U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: ADMINISTRATION VIEWS

PART 2

HEARING BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

September 19, 2002

WITNESS:

SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL  

REP. HYDE: Mr. Secretary, I hate to tell you this, but while you were socializing and these cameramen were watching, the staff removed the film from all those cameras. (Laughter.)

REP.: A negative reaction to that.

REP. HYDE: There was a negative reaction to that? All right.

Anyway, we're all set. The committee will come to order. We thank you, Secretary, for your patience. This has been another typical day on the Hill. And it's a great pleasure to welcome you once more to our committee. We heard from a very distinguished panel of experts this morning on the subject of Iraq, and of course we look forward to your testimony.

The United States is once again confronted with the specter of Saddam Hussein armed with an arsenal of chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons. This is a sobering prospect. But we should not focus our attention solely on his instruments of destruction. Indeed, we must recognize that the threat lies in Saddam himself. The record could not be more stark.

In 1980, he attacked Iran and initiated a decade of warfare that killed and wounded over one million people, a conflict that included his use of chemical weapons on Iranian troops. And in 1990, he invaded Kuwait and imposed a brutal occupation upon that country, laying waste to everything within reach when his forces were finally driven out. He has indiscriminately used chemical weapons on unarmed civilians in his own country and has slaughtered any who have opposed him.

Given this record, there can be no doubt that once armed with weapons of even greater destructive power, he will have little reluctance to use them. The threat to U.S. interests is obvious, but we're not the only target. The entire world should understand the danger that Saddam poses to everyone, and should welcome any opportunity to end it before he is ready to strike.

Despite the extensive criticism that has been directed at the administration, I believe that the president and you, Mr. Secretary, have gone to extraordinary lengths to enlist the cooperation of the world community, including that of our allies and the United Nations.

The response, however, has been a disappointing one. You will forgive me if I say that many of our critics apparently refuse to recognize the danger for what it is, or have decided that this is a problem they can leave to the U.S. while they limit their contribution to commenting safely from the sidelines. We can see this attitude once again in the eager reaction to Saddam's latest promise of cooperation, which has at least initially accomplished its purpose of undermining the fragile beginnings of a consensus that at long last something must be done.

But we would be fools indeed if we believed that Saddam can be trusted. He has cynically broken all of his previous promises of cooperation, and there's no reason to believe that his latest statement is anything more than an attempt to delay and divide us. He will only use the time the world grants him to further his plans and preparation.

To those who advocate a more trusting approach, I need only remind them that Britain and France once waited hopefully while Germany armed itself, with results that were catastrophic to all. This is a stark reality, that we are confronted with an even greater danger than Saddam himself. Despite clear and repeated warnings, it appears that much of the world does not understand that we have entered a wholly new and increasingly perilous era. Through repeated usage, the term "weapons of mass destruction" has become almost banal, but the unimaginable destructive power these weapons represent requires our constant focus and a determination to do what we must to defend ourselves.

The problem is not merely that a murderous tyrant such as Saddam may be in possession of these weapons; in the aftermath of September 11th, we must accept that he has been joined by many others of an even more fanatical purpose. Terrorists willing to commit suicide in order to kill large numbers of innocents cannot be stopped by the familiar conventions of deterrence.

Their possession of weapons of mass destruction must be equated with a certainty that these will be used against us. To assume that these terrorists and others will remain unarmed by Saddam is an assumption with a deadly potential. A first strike could well be the last strike. We should not guess the world into annihilation. Given the leadership role of the United States in the world and the recognition that only we can defend our own interests, we do not have the luxury of pretending not to see the danger confronting us. All our choices are difficult ones. But the only real option is to act.

I now yield to Mr. Lantos for an opening statement, and I will beg the indulgence of the committee to forego their opening statements so we can get to the secretary's important testimony. Their statements will be a made a part of the record without objection.

And now, Mr. Lantos.

REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me associate myself with all of your remarks.

Mr. Secretary, we are delighted and honored to have you. You have preformed magnificently in our national interest. And I think I can speak for all Democrats and all Republicans on this panel to say we are deeply in your debt. You have done an outstanding job. I really found out how outstanding a job you did when my wife told me last Sunday, as we were watching you, "This Colin Powell's finest hour." Her judgment is impeccable.

Mr. Chairman, the president gave a speech last June in which he put forth a doctrine of preemption. I support his approach. In the security environment of today, where technology overrides borders, where weapons of frightening destructive power can pass easily and unseen between rogue states and terrorists, it is only common sense that a doctrine of preemption be one tool in our policy arsenal.

We cannot wait for madmen to strike first; their blow might be more than we should bear.

But it would be wrong, Mr. Chairman, to think that preemption is a new concept on the world scene. Wise leaders have always been alert to threats and taken timely action. To cite perhaps the most appropriate and crucial example, in 1981 Israel bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, incurring the fury of much of the world but the deep gratitude of all thinking people less than a decade later. Had it not been for Israel's action that fateful day, it would have been a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein who would have occupied in Kuwait in 1990, and we may well have chosen a different strategy than we did. Had Saddam possessed nuclear arms in 1990, he might very well today control not only the oil fields of Iraq and Kuwait, but also those of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Thanks to the doctrine of preemption, that did not occur.

The administration is asking us to support their right to wage war on Saddam Hussein if he cannot be brought into compliance with all U.N. resolutions. Mr. Chairman, the case for removing Saddam is powerful. Already illegally wielding chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein must be stopped before he develops nuclear arms and the capacity to deliver them, and he must be stopped before he shares his chemical and biological weapons with terrorists, if he has not already done so. There is very little time to lose.

Some argue that we need not resort to military action, because Saddam can be contained, as the Soviet Union was. But who would bet their lives on it? With the stakes so high, we must prepare for all eventualities, not merely for the possible or even for the probable.

Saddam is a dictator who took over one of the wealthiest countries in the world and utterly destroyed its economy through his reckless actions. As we all know, he started two major wars, tried to wipe an entire country off the map, attacked Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran unprovoked, tried to assassinate a former president of the United States, gassed his own people as well as Iranians, and committed innumerable abominations in what the great Iraqi intellectual Ghenan Makia (sp) labeled "a republic of fear". When he was given a reprieve after the gulf war, survival in exchange for the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction, he egregiously violated the terms of his parole.

How difficult is it to believe that a dictator with this type of a resume would use nuclear weapons? Were we to sit on our hands while Saddam develops nuclear arms, could we ever forgive ourselves if he used them? If he did use these horrible weapons against our interests, could we say we were surprised, that we would never have imagined such a thing? If we do nothing, we will almost certainly stand humiliated before history. We are in a race against time. We must rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein before he commits his next outrage.

Mr. Chairman, if there will be an Iraq campaign, it must not end with Saddam's fall. The biggest benefit in a post-Saddam Middle East would be the emergence in time of a democratic Iraq that could become the democratic jewel of the Arab world. This would require a long- term effort on our part and on the part of our friends. But its success would revolutionize the region far more than just repaying our investment. A democratic Iran (sic) would be anti-extremist. It would be devoted to building its society rather than destroying others. It would isolate terrorist supporters like Syria and Iran. And the myth that democracy is incompatible with Arab society would be shattered. Indeed, the demonstration effect of Iraqi democracy would resonate throughout the authoritarian-dominated Middle East.

By assisting Iraqi democratization, the United States would not only have demonstrated its opposition to a lawless Iraqi regime, but to its commitment to the Iraqi people. And, as in our finest hours, we will have joined our resolve to defend ourselves to our highest democratic ideals.

Mr. Chairman, war is a terrible thing. I know it well. I was closer to it for a longer periods of time than most members of Congress. Sometimes, as in the Second World War, there is no other way to do what is best for humanity. Mr. Chairman, if no peaceful way can be found to rid the world of the plague of Saddam Hussein, I believe this may be one of those times.

Thank you.

REP. HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

They say when you're introducing someone who has many accomplishments and is so well known, the less you say, the better. And if I were introducing you at a dinner, I would say, "Ladies and gentlemen, the secretary of State." But in any event, it's a great pleasure to welcome you, and we'd like to hear from you now.

SEC. POWELL: (Off mike) -- the committee, and I welcome this opportunity to present the administration's position with respect to our situation regarding Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos and other members of the committee, you and I have been discussing Iraq for many years. In fact, many of the committee members go back to the days before the Gulf War, when I came up and testified on so many occasions about what we were doing in our buildup of Desert Shield. We all remember vividly that in 1990, Saddam Hussein's forces, as both of you have noted, invaded Kuwait, brutalized that population, and at that time rejected the international community's ultimatum to withdraw.

The United States built a worldwide coalition. We got the whole international community involved at that time, with the clear political purpose of liberating Kuwait. And the military instrument of that coalition, led by America, had an equally clear military objective that flowed directly from the political purpose, and that was to eject the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.

The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and objective, and the international community responded with unprecedented political backing, financial support and military forces. And as a result, we not only accomplished our mission in the Gulf War; the way in which we did it was a model of American leadership and a model of international cooperation.

When the war ended, the Security Council of the United Nations agreed to take measures to ensure that Iraq did not threaten any of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein, as you all -- both have noted and all will note, was a man who, after all, had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and then against Kuwait in 1990; who had fired ballistic missiles at neighboring countries and had used chemical weapons in the war with Iran and even against his own people. The United States and the international community at that time were strongly determined to present -- prevent any future aggression.

So United Nations Security Council resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms of the cease-fire in the Gulf. And the fundamental purpose of this resolution and many more that followed was restoration of regional peace and security by way of a series of stringent demands on Iraq -- particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction and possession of ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers. Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more conventional military capability while at the same time not leaving Iraq so prostrate that it could not defend itself against Iran. It just had finished a war with Iran, and we did not want to give Iran an opportunity to start that war up again from a position of superiority. The focus of 687 was on weapons of mass destruction, and the resolutions that followed focused on that and other problems with Iraq that I will touch on in a moment.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest of the story. You heard President Bush relate it at the United Nations seven days ago. Iraq has defied the United Nations and refused to comply completely with any of the United Nation Security Council resolutions that were passed. Moreover, since December of 1998, when the United Nations inspection teams left Iraq because of the regime's flagrant defiance of the U.N., the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein has been free to pursue weapons of mass destruction.

Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically. Since September 11th, 2001, the world is a different place, a more dangerous place than the place that existed before September 11th or a few years ago, when the inspectors were last in. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on terrorism that those attacks made necessary, a new reality was born.

The world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat, a threat that could not be deterred, as has been noted; a threat that we could not allow to grow because of this connection between states developing weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organizations willing to use them without any compunction and in an undeterrable fashion. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of our nation. It still is, and it will continue to be so for years to come.

We now see that a proven menace, like Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons of mass destruction could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people. President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. This administration is determined to defeat it. I believe the American people would have us do no less.

President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the international community, just as an earlier President Bush did some 12 years ago. He understands perfectly how powerful a strong and unified international community can be, as we have seen so well demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere, a war on terrorism that is each day producing new successes one step, one arrest, one apprehension at a time.

The need to engage the international community is why the president took his message on the grave and gathering danger of Iraq to the United Nations last week. Moreover, it is the United Nations that is the offended party, not Iraq, as some people might claim. It's not just the United States, it is the international community that should be offended. It is a combination of United Nations resolutions that have been systematically and brutally ignored and violated for these past 12 years. It was the United Nations inspectors who found it impossible to do their job and had to leave the work unfinished. The president's challenge to the United Nations General Assembly was a direct one and it was a very simple one: If you would remain relevant, you must act, you must not look away from this challenge.

The president's speech was powerful. I was there. I listened to it, I knew what he was going to say. And I could see the energy in the room as he delivered it. It energized the United Nations General Assembly, and it energized the debate taking place at this 57th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. It changed the political landscape on which this issue was being discussed.

It made it clear that Iraq is the problem, Iraq is the one that is in material breach of the demands placed on it by this multilateral organization, the United Nations.

The president made clear that what was expected of Iraq was to repair this breach if they could. He made it clear that the issue, however, was more than just disarming Iraq by eliminating its weapons of mass destruction and by constraining its mid- and long-range missile capability. The U.N. resolutions also spoke of terrorism, human rights, the return of prisoners, the return of property and the proper use of the oil for food program.

And the indictment that the president laid out didn't need much discussion or debate. Everybody sitting in that chamber last Thursday knew that Iraq stood guilty of the charges. It convicted itself by its action over these past 12 years. There can be no question that Iraq is in material breach of its obligations.

Over the past weekend, while I worked the aftermath of the president's speech, I saw the pressure build, build on Iraq, as the Arab League, the secretary-general and so many other nations pressed Iraq on the need to take action because it stood guilty, and nobody could deny the guilt.

And then four days ago, on Monday, Iraq responded, not with a serious offer but with a familiar tactical ploy to try to get out of the box, to try to get out of the corner once more. The Iraqi foreign minister said Iraq would let the inspectors in, quote, "without conditions." And this morning, in a speech at the United Nations, he challenged President Bush's September 12th speech. He even called for a discussion of the issue of inspection teams, in accordance, quote, "with international law," he said. He is already walking back. He is already stepping away from the "without conditions" statement that they made on Monday.

But he is not deceiving anybody. That is a ploy we have seen before. We have seen it on many occasions. And on each occasion, once inspectors began to operate, Iraq continued to do everything to frustrate their work.

Mr. Chairman, I will call your and the members' attention to the written statement that I have submitted -- and I ask that it be put in the record -- where I record a dozen examples of Iraq's defiance of the U.N. mandate. Cited in that longer statement is everything from intimidation at gunpoint to holding up inspectors while all the incriminating evidence was removed from the site to be inspected. It is a litany of defiance, unscrupulous behavior and every sort of attempt at noncompliance. And by no means have I listed everything, only a sampling.

The Iraqi regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its demands on inspectors, sometimes at the point of a gun, and its general and consistent defiance of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. There is absolutely no reason to expect that Iraq has changed, that this latest effort of theirs to welcome inspectors without conditions is not just another ploy.

Let's be absolutely clear about the reason for their announcement on Monday and what their foreign minister said today.

They did not suddenly see the error of their ways, they did not suddenly want to clear up the problems of the past 12 years, they were responding to the heat and the pressure generated by the international community after President Bush's speech. The United States has made it clear to our Security Council colleagues that we will not fall for this play. This is the time not to welcome what they said and become giddy, as some have done. This is the time to apply even more pressure. We must not relent. We must not believe that inspectors going in under the same conditions that caused their withdrawal four years ago is in any way acceptable or will bring us to a solution to this problem. These four years have been more than enough for Iraq to procure, develop and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspections that were subject to Saddam's cheat-and- retreat approach from 1991-1998. If inspectors do go back in because the U.N. feels it is appropriate for them to do so, they must go back in under a new regime, with new rules, and without any conditions and without any opportunity for Iraq to frustrate their efforts.

It is up now to the United Nations Security Council to decide what action is required of Iraq to deal with this material breach of the United Nations mandate. If part of that solution that the Security Council comes to involves an inspection regime, it must be a regime that goes in with the authority of a new resolution that removes the weaknesses of the present regime and which will not tolerate any Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a resolution that will be negotiated with Iraq. The resolution must be strong enough and comprehensive enough that it produces disarmament and not just inspections.

Many United Nation members, including some on the Security Council, want to take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in without any new resolution or new authority. It's a recipe for failure, and we will not support that. The debate we have begun to have within the Council is on the need for and the wording of a resolution. Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq in material breach.

Then we must specify the actions we demand of Iraq, which President Bush has already laid out in his speech last week. And then here is the key element, here is what will make it different from what we did in the past, and this must be an essential element of any road going forward, any plan to go forward form the Security Council: We must determine what consequences this time will flow from Iraq's failure to take action.

That is what makes this different. This time, unlike any time over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be hard consequences. This time, Iraq must comply with the U.N. mandate, or there will be decisive action to compel compliance.

We will listen to other points of view and will try to reach agreement within the council. It will be a difficult debate. We will also preserve at all times the president of the United States's authority and ability to defend our nation and our interests as he sees fit; do it with our friends, do it with the United Nations, or do it alone. But the president has made it clear that this is a problem that must be solved and will be solved.

Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach, that U.S. interests should be our total concern. But Mr. Chairman, both of these issues, both multilateral and unilateral, are important. We are a member of the United Nations Security Council. We are a member of the United Nations. It is a multilateral institution whose resolutions have been violated. But the United States as a separate matter believes that its interests are threatened, even if the United Nations does not continue to come that conclusion.

We are trying to solve this problem through the United Nations and in a multilateral way. The president took the case to the U.N. because it is the body that should deal with such matters as Iraq. It was created to deal with such matters. And President Bush is hoping that the U.N. will act in a decisive way. But at the same time, as he has made clear and my other colleagues in the administration have made clear and I make clear today, if the United Nations is not able to act and act decisively -- and I think that would be a terrible indictment of the U.N. -- then the United States will have to make its own decision as to whether the danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to defend our country and to defend our interests.

Now Mr. Chairman, our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped by a strong, strong congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to take action. The president should be authorized to use all means he determines appropriate, including military force, to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions Iraq is defying, and to defend the United States and its interests against the threat Iraq poses, and to restore international peace and security to the region.

I know that the administration has provided language to the Congress. I ask that the Congress consider it carefully and quickly, and I ask for immediate action on such a resolution to show the world that the United States is united in this effort to help the United Nations understand the seriousness of this issue. It would be important for all of us to speak as a nation, as a country, and to give this powerful signal to our diplomatic efforts in the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community and my colleague Secretary Rumsfeld are giving the Congress additional information with respect to military ideas and options, with respect to the intelligence supporting the conclusions we have come to, so I will not take any time to do that here today. But I'm prepared to answer any questions in these areas that you think I might be competent, qualified to answer.

But let me say this about the Iraq threat before I stop and allow the greater part of our time available for your important questions to be answered: We can have debates, discussions, disagreements about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. And we can discuss whether they are or are not violating the range constraints on the missiles that they have. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions. That is not debatable; it's a fact -- a stated fact. And no one can doubt Iraq's intention to continue to try to get these weapons of mass destruction unless they are stopped. And that is also not debatable. And I hope that will help to shape our debate and our discussions and the important decisions that we may have to make as a nation. These two realities -- their intention and the continued violation -- are indisputable.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will stop and look forward to the questions from the committee. And once again, I ask that my full statement be put in the record.

REP. HYDE: Without objection, so ordered.

And I just want to say to the secretary, we, as a committee, will move swiftly to consider a resolution. We will mark it up in our committee so we can have our wishes expressed in the resolution.

We are working with the White House with the text of the draft that they have submitted. We understand the urgency, and we will act accordingly.

I'm now pleased to recognize my Democratic counterpart, who has made bipartisan a real, genuine word. Thank you.

Mr. Lantos?

REP. LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me echo your words. This committee will take up the resolution at the earliest possible time. And let me just remind all of us that it was just about a year ago, Mr. Secretary, that my good friend Henry Hyde and I spent nine hours in our respective managers' chairs taking up the resolution with respect to our determination to fight global terrorism. That resolution passed almost unanimously. I am confident that this resolution will pass overwhelmingly because the American people and the Congress will speak with one voice on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to relinquish my questioning time to other members of the committee because we usually never get to the more junior members.

So I will -- much as I would like to ask many questions, let me just conclude by saying your statement was extraordinarily powerful. There isn't a single sentence in it with which I would disagree. I want to commend you, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

REP. HYDE: Speaking of junior members, Mr. Gilman. (Laughter.)

REP. BENJAMIN GILMAN (R-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman --

REP. LANTOS: Had I known that, Mr. Chairman, I would have -- no --

REP. GILMAN: That's the nicest comment I've heard all day, Mr. Chairman!

Mr. Secretary, welcome. It's always good seeing you before our committee, and you've been doing an outstanding job and we all laud you for that. And I want to thank our chairman for his leadership in these important hearings. We had this morning a very important distinguished panel before us regarding the issues and the dynamics that the administration must take into account when pursuing policy toward Iraq. And as 9/11 taught us, Saddam's means of deploying weapons of mass destruction are by no means limited to conventional means. He has continued sponsorship of terrorist groups of global reach, providing him additional mechanisms with which to deliver them.

And as long as Saddam's regime continues policies aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons and increasing his storehouse of chemical, biological and possibly radiological weapons, the Iraqi regime will continue to pose a serious threat not only to our nation, but to our allies in the global community. If the only sure way to render Saddam's regime incapable of presenting a threat to our nation, Iraq's neighbors and our allies in the region and the people of Iraq itself is through swift and prompt removal of the regime itself -- and we hope you can convince the U.N. to move expeditiously. And my -- and that's why I support the president's proposed joint resolution authorizing the use of armed forces against Iraq without conditions. And I hope our committee will act appropriately.

Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, despite the fact that President -- Mr. Saddam Hussein has given us a letter of unconditional -- quote, "unconditional authority" to enter Iraq, we assume there'll be further conditions, as you've already pointed out. Let's assume the U.N. moves in their usual manner of delay and debate. When is the appropriate time that we move despite the U.N.'s activity?

SEC. POWELL: I can't answer that today, Mr. Gilman. I've been spending an enormous amount of time, as you would expect, talking to the different members of the Security Council. And as soon as I leave here, I'll be meeting with an important member, the foreign minister of Russia, who will be my guest this evening and will be here all day tomorrow with the minister of Defense of Russia. And I'll get a good sense of where we are by early next week as all of the Security Council members react to the president's speech, react to what was said Monday by the Iraqis, what was said today by the Iraqis, and start to get a sense of the possibility of getting a resolution or resolutions from the Security Council that would satisfy our purposes. But as the president has said and as I have said, we will only be patient for weeks as we go about this work, and not months. And I hope we will get a resolution that will have the indictment, actions that they need to take, and we will determine what actions they need to take.

And then I hope we'll be able to get consequences that will flow from lack of action. But if we don't get that, then the president will consult with the Congress, I'm sure, talk to the American people, and we will be standing by as a Cabinet to give him the advice he needs to make a decision as to what the United States might have to do by itself or with the help of friends.

One thing that happened last week as a result of the president's speech is a lot of our friends -- and I don't want to go into specific names of countries right now -- but a lot of our friends and a lot of nations that were sitting there undecided or needed to hear more about this saw the president's speech as an opportunity for the international community to act. And they have indicated to us that they would now watch what happens within the council, and if the council acts, fine. They would be able to work with us. But if the council didn't act, the -- we have made the try to get the council to act, and they may be willing to join with us in whatever we might feel it necessary to do.

REP. GILMAN: That's encouraging. One more question --

REP. HYDE: The -- no, the gentleman's time has expired.

REP. GILMAN: I don't see the red light, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: Well, all right. Yeah, 35 seconds.

REP. GILMAN: Just one more question. What is your view of the plan by the Carnegie Endowment supporting coercive inspections?

SEC. POWELL: It's a very interesting plan. I've read the report. We're looking at the report and studying it. There are some parts of the report that I -- we did not find acceptable, and that is in order for this to work, we would have to foreswear any action against Iraq, and that's not something we can do.

The problem I have with the report -- and I'll be spending more time on it -- is that it once again sets it up so that we need coercion to go perform these inspections. That's not what we're looking for. He is either serious -- Iraq is either serious, trying to make a change in their behavior -- and I don't know that they will or they won't; I'd bet against it, if I was a betting man -- and therefore you shouldn't need coercive methods.

What we're looking at is, if the U.N. decides to send inspection teams back in, under a new mandate -- any time, any place, anywhere, with no hindrances tolerated -- and Iraq tries to frustrate that, the teams come out. We don't play games at palaces. We don't stand around debating or arguing anything with them. They are not serious.

What we're trying to find from the Iraqi side is an -- serious expression of their desire to get out of the breach they're in. We didn't hear it today. We didn't hear it Monday. And so that's a reservation I have about coercive inspections, but we are looking at it.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: The chair announces that the order in which you will be called is the order in which you arrived for this meeting as recorded by the clerk of the committee. So if you are distressed that you're not being called timely, take it up with the clerk. (Laughter.)

Mr. Berman.

REP. HOWARD BERMAN (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for coming, Mr. Secretary. And I intend to support the resolution authorizing the -- all necessary means to achieve the goal of disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction even if, ultimately, that includes the need to change regimes. And my assumption is that the reason the administration has had a policy of regime change is its belief that, based on Iraq's past behavior, the only way to achieve the goal of the disarmament of the weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them is through regime change. There could be some tightening up of the resolution; we can go through that. There's time to deal with all of that. But I intend to vote for it.

But if it comes to that; if the efforts to determine whether or not Iraq will change its behavior and allow the kind of inspection and follow-up destruction of weapons and disarmament does not go as we could hope, and that the decision is made by the president to use force, there is great concern about -- there are many concerns, of course, but one concern is the post-Saddam strategy for the international community, generally, and for the United States, specifically. And for the U.S., specifically, the rhetoric in the last campaign and of some people now in leadership positions in this administration regarding earlier policies concerning nation-building make people worry that commitment -- the financial resources, the continued presence of coalition forces, the patience to create the multiethnic democratic institutions -- will not be there, and that we won't be in there for the long haul.

And the opportunity that was spoken of by Mr. Lantos so eloquently, of transforming that part of the world in a way that shows us to have become the liberators of the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein, and to demonstrate that this is not us against the Arab world, will have been missed. And particularly concerns about what Iran's role will be in the wake of this; will the forces for Shi'ite and Kurdish separatism take over? Will heirs to Saddam's tyrannical behavior in the regime take over? These are all concerns.

I'm wondering what assurances you might be able to give us about this administration's will to deal with the very complicated but critically important post-Saddam decisions that are being made, and the planning for that.

SEC. POWELL: Of course the president has not decided on a military option. But we do a lot of contingency planning within the administration. And every question you just touched on, every point you just made, has been under consideration, and we understand the implications of such a change of regime action and have made a commitment, to ourselves, anyway, as we start down this road that we would have obligations to see it through.

We would hope that if it came to that, there would be such a sea change in the region, rather than it being seen as an assault, it would be seen as a liberation, and it would be seen as the beginning of a new era in that part of the world, as Mr. Lantos has spoken of. And we are working our way through the issues that have been raised by such contingency. And it's another reason why we went to the international community last week, because if we ever get to that point, we want the international community in there; it will take the international community to help stabilize the situation and create the kind of region that we talked about earlier.

There are some advantages that exist in this particular situation in that Iraq is not a poor country; it's just squandered its wealth. It will have access to $20 billion a year of oil revenue, as it does now, except it won't be going to weapons of mass destruction or to suppressing the population. It has an educated population and it has a social structure that can be worked with. Yes, there are three different, significantly different ethnic groups with the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds. But there are also things that hold them together as a single nation, which we would also be committed to.

So the short answer to your question, Mr. Berman, is yes, all these issues are being considered, and we recognize that we would have an obligation to stay for a while.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Leach of Iowa.

REP. JAMES LEACH (R-IA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think all Americans realize there's enormous risk in action and enormous risk in inaction, and so we're all trying to put the pieces together in terms of judgment. And philosophically, I would just begin with a bit of advice; and that is, not to emphasize the preemption doctrine. Although there's an element of all of this, this is principally, to me, a doctrine of law enforcement. And the law enforcement relates not simply to U.N. resolutions and Security Council resolutions, but principally to violations of the Biological Weapons Convention and the NPT. And if the U.N. is going to be relevant, it's to uphold the law. And the law is very clear-cut.

The second point I would make is that I think all of us are very concerned, as the prior speaker mentioned, with the so-called end game, but I, at least, am personally even more concerned for the beginning game. The reason that there are violations of the Biological Weapons Convention is that they have biological agents, and so the question becomes, will they be used? And if they are used, will this not become one of the most extraordinary events in the history of man?

And in that regard, the obvious issue is how do we try to determine and do everything we can to see that they're not used? And one of the great messages that I think it's very important to emphasize in terms of words is that leaders can be mendacious, but people and countries are not evil, and that we ought to emphasize to the Iraqi people that we're on their side; however, if any individual in Iraq participates in usage or unleashing of a weapon of mass destruction, they will be held accountable as war criminals. And that is the only way they can be looked at.

And so my question to you, sir, is, what kinds of efforts have we been making to reach out to the Iraqi people to underscore this nature of modern war, the usage potential of a weapon of mass destruction in a defenseless circumstance, and particularly in the first hours or days of engagement. This trauma appears to me to be absolutely stunning in significance.

SEC. POWELL: We have considered this question carefully, and in any campaign that might be engaged in, there will be a strategic information component to it that makes just that point, that this is not conflict against the Iraqi people, but a despotic dictatorial tyrannical regime, and that it would be wise for any citizen of this country not to any longer support that dictator, and particularly for the armed forces of this country to recognize the consequences of resisting, or especially using these kinds of weapons in a criminal manner inconsistent with international law and the obligations of that country. These are messages that we will be getting out if we start down into such a campaign, and there will be time to convey such messages. And we are starting to convey them now. Not that we are beginning such a campaign, but just to make sure it's understood.

I understand the seriousness of this issue. I faced this question once before, in 1990. And there's another component to educating the population, and that is making sure they understand the deterrent capacity of the armed forces of the United States if such weapons were to be used. And I believe to some extent that might have deterred their use 12 years ago when Desert Storm was being fought. And at that time we were also making sure in every way we could that we went after those sites and locations where such materiels, such weapons might be located. And one of my great concerns at that time as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was how to do that, and to make sure that in attacking such places we were not sort of releasing that which we were trying to destroy. And I think at that time we were successful. But use of biological weapons would be one of the more terrible things that we have seen in history.

And it would be a terrible thing to have occur at this time. But to let the presence of such weapons or the use of such weapons at the beginning of such a campaign deter us from entering into such a campaign would also be a big mistake, because they would just continue to be developed and become an even bigger threat at some future time.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Ackerman of New York.

REP. GARY ACKERMAN (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Good to see you again.

As you might know, when the president spoke at the United Nations, Mr. Gilman and I were also on the floor, not because you needed any help but because we thought you might appreciate some support from your New York homeboys. And we brought Mr. Issa along with us, as well -- made him an honorary New Yorker. And I just want to say that your observation that the room was electric even on the part of those who don't always agree with us was absolutely the right observation. I think people have tremendous renewed respect for the U.S. and what we're trying to do and also for the reasons there are still some who don't understand it fully.

That being said, I have two basic questions. The first one is, what would be the administration's course of action if within the Security Council some of the permanent representatives -- France, Russia, China -- would insist on proceeding with inspections under the current, existing U.N. regime?

SEC. POWELL: We would oppose it. We would oppose it.

REP. ACKERMAN: Right. But they could veto any resolution.

SEC. POWELL: It's not clear that it would require another resolution. We would -- may -- we might have to find other ways to oppose it, because there are existing resolutions now that authorize it.

REP. ACKERMAN: Right. The ones you cite -- what you're saying here and in the president's resolution --

SEC. POWELL: Trust?

REP. ACKERMAN: -- in the proposed language that we've seen today is proposing, basically, nothing new that we've been talking about, except acknowledging that the existing U.N. resolutions are, indeed, surviving, the vote that was taken never having been rescinded, and the problem continues, as I understand what we're doing.

SEC. POWELL: There is standing authority for the inspection team, but there are weaknesses in that authority which make the current regime unacceptable. And we need a new resolution to clean that up and to put new conditions on the Iraqis so that there is no wiggling out.

And so if somebody tried to move the team in now, we would find ways to thwart that. And in fact, we have been in conversations with the secretary-general, I have spoken to both him, and we are in contact with Dr. Blix, the head of the UNMOVIC, the inspection team, and Dr. Blix and the secretary-general have made it clear that they recognize that there is a debate taking place in the Security Council, and they're waiting to see whether the Secretary Council chooses to give UNMOVIC different or new authority.

REP. ACKERMAN: The second question I have basically follows up on the concern that Mr. Berman raised, which was to the point of our commitment after invasion, after disarmament, after Saddam, what, and our commitment to that. The question is basically what would the military -- what effect the military action in Iraq would have on our overall war on terrorism.

The primary focus of the war on terrorism right now is in Afghanistan -- primarily. Nonetheless, terrorism is on the increase there, and the president there narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. And the indications are that al Qaeda is preparing for new attacks. In addition to the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance that we've given, the stuff that we've not given seems to render that whole situation as inadequate. And your own State Department recent report on meeting the immediate security needs in Afghanistan seems to be backtracking from the commitments that we've made for expanding international security force over there.

How can we rebuild a safe and secure Afghanistan, as we've committed, and for which we've had so much support from the international community, and that commitment was pretty hard -- hard to get and hard to make, in some cases, we asked a lot of those countries that came along with us or agreed with us. I mean, it's not just for them a roll in the hay, and yet they still ask the question, you know, "Will you love us in the morning?"

And our actions seem to fly in the face of that, and it looks like we're moving away.

Can we sustain these two actions of pacifying both Afghanistan and Iraq? Can we do this on two fronts at the same time? There are people questioning the commitment to resources to both of these, because on the first one our commitment seems to be a lot softer than it was going in. And I think that would be highly problematic if we didn't follow through on that and do everything that we can. You know, we were able to do it after World War II. If we're going to make the commitment -- I mean, this is a big commitment.

SEC. POWELL: In terms of a military commitment, I will yield to Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, and I believe they've analyzed this and believe, as a military matter, it is within the capability that exists within the armed forces of the United States.

With respect to your point that we are backing off or we're not being as aggressive as we were in the beginning, I have to take issue with that. We have put $450 million, way over our initial commitment, into Afghanistan. We've accomplished a great deal. A national army is slowly being built. A government is being made to function. It is still a fragile situation, but a lot has been accomplished in just a period of nine months, with a start from absolutely nothing.

President Bush made another commitment last week, of $180 million -- 80 (million) from us and 50 (million) from the Japanese and the Saudi Arabians -- for highway reconstruction. A million people have come back into the country from refugee camps.

There is still the security problem. It is still fragile. That's why we are keeping Operation Enduring Freedom going, to chase down al Qaeda and Taliban remnants. But have we cleaned them all out? No. Are there pockets of insecurity in the country? Yes.

My most pressing concern -- and I think Don Rumsfeld would say the same thing, as would General Franks and General Myers -- is for the southeast part of the country, along the Pakistan border. And we are working on this. We are -- first priority right now is to see who will take over the current ISAF mission when the Turkish finish their tour at the end of the year.

The question of expanding ISAF is constantly under discussion. We have not made a commitment to expand it yet. We have been talking about it, and my colleagues in the Pentagon and my associates in the State Department will be discussing it further early next week: who would perform that mission? But let's not see ISAF as a solution for all the problems. ISAF is essentially a force that goes into an area, sits, provides a useful presence. But it is not the answer. And in the report that you made reference to, my associate who wrote that report, Ambassador Johnson (sp), was making the point that you can't -- there won't be enough troops to flood every corner of Afghanistan with an ISAF. And if you take Kabul, we have 5,000 ISAF troops there. We had the most competent protective people one can imagine guarding President Karzai, and someone still was able to get close enough to take a shot of him. And we were lucky that he wasn't killed.

So it remains a fragile situation. There are people who are trying to destroy this emerging democracy. And America is committed, working with our allies, to stay the course in Afghanistan.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome to the committee. And again, as usual, your testimony was outstanding. I'd just remind everyone that just a few years ago someone got close enough to President Reagan to almost take his life. So it is very hard to protect a head of state.

Just a couple -- one real basic question, and I think all of us who watched the president at the United Nations were very proud and felt that he in a masterful way laid out the case -- clear, compelling, not ambiguous. And I think many people walked away from that. It probably has led to an enormous sea change of attitudes within the U.N. itself. And I think, as I -- throughout history the credible threat of force by any country -- in our case, the United States -- has brought us to the point in this case where the international community understands -- perhaps they wanted to put this aside and not face it -- that Iraq poses serious threats to the region, to the United States, and that Saddam Hussein is showing no abatement whatsoever in his efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction.

Saying that, I do believe, as I know every member of this Congress believes, war should be an option, a last resort after all of the diplomatic and other means are exploited. We now have a joint resolution before us. And I wonder if you might comment on what might happen if it were to receive a lukewarm response, or perhaps might even -- might not even pass, to the diplomatic efforts at this crucial stage in this effort.

SEC. POWELL: I think it would be very unfortunate if it got a lukewarm response or for the next several weeks members eviscerated it and watered it down so that we were not playing a certain trumpet in the United States. It would undercut my efforts.

After the president gave his speech last Thursday, Mr. Smith, the phone lines to Baghdad lit up. Lots of people were calling and saying, "They are serious. It's show time." We put enormous pressure on this situation, on the entire international community and on Saddam Hussein. I knew at some point they would make a move. I knew they would invite the inspectors back in at some point. I didn't think it would happen three days later. That was a little bit of a surprise, although I knew it was going to happen the day before it happened. It was a little bit of a surprise, but it reflected pressure. And for us not to continue that pressure by the threat of force, by the consequences for failure to act on the part of the Iraqi regime, I think, would be very unfortunate. And a lukewarm, weak, eviscerated resolution coming out of the Congress would not serve my diplomatic purposes.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Faleomavaega.

DEL. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA (D-AS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. I always say that your eloquence is second to none, and the substance of your remarks certainly is very welcome by the members of this committee.

Mr. Secretary, I'm certain you are well aware that this is perhaps -- this issue is perhaps more serious, more profound than anything that we could ever discuss in our constitutional frame of government, and call it war, when our nation and its national leaders must decide whether there is a justifiable reason to send her sons and daughters in harm's way, to sacrifice, ultimately, their lives to defend our nation from its enemies.

You, Mr. Secretary, can appreciate more the filth and the stench there is in war, from your own experience in Vietnam. War does not discriminate between Republicans and Democrats. America's finest men and women, in the prime of their lives, could go to be coming back in body bags, with families and loved ones to experience sorrow and sadness.

I resent anyone here in this body to insinuate or imply that those of us on this side of the aisle, as Democrats, are a bunch of nilly-willys and are afraid to fight a war.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Mr. Secretary, if and when we do fight this war, will our president's use of military force be so certain that this war we will fight will be nothing less but to win?

SEC. POWELL: Yes.

REP. FALEOMAVAEGA: I sure appreciate that answer.

I like to call you "the reluctant warrior," if I may.

SEC. POWELL: I don't shrink from the title.

REP. FALEOMAVAEGA: Mr. Secretary, some 58,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen never returned from Vietnam. You and I both experienced that sad situation in Vietnam, including some 300,000 of our U.S. military personnel wounded and maimed for the rest of their lives and some 2 million Vietnamese who lost their lives in that awful war. Will there be from the administration a promise that will never hear another secretary of Defense, years later, confessing that we were wrong to be in Iraq, just like former secretary of Defense McNamara, making this confession that we were wrong to be in Vietnam?

SEC. POWELL: Congressman, we have had the most intense discussions about this issue within the Cabinet. And nobody wants war as a first resort. The president went to the U.N. last week on mission of purpose, not to issue a declaration of war.

But sometimes war comes. I've been known as a reluctant warrior; it doesn't bother me in the least. I fought for two years in Vietnam; I commanded units on the DMZ and on the Iron Curtain. I've sent men into battle, sent women into battle in the certain knowledge that some of them would die the night that I sent them in. And so war should always be a last resort. But the threat of war has to be there, and when a decision is made to fight a war, it's also well-known that I believe strongly in doing it decisively and doing it in a way that achieves a political purpose so that no life is wasted in the prosecution of that war.

REP. FALEOMAVAEGA: Mr. Secretary, when we do win the war -- perhaps it might be too presumptuous on my part -- but there seems to be a real serious concern about the destabilization of countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, let alone the millions of refugees that are going to be created and the havoc of war coming out of Iraq.

Am I too presumptuous to think that this may not happen in the aftermath of a war effort against Saddam Hussein and his regime? And are we prepared to answer and to meet those -- the results that may be produced as a result of the war?

SEC. POWELL: We obviously are thinking through all of these issues, Congressman, and making sure that we have made appropriate plans.

In my own mind, these sort of destabilizing activities might occur before, in the buildup to the conflict rather than after. There is no regime in that part of the world, there is no government that I deal with -- and I deal with them all, I can safely say -- there is no nation over there that would not like to see a different leader in Baghdad. They differ as to how to bring it about; they differ as to how serious a threat it is to them. But there is no one who would feel terribly saddened if Saddam Hussein was not in Baghdad. And once he is not in Baghdad, I think we have an entirely new strategic situation upon which we can build.

But will there be a lot of concerns and some instability in the region and some troubles we'll have to deal with in the period before decisive action? The answer to that is yes.

DEL. FALEOMAVAEGA: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: I thank the gentleman from American Samoa.

And the gentleman from California, Mr. Royce.

REP. EDWARD ROYCE (R-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Secretary. Earlier today, Tom Lantos made a point which Michael Ledeen also makes in his book, "War Against the Terror Masters." And Tom Lantos's point was Iraq would have developed a nuclear weapons program, they would have a bomb by now had it not been for the pinpoint bombing of the reactor in 1981, which one could argue was an exercise in the right of preventive self-defense, especially in light of the chemical attacks on Iranians and on Kurds. And it would seem that had Iraq developed, had they had that weapon during the time of the Gulf War, your work would have been much more challenging.

And I think one of the reasons we're focused here today on Iraq is because of the recognition from defectors that have told us that they are developing.

So if they do not see reason and if they do not let the inspectors back in, then we're confronted with the question of how to develop Iraqi democratic opposition. And I wanted to bring up some of the points that are argued; that just as with the Taliban in Afghanistan, we were able to find elements that were ready to rally against the Taliban, so it is with the Iraqi people. We have seen how their resistance could be used as an effective weapon. The Iraqi National Congress -- they've carried out numerous attacks against the regime. Those couldn't have been carried out without quite a bit of popular support.

And if we were to take the no-fly zone in the North and change that into a "no trespassing" zone, and let the Iraqi National Congress install itself, ensconce itself there, and recognize that as a legitimate government in the country and make it a haven for Saddam's enemies and make it a staging ground for a democratic revolution; and if we were to create a similar zone in the South using our airpower, given the historical resistance we've seen in the South, we might see the ability to put together a sustainable opposition.

Now if it comes to having to make that decision, then we should be doing what we can now to build the Iraqi National Congress. And I wanted to ask you about that, because, to me, long-term, just as in Afghanistan, there has to be this support for the people who have resisted Saddam over the years, and we have to build strong institutions that will rally the people when the time comes.

SEC. POWELL: As you know, in -- Mr. Royce, in recent weeks we have been intensifying the level of discussion and having meetings with members of the opposition, the INC and others. And we understand that as we think about such a campaign, that becomes reality, we will need to create something new consisting of both those from outside as well as those from inside, in order to put something that will have stability.

And so we are intensifying the level of work that we are conducting with the opposition. And we had conferences in the State Department recently, and my colleagues in the Defense Department are also doing quite a bit of work on this. Your idea of how one might conduct such a campaign using the northern and southern no-fly zones are ideas that have occurred to others in the planning process. And all of this is being taken into consideration.

I'd like to stop there.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

REP. DONALD PAYNE (D-NJ): Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary -- appreciated your very thorough comments. And as we all know, this is a time when very grave decisions will have to be made. In this morning's testimony -- and I'd like to hear your comments regarding -- it was -- one of the panelists seem to feel that if the U.N. inspectors went in and found nothing, that -- he concluded that therefore, Saddam Hussein did a good job at hiding them and that we should simply go in, anyway. And I wonder if that is the opinion of the administration.

And secondly, there was a (sic) estimate by another panelist that the military strength of Iraq is much weaker than it was in '91 and that it would almost be a -- said -- not quite a cakewalk but it would be something that could be handled very easily. And I would like to know what your opinion on that is -- especially in light of regime change. I guess if regime change would conclude that you will eliminate the leadership of Iraq, and I certainly support someone other than Saddam Hussein leading Iraq, that's for sure. I don't think any of us quarrel with that.

However, what do you think, in your estimation, would be the reaction of the Iraqis if regime change means, I guess, elimination? Would that be somewhat different than an invasion of Kuwait, when they were repelled by our forces -- very well -- than a sort of a battle to the end, because regime change, I guess, means the end of those people that are currently in control?

SEC. POWELL: On the first question, if it is possible to get an inspection regime of the kind we have in mind -- and we have some fairly stringent demands that we would put before the Security Council -- and they went in and did a thorough job and they were not hindered in any way, the Iraqis were cooperating with them, that would raise our level of understanding and confidence that they have eliminated most of what could be found, visible. We will never be able to find everything if the Iraqis were still intent on hiding something. Any refrigerator truck could be a biological factory. Tunnels. Other places of hiding. Things can be hidden in plain view that are capable of producing chemical weapons or biological weapons. Nuclear weapons are a little more difficult. But that could sequestered away. The real thing is, are they serious? And so the inspection regime would also be not just an examination of what they have and getting what they have and destroying it, but it would also be a test of their seriousness. And I think what we have to do is, as the inspectors are reporting and telling us what they found and what they're doing, we'd have to make a judgment as to whether we should have confidence in that, or whether we should reserve the right to -- and the ability to conduct regime change.

He is weaker than '91, significantly weaker in terms of his conventional capability. I will yield to my colleagues in the intelligence and defense community. But I would guess he was somewhere between 35-40 percent conventionally of his original 1991 strength. But I would rather they give the answer. I don't dabble in their business anymore.

And so I, as a former general, and I know what current generals tend to think and how they do their planning, you never plan a campaign, think it's going to be a cakewalk. If you got the force, use it, and put what you think is needed for the task that is ahead of you. And I will let the Pentagon determine what that answer is.

With respect to regime change, we would make it clear from the very beginning of this, to the Iraqi people -- in answer also to an earlier question -- that we're viewing this as a liberation; that this despotic regime, which has sat on your dreams and your aspirations and your desires, which has subjugated its minorities, which has suppressed the Shia in the south, persecuted the Kurds in the north, gassed its own people, is now gone.

There will be some who are so wrapped up in that dictatorial regime, in that tyrannical system, who have benefitted from that tyranny, who will not be happy that he's gone. But I suspect that most people, once they realize that a better day is coming; the United States is not coming to impose, not coming to replace a dictatorial regime with anything but something that is representative of the people of Iraq, can be brought over rather quickly to a new form of government which they will be participants in creating, as opposed to having it imposed upon them. It will be a government of Iraqis governing Iraqis in a democratic fashion. It seems to me it would not be a hard case to make there is a better use of your oil wealth, and you're going to be better off being part of the international community than -- rather than being the pariah of the international community. And so I think attitudes can be changed quickly.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from New York, Mr. King.

REP. PETER KING (R-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Powell, I want to join with my colleagues in commending you for the testimony you provided here today, for the outstanding job you're doing as secretary of State, and particularly over the past several weeks in marshaling international opinion behind the United States, and also by your testimony today, and just by your public appearances in galvanizing the American public behind the effort. I will fully support the resolution when it comes to a vote, I'll be proud to support it.

And I again just want to say that you and the president, I believe, are really laying the groundwork in the way that it has to be done because if there's any vote that a member of Congress should take seriously, it's putting a young American's life at risk. I don't think any of us take that in any way but the most serious manner.

I would like to ask my question sort of as a follow-up to what Mr. Faleomavaego said regarding the impact that this -- if it does become a military exchange and the United States does win, as we certainly expect to, the long-term impact it will have on the moderate Arab states in the region; and also if you can tell us what our contingencies are if Israel should be attacked by Iraq once an engagement begins.

Thank you, sir.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown.

SEC. POWELL: Do I get to answer the gentleman from New York?

REP. HYDE: I'm sorry; what?

SEC. POWELL: (Laughs.)

REP. KING: Mr. Secretary, they're always coming between New Yorkers.

SEC. POWELL: The chairman runs a nice, speedy hearing. (Laughs.) (Laughter.) Everybody gets their questions in; they just don't get any answers. (Laughter.)

REP. HYDE: (Laughs.)

REP. KING: I hope it's not a commentary on the quality of my question. (Laughter.)

REP. HYDE: I'm sorry, Mr. Secretary. I was distracted by administrative details up here. Please proceed.

SEC. POWELL: There will be difficulties in the region during any such campaign of the kind that we're talking about here today. But I think that in the aftermath, if it's done well, if it's done right, and if people view it as a liberation and not an invasion, I think that can be managed. It's really going to be in the transition period, (the/to ?) buildup.

With respect to Israel, this also is something we are thinking about. And you can be sure we'll be in the closest consultation with our Israeli friends and colleagues. Both Vice President Cheney and I have experience in dealing with this question and this problem, and I think we would know how to deal with it again.

(Pause.)

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from Ohio --

SEC. POWELL: I wasn't objecting, Mr. Chairman, I just -- (laughs).

REP. HYDE: I think I know a pause when I see one. (Laughter.)

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown.

REP. SHERROD BROWN (D-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us today.

I'm very concerned about the direction that the administration's taking our nation, the "go it alone" attitude, from Kyoto, to ABM, to International Criminal Court, perhaps a unilateral mission in Iraq. That troubles me. I believe, as you do, that Saddam Hussein poses a threat to peace unless he readmits U.N. inspectors unconditionally to root out weapons of mass destruction. I supported, as did my colleagues, House Joint Resolution 75, which warned Saddam Hussein that he must comply with the U.N., but I firmly believe we must exhaust every option to achieve our goals by diplomatic means before we even consider military action.

Scott Ritter, the former senior U.N. weapons inspector, stated that Iraq currently has no weapons of mass destruction, is not a threat to the outside world, because it lacks the fissile material to develop highly enriched uranium.

I have two questions. First, what efforts are we making to ensure Iraq does not acquire nuclear material -- we and others in the world community? And second, were Saddam to submit to inspections and be fully disarmed of his weapons of mass destruction, would the administration, without the support of a significant number of our allies, initiate military action to effect regime change based on Saddam's noncompliance with other conditions?

SEC. POWELL: First, with respect to the point about unilateralism, I spend a great deal of my time in the multilateral world, and as you can cite a couple, like the ICC and Kyoto, where we were not in with the international consensus, I can go to a lot of issues where we are in with the international consensus. And the very fact that the president went to the United Nations last Thursday and presented the case, I think, shows the respect we have for the opinion of others, the respect we have for the United Nations. And we took the problem to the United Nations. It is Iraq who is acting in a unilateral way in this regard. But I don't want to belabor that.

Scott Ritter -- if he's right and if Saddam Hussein is telling the truth, then the answer's quite simple. Invite everybody in -- inspectors, politicians, congressional delegations. Give us all the documents that they've been hiding for all these years. Don't frustrate anyone. Let everybody come in and look and examine it. If that's the case, fine.

But the intelligence is clear, the evidence is clear, that they have not stopped trying to find the materials necessary to develop weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence is clear. It's obvious. And notwithstanding Scott Ritter's claims that there is nothing there, we can show you intelligence, in classified settings or even in unclassified settings, that show that his intention has not changed and he's continuing to pursue this kind of technology. We're working hard to keep from acquiring it. When we find out about things that might be heading in his direction, we take action to stop it by talking to the countries from which those materials are coming.

With respect to fissile material, we are hard at work with those nations that are potential sources of fissile material to bring that material under control, to dispose of it.

You may have noticed recently with one country we were able to get a great deal of material back under control and sent back to its origin, where it will be stored safely. So we're hard at work on that. With respect to what the United Nations or the president might decide to do if there was an effective inspection, I don't think I can comment on that right now until we actually see that happen.

The reason we came to the position that regime change was appropriate -- and it's a position that has been the American government position since 1998, as a result of legislation passed by Congress and as a result of a decision made by President Clinton -- was because for years, and especially in '97 and '98, we saw Saddam Hussein was simply stiffing the United Nations, stiffing the international community. And the judgment was made, a correct judgment which this administration also came the same conclusion after we came in, that regime change seemed to be the only thing that would solve this problem. And even after you satisfy all the concerns about weapons of mass destruction, if you were able to do so, as the president noted last week and as I touched on but did not linger over in my statement, there are other conditions within the U.N. resolutions that have to be dealt with as well: with respect to human rights, with respect to accounting for missing persons, to include an American pilot, and with respect to return of property, and with respect to proper use of the Oil For Food program. And all of that I think is something that the Iraqi regime must be held to account for as well. But I cannot say to you now what the situation might look like sometime in the future when the inspectors are going in and what judgment the Security Council or the president might have to make at that time as to whether or not a different course of action is required.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from New York, Mr. Houghton.

REP. AMO HOUGHTON (R-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you, Mr. Secretary. Let me just ask you a couple of questions.

It seems to me that what you are saying -- I may be wrong here -- that the United States is going to do what it wants anyway. In other words, inspection is something we want, but inspection isn't the goal because it's disarmament, and it's regime change. And those are two latter things that I wonder whether the United Nations is going to grapple with.

Then the other question -- and I wasn't in here for part of the other discussion. And if the question is duplicative, please forget it. I wonder about our allies. We're not really a sort of unilateral type of country.

We've never done that in the past. We've always tried to bring other people around so that there's not a divisive but is a sort of a coagulating of forces.

And then the last question is one of cost. And I don't know; maybe that was brought up before, and if it was, forget that. But if I remember it correctly, Japan picked up a great deal of the cost of Desert Storm. And we've got an economy which is sort of shaky. And so when you take a look at the cost of the war and of nation- rebuilding and other ancillary things, you just don't want to have a situation which ruins the economy, which is the basis of it all. Maybe you'd like to comment.

SEC. POWELL: On the last question, I cannot give you an estimate of cost. And nobody really can give you a good estimate, because it's not clear what might be required yet. But yes, there will be a cost associated with it. But since I cannot estimate what that cost is, I cannot give you what the impact is on the economy. You're quite right; Desert Storm -- we were able to mobilize the international community for the most part. The cost was quite manageable.

With respect to allies, we always prefer to work with allies. We've been part of great alliances -- NATO, many other alliances. We have gone into combat a number of times with friends by our side. Afghanistan is an example. Kosovo's an example. Kuwait is an example. Sometimes you have to act unilaterally and sometimes without benefit of international consultation or support and very often in a preemptive way. And we've talked about all these issues here today.

Let me wrap it up with a single example which people sometimes forget: The 20th of December, 1989, a few months after I became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we went into Panama, and we didn't ask the OAS; we didn't ask the United Nations. We brought 13,000 troops out of our barracks in Panama, and I dropped another 14,000 troops by air and by air landing -- all in a 24-period. And we took out a regime -- a regime that was killing American citizens. And four days after they killed an American citizen, we took it out. And a day later, we put in a new president -- a president who had been elected by the Panamanian people and was not being permitted to accept the office.

And so preemption, no consultation, no support of anyone. Why? Because American interests were at risk, American citizens were at risk. And President Bush at that time, George Herbert Walker Bush, felt it was necessary to act, with a recommendation from this chairman and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney at that time, act to protect American citizens. We completed the mission, turned the country back over to the Panamanian people. We not only took our forces out, but completed the elimination of American military presence in Panama under the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty.

So sometimes it is necessary to act in that fashion because you have to protect your interests, you have to protect your citizens, and you either have no choice or you have no time to do it in a multilateral fashion.

But as the president demonstrated last week, he wanted to take this problem to the international community. That's exactly what he did. The international community did respond. And to come to the first part of your question -- what we would expect the international community to do -- is to support the indictment that the president laid out. I don't think there's any disagreement about the violations of the Iraqi regime. Secondly, determine what action Iraq has to take to deal with that breach. And the president laid out what Iraq should do in his speech. But it won't work unless there is the third element, and that element -- consequences; what is the international community, or the United States and so inclined nations, prepared to do in order to keep the pressure on Iraq, and not just pressure, the reality of something happening if they do not change their ways, if they do not respond to these demands.

REP. HYDE: The gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. McKinney.

REP. CYNTHIA MCKINNEY (D-GA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want you to know that my respect for you is unbounded. I would also like to say thank you for the recognition and acknowledgement that you gave to the people of African descent in Latin America in general, and in particular, the Afro- Colombians.

I note with some sadness today the coup attempt that -- and the accompanying violence that took place in Cote d'Ivoire.

Sadly, I fear that this is the -- has more to do with the unexploited oil reserves that makes Cote d'Ivoire a candidate for political intrigue, destabilization, and what I would call the underbelly of globalization and our unquenchable thirst for oil.

I note that several news articles inform us that the Bush administration had a plan for regime change in Iraq drawn up long ago by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, General Myers and General Franks. Further, we are informed that U.S. troops would be used to guard oil fields around the Shi'a port of Basra. We're also told in other news articles that former CIA Director Woolsey is already divvying up Iraq's huge oil reserves for U.S. corporations and stands ready to punish the oil companies of those countries who don't support our plan for regime change. Also, we are told about the as-yet unannounced Office of Global Communications, that it will be given $200 million to convince the American people of the need to oust Saddam Hussein.

I've read the White House discussion draft of the joint resolution, and it authorizes the president to use force in order to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions. Given the number of important U.N. Security Council resolutions that are ignored and unenforced, how can we put our young men and women in harm's way when this president refuses to even pay them? This president signed an executive order waiving the high deployment overtime pay of our young men and women, those same young men and women who will be asked to put their lives on the line, and perhaps even die.

Secondly, we didn't use U.S. troops and we didn't even threaten to use force when a million Rwandans were killed in 100 days. We didn't use force.

When the people of Afghanistan were left to the horrors of the Taliban, we didn't use force. When 12-year-old little girls were raped and the hands of little boys were chopped off in Sierra Leone, we didn't use force. From August 2nd, 1998, when Uganda and Rwanda invaded Democratic Republic of Congo, 3 million people have been killed, and we didn't use force.

For how many years has there been war in Sudan? Millions of people have been killed, and we didn't use force.

In the mid-1970s, when East Timor was invaded by Indonesia and one-third of the East Timorese population was murdered, we didn't use force, we gave the green light.

Mr. Secretary, I know that your job is a difficult one, and you have carried yourself -- (pause) -- with such high stature and conviction. We are being asked to give sanction to a war. Could you just comment on what I've said?

SEC. POWELL: You said a great deal, Congresswoman McKinney, and if time permitted, I would like to go down most of these items. Time does not permit.

I won't talk about any contingency plans, and I'm not sure what the reference to Jim Woolsey is.

With respect to Cote D'Ivoire, we are concerned about the disturbances that have been taking place over the last two days, and hopefully things are settling down.

You wrapped in the issue of oil there.

REP. MCKINNEY: Yes.

SEC. POWELL: We are an oil-consuming nation, and we deal with nations that are able to give us oil. But I'm troubled by some of the recent reports in the press that suggest that's all we're interested in Africa -- in oil. One today in the Washington Post is especially troubling to me.

I have spent most of my time in Africa talking about economic development, talking about HIV/AIDS, talking about poverty, talking about AGOA and talking about, as I did last -- the week before last in Gabon, setting aside 10 percent -- with the president, President Bongo, setting aside 10 percent of the country for national forests and to protect their environment. And to have the whole thing sort of focus on oil is a bit troubling.

But we are an oil-consuming nation.

As soon as everybody in this room sells their SUVs or cars, we won't be an oil-consuming nation. But as long as we are, then we should work in a way with countries that have that natural resource so that they can use that natural resource, not just to fuel our appetite but to generate wealth that will help their people come up out of poverty if that wealth is used properly.

With respect to U.N. resolutions, I believe they all should be obeyed. and we try to have them all implemented. But not all of them are violated so fragrant -- flagrantly and consistently as Iraq has violated the resolutions placed upon it. And it is not just a violation that will cause a disturbance; it is a violation that is allowing them to pursue the most dastardly weapons imaginable -- nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons -- which they have showed every inclination in the past to use if they have. And so those resolutions that are being violated, I think, do require the kind of action that we have asked the Security Council to contemplate and the kind of action that the president is asking the Congress to support, should it become necessary.

Overtime pay for young personnel -- I'm not sure if you were referring to uniformed personnel or not. I'm not familiar with that issue.

But with respect to the -- some of the other issues, you've touched on, we've been actively engaged in the Sudan. And I met with the Sudanese foreign minister, and we do have some progress toward peace in that troubled part of the world. We're increasing our diplomatic presence. We sent one of your former colleagues from the Congress, Senator Danforth, in, and he did a terrific job. And we're working hard.

We're working hard in East Timor to support that new Democracy. Uganda, Rwanda -- we have had success. President Bush met with President Kabila and Kagame and with President Mbeki last week to give push to solving the problems in the DRC. I can't say what happened our account for decisions that were made before our watch in the mid- 90s, but we're working each one of these accounts, because we strongly believe that we've got to get these regional conflicts solved in Africa and other parts of the world so we can focus on what President Bush said is his real agenda: economic development; trade, not aid; helping nations.

We have come to this body and asked for a $5 billion increase in our aid accounts beginning three years from now and building up to that. Why? So that we can invest in these nations that are coming out of regional conflicts or getting themselves on a path to democracy -- a 50-percent increase in amounts available for aid. No administration has done that in the last 30 years. So I think we've got a good record to tell on most of these issues that you have raised.

But in the case of Iraq, we have a real and present danger of a regime that is trying to develop the worst weapons imaginable and has shown the proclivity, the intention and the likelihood of using such weapons or, even more troubling, these weapons being slipped out to terrorists, who absolutely are undeterrable and will use them against us.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Nick Smith.

REP. NICK SMITH (R-MI): Mr. Secretary, I would assume that even though -- if a U.N. resolution by the Security Council is passed, if it's a tough resolution, it's still not going to call for regime change. And so that leaves, it seems to me, a real conflict. And maybe my question -- part of the question would be, if we use military force going into Iraq, what would you consider the top priority; finding all of the weapons of mass destruction and destroying them and the potential -- or the immediate potential to produce more, or regime change?

SEC. POWELL: The principal objective would be disarmament, and regime change has always been linked to disarmament. But regime change would also link to those other elements, such as human rights violation, terrorism, misuse of the oil-for-food program, not accounting for prisoners. And so that's why regime change has been a policy of the United States government through two administrations and by an act of Congress.

REP. NICK SMITH: But is it fair to assume that a U.N. resolution --

SEC. POWELL: It's fair to assume --

REP. NICK SMITH: -- isn't going to call for a regime change?

SEC. POWELL: It's fair to assume right now that you would not see a U.N. resolution come out that would explicitly say regime change

REP. NICK SMITH: So therefore, if there --

SEC. POWELL: It would also not prohibit regime change. I think the most one could expect out of the U.N., since regime change is not a policy of the United Nations, is that in the face of continued Iraqi violation and failure to respond, the U.N. might authorize member states so inclined to take all necessary means or to take appropriate action, without describing or specifying what that appropriate action should be or what specific objectives might be.

REP. NICK SMITH: So it would seem to me part of the problem is, even though we find these weapons and destroy them, and even though we bring our intelligence community and technology into discovering what's there -- and it's not going to be -- it's going to be impossible to discover everything -- you still end up with the problem afterwards that if you have Saddam there, he can reestablish after five years or 10 years, and he says, "Well, look, let us live our lives." There's still that threat without regime change. How do you deal with that?

SEC. POWELL: That is the reason that the president has focused on regime change and why it has been U.S. policy. But I don't want to prejudge what the president might do in light of changed circumstances or in light of success on the part of the U.N. in imposing its will on Iraq. But it certainly remains the policy of the United States government that regime change would be a solution to the challenge and the problems we face now.

REP. N. SMITH: If we were to go in with military force, would you and the administration develop some kind of an exit strategy in terms of how long are we going to stay there, how long are we going to try to reform that government?

SEC. POWELL: In the contingency planning that has been undertaken, we are certainly looking at the duration of any such mission, with the goal of turning it over to international elements or back to the people as quickly as possible. It is not -- nobody wants to go and stay for any extended length of time, if it is avoidable.

REP. N. SMITH: And my last -- last comment and question is, despite the president's excellent, outstanding presentation at the U.N., my constituents still feel that they don't have enough information to feel justified in supporting military advancements on Iraq.

SEC. POWELL: Well, I hope this hearing will help. And I hope the testimony being provided by my colleagues in the administration -- Director Tenet and Secretary Rumsfeld -- will convey to the American people the seriousness of this issue and why we have to go before the Security Council and ask them to act, and why, if they do not act, the president may have to act. And I hope that as this argument is made over time -- and the debate really now has started. We're no longer just having dueling editorials and dueling articles and dueling leaks. The president has made the case clearly before the nation, before the United Nations, before the world. And I think these hearings are very helpful in explaining it and educating the American people and the population of the world.

REP. N. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. KING: Mr. Secretary, there's not been a regime change here in the committee, I'm just filling in for Mr. Hyde! (Laughter.)

SEC. POWELL: Oh.

REP. KING: Mr. Sherman?

REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Thank you. Glad to see the old regime continues!

Saddam has killed hundreds of thousands of people, gassed his own people, risked his own life several times, all in an effort to expand his power. If he had nuclear weapons, he could smuggle one into the United States, after all, a nuclear weapon is about the size of a person, hide it in an apartment somewhere, lead a blindfolded American physicist to the undisclosed apartment, and let America know that he had the capacity to destroy Chicago or Los Angeles.

I think at that point it is unlikely that you would find a majority of this House authorizing American force to defend Kuwaiti sovereignty or anything else that might cost us an American city. And so it is unacceptable that we go back to sleep and let this man develop nuclear weapons.

The do-nothing policy shouldn't be completely derided, because that is the policy the two administrations embraced until September 10th of 2001. Iraq didn't change on September 11th; America changed. We woke up, and we decided that risks we used to sleep through and wait to mature we had to deal with.

So if the do-nothing policy isn't really seriously before us, there are really two policies before us. One is what I call the Richard Perle Invade Now approach. And this has a legalistic version which is really the same thing. And it says, Iraq must immediately comply with all U.N. resolutions, including the one to stop oppressing its own people, or we invade pretty soon. And I don't think Saddam is going to morph into Mother Teresa in a week or two. So if we insist upon enforcing by force all U.N. resolutions, including the ones that call for human rights in Iraq, that's the Invade Now approach. The other is an approach for a robust inspection regime with enforcement, which means if there's the slightest interference with the inspectors, you bring in Richard Perle.

Those are the two approaches. Neither one of them is perfect or simple. Our committee and in other forums the problems of inspectors have been talked about, and Richard Perle did a pretty good job of that this morning. But I would point out a regime change doesn't mean that 10 years from now you couldn't have another Baathist regime in Iraq, or a Nasserite regime, or an Ayatollah-led regime. In his dying days Saddam might spirit away his nuclear secrets, just as the Nazis loaded up a submarine with their nuclear secrets in their dying days and sent that submarine unsuccessfully to the Japanese imperialists. And the effect of an invasion on the Arab street is not known.

What concerns me, Mr. Secretary, is that when you're at the United Nations, you're really going to two different organizations and asking for authorization. You're up in New York and you're down here.

When you're at the United Nations, the most you can hope for is a truly robust inspection regime, and I hope you get it.

Here the White House just released a resolution that goes far beyond anything you could plausibly expect or even dream the United Nations security Council would do. It's a blank check. It says we can go with the Perle approach or the Powell approach. Congress doesn't have an opinion on it. You guys decide. We're going to go home and wave in parades. And it simply disturbs me that you would ask Congress to abdicate any responsibility for choosing between these two approaches.

And I would prefer if you would submit a resolution or discuss -- I mean, we can draft resolutions here -- but discuss -- do you want -- which side of this debate are you on? Do you want a resolution directing the use of force against Iraq in the next week, regardless? Or do you want a resolution that embraces the robust inspection with all the bells, whistles, enforcements, immediacies and expectation that if there's the slightest -- if there's a five-minute delay, then you're authorized to invade? Or do you have a view of the U.S. Constitution that says Congress is just supposed to be a rubber stamp, sign the blank check, and you guys fill in the word "Perle" or the word "Powell" on the dollar-sign line and take the check to the bank?

SEC. POWELL: I think the president certainly does not have a view of the U.S. Constitution that Congress is a rubber stamp. I know I certainly don't, and I don't think any of my colleagues in the administration do. I think that the president views Congress as a partner, and that's why he met with the leadership two weeks ago and engaged the leadership at the beginning of September. And that's why, in response to that discussion with the leadership, he said at the end of that meeting, "I will consult with the Congress and ask you for approval of authority."

And now he has sent language to the Congress reflecting what he would believe is appropriate for the Congress to do.

But he understands fully that this is merely the beginning of a discussion that has to take place, for the most part, within the Congress. And I think, therefore, he has provided his recommendation, and we now wait to see how Congress to chooses to dispose of that recommendation or act on that recommendation.

And the president will, obviously, when the resolution emerges, engage with Congress on it, watch the debate as Congress debates whatever resolution it chooses to debate. And he will respect what Congress says when Congress has acted on it. He will take it into account. He also recognizes that he has his own authority as president of the United States, but he understands the important role that Congress plays. And that's why he has brought this issue to the Congress.

Remember, at the time, sir, people were saying, well, you know, there is a legal opinion that says he doesn't have to even come to the Congress. But --

REP. SHERMAN: I thank you for that.

SEC. POWELL: -- he understood what was the right thing to do, and he did the right thing.

REP. SHERMAN: Would there be any harm if we passed a resolution --

REP. HYDE: The gentleman's time has expired.

REP. SHERMAN: -- (inaudible) -- I'm sorry.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Kerns.

REP. BRIAN KERNS (R-IN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for spending your time. And I know you've been here for quite a while.

The questions that I've heard back in Indiana, back home, across the country -- fellow members of Congress -- I just returned from the Middle East -- from the Middle East -- is to the timing and the timing with regard to the war on terrorism. What is your opinion of the impact on the war on terrorism -- how this will impact the cooperation of those countries, particularly in the Middle East, that are trying to help to the extent that they can? And do you see that this could jeopardize, enhance that cooperation and our efforts on the overall war with terrorism?

SEC. POWELL: I think it's manageable, sir. And the president's speech helped a great deal last week when he demonstrated to the nations in the region that he was looking for the Security Council to examine this and see what the proper course of action in the multilateral forum was. And almost immediately, we got positive reactions from a number of the nations in the Middle East.

Many of them also immediately went to the Iraqis and said, "Boy, this is deadly serious and it's time to stop the games." So I think the nations in the Middle East know that we are trying to work within the international community to deal with this problem, and are appreciative of that effort; and because they are appreciative of that initiative on the part of the president, it helps us in our overall campaign against terrorism.

Will there still be some difficulties as we move forward? Yes. But I think the president went a long way to dealing with the concern you just raised.

REP. KERNS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis.

REP. JIM DAVIS (D-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary.

I want to start by being very honest with you about the level of frustration I have at the sequence of events here. You are the first and only representative of the administration to come before this committee and to begin to talk about Iraq, either in a classified or unclassified, private or public, hearing. And I'm being told this committee may be asked to vote as early as next week on this resolution. I do not think the administration is helping its cause by coming so late and just starting today. I think the committee -- not the members of this committee, the American public through this committee -- deserves a lot more information before we're asked to act.

My frustration is heightened by what I regard as the implication in the public comments of the administration that members of Congress are receiving new information or information the public does not have. That gives me a great deal of frustration.

The way I regard the administration's position right now, Mr. Secretary, is not that there is new information which has created a more imminent or substantial risk on the part of Saddam Hussein, but that the standard has changed since September 11th and that the new standard, as the president so well articulated in front of the United Nations, is grave and gathering danger. And I don't know what that means.

I have a couple questions. My first pertains to my concern that this debate seems to be conducted without any regard whatsoever to the risk that this country faces as a result of al Qaeda. And in my state, Florida, and others, it certainly seems to be a very imminent and substantial risk. And in the absence of information that suggests to me that Saddam Hussein is an imminent, substantial risk, aren't we jeopardizing our commitment to the war on terrorism by dealing with the Saddam Hussein situation at the same time, as opposed to dealing with it later?

SEC. POWELL: I don't think there is a difference between the approach we're taking to Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction he's developing, which might become terrorist weapons, as being not part of the campaign against terror. And it really got pulled into that, the nexus became what happened on September 11th when we saw what the possibilities are with this kind of weaponry in the hands of terrorists.

With respect to -- and I don't think us dealing with Saddam Hussein means we can't deal with al Qaeda. At the same time we're having this debate, we're rolling up cells. We've had quite a bit of success in recent days picking up people in Pakistan and elsewhere, and starting to connect more and more of the dots. So the campaign against al Qaeda has not suffered, and in fact, it's really turned to the phase of law enforcement, intelligence exchange, financial transaction tracking. And that campaign will continue, and we're showing a great deal of success day by day with apprehensions and arrests.

This administration just didn't discover this problem a few weeks ago, we've been talking about it since the very beginning of the administration. I might have to go back through my confirmation hearing and my first appearance before this committee, but I think we've been talking about Iraq as a problem from the very beginning.

One of the first meetings I had as secretary of State was with my staff to discuss what to do about the fact that the whole sanctions regime on Iraq was collapsing. The members of the Security Council were just moving away from the whole sanctions regime. I spent a whole year pulling that sanctions regime back together, getting all the permanent members knitted back together on the goods review list and "Smart Sanctions," as it's called. And that took a lot of work, and it showed the commitment of the administration to do something about this.

During that same period of time, we were studying the intelligence, we were seeing what the inspectors had said and where they'd left it off in '98. And I think it is no surprise to this committee, or the Congress, or to the American people, that President Bush has been speaking about this problem from the very beginning of his administration. And now we have reached a point, in the aftermath of 9/11, that it is not a problem we can just continue talking about; we really have to act on this problem.

REP. J. DAVIS: But, Mr. Secretary, I think what is a surprise, that we've gone from what you describe to now the brink of a war against this country. And I think the Congress and the American public is entitled to a clear explanation as to what's changed. Is it the information? Is it the evidence, some of which we may not be able to talk about publicly, some of it we might, or is it the standard?

SEC. POWELL: I think I can make a case that all of those elements play a role in creating a sense of urgency at this time. The fact that we have seen terrorists trying to learn about biological weapons and chemical weapons and nuclear weapons and radiation bombs, I mean, the information that's come out on al Qaeda and what we found in Afghanistan, it may not be smoking gun information, but it certain says we have got to go after this kind of technology, this kind of mass weapon technology wherever we find it. And we find it in Iraq in the hands of an individual who's demonstrated he is willing to use it. And I think that brought a heightened sense of urgency to it. We have found no change in the intention of Saddam Hussein over these years to abandon this. You have been reading stories about these aluminum tubes. There may be a debate, some say in the newspaper today, whether they're for centrifuges or for something else. The fact of the matter is that he is going after this kind of technology. So his intention is not changed.

And so I think all of these things have come together. And we have been in office for, oh, 22, 21-1/2, 22 months now, and we've been talking about this problem for this long. And the president was determined that he wasn't going to just talk about it for his whole period in office but to start to act on it. And he's now bringing the case to the American people. We have had a large number of meetings over the last year and a half about the no-fly zone, the fact that we are attacked in the no-fly zone almost every day. And even in the last four days since the Iraqis said, "Come on, everything's fine, no conditions," they're still firing at our airplanes. We've had six incidents of this occurring so far this week.

And so the president has made it clear that we just can't look away from this problem. Doing nothing is no longer an option. All of these elements have come together. And he has presented the case to the American people, trying to help the Congress understand it better today, as are all of my colleagues in the administration. And we know that it is a weighty decision that we are putting before you.

REP. J. DAVIS: But Mr. Secretary, the choice doesn't have to be between war and nothing, does it?

SEC. POWELL: The president didn't declare war. The president has taken the case to the Security Council. He didn't ask them to declare war. He said, "Here is a problem.

Here is a problem that you have been turning away from all these years, and you cannot turn away any longer, in light of the terrorist threat the world faces. And therefore it's time for you to put down binding demands on this regime and put down actions that they must take to get out of these breaches." The president listed them.

But to list these actions and to say you've got to do this, but if you don't do it, there are no consequences and we will just come back next year at the 58th General Assembly session and talk about it all over again -- the president believes strongly and I think many of our friends believe strongly -- certainly Prime Minister Blair has spoken out strongly about this -- is no longer an option. Even those nations that are not prepared to go as far as we are right now have acknowledged the problem, and they are trying to get the Iraqis to do something before these consequences flow. But there must be consequences that will flow, or you cannot expect Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis to do anything but what they've been doing for the last 11 years.

REP. HYDE: The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul.

REP. RON PAUL (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Secretary.

I'm the last one on this side, I guess, but hopefully not the least of the group. But I do take a different position. I am -- and I've spoken out on this, and I'm sure others are aware of this -- I'm strongly opposed to this war. I see no purpose in it. And I get thousands of letters on this. And even Mr. Smith a few minutes ago said when he talks to his people back home, they can't understand what we're doing.

And a lot of people still believe in this country that for us to initiate a war is hardly good sense in solving problems. You know, a lot of people in this country still believe in negotiating -- negotiation and containment. And even I -- I was called up in the military during the Cuban crisis, and missiles were 90 miles off our shore. And we didn't have to go to war over this, and we settled this.

And here we are -- we have a country that you even admit is greatly weakened from where it was before, and they're 6,000 miles away, they're half the size of Texas, they have a GDP that is 20 percent less than that of Idaho, and we're willing to make this commitment to war. I -- there's just a lot of -- a lot of people are really still concerned about this, and their concern, I think, shouldn't be fluffed off, because I think they're very serious, and they have good reasons to be concerned.

They're concerned by, you know, a massive expansion of the war. Some people even say, "Who knows? This could end up in World War III," when we think of what the Muslim-Arab world now thinks of us. And this could lead to something unheard of. And this is historic, because look at what happened in Vietnam; nobody planned that. The costs can be out of control, and we can end up with somebody worse in Iraq. So there's a lot of reasons why we ought to be careful on what we do. And if we were able to handle the Soviets, I just can't see why we have to be so determined that we have this all-out fight.

But my question has to do with anticipation of this uprising, which didn't occur after the Bay of Pigs, of course; didn't occur after Persian Gulf War I. And we're going to liberate these people? A good example of this -- and this is minor; I realize this -- but this was not anticipated -- this was in The Wall Street Journal two days ago. And this has to do with -- and the headline says "Bush protest on human rights backfires in Egypt." I had no problem with what the president said, you know, about --complaining about Ibrahim being put in prison. But the surprise was that the human-rights groups in Egypt are standing up for the government and attacking us. And they very subtly said -- this was their answer: "Any foreign interference in our internal politics is an insult." Who else spoke out against that? The wife of the man that was in prison, implying that we ought to stay out of this, that we're making the problems worse!

So my suggestion here is, do we really know? And what are the unanticipated consequences that can occur? Twenty Arab nations voted to condemn our plans to invade, to initiate this war. So what kind of assurances can we give the American people for all these individuals who are so anxious to go to war that there will be, you know, at least a reception over there, when there's no indication that there's support among the Arab nations and no European nation is for it? Going to be very interesting to see what happens in Germany this weekend, because it'll be a pro-American or an anti-American vote. And we may well lose it. And Tony Blair may well lose it, too.

SEC. POWELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Paul.

Nobody is looking for a war if a war can be avoided. The president didn't go up to the U.N. to declare war; he went up to the U.N. to declare a problem. The Cuban missile crisis lasted a few weeks; this has lasted for 12 years. President Kennedy didn't negotiate out of the Cuban missile crisis simply because he and Khruschev got along well. Khruschev didn't have the cards. And President Kennedy had the power and had made it clear that he was not going to tolerate this and he would take action. It was not just, "Stop your ships from coming," but "If you don't stop those ships from coming, turn around and get the stuff off the island of Cuba, you" --

REP. PAUL: May I interrupt?

SEC. POWELL: Yes, sir. (No ?), sir. Yes.

REP. PAUL: I just want to add that we took our missiles out of Turkey at that particular time as part of the negotiation.

SEC. POWELL: That was part of the negotiation. And the negotiation finally solved it. But that negotiation would not have been successful, the action that Khruschev took would not have been taken if he wasn't sure that you were being called up not just for a jaunt in the swamps of Florida, but you were being called up at that time, Mr. Paul, and I was being activated and pulled out of my unit at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and getting ready to be sent to Florida as well, because President Kennedy was deadly serious and Khruschev knew it.

Now, in order to make the pill go down a little easier, we subsequently made the deal with the missiles in Turkey.

REP. PAUL: Right.

SEC. POWELL: But there was no doubt about American determination and American purpose at that point. And I would submit that it wasn't just negotiations unbacked by force that did it; that we had the force to prevail, and Khruschev did not. And he turned around and he also lost his position in due course because he had played in a game he shouldn't have been playing in.

I understand the concerns you raise, Congressman Paul, and we know that much work has to be done in the Arab world. And I'm hard at work doing that.

I also know that the United States is looked to as the arbiter in the world on so many issues, so many crises; and the one thing we do that sometimes gets us in trouble in places, that we do speak out for human rights, and we do speak out even when people may not want us to speak out, even when people may object to us, quote, "interfering" in their internal affairs. But we do it because we believe there are universal standards of human rights and justice. And it's been a hallmark of American foreign policy for many, many years, and I think it has to continue to be a hallmark of American foreign policy if we're going to remain the nation we are and the inspiration to the rest of the world.

It is always easier for me to go visit a leader and not talk about human rights. Nobody wants me to talk about human rights when I come visit them or when they come see me, but they hear it because it's part of our foreign policy, and we would not be true to our nation and our foreign policy if we did not. And over time, our message tends to penetrate, and our message tends to inspire people to want a different kind of regime and a better life where such things can be spoken about.

REP. HYDE: (Off mike) -- leave at 6:00.

SEC. POWELL: I really do, sir.

REP. HYDE: And that leaves one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight of our Democratic brethren who have --

SEC. POWELL: We can do it. (Laughs.) I'll be brief!

REP. HYDE: So --

SEC. POWELL: I don't want to be rude. So we can go a few minutes longer. I will be brief with my answers, I promise.

REP. HYDE: If -- in exchange for brief questions, is that right?

SEC. POWELL: In exchange for a brief question, yes, sir.

REP. HYDE: All right. Then Mr. Engel is next.

REP. ELIOT ENGEL (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, Secretary Powell and I are both from the Bronx, and I don't think brevity is part of our upbringing.

SEC. POWELL: (Chuckles.)

REP. ENGEL: But let me just say, first of all --

SEC. POWELL: Did you get a report about my travels in the Bronx the other day? (Chuckles.)

REP. ENGEL: I did, I actually did. And everybody was very thrilled. They actually said you responded much better now than when you were a child, but I could have expected that!

Thank you for all the work that you do. And I had a bunch of questions. I'm going to throw it out, and you can be as brief as you like about it.

On September 11th, the New York Times reported -- let me read this briefly: "Senior intelligence officials acknowledged today that the government had not compiled an updated cross-agency assessment of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capacities. Intelligence officials, responding to repeated complaints, said today that they were working on the authoritative document. The last such thorough assessment on Iraq's clandestine weapons was produced about two years ago, and the administration hasn't prepared what's called a National Intelligence Estimate, which in essence is the cross-agency analysis of a major intelligence question performed by a nation's intelligence services."

I'm not asking you to disclose any classified information, but can you tell us whether we have or will perform this NIE?

SEC. POWELL: I can't speak to the particular article. For the 22 months I have been at this I have been getting a constant stream of intelligence information, not only from the CIA but from my own intelligence agency, INR, within the State Department, that talked about all of these, and on a regular basis. I tasked my director of intelligence to go get me the latest that he could, interagency basis, on conventional weapons, radiological, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in Iraq. And I have had a steady stream of information, even though it might not have been in the form of an NIE.

REP. ENGEL: We had a hearing -- I'm going to just jump around quickly. We had a hearing here yesterday on Syria. And many of us believe that Syria and Iran have an even worse track record of terrorism than does Iraq, and Syria continues to occupy Lebanon. I hope that in our focus in Iraq we're not going to forget those other states who support terrorism. And I want to add to that, last time -- and you remember I supported Operation Desert Storm back in '91, and I expect to vote for a joint resolution next week or whenever it is -- we put great restrictions on our ally Israel not to retaliate when Saddam Hussein sent missiles over to Israel. We don't know what he may do or what he may not do. But I just want to say that I would hope that no such restraint -- we would hope that this wouldn't have to happen, but I would hope that we would not pressure Israel or any nation not to respond and defend their own security this time around, if that should happen.

SEC. POWELL: We would -- we would certainly be in constant touch with the Israeli government on this matter. And in the case of the gulf war, I believe the decision the Israeli government made at that time was the correct one.

REP. ENGEL: Thank you.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Delahunt.

REP. WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT (D-MA): I just want to associate myself, Mr. Secretary, with the remarks of the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis. People in my district have a profound concern. There appears to be a sense of urgency, and I think you responded to him by saying there has been talk about it. But I think there's a sense among the American people that this has come out of the --this has come out of the sky on them.

We're talking war, when it really hasn't been on the radar screen, so to speak.

We've known for years about Saddam Hussein. I think you served on the National Security Council when we supported Hussein in the war against Iran. We were aware that he was using chemical weapons then, that he gassed the Kurds -- I think it was in 1988 -- that we had an embassy there, that we in fact took him off the terrorist list.

But there doesn't -- I don't see it -- any new hard evidence to indicate that we should be rushing into this. I heard today for the first time that we're going to be voting on the resolution next week, maybe the week after. I'm uneasy, Mr. Secretary, and I know I'm speaking for an awful lot of people. I know I come from Massachusetts. I know we're different. But I got to tell you, it is a profound concern. A thousand people showed up when they should have been on the beach, on Cape Cod, on a beautiful Sunday day, and they were truly, truly concerned.

SEC. POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Menendez.

REP. ROBERT MENENDEZ (D-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think it goes without saying that we have tremendous respect for your service to our country. But I was here when you made your statement. I read through it again. I saw all of the comments relating to what Iraq has done in the past and what it has failed to do in terms of the United Nations resolutions. But what I failed to see is what is it that makes this the imminent threat to the national security of the United States.

You know, on -- you cited, you make reference to the terrorist attacks and that September 11th changed the world, and of course -- at least we believe it changed the world; over in Europe, I think it only -- think they changed America -- but you know, the fact of the matter is that what I see is, who did we go after, after September 11th? We didn't go after Iraq, we went after al Qaeda and bin Laden. And so we identified what was the threat to the United States, and a year later we were pursuing that element of terrorism against our country.

Now you recite, as the administration has recited, everything that has happened in the past.

You recite the violations that have taken place. Those took place when the president took office. They took place before the president took office. They continue to take place today. Yet I have not seen yet -- and without, of course, discussing those briefings -- I have not seen yet what is the clear and present, imminent danger to the United States? What is the casus belli here that we are in fact pursuing?

And lastly -- if you could respond to that. And, you know, why didn't we go in August instead of against al Qaeda, against Saddam, if he was such a threat to us?

And lastly -- and I don't think this is a good guy, by any stretch of the imagination. He's a bad actor. He is a menace to the world. But the question is the timing and the reason, this urgency that has suddenly developed in terms of saying we must act now, and we will do it unilaterally, even if we can't get multilateral support.

And lastly, what's our game plan? You know, all we tell the world is that regime change is our ultimate goal -- not just weapons of mass destruction but regime change. Now, if you tell Saddam that regime change is your ultimate goal, then he's more likely, I would think, to use whatever weaponry he has, number one. And number two is, when we succeed at that regime change, what's our game plan for a post-Saddam Iraq? What's our responsibilities there? How much is that going to cost? What's our long-term commitment? What's our game plan? Let us know before we start this military action also what's our exit strategy in that regard.

SEC. POWELL: I think there perhaps should have been a sense urgency long before this time, because he never gave up his sense of urgency in trying to develop these weapons of mass destruction.

And President Bush came in, and I think for the last 20-odd months of his administration has been conveying the seriousness of this issue, and now the pieces are coming together when he believes it is time for the international community to act. There is no one, single piece of intelligence information that says, "Let's act this month, today, rather than last month." But it always says why wait for a year for now, so that we can see that these weapons have been developed further, and with this new nexus if terrorism, with the possibility that this kind of weaponry can get in the hands of the other, what is the point of delaying?

And so I don't know that it has suddenly descended upon us a real and present danger so much as that it's a danger that's been there all along, and it is real and it is growing, and why not this time?

Why wait? Why did we wait previously?

REP. MENENDEZ: Why not against other regimes that have the same --

SEC. POWELL: There are other -- I don't think there is any other regime that is quite as dangerous as this particular regime and has demonstrated the willingness to use the kinds of weapons they are developing.

REP. MENENDEZ: How about our post-Saddam --

SEC. POWELL: Post-Saddam we have talked about. But there -- a case can be made, and I think it's a powerful case, that nobody is all that anxious to stand by Saddam when he's on his way out. Certainly none of the allies that I know of and I speak to on a regular basis anywhere in the world are supporters of Saddam Hussein and would not like to see him gone. And so I think there is an opportunity to portray this not as an oppressive invasion, but really, a way of changing a regime so that people will be liberated.

REP. MENENDEZ: No, my question, what's -- what's our game plan for Iraq, though?

SEC. POWELL: Then the game -- well, we obviously have this under serious consideration, all aspects of this campaign, should it come to a campaign. And our game plan would be, if this were to occur we would work with the international community to put in place a government, a leadership, drawing from people outside right now in opposition as well as those inside, who would put in place a government that is representative of its people and is no longer a threat to its neighbor.

REP. HYDE: The --

SEC. POWELL: It'll take time, it'll take effort, it'll take energy, and it'll take money. It'll take staying power.

REP. HYDE: The next gentleman is Mr. Meeks. But if Mr. Meeks will withhold for a moment, I usually give my time to the members because we always run out of time and everybody gets a little testy when they don't get called. But I want to say something at this point, and so I going to yield to myself for a moment.

I'll tell you what's different for me. Not for anybody else, but for me. I was in World War II, and I remember the kamikaze pilots. And I thought they were a strange breed. Very patriotic, but a little weird, to dive into an aircraft carrier and incinerate yourself. The suicide bombing that's going on in Israel and in the Palestinian conflict, the fact that there is so much hate -- the World Trade Center bombings where the people with joy incinerate 3,000 people, there's a lot of hate there.

I had no idea the depth of hatred in the world against freedom, against us. And we cannot watch the development of these biological weapons which could poison the water in New York, like that, no big deal; the stuff could be smuggled in with a diplomatic pouch and it could be devastating, devastating.

So it's a new ball game. It isn't like in the old days when General Burgoyne lined up his troops and they "Don't fire till you see the whites of their eyes." There is a lot of hate combined with a lot of death that can be dealt very quickly and very easily. And therefore, as I said, the first punch could be the last punch. We can't stand idly by and let that happen.

Iraq isn't the only country that hates us and that will disseminate and distribute these weapons to people who will be happy to use them and go to heaven as they burn up in the flames. But this is a different situation today than there was. And what brought it home to me was September 11th and the World Trade Centers and in the bombings in Palestine, in Israel. Those are -- it's a new world. And I think our leaders, our government has the duty to protect us, and I think that's what they're trying to do. And they need our help, not our hindrance.

Anyway. Mr. Meeks.

REP. GREGORY MEEKS (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to associate myself with every word that Mr. Menendez indicated. Every word. Because I think that is absolutely the key and the problem that I'm having myself understanding and my constituency.

Secondly, just in what the chairman just indicated, I think just the opposite. Yes, the whole world is different since September 11th, but what it showed me since September 11th, that, you know, when they came in, these kamikazes and the guys that are blowing themselves up, they are a different breed. And you know, some of the stuff that they can use to damage and threaten us, they don't even have to sneak it in; they can get it right here. When we look at the anthrax scare, that wasn't brought in from someplace else, that was created here. So they don't have to go to smuggling it to get here. The danger is already here.

And so to me, what 9/11 showed me is that we do need a better relationship outside of this world.

And what it also showed me is that we can have it, because when I look at what has happened post-9/11, many -- I remember the debate in this Congress, they questioned whether or not we should be friendly or have -- use Pakistan as an ally. And you I remember coming before this committee saying we should give them the opportunity to prove that they want to be an ally. And if they don't want -- and then if they don't prove it, then we should -- we'll do something about it. And when I look at what has happened there in Pakistan and in Malaysia and Singapore and Indonesia, all Muslim countries primarily, and that they (in fact ?) -- people who are threatening us right now, they are helping expose them so that we are not in danger.

And then I talked to some of those individuals from their government and some from our own State Department, and they say, "Well, the appearance is that it is us against the Islamic nations," and some of the information that we're now getting could possibly stop or not be as frequent as it is as a result of this, and therefore, in my estimation, put us in greater danger here in the United States.

If there is no imminent -- and I -- and believe me, if you could show me or tell me, that's the information I'm trying to look for, whether it's classified or unclassified, that there is -- this nation is in imminent danger, I'm the first to say, "Let's go strike first." If there's something that has happened within the last five months or six months or something that we need to do right now, then I'm -- I'll be the first to say, "Let's go, and let's strike right now. Let's not wait." But if not, then why not take the time, the opportunity to have -- we're voting on this resolution next week -- but to have our new friends and allies and our old friends and allies work together? And if this does not happen, then we can all do this together as opposed to us doing something on a unilateral basis, which then I think will further anger the world and further put Americans in jeopardy and having more people around the world hating us in America.

SEC. POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Meeks. The resolution that the president is asking for and a draft of which he provided is not a resolution that is a declaration of war to go to war tomorrow. It's an expression of support for what he might have to do if the actions that we're trying to take in the multilateral organizations, the United Nations Security Council, are not successful. He has taken the case to our friends and allies. I spent an enormous amount of time on it. I'm getting ready to do it again in a few minutes.

And so we understand the seriousness of this issue. And it is not a rush, but at the same time, it is useful for the world to see the United States united behind the proposition that something has to be done about this. And I'm sure that the chairman is arranging for whatever intelligence briefings or other information that the committee might need to have a better understanding of the nature of the threat.

REP. HYDE: Ms. Lee.

REP. BARBARA LEE (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Hello, Mr. Secetary.

SEC. POWELL: Hello.

REP. LEE: And thank you for your very clear testimony. It's really always very good to see you and really to listen to your straight talk. And I too want to thank you for your service and for the extremely important role that you're playing during this very difficult period.

I have two questions that I would like to ask you very briefly. First of all, we did receive, of course, the White House discussion draft of the resolution. And in the draft -- and you indicated earlier one of -- the provision which says that Congress has already expressed support for regime change. Again, this was expressed through Public Law 105-338, under, I believe, the Clinton administration --

SEC. POWELL: Mm-hmm.

REP. LEE: -- also, again, serving as the basis for -- one of the bases for this resolution.

Also in this draft discussion, you cite the resolution last year that was passed, Public Law 107-40, as, again, part of the rationale and basis for moving forward with the use of force.

I ask you about this because many members whom I've talked to with regard to -- I didn't support either one of them, because I didn't want to get to where I think we're going -- but many members who I talked to indicated to me that when they voted for either one of those, they did not read this or understand that to mean that the use of force was being authorized for a regime change, that that is not what was entailed in that. And I'm quite surprised to see both of those resolutions here, in here, the one of 9/14 and also the previous one.

My second question is this:

If Iraq had not responded with an affirmative on the return of weapons inspectors with, as you call it, their tactical ploy -- that's, I believe, how you described it -- what would have been the United States' response? And how would our strategy differ now and how would this resolution before us read, had they just not responded or said, "No inspections; case closed"? What would our position be at this --

SEC. POWELL: I don't know that it would have been any different. The president, when he met with the leadership two Wednesdays ago, I guess it was now, if my memory serves me correctly, said that he would be consulting with Congress and that he would be taking the case to the international community. He's done both things. And if Iraq had not said anything this past Monday, which I think is your question, we would still be on the same track.

I would be doing the same thing today, if they hadn't spoken on Monday -- trying to generate support within the Security Council for a clear statement of the indictment against Iraq, the material breach, what actions the should take, as the president laid them out in his speech, and a statement of consequences for inaction. Their effort on Monday to derail that effort, derail that strategy, won't succeed because we're going to continue to try to get that resolution from the Security Council.

With respect to the two public laws you made reference to, I don't have them in front of me to see their full language, but I don't think they were intended to be "all necessary means" kinds of authority in either of those public laws. I think this pulling forward from the past Congress's previous expressions on this issue leads us to this resolution language, which is presented to the Congress for its consideration, which would give the president appropriate means to deal with the situation as he sees it necessary.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Schiff?

REP. ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA): Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your not only being here, but staying long enough for the rest of us to have a chance to ask you a couple of questions.

I wanted to begin by noting my agreement with some of the non- debatable points that you made at the outset; that is that Saddam Hussein has violated and continues to violate U.N. resolutions, that he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. And although you didn't posit it as a non-debatable point, I also concur with your statement that the present circumstances are unsustainable. And indeed, when several of us in a delegation went to Incirlik and talked with the wing commander there and discussed how every day, and practically every hour, American pilots are shot at by Iraq in their enforcement of U.N. resolutions, it became even more apparent how unsustainable the present course is.

You also made the point, though, that the intelligence is clear about a lot of what Saddam Hussein is doing. And I do want to express a note of disappointment, that some of my other colleagues have alluded to, with the information that has been shared with members of Congress. And I have attended the classified and non-classified briefings. And many, many of us feel that there was much more information that we should be receiving. And indeed, often the information we receive on CNN is of greater value and of greater insight than what we have in classified briefings.

So I would encourage you to pass that message back, that the administration has to do a better job of sharing information with the Congress.

And I would also encourage the administration to do a better job of sharing information with the American people. We've talked about the Cuban missile crisis. And one image that stays fresh in all of our minds is that of the photographs of the missile build-up in Cuba.

Given the advances in our technological sophistication since the early 1960s, it would be, I think, important for the administration to help make the case to the American people to show graphically some of the evidence it possesses.

And finally, I wanted to ask you, in line with some of what you've heard, about the imminency, because there is a perception, not only among many of the members but among many of the American people, that there is something rash and sudden about this. The breaches of U.N. resolutions have been going on for a decade. The lack of inspections have been going on for several years. The September 11th attacks did change this country and the world. But when we think about it, too, the September 11th attacks were not attacks using chemical or biological weapons; they were, in fact, using commercial airliners. And in that sense the threat from Iraq didn't change in the nature of that attack. And I wonder if you could share both what the best, most recent and most irrefutable evidence of Saddam Hussein's development of weapons is. And also, what is the best case scenario? What would you like to see happen? Not in a dream world where he morphs into Mother Teresa, as one of our members mentioned, but what is it that's a plausible and best case scenario for what the U.N. would do and what we could compel Iraq to do, short of invasion? And in the event of invasion, should the American people be prepared for young American men and women being exposed to chemical and biological weapons and dying from their exposure?

SEC. POWELL: On the third question, that is always a risk in modern warfare. It's a risk that I had to deal with at the time of Desert Storm. We went into Desert Storm fully expecting chemical weapons to be used immediately and recognizing that there was a risk of biological warfare. I did not expect nuclear engagement because we were reasonably sure they did not have a nuclear weapon at that time. But -- they might have, but we didn't think they really did. So it's something that is a part of modern warfare, and we train our troops to deal with it. But it is still a horrible thing to contemplate.

With respect to most recent, I don't know that there is a single smoking most recent gun, although people have been reading stories about the aluminum tubes. It shows a continued intention on the part of Saddam Hussein to do it. But there are many other things that may be going on that we also don't know about. But we do know the intention still remains. So it's not just what we know, it's what we don't know that may be going on, because there is someone determined to try to develop this kind of capability that we have to keep our eyes on.

I will convey your message back to my colleagues in the administration, especially those in the intelligence community, that there is a desire to see more information. But they will not come up here with something that says, "This makes yesterday quite different from today in what we have to do today as a result of this knowledge."

But there will always be the danger of waiting for something that gives us a sense of urgency, and unless that comes along, we won't act. But we might wake up one day and something has happened, and we will regret the fact that we hadn't acted. And it is not just a sense of urgency that should impel to act. It is a sense of what this whole regime has been up to for all these there, the violations of all these years. And it's as good a time to act now, especially in light of the kind of comments the chairman made a little while ago, about the change in the world.

Now, people say, "Well, it was not a chemical or biological weapon that was smuggled into the country." It was a weapon that was developed here. It was a plane full of fuel that made one devastating bomb, four of them -- one didn't get to its target and crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, killing a large number of people. But the next time it might be a biological weapon that doesn't kill 3,000, but kill 100,000 or has that potential. And if we have the ability to find out where this kind of technology might be being developed and where it could originate from, it seems to me we have an obligation to try to do something about it.

With respect to what would be an outcome short of war, that outcome has been before the Iraqi regime for years, and that is to come totally clean. There was no regime change policy before 1998. The policy was, come clean. You say you don't have any; prove it. You say you don't have anybody (sic); let people come in and go all over the country without interruption, without interference, without being sidetracked and demonstrate it. And what the inspectors found for seven years and what we know has been the case since is that they were just getting on the trail, and the Iraqis were doing everything to keep them off the trail. And they constantly found more leads to follow.

Why did the Iraqis stop them in 1998? Why did they insist that we have to frustrate them to the point where they have to leave? Because they were being successful. They were finding out information. They were finding out leads. And what we haven't been able to do for the last four years is to have that kind of intrusion within the country that would allow us to find out what might have been going on in the absence of inspectors.

We can do a lot with intelligence, but it is not as good as on-the- ground looking, on-the-ground interrogation of people, defectors coming in and then giving information that inspectors can then go use. So it seems to me that a first step, not an only step and not the final step, would be a regime where the inspectors go in and are completely free and are not inhibited in any way.

What this would also suggest is whether or not there has been a change in Iraqi attitudes and whether they have given up the intention of developing weapons. That would be also something that would he very significant to discover.

But, you know, we are where we are, and I think this is the time to take action and not try to find a way of not taking action because it is a difficult action to take. I think this is the time and the place.

REP. HYDE: The gentlelady from California, our final interrogator.

REP. DIANE WATSON (D-CA): Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the secretary for the time and, I think, his serious and true commitment to try to think through what needs to be done. However, let me just say straight out for the record, I would not vote for the resolution as it has been sent down to us today that says the president is authorized to use all means that he determines -- that he determines -- to be appropriate, including force. And it goes on.

Let me pose some questions, and you can answer them in your closing.

Would coercive inspections as presented by the Carnegie Endowment be something that would be presented if the final resolve in the resolution says that the president would use all means? Would coercive inspections be one?

Number two: Why are we so hated? That is the question that has been asked ever since 9/11. What do we do to incur the hatred of people?

And the next thing is, I am still very concerned about Afghanistan. I am hearing that there's been a resurgence of the Taliban. I don't think we have completed that job. And I did hear you say about an hour ago that we can do two things at one time.

So do you anticipate that an invasion of Iraq will have any significant impact on the security situation and on our ability to win peace in Afghanistan? And what must we do, what more must we do to win the peace in Afghanistan? And have we learned any lessons that can be used in Iraq?

And then, how would it impact our relationships with Pakistan, where significant segments of the population are still sympathetic to al Qaeda, if we are preemptive?

And the last point I just want to make is that in the newspapers yesterday, Wall Street Journal, it says that Bush's economic aide says the cost of a war on Iraq may top $100 billion. At a time when we have some domestic issues that have been pushed off the table and put on the shelf, we are contemplating force. And I still don't understand the urgency of this.

And I'm going to end by saying that as a representative of over 600,000 people, and I'm on what they call the "left coast" -- that's California -- I don't -- I haven't heard yet what I can tell my voters that would then get them to support a preemptive attack on Iraq.

So if you could address some of those points, I would appreciate it. And I'm sorry for taking so long.

SEC. POWELL: On course of inspections, Carnegie idea, we're studying it. I've read the report, as I mentioned earlier. We're studying it. I have two problems with it. One, it says the only way it will work is if you give up the idea of using force. I think if you give up the idea of using force, you're playing into the hands of the Iraqis.

And the second problem I have with the course of inspections is that it's almost a non sequitur, if it's supposed to be an inspection where they're cooperating with you, you shouldn't need to fight your way in or shot your way in. And as an old infantry officer, I have a little bit of concern about me being a young company commander in charge of 100 troops in the middle of Mesopotamia all by myself trying to shoot my way into a presidential palace or to force my way into a presidential palace.

I haven't squared all those circles in my mind as to whether this concept would work, but we're studying it and we're in touch with the Carnegie Center.

What do we do to incur hatred? Some people resent us. Some people don't like our system. Some people believe we are supporting the wrong side in the Israel-Palestinian dispute, even though I spend most of my time trying to support both sides, to see if we can find a solution to move forward.

But there is great deal of resentment to our success. There is a great deal of resentment to the fact that we stand by our value system. And we are designing programs to try to deal with this.

I point out, to a lot of audiences who say we are anti-Muslim or anti-Islam, we fought three wars in the last 12 years. What did we do in Kuwait? We rescued a Muslim country. What did we do in Kosovo? We rescued a Muslim country. What did we do in Afghanistan? We rescued a Muslim country. And in all instances, we didn't stay. We didn't take their oil. We didn't try to capture them. We tried to help them. We tried to put them back on a more stable footing. And we've got to get this case out better.

In Afghanistan, I -- you know, people are concerned about Afghanistan. It is a fragile situation. But my heavens, you should see or stop and reflect -- I know you do see -- but reflect on how far we've come. We've come a long way in the last nine months, and we've done a tremendous job, and President Karzai and his associates have done a tremendous job. But we haven't solved every problem in Afghanistan. We have not gotten rid of every al Qaeda element that's there. But we're going to stay there until we do and put that country on a stable footing. And we can do it and also deal with other contingencies in the world. Our whole force structure is designed to deal with more than one problem at a time.

The impact on Pakistan -- we stay in the closest touch with President Musharraf. He also is under attack by these terrorist elements. And so to the extent that we -- going after terrorism, so is he. And he has been playing an important role in our campaign against terrorism, as evidenced by the arrests that were made just within the past few days on conspirators who were part of the 9/11 terrorist attack against us.

With respect to the Wall Street Journal, I just can't comment on what number was provided with respect to how much what would cost. I don't know the assumptions. I'm familiar with the article. I just can't comment on it, and I don't believe the White House has bought into that number, because it's a number that -- I don't know what the basis they -- what -- the assumptions they used to determine what the cost of such a thing would be.

And with respect to the urgency of it all, I think I've talked to that in my previous two answers. Is there a smoking gun that requires something to be done today? No. But has there been a problem that has been developing over many years, that we just cannot ignore any longer? No (sic), or to paraphrase what my colleague Don Rumsfeld likes to say, do we wait for the gun to go off and then decide we should do something too late? I believe this is the time to deal with this problem and not push it off for another Congress or another president.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Secretary, you have been more than generous with your time. You have made a great contribution to this subject. And we are proud of you, and we thank you.

SEC. POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: The committee stands adjourned.