LESSONS LEARNED IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Committee

July 9, 2003

WARNER: The committee meets this morning to receive the testimony from the secretary of defense and General Tommy Franks, who has just stepped down as commander in chief of the forces that are now CENTCOM.

. . .

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOHN WARNER
A Senator from Virginia, and
Chairman, Armed Services Committee

WARNER: The American public, indeed the world, are awaiting this testimony this morning, and consequently I am going to put my full statement into the record and make but a very few brief opening remarks out of deference to my colleagues who are anxiously awaiting to hear the testimony and participate in the questions, and indeed the public that are following the hearing.

First, we open being mindful of the loss of life, loss of limb and the families who have suffered the consequences as they have throughout the history of this nation and other nations in times of war.

They paid a great price, and those risks continue as we well know each day. They showed courage, the men and women of the coalition forces. They showed commitment.

Our delegation of nine senators witnessed that just days ago, when we spent time in Basra, Baghdad and Kirkuk.

And we thank you, Mr. Secretary, and your staff, Tommy Kologis (ph), Secretary Cambone and others who made this trip very successful.

So we salute all the men and women of the coalition forces and their families.

The leadership that has been shown is remarkable. Our president, secretaries of state and defense, our military, General Franks, all those in your command.

Our hearing this morning covers not only Iraq, but Afghanistan and indeed the impending possible military commitment in Liberia.

So I hope each of you will, that is you, Mr. Secretary, on Liberia touch on that issue.

Civilian control of the military has been a part of our history, but I look upon the relationship that you, Mr. Secretary, had with General Franks as really one of partnership. And I guess that's the way it should be.

The bucks finally stopped on your desk, but having watched the two of you as partners conducting the operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan is truly remarkable.

When Senator Levin and I, on two occasions, visited Afghanistan, and I think to an extent in the Iraqi campaign, we were impressed by the leadership of the non-commissioned officers, and indeed the junior officers, but the non-commissioned officers; how groups of 15, 20, 25 would go in on a mission at night with one officer and that officer knowing full well that each man or woman, as the case may be, knew exactly what their missions were.

WARNER: A remarkable chapter in history and also of jointness; joint operations between the Army, the Navy, the Marines, the Air Force.

While the major field maneuvers of our troops, division level, regimental level, have stopped, nevertheless the fighting continues at the company level. When we visited the 4th I.D., the commander went into great detail. Three operations, General Franks. I think one is still continuing.

Taking to the remaining enemy, the battle. Not waiting for the enemy to come but taking it to them.

And to meet that challenge, we would like to have your views this morning on the force levels, the adequacy, the rotation policy and how other coalition nations are joining, Mr. Secretary. I personally felt that tremendous effort had been made from Washington and the other capitals of the world to bring in other troops, not only to augment our existing force structure but, hopefully, to provide and facilitate for the rotation of our forces and those of Great Britain back home.

The intelligence is a matter of great interest -- your views on the adequacy of that intelligence from a military standpoint. Troop commanders told us, when we asked the question, they had a high degree of confidence in the intelligence that they received.

Nevertheless, Mr. Secretary, the issue of intelligence is of importance, as you well know, and how the intelligence which was utilized in the policymaking levels, at your level and with your subordinates, as you address the American public in open forums and as you address the Congress, how you utilize that intelligence in such a manner to, I certainly feel, remain accurate at all times.

WARNER: The Task Force 20, which is performing, General Franks, the specialized mission of searching out Saddam Hussein -- a bounty, quite properly now, having been put on his head -- and how they're operating to not only find him and his two sons, but indeed the others that had significant roles in perpetrating the horror throughout Iraq and the threat to the world with their weapons of mass destruction.

And on weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Secretary, you brought in David Kay, a man with impeccable credentials and a long background of history in this subject, working with General Dayton. And you've given him a charter to go out and use every asset that they need to uncover the mystery of these weapons of mass destruction.

Lastly, I want to credit Ambassador Bremer. I've known him through the years, but I think he's doing an extraordinary job. And he laid down the three objectives that he has at this time to try and lessen the risk to our troops, and at the same time bring about the fulfillment of our mission to provide freedom for the Iraqi people.

First, was to take the battle to the enemy -- and that's being done -- to root out the last pockets of resistance.

Secondly, to utilize every effort to find Saddam Hussein and the other principals.

And thirdly, to form an interim government composed initially of two parts: one, a governing council of Iraqis, who will elect their own chairman of that council, to supervise the several ministries, whether it's the creation of a police force, whether it's education, whether it's the preservation of artifacts, whether it's sewers, whether it's electricity; and secondly, to formulate a group of individuals that will sit down -- Iraqis -- and write a constitution, because without a constitution, we cannot expect elections to be held nationally. There's just no infrastructure on which an election can be established until that constitution is put in place and candidates can address their views with respect to the fulfillment of the provisions of that constitution.

WARNER: Now while our delegation was there, we met in Kirkuk with Iraqis who are assuming local office as mayors, assistant mayors and so forth. And Bremer is to be congratulated in pockets here and there where possible putting together groups of Iraqis, Iraqis who, sort of, elect themselves and take over the responsibilities of community matters. But the national elections have to await the constitution.

So on the whole, just speaking for myself, I feel very positive on my return from this inspection trip, and I once again salute those in uniform in the coalition forces who, night and day, are taking the risks and their families at home who are sharing in those risks.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I'll also shorten my statement and ask that the entire statement can be part of the record.

WARNER: Without objection.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

CARL LEVIN
A Senator from Michigan, and
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services

LEVIN: First, General Franks, let me thank you for your life of commitment to this nation and your public service as a soldier. You've proven yourself time and time again during a unique period in our history. Historians will someday judge the military campaigns that you led in Afghanistan and Iraq that swiftly defeated the Taliban and the forces of Saddam Hussein as brilliantly planned and executed examples of the military art and as foreshadows of future military tactics.

While you would be the first to acknowledge that most of the credit and thanks must go to all who assisted you in that effort, and especially to the fighting men and women of the U.S. armed forces who executed those campaigns, your role as their commander was indispensable.

Any inquiry into lessons learned will inevitably tend to emphasize areas of concern, and will tend to spend less time on the innumerable things that were done well.

LEVIN: It is essential that that be done. But it must not detract in any way from our appreciation for the superb performance of duty by the men and women of our armed forces as they continue to conduct stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and prepare to execute other missions in support of our national military strategy.

We must succeed in this endeavor, this post-conflict stability effort of ours, and we need to understand the strategy for ensuring that success.

Part of that strategy hopefully will be an attempt to internationalize the security and nation-building efforts.

To achieve that end I hope that we will seek NATO and United Nations support and endorsement that will facilitate the recruitment of their member nations to our effort in terms of providing troops, resources, expertise and international legitimacy.

The whole world has a stake in the stability of Iraq. It is a mystery to me why apparently we have not reached out to NATO and to the United Nations as institutions. Their support could bring significant additional forces, such as German and French forces through NATO, and Indian and Egyptian forces through a U.N. endorsement.

We're going to be in Iraq a long time. A large number of troops are going to be needed, as the president acknowledged last week. There are a number of advantages to having a significant number of additional forces from other countries join us in the stability operations in Iraq.

First, some U.S. forces, including Reserves, have seen extended combat and other exhausting duty. With U.S. forces stretched thin around the world, increasing the number of non-U.S. forces who can substitute for us in Iraq would reduce the numbers of and the burden on U.S. forces.

As of now, the number of troops of other countries present on the ground will increase from the present number of 12,000 to a total of only 20,000 by the end of the summer; an increase of a mere 8,000 troops out of about 165,000. That is difficult to sustain.

LEVIN: Second, I would hope that internationalization would serve to reduce the threat to U.S. forces in more ways than reducing the quantity of our forces on the ground.

Up until now, we have been the main target of those Baathists who stand to lose most when democracy is established in Iraq because we were the ones who brought down Saddam's regime which provided privileged status to the Baathist minority. It would be harder for those Saddam loyalists to sustain attacks on forces wearing NATO or U.N. patches on their shoulders. Because it would be dramatized to the people of Iraq that this is not a U.S.-British occupation, but is an international effort to bring stability to the nation and to the region.

Just as reaching out to the world is necessary, so is reaching in to the Iraqi people to help this effort succeed. As our chairman has indicated, that means turning over the civilian government as quickly as possible to the people of Iraq so that they understand that they are deciding their own future.

It also means making better use of our TV capability in Iraq, so that Iraqis can be interviewed about and talked to their fellow countrymen about the thousands of projects that we are engaged in to help rebuild their nation. We are rebuilding schools, we are bringing back water, we are fixing up neighborhoods, we are supplying food or moving garbage and doing many other tasks needed to reconstruct Iraq, but we have done an inadequate job of getting that information to Iraqis.

False propaganda that we blew up a mosque must be countered by Iraqis speaking about our rebuilding efforts in their communities, and assuring Iraqis that we are not there for domination, but to help them rebuild.

And Mr. Secretary, we talked to Secretary Cambone about speeding up that television presence and projection to Iraq during our trip. And I know that he's probably by now already discussed that with you. The Chairman and I and all the members of the delegation had some strong feelings about the importance of speeding up that effort.

The United States has taken upon itself the daunting task of nation building in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The administration and Congress must work together to ensure success in those endeavors. It's essential in that regard for our nation to understand the strategy and the milestones for achieving our objectives, and surely we need to know how we will continue over the foreseeable future to maintain a large American military presence in your former region of command, General. It's been now -- what? -- two days or one day?

FRANKS: Two days.

LEVIN: I know the relaxation in your face is palpable. Just kidding. You did that with great glory. You handled it absolutely brilliantly and never even showed the stress.

But, we have to let the American people know how we're going to be able to execute other missions of our national military strategy as well as maintaining the large presence in the CENTCOM region.

Mr. Secretary, we very much look forward to your testimony, as well as that of General Franks. We thank you for your service, your commitment and I know you're grateful for the presence of your former (inaudible) today.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator Levin.

WARNER: Mr. Secretary?

RUMSFELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I would ask that my complete statement be put in the record.

WARNER: Without objection, the statements of both witnesses will be included in there.

STATEMENT OF

DONALD H. RUMSFELD
U.S. Secretary of Defense

RUMSFELD: And I'd like to make a brief statement. I begin by saying a few words about the remarkable man seated next to me, General Tom Franks.

On Monday, I was in Tampa to attend to the change-of-command ceremony there. It was an occasion to reflect on General Tom Franks and what the CENTCOM leadership that he put together has accomplished during his tenure as combatant commander.

Think back to September 11th, it was a dark day for our country, to be sure, but how fortunate our country was to have General Franks and his team in command at CENTCOM.

In the period since September 11th consider what's been accomplished. In just weeks, they developed and were executing a war plan for Afghanistan. They employed a range of capabilities from the most advanced, such as laser-guided weapons, to antique, 40-year-old B-52s that had been updated with modern electronics, to rudimentary cavalry charges, driving the Taliban and Al Qaida from a power in a matter of months.

The plan they developed for Operation Iraqi Freedom was even more innovative and transformational, employing an unprecedented combination of speed, precision, surprise and flexibility.

One of the most interesting aspects of the campaign was mentioned in the opening statements about the lesson's learned process. It began before the war ever began. There were something in excess of 50 to 70 people that General Franks installed as a team from Joint Forces Command in his command from the very start.

And they did a lot more to take notes to improve our performance for the next war. They actually provided immediate feedback, allowing CENTCOM leadership to apply lessons in real-time and improve coalition performance in this war. General Franks has said to me that there wasn't a day that went by that there wasn't valued added.

I'll leave it to General Franks to describe the lessons he believes are most important. I've listed some in my testimony.

We're still in the early stages of studying these lessons and the conclusions that are drawn will most certainly affect how the armed forces of the United States and the services organize, train and equip for many years to come. This will be one of General Franks' truly enduring legacies.

RUMSFELD: He led the coalition forces that liberated two nations, but how he liberated those two peoples, the tactics, the strategies he developed and employed, will contribute to the freedom of our country and our people for years to come.

So while General Franks may be leaving the service, the Army, his service to our country will live on in the impact of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom that it will have on our budgets, our procedures, our training, our doctrine and our joint war- fighting.

And the people he led, those who served with him in Iraq and Afghanistan, will now take those transformational experiences to their next important commands and teach them to the next generation of leaders.

So, General Franks, I salute you and thank you for your truly remarkable service to our country.

Today, Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding from decades of tyranny. Coalition forces are helping the Iraqi people get on the path to stability and democratic self-government by helping Iraqis re-establish security and commerce, restore power and basic services, reopen schools and hospitals, and establish the rule of law.

With each passing week, more services come on line, power and water are restored in more of the country, gas lines disappear, and more Iraqi police are on the street. But we must not underestimate how difficult the task is before us.

Yet despite the difficulties they face, most Iraqis are far better off today than they were four months ago. Let there be no doubt about that.

The residents of Baghdad may not have power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up each morning in fear wondering whether this will the day that a death squad would come to cut out their tongues, chop off their ears or take their children away for "questioning," quote/unquote, never to be seen again.

It's true there are some Iraqis who are not better off today. For the most part, they comprise a small, elite segment of Iraqi society that benefited from the Saddam Hussein dictatorship. And they are understandably unhappy now that the regime that favored them at the expense of the population has been removed from power.

Today, some of them are in hiding. Others are engaging in acts of sabotage and violence.

Let me say a word about the security situation in Iraq.

There seems to be a widely held impression that the regime loyalists are operating freely throughout the country attacking coalition forces at will. That's clearly not the case. Large portions of Iraq are stable.

If one looks at this map beside me, while there have been isolated incidents in other parts of the country, most of the recent attacks have been concentrated in Baghdad and in the three corridors that reach to the west, the north and the east out of the Iraqi capital.

At this moment, coalition forces are engaged in operations to deal with the threats in these areas. Indeed, a number of recent incidents in those regions are the result of offensive operations by the coalition, cases where the coalition forces have been seeking out and engaging pockets of enemy fighters.

Mr. Chairman, the problem is real, but it's being dealt with in an orderly and forceful fashion by coalition forces.

In Iraq, coalition forces drove the country's leader from power, but unlike traditional adversaries in wars past that sign a surrender document and hand over their weapons, the remnants of the Baath regime, Fedayeen death squads and the Special Republican forces did not surrender. Some were killed or captured, but many others, and particularly in Baghdad and to the north, faded into the population and are now forming pockets of resistance against coalition forces.

We're now dealing with those remnants of the regime, just as we are dealing with the remnants of the Al Qaida and the Taliban that are hiding in the border areas of Afghanistan.

In addition to the remnants of the former regime, coalition forces in Iraq are also dealing with tens of thousands of criminals, some estimate up to 100,000, that were let out of the prisons into the streets prior to the beginning of the war.

And they're dealing with foreign terrorists who've crossed into Iraq, in many cases from Syria, looking for an opportunity to harm the coalition and to try to shake our resolve in the war on terror.

Well, they'll not succeed.

So there are a number of sources of instability, but this much is certain: Iraq has been liberated; the Baathist regime has been removed from power and will not be permitted to return, but our war with terrorists, the remnants in Iraq, the remnants in Afghanistan and terrorist networks across the globe, continues. It will take time, but we will prevail.

As President Bush made clear last week, there will be no return to tyranny in Iraq.

RUMSFELD: Those who threaten the order and stability of that country will face ruin just as surely as the regime they once served.

One of the challenges facing the coalition is finding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as the chairman mentioned. We are still early in that process, and the task before us is sizable and complex.

Major combat operations ended less than 10 weeks ago. The Iraqi regime had 12 years to conceal its programs, to move materials, hide documents, disperse equipment, develop mobile production facilities and sanitize known WMD sites, including four years with no U.N. weapons inspectors on the ground. Needless to say, uncovering those programs will take time.

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the prism of our experience on September 11th. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent men, women and children killed by terrorists. And that experience changed our appreciation of our vulnerability and the risk the U.S. faces from terrorist states and terrorist networks armed with powerful weapons.

The United States did not choose war. Saddam Hussein did. For 12 years, he violated 17 U.N. resolutions without cost or consequence. His regime had an international obligation to destroy its weapons of mass destruction and to prove to the world that they had done so. He refused to do so.

If he had, in fact, disarmed, why didn't he take that final opportunity to prove that his programs were ended and his weapons were destroyed? Why did he continue to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions when he could have had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed? Why did he file what all agreed was a fraudulent declaration of his weapons with the United Nations? Why didn't he cooperate with the international community as Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa did?

Had he done so, war would have been avoided. If he had, in fact, disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by cooperating with the United Nations.

Yet he did not cooperate. He continued to lie and obstruct U.N. inspectors. The logical conclusion is that he did so because he wanted to keep his weapons. And he believed that he could continue to outwit the international community for another 12 years just as he had for the past 12.

The objective in the global war on terror is to prevent another attack like September 11th or a biological, nuclear, chemical attack that would be worse before it happens.

We can say with confidence that the world is a better place today because the United States led a coalition of forces into action in Iraq and because of General Tom Franks' skilled execution of the president's orders.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

WARNER: Mr. Secretary, before we hear from the general, I think it's important that you interpret with some detail this important map.

While we hear daily the stories of attacks, my understanding of that map, based also on my trip, is the green indicates those sections of Iraq which are relatively secure. The dark center brown is where the most intense number of attacks are coming. And the lighter shade of green are between the two in terms of level of threat.

WARNER: Is that correct?

RUMSFELD: That is correct. And if you'll recall when the U.S. and coalition forces moved up from the south, most of the fighting occurred south of Baghdad and in Baghdad. And to a considerable extent the forces in Baghdad and north in the Saddam Hussein strongholds in many cases disappeared into the countryside and still are there, so they still need to be dealt with.

WARNER: And those forces did not witness the maneuver of our heavy forces, which at one time were anticipated, had our relations with Turkey been such that we could have inserted heavy forces in the north. Is that not correct?

RUMSFELD: It's true. We did end up -- General Franks did, of course -- with forces in the north, and there was fighting up in that area, but was not as extensive as it was in the areas to the south.

WARNER: Thank you.

General Franks?

FRANKS: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Senator Levin. It's an honor to appear before the committee.

I'd ask that my full statement be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Without objection.

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL TOMMY R. FRANKS
Former Commander, U.S. Central Command

FRANKS: Since we last sat in this room much has taken place in the Central Command area of responsibility. A brutal regime has been removed in Iraq, to be sure, and efforts are ongoing to help Iraqis build a new future. Forces have continued to help Afghanistan, and those people make strides toward independence and have continued to seek out and destroy terrorists and their networks in that country, as well as across the central region as part of the global war on terrorism. And I look forward to discussing these important subjects today with the committee.

Let me begin by bringing a message to this committee from some 280,000-plus members of our coalition, those that I have been privileged to command. And that message for the committee is very simple. It's: "Thank you." These men and women in uniform very much appreciate the support of this body and the support of this committee and all that you have done on their behalf, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, early this week General John Abizaid took the reins of Central Command and, in fact, he is a principled leader, as this committee knows, and a soldier who brings a great deal to United States Central Command. And I am proud to relinquish command to him and to consider him a friend.

I'd like to begin today by recognizing coalition nations whose contributions of forces, equipment and economic support have signaled worldwide commitment to the eradication of terrorism. Over the past year, the coalition has been steadfast and today there are 63 nations represented in Tampa at our headquarters; perhaps the largest coalition we have ever seen.

A force has been built in the Central Command area of responsibility to continue to move forward to the complete achievement of all of our objectives in Operations Iraqi Freedom, as well as in Operation Enduring Freedom, as the secretary said, to prevent recurrence of the events we saw on 9/11/01, to deny terrorists opportunities to use weapons of mass destruction on our people, to bring terrorists to justice, to dismantle their networks.

We've also established a visible and viable presence in the Horn of Africa, Mr. Chairman, since we last met, in order to continue that work. And work in the central region is under way, but as I'll discuss in a moment, the environment within Central Command's region remains challenging and volatile, as the secretary said. Securing U.S. interests in the future and ensuring regional stability will continue to involve risks in this region and will continue to require the commitment of our resources.

This area encompasses 6.4 million square miles and about a half a billion people, as the committee knows, and it runs from the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan and South Asia up to Central Asia as far north as Kazakhstan, including the waters of the Red Sea, the northern Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, key maritime choke points of the Suez, the Bab el-Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz.

FRANKS: This is an area that represents all of the world's major religions and at least 18 major ethnic groups. National economies in this region produce annual per capita income which vary from very little, perhaps a few hundred dollars a year, to tens of thousands of dollars. The area includes dictatorships, absolute monarchies, failed states, democracies and governments in transition toward democracy.

Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse, religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges and military power imbalances create social, economic and military volatility. These factors are particularly significant given the geographic and economic importance of the region, where national resources provide extraordinary opportunities, but they also give rise to a range of socio-economic problems.

In the past two years, Central Command has been at the leading edge of the global war on terrorism and the context I just provided makes it perhaps understandable why the initial focus of the war on terrorism would be in this region. The command is engaged with U.S. and coalition forces today in both Afghanistan and Iraq. And the commitment, as the secretary said, remain strong as our leaders and our troopers continue to work to bring security across the region.

On the ground today in Iraq, our troops are conducting ongoing operations. We're combining civil military work with direct, offensive, military action which will continue to seek out and bring justice to leaders of the fallen regime and others, as mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by yourself, as well as Secretary Rumsfeld.

Priorities will continue to include forming and training police and security forces, as well as the creation of a new Iraqi army. We'll continue to work to improve the infrastructure, working with Iraqis to support the establishment of local governance, providing emergency medical care and other humanitarian assistance.

Much dangerous work remains to be done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today which four months ago were only a dream. Our troops continue to work closely with Ambassador Jerry Bremer and the entirety of his civilian team to provide the tools he needs to be successful. Progress is being made and our country is justifiable proud of what's been accomplished.

As I think about lessons learned -- as the secretary mentioned -- I'll talk to just a few. Decisive combat work inside Iraq saw a maturing of joint force ops, or operations in a number of ways.

FRANKS: Some capabilities we saw reached new levels of performance. From a joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations Southern Watch, Northern Watch and the Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan contributed to the jointness and the culture within the headquarters of our area.

These operations helped to improve our interoperability. They also helped to improve our command, control, communications, computer and intelligence networking.

Our forces were able to achieve operational objectives by the integration of maneuver forces, special operations forces, other government agency assets, precision lethal fires and non-lethal fires.

We saw for the first time integration of forces rather than deconfliction of forces.

I believe perhaps most transformational is that particular notion, the business of the integration of forces, rather than, as we have seen in the past, simple deconfliction of forces.

It seems to me that this integration of the conventional, as you said, Mr. Chairman, air, ground, sea forces delivered special operations capabilities, dealt effectively with asymmetrical terrorist-like threats and enabled precision targeting simultaneously in the same battle space.

Similarly, we have seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq the ability of special operators to use conventional forces in order to set conditions for the success of those forces.

Operational fires have been used to spearhead ground maneuver and our forces have been able to sustain the momentum of the offensive while defeating enemy formations in all kinds of terrain: open desert terrain, complex terrain and urban terrain.

We saw jointness, precision munitions, command and control, the readiness of our equipment, the state of training of our troops, and coalition support as very clear winners during Operation Enduring Freedom.

The secretary said that I would also mention some of the lessons in my remarks, and I'll do that briefly now.

We also identified a number of areas where we believe we require additional work.

Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of standardized combat identification, so fratricide prevention remains work that we're going to have to focus on in the future.

Deployment planning and execution were cumbersome, and were much more closely akin to those required during the Cold War than to those required for force projection by our country in the 21st century.

And coalition information sharing needs to be improved at all levels. When we operate coalition, we need the ability to reach back and forth to and with coalition members.

Human intelligence and communications bandwidth also represent areas where we're going to be required, Mr. Chairman, to focus effort in the future.

A few comments on Iraq and where we stand today.

As the secretary says, security continues to improve. Portions of Iraq are now, and will remain for some time, however, very dangerous. The term stability operations does not infer that combat operations have ended. Indeed, they have not.

Our forces are engaged in offensive work as members of this committee saw during a recent trip all over Iraq today.

As we move forward, the composition and size of the forces that we have in that country will change to match the conditions and it will ever change to match the requirements, recognizing that the enemy we see there also has a vote and so we will size ourselves as we have in the past in order to meet the conditions that we see develop in the future.

FRANKS: Factors that will influence our force mix inside in Iraq, will have to do, as Levin said, with coalition contribution. They will have to do with what we see in the way of the enemy threat. They will have to do with what we see in the success of the Iraqi people, themselves, as they field their security forces, police forces, infrastructure security forces, single-site protection capabilities, and as we assist them in fielding a new Iraqi army.

Integration of coalition forces is a major near-term effort. The United Kingdom and Poland are committed at this point to leading divisions in southern Iraq and many partner nations have offered forces to fill those units. Deployment of those forces has already begun, Mr. Chairman.

We continue discussions today with India and Pakistan. At this moment 19 coalition partners are on the ground in support of operations in Iraq, with deployment of an additional 19 countries pending. And additionally, 11 nations are conducting military-to- military discussions with the secretary's staff, the Joint Staff and my staff in Tampa today.

At this point, we see some 35,000 policemen as having been hired -- Iraqi policemen. This represents 55, perhaps 60 percent of the total requirement, around 60,000, policemen in that country. Until we see the complete standing up of the number of security forces and policemen, we'll continue joint patrolling, we'll continue to train with and work with these Iraqi forces as we bring them on.

Creation of a new Iraqi army is also moving forward. The plan envisions three divisions, located near Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. They will provide for territorial defense and they will conduct stability operations. Over the next year, our goal is to field approximately nine battalions in order to do that work, and initially those forces will focus on performing security at fixed sites, assisting in the movement of convoys and providing border control. As it develops, this force will work with coalition force to contribute to stability and security throughout Iraq.

Underlying all security functions is the need to continue humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil military operations to improve the quality of life for Iraqi people. It is obvious to all that in order to see Iraq move forward into the future, security must come along at a pace that sees the betterment of the conditions of life for the Iraqi people and the establishment of Iraqi governance -- the placing of an Iraqi face on the government there. It is in our interest to move these items forward as quickly and thoughtfully as we can, and we'll continue to do that.

I can't overstate the value of coalition contribution to success we have seen up to this point.

FRANKS: Hospitals, medical supplies, water, food, transportation, expertise in rebuilding is being provided by coalition members.

The fact that there has been no humanitarian disaster in Iraq, no widespread outbreak of disease, no hunger, no refugees or massive problems with displaced persons, or any other predicted consequence of war, all of that due in large part to the contribution of our allies.

The coalition provisional authority, Ambassador Jerry Bremer, and our forces will continue to work in concert with international and nongovernmental agencies to reverse the result of more than three decades of a brutal regime.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying the global war on terrorism is ongoing. The precision, determination, expertise of our military forces and our coalition partners has brought about the liberation of both Afghanistan and Iraq in lightning speed with minimum bloodshed.

However, these two nations have only taken the first steps toward freedom. The United States and our coalition partners must be there to support the whole journey.

While we have accomplished a lot, the potential for terrorist acts and other setbacks remains very real. Afghanistan has a new, fragile government, a new army, and with coalition support the nation is making strides toward long-term stability.

In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime was destroyed, and regime supporters are being rooted out. Our focus has changed from military destruction of a regime to providing security and humanitarian assistance, assisting the Iraqi people to grow a representative form of government.

Decisive combat operations have been completed, but much work remains to be done. I, as every member of this committee, Mr. Chairman, am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who continue to serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of our mission from Egypt to Kazakhstan, from Suez to Pakistan, regardless of the uniform of service they wear or the nation from which they come.

I thank Congress and the American people for the tremendous support you have shown and what you have done for me.

Mr. Chairman, I'd be pleased to join the secretary in answering your questions.

WARNER: Thank you, General. All of us join the secretary in his commendation of your distinguished career of 36 years, I believe.

Am I not correct?

And that contribution of your family.

Excellent statement by both witnesses. Very balanced. What went right and what we've got to learn to do better in the future. And we'll probe that in these questions.

We'll have a six-minute round of colleagues. We have almost full attendance of the committee. And I'll move out quickly.

Mr. Secretary, as I departed, the one thing that was foremost in mind is how can we proceed and what steps are being taken to reduce the risk to the individual and groups of our soldiers and civilians -- coalition civilians who are in support of the soldiers in the face of these repeated, daily attacks and losses.

The most encouraging information that I received was from Ambassador Bremer. And that is that he hopes by this July, within weeks, to have concluded putting in place the initial steps of the interim authority with Iraqis: as I mentioned, a council and a constitutional group.

WARNER: Is that on schedule? And do you concur, in my view, that that's perhaps the strongest tool that we have to reduce these attacks, put an Iraqi face, a degree of Iraqi responsibility on this situation as we move toward securing their freedom?

RUMSFELD: Mr. Chairman, I do. I think it's a combination of political progress. And as you suggested, Ambassador Bremer is hopeful that sometime next week or the week thereafter there will be the governing council set up with some 25 to 30-plus members. There are a number of city councils, as you know, that have been stood up in Baghdad and other portions of the country.

I think it is, however, a mixture of the political progress, where Iraqis begin to assume responsibility for some of the ministries and some of their activities; economic progress, as General Franks said, so people see their lives improving; and military security. And I don't think any one can be separated. I think all three are critical and they all have to move forward.

WARNER: I agree with that. But as soon as we can begin to hold some Iraqis responsible for these killings and constant attacks, all the better, in my judgment. And they can publicly address the need to have them stopped.

Mr. Secretary, with respect to questions of augmenting the coalition forces and specifically, as my colleague, Mr. Levin, said, and as I raised with Ambassador Bremer, the inclusion elements of NATO, can you address that?

RUMSFELD: I'd be happy to.

I keep hearing people say things and people write things to the effect that is the U.S. and the U.K., and it's not. As General Franks said, we've got 19 countries on the ground. We have commitments from another 19 countries. We are in discussions with another 11 countries; that would bring the total up to 49 nations. My understanding is that we currently have on the ground some 19,000 coalition forces with commitments for another 11,000, which would bring the total to 30,000.

In addition, the work is going forward to develop an Iraqi army. Former Undersecretary of Defense Walt Slocum is working hard to achieve that goal. And we expect to have thousands of Iraqis back in uniform functioning in a responsible way, as well as the police evolution that you've discussed.

Now, what about the U.N. and NATO? The United Nations passed a resolution. They've assigned an individual, Mr. de Mello, who works closely with Ambassador Bremer.

I believe, Senator Levin, you indicated that it was a mystery why we haven't reached out to NATO. We have reached out to NATO. NATO is assisting Poland, which has agreed to take a sector, in force generation. In addition, there are discussions that have been taking place in NATO about the possibility of taking on an additional role. At the current time, as you know, they're planning to take over responsibility in Afghanistan this August. So they have a lot on their platter.

RUMSFELD: But we have reached out to just about everybody I can think of asking for assistance of various types and it is coming in.

Is it as much as we'd like, as fast as we'd like? No, it isn't.

But are we hopeful it will continue to increase? Yes.

WARNER: Mr. Secretary, all of us are very mindful of the need to maintain a rotation base of our forces back, recognize that probably the OPTEMPO of our military forces of all branches are at a very high point at this time, and yet our nation and other nations are faced with a contingency operation in Africa, most notably Liberia.

I think the president quite properly is facing this issue, has sent teams out to make an assessment of what needs to be done, will evaluate it and then make a presidential decision.

Could you share with us this morning some of the options that are being considered and how those options, in terms of our force structure, might impact on our troop redeployments out of Iraq or troop redeployments in others areas? In other words, can our military accept, in your professional judgment -- I know they will, but what are the consequences of accepting a presidential decision should it be made of a deployment force?

I mean, bear in mind that if you deploy, say, 1,000 individuals you've got to have 1,000 in transit, 1,000 in training, so it's a multiple of the force that actually goes into country.

RUMSFELD: You're quite right, of course, Mr. Chairman, that when you have 1,000 troops deployed overseas you do need a rotational base and it ends up like a multiple of three rather than just the 1,000.

First let me say that it is critically important that the department manage the forces in a way that we can continue to attract and retain the people we need; that the Guard and Reserve, who have just done a superb job are not stressed or called up so frequently, or kept there so long that it affects their commitment to serve in the reserves.

We need them badly, and we have to be attentive to that, and we intend to be.

The rotation out of Iraq is already starting. I don't know what the number is, but I think it's something like 142,000 have already been redeployed. For the most part, there are large numbers of Air Force and Navy. There also have been some Army and Marine.

WARNER: Redeployed back home, put in home?

RUMSFELD: Redeployed back home, back to their bases wherever they were, mostly in the U.S.

The 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division is now in Kuwait. It's been taken out of Iraq, and it should be back home in July.

The 2nd Brigade, the plan is that they would return in August, having been there something like 10 months.

And the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division is scheduled to return in September, and they would -- they have been in there since about January so that would be a total of about nine months.

And the services and the joint staff have been working with Central Command to develop a rotation plan so that we can, in fact, see that we treat these terrific young men and young women in a way that's respectful of their lives and their circumstances and the wonderful job they did.

With respect to Liberia, the president is considering the appropriate U.S. role. He has indicated to world leaders that he intends that the United States assist in some way with respect to Liberia.

He has asked the Department of Defense to dispatch assessment teams in two locations, one in Liberia -- and it's currently there, several dozen people -- and in addition he is sending assessment teams to the so-called ECOWAS nations to determine the readiness of the ECOWAS forces and the extent to which they may or may not be ready to deploy, and over what period of time, with what type of equipment, having had what type of training.

RUMSFELD: The United States and Great Britain and several other countries have been in the process for many months now training ECOWAS forces. And some have been used in Sierra Leone, some are currently committed. So until the assessment teams come back, it seems to me that we will not have a good grip on what we would propose to the president.

WARNER: Thank you.

Your staff briefed this committee yesterday and you'll be briefing yourself, the Senate, tomorrow. So I commend you in keeping us informed on it.

General Franks, lastly, the level of conflict that continues; in your planning, did you anticipate this level? You've been very candid with us this morning. And had you put in place the preparations to deal with it?

And have you considered, perhaps, while we're standing up an Iraqi army, between now and the stand-up of that army utilizing some Iraqi soldiers that can be trusted to go along on the patrols with our own, so that we have not only the coalition helmet, but something that the citizens can clearly perceive as one of their own helmets?

FRANKS: Mr. Chairman, the latter point first. Yes, as we begin to work to build with Walt Slocum -- and the secretary mentioned a minute ago -- the Iraqi army, we will, as those forces are brought on, position them, work with them in a very operational way. Because, as you said, that serves to put an Iraqi face on the security assets that are being used throughout the country. And so, yes, sir, that is part of the plan.

With respect to the level of violence, Mr. Chairman, I will tell you, I think, in a war and in post-conflict, one never knows exactly how to gauge what may be expected in the aftermath of major combat.

Was it anticipated? Mr. Chairman, I would say, yes, sir, it was. And perhaps the way I'll justify that statement is to say that the footprint that we see in Iraq today is not the same footprint that was in Iraq on the day the president announced the cessation of major combat operations.

In fact, the deployment orders which had been approved by the secretary prior to the time -- I believe it was the 1st of May when our president said that major combat operations had ended -- the deployment orders which had already been signed, in fact, adjusted the footprint for Iraq, in terms of military policemen, in terms of civil affairs people, in terms of humanitarian assistance-type forces, in terms of engineers.

The plan called for the removal of forces that are much more inclined to be used during major combat operations than during stability operations, for example, armored formations.

And so, I believe, Mr. Chairman, we did anticipate a level of violence and I can't tell you whether we anticipated that it would be at the level that we see right now. You know, Mr. Chairman, I think that when a war begins, one can always hope for a very quick transition to peace to see a nation begin to rebuild itself without a great deal of friction and without a great deal of messiness.

FRANKS: But on the operational side, on the military side, we must always be prepared to handle whatever level of violence may come along. And, Mr. Chairman, I believe our forces have been and will continue to be able to handle the levels of violence that we see as this nation tries to bring itself together.

WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rumsfeld, going back to the NATO issue just for a minute, back in April you were asked about a possible role for NATO, a formal role for NATO in the postwar effort in Iraq. And this is what you said, that you suggested to the secretary general that, "I thought that would be a good thing if NATO wanted to do that. Obviously, France would be opposed, I'm told. They're opposed to a lot of things, so that shouldn't be a problem because you can do it at 18 instead of at 19 countries since they're not a member of the Defense Planning Committee."

Now, we have apparently not asked NATO to formally decide to raise a force for deployment in Iraqi similarly to what they've done in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Why have we not made that request of NATO, asked NATO not just to support Poland, for instance, as they've done as an individual country, but why have we not asked NATO to formally decide as NATO to raise that force and to give its endorsement to our action? Is it because we're afraid France might not go along or what? We don't want to ask France?

RUMSFELD: No. First of all, it's not clear to me we haven't. I was told this morning that the discussions taking place in NATO include a discussion about a possible NATO role in Iraq.

Now, to what extent the Department of State or the United States has or has not issued a formal request, I don't know. But I know the discussions are going forward. And I know that the assistance that NATO is providing, not individual countries in NATO, but NATO as an institution is providing to Poland is a NATO institutional action. It is something that's been discussed, approved and under way.

I also know, as I said, that NATO is preparing to take over responsibilities in Afghanistan. So how many things like that they're going to be able to do at one time remains to be open.

But I have no problem, as I indicated then and I indicate now some months later, in having NATO involved. Indeed, I think it would be a good thing.

LEVIN: NATO involved as NATO, formally being asked and deciding as an organization to raise and to deploy forces in Iraq. You have no problem with that?

RUMSFELD: I have no problem with that. Indeed, I'm very pleased that NATO has been assisting and is currently discussing assisting in additional ways.

LEVIN: If that request to NATO had been made, wouldn't you know about it?

RUMSFELD: I don't know technically what you're getting at. But whether the Department of State has instructed the U.S. ambassador to NATO or permanent representative, as he's called, to issue some sort of a formal request, I don't know.

I know NATO has seized the issue, is discussing it. I was told that this morning after Pete Pace -- General Pace, had a phone call with the supreme allied commander of Europe, General Jones.

LEVIN: Would you support asking Germany and France to provide forces in Iraq?

RUMSFELD: Our goal is to get large numbers of international forces in from lots of countries, including those two. But we have requests out to a large number of countries.

LEVIN: But you would specifically support requesting Germany and France to provide forces in Iraq?

RUMSFELD: We have made requests to -- I don't know what it is. The Department of State's issued requests to something like 70 or 80, 90 countries.

LEVIN: Is Germany and France on the list?

RUMSFELD: I'll have to ask. I would suspect they are.

LEVIN: But would you support it?

RUMSFELD: Why certainly.

LEVIN: Good.

The troop level, General Franks, you've indicated that that is going to depend upon conditions that exist in the future.

LEVIN: General Abizaid, at his confirmation hearing, recently said that he believes that we would have a large number of troops in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

Do you agree?

FRANKS: I do, sir.

LEVIN: Could you give us just a range of troops. I mean, would it be from 100,000 to 150,000 for many years? Give us some kind of a range. I'm not asking for any kind of precise figure, but what's your current best estimate?

FRANKS: Mr. Chairman, that actually is not as hard to answer as it might seem.

We have about 145,000 troops in their right now. As I have talked to commanders at every level inside Iraq, one finds that that footprint appears to us, on the operational side, to be about what that footprint needs to look like.

There has been suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And, in fact, I can tell you in the presence of this secretary that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say yes. We have talked about this on a number of occasions, and when the tactical commanders on the ground determined that they need to raise force levels, then those forces, in fact, will be provided.

The secretary may want to comment on that.

LEVIN: No, that's reassuring though. In other words, the current footprint is your best estimate. And would that be for the foreseeable future?

FRANKS: Sir, it is for the foreseeable future.

LEVIN: On the weapons of mass destruction issue, which is back in the press in many ways in the media this week, Secretary Rumsfeld, as you know, earlier this week the White House acknowledged that, quote, "The reference to Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the president's State of the Union speech on January the 28th."

On the 29th, you said on CNN something very similar to what the president had said the night before when you said that the Iraqi regime, quote, "recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

Now, Condi Rice, just a few weeks ago, said the following: "that we did not know at the time. No one knew at the time in our circles. Maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery."

And I'm just curious as to whether or not you've determined, as a policy-maker, how the facts, the falsity of that claim, of uranium sale to Iraq to Africa, remained in the bowels of the agency for nine months after you made your statement on the 29th.

Did somebody come to you, the intelligence community come to you, and say, "My gosh, we got facts that show that that just simply is inaccurate"?

Have you determined how those accurate facts, in other words the knowledge in the bowels of the intelligence community that it was wrong that Africa was solicited by Iraq for uranium and that those documents were forged, have you determined how it happened that that information about the forgery stayed for so long in the, quote, to quote Condi Rice, "the bowels of the agency"?

RUMSFELD: No. I can't give you a good answer. I can try to get an answer for the record, if you'd like.

I must say that as someone who reads intelligence every day, as you do, I find that corrections are being made fairly continuously; that you review a week's worth of intel, and two months later they come back and say, "Well, we said this on this date, but we have new information that suggests this or that."

RUMSFELD: So the fact that the facts change from time to time with respect to specifics does not surprise me or shock me at all. It's to be expected. It's part of the intelligence world that we live with is uncertainty and less than perfect knowledge.

I must say, however, that as we've gone through this period I think the intelligence has been quite good, and I don't think the fact that there's an instance where something was inaccurate ought to in any way paint a broad brush on the intelligence that we get and suggest that that's a pattern or something. It's not.

LEVIN: Would you find out for this committee for the record -- this is a significant piece of intelligence, it was relied on at the highest level, very publicly, very visibly by the president and by you within two days of each other right before the war, a very significant statement about seeking uranium in Africa. It was based on intelligence.

That at the same time the intelligence community knew in the depths of their agency that this was not true it seems to me is absolutely startling and I think we would all want to know how it could possibly have stayed there in the basement of the agency while policy-makers in the upper floors were making these statements.

If you could do that for this committee, I think we'd all appreciate it.

RUMSFELD: I'll try to do that.

WARNER: Senator Allard?

ALLARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm interested, in light of recent attacks and everything, your assessment as to what's happening with -- are they more organized than, say, they were three or four weeks ago? And if they are becoming more organized, is there any evidence of some -- how central is this organization? Is it by region or is it countrywide?

And I'd like to hear your assessment on that, General Franks.

FRANKS: Senator, because we see more of the activity -- you know, I ask myself, "Are we seeing more of this violent activity in the areas that are shaded on the map that the secretary turned around a minute ago? Are we seeing more of this violent activity because some of these jihadists, extremists, Baathists, Saddam Fedayeen are coming together? Or are we seeing more violence there because we are more offensive and because we are placing more patrols in there?"

And so the answer that I give you I will caveat with that, because I suspect that we're seeing increased violence in some of these areas because we are more present. I mean, we are out looking for it, because that's our charter; that's what our force is going to do.

Now, in terms of networking among these groups or between these groups, Senator, I don't -- I am not comfortable right now saying that I believe that there is operational control between factions operating in Tikrit, Ar Ramadi, Mosul, Bayji.

FRANKS: I'm not sure.

I recognize the same thing you recognize, which is that we see increased violence, sir. But I'm not ready yet to tell you that I see evidence that these violent acts are being coordinated. I might tell you that next week, Senator, but I do not yet see evidence of it.

ALLARD: Do you see any outside influences coming into the country, for example, Iran? Is there any coalition forces from any of the neighboring countries that you can pick up, any suggestion that there may be?

FRANKS: Sir, as you know, since the war started we have seen infiltration of elements through Syria and we have encountered those on a number of occasions. I believe that there continue to be efforts by Iran, by Tehran, to influence activities inside Iraq. We see evidence in there of the intelligence services -- Iranian intelligence services. We see evidence in there of political forces.

So, yes, I do see attempts by nations in the region -- I named those two -- to influence activities that are going on inside Iraq.

ALLARD: Mr. Secretary, I'm aware that Ambassador Bremer's trying to get some members on their Iraqi governing council and get this put together rather quickly, at least in the near future. Do you have any idea what we're thinking about as far as make-up of the council? Are we going to include Islamic clerics? Are we going to have former exiles and Kurdish leaders? And when do you anticipate national elections?

RUMSFELD: I saw the pool of names, and it's large and diverse, in answer to your question. It includes folks from all across the spectrum, the Iraqis.

And elections are something that, it seems to me, will have to be determined as we go down the road. The goal in life is not to have one election one time, as happened when Adolf Hitler was elected, for example. The goal is to have a process and to have true representations and true respect for the various elements, diverse elements in that country. And the steps would be something like this, although I can't even be certain of that.

There will be a governing council. There will be some sort of an interim authority. There will be a constitutional convention to develop a constitution. The constitution, and the Iraqis who develop the constitution will make a judgment as to when and at what pace they think their country is ready to have elections in a way that would be reasonable and create a representative system for them.

And that's out some way. If you think back to Afghanistan, we still have a provisional government in that country and their elections are expected next year some time. So it takes some time. It's not an easy transition.

ALLARD: You know, the Kurdish problem in the north, I think, continues to be a problem. And the question I have is, from your assessment, Mr. Secretary, do you think the Kurds in the north are more interested in rebuilding Iraq or are they more interested in forming a separate country at this particular point in time?

RUMSFELD: Oh, I think the former. Everything I've heard is that the individuals from the Kurdish section of Iraq are, in fact, participating in this process; that they've behaved in a reasonably constructive way; and that they're relieved that the regime of Saddam Hussein has gone; and that they intend to play a political role in the evolution of a new Iraq.

ALLARD: Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. Thank you.

WARNER: The chair will recognize the senator...

RUMSFELD: Senator, can I make a response to Senator Levin on this subject that General Franks answered on footprint?

He responded for the foreseeable future a footprint about such as it is, as I recall. I would just amend that slightly, by saying that -- exactly. We see no reason to think that footprint isn't the right one for the moment. But the composition of U.S. forces can change and we could end up with different types, as he suggested. And second, the numbers of U.S. forces could change while the footprints stay the same, in the event we have grater success in bringing in additional coalition forces, in the event we are able to accelerate the Iraqi army.

So the exact number of U.S. forces might change, as well as the composition, even though the footprint, as General Franks said, would be roughly the same until we see evolution in the political and economic spheres.

Thank you.

WARNER: Two administrative announcements, colleagues. We have two votes coming circa 11:30. It's the intention of the chair to catch the end of the first vote and remain and do the second, and then return and resume the hearing.

Following the open hearing, we will have a closed hearing in the Intelligence Committee, next door. Thank you very much.

Senator Kennedy?

KENNEDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary, General.

We're all tremendously proud of the troops' effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It's a great credit to you, Mr. Secretary and General Franks.

I'm now concerned that we have the world's best trained soldiers serving as policemen in what seems to be a shooting gallery.

The president declared an end to major combat operation, but the war's not over for the men and women who are on the ground in Iraq while their families are here at home. And the lack of a coherent plan is hindering our efforts at internationalization and aggravating the strain on our troops. Our troops are tired, want to return to their families who are at home coping with the absence and the loss of income. They've been gone close to a year and this truly is a hardship.

Then the American people want to know what the strategy is to stabilize Iraq, bring the promise of democracy to the Iraqi people, alleviate the strain on our troops.

Now I've heard, in response to Senator Levin's questions about the NATO forces, there are 2 million troops in NATO -- clearly, not all of them are qualified to go here. But you have the Italian carbinieri and the French gendarmes and the Spanish guardia civil, that are superbly trained troops in being able to riot control and dealing with barriers and fire and explosives. Have we made a specific request to try and get some of the best-trained police that exist in the NATO countries to provide some relief to these American troops that are in the process of being attacked almost daily?

RUMSFELD: Yes. In fact, Italy and Spain have both made commitments.

KENNEDY: And when will they come? Can you tell us what the expectation is, and how many are going to be there?

RUMSFELD: I can't tell you precisely.

RUMSFELD: It's up -- I've always believed that it's up to those countries to make their own announcements as to what they're...

KENNEDY: I'm asking about what's been requested, what you've requested.

RUMSFELD: We have requested of them exactly the kinds of forces you've described, and they have made commitments to do so.

The dates generally for these forces are going to be in the latter portion of this summer and into September, and certainly by October. So I'm guessing that some will be coming in next month, and then it will be August, September and October that they would be flowing in.

But I don't want to refer specifically to those countries because I'm speaking to the 19 countries that have made commitments.

KENNEDY: Well, that's true.

But these three certainly, among others, have some of the best trained in terms of the police function.

I was troubled just by your earlier response about the knowledge of the request of troops from NATO. It would seem that you would be the person would be on the phone to NATO to ask these troops to be available. And we just want to know are you on the phone talking to NATO to General Robertson to request troops? Have you done that?

You indicated in an earlier response, "We want to reach out to everyone." Is it as much as we would like? No, in terms of response to NATO. It's not clear that we have announced other countries. I have no problem if they want to provide more help and assistance.

I think families want to know what are we doing. If they have 2 million troops over there, what are we doing to bring a major chunk of those troops through NATO into Iraq? Is that part of our plan now in internationalizing the military phase of it?

RUMSFELD: We have made requests of NATO. I don't know quite what you're asking.

The 2 million troops, Senator...

KENNEDY: Well, I'm asking when have you talked? Have you picked up the phone?

RUMSFELD: The 2 million troops, I believe, include the United States of America.

KENNEDY: Right.

Well, then you've got -- what? -- a million, 700,000 over there, out of the million, 700,000 over there?

RUMSFELD: And we have asked -- I believe, months ago the United States through the Department of State made a request to something like 70 or 80 countries for assistance.

There have been force generation meetings that have been taking place. One took place very recently. There's another taking place, I believe, in New York.

KENNEDY: Your answer I gather, Secretary, is you're doing everything that you possibly can as the secretary of defense...

RUMSFELD: We believe we are.

KENNEDY: ... to make every request of NATO for combat troops, as well as for the kind of guardia (ph) functions, and that you're satisfied you're doing everything you can within NATO, and you have made that request yourself, or you're conscious that the administration, or if you don't know that you're going to find out whether they have made that.

RUMSFELD: We certainly want assistance from NATO and from NATO countries, and we have commitments from a good large number of NATO countries already and NATO is already assisting.

KENNEDY: In the other area of the development of Iraq, as I understand the U.S. government has talked about the future of Iraq working groups. But I'm told by the people on the ground that there's no formal plan for reconstruction.

Can you provide us with the operational plans for reconstruction? Who are the people, the level of resources that are committed? How many Iraqis will be involved in the plan to build police, justice system, the media, the schools, the other institutions?

And are there plans on paper, and where are those plans? Or are we shooting from the hip and taking a piecemeal approach when American lives are at stake, in terms of the broader security issues?

RUMSFELD: There certainly are plans for the reconstruction of Iraq. I would, however, say that the plans are not for the United States or the coalition to reconstruct Iraq.

Iraq's circumstance today is the result of 30 years of repression by the Saddam Hussein regime and his Stalinist-type economy, and the denial of the people of that country and the infrastructure of that country, the kinds of opportunities and investments that a wealthy country like Iraq is perfectly capable of doing.

Today, if one goes from the Gulf states, from Kuwait or Qatar or any of those nations, into Iraq it's like going in the old days from Romania into West Germany. It's just stark how damaging that regime has been to that country, to say nothing of the mass graves of people that were killed by the regime.

The plans do exist, but it will be the Iraqi people that will have to build back their country and reconstruct their country.

And that reference was made earlier to nation building. I suppose it's mostly semantics, but I think it's a little heady and arrogant to think that you can build an other people's nation.

RUMSFELD: I think the Iraqi people are going to build their own nation back. And they're going to build it in a distinctly unique Iraqi way.

And our task is to try to create an environment to get rid of that repressive regime, and to try to create an environment within which the Iraqi people can put themselves on a political and economic path toward the future, and not to think that we're going to go in there and send the American taxpayers' dollars, and billions of them, trying to rebuild a country in a way that fits our image, because that's just not going to happen.

KENNEDY: Well, you're not suggesting we're not going to be spending billions of dollars of the taxpayers'...

RUMSFELD: Of course, we will.

WARNER: Thank you very much. I didn't mean to interrupt you, Senator, but we have to -- Senator Sessions?

SESSIONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Franks, I want to express my congratulations, along with the others, for your leadership, appreciation for your career, and for the great troops that you led, how they performed under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. They performed so well.

You know, when we think about what has occurred, a lot has occurred. We could have, as a nation, stayed right here and tried to build up defenses at home. Or we could have gone after the bases of terrorism that were plainly out there in the world.

The president made a decision -- this Congress supported him overwhelmingly -- to eliminate those bases. We saw those in Afghanistan. You've liberated that country, and we've removed Al Qaida and the Taliban from authority there.

We've now liberated the people of Iraq. And our priority is, and our hope is, that we can help them establish their own nation. It certainly will be, as the secretary said, ultimately their challenge to do that.

I wanted to ask you a couple of things.

One of the concerns I have is how quickly we can bring on the Iraqi indigenous army that will be a servant of the Iraqi people and of the Iraqi nation. How difficult is that? Do we need more resources? What can we do to speed along the creation of a healthy, well-trained army that serves the people of Iraq?

FRANKS: Sir, first, thanks for your kind remarks.

We do want to bring the Iraqi national army on line as quickly as we can. I think the vision is for order of magnitude 12,000 or so within the initial 12 months, if my memory serves.

We want to have as much Iraqi army as we can, but we want a professional Iraqi army when we build it. And what I mean by that is we want the training of the troopers, from the bottom up, to be done in a very competent way. And we have reinforced for ourselves in Afghanistan that we know how to do that, that we can do it.

But what we also learned in Afghanistan is that we do not want to create an army that has no place to go. We want to be sure that the Iraqis themselves bring along the infrastructure for the positioning of those forces as we bring them on line. And, at the same time, we want to be sure that we work from the top down, to create a ministry of defense and the operational level for an army that can manage them.

And so, I would like, Senator Sessions, to see this thing, the Iraqi army, come along as fast as we can actually control it and put it to work. And I am satisfied with the pace that Walt Slocum intends to work on that project right now, sir.

SESSIONS: General Franks, if you would just briefly share with us the status of our commitment to containing Saddam Hussein before this war started, resources that we've been committing for over a decade to keep it in a box, including patrolling the Persian Gulf, air flights, and Northern Watch and Southern Watch.

SESSIONS: You know, we think about the cost of the operation and the effort to help Iraq rebuild, but tell us about the cost we were incurring annually.

FRANKS: Sir, if you think about Operation Northern Watch, Operation Southern Watch and the maritime intercept operations that were ongoing between 1992 and 2002, I can't give you with precision the math associated with that. The number that I would give you would probably be just Northern Watch, Southern Watch, $1 billion to $2 billion a year depending on the year. And that does not factor what it cost coalition members, like the state of Kuwait, for example, who paid in assistance in kind perhaps another $200 million to $250 million a year during the course of containment.

Sir, I attempt to justify nothing with respect to containment, and I make no comment about whether that was good or bad. That is, from an operational perspective, our job was to control the skies over Iraq and to ensure, as best we could in doing that, the sanctity, if you will, of 786, 787 and Security Council resolutions, some 17 of them that the secretary mentioned earlier. That was the policy. That's what our forces worked to do for that period of time.

I will offer the operational fact, sir, that at this time those operations are no longer necessary. And in fact, there are no longer jets shooting, and air defense systems shooting, at American men and women, and then returning to the sanctity of bases belonging to the regime.

SESSIONS: Well, I think that's an important thing for us to consider. And I always felt that, in fact, the Gulf War never ended. There was, sort of, an agreed upon peace. It was not holding. And to me something had to be done, and I think those actions have been taken.

FRANKS: Sir, if I could insert one thing in response to a comment Senator Kennedy made a minute ago about troops having been committed a year and in many cases being very tired, I believe, having been there, sir, that troops are tired at two levels. One is a tactical level, where one becomes tired. And the other is a level where people do not believe in what they're doing.

I believe members of this committee who recently visited our troops on the ground in Iraq found none of the latter. And it's my job and our job, to be sure, that we provide the tactical relief, rest and quality of life for our troops as best we can.

But my comment is that I believe that our young men and women who are deployed in Iraq working in a very dangerous circumstance, believe in their responsibilities and are doing them remarkably well.

I'm sorry, sir. Please.

SESSIONS: Thank you.

WARNER: Senator Reed?

REED: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, General Franks, let me add my commendation for an extraordinary career in the Army and service to the nation. I think you know that we're all sincerely appreciative. But I think you also know that the appreciation of the soldiers who you serve with, their respect is much more, I think, gratifying to you, and it should be. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, I had the privilege to go with Chairman Warner and Senator Levin to Iraq. And I had a chance to meet lots of soldiers. And I would agree with General Franks: They are proud of what they're doing.

REED: They will do it as long as we ask them to do it.

But they had one question of me, I couldn't answer; particularly, the troops in my home state -- 115th Military Police Company, 119th Military Police Company, 118th Military Police Company, 118th Military Police Battalion: When are we coming home?

The answer to that question relies upon having troops available to replace these troops, because as you've both indicated our footprint in Iraq will be significant. This burden falls, particularly with impact upon the Army. Today, the Army has 370,000 troops in 120 countries. In Iraq, the footprint has the 3rd I.D., the 4th I.D., the 1st Armored Division, 101st Airborne, 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd, the 2nd Light Cavalry Squad and the 3rd Army Cavalry Squadron. In addition, five National Guard- enhanced battalions in Iraq and two in Kuwait. That's a significant footprint.

In Afghanistan, shortly we'll have almost two full brigades of the 10th Mountain Division, to take the mission. In the Balkans, we have the 34th National Guard Division from Kansas. In Kosovo, we have the 1st Infantry Division, which was replaced by the 28th National Guard Pennsylvania Division. We have forces in Korea -- the 2nd I.D. We have contingency forces in the United States, and there are other areas of the world that are dangerous.

In addition to that, the normal doctrine years ago when I was serving, was for every deployed unit you had to have a three-to-one ratio. That, I think, has changed to five-to-one now, because we also have preparation, exercise phases, training center mission, reintegration and then the actual mission. We are dangerously stretched thin in the Army and other services also.

I know the answer to this will be multi-national forces will take the place of these troops in Iraq, but so far we've been unsuccessful in arranging those forces. And it seems to me that we have to be prepared to increase our Army, the number of brigades in the Army, or to activate National Guard divisions, and we have to make that decision soon because the training these troops will need before they deploy.

So, Mr. Secretary, are you planning or prepared to increase the size of the Army to meet these commitments?

RUMSFELD: First, I will say that I talked to General Abizaid this morning, and he is sensitive to the importance of troops knowing what the rotation plan will be so they have some degree of certainty in their lives. And he's sensitive to the importance of the quality of their lives, whether they get mail and those types of things, and is determined to continue the fine work that General Franks has done, and now that we've completed major combat operation in Iraq, begin to get greater clarity as to how that rotation will take place.

It would be incorrect to say that we expect that international forces would replace all of U.S. forces; we don't anticipate that. We're going to have to replace U.S. forces with U.S. forces in large measure and we understand that. And the joint staff and the services have been asked to make a presentation to me -- the request went back many, many weeks and they have been working in the tank with the services and they expect to bring that forward sometime this month, in which case they'll get clarity as to what people can expect in terms of their circumstances.

Then the question comes: Do you need to increase force levels, particularly in the Army or Marines? The ground forces, I would add. And the question to that is, if we believe that's the case, obviously, we would come to the Congress and make that request.

At the moment, we are attempting to bring down our force commitments in a number of countries in the world. We have proposals with respect to what's taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo which are through NATO, in together and out together, as you're familiar. We have been working to try to reduce our force in the Sinai. We have discussions going on with Korea as to how we can have our footprint there arranged.

RUMSFELD: We have discussions taking place in Europe.

We also have, I'm told by Dr. Chu and I don't know if we've ever gotten the exact list, but something in the neighborhood of 300,000 men and women in uniform doing jobs that aren't for men and women in uniform. They're doing civilian functions, and they shouldn't be doing civilian functions. So we've got to continue to try to manage the department in a way that we make the best use of people who serve in the armed services.

If, at some point, it looks as though what you suggest might be the case turns out to be the case, clearly we will come to Congress and ask for an increase. But at the moment, we do not see that that's the case.

REED: Let me address the question a different way.

Since September 11th, 42,000 National Guard troops have been on active duty. And that's before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Doesn't that suggest to you that there's a need for increase in active forces?

RUMSFELD: In the first place, I don't have the number at my fingertip, and I regret that. But there are a very large number of Guard and Reserve that have been on duty that are volunteers. They are individuals who were not called up. They are not required. But a nontrivial fraction of the total have been individuals who were asked, "Would you like to come on and serve on active service for a period?" and they have said, "Yes."

So you are right except that, within that mix of numbers of Reserve and Guard, a lot of them are there because they want to be, not because they're being forced to be.

REED: Well, you need them, Mr. Secretary, even though they want it.

RUMSFELD: You bet we do.

REED: Then the question goes, if you need that many national Guardsmen over an extended period of time, stretching back over a year, doesn't that suggest that the active forces have to be increased?

RUMSFELD: Well, of course, we have increased the active forces. We have a provision that Congress passed and the president has taken advantage of the 2 percent plus. And under an emergency, even the 2 percent ceiling is not a requirement for us, and we are, in some cases, above the 2 percent.

So the force levels have increased during this period. You're quite right.

REED: Mr. Secretary, my time has expired, but I think this issue of the size of our forces is rapidly approaching a decision point. And from what I've seen, from the extended deployment of our Army particularly -- and I agree the Marine Corps also, and I suspect the Navy and the Air Force could make similar cases -- is that we're reaching a point where we have to go ahead and bite the bullet and put more forces in our force structure so we can rotate those troops who are doing so well and serving so proudly out of Iraq.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Collins?

COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Franks, let me begin my remarks by joining my colleagues in thanking you for a truly outstanding career. Our country owes you an enormous debt of gratitude and I join my colleagues in saluting you.

Mr. Secretary, I was honored to be part of the Armed Services Committee trip to Iraq recently. And like my colleagues, I had the opportunity to talk with many of our troops.

I want to echo the impressions that Senator Reed received in his conversations.

To a person, I found that our troops' morale was very high, despite the harsh conditions under which they are serving and despite the dangers to which they are exposed. But I also found a weariness among our troops. And over and over, I heard, "I'm proud of our mission, I helped free the Iraqi people, but when do I get to get to go home?"

So I think it is important that we communicate to the men and women who are serving so that they will have some expectations.

COLLINS: One soldier from Maine told me, "I can deal with another three months, I can deal with another six months, but I just need to know."

So I would encourage you -- and I know that General Abizaid is working on this -- but to share that information with our men and women in uniform as quickly as it is available so there can be some certainty.

I would also ask you, Mr. Secretary, to project for us what you see as the percentage mix of American troops versus troops from other countries as part of the coalition forces by the end of the year. Obviously, we can rotate troops home more quickly if we can replace them not just with American troops, but with troops from other countries.

Could you give us a rough estimate of what you see as the percentages of American troops versus troops from other countries as part of the coalition forces by the end of the year?

RUMSFELD: Well, as General Franks and I've indicated, we now have about 148,000 troops there. We're hoping to have the non-U.S. coalition forces up to something like -- at the moment we're looking at 30,000, sometime later summer, early fall. We intend to have the Iraqi army grow as rapidly as we can do so. And there's actually a fourth source of forces, and that's contract forces for site protection to the extent that that might make sense.

And that's roughly what it looks like to me going toward the end of the year.

COLLINS: You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, in your statement that Iraqis no longer wake up every morning in fear wondering whether this will be the day that the death squads come. And indeed, all of us feel a great pride at freeing the Iraqi people from the breathtaking brutality of Saddam Hussein and his regime.

But nevertheless what I found during the trip is that, there still is very much a climate of fear in Iraq. There's a fear that the Americans and the coalition forces will go home too soon and that Saddam Hussein will return to power.

I was struck by a conversation that we had with an Iraqi who is running an oil refinery in Basra, whom whenever we asked any question that involved Saddam Hussein would not respond.

How important is it that we capture or kill Saddam Hussein, and how high a priority is it for the coalition forces?

RUMSFELD: The president has said, and we all agree, that the United States and the coalition forces are committed to stay as long as is necessary and not a day longer. So the idea that we would leave too soon and Saddam Hussein come back is not a realistic concern that anyone ought to have. Saddam Hussein's not coming back.

How important is it that he be caught or killed and that closure come to that? It would be helpful. There's no question but that this individual has created such fear on the part of the Iraqi people because of his brutality and the numbers of tens of thousands of people he's killed and the willingness to use chemical weapons on his people and on his neighbors, that there is a fear not just in Iraq, but in the region that we have to be certain that he is not going to be around.

I think that that'll take some time. People don't get over that fear immediately. But he's not coming back. He's through. That regime is over.

COLLINS: You and I know that. You and I know for certain that Saddam Hussein is not coming back. But I am convinced that the fear that Saddam will come back is impeding our progress in reconstructing Iraq.

COLLINS: Prior to this trip, I would have said that as long as he's out of power, that's sufficient. I came back with a very different feeling, a determination that unless we capture or kill Saddam, that our progress is going to be far slower.

RUMSFELD: I agree with that. And I will say that, however, in answer to your question, "What's the priority?" the priority is very high, as I'm sure you were briefed.

COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Akaka?

AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my pride of the troops as well as the leadership to the record here, General Franks. What you've done out there with our troops are extraordinary. And I want to say, "Thank you," and I want to praise you for all that.

I also want to commend Secretary Rumsfeld for all he has done with us, as well as with you and the troops out there during this period.

I want to continue to pursue that question of, "When are we coming home?" because although I didn't make that trip to Iraq, I've heard it at home as well.

Secretary, you mentioned, in response to Senator Warner's questions, that CENTCOM is developing a rotational plan for forces in Iraq. And it appears at this point that we don't have detailed answers to that. My question to you is when do you expect that plan to be completed? And will it include troop rotations in Afghanistan as well?

I would appreciate if you could brief me on that plan, when completed as well. As ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I am deeply interested in this issue.

RUMSFELD: Senator, CENTCOM's responsibility is to communicate the force requirement that they believe they need to do the job that they've been asked to do. The joint staff and the services then work with them to determine what kinds of forces and what kinds of rotation schedules make the most sense.

That work is currently being done. It's going to be presented to me this week and I expect to be able to make some decisions.

The certainty question is clear. To the extent we can get that work done, tell them, as we've now told the 3rd Infantry Division, what their certainty is, to the extent we can do that with the other forces there -- I should add, however, we have redeployed over 140,000 troops already, including some Army and including some Marines, some ground forces as well as Navy and Air Forces.

AKAKA: In regards to this deployment, Mr. Secretary, I recently visited some of our fine Marines at Camp Lejeune and our great soldiers at Fort Bragg. Many of them had just returned from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we spent a lot of time just talking about what they will need to reconstitute their forces after returning home. In past operations, it has sometimes taken units up to a year or more to fully regain high levels of readiness.

Do you expect these time lines to be about the same after Iraqi Freedom? If not, how do you expect to accelerate them and how much additional funding will this require?

RUMSFELD: We've asked for some funds already for reconstitution and I don't doubt for a minute that we'll have to ask for additional funds for reconstitution and it's important that that be done.

RUMSFELD: It varies from unit to unit how much time it takes and how much the cost is, but that work is all being done by the joint staff.

And the other thing that happens, however, is that combatant commanders around the world look at what took place in CENTCOM in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they begin to change their judgments about the numbers of precision weapons they would use, for example, relative to dumb bombs, and how they might conduct their campaigns. And as they evolve their contingency plans, they then alter their needs and those kinds of things will be coming in in the budget that's being prepared at the present time for presentation next year.

AKAKA: Mr. Secretary, I'm quite concerned about the problem -- and I'm shifting to dirty bombs. The General Accounting Office recently completed a report for me on the availability worldwide of radioactive material that can be used to construct such a weapon.

Because of this, the looting of Iraqi nuclear sites has been a matter of great concern. I thank you for letting an International Atomic Energy Agency survey team into Iraq.

I would appreciate it if you could provide me an update, either now or for the record, as to whether or not all the missing radioactive sealed sources at the sites have been accounted for.

General Franks?

FRANKS: Sir, would you repeat the last part of the question, just the last phrase, sir? I missed the last part.

RUMSFELD: The percentage o