and a dynamic situation.

One thing I would caution against is trying to prejudge the outcome or divisions within the council. I think we faced -- and we have some interesting examples during the past year or so, of situations that we faced where the council appeared to be divided initially, but through the hard work and effort of the diplomacy of our president and our secretary of State, we ultimately were able to reach consensus.

SEN. HAGEL: So the position of the United States government today, if I understand it, is not necessarily opposed to a second resolution. We would evaluate it, based on the substance, and possibly support a second resolution. Is that right?B. NEGROPONTE: I mean, I believe that -- yes. And it would be desirable to achieve --

SEN. HAGEL: Do you think it's likely that we'll see a second resolution proposed? B. NEGROPONTE: I would not want to make that prediction at this point in time. But as the deputy secretary said, I think it would be desirable, and it is more desirable -- the more friends one can mobilize in an enterprise of this kind, the better off you are.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, you have just recited a rather bleak assessment of the inspections up to this point in the inspectors' report, although, as we know, Doctors ElBaradei and Blix have both suggested that those inspections continue.

Now, with that very bleak assessment, which I read into it, the United States government thinks essentially they're worthless and they have not produced anything except buying time for Saddam, then why -- or are we? -- supporting continued inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: Well, I don't think, Senator, that we've written off the inspections themselves. The problem isn't the inspections, it's the attitude of Iraq. And I think --

SEN. HAGEL: Are we supporting continued time for inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: Well, at the present time -- we have not taken any decision to discontinue our support for inspections, if that's the question.

SEN. HAGEL: So essentially, the government's position is we continue to support inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: At the moment, we do, yes. But if I could just complete the thought --

SEN. HAGEL: Sure.B. NEGROPONTE: -- I think that the -- the onus is on Iraq to cooperate. And if nothing else, the process thus far has demonstrated an unwillingness on the part of Iraq to be fully and unconditionally and immediately and proactively cooperative.

SEN. HAGEL: But we are supporting continued -- we are supporting continued inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: At the moment, we are.

SEN. HAGEL: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned -- I think your quote was, "Saddam Hussein must make that choice in a hurry." To your point, Mr. Ambassador. What then would be our thinking about if inspections go forward, which I assume they will, which you just said, that we're not opposed to that for the moment. You also said that we'll have consultations next week based on a number of things that will be happening.

But what, then, is the time frame? Are we going to lay down -- the United States lay down in the Security Council a time frame? All right, two weeks, three weeks, we go to war? Where are we?

MR. ARMITAGE: Yeah. As the president said, Senator, no decision has been made. However, he has instructed us to engage for the next few weeks in intensive diplomacy to try to resolve this peacefully. So, I think the best time frame I can give you is this is a matter of weeks and not months, sir.

SEN. HAGEL: In consultation with the Security Council, based on facts and intelligence reports the secretary will lay out.

One last question before a very conservative evaluation of our time frame here and Bertie gavels me down. Intelligence-sharing with the inspectors; are we sharing enough, not enough, too much? Are they getting what they need, what's important for them?

MR. ARMITAGE: We have 108 inspectors in the field right now -- 256 total, but many of them are support people. We have increased, as they've gone forward, the amount of intelligence. I am given to understand that they've got just about what they can handle. They're getting -- about to graduate another 57 inspectors, so we'll have more in the field, and that would indicate to me that we ought to be pushing more intelligence ahead. The secretary of State has used the phrase, "We want to flood the zone; as much as they can take, feed 'em," sir.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes?

SEN. PAUL SARBANES (D-MD): Well, thank you very much, Chairman. It's the intention to increase significantly the number of inspectors, is that what I'm to draw from your last response?

MR. ARMITAGE: It is to increase the number -- I wouldn't characterize it -- we are graduating -- or there is graduating a number -- another class of 57, a majority of which would be available to go into the field to add to the 108 that are already in the field inspecting. And another 100-plus who are involved in support and flying, et cetera, Senator.

SEN. SARBANES: What is the difficulty that you perceive with allowing the inspectors to continue to do their work in an intensified manner over a period of time?

MR. ARMITAGE: I think that we agree that the -- ought to be intensified inspections over a period of time. Perhaps the disagreement we have, sir, is over the amount of time. And from our point of view, 12 years, two months and several days is about enough time. But we haven't quite given up yet.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, is this regime a more rigorous regime that they're operating under now than when they went in before?

MR. ARMITAGE: (Pause.) I'm getting my brains behind me on this, Senator.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I think Ambassador Negroponte could answer that question.B. NEGROPONTE: Well, I was just going to add an element to it, which is -- they're already, in our judgment in material -- in further material breach. So, I think --

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I understand that. I mean, the president keeps saying he hasn't made up his mind, but it seems to me he's defined the problem in such a way that he has to go to war. Because he, in effect, has said if we don't find -- if the inspectors don't find any hidden weapons, Saddam is being extremely good at hiding them. And if they do find them, then it just shows that he was in violation and, therefore, has to be punished. So, the problem has been defined in such a way that it seems to me a war is the only conclusion you can draw.

Other than the very remote possibility that he will leave the country -- I don't know how much weight to give to that -- but other than that, the issue has been defined in such a way that there's no alternative but to go to war.

And yet the president keeps saying, "Well, I haven't made up my mind about going to war." And yet we're positioning large numbers of troops and logistics and so forth in the area. It's all geared to go to war. And presumably at some point here he's going to turn and say, "Well, now I've decided to go to war." But it seems to me that decision, in effect, was made when the problem was defined in such a way that there was no alternative.

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator, I'll answer the previous question, but let me try to take this first. The decision -- the problem was defined by Resolution 1441, which required Saddam Hussein to cooperate, and he's the one who's not cooperating. Had he made the disclosures, it was quite clear we'd be having a different debate. And if he makes a full disclosure tomorrow, we'll be having a different debate.

On the question of moving forces, there is no question, I think, in most people's mind -- I'll defer to John's analysis of the council -- that we wouldn't even have UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq without the threat of the use of force. And I think that's generally accepted.

And finally, on the previous question, which I didn't --

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I accept that proposition. But once you succeeded in doing that and getting the inspectors in with what I understand is a more rigorous regime than when they were previously in Iraq, it's not quite clear to me why we then don't play out that path.

Now if the inspectors -- first of all, does the presence of the inspectors, in your view, inhibit Saddam's activities with respect to weapons of mass destruction?

MR. ARMITAGE: It occurs to me that in a state the size of California, with 23 million people, that several hundred -- if it gets to that -- inspectors probably in the most minimal way inhibits him, as he, I would think, has to pay some -- play some hide-and-seek with us. But when you look at the size of the problem, if we have to depend on inspectors to ferret out the information, we can't get there from here, Senator.

SEN. SARBANES: Yeah. What about several thousand inspectors?

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, I don't know. Would I say several thousand is better than 2(00) or 300? At some point in time, if you're not going to cooperate, you're not going to cooperate. And more inspectors are not going to force the cooperation, just force more obfuscation.

SEN. SARBANES: What is your definition of cooperation?

MR. ARMITAGE: The definition is not my definition, sir; it's the definition of Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei that any --

SEN. SARBANES: But apparently their view is that they need and should have a significant -- more time for their inspectors to carry out their tasks. Isn't that their view, as I understand it?

MR. ARMITAGE: I have certainly heard Dr. ElBaradei say that, sir. And that's his opinion. The decision rests with the Security Council.

(To Ambassador Negroponte.) John, you've talked to Hans --B. NEGROPONTE: Well, I think also the definition of cooperation is in the resolution, and it's quite elaborate, allowing U-2 flights, allowing unrestricted access, cooperating proactively. And all of these things are things that Iraq is not doing at the moment. I think the fundamental difficulty is that as far as Iraq is concerned, this seems to be business as usual. It's the way they dealt with inspections in the past.

With regard to your question about --

SEN. SARBANES: Do you think these inspectors are being -- they're not getting greater access than they had in the past?B. NEGROPONTE: They are getting -- in process -- they're getting some procedural cooperation. They're getting access to the sites that they've asked to go to. They've gone to, I think, some 300 sites or 250, and most of them are sites that had previously been identified and previously been inspected. Those they're getting access to. But we consider this to be just procedural.

As far as whether they've -- moving materials, continuing to hide materials that they have, giving access, for example, to private interviews for scientists, the U-2 issue that we mentioned earlier --

SEN. SARBANES: I understand the --B. NEGROPONTE: -- as far as we're concerned, the substantive cooperation --

SEN. SARBANES: How much of the information which the administration has in terms of its suspicions about sites and what ought to be inspected and where the inspectors ought to go, and so forth, is being provided to the inspectors? It's my understanding that there's a very large amount of information of that sort, but that only a small portion of it has been given to the inspectors in terms of leading them to places that we think should be looked at. Is that correct?B. NEGROPONTE: As the deputy secretary said, the secretary's instructions were to flood the zone. We have been providing packages of intelligence information. I think it's important that it be actionable by the inspectors. But yes, we have been providing substantial information to them, and so have other friendly countries.

SEN. SARBANES: But --

Mr. Chairman, could I just get an answer to that question?

How much -- in the total picture, what you have, how much are you giving to the inspectors?B. NEGROPONTE: (That's for you ?).

MR. ARMITAGE: I'll have to supply it for the record. I don't know the answer in percentage terms, Senator. So I would -- if you'll allow, will supply it. I don't know it.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you for supplying it for the record.

SEN. SARBANES: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Chafee.

SEN. LINCOLN CHAFEE (R-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll just follow up on Senator Sarbanes' line of questioning.

It seems as though we're arguing over how much cooperation and obstruction is being -- is taking place in Iraq. But Hans Blix did say in his report to the United Nations the prompt access, open door policy that has been pursued so far by the Iraqi vis-a-vis the inspectors is an indispensable element of transparency in a process that aims at securing disarmament by a peaceful means. How do you react to him saying that? That -- those are his words. (Pause.) He's saying he is getting prompt access and an open door policy.B. NEGROPONTE: Senator, but he also said -- and here's a quote which I think is perhaps the most telling: "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today," -- and that's when he was speaking on Monday -- "of the disarmament that was demanded of it." And he's also said on repeated occasions, if Iraq had cooperated fully and unconditionally in 1991, we wouldn't be here discussing these issues today. So while I think he acknowledges a certain amount of cooperation with respect to process, I believe he considers substantive cooperation to be sorely lacking.

SEN. CHAFEE: Well, the decision to go to war, then, is splitting a hair here, it seems, of -- as over cooperation or lack of it.

You do mention the U-2 flights. Just a question of -- I have is what prevents us from overflying Iraq with our U-2s? What -- what's the -- what, is he going to shoot them down?

MR. ARMITAGE: I understand that the U-2 flights are something that Mr. Blix has put forward as a matter of cooperation. And they have not -- he has not received satisfaction from the Iraqi authorities. Could the United States fly that? Yes. We could fly that, sir. The question is -- I think Dr. Blix is using this to try to engender cooperation from the Iraqis. And yet again he's been thwarted. And with your permission, Senator, I'd like to insert into the record several of the comments that Hans Blix made in his report. He said a lot. And a lot of it is quite negative about the question of cooperation and access, et cetera.

SEN. CHAFEE: Yes.

Secretary Armitage, you started off your opening statement, your testimony, with the incident of anthrax here in this -- in the building next door.

And wouldn't you assume that many countries, if we -- and I think it's generally accepted that that anthrax came domestically, within our borders -- that many countries could have this so-called weapon of mass destruction? Do we have a consistent policy towards dealing with countries that have weapons of mass destruction?

MR. ARMITAGE: First of all, to be clear, I didn't make the allegation that Iraq had planted that letter in the building.

SEN. CHAFEE: No, I didn't suggest that.

MR. ARMITAGE: I was just using it to indicate sort of the danger of unaccounted for anthrax in this case.

The question of nonproliferation policy, which I think generally you're getting at, is one that we have been accused of having a certain lack of consistency with. And I think, no, it's hard to have a "one size fit all" policy. Some of the people who are engaged in the manufacture of some of these weapons are, in other cases, friends of ours, and we have to use a different process to try to jawbone them or persuade them to get out of it.

So I'd say that if you're looking for kind of a statement -- and I don't mean to trivialize it -- but almost a bumper sticker statement, I'm incapable of giving it to you.

SEN. CHAFEE: Great. And also -- thank you very much. It seems as though the American people believe that with the inspectors in Iraq, that there is no immediate threat. And I have the feeling that -- from my constituents, that we're back to regime change. First it was regime change, then it was disarmament; we're back to never mind disarmament, it's all about regime change. And not allowing the inspectors to continue has, I think, the American people very perplexed. Can you comment?

MR. ARMITAGE: Simply that I think that some of the facts on the ground are changing. We had put a lot of effort, as John indicates, into the diplomacy. We are very disappointed that the report of Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei didn't give more room for optimism and hope.

And as regards the amount of time, I must say, just from past experience -- as I indicated, I've been coming up in front of Senator Lugar for 23 years. The one thing I don't want to have is the hearing that's full of recriminations because we didn't do something, we were waiting for a little more time or another inspector. And that's a real thought in my mind. And I would rather suffer tough, rigorous questioning, or even hostile questioning, any number of times than have the one hearing that might be full of recriminations.

SEN. CHAFEE: Well, I don't think that's -- I don't think that's --

MR. ARMITAGE: No, I -- (off mike) -- but generally.

SEN. CHAFEE: I don't think that's appropriate, in that you just mentioned anthrax. We could have an incident at any time.

But I think that as we look at letting the inspectors continue to do their work, the American people are asking why aren't we allowing them additional time? We understand that with the warm weather coming in the summer, the soldiers have to wear their protective gear, there's some kind of timetable. But why not wait a year? I think the American people are feeling, with the inspectors in there, that it is a sense of security.

MR. ARMITAGE: Clearly, Senator, we've got a difference of opinion on this. My point of view is that the American people have waited 12 years and several months. And if you're not going to get the cooperation, then another year only increases the danger for us and the possibility that we might have that hearing that I fear, and will do anything to avoid.

But it's a difference of opinion that we have, sir.

SEN. CHAFEE: All right, fair enough. Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Dodd?

SEN. CHRISTOPHER DODD (D-CT): Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me, first of all, just begin by congratulating you on your chairmanship, and looking forward to working with you. It's been a long time since you've been in that chair, and remember with great fondness your service as chairman of this committee back a decade-and-a-half ago.

SEN. SARBANES: It was (about ?) '86.B. NEGROPONTE (?): I remember all of you.

SEN. BIDEN: (Off mike) -- that long we have to wait again! (Laughs.)

SEN. DODD: The committee did a lot of good work under your leadership. And let me welcome the new members as well to the committee.

SEN. SARBANES: You didn't have any gray hair in those days --

SEN. DODD: No, I didn't. Neither of us did in those days.

SEN. SARBANES: Yeah. Yeah.

SEN. DODD: But let me welcome our new members as well, both on the Democratic and Republican side. I think you'll enjoy the work of the committee.

And let me thank our witnesses. I've enjoyed the relationship with both of you over the years on a variety of different matters.

And let me also join in the comments of commending Secretary Powell. There are a lot of us up here who are very pleased indeed that he's in the position he is in, and have a lot of confidence in him.

Mr. Chairman, I -- just to begin, I think it's important maybe to establish where we are, some common ground. We can spend a lot of time here -- and the news is, of course, where the differences are, but I think there are, at least to some degree -- I'm not speaking about unanimity here among everyone, but there are some important points and common ground.

I think all of us, without exception, agree that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant, that his presence on the world stage poses threats to the world. I would argue, others may, that there are more significant threats that I would place at a higher priority than -- sort of terrorism. I would even place the issue of North Korea as a more significant immediate threat. But nonetheless, this is a threat. And to suggest otherwise I think would be wrong. He's acquired biological, chemical weapons of mass destruction, and he's tried to accumulate nuclear weapons as well. That's a given. We accept that and understand that.

Most, I think, of the members of this body would also agree with the passage of H. Res. 114, that the president has the authority -- whether they voted for it or against it, I think most would agree he has the authority he needs to act multilaterally or unilaterally. At least I accept that that's the case. Now, we might want to come back and deal with it another day. But the passage of that resolution gave him that authority. And I think most people in the country as well as members of this body applaud the president's decision to go to the U.N. One of the reasons that many of us supported that resolution was, in fact, to encourage the administration to do exactly what you did in September and exactly what you achieved in October. Now, it'd have made a great deal of sense for us to build that kind of international support to deal with this threat -- not this threat alone, but other threats as well -- and that how we proceeded with that was going to make good sense.

Now, those are pretty profound points of common agreement, it seems to me. What concerns us, I think, is the lack of information other than sort of the rhetorical suggestions of where we are, to suggest somehow -- I know you talk about 12 years. But we're talking on a framework here over the last 60 days or so, 70 days since the passage of certain resolutions. We've known that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant for a long time. He was a tyrant 12 years ago, he was a tyrant 80 days ago -- 60 days ago, 50 days ago, 40 days ago. There's not anything that's really changed in all of that, at least in most of our views. And yet we're hearing this sort of -- vague suggestions about materials and so forth. And I'm not even arguing that they may be the case. I've been sort of accepting of the notion that this exists. But the decision to go to war is based on the conclusion that that, in fact, is the case. And for many of us up here, we have not yet seen the kind of data I think that's necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to make a suggestion to the committee. I'm glad the secretary's going to go to the U.N., on Thursday, I think, of next week. But I don't think it's an outrageous suggestion that he might come and talk to us in a closed door session here. I presume he's going to be constrained in a public forum at the United Nations -- it'll be aired globally -- about what facts and data we have. I certainly think it's right for us to know, since we're going to bear the burden of this if we go to war, financially and otherwise, that the elected representatives of the United States people might have that information before the U.N. does, with all due respect. And I'm wondering if it would not be a -- how welcome the suggestion would be that he might appear before us on Wednesday, before he goes up on Thursday, in a closed door session, if necessary.

SEN. LUGAR: Let me respond just briefly to the Senator. I visited last evening with Senator Frist on that issue and have conveyed the thought that this would be very helpful. For this committee, or perhaps all senators, this is a judgment of leadership. But I hope that that will come to pass, and I will forward the suggestion again.

SEN. DODD: Well, I thank you. And I -- and it would be tremendously helpful to us to have that.

You may want to comment on that, if it --

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, beyond the obvious that I'm not going to take charge of my boss' schedule. But I want to say that he would endorse exactly what you say as a general matter. We owe the body, the Senate and the House, an appearance to lay out this. I might suggest that Secretary Powell is basically 24/7 now getting ready for this thing next Wednesday. But the sharing the information is something that, of course, you have every right to demand.

I would just suggest it might be the intelligence officers -- or, the intelligence community who might better provide that. Secretary Powell's going to put in context to support the comments that --

SEN. DODD: Well, I don't care how it gets done -- I don't care how it gets done. I'm just tired of having to hear sort of these speeches being given about this. And I'm one who supported this resolution -- I'm not your opponent. But my people want to know why we're going to do this, other than sort of speeches given that are sort of pep rally stuff. I want to know specifically and factually what we know -- (chuckles) -- and I think my constituents do, and I know my colleagues do. And before you go and tell the whole world about it, I think we have a right to know what's going on here. And that's really what the bottom of a lot of these questions are; we want to know. And that's not a partisan comment. You'd hear that from -- quietly, maybe -- from the other side more than I'm saying it publicly, but we want to know.

So I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, however you can do this, but let's do it before you go up there.

MR. ARMITAGE: We're in violent agreement with you. I was just trying to protect the calendar of my boss for the obvious reason.

SEN. DODD: I understand. I appreciate it.

Let me go back, if I can just -- I don't know how much time I have here left, but let me go back to this question that Senator Sarbanes raised and -- about the inspectors. I -- and Senator Hagel raised it, as well -- I'm sort of wondering why we supported even the resolution in October if you feel as though the inspection process is such a failure or just isn't producing results at all. This was only 60 days ago we did this. This wasn't a year and a half or 12 years ago. This was just a few hours ago, we voted -- (chuckling) -- along with 14 other members, or whatever it is, of the Security Council; the United Nations endorsed this resolution, which a major part of which includes the inspections process. Sixty days later, we're denouncing it.

And by anyone's estimation, in fact, Resolution 1441 requires that every country share information with the inspectors. Is that not true? Is that true? That there's a requirement you step up. Now, by public admission, and I'm constrained, I guess, here, but I'm told if there are this many inspection sites -- (chuckles) -- and so forth, we provided about -- (gestures) -- this much information, without getting into the specific details as a government, in terms of our obligation of meeting the requirements of 1441, to assist the inspection process. A very small fraction of the sites that were available -- we know are available, we've actually provided information about. Why are we not doing a better job of that? And if that's the case, why are we denouncing the inspection process before it's had a chance to work?

MR. ARMITAGE: I would take some exceptions, Senator Dodd, with the characterization that we're denouncing the inspections process --

SEN. DODD: Well, denouncing may be --

MR. ARMITAGE: -- which, as John has already indicated, it's going to go ahead. But I do want to make one thing clear. Nowhere in 1441 -- or, as far as I know -- in the discussion about the inspection was it ever the case that the inspectors were going to do more than to verify disarmament; that's what they're there for. They're not playing cat-and-mouse and hide-and-seek.

SEN. DODD: I don't disagree with that.

MR. ARMITAGE: But that's the first thing.

The second thing is I would note that Mr. Blix said -- (pause) -- Mr. Blix said even in his report to the council the other day that even with the inspectors there, illegal procurement activity is continuing today.

So, we're not denouncing it. We'll just take Dr. Blix at his word.

SEN. DODD: Well, all right. My time is up. We'll come back to this, but I appreciate --

SEN. SARBANES: Mr. Chairman, could he clarify that? When you say "illegal procurement," you mean they actually are obtaining materials? And if so, what's being done about those that are selling the materials?

MR. ARMITAGE: (Off mike.)

Excuse me.

(SEN. DODD ?): You can't push it through the table!

MR. ARMITAGE: I know it. I'm sorry! (Laughs, laughter.) Well, it might spare me some difficulty!

(SEN. DODD ?): I know, yeah! (Laughter.)

MR. ARMITAGE: John Wolf informs me it's not a matter of selling; they are still buying and importing. Is that right, John?

SEN. SARBANES: Well, someone's selling it, then.

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, yeah.

SEN. SARBANES: Yeah, well, isn't there a regime to control that?

MR. ARMITAGE: Yes, sir.

(Confers off mike.)

John is just making the point that of course we try to stop it; it's an illegal procurement. They smuggle it in, and we're trying to stop it where we can.

SEN. SARBANES: All right.

MR. ARMITAGE: We've had sanctions where we can, yeah, identify companies. But the smuggling of it continues even now.

SEN. SARBANES: All right.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Biden?

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Chairman, just a very brief intervention. I appreciate your going to Senator Frist and suggesting that the secretary be up here, and I appreciate what Senator Dodd said about wanting to know the information, if it doesn't matter what source.

I think it does matter that it be the secretary, and I think it matters, for purposes of the show of unity here, that there is the sense of -- I think it's very much in the interest of the administration to maintain -- and I know the secretary believes this as well -- to maintain the vast majority of us on both sides of the aisle being in lockstep with the secretary. And I quite frankly think it's just -- as a matter of appearance, if nothing else, it is somewhat inappropriate not to come and speak with us first. It will engender a great deal of goodwill. And we can get from the intelligence community maybe even more than we can get from the secretary, theoretically, but it is important that the secretary himself, showing the world that this -- we are together.

It is -- it was -- it is -- it -- anyway, I just think it would be a very useful thing across the board, beyond the information we'll learn specifically, and specifically so we are aware of the nature of the pitch, if you will, not just the specifics of the assertions made relative to the material. I just hope that y'all will consider that.

MR. ARMITAGE: I will take it back, sir.

SEN. LUGAR: I thank the senator for his comment. Obviously we are in agreement, and hopefully Secretary Powell will be, too. And so we will work carefully together.

Senator Brownback.

SEN. SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen. And I want to endorse the thought of having Secretary Powell up here, but I also want to say, on top of that, I appreciate how much you've worked with us to date. A number of us put forward the idea that there should be a resolution passed by Congress to the administration. The administration -- I think a number of people actually argued in the administration we don't have to do that, but you did. I think that was a wise move.

A number of us argued that you should go to the United Nations for a resolution. The administration, I think, probably a number of people within, argued we don't have to do that, but you did.

Last week, Thursday, there was a briefing of Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld, with members here of the Senate, that I thought was pretty candid. Thank you for doing that.

I think this would be another positive step. And I think there's been a good -- frankly, I think there's been a very good movement back and forth and communications back and forth. We're getting down to the real tough point now: whether you actually engage U.S. military force and other military force. And I think that's obviously where we all get antsy and hard-pressed.

I want to make one point about the weapons inspection, because I've chaired the subcommittee that's dealt with this for some period of time, and we've had a lot of hearings on Iraq over the period since I've been in the Senate in '96. They haven't complied at any point in time in the past.

We have models of compliance of weapons inspections that the U.N. has done, like South Africa and Kazakhstan, where these were two countries that did cooperate with the U.N. And they didn't -- there wasn't any hide-and-seek. They said, "Come in. We don't want these things anymore. Here is where they are. Come and get them." I mean, I think that's the nature of the resolution we have. Now if I'm wrong on that, correct me. But that's the nature, and we actually have a model of that in the past.

I want to follow up, Secretary Armitage, on your point about the hearing that we don't want to have about terrorists distributing weapons of mass destruction and using them in the United States. There's an article in the New York Times today talking about large convoys moving out of Iraq and to Syria. And I guess -- I'm just going to read you this instance or report: "For instance, the administration today was still debating the credibility of intelligence about a Christmastime Iraqi truck convoy that some American analysts say could have been transporting weapons of mass destruction or scientists to Syria, where they would be safely out of the United Nations inspectors' view."

Do you have any either further illumination you could give us about what we know about movement of weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq, if you can identify -- ?

MR. ARMITAGE: I would -- Senator Brownback, I would say that there's been a debate in the administration, as I know, in the intelligence community. It's about how much we know about other countries perhaps receiving such things as missiles. I don't think -- particularly, I don't think we know the definitive. I saw the report that you referred to. And I've seen other reports. Now, I can't give you a level of credibility on other reports as to whether missiles are in other countries. Those countries whom we've approached on this with our suspicions have vehemently denied. But -- that's what they've done. So I can't --

SEN. BROWNBACK: You can't confirm or deny this, this report in the New York Times today? Okay.

Let me ask you about the presence of terrorists on Iraqi soil. You identified or spoke some about some al Qaeda. Again, another New York Times article just today talked about the presence of other terrorist groups in Iraq, Ansar al-Islam, an extremist group. Can you identify for this group other terrorists that are currently operating on Iraqi soil?

MR. ARMITAGE: I can verify that, and I can provide you -- I can do that. I don't think I want to do that publicly. I think it's part of what the secretary will be saying. There are other groups who have apparently either been driven or have found some ability to be harbored in Iraq. Some are the -- around the northern part of Iraq, close to Iran, but not associated Iran, the group you just mentioned and others. But with your permission, I'd provide it for the record and in a classified way.

SEN. BROWNBACK: But you can confirm this in the New York Times today that this group is operating on Iraqi soil. (Pause.) Thank you. And I -- and others you will provide to us in a -- can you provide that in a secure setting, of other terrorist groups that are operating on Iraqi soil?

MR. ARMITAGE: I will do so, sir.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Can you provide to us either here or in private, do we know of any distribution of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists? I know that would be a very difficult thing to find. But do we know or can you provide that either here or in a private setting?

MR. ARMITAGE: Yes, I can. And I'm not an expert in these matters, but there have been some real speculations about certain poisons and other things that were associated with some of these groups who are in -- particularly northern Iraq. But I -- with your permission I'll content myself with those comments only.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Okay. And you can provide that to us in a private distribution. Because that to me has been the real issue about Iraq. There are a lot of bad players in the world. There's no question about that. North Korea is clearly up there, and we've got others. But the mix here of a guy with weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein, who's used them in the past, and terrorists on his soil that are willing to use them against us, and on our soil, is the potent mixture that I think is so poisonous and so hard for us to even contemplate that you've got to go with that on an early basis.

And I just want to conclude by asking you about other countries that'll be supporting us, whether or not there's another U.N. resolution, which I -- I question the need for another resolution on top of it. But I note that you have -- eight European leaders have voiced their support for the U.S. on Iraq that just was out again today. This is a Wall Street Journal article. I note today that Jordan has now said they're even going further than they did in the Gulf War I of allowing some positioning of U.S. forces, where they maintained a neutral position in the invasion of Kuwait.

Congratulations on those. Do you have others that you can announce to us that are joining our coalition?

MR. ARMITAGE: I'm going to give you a numerical idea. I do not desire to announce the names publicly, sir. But for instance, those who have committed to full access -- 21 countries are fully committed to grant us access on route, should a military activity be required. There are others that are under discussion. But we've got 20 countries that are fully committed, and three that are partially committed to allow basing. Overflight -- 22 countries. We've got a total of nine countries who have either fully committed or partially committed some troops.

So, should a military activity be required, there's more going on than one suggests. And I've got a list, and I don't want to -- I can provide it secure. But I deliberately had it done that way for this hearing.

SEN. BROWNBACK: I think it's particularly significant about the Jordanians, who are right there in the area, and have taken even a more aggressive stance this time than last.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: I thank the senator from Kansas.

Let me just say parenthetically, his travels in the Near East, the Middle East, and now the Far East have been extensive, and his report to members of the committee really very helpful, even with regard to the North Korean border. And I congratulate you on that achievement.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Feingold.

SEN. RUSSELL FEINGOLD (D-WI): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. First, let me congratulate you on your role as chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I certainly enjoyed very much Senator Biden's tenure. And I have greatly enjoyed working with both of you and admire your work.

Mr. Armitage, you began very dramatically with your testimony with regard to the anthrax. And it sort of follows what Senator Brownback was talking about.

To both of you, is it your contention that Iraq is the single- most likely source of WMD transfers to international terrorist organizations to date? And specifically, would it be more likely than Iran, more likely than actors in Pakistan, more likely than a cash- strapped North Korea?

I wonder if both of you would respond to that.

Mr. Armitage?

MR. ARMITAGE: That's an interesting question. I think in terms of the full-up capability -- chemical/bio -- that I would endorse the statement that Iraq is the most likely. There are (subsets ?). I'm unaware, for instance, if Pakistan has had chemical and biological developments. North Korea -- I don't know that we have much insight into their chem and bio. We've got more into their nuclear, things that I've been able to discuss with you and others in private settings. And our fear with North Korea is a possible proliferation. We have no information about nuclear proliferation. And I have none on other WMD.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Your answer seems to relate to whether they have these things. My question is, who is the most likely to be involved in a trade of them or a sale of them or distribution of them? Is it your belief that Iraq is more likely to engage in that kind of transaction with terrorists? Or would it be fair to say that there's a question here, that Iran, Pakistan, and perhaps North Korea may be more likely?

MR. ARMITAGE: Of those four, I would say that Iraq is the most likely, sir. But I don't want to leave you with the impression or the implication that I'm not concerned with the nuclear proliferation possibility of North Korea.

SEN. FEINGOLD: What about other countries? Are there other countries that would be, in your view, more likely than Iraq to do this? Or is Iraq the number one, most likely country to engage in this kind of transaction with a terrorist organization?

MR. ARMITAGE: I'm trying to run over in my mind the sort of varsity and junior varsity of those who are engaged in these activities. I think as a governmental matter that my fear would be greatest on Iraq.

There are other concerns of -- sort of we've had historically in the Russian Federation, et cetera, not having full control over their inventories, but as a governmental matter, we think the government's trying to control, but I can't discount the possibility of others having a rogue or off-the-books operation.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I'd just note this isn't an academic question or something for our interest. The reason I ask is, we're talking about invading one of these countries on this premise, on the basis that they are the greatest risk and have the greatest likelihood of this connection.

Mr. Negroponte.B. NEGROPONTE: Without getting into the question of assessing the risk, I would point out from a U.N. context, the difference between Iraq and the other countries you've mentioned is that Iraq is under 17 different United Nations resolutions, many of which are demanding, and have been demanding since 1991 -- April 3rd, 1991, Resolution 687 was passed demanding that Iraq declare its WMD holdings within 15 days, and here we are 12 years later discussing this same subject. So they are under many more resolution than any of these other countries are, with respect to its WMD, just --

SEN. FEINGOLD: I don't question that. What I'm getting at here, and I think Senator Dodd and others were, is, is this the entity that is most likely to help out an al Qaeda-type operation to try to harm Americans? And so let me follow with, what is Iraq's proliferation track so far? To what extent have they proliferated?

MR. ARMITAGE: May I ask Assistant Secretary Wolf to answer, sir? I think -- get it once?

SEN. FEINGOLD: Be pleased.

MR. ARMITAGE: John?

JOHN WOLF (Assistant secretary of State for nonproliferation): Thank you, Senator. I think their record as a proliferator is less than -- they are largely a buyer. They are buying in all of the aspects -- chemical, biological, nuclear. They're developing long- range missiles. And as a country under a U.N. -- a restrictive U.S. -- U.N. regime, they are not only acquiring, but they are in direct violation of a series of obligations. They harbor -- they do harbor terrorist groups, so it's not an academic matter. And we don't know -- taking a Secretary Rumsfeld language, we don't know what we don't know. But here's a country in the middle of a vital region which is acquiring all of the capabilities which threaten the region and pose a threat beyond the region. And that's why the U.N. has been so assertive over the last 12 years.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand. But it sounds like you're saying that they are -- if I could continue with you -- that they are less of a proliferator than others. Isn't that what you just said?

MR. WOLF: I would say we define the threat of Iraq in a different way. It is their ability to use those weapons against their own people, to use it against their neighbors, and potentially to use it far beyond.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand that, and that's terribly important, but I'd like you to answer my question. Are there other nations that are greater proliferatorts than Iraq of these types of substances and weapons?

MR. WOLF: There are other countries which proliferate.

SEN. FEINGOLD: More than Iraq?

MR. WOLF: But nobody has used -- Senator, I would like to say that in Iraq's case, they're acquiring dangerous weapons --

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand that.

MR. WOLF: -- which they have used against thousands of their own people, which they have used against their neighbors, which they have the capability to use far away. That's the threat that we're addressing. That's the threat the U.N. has put in -- that's why the U.N. demanded its disarmament.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I recognize that --

MR. WOLF: It's that disarmament they have to achieve.

SEN. FEINGOLD: -- is terribly important and has to be dealt with. But an awful lot of the information today, an awful lot of the argument today and the president's argument is not simply based on what Iraq will do; it is premised on what Iraq will do in conjunction with terrorist organizations.

And that appears to require proliferation, and that's why this question is so important.

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, I don't gainsay the importance of the question at all, Senator. But I think that a good deal of weight has to be given to what everyone I think would acknowledge has been the bloody-mindedness of Saddam Hussein. And that does weigh somewhat in this equation.

SEN. SARBANES: Would the senator yield for just one quick question? I wanted to clarify one thing.

Senator -- Secretary Armitage, you said that there are al Qaeda terrorists in northern Iraq, I think, earlier in response to a question. Are they in the territory in northern Iraq that's under Saddam's control, or are they in the territory in northern Iraq that is not under Saddam's control?

MR. ARMITAGE: The ones that I referred to in northern Iraq are not under his direct control. There are al Qaeda in Baghdad, as will be -- as we move forward, will be explaining.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more question?

In the State of the Union, the president seemed to suggest that the lesson to be learned from the recent history of the Korean peninsula is that we must stop potential proliferators before they have the means to blackmail others, and obviously we all agree on that. But I worry that there are, in effect, some nuances being lost here, and that our message to the rest of the world is starting to sound like, acquire weapons and then be free from the threat of military action, or don't acquire weapons and then perhaps be subject to invasion. The incentives are for proliferation and the pursuit of WMD as quickly as possible under this message. How can that possibly be in the interest of global stability and in the interest of the security of the United States of America?

MR. ARMITAGE: It seems to be that a nonproliferation policy, Senator, has to have several aspects to it. Part of it is a good deal of self-restraint. We stop people where we can. We try to persuade them not to have weapons. We sanction them where we can. But a good bit of the nonproliferation policy depends on enlightenment in terms of countries -- South Africa, Taiwan, others who have voluntarily given up these programs. I don't agree, and I think the enlightened have come to the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction are more trouble than they're worth. The countries who acquire these weapons are ones that are generally a basket case, and they do it for one of three reasons that I've tried to already illuminate: to dominate, to intimidate, or perhaps, in the extreme, to attack.

SEN. FEINGOLD: But if they've already got them, we're not going to go in there and deal with it.

MR. ARMITAGE: No, not -- not so, sir. The attempt by the previous administration in the framework agreement in the North Korean situation was an attempt to deal with it. We attempted to deal with it, until we ran into the acknowledge of the HEU program in North Korea. Now we're going to have to take a different tack.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, what I meant by "deal with it", obviously, is to deal with it the way we're about to deal with Iraq.

MR. ARMITAGE: But I cannot sit here and won't try to sit here and tell you that I know that, as I said earlier, one size fits all in these things. I don't think it does.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGA