IRAQ WEAPONS INSPECTORS' REPORT TO
THE UNITED NATIONS

Hearing Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 30, 2003

OPENING STATEMENT OF

RICHARD G. LUGAR
A Senator from Indiana
and Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SEN. LUGAR: This hearing is called to order. Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets to hear testimony from Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and United States ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte. Both are principal actors in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy towards Iraq. And they'll provide comments on U.S. reaction to the 60-day progress report on Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.

On Monday, January 27th, Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Hans Blix, executive chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC, delivered an update to the United Nations Security Council on their efforts to verify disarmament in Iraq. Mr. Blix's assessment -- and I quote -- "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it," -- end of quote -- should not come as a surprise to this committee and those who have watched the process unfold over the last 12 years. Iraq continues to resist United Nations efforts to verify its compliance with a host of Security Council resolutions.

On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 requiring Iraq's immediate, unconditional and active cooperation in verifying the dismantlement of the weapons of mass destruction and the programs that support them. In my opinion, Iraq has failed to comply with these requirements and is in material breach of these obligations.

Iraq continues to deny U-2 overflights, requested documentation, and unfettered access to weapons scientists. Furthermore, the recent discovery of chemical warheads in Iraq, and Iraq's failure to provide proof as to the final disposition of tons of chemical and biological agent are clear instances of non-compliance.

It is Iraq's responsibility to prove compliance with the resolutions passed since the end of the Persian Gulf War. To date, Iraq has failed to do so. Simply stated, previous United Nations inspection reports have listed weapons, materials and programs of mass destruction in Iraq.

Resolution 1441 gives Iraq one final chance to destroy the weapons and materials and stop the programs by showing evidence of that destruction or inviting UNMOVIC inspectors to view items previously listed and to destroy all of them with worldwide observation. To date, Iraq has shown no required evidence nor directed the inspectors to the weapons and materials, even though the Security Council voted 15 to zero that such a monumental defiance of the United Nations would result in grave consequences.

Now, demands are heard in our country and in other countries that the U.N. inspectors produce, quote, "smoking guns," end of quote, or dramatic pictures. The U.N. has listed the "smoking guns" in past reports. Iraqis' apparent persistence in the notion that all these past reports are illusion, that nothing ever happened, that nothing, therefore, can be reported, and that any consequence of that wholesale evasion are unwarranted are the subject of our hearing today.

The report Iraq submitted in early December on the current state of its weapons of mass destruction contains no new information, is largely a reprint of earlier documents, and still Iraqi leaders claim they have given the United Nations full cooperation. As Hans Blix reported to the Security Council, there are glaring omissions and apparent violations that Iraq has failed to explain. And he went on to point these out. Iraq has tested missiles that exceed the permitted range. Iraq has failed to prove that it destroyed all of its anthrax stockpile. Iraq has illegally imported rocket engines and fuel. Iraq has failed to account for 6,500 chemical weapons. Iraq has failed to declare 650 kilograms of bacterial growth medium that could be used in the development of biological weapons. Iraq has rebuilt missile production facilities that were destroyed by previous inspectors. And UNMOVIC inspectors have discovered precursors to mustard gas.

Now, furthermore, Iraqi scientists continue to refuse to meet with United Nations inspectors in private, and to date, those who have agreed to interviews have demanded representatives of Iraq's monitoring directorate to be present. It's apparent that Baghdad is working to discourage private meetings. On numerous occasions, I've asked UNMOVIC and the IAEA to utilize the authority that's been given to hold interviews outside of Iraq. Scientists who agree to be interviewed should be given the opportunity to emigrate with their families. Our experience has shown that these scientists are the best source of information on weapons programs.

As Iraqi intransigence has become more deliberate, President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, Great Britain, have ordered military forces into the region in increasing numbers. And the presence of these military forces in the region and insistence by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair and others on complete disarmament have been the catalyst behind what little cooperation the United Nations has received to date from Iraq.

All Americans -- all Americans -- are hopeful that military action against Iraq can be avoided. Iraqi actions are providing little encouragement to date. The list of outstanding Iraqi obligations and requirements is the same today as it was when the United Nations inspectors left in 1998, and there is little evidence that Saddam Hussein has decided to comply or to cooperate. Now, our nation will and must act when our national security interests are threatened. Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of their transfer to terrorist organizations is unacceptable. Saddam Hussein has launched chemical and biological weapons against his neighbors as well as his own people, and we cannot permit him to maintain these weapons of mass destruction.

On November 8th, the United Nations made a strong statement requiring full Iraqi compliance. Those days of hope and consensus have waned as narrower interests have begun to peel back the Security Council's unanimous support for Resolution 1441. This is unfortunate. The administration should continue to work to build support at the United Nations for full implementation of Resolution 1441, including the need for action in the absence of complete Iraqi compliance. As President Bush noted in September in his speech before the General Assembly, the United Nations faces "a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside, without consequences? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?," end of quote by the president.

In recent days, the administration has begun to consider release of highly sensitive intelligence on Iraq's weapons ambitions. I'm encouraged that Secretary Powell will visit with the Security Council and share some of our intelligence community's assessments of Iraq's behavior. I appreciate the importance, as we all do on this committee, of safeguarding sources and methods in sharing highly classified information, but I believe those risks are now outweighed by both the need to point the United Nations inspectors in the direct of suspect site and by the need to demonstrate to the Security Council and allied governments the seriousness of our purpose.

If, after continued discussions, the United Nations' support is not forthcoming, the United States must consider a different course. We must work with like-minded nations to form what President Bush has called the coalition of the willing, committed to the disarmament of Iraq.

And before I recognize our distinguished witnesses, which we welcome, I want to call upon the distinguished chairman of this committee, who has graciously relinquished the gavel, at least for a period of time, in the topsy-turvy politics of our country. (Laughter.)

I am grateful for his friendship, for his leadership, and I call upon him now for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
A Senator from Delaware
and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SEN. JOSEPH BIDEN (D-DE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I like to think I would have relinquished it voluntarily, but I doubt whether I would have. But if it's going to be relinquished, there's no single person, in my view, in the Congress more qualified to have that seat than you.

And I want to thank you for getting this right under way, not waste any time. This is -- as everyone has been saying in various fora, this is a momentous moment for the United States of America, and a great deal is at stake.

And I say to my two friends, our witnesses, that I never thought we'd get to the point where I'd have trouble seeing you, Secretary Armitage. But I'll tell you, this dais keeps getting extended. I've been here a long time. (Chuckling.) First I walked in and thought maybe my eyes were going bad. And I realized we've extended by about 10 feet; the table's moved back. So either I've been here too long or I'm going to have to get binoculars, if we keep expanding this.

And I do want the record to note that I have been calling for 12 years for a new microphone system in this place, in this, and it wasn't until we had a Republican chairman they arrived! I just -- my only regret, Mr. Chairman, is I wish that this had happened on my watch.

Now technically, we didn't organize -- technically, we didn't organize in the middle of January. These were put in in January. So I'm going to claim credit for the mikes. This is my one contribution to American foreign policy. That is, the witnesses can hear us now, which I'm not sure is a good thing.

But at any rate, let me be serious for a few moments. As we speak, the Judiciary Committee, in which I am a member, is meeting. And we are about to pass a bill that I've introduced, out of committee, providing for the ability for 500 visas for Iraqi scientists and all their families. I would urge you, Rich, to make the point to the administration it would be helpful to get this out and moving. I can't imagine it's not helpful to you, although it's not dispositive of what they may do -- the idea that -- now there's a limit of 100 -- we move it to 5(00) and the entire families of these scientists, if they so choose, to come to the United States.

Secretary Armitage, Mr. Ambassador, Ambassador Negroponte, I want to add my -- welcome both of you. We are eager to hear your testimony, and I can't think of a more critical assignment for the future standing of our country in the world than the one facing you in the immediate weeks ahead. You've been charged with making America's case to the world and building the coalition to confront and, if necessary, to forcibly disarm Saddam Hussein.

I want to commend you for your achievements to date and, in absentia, your -- not your boss --- your boss, Secretary Armitage, but not the ambassador's boss -- but I want to commend in absentia Colin Powell. I think he is the best thing since sliced bread, and I think he is doing an incredible job right now, with both of you.

By taking the issue of Iraq's disarmament to the Security Council and challenging the U.N. to enforce its own resolutions, as the president did in the brilliant speech that he made -- I think the most significant speech, in my view, he's made since he's been president -- have made Iraq the world's problem, not just our own. And I can't emphasize enough how much I agree with you that it must remain the world's problem, not just our own.

You've achieved an outcome that your detractors thought impossible, but as, I'm going to be frank to say, I predicted you'd be able to do; and that is, you got the Security Council to vote unanimously last fall for demanding Iraq's disarmament. And I predict you will be able to do it -- if not unanimously, with the German abstention, in all probability -- you will be able to do that again for a second resolution. At least I hope that is going to be the outcome. And I know you're going to attempt to pursue that, although you're not committed to that position that you must get a U.N. resolution. But clearly, clearly, clearly it would be in our overwhelming interest if that were able to be done.

I look forward to your analysis of the reports issued this week by the United Nations weapons inspectors. To me, they clearly show -- they clearly show -- that Saddam continues to thumb his nose at the world and is in material breach -- and is in material breach -- of the 1441, the most recent U.N. resolution. They bolster the case that the United States has made that Iraq is violating the terms of surrender.

And I want to term them in terms of surrender. I am so frustrated by some other parts of this administration of injecting into this debate a notion relating to preemption that has not a damn thing to do with whether or not we move against Saddam Hussein. I would hope the president and everyone else would stop talking about a doctrine you can't even explain -- you can't even explain -- to the American public, you can't explain to us, because it's confusing the rest of the world. We are not acting, if we act, preemptively. We are enforcing a surrender document. Saddam Hussein invaded another country. The world responded. If this were 1930, he would have signed a peace agreement. It's not. We have the United Nations. He signed on to -- in return for his ability to stay in power, he made a commitment to the world, several commitments. Enforcing that if necessary is not preemption -- is not preemption -- whatever the hell that doctrine is supposed to mean

And so I really think you -- I would respectfully suggest that when you talk about this, you not further confuse the devil out of the rest of the world and make us sound like a bunch of cowboys, that we're going to be out there preemptively imposing our view. This is an enforcement of a binding international legal commitment that a man made to save his skin and stay in power.

In a legal sense, it's clear that Iraq is in material breach, but the court of international opinion is not a court of law. You have to meet a higher standard of proof, not legally have to meet it, but practically, to enhance our greater interest. We have to meet a higher standard of proof in order to convince the Security Council and the thousands and thousands of people out there -- millions -- who do not understand and are not ready to believe.

I'm going to say something that's mildly controversial, but since I said it in front of 500 world leaders the last three days in Davos, every world leader in Europe and the Middle East knows he's in material breach. They know it. Why aren't they responding? We have no -- with the possible exception of England -- significant powerful leader in Europe today. That's not a criticism, it's an observation. And they are unwilling, in my view, to stand up in the face of public opinion in their communities, that run from 95 percent to 70 percent against this war, based upon him being in material breach as defined. So we got to help them. We got to help them because they know, they know he's in material breach.

And I sincerely hope -- and I join Senator Lugar in the -- the best news I heard in the president's speech was on the 5th, the secretary of State is going to go lay out this case.

This is about further strengthening -- the concern that I hear, and I know you have to respond to, and you hear it -- you won't -- I'm not suggesting you should acknowledge it, but I'm going to say it, that people who are our friends, countries who our friends and our allies, they are talking about, well, you can't move based upon a doctrine of preemption. They're asking about, is this about oil? Is it about further strengthening the United States' already predominant position as a world power? Much of this skepticism is undeserved, but none of it is unfamiliar to either of you, given your daily contact with foreign governments.

Some might ask why it matters what other countries think. I'm sure I'll get phone calls and letters saying what -- "Biden, you're talking about caring about what these other countries think. We're America. What does it matter what they think?" Well, it matters a great deal. It matters because while we can do this alone, while we are fully capable of doing this alone, we are so much better off, so much better off if we do it with others. Having others with us increases our chance of success, and by success I mean not just taking down Saddam. That is not the measure of success. The measure of success is that we take him down, if need be; we gather up and destroy the weapons of mass destruction; and we are assured that there is a government in place that is not likely to reconstitute the menace and threat. That is a gigantic undertaking that exceeds merely the military operation. And it also, if we have others with us, decreases the risk and lowers the cost, and it invests others in the complicated matter of the day after, or more appropriately, in my view, the decade after. And it does not make us a target of every terrorist and malcontent in the world, if we are not doing this alone.

It matters. It matters in terms of our naked self-interest.

In my view, to gain international support, the administration is going to have to have a more consistent message that this is about enforcing the terms of surrender between Saddam and the Security Council. I believe, presumptuous of me to say -- well, it's not presumptuous, I've been here longer than most of you -- I believe it's important to marshal the best evidence available to our government to demonstrate irrefutably that Iraq is not only failing to account, but is in violation and continues to demonstrate -- and we have evidence that it demonstrates -- an ability to thwart the efforts of the inspectors. There is a policy of deception that is underway, and the world has to be told it.

This is important to do not only for a skeptical international community but, I'd respectfully suggest, for all our constituents, where we live. The best way, I think, to do this is -- I believe there is a compelling case to make. I hope that it leads the U.N. Security Council to pass a second resolution to disarm Iraq and, if Iraq refuses to disarm itself, I believe, otherwise -- as Secretary Powell and President Bush, as they have said -- the Security Council risks undermining its credibility in a permanent sense.

And I am one of those who believes that there is great promise. The more powerful we are, the more predominant our power, the more we need the United Nations, in my view, not the less we need it; the more we need it, because our motives, as -- Mr. Ambassador, I have never, in all my years of attending international meetings with heads of state and foreign ministers, ever heard our motives questioned as much as they are today. Not merely our judgment. We're used to that. But they're questioning our motives. And that is corrosive. And that's why I believe, if we're smart -- and you are, clearly, and you're doing a great job -- if we're smart, we will be able to strengthen the United Nations in the process here so our motives are not always the thing in question.

I would hope that the resolution would make clear that Saddam once and for all must choose between giving up his weapons of mass destruction and giving up power. And I hope it would make it clear to the world that the choice between war and peace is Saddam's choice, not our choice. I think this is the single best way to avoid war. My unsolicited advice -- well, solicited advice to some of the heads of state that attended this meeting, and foreign ministers, was if you really don't want us to go to war, join us. Join us. Join us in making it clear to Saddam that we're united, we're united in the resolve that he must give up these weapons. Absent that, I think there is no chance we'll be able to avoid war.

Mr. Chairman, last summer you and I held a series of in-depth hearings on Iraq, and our goal was to begin a national dialogue so the American people would be better informed about the threat Iraq poses, the options available to us, the regional considerations and, finally, what was going to be asked of them, the American people. Those hearings and today's hearings and subsequent hearings you have planned, in my view, are critical because I believe that no foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. And unfortunately, and it's not a criticism -- again, it's an observation -- it may not be the time -- but unfortunately, there has been not much informed consent thus far. In my view, the American people have a very distorted but understandable view of what lies ahead.

The vast majority of people in my state assume that if we go to war, Johnny's going to come marching home after a three-week encounter and it's going to be like the first one, and that we're not going to be tied down and engaged for the -- to the tune of billions of dollars; which I support, by the way. I'm not arguing -- this is not a reason not to go if we have to.

But it is a reason to explain to all our constituents, so we're not sitting here two years from now when we're trying to pass an authorization for an additional $20 billion to maintain forces and maintain our effort to maintain a stable government in Iraq to keep that area from imploding, and we are told on the floor, "No, you guys, that's a foreign policy thing; we really have to go out there and take care of the Delaware River dredging an we have to take care of a problem in Tennessee, we have to take care of some other economic and pressing need, whether it relates to education or health care."

The American people have to know up front what we're about to sign them on to. The American people have yet to have a clear explanation of why war may be the only remaining alternative and what authority we are using to go to war and what will be expected of them, not only winning the war but in securing the peace.

In last summer's hearings, we were told that we would have to stay in Iraq in large numbers for a long time at high cost. Now, initially the administration, the White House -- not denied, but suggested it would not mean that kind of commitment. There are reports now -- we were told then it would take 75,000 forces in place for at least three to five yeas, some suggested as long as 10 years, and we'd be engaged in a thing that no one in this administration, understandably -- or any administration -- wants to utter a phrase -- "nation building."

Gentlemen and ladies of this committee, understand we're about to embark in a commitment of nation building. Our warriors will not only win and fight wars, they will be required to build a nation, or at least reconstruct a government. And the American people don't understand that. I'm confident they're wiling to bear this burden if it's explained to them. They should not be surprised when, two years after this war is over, they see tens of thousands or thousands of American forces, American troops, in Iraq, some of whom are being shot at guarding oil wells, some of whom are going to be on a border and going to end up being killed trying to secure that border so Iranians don't think they have part of northern Iraq, and the Kurds don't think they can move into Kirkuk, so that -- and so on and so forth.

It's a big-deal job coming up. They should be -- not be sandbagged by the sudden choice down the road that requires them to choose between supporting the continued presence in Iraq and other vital needs our country has. It will be incumbent upon the administration in the coming days to level with the American people about the commitment they will be asked. The president's made that commitment personally to me and to many of us in the Cabinet room. And I believe he will do it at the appropriate time if there is nothing left, no alternative left but war. They should know what are the risks, what's coming to them, what will be the cost how long it will take, to the best of our knowledge, and can we afford to remove Saddam Hussein and rebuild Iraq and pay for homeland security and all the other things we have to deal with.

Raising these questions and others should not, in my view, be an excuse for inaction, but we owe to the American people to be straight up with them.

I'll conclude by saying to you, although it's a very different circumstance -- that is, the preparation to go in and respond as we had to in World War II and what we know we're about to do now -- we're still talking about a couple hundred thousand forces.

And I'm looking forward to the president and the administration doing what I think all presidents must do in such circumstances, is stand up, as Franklin Roosevelt did, and forthrightly say there will be pain, there will be costs, there will be loss of life, and there will be -- we'll be asking of you for your treasure -- the treasure, our money -- in order to be able to finish a very important job.

I strongly recommend, and sincerely hope, and look forward to, if the diplomatic route is in fact exhausted -- if it is exhausted -- that we will have that frank assessment, because the American people will do whatever is asked of them, but they will resent keenly the implication that we are doing this for a reason that is not real -- and I would argue al Qaeda is one of those reasons; and further, implying to them that this will be essentially a costless, bloodless undertaking. They will do what's asked of them.

I know the two men before us cannot speak in that sense for the administration, but I know them to be men of integrity intellectual and personal, and I know that they will give us straight answers to the questions we have today. I look forward to it. I believe you can count on the support of the vast majority of this committee in your effort to try to diplomatically solve this. And I would suggest you'll get the support of the Congress overwhelmingly, if all alternatives are exhausted, if in fact there is a leveling with the American people and the world community what's at stake here and what we're committing to.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Let me mention three things before we greet our witnesses. As Senator Biden has noted, the table is longer. Ideally there is more elbow room for members and for staff. And secondly, the microphones, mercifully, do work, and members can be heard. The problem is, members will need to press the button in front of them to make sure the microphone works, and then preferably to press the button again when the statement, editorial, or what have you, has been completed.

Thirdly, we will have other meetings of the committee shortly that -- and I appreciate attendance already today of 15 out of our 19 members . Given conflicts, senators have gone back and forth to make quorums in other committees. But this is important business. And next --

SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D-CA): (Off mike.)

SEN. LUGAR: You can't be heard. (Laughter.)

SEN. BIDEN: (Chuckles.) There is no circumstances in which Senator Boxer will not be able to be heard, I assure you.

SEN. LUGAR: It will be remedied, yes. Relief will come.

Let me mention that we are mindful of other policy issues, and next Tuesday we will be discussing North Korea. On Wednesday, we will have a business meeting and, hopefully, mark up legislation on HIV/AIDS, and a very ambitious program that the president has mentioned, that members who are on this committee have helped formulate -- Senator Kerry, Senator Frist in particular, and many others. And then on Thursday, we will have Secretary Powell, in which he will make his initial appearance. And that will be a highlight, as it always is. And then we will be back to Iraq to discuss, as Senator Biden suggested, what happens in the months and years that follow; what are our obligations, what sort of planning is our administration doing. And I know our administration figures will be eager to share with us their thoughts on how other nations and other factors may come into this.

I will not go beyond that, except to say that Afghanistan comes very shortly thereafter, to see what all is going on there now and how we may be helpful in our work.

And then finally, in the course of this month, we will discuss the authorization bill, really one of the essential factors of this committee. And I've asked all members to be creative. This is their opportunity. This is an opportunity, likewise, for Secretary Powell and for you, Mr. Armitage, and for the department to think about robust diplomacy for our country, all the various forms of assistance -- economic, strategic, human rights and so forth -- that we want to do, and to work with our president and with the budget committee and with all the powers that be, so that we are able to fulfill these aims.

SEN. BIDEN: You thought I was aggressive!

SEN. LUGAR: Now we call upon the distinguished deputy, Mr. Armitage, a good friend of the committee. He has been testifying here for over a generation. But this is a very important day, and we welcome you.

MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Chairman Biden. I was contemplating coming up here, Senator Lugar, that you and I have been doing this for 23 years. At least I've had the honor of being in front of you for 23 years, with a short break. But even in the time out of government, I was able to come up at the request of the committee from time to time, and always found myself much better off for it.

And I think, speaking for John and for myself, we're delighted to be at your first meeting as you hold the gavel of chairmanship. And I'm sure the attendance here reflects the enthusiasm that Senator Biden engendered in this committee and which you've carried on.

And Chairman Biden, I'm not going to take the bait on the question of the microphone being the only accomplishment. The fact of the matter is, we could spend all the time allotted for this hearing talking about the accomplishments, but I'd like to signal one. Last year, during your chairmanship, you held a series of public discussions and hearings on Iraq, which really broadened, opened up the discussion to the public, as well as helped the administration to sharpen their thinking. So look, we know the truth and are very grateful for it.

SEN. BIDEN: (Inaudible.)

MR. ARMITAGE: I'd just ask you, Mr. Chairman, if you'll be kind enough to put our statements or at least my statement in the record. I'm not going to read it. I just want to make a few comments, which I've jotted down here.

SEN. LUGAR: With unanimous consent, that will be done.

MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. GEORGE ALLEN (R-VA): You want to capitalize "Mack" in "Mack truck."

MR. ARMITAGE: (Laughs.) Right. Got it. Thank you. (Subdued laughter.)

In October of 2001, less than a teaspoon of anthrax in an envelope brought chaos to this body. Several hundred of your employees had to undergo emergency medical treatment. The building next door was closed. And ultimately two members of the Postal Service died, and the building in which they worked has yet to reopen.

Saddam Hussein, according to UNSCOM, the special commission, has 25,000 liters of anthrax. That's over 5 million teaspoons of anthrax. And he has yet to account for a single grain.

That is why we are so alert to take your invitation up, Mr. Chairman, and get up here, because we feel a sense of urgency. And from our point of view, that's evidence of it.

Now you're absolutely correct; we've had quite a week. Monday Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei made their comments to the Security Council, and on Tuesday the government of Great Britain announced that in their view, what they heard constituted a further material breach -- something that we heartily concur in.

Tuesday night, the president made his -- what I thought a compelling State of the Union address, in which he announced that Secretary Powell would indeed, on the 5th of February, go to New York and present some of this evidence to the Security Council. But let me be clear: This is more than simply an appearance before the Security Council. This will be open; we're going to try to lay this out for the world. There are some leaders, as you suggest, Chairman Biden, that do not want to lead. So we'll try, as you suggest, to make it a little easier.

Now 12 years have gone by in which Saddam Hussein, to use your phrase, sir, has thumbed his nose at the international community. He's thought that he could do just what he pleased; he could have it both ways and not pay any personal price. Those days are over. He felt that because he faced a series of resolutions that had no teeth.

In September, President Bush went to New York and made a very strong case that we would try to get a resolution, and we did. We got a resolution with teeth, a resolution that was backed by a very strong vote of the House and the Senate, Joint Resolution H. 114, which authorized the use of force under certain conditions, which are laid out in the legislation.

And these -- this 1441 had two simple tests. The first was a declaration that was to be full, currently accurate and complete. Saddam Hussein failed that test, and had a second simple test, and that was to cooperate; to cooperate actively, immediately and unconditionally with the inspection regime. He failed that test.

Now, there are many in the international community who call out that we need to give the so-called inspectors more time. And my view is that's the wrong question. The question to ask is -- or to contemplate is how much time has Iraq already been given? In my view, 12 years and two months and several days now. Inspections continue, but inspectors, as Secretary Powell noted the other day, can grope around in the dark. This is not a scavenger hunt; this is not hide- and-seek; they're there to verify, and to verify, they count on cooperation.

The question is not how long should be given for inspectors to grope in the dark, but when Saddam Hussein is going to turn on the light. And I think it's quite clear from the president's comments on the State of the Union that if Saddam Hussein doesn't turn on the light, the lights will be turned on peacefully or forcibly, and you're exactly correct: It's his choice. But one thing I'm going to make clear: He's got to make that choice in a hurry. And I think that was equally clear from the comments of the president at the State of the Union and yesterday in his travels.

In our view, the lack of cooperation -- simple cooperation from Saddam Hussein indicates that he's intent on holding on to these weapons for three simple reasons: He wants them to either dominate or to intimidate or to attack. The president said the other evening in the State of the Union that for us to trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, neither is it an option.

So I welcome the opportunity to be here, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to very vigorous give and take with the members of this excellent committee. Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Secretary Armitage.

It's a privilege to have our ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, veteran diplomat, ambassador, likewise a good friend of the committee -- testified frequently, but very important testimony today.

It's great to have you, sir. And if you'll proceed.B. NEGROPONTE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And it's a pleasure to be before the committee once again.

As the deputy secretary has said, Resolution 1441 presented Iraq with a requirement to disarm, and two tests: one, that Iraq would submit -- and I quote -- "a currently accurate, full and complete" -- unquote -- declaration of all aspects of its WMD programs and delivery systems; and two, would Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

The presentations we heard on Monday in the Security Council confirm that in spite of the urgency introduced into Resolution 1441, Iraq did not meet either test.

The declaration was a fundamental test of cooperation and intent, and Iraq failed it resoundingly. On January 27th, Dr. Blix himself again said, "The declaration does not" -- and I'm quoting here -- "clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues. Regrettably" -- and I'm continuing to quote here -- "the 12,000-page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their numbers." End of quote.

And then the inspectors' reports go on to raise a number of key issues that are still unanswered, and to which you referred to in your statement, Mr. Chairman, and so has Secretary Armitage also, so I won't repeat them in detail, but they relate to the VX; to the Iraqi air force document that indicates that there are at least 6,500 chemical bombs, weapons bombs, unaccounted for; unanswered questions about 122mm chemical rocket warheads, 12 of which were just found by UNMOVIC in a bunker that was constructed since 1998, that is to say since the weapons inspections ended under UNSCOM. So this is evidence of continued activity on their part, after the inspectors were no longer able to operate in Iraq at the end of 1998.

Dr. Blix also said that there are strong indications -- and this, of course, is particularly troublesome -- that Iraq produced more than the 8,500 liters of anthrax it admitted to, and claims to have unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided -- again, and these are Dr. Blix's words -- "no additional or convincing evidence on anthrax production and destruction."

They also did not declare some 650 kilograms of bacterial growth media, and deliberately deleted information about the importation of this media that Iraq had previously provided in 1999.

There remain some significant questions about Scud missiles. And Iraq is developing two missiles, the liquid-fuel Al-Samoud, and the solid-fuel Al-Fatah, which UNMOVIC knows, knows for a fact were tested at ranges greater than 150 kilometers, the range limited established in Resolution 687, which was the resolution that closely followed the end of the war.

Dr. Blix said, and again, I quote, "The missiles" -- I think this is a very important quote -- "The missiles might very well represent a prima facie case of proscribed systems," end of quote. And in reply to a question that I put to Dr. Blix in the Security Council yesterday afternoon, he said he expected to make a determination in this regard quite soon.

Iraq has casting chambers for solid fuel missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers and has imported other equipment, including 380 rocket engines. Dr. Blix said again, quote, "These items may well be for proscribed purposes," end of quote. And we definitely believe that they are.

Based on a tip, UNMOVIC discovered -- an intelligence tip -- UNMOVIC discovered some 3,000 official documents in a private home that deal with such subjects as laser enrichment of uranium. And Dr. Blix again remarked that he, and I quote, "could not help but think," unquote, that other private residents -- residences may contain troves of such documents.

The declaration is also silent on any steps since 1998 with regard to Iraq's nuclear program, to mobile biological weapons labs or, indeed, any new activities since the inspections ended. So they would have us believe that since the inspections ended in 1998, they had engaged in none of these proscribed activities, which is laughable on its face.

The inspectors acknowledged that there has been Iraqi cooperation on process, but that is not the substantive and the active cooperation that the council requires. The resolution determined that, and again I quote, "Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access," end of quote, and unimpeded movement.

Instead, we see attempts to intimidate UNMOVIC by large numbers of minders -- at times, as many as five minders for each inspector -- as well as so-called spontaneous demonstrations and restrictions masked by concerns for safety. Dr. Blix himself has told us that the presence of minders, and I quote, "bordered on harassment," end of quote, and described some recent disturbing incidents, including official allegations that the inspectors are spying. This is hardly the attitude of a government that wishes to cooperate with the inspection process.

The Iraqi government now claims it cannot ensure that its citizens will allow inspectors entrance to private property. And Iraq has refused to allow the free and unrestricted use of U-2s on missions, a clear violation of 1441.

Inspectors must also have immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC and the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice.

But UNMOVIC and IAEA have not been able to obtain private interviews -- not a single one, even after belated assurances two weeks ago that the government would encourage its citizens to accept private meetings. Inspectors have noted that they have not been provided with all the names of personnel in Iraq's former and current WMD programs as required.

On the question of nuclear proliferation, the IAEA director- general, ElBaradei, informed the council that to date, the IAEA, and I quote, "found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the 1990s." End of quote. That said, Dr. ElBaradei was also clear that to date, Iraq had only provided passive support, not "proactive support," to use his words.

It's well to recall, however, that in 1991, the IAEA was on the verge of declaring Iraq nuclear weapons-free, when subsequent inspections, based on defector information, revealed an extensive, secret nuclear weapons program -- a reminder that we can never be complacent when it comes to Iraqi veracity.

The IAEA also has outstanding questions that Iraq's declaration failed to address. And according to Dr. ElBaradei, these include weapons design and centrifuge development. And the IAEA has not yet completed its evaluation of aluminum tubes.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we believe that Iraq is not disarming. The council's unanimity in support of Resolution 1441 was the result of enormous diplomatic energy. There was substantial give-and-take over weeks of negotiation because we all understood that President Bush had transformed the debate and the importance of the undertaking. Iraq has failed the tests set out by 1441 and is close to squandering its final opportunity.

And I might just add as a closing note, as the deputy secretary mentioned, council members, of course, are looking forward with great interest to the meeting that we will be having next week when Secretary Powell will be addressing the council with respect to information and intelligence we have with respect to Iraq's non- compliance with Resolution 1441, and the programs of denial and deception in which they are engaged in order to totally frustrate the inspection process.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Ambassador Negroponte.

Parenthetically, let me just comment, because I think it's relevant. Last Wednesday, I was privileged to witness a conversation between the president of the United States and the secretary-general, Kofi Annan, in which our president affirmed the strong support we have of the United Nations, our prayer, really, that the United Nations will be more and more successful not only in this endeavor, but in several others that we have ahead of us on the trail. And the secretary-general understands the gravity of this situation in terms of the future of the United Nations and the credibility. So that is a firm understanding, face-to-face, between two very important individuals in this world.

I would say to the committee, the secretary-general has asked that I work with the ranking member for a day in which the committee might go to the United Nations.

He would like to be our host and to provide a remarkable opportunity for learning and participation. And so I take that seriously, and I mention that so that we can all think, as it's always difficult to find times for him and for us, but an important mission for us.

SEN. BIDEN: Will you yield on one -- very -- very, very briefly.bassador, thought when you left the role of being out in other hinterlands that you would never hear the words again "here comes a codel". (Laughter.) But --

SEN. LUGAR: With that welcome intervention, why -- (laughter).

Now, let me say that we've consulted briefly here on -- in fact, we have many members here today. The ranking member agrees that our procedure should be that we will move the chairman's question, ranking member's question, then Senator Hagel, and then Senator Dodd -- in other words, in seniority by both parties with a seven-minute limit, and with the veteran Bertie Bowman (sp) on the clock. (Laughter.) For those who have not experienced Mr. Bowman (sp), he has outlasted all of us on this committee -- (laughter) -- a rigorous timekeeper. And the green light will go on at the beginning of the seven limits. With one minute to go, the yellow light, caution signal, and the red, the final termination, hopefully, of both the answer as well as the question. But we will try to be liberal in interpretation.

Let me just say, I've already had an opportunity to give my views on the subject, and I will pass at this point and turn to the distinguished ranking member for his questions.

SEN. BIDEN: And I'll -- I have several questions, but just ask one, if I may. The administration officials, including the president, on Tuesday night have repeatedly asserted that the Iraqi government maintains ties with members of the al Qaeda network. Are you able to tell us what evidence you have to support that claim? And as a follow-on to that, what is this -- why is it that we spend, it seems, so much time on making the assertions that are the least -- or, the most difficult to prove, including the aluminum tubes, when we have such overwhelming evidence of the failure of Iraq to comply with the existence -- with 1441? It seems to undercut our case. We lead with the two things that may be true but are the most difficult to prove. And we seem not to do what you guys did here today; very compellingly talk about VX, anthrax, things we know.

So it's a two-part question. One, what evidence, if you're able to share with us, is there about direct connection between Saddam and al Qaeda? And two, what is the rationale for how we've been leading thus far, and will it change with the evidence we're presenting?

MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you, sir. On the question of al Qaeda in this forum, I'll say that it's clear that al Qaeda is harbored, to some extent, in Iraq, that there is a presence in Iraq. There are other indications of some -- a recent assassination of our diplomat in Amman, Mr. Folley, that was apparently orchestrated by an al Qaeda member who's resident in Baghdad. Having said that, I am not making the case here that this is a 9/11 connection. But I will make the case that the president has made consistently, sir, and that is that it is the thirst for the weapons of mass destruction and our belief that if Saddam Hussein can pass them to people who will do us ill without being caught, he will do it, that gives us so much concern.

And this will be part of the information that Secretary Powell is going to impart in some more detail. They're busy back home right now trying to declassify as much as possible to give him a pretty full case.

On the question of why we spend so much time on things that are difficult to prove, perhaps particularly on the aluminum tubes, we miscalculated. Clearly, there's a difference of opinion in the intelligence community, which we came up and briefed forthrightly and, indeed, deliberately.

SEN. BIDEN: I agree, you did.

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, the reason we did it deliberately was to show you we're not playing "hide the bacon" here; there is a difference of opinion. I believe that, as I indicated to Senator Hagel the other day in a conversation, that the view is shifting on this more toward the side that this has a relationship to nuclear activities rather than rocket motors. But perhaps we miscalculated. And I take your comments as a sign to, as we used to say in the Navy, KISS, "Keep it simple, sailor," go with your strong points.

SEN. BIDEN: I yield back the rest of my time, Mr. --

SEN. LUGAR: I thank you.

Senator Hagel.

SEN. HAGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Negroponte. I add my appreciation to what has already been stated here this morning from our distinguished chairman and ranking members for your leadership, Secretary Powell's. Historic, dangerous, difficult, challenging times, and we -- I believe we're all grateful that the two of you, Secretary Powell and his team are in the positions you are in. So we appreciate your good work. Thank you.

There has been some discussion here this morning about the possibility of a second U.N. security resolution. Mr. Secretary, in consultation with our U.N. ambassador, what is the position of the United States government on a second resolution? And what would be the prospects, in your enlightened opinion, of a second resolution? Not is it required, but what's the position of the United States? Are we opposed to it? And what are the prospects for the French or someone moving in the Security Council on a second resolution?

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator, thank you for your comments about Secretary Powell and his leadership. We appreciate it greatly. I'll start, and I think John will finish.

We find a second resolution desirable but, as you suggest, not absolutely necessary, for all the reasons that Chairman Biden laid out, particularly the Resolution 678, which does already authorize all necessary means. Having said that, Secretary Powell will make his presentation on the 5th, and after that, we'll kind of assess the tone and tenor of the discussions. We'll let this germinate a bit, with Ambassador Negroponte talking with his colleagues, and then we'll make a judgment.

Now, a second resolution could run the gamut from a very -- a resolution that simply finds that Iraq has not complied, to, the far end, authorizing all necessary means. So when we talk about a second resolution, there are any number of subsets of it. But -- John?B. NEGROPONTE: As you correctly -- as Senator Biden, I think, correctly said earlier, 1441 doesn't require nor does 687 require a second resolution. and the secretary said it also. I think there's going to be a lot of diplomatic activity, both now -- we've got Prime Minister Blair coming to meet with the president, then Secretary Powell's briefing to the council.

And then I think we're going to enter into sort of a dynamic phase of our diplomacy and are going to be -- have to be taking the temperature of how our colleagues on the council feel about this, faced with both the determined position of the United States on this question, and a dynamic situation.

One thing I would caution against is trying to prejudge the outcome or divisions within the council. I think we faced -- and we have some interesting examples during the past year or so, of situations that we faced where the council appeared to be divided initially, but through the hard work and effort of the diplomacy of our president and our secretary of State, we ultimately were able to reach consensus.

SEN. HAGEL: So the position of the United States government today, if I understand it, is not necessarily opposed to a second resolution. We would evaluate it, based on the substance, and possibly support a second resolution. Is that right?B. NEGROPONTE: I mean, I believe that -- yes. And it would be desirable to achieve --

SEN. HAGEL: Do you think it's likely that we'll see a second resolution proposed? B. NEGROPONTE: I would not want to make that prediction at this point in time. But as the deputy secretary said, I think it would be desirable, and it is more desirable -- the more friends one can mobilize in an enterprise of this kind, the better off you are.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, you have just recited a rather bleak assessment of the inspections up to this point in the inspectors' report, although, as we know, Doctors ElBaradei and Blix have both suggested that those inspections continue.

Now, with that very bleak assessment, which I read into it, the United States government thinks essentially they're worthless and they have not produced anything except buying time for Saddam, then why -- or are we? -- supporting continued inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: Well, I don't think, Senator, that we've written off the inspections themselves. The problem isn't the inspections, it's the attitude of Iraq. And I think --

SEN. HAGEL: Are we supporting continued time for inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: Well, at the present time -- we have not taken any decision to discontinue our support for inspections, if that's the question.

SEN. HAGEL: So essentially, the government's position is we continue to support inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: At the moment, we do, yes. But if I could just complete the thought --

SEN. HAGEL: Sure.B. NEGROPONTE: -- I think that the -- the onus is on Iraq to cooperate. And if nothing else, the process thus far has demonstrated an unwillingness on the part of Iraq to be fully and unconditionally and immediately and proactively cooperative.

SEN. HAGEL: But we are supporting continued -- we are supporting continued inspections?B. NEGROPONTE: At the moment, we are.

SEN. HAGEL: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned -- I think your quote was, "Saddam Hussein must make that choice in a hurry." To your point, Mr. Ambassador. What then would be our thinking about if inspections go forward, which I assume they will, which you just said, that we're not opposed to that for the moment. You also said that we'll have consultations next week based on a number of things that will be happening.

But what, then, is the time frame? Are we going to lay down -- the United States lay down in the Security Council a time frame? All right, two weeks, three weeks, we go to war? Where are we?

MR. ARMITAGE: Yeah. As the president said, Senator, no decision has been made. However, he has instructed us to engage for the next few weeks in intensive diplomacy to try to resolve this peacefully. So, I think the best time frame I can give you is this is a matter of weeks and not months, sir.

SEN. HAGEL: In consultation with the Security Council, based on facts and intelligence reports the secretary will lay out.

One last question before a very conservative evaluation of our time frame here and Bertie gavels me down. Intelligence-sharing with the inspectors; are we sharing enough, not enough, too much? Are they getting what they need, what's important for them?

MR. ARMITAGE: We have 108 inspectors in the field right now -- 256 total, but many of them are support people. We have increased, as they've gone forward, the amount of intelligence. I am given to understand that they've got just about what they can handle. They're getting -- about to graduate another 57 inspectors, so we'll have more in the field, and that would indicate to me that we ought to be pushing more intelligence ahead. The secretary of State has used the phrase, "We want to flood the zone; as much as they can take, feed 'em," sir.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes?

SEN. PAUL SARBANES (D-MD): Well, thank you very much, Chairman. It's the intention to increase significantly the number of inspectors, is that what I'm to draw from your last response?

MR. ARMITAGE: It is to increase the number -- I wouldn't characterize it -- we are graduating -- or there is graduating a number -- another class of 57, a majority of which would be available to go into the field to add to the 108 that are already in the field inspecting. And another 100-plus who are involved in support and flying, et cetera, Senator.

SEN. SARBANES: What is the difficulty that you perceive with allowing the inspectors to continue to do their work in an intensified manner over a period of time?

MR. ARMITAGE: I think that we agree that the -- ought to be intensified inspections over a period of time. Perhaps the disagreement we have, sir, is over the amount of time. And from our point of view, 12 years, two months and several days is about enough time. But we haven't quite given up yet.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, is this regime a more rigorous regime that they're operating under now than when they went in before?

MR. ARMITAGE: (Pause.) I'm getting my brains behind me on this, Senator.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I think Ambassador Negroponte could answer that question.B. NEGROPONTE: Well, I was just going to add an element to it, which is -- they're already, in our judgment in material -- in further material breach. So, I think --

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I understand that. I mean, the president keeps saying he hasn't made up his mind, but it seems to me he's defined the problem in such a way that he has to go to war. Because he, in effect, has said if we don't find -- if the inspectors don't find any hidden weapons, Saddam is being extremely good at hiding them. And if they do find them, then it just shows that he was in violation and, therefore, has to be punished. So, the problem has been defined in such a way that it seems to me a war is the only conclusion you can draw.

Other than the very remote possibility that he will leave the country -- I don't know how much weight to give to that -- but other than that, the issue has been defined in such a way that there's no alternative but to go to war.

And yet the president keeps saying, "Well, I haven't made up my mind about going to war." And yet we're positioning large numbers of troops and logistics and so forth in the area. It's all geared to go to war. And presumably at some point here he's going to turn and say, "Well, now I've decided to go to war." But it seems to me that decision, in effect, was made when the problem was defined in such a way that there was no alternative.

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator, I'll answer the previous question, but let me try to take this first. The decision -- the problem was defined by Resolution 1441, which required Saddam Hussein to cooperate, and he's the one who's not cooperating. Had he made the disclosures, it was quite clear we'd be having a different debate. And if he makes a full disclosure tomorrow, we'll be having a different debate.

On the question of moving forces, there is no question, I think, in most people's mind -- I'll defer to John's analysis of the council -- that we wouldn't even have UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq without the threat of the use of force. And I think that's generally accepted.

And finally, on the previous question, which I didn't --

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I accept that proposition. But once you succeeded in doing that and getting the inspectors in with what I understand is a more rigorous regime than when they were previously in Iraq, it's not quite clear to me why we then don't play out that path.

Now if the inspectors -- first of all, does the presence of the inspectors, in your view, inhibit Saddam's activities with respect to weapons of mass destruction?

MR. ARMITAGE: It occurs to me that in a state the size of California, with 23 million people, that several hundred -- if it gets to that -- inspectors probably in the most minimal way inhibits him, as he, I would think, has to pay some -- play some hide-and-seek with us. But when you look at the size of the problem, if we have to depend on inspectors to ferret out the information, we can't get there from here, Senator.

SEN. SARBANES: Yeah. What about several thousand inspectors?

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, I don't know. Would I say several thousand is better than 2(00) or 300? At some point in time, if you're not going to cooperate, you're not going to cooperate. And more inspectors are not going to force the cooperation, just force more obfuscation.

SEN. SARBANES: What is your definition of cooperation?

MR. ARMITAGE: The definition is not my definition, sir; it's the definition of Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei that any --

SEN. SARBANES: But apparently their view is that they need and should have a significant -- more time for their inspectors to carry out their tasks. Isn't that their view, as I understand it?

MR. ARMITAGE: I have certainly heard Dr. ElBaradei say that, sir. And that's his opinion. The decision rests with the Security Council.

(To Ambassador Negroponte.) John, you've talked to Hans --B. NEGROPONTE: Well, I think also the definition of cooperation is in the resolution, and it's quite elaborate, allowing U-2 flights, allowing unrestricted access, cooperating proactively. And all of these things are things that Iraq is not doing at the moment. I think the fundamental difficulty is that as far as Iraq is concerned, this seems to be business as usual. It's the way they dealt with inspections in the past.

With regard to your question about --

SEN. SARBANES: Do you think these inspectors are being -- they're not getting greater access than they had in the past?B. NEGROPONTE: They are getting -- in process -- they're getting some procedural cooperation. They're getting access to the sites that they've asked to go to. They've gone to, I think, some 300 sites or 250, and most of them are sites that had previously been identified and previously been inspected. Those they're getting access to. But we consider this to be just procedural.

As far as whether they've -- moving materials, continuing to hide materials that they have, giving access, for example, to private interviews for scientists, the U-2 issue that we mentioned earlier --

SEN. SARBANES: I understand the --B. NEGROPONTE: -- as far as we're concerned, the substantive cooperation --

SEN. SARBANES: How much of the information which the administration has in terms of its suspicions about sites and what ought to be inspected and where the inspectors ought to go, and so forth, is being provided to the inspectors? It's my understanding that there's a very large amount of information of that sort, but that only a small portion of it has been given to the inspectors in terms of leading them to places that we think should be looked at. Is that correct?B. NEGROPONTE: As the deputy secretary said, the secretary's instructions were to flood the zone. We have been providing packages of intelligence information. I think it's important that it be actionable by the inspectors. But yes, we have been providing substantial information to them, and so have other friendly countries.

SEN. SARBANES: But --

Mr. Chairman, could I just get an answer to that question?

How much -- in the total picture, what you have, how much are you giving to the inspectors?B. NEGROPONTE: (That's for you ?).

MR. ARMITAGE: I'll have to supply it for the record. I don't know the answer in percentage terms, Senator. So I would -- if you'll allow, will supply it. I don't know it.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you for supplying it for the record.

SEN. SARBANES: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Chafee.

SEN. LINCOLN CHAFEE (R-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll just follow up on Senator Sarbanes' line of questioning.

It seems as though we're arguing over how much cooperation and obstruction is being -- is taking place in Iraq. But Hans Blix did say in his report to the United Nations the prompt access, open door policy that has been pursued so far by the Iraqi vis-a-vis the inspectors is an indispensable element of transparency in a process that aims at securing disarmament by a peaceful means. How do you react to him saying that? That -- those are his words. (Pause.) He's saying he is getting prompt access and an open door policy.B. NEGROPONTE: Senator, but he also said -- and here's a quote which I think is perhaps the most telling: "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today," -- and that's when he was speaking on Monday -- "of the disarmament that was demanded of it." And he's also said on repeated occasions, if Iraq had cooperated fully and unconditionally in 1991, we wouldn't be here discussing these issues today. So while I think he acknowledges a certain amount of cooperation with respect to process, I believe he considers substantive cooperation to be sorely lacking.

SEN. CHAFEE: Well, the decision to go to war, then, is splitting a hair here, it seems, of -- as over cooperation or lack of it.

You do mention the U-2 flights. Just a question of -- I have is what prevents us from overflying Iraq with our U-2s? What -- what's the -- what, is he going to shoot them down?

MR. ARMITAGE: I understand that the U-2 flights are something that Mr. Blix has put forward as a matter of cooperation. And they have not -- he has not received satisfaction from the Iraqi authorities. Could the United States fly that? Yes. We could fly that, sir. The question is -- I think Dr. Blix is using this to try to engender cooperation from the Iraqis. And yet again he's been thwarted. And with your permission, Senator, I'd like to insert into the record several of the comments that Hans Blix made in his report. He said a lot. And a lot of it is quite negative about the question of cooperation and access, et cetera.

SEN. CHAFEE: Yes.

Secretary Armitage, you started off your opening statement, your testimony, with the incident of anthrax here in this -- in the building next door.

And wouldn't you assume that many countries, if we -- and I think it's generally accepted that that anthrax came domestically, within our borders -- that many countries could have this so-called weapon of mass destruction? Do we have a consistent policy towards dealing with countries that have weapons of mass destruction?

MR. ARMITAGE: First of all, to be clear, I didn't make the allegation that Iraq had planted that letter in the building.

SEN. CHAFEE: No, I didn't suggest that.

MR. ARMITAGE: I was just using it to indicate sort of the danger of unaccounted for anthrax in this case.

The question of nonproliferation policy, which I think generally you're getting at, is one that we have been accused of having a certain lack of consistency with. And I think, no, it's hard to have a "one size fit all" policy. Some of the people who are engaged in the manufacture of some of these weapons are, in other cases, friends of ours, and we have to use a different process to try to jawbone them or persuade them to get out of it.

So I'd say that if you're looking for kind of a statement -- and I don't mean to trivialize it -- but almost a bumper sticker statement, I'm incapable of giving it to you.

SEN. CHAFEE: Great. And also -- thank you very much. It seems as though the American people believe that with the inspectors in Iraq, that there is no immediate threat. And I have the feeling that -- from my constituents, that we're back to regime change. First it was regime change, then it was disarmament; we're back to never mind disarmament, it's all about regime change. And not allowing the inspectors to continue has, I think, the American people very perplexed. Can you comment?

MR. ARMITAGE: Simply that I think that some of the facts on the ground are changing. We had put a lot of effort, as John indicates, into the diplomacy. We are very disappointed that the report of Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei didn't give more room for optimism and hope.

And as regards the amount of time, I must say, just from past experience -- as I indicated, I've been coming up in front of Senator Lugar for 23 years. The one thing I don't want to have is the hearing that's full of recriminations because we didn't do something, we were waiting for a little more time or another inspector. And that's a real thought in my mind. And I would rather suffer tough, rigorous questioning, or even hostile questioning, any number of times than have the one hearing that might be full of recriminations.

SEN. CHAFEE: Well, I don't think that's -- I don't think that's --

MR. ARMITAGE: No, I -- (off mike) -- but generally.

SEN. CHAFEE: I don't think that's appropriate, in that you just mentioned anthrax. We could have an incident at any time.

But I think that as we look at letting the inspectors continue to do their work, the American people are asking why aren't we allowing them additional time? We understand that with the warm weather coming in the summer, the soldiers have to wear their protective gear, there's some kind of timetable. But why not wait a year? I think the American people are feeling, with the inspectors in there, that it is a sense of security.

MR. ARMITAGE: Clearly, Senator, we've got a difference of opinion on this. My point of view is that the American people have waited 12 years and several months. And if you're not going to get the cooperation, then another year only increases the danger for us and the possibility that we might have that hearing that I fear, and will do anything to avoid.

But it's a difference of opinion that we have, sir.

SEN. CHAFEE: All right, fair enough. Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Dodd?

SEN. CHRISTOPHER DODD (D-CT): Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me, first of all, just begin by congratulating you on your chairmanship, and looking forward to working with you. It's been a long time since you've been in that chair, and remember with great fondness your service as chairman of this committee back a decade-and-a-half ago.

SEN. SARBANES: It was (about ?) '86.B. NEGROPONTE (?): I remember all of you.

SEN. BIDEN: (Off mike) -- that long we have to wait again! (Laughs.)

SEN. DODD: The committee did a lot of good work under your leadership. And let me welcome the new members as well to the committee.

SEN. SARBANES: You didn't have any gray hair in those days --

SEN. DODD: No, I didn't. Neither of us did in those days.

SEN. SARBANES: Yeah. Yeah.

SEN. DODD: But let me welcome our new members as well, both on the Democratic and Republican side. I think you'll enjoy the work of the committee.

And let me thank our witnesses. I've enjoyed the relationship with both of you over the years on a variety of different matters.

And let me also join in the comments of commending Secretary Powell. There are a lot of us up here who are very pleased indeed that he's in the position he is in, and have a lot of confidence in him.

Mr. Chairman, I -- just to begin, I think it's important maybe to establish where we are, some common ground. We can spend a lot of time here -- and the news is, of course, where the differences are, but I think there are, at least to some degree -- I'm not speaking about unanimity here among everyone, but there are some important points and common ground.

I think all of us, without exception, agree that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant, that his presence on the world stage poses threats to the world. I would argue, others may, that there are more significant threats that I would place at a higher priority than -- sort of terrorism. I would even place the issue of North Korea as a more significant immediate threat. But nonetheless, this is a threat. And to suggest otherwise I think would be wrong. He's acquired biological, chemical weapons of mass destruction, and he's tried to accumulate nuclear weapons as well. That's a given. We accept that and understand that.

Most, I think, of the members of this body would also agree with the passage of H. Res. 114, that the president has the authority -- whether they voted for it or against it, I think most would agree he has the authority he needs to act multilaterally or unilaterally. At least I accept that that's the case. Now, we might want to come back and deal with it another day. But the passage of that resolution gave him that authority. And I think most people in the country as well as members of this body applaud the president's decision to go to the U.N. One of the reasons that many of us supported that resolution was, in fact, to encourage the administration to do exactly what you did in September and exactly what you achieved in October. Now, it'd have made a great deal of sense for us to build that kind of international support to deal with this threat -- not this threat alone, but other threats as well -- and that how we proceeded with that was going to make good sense.

Now, those are pretty profound points of common agreement, it seems to me. What concerns us, I think, is the lack of information other than sort of the rhetorical suggestions of where we are, to suggest somehow -- I know you talk about 12 years. But we're talking on a framework here over the last 60 days or so, 70 days since the passage of certain resolutions. We've known that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant for a long time. He was a tyrant 12 years ago, he was a tyrant 80 days ago -- 60 days ago, 50 days ago, 40 days ago. There's not anything that's really changed in all of that, at least in most of our views. And yet we're hearing this sort of -- vague suggestions about materials and so forth. And I'm not even arguing that they may be the case. I've been sort of accepting of the notion that this exists. But the decision to go to war is based on the conclusion that that, in fact, is the case. And for many of us up here, we have not yet seen the kind of data I think that's necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to make a suggestion to the committee. I'm glad the secretary's going to go to the U.N., on Thursday, I think, of next week. But I don't think it's an outrageous suggestion that he might come and talk to us in a closed door session here. I presume he's going to be constrained in a public forum at the United Nations -- it'll be aired globally -- about what facts and data we have. I certainly think it's right for us to know, since we're going to bear the burden of this if we go to war, financially and otherwise, that the elected representatives of the United States people might have that information before the U.N. does, with all due respect. And I'm wondering if it would not be a -- how welcome the suggestion would be that he might appear before us on Wednesday, before he goes up on Thursday, in a closed door session, if necessary.

SEN. LUGAR: Let me respond just briefly to the Senator. I visited last evening with Senator Frist on that issue and have conveyed the thought that this would be very helpful. For this committee, or perhaps all senators, this is a judgment of leadership. But I hope that that will come to pass, and I will forward the suggestion again.

SEN. DODD: Well, I thank you. And I -- and it would be tremendously helpful to us to have that.

You may want to comment on that, if it --

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, beyond the obvious that I'm not going to take charge of my boss' schedule. But I want to say that he would endorse exactly what you say as a general matter. We owe the body, the Senate and the House, an appearance to lay out this. I might suggest that Secretary Powell is basically 24/7 now getting ready for this thing next Wednesday. But the sharing the information is something that, of course, you have every right to demand.

I would just suggest it might be the intelligence officers -- or, the intelligence community who might better provide that. Secretary Powell's going to put in context to support the comments that --

SEN. DODD: Well, I don't care how it gets done -- I don't care how it gets done. I'm just tired of having to hear sort of these speeches being given about this. And I'm one who supported this resolution -- I'm not your opponent. But my people want to know why we're going to do this, other than sort of speeches given that are sort of pep rally stuff. I want to know specifically and factually what we know -- (chuckles) -- and I think my constituents do, and I know my colleagues do. And before you go and tell the whole world about it, I think we have a right to know what's going on here. And that's really what the bottom of a lot of these questions are; we want to know. And that's not a partisan comment. You'd hear that from -- quietly, maybe -- from the other side more than I'm saying it publicly, but we want to know.

So I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, however you can do this, but let's do it before you go up there.

MR. ARMITAGE: We're in violent agreement with you. I was just trying to protect the calendar of my boss for the obvious reason.

SEN. DODD: I understand. I appreciate it.

Let me go back, if I can just -- I don't know how much time I have here left, but let me go back to this question that Senator Sarbanes raised and -- about the inspectors. I -- and Senator Hagel raised it, as well -- I'm sort of wondering why we supported even the resolution in October if you feel as though the inspection process is such a failure or just isn't producing results at all. This was only 60 days ago we did this. This wasn't a year and a half or 12 years ago. This was just a few hours ago, we voted -- (chuckling) -- along with 14 other members, or whatever it is, of the Security Council; the United Nations endorsed this resolution, which a major part of which includes the inspections process. Sixty days later, we're denouncing it.

And by anyone's estimation, in fact, Resolution 1441 requires that every country share information with the inspectors. Is that not true? Is that true? That there's a requirement you step up. Now, by public admission, and I'm constrained, I guess, here, but I'm told if there are this many inspection sites -- (chuckles) -- and so forth, we provided about -- (gestures) -- this much information, without getting into the specific details as a government, in terms of our obligation of meeting the requirements of 1441, to assist the inspection process. A very small fraction of the sites that were available -- we know are available, we've actually provided information about. Why are we not doing a better job of that? And if that's the case, why are we denouncing the inspection process before it's had a chance to work?

MR. ARMITAGE: I would take some exceptions, Senator Dodd, with the characterization that we're denouncing the inspections process --

SEN. DODD: Well, denouncing may be --

MR. ARMITAGE: -- which, as John has already indicated, it's going to go ahead. But I do want to make one thing clear. Nowhere in 1441 -- or, as far as I know -- in the discussion about the inspection was it ever the case that the inspectors were going to do more than to verify disarmament; that's what they're there for. They're not playing cat-and-mouse and hide-and-seek.

SEN. DODD: I don't disagree with that.

MR. ARMITAGE: But that's the first thing.

The second thing is I would note that Mr. Blix said -- (pause) -- Mr. Blix said even in his report to the council the other day that even with the inspectors there, illegal procurement activity is continuing today.

So, we're not denouncing it. We'll just take Dr. Blix at his word.

SEN. DODD: Well, all right. My time is up. We'll come back to this, but I appreciate --

SEN. SARBANES: Mr. Chairman, could he clarify that? When you say "illegal procurement," you mean they actually are obtaining materials? And if so, what's being done about those that are selling the materials?

MR. ARMITAGE: (Off mike.)

Excuse me.

(SEN. DODD ?): You can't push it through the table!

MR. ARMITAGE: I know it. I'm sorry! (Laughs, laughter.) Well, it might spare me some difficulty!

(SEN. DODD ?): I know, yeah! (Laughter.)

MR. ARMITAGE: John Wolf informs me it's not a matter of selling; they are still buying and importing. Is that right, John?

SEN. SARBANES: Well, someone's selling it, then.

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, yeah.

SEN. SARBANES: Yeah, well, isn't there a regime to control that?

MR. ARMITAGE: Yes, sir.

(Confers off mike.)

John is just making the point that of course we try to stop it; it's an illegal procurement. They smuggle it in, and we're trying to stop it where we can.

SEN. SARBANES: All right.

MR. ARMITAGE: We've had sanctions where we can, yeah, identify companies. But the smuggling of it continues even now.

SEN. SARBANES: All right.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Biden?

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Chairman, just a very brief intervention. I appreciate your going to Senator Frist and suggesting that the secretary be up here, and I appreciate what Senator Dodd said about wanting to know the information, if it doesn't matter what source.

I think it does matter that it be the secretary, and I think it matters, for purposes of the show of unity here, that there is the sense of -- I think it's very much in the interest of the administration to maintain -- and I know the secretary believes this as well -- to maintain the vast majority of us on both sides of the aisle being in lockstep with the secretary. And I quite frankly think it's just -- as a matter of appearance, if nothing else, it is somewhat inappropriate not to come and speak with us first. It will engender a great deal of goodwill. And we can get from the intelligence community maybe even more than we can get from the secretary, theoretically, but it is important that the secretary himself, showing the world that this -- we are together.

It is -- it was -- it is -- it -- anyway, I just think it would be a very useful thing across the board, beyond the information we'll learn specifically, and specifically so we are aware of the nature of the pitch, if you will, not just the specifics of the assertions made relative to the material. I just hope that y'all will consider that.

MR. ARMITAGE: I will take it back, sir.

SEN. LUGAR: I thank the senator for his comment. Obviously we are in agreement, and hopefully Secretary Powell will be, too. And so we will work carefully together.

Senator Brownback.

SEN. SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen. And I want to endorse the thought of having Secretary Powell up here, but I also want to say, on top of that, I appreciate how much you've worked with us to date. A number of us put forward the idea that there should be a resolution passed by Congress to the administration. The administration -- I think a number of people actually argued in the administration we don't have to do that, but you did. I think that was a wise move.

A number of us argued that you should go to the United Nations for a resolution. The administration, I think, probably a number of people within, argued we don't have to do that, but you did.

Last week, Thursday, there was a briefing of Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld, with members here of the Senate, that I thought was pretty candid. Thank you for doing that.

I think this would be another positive step. And I think there's been a good -- frankly, I think there's been a very good movement back and forth and communications back and forth. We're getting down to the real tough point now: whether you actually engage U.S. military force and other military force. And I think that's obviously where we all get antsy and hard-pressed.

I want to make one point about the weapons inspection, because I've chaired the subcommittee that's dealt with this for some period of time, and we've had a lot of hearings on Iraq over the period since I've been in the Senate in '96. They haven't complied at any point in time in the past.

We have models of compliance of weapons inspections that the U.N. has done, like South Africa and Kazakhstan, where these were two countries that did cooperate with the U.N. And they didn't -- there wasn't any hide-and-seek. They said, "Come in. We don't want these things anymore. Here is where they are. Come and get them." I mean, I think that's the nature of the resolution we have. Now if I'm wrong on that, correct me. But that's the nature, and we actually have a model of that in the past.

I want to follow up, Secretary Armitage, on your point about the hearing that we don't want to have about terrorists distributing weapons of mass destruction and using them in the United States. There's an article in the New York Times today talking about large convoys moving out of Iraq and to Syria. And I guess -- I'm just going to read you this instance or report: "For instance, the administration today was still debating the credibility of intelligence about a Christmastime Iraqi truck convoy that some American analysts say could have been transporting weapons of mass destruction or scientists to Syria, where they would be safely out of the United Nations inspectors' view."

Do you have any either further illumination you could give us about what we know about movement of weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq, if you can identify -- ?

MR. ARMITAGE: I would -- Senator Brownback, I would say that there's been a debate in the administration, as I know, in the intelligence community. It's about how much we know about other countries perhaps receiving such things as missiles. I don't think -- particularly, I don't think we know the definitive. I saw the report that you referred to. And I've seen other reports. Now, I can't give you a level of credibility on other reports as to whether missiles are in other countries. Those countries whom we've approached on this with our suspicions have vehemently denied. But -- that's what they've done. So I can't --

SEN. BROWNBACK: You can't confirm or deny this, this report in the New York Times today? Okay.

Let me ask you about the presence of terrorists on Iraqi soil. You identified or spoke some about some al Qaeda. Again, another New York Times article just today talked about the presence of other terrorist groups in Iraq, Ansar al-Islam, an extremist group. Can you identify for this group other terrorists that are currently operating on Iraqi soil?

MR. ARMITAGE: I can verify that, and I can provide you -- I can do that. I don't think I want to do that publicly. I think it's part of what the secretary will be saying. There are other groups who have apparently either been driven or have found some ability to be harbored in Iraq. Some are the -- around the northern part of Iraq, close to Iran, but not associated Iran, the group you just mentioned and others. But with your permission, I'd provide it for the record and in a classified way.

SEN. BROWNBACK: But you can confirm this in the New York Times today that this group is operating on Iraqi soil. (Pause.) Thank you. And I -- and others you will provide to us in a -- can you provide that in a secure setting, of other terrorist groups that are operating on Iraqi soil?

MR. ARMITAGE: I will do so, sir.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Can you provide to us either here or in private, do we know of any distribution of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists? I know that would be a very difficult thing to find. But do we know or can you provide that either here or in a private setting?

MR. ARMITAGE: Yes, I can. And I'm not an expert in these matters, but there have been some real speculations about certain poisons and other things that were associated with some of these groups who are in -- particularly northern Iraq. But I -- with your permission I'll content myself with those comments only.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Okay. And you can provide that to us in a private distribution. Because that to me has been the real issue about Iraq. There are a lot of bad players in the world. There's no question about that. North Korea is clearly up there, and we've got others. But the mix here of a guy with weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein, who's used them in the past, and terrorists on his soil that are willing to use them against us, and on our soil, is the potent mixture that I think is so poisonous and so hard for us to even contemplate that you've got to go with that on an early basis.

And I just want to conclude by asking you about other countries that'll be supporting us, whether or not there's another U.N. resolution, which I -- I question the need for another resolution on top of it. But I note that you have -- eight European leaders have voiced their support for the U.S. on Iraq that just was out again today. This is a Wall Street Journal article. I note today that Jordan has now said they're even going further than they did in the Gulf War I of allowing some positioning of U.S. forces, where they maintained a neutral position in the invasion of Kuwait.

Congratulations on those. Do you have others that you can announce to us that are joining our coalition?

MR. ARMITAGE: I'm going to give you a numerical idea. I do not desire to announce the names publicly, sir. But for instance, those who have committed to full access -- 21 countries are fully committed to grant us access on route, should a military activity be required. There are others that are under discussion. But we've got 20 countries that are fully committed, and three that are partially committed to allow basing. Overflight -- 22 countries. We've got a total of nine countries who have either fully committed or partially committed some troops.

So, should a military activity be required, there's more going on than one suggests. And I've got a list, and I don't want to -- I can provide it secure. But I deliberately had it done that way for this hearing.

SEN. BROWNBACK: I think it's particularly significant about the Jordanians, who are right there in the area, and have taken even a more aggressive stance this time than last.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: I thank the senator from Kansas.

Let me just say parenthetically, his travels in the Near East, the Middle East, and now the Far East have been extensive, and his report to members of the committee really very helpful, even with regard to the North Korean border. And I congratulate you on that achievement.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Feingold.

SEN. RUSSELL FEINGOLD (D-WI): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. First, let me congratulate you on your role as chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I certainly enjoyed very much Senator Biden's tenure. And I have greatly enjoyed working with both of you and admire your work.

Mr. Armitage, you began very dramatically with your testimony with regard to the anthrax. And it sort of follows what Senator Brownback was talking about.

To both of you, is it your contention that Iraq is the single- most likely source of WMD transfers to international terrorist organizations to date? And specifically, would it be more likely than Iran, more likely than actors in Pakistan, more likely than a cash- strapped North Korea?

I wonder if both of you would respond to that.

Mr. Armitage?

MR. ARMITAGE: That's an interesting question. I think in terms of the full-up capability -- chemical/bio -- that I would endorse the statement that Iraq is the most likely. There are (subsets ?). I'm unaware, for instance, if Pakistan has had chemical and biological developments. North Korea -- I don't know that we have much insight into their chem and bio. We've got more into their nuclear, things that I've been able to discuss with you and others in private settings. And our fear with North Korea is a possible proliferation. We have no information about nuclear proliferation. And I have none on other WMD.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Your answer seems to relate to whether they have these things. My question is, who is the most likely to be involved in a trade of them or a sale of them or distribution of them? Is it your belief that Iraq is more likely to engage in that kind of transaction with terrorists? Or would it be fair to say that there's a question here, that Iran, Pakistan, and perhaps North Korea may be more likely?

MR. ARMITAGE: Of those four, I would say that Iraq is the most likely, sir. But I don't want to leave you with the impression or the implication that I'm not concerned with the nuclear proliferation possibility of North Korea.

SEN. FEINGOLD: What about other countries? Are there other countries that would be, in your view, more likely than Iraq to do this? Or is Iraq the number one, most likely country to engage in this kind of transaction with a terrorist organization?

MR. ARMITAGE: I'm trying to run over in my mind the sort of varsity and junior varsity of those who are engaged in these activities. I think as a governmental matter that my fear would be greatest on Iraq.

There are other concerns of -- sort of we've had historically in the Russian Federation, et cetera, not having full control over their inventories, but as a governmental matter, we think the government's trying to control, but I can't discount the possibility of others having a rogue or off-the-books operation.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I'd just note this isn't an academic question or something for our interest. The reason I ask is, we're talking about invading one of these countries on this premise, on the basis that they are the greatest risk and have the greatest likelihood of this connection.

Mr. Negroponte.B. NEGROPONTE: Without getting into the question of assessing the risk, I would point out from a U.N. context, the difference between Iraq and the other countries you've mentioned is that Iraq is under 17 different United Nations resolutions, many of which are demanding, and have been demanding since 1991 -- April 3rd, 1991, Resolution 687 was passed demanding that Iraq declare its WMD holdings within 15 days, and here we are 12 years later discussing this same subject. So they are under many more resolution than any of these other countries are, with respect to its WMD, just --

SEN. FEINGOLD: I don't question that. What I'm getting at here, and I think Senator Dodd and others were, is, is this the entity that is most likely to help out an al Qaeda-type operation to try to harm Americans? And so let me follow with, what is Iraq's proliferation track so far? To what extent have they proliferated?

MR. ARMITAGE: May I ask Assistant Secretary Wolf to answer, sir? I think -- get it once?

SEN. FEINGOLD: Be pleased.

MR. ARMITAGE: John?

JOHN WOLF (Assistant secretary of State for nonproliferation): Thank you, Senator. I think their record as a proliferator is less than -- they are largely a buyer. They are buying in all of the aspects -- chemical, biological, nuclear. They're developing long- range missiles. And as a country under a U.N. -- a restrictive U.S. -- U.N. regime, they are not only acquiring, but they are in direct violation of a series of obligations. They harbor -- they do harbor terrorist groups, so it's not an academic matter. And we don't know -- taking a Secretary Rumsfeld language, we don't know what we don't know. But here's a country in the middle of a vital region which is acquiring all of the capabilities which threaten the region and pose a threat beyond the region. And that's why the U.N. has been so assertive over the last 12 years.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand. But it sounds like you're saying that they are -- if I could continue with you -- that they are less of a proliferator than others. Isn't that what you just said?

MR. WOLF: I would say we define the threat of Iraq in a different way. It is their ability to use those weapons against their own people, to use it against their neighbors, and potentially to use it far beyond.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand that, and that's terribly important, but I'd like you to answer my question. Are there other nations that are greater proliferatorts than Iraq of these types of substances and weapons?

MR. WOLF: There are other countries which proliferate.

SEN. FEINGOLD: More than Iraq?

MR. WOLF: But nobody has used -- Senator, I would like to say that in Iraq's case, they're acquiring dangerous weapons --

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand that.

MR. WOLF: -- which they have used against thousands of their own people, which they have used against their neighbors, which they have the capability to use far away. That's the threat that we're addressing. That's the threat the U.N. has put in -- that's why the U.N. demanded its disarmament.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I recognize that --

MR. WOLF: It's that disarmament they have to achieve.

SEN. FEINGOLD: -- is terribly important and has to be dealt with. But an awful lot of the information today, an awful lot of the argument today and the president's argument is not simply based on what Iraq will do; it is premised on what Iraq will do in conjunction with terrorist organizations.

And that appears to require proliferation, and that's why this question is so important.

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, I don't gainsay the importance of the question at all, Senator. But I think that a good deal of weight has to be given to what everyone I think would acknowledge has been the bloody-mindedness of Saddam Hussein. And that does weigh somewhat in this equation.

SEN. SARBANES: Would the senator yield for just one quick question? I wanted to clarify one thing.

Senator -- Secretary Armitage, you said that there are al Qaeda terrorists in northern Iraq, I think, earlier in response to a question. Are they in the territory in northern Iraq that's under Saddam's control, or are they in the territory in northern Iraq that is not under Saddam's control?

MR. ARMITAGE: The ones that I referred to in northern Iraq are not under his direct control. There are al Qaeda in Baghdad, as will be -- as we move forward, will be explaining.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more question?

In the State of the Union, the president seemed to suggest that the lesson to be learned from the recent history of the Korean peninsula is that we must stop potential proliferators before they have the means to blackmail others, and obviously we all agree on that. But I worry that there are, in effect, some nuances being lost here, and that our message to the rest of the world is starting to sound like, acquire weapons and then be free from the threat of military action, or don't acquire weapons and then perhaps be subject to invasion. The incentives are for proliferation and the pursuit of WMD as quickly as possible under this message. How can that possibly be in the interest of global stability and in the interest of the security of the United States of America?

MR. ARMITAGE: It seems to be that a nonproliferation policy, Senator, has to have several aspects to it. Part of it is a good deal of self-restraint. We stop people where we can. We try to persuade them not to have weapons. We sanction them where we can. But a good bit of the nonproliferation policy depends on enlightenment in terms of countries -- South Africa, Taiwan, others who have voluntarily given up these programs. I don't agree, and I think the enlightened have come to the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction are more trouble than they're worth. The countries who acquire these weapons are ones that are generally a basket case, and they do it for one of three reasons that I've tried to already illuminate: to dominate, to intimidate, or perhaps, in the extreme, to attack.

SEN. FEINGOLD: But if they've already got them, we're not going to go in there and deal with it.

MR. ARMITAGE: No, not -- not so, sir. The attempt by the previous administration in the framework agreement in the North Korean situation was an attempt to deal with it. We attempted to deal with it, until we ran into the acknowledge of the HEU program in North Korea. Now we're going to have to take a different tack.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, what I meant by "deal with it", obviously, is to deal with it the way we're about to deal with Iraq.

MR. ARMITAGE: But I cannot sit here and won't try to sit here and tell you that I know that, as I said earlier, one size fits all in these things. I don't think it does.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Let me mention, we'll have another opportunity to ask Senator -- rather, Mr. Armitage about North Korea next Tuesday. He will be back. And -- (laughter) -- will be (worrying ?) about that.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, we certainly hope so, yes. (Laughter.)

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Allen.

MR. ARMITAGE: Think I don't, Senator? (Laughs.)

SEN. GEORGE ALLEN (R-VA): If I may, I have to be at another meeting. I'll -- is Senator Enzi next in line over here? I'll yield to Senator Enzi. I just want to get reorganized here and --

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you. I'll come back to you, Senator Allen.

SEN. ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Enzi.

SEN. MIKE ENZI (R-WY): I thank the senator from Virginia, and I congratulate the chairman on the chairmanship. I do think that we have a tremendous team, between you and Senator Biden, providing direction for this committee. And I do want to reiterate what Senator Biden said in his opening comment, that we are not talking about preemption here, and we should get rid of that notion. This is the enforcement of a surrender treaty. I think that's a very significant comment. I thank the people that are testifying today. When we're discussing such an important issue, it's very comforting to have people of your capability and involvement to be here to answer some questions for us.

This year I've been serving along with Senator Sarbanes, under appointment of the president, as delegates to the United Nations for the 57th General Assembly. And I've got to tell you I've been highly impressed with Ambassador Negroponte and the rest of the team at the U.S. mission in New York. The people of the United States should be extremely proud of the work that they're doing in an extremely critical time. I have been briefed by Ambassador Negroponte and the team. I've been -- had arrangements made by them. I've been accompanied by them. And I've gotten particularly to see Senator -- Ambassador Negroponte in action. And it is really reassuring to me.

I had one meeting in New York with the Geneva Group, which is the 14 countries that pay 83 percent of the dues of the United Nations. And it was after the president gave his speech in New York. And it was really enlightening and somewhat reassuring to me to hear their opinions on what's happening in the United Nations and the need for the United Nations to show its relevance, as the president had asked.

It was interesting to be at the president's speech. I had read the papers the day before that had everybody in the General Assembly, I think, pretty well primed to think that he was going to storm in and tell them what was going to happen. And you can see the nervousness of the delegates and as we waited for the speech. And when the president was introduced, it was very noticeable that there wasn't any applause. Of course, I remembered back to the previous speaker and realized that there was no applause at the beginning of his speech or the end of his speech, so I wasn't sure whether it was the United Nations tradition or not.

But as the president spoke, it was helpful to be there and watch the body language of the delegates, because they kind of loosened up and said, "Gee, what we've been reading in the papers maybe isn't what this guy is about." And you could almost see them remembering back to the patience that he had after September 11th as he formed a coalition before we went into Afghanistan. And at the end of his speech, there was even applause.

And then we've had an opportunity to visit with a number of those delegates, and that's kind of theme that keeps being reiterated -- about the patience of the president, of the competence of his team, and a lot of good comments about Ambassador Negroponte.

Following -- the speeches that happened following the president's speech had a same theme as the president's speech: we have to be useful or we have to quit. And that's a message that that the United Nations really needed to have. And it is helpful if we get the opportunity to be up there and watch these things as they're happening. So I hope, as others have the opportunity, that they will do that as well.

Now in the way of a question, and since I haven't been up there since the 16 shell casings were discovered, I am kind of curious as to what the reaction was among other delegates regarding that and knowing that although we found 16, there were still 29,984, roughly, of those shell casings that had the capability of either being loaded or were still loaded. Has there been a reaction to that? I mean, that was one very specific finding of the inspection team.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: I think generally there was concern about it, Senator. I think Dr. Blix has told us that they're still doing some tests on whether any of those casings had any evidence of those particular items having been weaponized. But I think more generally speaking, I would only add that whatever else delegates at the Security Council might feel, I think there's almost unanimous agreement, with the possible exception of Syria, that Iraq needs to do more to proactively cooperate with the inspectors. I think on that there's virtually unanimous agreement.

SEN. ENZI: I know that the people in Wyoming, and other people I've talked to in the country, that the finding of those 16 shell casings, whether they had anything in them or not, was a realization that this country did declare that they had those things, and then haven't shown us yet where the remains are, if they did destroy them. And I'm hoping that had the same kind of a reaction at the U.N.B. NEGROPONTE: Well, correct. And also, in light of the fact that this is one of, I believe, 30,000 such munitions that are unaccounted for. So I think another question that arises, if they're going to be dribbled out, as Secretary Powell said a few days ago -- 12, I think, were the first, and then four more that were found -- how long is this going to take?

SEN. ENZI: And it has been helpful to realize this is the size of California, and we have 108 inspectors, and I think you said 57 more are coming. Thank you.

I yield back my time.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Enzi.

Senator Boxer.

SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D-CA): Mr. Chairman, everybody keeps saying "the size of California." Now you know how hard it is to run for the Senate from there. And I hope that word goes out to all opposition.

SEN. BIDEN: I might add, you have more people.

SEN. BOXER: Yes; 35 million, at the moment, and counting.

I want to say, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, you make a great team, and we look forward to working with you.

Secretary Armitage, I really respect you, and I really think you're particularly effective. And, Ambassador, you are working so hard every day to build the kind of coalition that we all want. I have some disagreements, and I want to lay those out.

In making the case against going to war against Iraq, the president was very eloquent in pointing out the horrific chemicals and the various weapons that Saddam could employ. And you, Secretary Armitage, have made the same point I think very eloquently, and you brought it home to us because I was one of those offices that shared the, shall we say, the breathing apparatus with Senator Daschle. So we all know the fear that these weapons of mass destruction can bring.

I think the case is made Saddam must disarm. Must disarm. There is no disagreement in our country. And as I go around my state, absolutely no disagreement: He must disarm. The question is, what's the best way to do it for the world and for our people and for our young men and women in uniform, and the rest. And some of us believe, because we know it's a fact, that since more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed by the inspectors in the '90s than by our bombs -- and this was put into the record here -- that this is an approach that ought to be given every opportunity to work.

Now, I want to put into the record something very unpleasant about our policies in the past.

The fact is, we all know that Saddam Hussein has been committing human rights abuses since he formally took control of Iraq in '79; I'm sure you agree with that, am I correct? And even before that, he effectively took control of the country in the '60s. This man has been around. He has shown how ruthless he is. And here's the point: During the '80s, we knew human rights abuses were being carried out. We knew that Saddam was using weapons against his own people. And I think it's very important to face that fact and let the American people know because it's important to understand how he got these weapons; why he's such a threat. And it's important not only as we make our policy here, but also as a signal to all of us that the enemy of my enemy is my friend sounds real good, but in practice, it can come back and bite us pretty hard.

Today, we are concerned, Mr. Chairman, that we can have a commercial airliner, United States of America commercial airliner, shot down by a Stinger missile, a shoulder-fired missile. We introduced those, and it got in the hands of the Taliban into the hands of al Qaeda. What a tragedy!

So I ask unanimous consent to place into the record an article called, "U.S. had key role in Iraq buildup: Trade in chemical arms allowed despite their use on Iranians and Kurds," and it was in the Washington Post December 30, 2002. May I place that in the record?

SEN. LUGAR: Yes. Without objection, so ordered.

SEN. BOXER: And in my remaining time, and I'm going to sit here for another round -- I assume we can have another round.

SEN. LUGAR: We will, if the members wish to do so.

SEN. BOXER: Good. I want to read a couple of things.

"The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George (H.W.) Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.

"According to former U.S. officials, the directive stated (that) the U.S. would do," quote, "'whatever was necessary and legal' to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran."

It goes into the fact that Donald Rumsfeld was appointed as a special envoy to the Middle East in 1983, and it quotes, "When Rumsfeld finally met with Hussein on December 20," 1983, "he told the Iraqi leader that Washington was ready for resumption of full diplomatic relations, according to a State Department report of the conversation. Iraqi leaders later described themselves as 'extremely pleased' with the Rumsfeld visit, which had," quote, "'elevated U.S.- Iraqi relations to a new level.'

"As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February (19)82, despite heated objections from Congress.

"When United Nations weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq after the (19)91 Gulf War, they compiled long lists of chemicals, missile components, and computers from American suppliers, including such household names as Union Carbide and Honeywell, which were being used for military purposes.

"A (19)94 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-'80s under license from the Commerce Department, including various strains of anthrax, subsequently identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce Department also approved the export of insecticides to Iraq, despite widespread suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare."

I am reading this. I get chills at what we did and the monster that was made even more of a monster because of our actions. And I think there has to be a lesson here that we have to understand and be responsible for our own actions. And we stand here and talk about the horrors of these chemicals, many of which were made possible by the actions of our own government when, for whatever reason, suddenly Saddam Hussein wasn't all that bad, you know, 20 years ago.

So, this line of questioning I will finish now and just make the comment that Saddam must disarm. He got these weapons from a lot of places, and he is a terrible danger. But I would beg this administration to listen carefully to colleagues on both sides of the aisle when we say that as long as the inspectors are there and they say they are making progress -- and absolutely it was a mixed report from Blix -- no doubt about it -- we should give the process a chance to work. And then we'll be able to develop a consensus like we had in the first Gulf War -- if we do this right. Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Boxer. We now come to a portion of the -- yes, would you like to --

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator Boxer is going to be kind enough to stay around, so I'll respond. But I think a couple of things you said -- I'm not going to argue -- I just want to make a point. This is one very important statement you make. Thank you for your comments about my opening statement. It was deliberate. We know where you live, as they say. Because I wanted to bring it home to you and other members, and I saw and paid very close attention to your statement of the 27th of January about the Blix-ElBaradei report. We are often accused of being totally tone deaf in the administration. It's not the case. We look at these, we think about them. And I saw -- and in that you said Saddam must disarm, and you also said the inspectors have to be given -- should be given more time.

The frustration that we have on that is that it's not a matter of the inspectors. They are not sort of policemen. They are verifiers. And if we don't get the cooperation, then time is not going to be the answer. That's our view. There's a difference of opinion.

But when you make the comment about the enemy's enemy is my friend, I specifically -- and I think in this very chamber in 1984 gave a testimony, and in it said that being the enemy of my enemy is not sufficient for a relationship with the United States. To be our -- to have a relationship with the United States that's lasting and worthwhile, you have to to some extent share our values. So I know what you're saying, and I was around in the '80s on both sides of the Iraq and Iran question. But the question of my enemy's enemy is my friend is not our policy -- it has not been for some time. And I just wanted to make that --

SEN. BOXER: Well, they should have listened to you in the '80s. There might not be such a situation --

MR. ARMITAGE: I was on both sides of the issue like a lot of people. I'm not -- I wasn't -- my skirts aren't totally clean on that either. (Laughter.) But I want to say the enemy of my enemy is not necessarily our friend. They have to share our values.

SEN. BOXER: That's for sure.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you. Make the case to the U.N. like you speak. I wish you'd make a case to the U.N. like to speak -- and to the world.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Allen.

SEN. ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for your leadership. I look forward to working with you as well as Senator Biden on this committee, and thank you for having undoubtedly one of the most important hearings on an important, pressing subject in a long time, in the long history of this esteemed committee.

I will not go through my whole statement. I really do want to hear the perspectives of Secretary Armitage and Ambassador Negroponte. I will just say that in listening to this and following it for the last year, it's very clear -- it's not just the last year but it's very clear that Saddam Hussein has proven that he's a dangerous, aggressive dictator. We saw his reaction. We saw his reaction on September 11th when the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia were hit. What was his reaction? Celebration.

We've also seen -- and Senator Boxer and I have worked on it to make sure -- this is before 9/11 -- to make sure we understood what was going on in Israel and what they were facing. We wonder about him and terrorism. He offers bounties or remuneration to families who send their young daughters or young son off onto suicide murders into Israel.

It would seem to me that we keep having to reprove the same case on stipulated facts -- and they're not just facts from our intelligence -- these are stipulated facts that the United Nations, the Security Council, has talked about previously. You go through all the volumes of various biological or chemical agents in these stockpiles, and it is clear that Saddam Hussein from time to time will change his tactics. At times he'll be belligerent and bellicose in his obstructionism. More recently he has turned to more deceitful deception in his obstructionism. The fact remains though he still has these stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

In addition, apparently it is understood by Dr. Blix and others that he has the missile capabilities that far exceed the range required by the United Nations -- not the United States, but the United Nations -- and there are other aspects of delivery systems of which we have concerns that I am not going to go into, because they were brought up in top-secret meetings. And there is, of course, the concern that he can hand it off to a terrorist subcontractor who would just love to disrupt this country and kill millions, if not thousands, of Americans with any of these chemical or biological weapons. We're not even arguing over the question of nuclear capabilities.

I'd like to ask several questions here. And the reason I wanted to find out where we were is I didn't want to ask questions of these two gentlemen that have already been asked before. Invariably Senator Hagel has asked the question I have found in this committee.

Now, Ambassador Negroponte, what has been the reaction of the other members of the U.N. Security Council as far as this report? How do their assessments of the Blix January 27th report differ, if at all, with your -- I've read and followed our responses to it -- what are their differences, if there are any? Because I think is going to be very important as we move forward in the days and weeks to come. And, for example, do they agree -- do any of them dispute the fact on what seem to be stipulated facts that Saddam Hussein possesses these various amounts or quantities of biological and chemical agents that could be used as weapons?B. NEGROPONTE: Thank you very much, Senator. I think as a general proposition, most of the delegations believe that Iraq has not cooperated proactively with the inspectors. I think they agree that the questions that Dr. Blix has raised are serious ones that Iraq needs to answer for. I think where you'll start to get a variety of perspectives from the different countries is with respect to whether what has happened thus far -- that is to say Iraq's incomplete and totally inadequate declaration in December and it's failure to cooperate so far, is sufficient to constitute a material breach of Resolution 1441. And there you start hearing a divergence of views. We have already said we consider it to be a material breach. The British foreign minister and the British delegate yesterday at our meeting of the Council said that they believe that Iraq is now in further material breach. And then a number of the other delegations have been arguing for more time for the inspections. But virtually all of them have said that Iraq has got to do more to cooperate with the inspectors. And so I think they've all been critical in that respect. But I would acknowledge that a number of them have argued for more time.

Now, what their position will be as this diplomatic process unfolds, the meeting between the president and Prime Minister Blair in Camp David this weekend, Secretary Powell's briefing to the Council next week, and the diplomatic activity that is inevitably going to surround that -- how their positions will evolve I think remains to be seen.

SEN. ALLEN: All right, so the question is what do you do with the material breach? But they do agree with the underlying facts insofar as the amount of these chemical -- or that Saddam possesses chemical and biological stockpiles?B. NEGROPONTE: Well, just to give you one example -- yes, sir. Just to give you one example, senator, here's the report of last night's meeting in the Council. I am reading from the cable report from our mission. And the French delegate -- and, after all, we know that France and ourselves have different -- quite a few differences of perspective on this issue. And yet I'm quoting now the French delegate said -- he noted, however, that the effectiveness of the inspectors would be enhanced if Iraq fully cooperated with the inspection teams. Iraq's record was -- and here's a quote: "was far from satisfactory," unquote. That's the French point of view on this question to the Security Council.

SEN. ALLEN: Okay. When -- either of you all, when will Dr. Blix add into his report the listing -- I think Secretary Armitage mentioned this -- the prescribed activity being violated insofar as the missile range matter? Or is that in the report, or when will -- I thought there was an insinuation that it would be.B. NEGROPONTE: There is an issue as to what to do about those missiles that have been tested beyond 150 kilometers, and also the 360 I believe rocket motors that have been imported illegally at which he has expressed serious concern about. And in reply to a question that I put to him in the Council yesterday, he said that he expected to come to a decision as to what to do about those proscribed items prior to February 14th.

SEN. ALLEN: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

It's a pleasure to welcome Senator Corzine of New Jersey to our committee, and I ask you for your initial burst of questions.

SEN. CORZINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking member. It's an honor to serve with you all, and I am truly thrilled to be here, and I look forward to having an opportunity to delve into the depth of the issues that I think are so much deeply on people's minds.

Now, I would just say that I don't think there's any debate, as a number of folks have said, that we have a real villain on our hands and a lot of -- and a bad actor and that actions need to be taken. And the question has been and continues to be how and the timing. And I have some great concerns that we don't follow through in the direction that we're taking, which is to surround the bad guy with a lot of power, put inspectors on the ground -- hopefully forcefully doing their job, whether it is disarming or verifying, as I think we have heard, or searching, and using the intelligence which our country has. I mean, I am confused about the U-2 overflights, since we have satellites and enormous amounts of ability in our intelligence area to provide some -- I think it should be shared so that the inspecting process can be as complete as possible.

But what I really want to ask is about the objectives, because the thing that confuses the people that I have to answer questions to is What are we doing here? Is this about regime change? Is this about disarmament? Is it about U.N. efficiency? -- efficacy, excuse me. Is it about the imminent threat to the United States? Is it about proliferation? And how does this fit into what kinds of precedents are we setting for American foreign policy as we go forward? There's been a line of questioning. If it's about proliferation, what about shipments of arms that we have seen Iran send to Israel? What about missile shipments from North Korea that we intercept? -- things that are tangible and understood by the American people. We hear one shoe size doesn't fit all, but there are grave inconsistencies with a lot of these various elements of what our objectives are. And I think we need to be clearer on this, and particularly when people hear us make the case that there's imminent threat to our homeland.

And I don't understand the sort of questioning that Senator Feingold brought out with regard to proliferation, because in fact we may be encouraging proliferation if it's a last resort by such a rogue regime Saddam Hussein has in place. So I've love to hear some clarity about objectives, but then translate it into how are we going to use the example of what we have said here to apply to the balance of how we deal in the world going forward for our foreign policy.

MR. ARMITAGE: Wow, thank you, senator. I'm tempted to be irreverent and say the answer to the objective is yes to all of the above. And I guess to some extent there's a bit in each of it. But let me try to give the clarity. You'll tell me if I make it or not.

The previous administration and our president had a regime change policy, and he said something like -- I don't have the exact quote with me -- that sooner or later Saddam Hussein will use these weapons. When this administration came in, we also agreed that regime change in Iraq was the appropriate way to move forward. I think that 9/11 changed a lot, and it certainly raised our anxiety level to an extreme degree.

The president, in heeding advice that he got from among others members of this body, decided to go to the U.N. to try to get the international backing for a policy of disarmament -- and that is our policy. The president said if in fact truly and completely that Iraq disarms, it will in fact be a changed regime. It is clear to us now -- at least thus far -- that there is no cooperation. And you will make your own judgment on whether you agree with that or not.

So right now, until the president makes the decision to use force, this is a disarmament regime. That's what we are about. And we are trying to engage the international community in that.

On the question, the broader question of how does this fit into other non-proliferation regimes, I think it's exactly in consonance with what we are trying to do in Korea and what will be the subject of Tuesday's hearing. We are also trying to engage the international and the regional leaders in finding a solution to the vexing question of the North Korean possible restarting of their facilities.

So it seems to me completely consistent in both areas. While without giving up our own ability and necessary authorization for a president to make a decision to do whatever he feels is necessary in self-defense, we are trying to work with the international community to lower the danger to all of us.

SEN. CORZINE: In those other instances, North Korea being the hypothetical example, I presume that if we were to look at the precedent that we have with regard to Iraq we would also then come to Congress and ask for a use of force resolution, go to the United Nations with a similar sort of request, if there isn't the kind of disarmament -- is that the lesson to be learned on how we are going to apply foreign policy lessons and examples that we are practicing here? -- which I think is very worrisome to the American people.

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator, I don't think we learned a lesson yet out of this. If the suggestion you make about coming back to the U.S. Congress for authorization in any situation is a very dicey one. We have had -- and I have had several discussions with members about that. But I want to be clear about one thing, that we understand the absolute necessity of reporting through the members of Congress to the American public, and we understand who does what, and we understand -- in terms of our responsibilities -- and we understand that our nation works best when we have the necessary tension between our executive and legislative branches. But at the end of the day we come to either a compromise or a decision and we move forward. That is short of saying absolutely, senator, we are coming back for authorization, because everyone up here knows I can't say that, and it will be situationally dependent. But everyone up here also ought to know that everybody in this administration understands completely the need to be as closely aligned with the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Senate in this case as possible. But I can't give you the satisfaction you'd like of saying we'll be here for an authorization in one situation or another.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to greet four new Republican members to our committee. On seriatim, they will now ask questions. First of all Senator Voinovich then Senator Alexander, Senator Coleman. Senator Sununu was with us earlier -- may reappear as his turn comes. Senator Voinovich.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to be a member of this committee at a time that I think is probably one of the most critical periods in our nation's history in terms of our international challenges with the Middle East, with Pakistan, India, North Korea, Iraq -- you go on.

Second, I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member for the courtesy that you have extended to me during the last several years in regard to my interest in Southeast Europe and NATO expansion. You've been very, very good to me, and I am grateful to you.

I'd ask that the statement that I have prepared be made a part of the record.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator, it will be so done.

SEN. VOINOVICH: I'd like to say that I was one of the early supporters of the resolution that gave the president the authority to do what was necessary to enforce the U.N. resolutions. I recall when it was first brought up for discussion that I called the White House and said I wasn't satisfied with the information that I had. And several of my colleagues were there. We met with Condoleezza Rice. We met with George Tenet. We got some good information. We went to the -- over to the State Department, got more information. And I was convinced, as a result of those meetings, that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.

I never got so many letters and calls about being against something as I did since I was in the Senate, this resolution. And I indicated to the people that wrote to me that I had enough confidence in this administration that they would do what the resolution required, and that was to exploit their diplomatic options. And you did that. I think it was extraordinary, Mr. Ambassador, that you were able to get a vote out of the Security Council for a very strong 1441.

And, I had the pleasure of spending some personal time with Secretary Powell when I was in Prague at the NATO summit, and again, I was convinced of his sincerity to do everything he possibly could do, no stone unturned, to try and work this out diplomatically. And you should be congratulated.

We now have the inspectors' report back, and the real question is, I think you said, Mr. Ambassador, the diplomatic window appears to be closing and the time for decision-making is approaching. The real issue here is will Saddam Hussein accept a -- disarmament? And there is this discussion about, you know, whether we should wait for six months or another year, or whatever it is. And as I -- as you said, Mr. Armitage, 12 months, two months, and a few days is what's been going on. He has been stiff-arming us for a long, long time.

And the question is, do we have any reason to believe that if we give them another six months of inspectors, and you multiply them fourfold, whether it will make any difference in terms of getting at the real issue, and that is, is this man willing to disarm? Does he get it? Does he understand that he's got to come clean or leave? That's the -- that's the real issue here. And we're getting to a crescendo now, and I -- I would like to know, do you think it will make any difference if we gave him six months or a year.

MR. ARMITAGE: I don't see a sign -- I don't see one single sign that he's gotten the message. I don't see one single sign of cooperation, Senator.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Mr. Secretary --B. NEGROPONTE: The only point I'd add, and even the inspectors themselves have said this, that even the modicum of cooperation that they have gotten with respect to process has been -- they would attribute to the pressure that Iraq has felt as a result of 1441 and as a result of our military build-up. And they acknowledge that publicly. But, I agree fully with Secretary Armitage that thus far there are no signs that he is prepared to cooperate.

MR. ARMITAGE: If I may, Senator -- and the shame of this is we want this disarmament to take place. We want Mr. Blix and his colleagues to be successful because, as was alluded to by some of your colleagues, we've got other dangerous situations, and we'd like to have the international community be part of the solution. But I don't see a sign.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Well, the question I've got is this -- our allies ought to understand that he's got the stuff, and yet they say "we need more proof." Now, are they asking for it because they need public relations with the people back in their country, or is it because of -- they just don't want to face up to the responsibility that we may have to use force to get the job done?

MR. ARMITAGE: I'm not sure I know all the reasons why. I think they want to evade -- some want to evade responsibility, some don't want to step up and lead. And I don't know how we got in this situation of having to have the, quote, "smoking gun." There was no smoking gun reference in 1441. It was accepted that he had evaded, obfuscated, confused the possession of these weapons for 12 years, so it was up to him to disarm. But somehow, as we move forward, we've gotten into the question of "you've got to make the case." And we've gotten perverted here.

SEN. VOINOVICH: The last thing would be is that you're confident that if we do have to use force, that we're going to have some of our international brothers and sisters with us?

MR. ARMITAGE: I am, Senator. And without getting into the numbers, there are quite a few military liaison people at Tampa who are liaising with CENTCOM on just that possibility.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. Senator Alexander.

SEN. LAMAR ALEXANDER (R-TN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first, it's a real privilege to serve on this committee with you as chairman and Joe as the ranking member, and to look forward to working here in such a serious time for our country, so I'm -- I look forward to this very much.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you.

SEN. ALEXANDER: And I want to thank the secretary and ambassador for being here today. I was -- I appreciate the time that you have spent with us, or the administration has. We've been here three weeks, those of us who are new, and we've had at least three meetings with Secretary Powell, including one this morning that was a bipartisan briefing of all the new senators. And we've had another meeting with Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld and then -- that was available to all the senators. And then we had another meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld. And that's in the last three weeks. And I welcome that. And I thank you for it. And I do think it's appropriate.

One of the advantages of being new is you get to hear what all the others have to say before they get to you, and so here's what I think I've heard.

SEN. : You'll get tired of that very quickly. (Laughter.)

SEN. ALEXANDER: Oh no, I can -- I can learn a lot that way. But, starting with Senator Biden, I think I heard a lot of common ground. I think I heard common ground about the fact that we're talking about enforcing a surrender document. I think I heard common ground in that we agree Saddam Hussein must disarm. I think I heard -- heard it, and when most members said, maybe all, that while we should be prepared to do it ourselves, we should work as hard as we possibly can to make sure we don't ever have to do that -- that there are a hundred reasons not to go it alone in this situation, if possible. I heard it said by virtually everybody, this is a grave danger. And I particularly appreciate the vividness of your one teaspoon of anthrax brought the Senate -- half the Senate offices, emptied them out, and killed five people in a post office without even opening the envelope, I believe. And they've got enough anthrax in Iraq for five million teaspoons of anthrax. And I believe we all seem to agree that the support of the American people and their understanding is absolutely essential to anything that we do, especially any sort of military action, because we never want to have a military action unless we can see it all the way through to the end, with the full support of the American people. So, there's a lot of agreement here, it seems -- it seems to me.

I want to focus on a question of terminology. I think to the extent we're losing the -- the discussion in the court of world opinion, in the mountains of Tennessee where some people are doubting it, or on the streets of Paris, it may be in the first sentence when we talk about inspectors and inspections, because I think those are misnomers in terms of what we're talking about. I mean, you say inspector, at least in this country, it engenders a vision of Inspector Colombo -- some detective -- 108 detectives running around California looking for something that might be this size. And the question is, do we give them enough time to find that.

That's not really what we're -- what we're doing here. We're not looking for a suspect. I mean, Saddam Hussein is a felon. He's a convicted felon. I mean, he did this. There is no doubt about that. We didn't say that. The United Nations said that, and they began to say it 12 years ago. So, he is a felon. And these U.N. folks who are over there are not really inspectors -- they're more like Saddam Hussein's parole officers or probation officers.

Now, I may not have the terminology exactly right -- I even was thinking about moonshiners a hundred years ago in the mountains of Tennessee, you know, what they would -- they'd catch them, the revenuers would catch them, and then they'd haul them before the judge and he'd basically say to them what we said to -- what the world has said to Saddam Hussein. You did it. You're convicted. You've done it before. You're a notorious criminal. Now, your sentence is tell us all about it, destroy it, prove it, or we'll come do it for you.

Now, that's basically what the world has said to Saddam Hussein. And it seems to me that too much of our discussion by the second sentence is into this business of the inspectors and inspections when we're talking more about convicted felons and parole officers. Now maybe you can improve on my technology, but I think that first sentence is an important part of what needs to happen in the next couple of weeks.

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator Alexander, first of all, I -- we were very grateful -- I mentioned to the chairman, you and some of your colleagues, Senator Coleman and Senator Sununu, coming down this morning and spending some time with us. We're at a great disadvantage appearing before you, Senator Alexander. We're not sure whether to call you Secretary Alexander, Governor, or Senator, so it's a little bit of trepidation for John and I to sit here in front of you.

I would like to sort of add to your title. We ought to make you press spokesman, because you were much more vivid. You gave me credit for having a vivid description of anthrax, but you were much more vivid and I think in an accurate characterization of the way things ought to be. I was expressing a frustration that we've somehow got perverted because it all of a sudden it was on us to prove a case that the United Nations and the Security Council Resolution 1441 said was on the shoulder of Saddam to prove that he was disarming. So, had we used this more vivid terminology, and I think felon and parole officer is perfect, we maybe wouldn't be in quite this -- quite this jam. But I suspect you'll see some of your comments being appropriated by others as we move forward to describe this, sir.

SEN. ALEXANDER: I have one other question, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that relates to vividness too -- like your teaspoon of anthrax comment as you began your testimony. The president said the other night that from three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq in the late 1990s had several mobile -- mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed, he said, to produce germ warfare agents and can be moved from place to place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them. Now, that's a very vivid image to me, and I think it could be to most people in the world. I mean, mobile biological weapons labs moving around the desert. And you also said there are five million teaspoons of anthrax. I mean, is that anthrax in those labs? Are they driving around, escaping -- escaping -- I mean, that's a vivid image to me. Can you tell us any more about those mobile biological weapons labs?

MR. ARMITAGE: This is one of the things, Senator, that we'll be speaking of in New York on Wednesday. But I just want to say something -- we'd be delighted if these labs were running around the desert. The problem is, they're parked, we believe, in either one of the many, many, many underground facilities or someone's garage, and that, of course, is the difficulty of the parole officers, finding out whether he's disarming or not. I'd be delighted if they were in the desert, because if they were in the desert, we could take care of business, but we don't believe that. We believe they are hidden in one of these many tunnels or underground facilities, or garages. And if Saddam Hussein has destroyed them, then he ought to show some -- any smidgen of proof, but he has refused to do so.

SEN. ALEXANDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Alexander. Secretary Armitage, let me just mention the next questioner is a fellow mayor, and so while you're adding to the titles of all the good people -- for instance, Senator Chafee was in an earlier life. Senator Coleman.

SEN. NORM COLEMAN (R-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have three mayors and we had three former governors out here. And Mr. Chairman, let me first note my being honored by being part of this committee. I would suspect that the timeliness of this hearing is probably a mark of the vigor and role that the chairman of this committee intends for the Foreign Relations Committee to play in these important, serious matters confronting us. And so I want to thank you for the opportunity and thank you for your leadership.

We have, as I've listened, as my distinguished colleague from Tennessee has listened, there's been discussion about history, discussion about the present, and obviously deep concern about the future. Would it be -- would it be fair to say that living in this post-9/11 world, that the impact of 9/11 changed some of our thinking about what does the word "threat" mean, that the reality of anthrax deaths in the United States has transformed, changed the paradigm -- we're on a different track in terms of perhaps that we're more vulnerable, perhaps -- and I just, two other observations -- that the threats of the weapons of mass destruction by states or terrorists is of greater concern, and that the failure to account for what we know to be the presence of weapons of mass destruction, biological agents, delivery systems for these is at a magnitude unprecedented for us?

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator, Mayor, it is absolutely fair to say that. We, after 9/11, all of us came to the conclusion that no longer were we safe behind the continental limits imposed by our two great oceans. And it brought forward in our minds all of our thinking and fears about weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems and the other items you mentioned, sir.

SEN. COLEMAN: To me, Mr. Secretary, it would -- it seems that we look at -- reflect on this question of time. For 12 years we let Saddam Hussein thumb his nose at the United Nations, but time is a much more serious factor right now because we know that in a blink of an eye the potential for death and destruction right here is greater than it's ever been.

I would note that -- and I want to reiterate something the distinguished ranking member noted about keeping it simple, and I think Senator Alexander said that. It's so important. I can't tell you that the folks in St. Paul, or St. Cloud, or, you know, the streets of Minnesota really fully are with us right now. There was discussion -- I have to ask you this -- can you find proliferation for me, in average terms?

MR. ARMITAGE: I guess in average terms, I'd say it was an unregulated delivery of bad items to bad people for them to accomplish bad purposes.

SEN. COLEMAN: If I can follow-up from one of the questions that the distinguished senator from Wisconsin asked, he raised the question -- I guess I would ask the question -- does Iraq's potential to use weapons of mass destruction, their potential to distribute weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, is that tied -- what's the relationship between that and whether they're the number one, or number three, or number six proliferator in the world?

MR. ARMITAGE: I think it's the combination of the unquestioned thirst for these weapons, combined with his history, his bloody mindedness, where, as we've said -- someone has said he sacrificed more than a million of his youths in his attempt to invade Iran. He then tried to subjugate Kuwait, and he's used this against his own people. And then there's a whole catalogue of things that he's done to his own people -- not because the United States -- it's not the United States who is saying he's done these things, Amnesty International has catalogued his rapes and torture, et cetera. So, it's the combination that makes him for us so loathsome.

SEN. COLEMAN: Two other points. One, and it gets to the issue of -- maybe it's the old lawyer in me, former prosecutor, but burden of proof. I think we have -- I think we got hung up in the discussion about smoking guns and looking for smoking guns, smoking guns in the state the size of California. The issue here is burden of proof. The burden of proof is on Saddam Hussein to say that what he had he has no more, that what he's used before he does not have the capacity to use no more. And whether it's one month, or three months, or six months, or 12 months, if he doesn't come forward right now and say "Here it is," then that's a problem. And what we're seeing, and what I'm hearing is that we're not seeing any indications that -- either us and our allies aren't seeing that he's coming forward and meeting his burden of proof.

Last comment, and last -- and it has to do with the issue of nuclear, which we had a lot of discussion about for a while, is that Dr. ElBaradei in his report I thought seemed to discount that, and yet I would like to ask, there was a report nothing that 3,000 documents relating to the laser enrichment of uranium were found in the home -- a private home. So, I would inspect there a lot of those, and you need a lot of inspectors to check out every private home. Could you help me understand the relationship of those documents, what we know, to Iraq's potential to develop nuclear capacity?B. NEGROPONTE: Well, I think that those are -- documents are still being analyzed. But I think in terms of -- it certainly shows that there are still scientists there who have these kinds of documents, and I think that it's a -- also an example, especially -- I believe I mentioned in my testimony that these documents were found on the basis of an intelligence tip -- I think it's proof that the Iraqi regime is taking steps in its program of denial and deception to disperse documents of this kind to its private citizenry to make it harder to find. So, I think it fits very much into the pattern of denial and deceit that the government of Iraq is pursuing --

SEN. COLEMAN: And so we know whether these documents, Mr. Ambassador, were contained in the December 7th, 2002, declaration from Iraq regarding its weapons of mass destruction?B. NEGROPONTE: I don't know the answer to that question, but I can certainly find out --

SEN. COLEMAN: Thank you.B. NEGROPONTE: -- and submit it for the record.

SEN. COLEMAN: Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Coleman. Let me mention that Senator Hagel and Senator Voinovich have asked that their statements be made a part of the record, without objection, that will be done. The committee will now commence a second round of questioning for those senators who wish to participate.

Let me start with a question raised by another senator about the mobile vans. And I've commented to my colleague, Senator Biden, it seems to me a fairly short time ago the issue of the mobile vans was classified or maybe heavily classified. It was not appearing on lists of the U.N. or others, for that matter. And I may be in error about that.

In any event, the mobile vans are now being discussed -- in the press and have been discussed here today, and are important I think for our understanding. And I asked the question as to how much more you can fill in for us. Many Americans are not acquainted with biological weapons or materials or laboratories or anything associated with this. What has been alleged with regard to Saddam Hussein is that some of the developments with the biological materials have occurred in very small spaces and with relatively small equipment that had dual use, that could in fact be broken down, put in a mobile van and literally carted down the road a hundred miles. Now, if there was not an inspector there in the last 15 minutes or so, giving the world verification of what is there and where it is, is impossible. That is the nature of chemical weapons in many ways.

And as the secretary knows -- because we've discussed this in public hearings -- my experiences in Russia have confirmed for me how rapidly you can move things, how very difficult it is, even if you're looking at it, to know what you are looking at. And I would say I am not as gifted as the UNMOVIC inspectors, but having looked at a lot of things without people there -- Russians who are now cooperative instructing me on what happened in various years, and what developments, and why some apparatus that is now making perfume or fertilizer was even a week ago doing anthrax. That is a tough thing for most of us to comprehend, including myself. But I would say this is the nature of the problem, with regard at least to those two sets of pathogens, and therefore requiring inspectors to find this clearly is not only a needle in a haystack, it is impossible. It is possible to hide it every day, every bit of it, and literally to take it miles away where no one will see it again.

SO I think it is fair enough for our fellow citizens to say, Show us the beef -- you know, lay it out on the table as Adlai Stevenson did with the Cuban missile crisis. But in these two instances, not only is this virtually impossible, but the whole character of the thing changes. In the case of dual use to those things that are benign to those things that are deadly.

The nuclear situation is a different one, as many have pointed out. But in this case the allegation is not that Saddam has a nuclear bomb or a warhead filled with whatever of a nuclear character. He might, and therefore the traces of those things that are telltale signs, including perhaps hundreds of pages of scientist notes as to how you would develop a program and who was involved in it. And all of that could be very interesting, and all of that is available, even if a bomb is not -- thank goodness. And it is to avert the bomb ever being available that we are talking about these issues and asking and demanding Iraq cease and desist the effort to create such a monster.

But with regard to the mobile vans, can either of you indicate to the committee what is available? And are you releasing material? Have you done so, or can you illuminate this territory at all?

MR. ARMITAGE: Thank you, senator. On the direct question of the mobile vans, other than acknowledging it, and acknowledging, as I did earlier, that this is one of the things that Secretary Powell is working, as I said feverishly, right now to get a sufficient level of declassification so that we can talk more openly and show to a wider public more graphically the existence of these. I can't go beyond it.

But I do want to push back a little bit, sir, on the notion of the Adlai Stevenson moment, because it gets to the question of who has got the burden of proof. And what Secretary Powell is going to attempt to do in the U.N. -- and he has said he is going to be showing some new intelligence and some new information that hasn't been seen before -- but he's also going to try to fill in the blanks following up on what Mr. Blix has said when he talks about a lack of cooperation, what we know about it, and lay it out in hopefully rather graphic terms, and in ways that are extraordinarily credible for all to hear, and that no one will be able to evade the absolute conclusion about Saddam Hussein's denial, deception, his absolute lack of willingness to show any sign of a disarmament motive in his mind.

SEN. LUGAR: I thank you.

Senator Biden.

SEN. BIDEN: Let me say that I am sure -- and I think there has been a good exchange, and each of the -- many of our colleagues said that after the opening statement by the chairman and myself that there's as lot we agree on -- I mean overwhelming agreement -- which probably confuses the public at large, when you have guys like me, and even occasionally the chairman and others taking some issue with the administration on how they approach this subject.

And I want to make it clear I think the disagreements to the extent they exist are based on the risk assessment as it relates to timing. And to the extent there's disagreement it relates to tactic not strategy.

I want to reiterate again before I ask these next three questions -- short questions -- is what I think the goal is. I think the goal that we have is to separate Saddam Hussein from his weapons of mass destruction with the greatest possible support of the world that we can get, to reduce in direct proportion the risk we face in separating, and after separating securing Iraq. That to me is the goal. And so where we have disagreements -- and I do have some disagreements, and I will not embarrass anyone, either of our witnesses -- I know there are -- have been significant disagreements within the administration on this question, these questions.

I would like to return to three points that have been raised by some of our colleagues. Senator Voinovich, who by the way has a keen interest in foreign policy -- and I want to compliment him on his deep involvement and hands-on involvement, particularly as it relates to the Balkans in working with this committee when he wasn't on the committee -- he said the question is not will Saddam -- he said, "The question is, Will Saddam respond if he's given more time?"

This is a tactical difference we have. I think the question is: If we give more time, will that markedly increase the support we get from the rest of the world and weigh that against the risks? So the question for me is: Will the additional time given increase the risk beyond the support we will get by allowing more time? And so that's -- I just want to -- I know we have a disagreement on that, but that's where I come from on this. So I sit down and I say the value -- not the legitimacy, not the justness, not the equities -- this guy doesn't deserve another tenth of a second. But by giving him another three weeks, three months or six months, and not move until the next "cold" quote, unquote season in the late fall -- what is the risk of doing that relative to the amount of support we would pick up, making our overall job -- which is going to be immense, in my view -- easier? And that's a tough question. But I don't think the question is if we give him more time is he more likely to cooperate. The more time we give him, the less likely he is to cooperate, in my view.

But the question is: Does his failure to cooperate increase the risk in a way that outweighs the risk of going with fewer people, less support when we go? That to me is the issue.

Now, I realize that maintaining the deployment of a hundred-plus thousand forces in the region is costly. I would just raise as a question to be considered -- it is a helluva lot more -- heck of a lot more costly to deploy those forces with fewer people helping us and less commitment to mop up after it's over. Now, again, that's tough call. Are we going to -- am I going to second-guess the president? No, but I am going to front-end guess it. I am going to front-end guess it. I come down on the side of suggesting that another several months is not something that in any way appreciably will increase any risk.s

The second point that I want to make is that you point out, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, what a bad guy Saddam is, and it's undisputable. But there's also another piece of history we have from the experts we brought before this committee. Saddam Hussein has a long history -- with good reason -- of oppressing Islamists as well as his neighbors. The people he hates most are the clerics. They're the ones that hate him the most, because he is a secular leader. If you were just going to write the profile of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden would like to kill Saddam Hussein. Osama bin Laden hates Saddam Hussein. So the idea that there is a natural affinity here is contrary to history, recent history and even not-so- recent history. That doesn't mean in a crunch he wouldn't in order to retaliate adopt the slogan we rejected that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. But that's the only circumstance under which there's any historical data to suggest he might be cooperative. That I believe is the consensus among most experts.

The third point that I would like to make -- and it was a comment made to me by a high-ranking official of a NATO country recently in Davos. I was making the smoking gun argument as it not being relevant. I said, How do we get to that point? And this very high- ranking person who both of you know said -- and I am paraphrasing -- I think this is a quote, but I'll be precise and say I'm paraphrasing. He said, The smoking gun was invoked by us in response to the hyperbole of a gunslinger -- your president. The smoking gun was invoked by us in response to the hyperbole of your president -- not my comment -- a gunslinger. And I don't know how many times I heard from world leaders this past week who is the president to stand before us and petulantly look down and say, "I am growing impatient." You're a diplomat, Mr. Ambassador -- I don't want either one of you to comment, except to defend the president -- because I like you too much. But if you use that language in the Security Council, even if everyone agreed with you, you would not get agreement. You would not get agreement.

So I'm just suggesting that it may be time for us to understand that we have sort of concurrent objectives here. The concurrent objective is take him down with the most help we possibly can get to maybe -- maybe -- have a shot of putting together a more stable -- with the help of the rest of the world -- a more stable government that will be less destabilizing for a very important region of the world, which is when your work really begins. So I just wanted to make those few points. I would invite response -- if you want to -- it's not necessary. But as we go forward, no one should confuse my support for the overall objective that has been signed on by the president of the United States of America. But no one should assume that I will not have strong disagreement with the tactical approach the president uses to accomplish the end, just as I would argue -- and I know for a fact that there has been equally -- equally energetic disagreement within the administration on tactics as well. I'm not odd man out on that regard.

So, at any rate, I just wanted to make that statement, and I hope that we can get -- I have a couple of questions I would like to submit for the record, if I may -- I won't take any more time -- that relate specifically to the Kurds. We just got back from Kurdistan -- as you know, you accommodated that trip. I would argue as much as I love the Kurds -- and I think Senator Hagel and I are the only two to ever address their "parliament," quote/unquote -- they have an overwhelming reason to make a connection between al Qaeda and Saddam, and I found very little evidence of it. But they -- their motivation for it is overwhelming. So we have to consider the source of some of this as well. I yield the floor. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: I thank you, Senator Biden. Normally I would turn to this side of the aisle, but Senator Nelson has not had a first round of question.

MR. ARMITAGE: Your indulgence, sir. I am not going to respond at length, but I feel a need to respond a bit. When you were writing out - -when you were illuminating us on what you thought our shared objective was, I was writing it down, and it is to separate Saddam Hussein from his weapons of mass destruction with the maximum international support possible. And I wrote, "In the most timely fashion possible." And you correctly identified that's one of the perhaps tension points.

However, what is the president doing? He is meeting today with Prime Minister Berlusconi --

SEN. BIDEN: I agree.

MR. ARMITAGE: What is he doing with Prime Minister Blair tomorrow? Now, the question of whether it's a week, two weeks, three weeks, a month or whatever, these are decisions that these world leaders will make. We also are desirous of getting the maximum international support possible. And I don't think that's an insignificant amount of numbers that I was reading off to I think Senator Brownback.

SEN. BIDEN: (Off mike) -- and I would, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, ask to submit into the record an article from the Wall Street Journal today by the following leaders of the following countries: Spain, Portugal, U.K., Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic -- all of whom have signed on. So I am not in any way -- it is -- all I am pointing out is it's a call that ultimately the chief executive has to make. But I will not, as you wouldn't expect, refrain from my suggestions as to what considerations should go into him making that call. That's the only point I wish to make.

MR. ARMITAGE: The only other point on your historical comments about Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are absolutely correct. After 9/11, a lot of things changed, including the need to be somewhere. There were some marriages of convenience that I think that over time we'll be able to show. And we've gotten a lot smarter about Osama bin Laden. And on the comment of differences in any administration or this one, I think those are differences we are blessed with, because it is only from such differences that the chief executive can make the most informed decision.

And finally, on the question of the gunslinger and smoking gun and all that --

SEN. BIDEN: It's not my comment.

MR. ARMITAGE: Not at all, sir. Not at all. But, you know, people were saying prior to September that the president would never go to the U.N., and he did it. And the same people that said he'll never have the patience to see this through the mosh pit, if you will, of a Security Council discussion -- and he saw it through. And having gotten the resolution, he'll never have the patience to let the inspectors try to do their job and let Hans Blix report -- all of which has been done. So I think there's a lot more --

SEN. BIDEN: In large part thanks to your persuasion.

MR. ARMITAGE: No, not at all. It's the president is in charge and he's making these decisions, sir. Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Your article will be submitted and without objection concluded.

And Senator Nelson.

SEN. NELSON: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to pick up on something that Senator Biden said a couple of hours ago in which he talked about nation-building. I went to Bosnia to have dinner -- Thanksgiving dinner -- with our troops, specifically for the reason not only to give them the "attaboys" they certainly deserve, but to understand what folks thought that we were going to be in Bosnia for a year, and we're there now in the seventh year. And the nation- building that is going to be required in Afghanistan and in the aftermath of Iraq, and wherever else we happen to have to confront terrorism where there's not a stable political and stable economic environment. And so I would just inject this thought -- and that's why I wanted to come back to the committee: What I found in Bosnia I was both pleased and at the same time a little concerned, because it is the National Guard that is performing the military duties -- in this particular case, Thanksgiving, it was a National Guard unit from Pennsylvania. And they are there for six months tour of duty.

Now, these are people who pick up from a civilian life, that they leave their employer or their own place of business and go to defend the interests of the United States -- in this particular case Bosnia -- very important keeping those people from slaughtering each other as we try to implant some sense of rule of law and hopefully it will be successful. Here's what concerned me, was the fact that as long as they were there for six months, they're doing the mission well. But if that six months suddenly got extended to a year, and then they are ready to come home and suddenly they are diverted to Iraq instead of coming home, what we have got to do as a matter of policy is decide can we rely -- is it fair to rely on the Guard and the Reserves who have the expectations of a limited time of active duty service, or do we need instead to increase the active duty military to take over this nation-building that Senator Biden was talking about? And we are going to be confronted with this.

Now, let me tell you a year ago the military chiefs asked for an increase of 60,000 active duty. That has since been erased from the agenda because the administration is saying, No, well, we don't need that. And what I want to raise to you all, and invite any of your comments as we get around to this serious question of nation-building in many nations, do we not have to face the fact that we are going to have to do this with active duty and not with calling on the Guard and the Reserves -- and particularly for the specialties that are needed, many of which are only found in the Guard and the Reserves today. I invite your comments.

MR. ARMITAGE: Well, it's with great trepidation, because my reputation is already mud in the Pentagon, so I'll -- (laughter) -- sort of try to weave my way through there. I saw Secretary Rumsfeld indicating his own dissatisfaction with the high op-tempo for the Reserves and Guard. And as you correctly suggest, Senator, people come on to do their duty and their job, but not forever, and not to be away from their civilian employers, et cetera. And he -- I'm sure he's looking at that, and he's expressing a great deal of satisfaction -- of dissatisfaction with it, and we'll see how he wants to proceed.

On the question of nation-building, which the chairman is going to have a hearing on Iraq -- excuse me, on Iraq and Afghanistan -- there's a lot of things we have to do differently. And after the pointy edge of the spear work is done, if military action is called on, we've got to do a lot better and learn the lessons of Bosnia, whether it's to get retired police officers and others to fall in and do more of the job, or some other way of doing business.

Now, Secretary Rumsfeld went to Chile recently and had what I thought was an excellent suggestion, that you'd start sort of a -- almost a carbinieri school in Chile for that hemisphere. And I spoke with the deputy foreign minister of Argentina about it yesterday, to actually train carbinieri which are the people needed now in the Bosnia region. We've got the Italians in there quite heavily. The Spanish are in there. But they don't have as many of those type of people. So, there are a lot of things that we have to do differently, and the international community has to do differently as we move forward. Nobody I think has anything but a deep gratitude for the sacrifice of the Guard and the Reserve.

SEN. BILL NELSON: Mr. Ambassador, any comment? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Senator Chafee.

SEN. CHAFEE: I know the hours are going on here, and I'll be very brief. First of all, thank you for the generous use of your time here, coming here. Very generous, appreciate very much.

And I'd just comment that it seems that after the break-up of the Berlin Wall the United States has found itself at the top of the heap, and with that comes a lot of responsibility and a lot of risk also. I asked the question recently in my office, "Who is second to us militarily?" And everybody had a different answer. But there really is no second. Someone said the U.K. -- or who is second? It's almost there is no second.

And so with this position we have, so vastly superior, whether -- however you might judge it, in battleships or submarines or men and women, fighting forces, jets, bombers, whatever -- however you might judge it, we're vastly, vastly superior. And I think our threat, as we look at the world, is going to come from rogue nations and from terrorists. And our best hope, as we look ahead decades from now, is to confront this threat under the umbrella of all the civilized countries working together. And there's a lot of justifiable criticism of the United Nations, but now more than ever I think we have to work through our good ambassador to empower the United Nations and to listen to them more carefully.

And we are going now into a new set of inspection rules. They're different from the old rules. They're much more strict. And they haven't really been given the time to work, I don't think, and I think many of the other civilized countries are saying the same thing. Let the new inspections, much, much stricter than the old inspection rules, work. And as we look ahead for the future and the decades to come, our best hope from these various threats, wherever it might be around the world, many hot spots, is under the -- the working together with our allies. And I think we've slowly, with our somewhat arrogant position as top of the heap, alienated some of our friends, and all the more reason for us to go back to the Security Council and to seek their approval as we go forth.

But once again, thank you for your time.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. Senator Boxer.

SEN. BOXER: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to our witnesses. And I have found this to be extremely interesting. And I hope that you will take back some of our comments, whether you agree with them or not, and synthesize them for the secretary. I think it would be really wonderful if you would do that.

I want to pick up on Senator Biden's point about the difference, as he sees it. I see it a little differently, but I share -- one of the main differences is the question of timing. You admitted that, and some of us believe that to have the time to build up the type of coalition we had in the first Gulf War would be well worth it. And I would like to put in the record, the coalition we had was 34 nations. It was -- they picked up 50 billion of the 65 billion. I'd like to put into the record the coalition we had at that time.

SEN. LUGAR: It will be put in the record.

SEN. BOXER: And the importance of the point that Senator Biden made on it. I look at it, in addition to that, another difference that some of us have -- not a majority, but I would say, I bet a majority of the America people -- and that is that we are putting in the administration so much of our power, and our influence, and our talent, to make the case for a military solution here, rather than take that talent, and that persuasion and so on and put it behind a robust, very workable inspection regime. And I think that that's -- that's the nub of the problem with a lot of my constituents, and I think a lot of the people in our own country, and I dare say a lot of people in the world.

And I don't expect you to have this, but I have a list of what the inspectors achieved in the disarmament process in the last -- right after the last war, and I'm going to quickly run through it, Mr. Chairman. I think it's instructive.

They destroyed the following, according to UNSCOM: 48 operational long-range missiles; 14 conventional missile warheads; six operational mobile launchers -- and there won't be a test on this -- 28 operational fixed launch pads; 32 fixed launch pads under construction at the time; 30 missile chemical warheads; other missile support equipment and materiel; supervision of the destruction of a variety of assembled and non-assembled super-gun components. In the chemical area, 38,537 filled and empty chemical munitions; 690 tons of chemical weapons agents; more than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals; 426 pieces of chemical weapons production equipment; 91 pieces of related analytical instruments. And in the biological area, the entire al-Hakam, the main biological weapons production facility, and a variety of biological weapons production equipment and material.

The reason I take the time to read it is that's no small feat. That's more than was destroyed by our bombs, and we had a lot of bombs going out there. So, knowing that, and knowing, as I believe Senator Chafee said, if I'm not -- if I misquoted you -- that it's even a stronger inspection regime now -- I believe you said that -- and that the whole world is watching now more than ever, I would like to see us put more of our influence and power behind that. And I think if we were to do that -- you see, I think it's a winner for us, because then if Iraq puts up her back and Saddam says "No, I'm not cooperating, this is a hoax, this is a fraud," and all that, the world will see it. And that's the way you take the high ground.

So, this is a difference that I see personally. And as I look at the comments of Secretary Powell, three weeks ago, quoted in the Washington Post that the inspection regime was in its infancy -- he said, quote, "The inspectors are really now starting to gain momentum." Three weeks ago, Secretary Armitage, he said it. In part because the United States had just begun to provide the intelligence, and that gets to Secretary (sic) Sarbanes' points, and others. And I'm flabbergasted that Ambassador Negroponte doesn't really know how much we've given them of what we have. I think you should be told that. You are our guy on the firing line. You need to know out of all the intelligence we've had how much has been turned over. And we know Hans Blix says he opening a new office, he's training additional inspectors. ElBaradei said continued inspections will be a valuable investment in peace because it could help us avoid a war. General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the allies during the Persian Gulf War has been quoted as saying, quote, "It's important for us to wait and see what the inspectors come up with, and hopefully they'll come up with something conclusive."

So, you know, I feel compelled to put this out there, because I think that the reason there's a split in American public opinion, and let me tell you, should we go to war, there won't be any split, there's no doubt in my mind, that's how we are. We're going to pull together and we do everything to make it work with the least possible loss of life, both here and innocent civilians. I've convinced of that. That's why when I heard of possible first use of nuclear weapons, I couldn't believe it, and I hope that that's not on the table.

I want you to take back the word that, you know, we could do this really right. We could have the kind of coalition Senator Biden referred to. We can have the cost defrayed. And for the record, I hope you would give us how many dollars people have agreed to put forward. And there's a report that came to us after the Gulf War from the Department of Defense saying how the contributions were so important in softening the economic blow of the war. And this is an important consideration.

So, I guess I've said my peace. I hope that it didn't fall on deaf ears. I hope that we will be briefed by Colin Powell as to why he has changed his mind on this. Before he wanted more inspections. Now I sense he's joined with others in saying, you know, "time's up." It seems like a very rapid change of heart to me, and I want to know why. And I hope you will convey our thoughts. And we are all one nation, and we are praying for a good ending here. And I hope you'll send the words back.

Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Chairman?

MR. ARMITAGE: Yes. Senator, thank you very much. The reason I indicated that I had seen your statement of the 27th of January was to try to make the point that you ended with -- you began and ended with -- and that is to carry the message back, both as a matter of having the relationship we have with this committee and as our duty, we have to carry these back to the secretary and beyond. So, have no fear that whether we agree or not, that's quite different, but the message gets carried.

Number two, I'm one of those who -- now, I don't want to be graded on my biblical reference and my memory of the exact biblical citation, but I'm one who grew up with the words of Isaiah, and I think it's 2:8, in my years, and that was where the question is asked, "Who shall go? Who shall we send and who will go for us?" And the answer is, "Here I am. Send me." And I think there, for better or for worse, a certain amount of that about the United States. For a lot of reasons, we're who and what we are, and in a very real way, it's "Who will go for us? Here I am, send me." It's usually referred to in a military context, but I think as a nation. Now, how we go is a serious question.

And finally, on the question of how much good was accomplished by the inspectors, you're right, I can't gainsay it. And it was at a time when the smell of cordite was still in the nostrils of the Iraqis, and their ears were still ringing from those bombs we expended. And in the 12 years since then, I think they've -- some in the leadership have come to a different conclusion, that there aren't any more teeth in the international community. So, I think that's why we may have a difference of opinion about the timing, how much time to give. But, I certainly wouldn't dispute any of the comments or the accomplishments that you outlined.

SEN. LUGAR: Mr. Biden.

SEN. BIDEN: Would you indulge me for about three more minutes?

SEN. LUGAR: Of course.

SEN. BIDEN: When we passed the resolution which you and I and others helped craft here giving the president the authority, there was a requirement that the president submit a report, and the report was focused -- granted, it's a month late, but we got the report -- and it was supposed to lay out what other military assistance, what other economic assistance, et cetera, that we expect from other countries. This is -- I'm going to submit a couple of questions on that, if I may, Mr. Secretary, because I think it is a -- it is not a complete report, and you may not be able to give a complete report yet. But I'd like to have described here is a little bit about the -- what was required in the report is the steps we're taking to encourage others to contribute to this initial fund, and that is afterwards, and a few other questions, which is following on from that Senator Boxer raised about the previous report, under the law, under the resolution, we are -- we need in that report.

Secondly, we'd also like to know, which will be the subject of another hearing, is what the game plan is, to the extent there is one, after and if -- if there is a war -- and after the war.

The third point I'd like to make is that I -- this may be a simple answer -- I'm revealing my ignorance here, maybe you know off the top of your head, Mr. Ambassador -- but Hans Blix's report indicated that there are a number of illegal actions that were uncovered, including possession of those 122 chemical rockets, possession of laboratories -- a laboratory and some mustard gas, development of liquid fuel missiles, et cetera. Is he authorized under 1441 to destroy -- confiscate and destroy that material? And if he is, has -- is this -- these -- are these illegal things within the -- within the control now of UNSCOM? Can you tell us that?B. NEGROPONTE: He is authorized to destroy those materials under 1441 and preceding resolutions, all the way back to 687, provided he makes a determination that they are -- this is Blix's position, that they are related to WMD programs and they are not simply illegal arms imports that even though they're illegal, they're not WMD. And he --

SEN. BIDEN: Oh, I see --

AMB. NEGROPONTE: And that is the determination he said he was going to be making within the next couple of weeks --

SEN. BIDEN: I see --B. NEGROPONTE: -- with respect to -- (inaudible) --

SEN. BIDEN: Well, I would hope that no matter what we do we could get maybe some clarification or amendment to that, because the idea that we're unable to destroy what he is not legally able to do under previous resolutions I think is a --B. NEGROPONTE: We have been arguing that that is what --

SEN. BIDEN: Great.B. NEGROPONTE: -- should be done.

SEN. BIDEN: And the last point I'll make is that I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, about -- you just talked about Chile. Bob Dole and I, seven years ago, when we put in authorizing language in follow- on to Bosnia, proposed to, and suggested the Defense Department had to develop that, it is clear to me -- it is clear to me it's the only alternative to boots on the ground with warriors there.

And the last point, I say to my friend from Rhode Island, I appreciate his observation about our power relative to the rest of the world. I may be mistaken, but I don't think I am -- our military budget is larger than the next 15 nations combined, from the second most powerful military to the 15th most powerful. You add up their -- and I'm not saying it shouldn't be, but just to put it in perspective, add up every other nation, including all our NATO allies, all of them combined -- China -- you add them all up, 15, whatever the top 15 are, our budget is larger than all 15 combined, which I think argues for the fact that they have to take on more responsibility, not that we should cut our budget.

But at any rate, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the the witnesses very much for their indulgence.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Biden. Let me mention that Senator Sununu has submitted a statement for the record, and without objection, it will be included.

Let me just conclude by commenting that clearly many members of the committee have argued today that the obligation is not on the inspectors but on the Iraqis. On the other hand, we have heard a great deal of testimony and in the question-and-answer session from senators today that constituents are deeply interested in the whole inspection process, who the inspectors are. Is the regime getting better? Is it large enough? What have they achieved in the past? Other questions of this sort.

And I appreciate, as people proceed to try to answer everything -- this may seem like a tangent that is not worth the exploration, but I think that it is. And it's probably obvious to both of you that much more probably needs to be written officially about the record.

When that happens, I just have these two observations. Rolf Ekeus, a very distinguished inspector from UNSCOM in another regime, has pointed out that many of the successes, as Senator Boxer pointed out, in the destruction of these weapons and materials of mass destruction came after the fortuitous departure of the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein to Jordan.

He really did know where things were. This was not just simply a scientist at a particular laboratory or other people we would like to interview. This is a pretty comprehensive view of the whole subject. And, remarkably, he did detail to the inspectors of that day where a lot was, and they promptly regained entry and destroyed it, a magnificent amount.

Now, even then they did not know what percentage they had, how much else was left; clearly a remarkable record, which, as Senator Boxer has said, is more than our bombs have achieved. But we didn't know often, when we were bombing, where things were either.

Back to the inspector problem. If you have direction, if another relative of the family leaves, conceivably there can be spectacular results within a short period of time. Absent that, I am told that the inspecting team now there is comprised of people, 75 percent of them people who have had no experience in Iraq before. That is unfortunate. And there were not many of them for several weeks.

So it has now built up -- you know, even given the gravity of all that was involved in the U.N. resolution, the fact is that the U.N. inspection community did not act particularly swiftly and aggressively, in the views of many, who are spending a lot of time looking at inspectors and examining the inspection.

Now, many are there now. They're sort of getting their ground legs. They go out each day to eight or nine places as directed and do baseline work. This is what the inspectors call it -- baseline; the same thing they've done before, last time, time before, just to check to see if anything's changed.

But these are hardly breakthrough situations, and unlikely to be, without, in fact, somebody telling us where the mobile van went and where it is today. But I (go through ?) this tediously, because I think you must go through it tediously. There is somehow a myth out in the country that inspection per se, even over many weeks and months, under these circumstances might disarm Iraq.

Up to the moment, there is not any evidence, in my judgment, that that could slightly be the case, even remotely in a century, not in a few months. However, if Saddam Hussein, using Chairman Biden's terminology, is really seized with the issue, this disarmament process -- he's surrounded; we are intent; the president has the will to go, with the willing -- maybe he will change his mind. Maybe he will not. But that is the critical factor. Or some member of his family might change his or her minds. Any of the above would be extremely useful. And we pray that some breakthrough will occur for the benefit of all of us, as well as the world.

But we thank both of you very much for devoting this time. We're still in the same calendar day that we began. (Laughs.) You've been very patient and stalwart, and we thank you. And we look forward to seeing you again, Secretary Armitage, very soon.

The committee is adjourned.