PREPARED TESTIMONY OF

DAVID KAY,
Director of the Center for Counterterrorism Technology Analysis,
Science Applications International Corporation

House International Relations Committee

February 25 , 1998

Detecting Cheating on Non-Proliferation Regimes:
Lessons From The Iraqi Experience

David Kay *1

With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat, a broad consensus seems to be forming that U.S. foreign and defense policies and budgets can now be premised on the absence of any major threat to the United States or its allies and on such timely detection of any newly developing threat that defensive measures can be deferred until after a threat emerges. The case of Iraq should offer a warning against too much optimism If this were not enough to ensure that concern with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will continue as a major foreign policy concern, one could add: US Presidential election politics; Saddam's continued ability to surprise the world with his survival and his ability to frustrate the international community from fully unmasking and eliminating his on-going program to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles to deliver these; continued social, economic and political chaos in Russia, the world's first nuclear superpower to disintegrate; concern about the stability of North Korea and how it might use its presumed arsenal of weapons of mass destruction as it collapses; the continued failure of China to abide by global or bilateral nonproliferation promises; and growing evidence of the worldwide reach of terrorism.

The failed efforts of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors and national intelligence authorities to detect or prevent prior to the Persian Gulf War a nuclear weapons program of the magnitude and advanced character of Iraq's should stand a monument to the fallibility of on-site inspections and national intelligence when faced by a determined opponent. The Iraqi military buildup, as well as the multiple failures of its timely detection, is an experience rich in lessons that, if correctly understood, may help in detecting other covert weapons programs and, equally important, U.S. understanding of the limits of its ability to guarantee timely detection.

During the inspections in Iraq after the Gulf War, an immense military production establishment was found that was producing or striving to produce a broad range of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering them. The nuclear program alone involved investments amounting to around $10 billion. Inspectors and those who monitor proliferation were surprised by the magnitude and advanced state of Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear explosive devices. At the time of the Gulf War Iraq was probably less than a year away from its first crude nuclear device and no more than three to four years away from more advanced, deliverable weapons. Moreover, the amount of foreign assistance and technology that fueled the Iraqi arms program was truly staggering.

As a result of the dogged determination of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), directed by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, a great deal is now known about Iraq's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

• The nuclear program had for ten years before the war involved a large clandestine effort - approximately $8-10 billion, more than 20 sites and more than 15,000 people - pursuing multiple routes to enrich uranium, directed toward producing nuclear weapons. Foreign assistance, both technical and equipment, from Western-based companies and the lax export control regimes operated by several of our Western allies played a major role in this program. Beginning in 1987 the Iraqis had also embarked on a testing program to field radiological weapons which would have had as their sole purpose rendering large areas uninhabitable and terrorizing civilian populations. Soon after their invasion of Kuwait, Iraq embarked on a crash program to strip the uranium out of the fuel in their safeguarded research reactor and further enrich it a secret centrifuge facility. The aim of this crash effort was to produce a single nuclear device by April 1991.

• The biological weapons program was of astounding scope, including the production of thousands of liters of botulism toxin and of anthrax and lesser amounts of a number of less well understood, but still deadly, agents. *2 Iraq has now admitted 19,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin - with 10,000 liters filled into shells, bombs and missile warheads, 8,500 liters of concentrated anthrax, with 6,500 liters filled into weapons, and 2,200 liters of concentrated aflatoxin, 1,580 of which was weaponized. At the time of the Gulf War biological agents had been weaponized, and missiles, artillery shells and aircraft - Iraq now says 191 warheads -161 bombs (100 filled with botulinum toxin, 50 with anthrax and 16 with aflatoxin) and 25 Al Hussein missile warheads (13 filled with botulinum toxin, 10 with anthrax and 2 with aflatoxin) - and an aerial spraying system designed to spray 2000 liters of agent over a target - stood ready to rain their deadly payloads onto civilian and military targets. Iraq has, at long last, admitted that prior to the Gulf War it had a full-scale offensive biological weapons program. At least two of the major biological weapons facilities were unknown at the time of the Gulf War. Of longer range concern should be the fact that Iraq was able to achieve such a remarkable biological weapons program after only five years of sustained work.

• The chemical program had not only produced hundreds of thousands of gallons of lethal mustard and nerve agents, but chemical weapons had also been used by the Iraqi regime on its own people as well as against Iran. The Iraqi Army at the time of the Gulf War - and still today - had more combat experience in employing chemical weapons than all the combined armies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The actual chemical weapons production capabilities of Iraq remain impressive, but still not fully understood. For example, until September 1995 Iraq had contended that its efforts to produce the advanced nerve gas, VX, had been a failure and that the production efforts had only existed between April 1987 and September 1988 and that the efforts had been a failure. Recent discoveries show that VX production had begun as early as May 1985 and continued uninterrupted until December 1990. Far from being a failed effort, it is now known that VX was produced on an industrial scale, with production possibly as large of 500 tonnes of VX. Even more disturbing is evidence that Iraq successfully mastered the production of a very stable form of VX for what they termed "strategic storage". Documentation obtained by UNSCOM in the last 6 months also shows that Iraq produced significant numbers of binary sarin-filled artillery shells, 122 mm rockets and bombs Iraq has also admitted three flight tests of long-range missiles with chemical warheads. An April 1990 missile test involved a sarin warhead.

• Documentation now in the hands of UNSCOM shows that Iraq was actively planning and had actually deployed its chemical weapons for strategic offensive use in a surprise attack mode. The known deployment of their longer-range Al Hussein missiles for which their were at least 25 BW loaded warheads supports these documents. Iraq has also told UNSCOM that launch authority for biological and chemical warheads had been pre-delegated during the Gulf War. This launch authorization was to be used if Baghdad was attacked with nuclear weapons.

• Iraq's missile program is perhaps better known, if not better understood, as a result of the dramatic television footage of Scud attacks during the Gulf War. This well funded, and foreign assisted program had already given Iraq the ability to attack, ultimately with its weapons of mass destruction, all of the states of the Middle East and of US forces that might come to the aid of these states. In addition to the 819 SCUD missiles Iraq obtained prior to the Gulf War from the former Soviet Union, it has now been discovered that Iraq successfully produced and tested similar missiles that it had produced on its own. UNSCOM reported in October 1995 that "At the end of September 1995, the Commission obtained new information on Iraq's testing activity, including both static and flight testing of Scud variant missile systems; several new designs of longer-range missile systems; development and testing of new liquid-propellant engine designs; development and successful testing of a warhead separation system; an indigenous design of a 600 mm diameter supergun system; and three separate flight tests of chemical warheads. Some of the previously undisclosed designs included missiles that could reach targets at ranges of up to 3,000 kilometres. The commission also obtained information of a special missile under design for delivery of a nuclear explosive device." *3

• Finally, it should now be clear to all that the Iraqi efforts to acquire these weapons did not end with the Gulf War. Just in the last several months new evidence has come to light that Iraq is continuing to secretly, and in violation of its obligation under Resolution 687, continuing to import equipment to extend the range of a new class of Scud-type missiles, produce additional chemical and biological weapons, and continue work on nuclear weapons-related projects.

What lessons should we draw from our failure?

We now know so much about Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and advanced means of delivery for these weapons that it is easy - and very convenient for some - to forget that the prevailing assessments of Iraq's accomplishments prior to the Gulf War were quite different. By the same token, international and national measures designed to give assurances that states were not attempting to acquire advanced arms were prior to the end of the Gulf War generally viewed as effective and reassuring. There is little to be gained in singling out individual analysts or organizations for their failure of vision and leadership, but much more to be gained by attempting to understand:

• the systemic sources that led to this failure;

• the accomplishments of UNSCOM, including both its strengths and weaknesses;

• what are the most important areas for US policy to address if similar failures are to be avoided in the future and if arms control regimes such as the nuclear nonproliferation safeguard system are to become more robust.

Why had IAEA safeguards failed to detect the Iraqi nuclear program before the Gulf War? Or - and this was potentially even more dangerous - why had IAEA safeguards given false assurances that there was no Iraqi nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War? *4

There is a simple, but very disquieting, answer to the source of the failure to detect before the Gulf War Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The IAEA's nuclear safeguards were simply not designed to address the case of a state that might attempt to embark on a clandestine nuclear program, except in one very limited case - the large-scale diversion of declared nuclear material. International safeguards were designed in the late 1960's and early 1970's to address one specific concern. That concern was that the foreseen rapid expansion of peaceful nuclear power would provide an opportunity for states that might want to acquire nuclear weapons to divert critical nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear activities to weapons programs. It was apparent that the public would not tolerate international trade in nuclear materials if such a danger could not be controlled. The response was to create a safeguard system that attempted to address this single concern Although surrounded by an elaborate system of technical jargon and rhetoric, IAEA safeguards were remarkably consistent in focusing on this single threat. The underlying assumption was that if a state desired to pursue nuclear weapons ambitions by some other means - a parallel clandestine program, for example - it would either not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or its activities would be detected by national intelligence systems of other states. The result was the development of an international nuclear safeguard system that has as its objective "the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection." *5

I am prepared to accept that most of the technical assumptions that surrounded the establishment of the IAEA safeguards in the early 1970's were on balance reasonable - viewed from the past. These included: probable diversion from civil material. was the only significant concern and technical means existed to detect any significant diversion; the amount of nuclear material. required for a weapon would be sizable*6; clandestine programs would be difficult to keep secret; nuclear weapons programs would have to be very large; relevant nuclear technology remained relatively well controlled and enrichment and reprocessing technology could be controlled. What was wrong with these assumptions was that at exactly the point that they were being codified into the international safeguard system they were being undermined by rapid shifts in the technology and equally important shifts in political relationships *7. The result is that international safeguards at the time of the Gulf War did not even attempt to do what most people thought they did - detect any efforts of a non-nuclear member of the NPT to develop nuclear weapons. The goal of IAEA safeguards was the much more modest, and much less relevant, objective of detecting the nondiversion of substantial amounts of declared materials

Beyond these technical limitations, the pre-Gulf War culture of the IAEA bears considerable responsibility for its failures. The IAEA was and remains an organization with a divided mandate and a divided membership. By its Statute - and one must add the American initiative that led to its creation - the IAEA has as its objectives both the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensuring that nuclear material. intended for civilian programs are not used for military purposes. The tension between promotion and regulation is a constant theme in budget debates as well as election campaigns for the top office of Director General. Many developing countries view the promotion of the transfers of nuclear technology as the top priority for the IAEA and are reluctant to see any resources being devoted to safeguards. Its Board of Governors regularly has included such notable opponents to effective safeguards as India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, China and Algeria The international diplomatic milieu and weak leadership led the IAEA to become trapped in the morass of believing that it had to subject all states to the same level of scrutiny. The level of inspection attention was determined by the size of the nuclear program, not by any judgment as to the likely proliferation threat. At the time of the Gulf War 55 percent of the inspection budget went to carry out inspections in three countries - Germany, Canada and Japan

I am still amazed that given the failures prior to the Gulf War of the international inspection system to detect the Iraqi nuclear program, that the record of the UNSCOM-led post war effort has accomplished so much. What are the reasons that international efforts to eliminate a largely unknown program were so much more successful than international efforts to detect the same program?

First of all, UNSCOM had one tremendous beginning advantage over the IAEA. UNSCOM had a single clear focus. It was to find and then destroy, remove or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It had no responsibilities with regard to the post-Gulf War reconstruction of Iraq, dealing with humanitarian relief or with the promotion of the peaceful side of nuclear, chemical, biological or missile technology. Multinational bureaucracies are difficult organizations for outsiders to understand, and almost equally difficult for insiders to keep focused on reasonable objectives of effectiveness. They are impossible to operate with mixed or conflicting objectives. UNSCOM was able to dodge this particular bullet, and it has made a tremendous difference.

Second, the Security Council did something in creating UNSCOM that it had never done before in the entire history of the UN. UNSCOM was created as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and is not subordinate to or dependent upon the UN Secretary General or the Secretariat. UNSCOM reported directly to the Security Council free of all the internal UN political pressures and compromises that render most UN reports senseless and makes direct action impossible. This arrangement also made it possible to operate a field operation free of the morass of UN rules. From little things - the first cipher lock on a UN office and the first reasonable secure communications system - to much more consequential actions - requesting and using national intelligence information and the first use of aerial reconnaissance - UNSCOM used its freedom from the UN bureaucracy to respond to an unprecedented challenge. Equally important the Security Council saw that the success or failure of UNSCOM would be viewed as its own success or failure. Particularly when compared to actions such as Bosnia, the Security Council in the case of UNSCOM has been remarkably consistent in maintaining a unity of purpose.

Third, UNSCOM was blessed with, what for the UN system at least, was a remarkably happy surprise in leadership. Rolf Ekeus, who was selected by the Security Council to chair UNSCOM, has demonstrated the rarest of combinations of leadership qualities in the UN - integrity, stubbornness, ability to resist intimidation, personal courage, diplomatic prowess, and the ability to inspire subordinates.

Fourth, as well led as UNSCOM has been it has benefited considerably from the incompetence and failures of Iraq. In the early nuclear inspections Iraq was the type of opponent of which one can usually only dream - overly centralized; brutal in a way that inspires more fear in its own supporters than the inspectors; crude and incompetent in presenting its own case; cheating on all matters so that it became viewed as untrustworthy regarding everything; and unable to ever formulate and follow a coherent strategy

Fifth, UNSCOM has had access to and chosen to use a vast range of inspection resources and techniques that the IAEA had earlier either rejected or never sought. These resources include national intelligence information, environmental monitoring technology, aerial reconnaissance, personnel drawn from national weapons programs, handheld GPS devices, zero notice inspections, detailed interviews with Iraqi personnel, and document seizure. The post-Gulf War inspections carried out by UNSCOM, in fact, have seen an unprecedented level of sharing of national intelligence information and techniques. Data from NTM was shared beginning with the very first Iraqi inspection; as they became available clues on the Iraqi arms programs gained from HUMINT were shared; data collection techniques and analytical capabilities were put at the service of the inspection efforts; and even a collection asset - a U-2 aircraft with sensors - has been leased to the UN. While the United States intelligence community has taken the lead in assisting the UN, significant contributions have also been made by other Coalition partners. None of these resources and techniques are panaceas, but without them it would not have been possible to mask a program as well hidden as that of Iraq.

UNSCOM, however, has been far from perfect. It must be recognized that even after five years of the most intrusive arms inspection regime ever to be imposed significant uncertainty remains as to the true extent of the Iraqi weapons program and astounding revelations - such as those of its biological weapons program - continue to arise. UNSCOM's early inspection in the missile and biological areas were poorly organized and led. The slowness of UNSCOM in fielding capable biological inspections directly contributed to Iraq's successful efforts to hide the true extent of this program. Operational security issues, even after several sharp warnings, were given too low a priority. UNSCOM also has shared with the IAEA the all too ready desire to declare victory and to move along to less intrusive and politically uncomfortable monitoring programs.

Today's formidable task is not just to recognize and attempt to redress the failures of yesterday that brought nuclear weapons almost into the hands of Saddam. The broader challenge is to discern and prepare for even more ominous developments that are threatening to ignite a new round of nuclear proliferation.

First and foremost among those developments is the inevitable insecurity that has arisen as the Cold War's dangerous but stable security order has passed from the scene. This old order has not yet been succeeded by an equally stable, and hopefully less dangerous, new structure. The unrealistic hope that the United Nations, ignored and enfeebled by the Cold War, could quickly assume the role of peacekeeper and peacemaker is now recognized as impossible. Even more disturbing is the hesitancy and mis-steps of the United States in defining its own role in the post-Cold War world. During the Cold War, the largest bulwark against nuclear proliferation in those industrialized states that could have easily acquired nuclear weapons was their belief that the United States was a reliable guarantor of their security and that they had no need to embark on the costly and dangerous road of nuclear weapons acquisition. The major new development making nuclear proliferation more likely in the future is the growing insecurity and uncertainty as to the structure of support that states can count on when threatened by others willing to resort to aggression and intimidation to achieve their aims of domination. Effectively resolving this uncertainty with firm security assurances matched by demonstrated military capacity, willingness and competence must rank high among the steps needed to prevent a spiraling nuclear arms race. I have considerable concern that, particularly in Asia, states unsatisfied with divisions of territory at the end of World War II may now be contemplating in very dangerous ways the use armed force. At least in the short term, I see no alternative to a United States willing to bear the risk and cost of leadership, while the international community seeks to build a multilateral structure capable of providing the need level of security.

A second new development that threatens to fuel efforts by states determined to acquire nuclear weapons is the real possibility of leakage of nuclear materials, technology, and, even, weapons from the stockpiles of the existing nuclear weapon states - particularly those of the former Soviet Union. The excesses of the Cold War which led to the accumulation of unbelievable amounts of nuclear material when combined with the social and economic chaos of the collapse of a nuclear superpower hold the potential for a devil's brew for sudden nuclear weapons acquisition by both states and terrorist groups. The work already underway to assist the Russians to bring a minimum level of security to their nuclear arms industry remains inadequate and must be accelerated.

Thirdly, the international institutional infrastructure that was built-up to provide international oversight of the world's nuclear industry is in urgent need of overhaul. The International Atomic Energy Agency that resulted from an American initiative - the Eisenhower Atoms for Peace plan - rested on the fundamentally flawed assumption that nuclear power would prove to be a boundless source of energy, literally too cheap to meter. While nuclear power has come to play an important role in producing electricity - certainly this is true in Japan and France - it has not lived up to the initial promises of cheap, risk- free power. Nuclear power is a demanding technology, requiring close concern to issues of safety, economics and proliferation possibilities.

The IAEA has failed to a considerable extent to adjust to these new circumstances. It continues to be both an institution that promotes nuclear energy as well as advising on safety issues and carrying out major responsibilities for the operation of nuclear safeguards to detect nuclear proliferation. The result is a schizophrenic institutional culture. In the democratic countries of the West, these three functions have been long split into separate agencies, and with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union quickly moved to separate these functions as well. It is only at the institutional level that such antithetical functions have been allowed to coexist in the same institution. The institutional renewal that is now broadly recognized as necessary for the entire United Nations system is urgently required for the central international institution responsible for stemming nuclear proliferation

The challenge of policing the nuclear threat - and devising comparable measures for the equally menacing possibilities of biological weapons - must move to the top of the international agenda. The realities of domestic and international politics is that it is easier to mouth soothing platitudes that extol progress made rather than to dwell on horrors that may soon emerge. This reluctance to look forward to avoid tragedy arises, by-in-large, neither from ignorance nor evil intent. Across the global, there is a striking uniformity of weariness with international politics and rising concern with simply be able to cope with the seemingly inextricable demands of providing within each of our societies acceptable levels of economic, social and physical security. To a degree frighteningly similar to the war- weariness of the Western democracies in the period between World War I and II, many of our societies seem to lack the vigor and cohesion required to prepare for and confront broader, longer-range threats to international security.

Future Prospects

It should now be clear to all that the Iraqi efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems for them did not end with the Gulf War. It should now be equally clear that Iraq freely and repeatedly - both before and after the Gulf War - has broken international obligations that it had accepted not to acquire such weapons. Iraq has continued for over a decade both massive efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and extensive deception efforts to defeat international efforts to unmask and destroy this program. Just in the last several months new evidence has come to light that Iraq is continuing to secretly, and in violation of its obligation under Resolution 687, continuing to import equipment to extend the range of a new class of Scud-type missiles, produce additional chemical and biological weapons, and continue work on nuclear weapons-related projects. Even after five years of the most intrusive arms inspection regime ever to be imposed on a country significant uncertainty remains as to the true extent of the Iraqi weapons program and astounding revelations - such as those of its biological weapons program - continue to arise.

The cease-fire that ended the Gulf War envisaged that Iraq would declare its stock of prohibited weapons, these would then be eliminated by UNSCOM and a long-term monitoring system administered by UNSCOM and the IAEA would ensure that Iraq did not rebuild weapons of mass destruction. This might have been an elegant solution to a war that ended with the aggressor still in possession of a vast arsenal of lethal weaponry - except that it required two conditions that did not turn out to be true. First, Iraq would have to provide UNSCOM and the IAEA with a complete list of all of its prohibited weapons and their location. Second, Saddam and his regime would have had to be replaced by a regime prepared to live in peace with its neighbors. As events have shown, Iraq has filed to date with UNSCOM more than a dozen "full, final and complete disclosures" of its prohibited weapons - and each one has been shown by subsequent events to be false. Iraq's lack of cooperation with the weapons inspection process has been the one constant through out these last five years Iraqi behavior is unchanging. In the months immediately after the end of the Gulf War I lead teams that had shots fired over their heads as they chased an Iraqi convoy moving secret nuclear equipment and a team that spent four days surrounded by Iraqi troops in a Baghdad parking lot, other teams as recently as this month were on five separate occasions denied for as long as 18 hours access to Iraqi facilities. Intimidation, physical attacks and threats have become a constant element of weapons inspections in Iraq.

A recent report of UNSCOM to the UN Security Council provides several examples of the continuing effort of Iraq to shield its proscribed weapons activities *8:

• "Iraq has admitted that it had been withholding important information on its missile programmes . . . Iraq's account concerning missile warheads, including those for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, lacks consistency and the necessary evidence for verification . . . The Commission believes that Iraq is still withholding important documents related to proscribed activities and has not provided them in the new disclosure."

• "The new information obtained by the Commission since August 1995 clearly shows that Iraq's chemical weapons programme was more developed and wider in scope than had previously been admitted. Thus the March 1995 chemical full, final and complete disclosure and subsequent amendments were rendered invalid and the Commission requested that Iraq submit a new disclosure . . . Based on information available to it, the Commission believes that there were further activities relating to the development of chemical munitions that have still not been disclosed, including foreign assistance."

• "Of note is the recent admission by Iraq of its 1988 plans to relocate the production of chemical precursors to civilian chemical facilities, which has confirmed the Commission's approach taken with respect to its monitoring system. The Commission's monitoring team continues to discover non-declared dual-use equipment in Iraq. Under the monitoring plan, Iraq is required to declare all such dual-use chemical manufacturing equipment. Iraq is still unable to provide complete semi-annual declarations required by the monitoring plan in the chemical field."

• "The draft full, final and complete disclosures of November was Iraq's third official declaration in the biological weapons area submitted this year . . . the November draft contains major deficiencies in structure and content. Serious gaps and omissions exist in the declaration and in the documentary support, especially related to biological warfare agent and munition production, munition filling and the destruction of weaponized and bulk agents. In a number of cases, Iraq's declarations appear to downgrade the scope and the results of research, development and production efforts related to certain biological warfare agents . . . The Commission is especially concerned by Iraq's continuing failure to provide definite figures on amounts of biological weapons agents and munitions produced, weaponized and destroyed. In the absence of such figures, accompanied by supporting documentation, it is not possible to establish a material balance of proscribed items, nor is it possible for the Commission to provide an assessment to the Security Council that Iraq does not retain biological weapons agents and munitions."

Faced with five years of deception and lack of compliance, what are the chances of the monitoring system successfully workings? The short answer is that the verification system that has been put in place has very httle chance of working if Saddam's regime continues its constant cheating and deception. The monitoring system did not detect the post-Gulf War Iraqi efforts to develop new missiles nor did they unearth the previously unknown biological weapons program. Both of these came to light as a result of the defection of two of Saddam's son-in-laws, and given their ultimate fate it would be unwise to count on a dependable supply of equally knowledgeable, but naively stupid, defectors.

UNSCOM, itself, has said that confidence in the effectiveness and comprehensives of its long-term monitoring system depends crucially upon a full knowledge of Iraq's prohibited programs. Effective monitoring requires: "Possession by the Commission of a full picture of Iraq's past programmes and a full accounting of the facilities, equipment, items and materials associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with full knowledge of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to Iraq, the technologies acquired by Iraq in pursuing the past programmes, and the supplier networks it established to acquire those elements of the programmes that it could not acquire indigenously . . . Clearly, knowing where to focus effort requires knowledge of what Iraq would have achieved in its past programmes . . . A necessary prerequisite for a comprehensive solution is that Iraq demonstrate a full openness and a manifest willingness to cooperate in all its dealing with the Special Commission." *9

All the evidence to date indicates that UNSCOM's own preconditions for an effective monitoring system have not been met. The UNSCOM monitoring system is certainly not without considerable value. At the very least it forces the Iraqi's to adopt expensive deception practices, slows the pace of Iraqi efforts to expand its weapons arsenal, threatens exposure of continuing efforts of foreign suppliers to support illicit weapons efforts, and provides a ready mechanism to pursue new information that may develop from defections or other sources. But no one should believe that the monstrous efforts of Iraq to obtain and use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been eliminated. The consistent pattern of Iraqi behavior has been to bend every effort to maintain or extend its capabilities to threaten its neighbors with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons delivered by long-range missiles. Charm offensives come and go, but the constancy of Iraq's efforts to protect its prized programs for terror and intimidation do not change.

We should also recognize that the current case of Iraq raises serious issues that go considerably beyond Iraq. More broadly, the analytical framework that undergirds the drawing of US intelligence estimates of future threats no longer matches the realities of the world we are entering. The US over the course of the Cold War built up an elaborate methodology for estimating the probable dimensions of Soviet behavior. This methodology adapted itself well to competition with an implacable, but risk avoiding and lumbering bureaucratic opponent such as the Soviet Union. Even during the Cold War, U.S. intelligence estimates were often wrong when the Soviets chose to "act out of character" - for example, stationing missiles and nuclear arms in Cuba, invading Czechoslovakia and invading Afghanistan. This process failed again in the case of Iraq where massive foreign technology assistance was fused with a leader willing to run the most extreme of risks. The intelligence challenges of today and tomorrow, to name a few, are to understand the terrorist threat, the leakage of nuclear and other advanced arms from the former Soviet Union, the pace at which long-range missiles, biological and nuclear weapons might spread and the likelihood that the Chinese might choose to use military threats and actions against their neighbors. The US now faces a period when the focus of intelligence that guided its Cold War efforts has been lost. In a very real sense Iraq should have warned us that we have lost our capability for strategic warning. There is no agreed, validated threat on which to focus and the capability milestones that guided the assessment process of Soviet intentions and weapons development have all crumbled. In my view there is an urgent need for a high-level, integrated assessment of the US intelligence estimation process before we are surprised again. It should not be forgotten that we were extremely lucky that Saddam chose to risk a confrontation with the US at exactly the time when US military capabilities assemble to face the Soviets were at their maximum strength and freed of any serious Soviet military threat. If Saddam had waited only a few years the US would have faced a far greater challenge in bringing a similar level of military might to bear.

Conclusions

If this is a reasonably accurate accounting of the implications and lessons that should be drawn from the Iraq experience, what conclusions can be drawn as to the approach the US should be considering in relying upon international regimes to limit the further spread of advanced arms?

First, be wary of arms control arrangements that have mixed agendas. The largest continuing defect in international nuclear safeguards remains, in my view, the mixing of promotional and regulatory responsibilities in the same organization *10. The IAEA is obligated to promote nuclear energy. The same organization that was asked to ensure that Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Algeria and Libya were not violating their safeguard agreements was also involved in extensive technical assistance programs to advance the nuclear programs of those same countries. In the case of Iraq this assistance went directly to individuals and activities later identified with the clandestine weapons program. Its promotional activities have advanced reprocessing, large scale enrichment facilities and nuclear desalination with Russian naval reactors - all items with serious proliferation problems. Even in national non-proliferation efforts we have seen the difficulty the US has had in balancing non-proliferation and trade concerns The problem is much more serious in a multilateral forum composed of many states actively hostile to arms control. The tendency is to make concession to maintain the agreement while compromising the inspection and verification activity. But even in more limited arrangements such as the US brokered agreement with North Korea, there is reason to be concerned that the instrumental goal of supplying the North with nuclear reactors will overwhelm the arms control goal of limiting the North's ability to produce nuclear weapons.

Second, technology changes and arms control agreements that cannot adapt to changes in technology will become at best irrelevant and at worst dangerous. After the mid-1970's IAEA/NPT safeguards focused on a declining part of the proliferation problem, diversion from declared facilities, and used antiquated techniques and approaches to cope with the safeguard mission. Any attempt to ensure the peaceful nature of such dynamic fields as biological research or missile developments must be crafted to ensure flexibility and adaptability. The US particularly bears a heavy responsibility in the 1980's for not taking a leading role in questioning the adequacy of IAEA methods and attempting to assist a much needed renovation of inspection techniques. The benefits that can be achieved by US leadership are fully demonstrated in the case of UNSCOM where the US deserves much of the credit for leading the way in making resources available. Much can be done to improve the rigor of IAEA safeguards. The menu of useful approaches is long, including making more resources available to the IAEA, focusing the inspection effort on problem states and regions rather than blindly following the sacrosanct rules of diplomatic equality, focusing more effort on the detection of clandestine programs rather than inspection of only declared facilities, moving to internationalizing all fuel cycle facilities, restricting the right of a state to attempt to escape its NPT obligations by easily withdrawing from the treaty. There are no lack of ideas outside the agency as to these steps. What remains in doubt is whether the determination and leadership exists within the IAEA and its members to push these reforms fully through.

Third, we should not underestimate the difficulty that exists in reaching judgments of non-compliance with arms control obligations. UNSCOM was that rare lucky case where the non-compliance of the inspected party was almost guaranteed by the nature of the agreement. By July, 1991, no one was in doubt that Iraq was locked on a strategy of deceit and cheating. The more usual cases will involve ambiguous information and, more importantly, few good, agreed answers as to what to do if a state is found cheating. The basic arms control dilemma that remains unresolved, even after Iraq, is what to do when you catch a state in violation of its obligations. What is little understood outside of the ranks of those who have served in inspection organizations is the corrosive effect this dilemma has on the integrity of the inspection process. Inspections seek to confirm compliance not to find non-compliance. Concerns are dismissed with demands for "real" evidence, not with programs of more intrusive inspection. If the proliferator is adroit and unfettered by any obligation to speak the truth, the inspection or verification challenge can be quite daunting. Until this dilemma is adequately understood and addressed, arms control agreements will remain as potential "good cover arrangements" for proliferators and generators of false security.

Fourth, states seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capacity are most vulnerable to effective counter moves during the early stages of their efforts well before any weapons have been obtained. Economic sanctions, tightened export controls, more rigorous international inspections, political pressure, and, even, preemptive military steps all work best before a state has directly achieved nuclear weapons status. Unfortunately, at such early stages is precisely when it is most difficult to draw compelling conclusions as to the aims of weapons programs that are carefully shielded from direct scrutiny. The result is, as illustrated by current disagreements between the U.S. and Russian over the true nature of Iran's nuclear ambitions, an inability to agree to take early action to constrain a possible nuclear program. The intelligence world at the best of times is characterized by uncertain data and sources and methods for acquiring such data that are difficult to share with even friends. If effective collective action is to be taken to halt further nuclear proliferation, policymakers - and not just intelligence professionals - must address the need to produce better, more sharable intelligence on states with suspected nuclear ambitions.

Fifth, technology denial historically was the leading avenue of efforts to control a spread of nuclear weapons. Starting with the Baruch Plan for centralizing all nuclear activities under a central United Nations authority down to the present efforts of the London Supplier Group of major nuclear states to restrict the exports of weapons related technology. While technology control efforts can still present significant speed bumps to nuclear weapons programs, they are of declining effectiveness and may tend to give more false than real security. Nuclear-capable technology today is for more widespread than it was even fifteen years ago. Computers, most far more powerful than those used to design early U.S. thermonuclear weapons, can be easily - and legally - acquired off the shelve worldwide. Highly accurate milling tools, again far better than those used in the US nuclear program until the last two decades, are a legitimate commercial item with widespread industrial uses. The basic design principles and fabrication techniques for simple nuclear devices have long been declassified and joined the open global technology base. And finally the spread of nuclear power programs prove very legitimate cover for almost all of the purely nuclear technology and training that cannot othe