U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: ADMINISTRATION VIEWS

PART 1

HEARING BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

September 19, 2002

WITNESSES:

THE HONORABLE RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

THE HONORABLE R. JAMES WOOLSEY, VICE PRESIDENT, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON

THE HONORABLE JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

GENERAL CHARLES G. BOYD (INVITED), U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.), PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-IL): The committee will come to order. May you live in interesting times is a traditional Chinese curse, the full meaning of which becomes clearer every day. There is no issue more fraught with consequence than the one we face today. What should America's response be to threats posed by Iraq along with the larger challenge of extirpating terrorism of global reach?

There are disagreements about strategy, tactics, the efficacy of inspections, differing evaluations about the cost of intervention, what should follow a possible intervention, and so forth. Today I would like the attention to be focused mainly on what our expert witnesses have to say. There will be time later for us to debate these important issues, but I would offer only two observations. One is that the administration seems utterly convinced about the gravity of the threat from Iraq and the need to deal with it quickly. The second is my view that Saddam cannot be trusted. The word unconditional flows very quickly from his lips. His diplomats used it repeatedly in 1991 as they made promises that turned into endless quibbles, obstructions and defiance.

The committee begins today by welcoming five very distinguished Americans, both current and former public servants to talk about this most compelling issue of our day. This afternoon we will hear from the secretary of state and I will have a little more to say about that later. First we will hear from three former civilian government officials, Richard Perle, James Woolsey and Jessica Tuchman Mathews and retired Air Force General Charles Chuck Boyd.

I will introduce them more fully after giving my esteemed colleague, the ranking member of the committee, Tom Lantos an opportunity to make an opening statement. Mr. Lantos?

LANTOS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for holding this hearing and I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses. I fully share your opening comments. It is not only the administration which is convinced of the gravity of the threat. It is most, if not all of us in Congress, who are convinced of the gravity of the threat. I also share your second observation that Saddam Hussein on the basis of his record clearly can be trusted only by morons. I would add one more observation. Some people conduct this discussion or debate as if it would be analogous to debating the merits of an abstract painting. Some people like the color scheme. Some people don't like the color scheme. Some people would like to see different paintings and different combinations.

What distinguishes this debate from a debate on an abstract painting is that we have a history to deal with. And the totally ahistorical approach of some in the public, in the media and in the Congress is profoundly disturbing. So allow me in a minute or so to sketch what I consider to be the historical context of this discussion. The concept of preemption is not a new one as it relates to Iraq. In 1981, Iraq's nuclear reactor at Aussi Roc (ph) was destroyed. At the time, that preemptive act was widely criticized by the Reagan Administration, by most members of Congress and certainly the bulk, if not all of the media. I took a different point of view.

On the floor of this body, I praised that preemptive act because it was obvious that Saddam Hussein in 1981 was hell bent on developing nuclear weapons. Had the Aussi Roc (ph) reactor not been destroyed, the outcome of the Persian Gulf War could have been very different. The voices who even without a nuclear equipped Hussein suggested let's wait would surely have said how can we contemplate action, military action against a nuclear equipped Saddam Hussein. So maybe nothing would have happened. And Saddam Hussein today would be in control of the oil resources, not only of Iraq, but Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Emirates. And he would have a strangle hold on the jugular of the civilized world through his control of energy.

Had we decided to commence the war despite his nuclear capability, the losses would have been infinitely higher than what in fact, we suffered. There was also a debate in this body, in the Congress on whether to authorize action by the first President Bush against Iraq after they invaded Kuwait. And while we prevailed, those of us who favored authorization and voted for authorization, there was a very large negative vote which in a historic context appears to have been a profoundly mistaken negative vote. Now it's not only members of Congress who made mistakes. Some of us at the end of the war on Kuwait, on Iraq in connection with the invasion of Kuwait called on the administration of the first Mr. Bush to finish the job.

LANTOS: In retrospect, it would be hard for anyone to argue that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was a wise decision. So each of us comes to this debate not only with an understanding of what happened objectively, but what our own positions was along the way. And it is rather intriguing to see that some of the same people who gave bad advice 10 years ago and 22 years ago are again in the business of giving bad advice.

I'm looking forward to the administration sending up its proposal. I'm looking forward to our own vigorous debate here in this body and in the Senate. And I know that our distinguished witnesses will shed a great deal of light on this most important issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: Who is seeking ...

MCKINNEY: The gentlewoman from Georgia.

HYDE: Oh, there she is. Yes, gentlelady from Georgia.

MCKINNEY: I have an opening statement I'd like to read.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, I do as well.

HYDE: I understand. Who ...

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman, this hearing is about war. This hearing is about life and death. And as I look out at the audience and I see young people there, ...

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, will we all be allowed to give opening statements?

MCKINNEY: I would love to be able to give my opening statement.

HYDE: The gentlelady really has not been recognized.

MCKINNEY: Yes, I was recognized.

HYDE: Not for the purpose of giving an opening statement.

MCKINNEY: I wasn't giving an opening statement. I was giving my remarks.

HYDE: Well, you were giving an opening statement to your opening statement.

MCKINNEY: No, I was not, Mr. Chairman. But I would appreciate very much if you would allow me to give my opening statement.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman?

MCKINNEY: I can't believe that we're having a hearing on matters of war and peace and sending our young people off to war and you're trying to stifle the voices of the members of Congress.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: Who's - yes?

(UNKNOWN): Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say that I think that this chairman would never seek to stifle the voices of members of Congress. And if I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, we have some very distinguished witnesses here as you often and mostly have at our hearings. And I think we all have very, very strong opinions on this subject. In the interest of having everybody express their opinions, might I suggest that we proceed with the witnesses and those of us who have statements that we would like, take our five minutes sometimes right after them?

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman?

(UNKNOWN): Because otherwise, we will never -- multiply by five the members of this committee.

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman, we always have distinguished witnesses at all of our hearings. But that doesn't give us the right or give the chairperson the right to stifle the voices of the members of Congress.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of making a motion?

HYDE: Yes. The gentleman from New York.

(UNKNOWN): I would like to move that we proceed with hearing the witnesses and any member who has a statement to make, opening, closing or intermediary after the witnesses and after our questioning period be allowed seven minutes to make statements.

MCKINNEY: I'll object.

(UNKNOWN): I submit a motion. I didn't ask for unanimous consent.

HYDE: Those in favor of the motion, say aye.

MEMBERS: Aye.

HYDE: Opposed, nay.

MCKINNEY: No.

HYDE: The aye's have it. And ...

MCKINNEY: I call for a vote, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Motion is granted. The gentlelady asked for a roll call vote and the clerk -- do we have a clerk available? Will the clerk call the roll?

CLERK: Mr. Gilman?

GILMAN: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Leach? Mr. Bereuter?

MCKINNEY: Do we have a clerk available?

(UNKNOWN): Clerk is calling the roll.

CLERK: Mr. Bereuter? Mr. Smith? Mr. Burton? Ms. Gallegly? (INAUDIBLE) Mr. Ballenger? Mr. Rohrabacher?

ROHRABACHER: No.

CLERK: Mr. Royce?

ROYCE: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. King? Mr. Chabot?

CHABOT: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Houghton?

HOUGHTON? Aye.

CLERK: Mr. McHugh? (OFF-MIKE). Mr. Cantor?

CANTOR: Aye.

CLERK: Flake, Kerns, Davis, (INAUDIBLE)?

(UNKNOWN): Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Lantos?

LANTOS: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Berman? Mr. Ackerman? Mr. Faleomavaega?

FALEOMAVAEGO: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Payne? Mr. Menendez? Excuse me?

(UNKNOWN): (INAUDIBLE).

CLERK: Ms. McKinney?

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman, I have an article here from December 2 saying that there is a secret plan for a U.S. war against Iraq made by none other than Mr. Woolsey who is here. I vote no and I would love to have the opportunity to have my statement heard now as opposed to after these people have had the opportunity to have their say. Were they involved in the plan to make a secret war against ...

HYDE: The gentlelady will maintain order.

MCKINNEY: ... Iraq?

HYDE: The lady will maintain order, please.

CLERK: Mr. Sherman? Mr. Wexler? Mr. Davis?

DAVIS: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Engel? Mr. Delahunt?

DELAHUNT: No.

CLERK: Mr. Blumenhauer?

BLUMENHAUER: Aye.

CLERK: Ms. Napolitano?

(UNKNOWN): (INAUDIBLE) Ms. Berkley.

CLERK: Oh, Ms. Berkley. I'm sorry.

BERKLEY: (INAUDIBLE).

CLERK: Mr. Schiff?

SCHIFF: (INAUDIBLE).

CLERK: Mr. Hyde?

HYDE: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Chairman, (INAUDIBLE) of 12 aye's and seven no's.

HYDE: The motion is carried.

The Honorable Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute was formerly an aid to Senator Scoop Jackson and an official of the Reagan Defense Department. Since then, he's written prolifically on defense and security issues and presides over the Pentagon's Advisory Defense Policy Board. Mr. Perle is appearing by digital video conference linked from the American Embassy in London and I thank Ambassador William S. Farrish (ph), the Minister Counselor for Public Affairs at the embassy, Mr. Daniel Srevenate (ph) and the embassy staff for enabling Mr. Perle to join us this morning.

The Honorable Jessica Tuchman Mathews has been a journalist and has worked in the non-profit sector and in government, most recently as under secretary of state for global affairs in the Clinton Administration. She's currently President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a principal author along with General Boyd of a proposal embodied in a paper entitled, "Iraq, A New Approach" issued August, 2002.

Retired Air Force General Charles Boyd is President and CEO of Business Executives for National Security. He retired from the Air Force after having served as deputy commander in chief of U.S. forces in Europe. He was shot down on his 105th mission in Vietnam and survived 2,488 days, almost seven years as a prisoner of war. Prior to assuming his current position, he was a consultant to Former House Speaker Gingrich and later executive director of the Hart-Rudman National Security Commission.

Finally, the committee welcomes the Honorable James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, ambassador to the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe, under secretary of the Navy and general counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. He was also for many years a practicing attorney and I guess still is. No. We're certainly honored to have all of you present or appearing before us.

And we'll start with Mr. Perle across the Atlantic with a five minute, give or take five minutes, summary of your statement. And the full statement will be made a part of the record. Mr. Perle?

RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I particularly want to thank you for including me in today's hearing even though I can be present only through the miracles of a video link from London. The president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense have all spoken in recent days about the urgency of dealing with the threat posed to the American people and others by Saddam Hussein.

In what may be the most important speech of his presidency, President Bush has argued eloquently and persuasively to the United Nations in New York. But Saddam's open defiance of United Nations and his scornful refusal to heed its many resolutions is a challenge to the credibility of the United Nations itself. And he has rightly asked the United Nations to approve a security council resolution that would force Saddam to choose between all compliance with the many resolutions he has scorned and violated and action to remove his regime from power. Saddam's response, calculating, deceitful and disingenuous moves only slightly in the direction of accepting UN inspections of Iraqi territory. And even in this, it is far from clear that he offered to accept a robust inspection regime.

Such a regime would, at a minimum, include substantial inspection teams with Americans in key leadership and decision making roles distributed throughout Iraq and independent capability to move anywhere from inspection team bases to any site in the country without prior notification or approval, the right to interview any Iraqi or Iraqi residents, together with his family at safe locations outside Iraq, appropriate self defense capabilities for the inspectors so they can overcome efforts to impede them and the like.

My own view is that even with all that, it is simply not possible to devise an inspection regime on territory controlled by Saddam Hussein that can be effective in locating, much less eliminating his weapons of mass destruction. In any case, the inspection regime known as UNMOVIC doesn't even come close. Its size, organization, management and resources are all inadequate for the daunting task of inspecting a country the size of France against Saddam's determined program of concealment, deception and lying.

We know, Mr. Chairman, that Saddam lies about his program to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. We know he goes to great lengths to conceal his activities. We know that he has used the years during which no inspections took place in Iraq to move everything of interest with the result of the database we once possessed, inadequate though it was, has been destroyed. We know all this, yet I sometimes think there are those at the United Nations who treat the issue not as a matter of life and death, but rather more like (AUDIO GAP) perfect and expand his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the danger to us, already great, will only grow. If he achieves his holy grail and acquires one or more nuclear weapons, there is no way of knowing what predatory policies he will pursue.

That is why, Mr. Chairman, the president is right to demand that the United Nations promptly resolve that Saddam comply fully with the full range of United Nations resolutions concerning Iraq or face an American led enforcement action. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Perle. Next we are pleased to hear from Ms. Mathews.

JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for having us to address this distinguished committee. In these five minutes, I believe that all members of the committee have been given copies of our report, "Iraq, A New Approach", and I'd just like to supplement that with a few additional points. The starting point of this proposal, and I'd like to emphasize this because for some -- in many respects, it's the most important point. And for some, it's the most controversial.

MATHEWS: Starting point for this proposal is the belief that only Saddam's weapons of mass destruction pose a threat, either to the United States or to the world. And it therefore, our belief and it underlies this proposal that eliminating the weapons of mass destruction, rather than Saddam Hussein, per se, ought to be the primary goal of U.S. policy.

Not only is this the location of the threat, it is our belief that only this provides a legitimacy for the use of force and only this as a goal commands broad international support. As soon as the United States steps beyond that goal and widens its focus beyond the goal of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, we lose the international support we want and need. This is a problem that reaches back to the middle of the Clinton Administration at least. Also as a starting point, let me emphasize that in our belief Saddam's weapons of mass destruction do pose a threat, pressing threat. That's a threat that dates back at least to 1998.

They do not pose an immediate threat that requires us in any way to rush into action in a matter of -- excuse me -- days or weeks. Or there is no evidence to support that or to resort to war as a first resort. What is the proposal then, as a middle way, a third approach between the unacceptable status quo and the enormous risks and costs, certain costs of going to war? We believe that this middle ground can be found in a proposal to create what we have called the IIF, the Inspections Implementation Force, a powerful, multi-national, military force, American led and largely, but not wholly American composed, that would enable UNMOVIC, that would strengthen the weaknesses that Mr. Perle just referred to which are real. And would enable UNMOVIC to carry out what we've called comply or else inspections.

We believe, with Mr. Lantos, that the time for negotiation and discussion with Saddam Hussein is long past, that that only produces delay. And these inspections would rely far more on Iraqi compliance than on the unlikely event of Iraqi cooperation. Under these comply or else inspections, we would have a system of inspections drastically different from those in the earlier period under UNSCOM where the balance of power in technology, in money, in resources and in political unity were all drastically tilted in Iraq's favor. This is a proposal to drastically redress that balance in favor of the inspectors. The or else in our comply or else inspections is of course, if Saddam chooses that overthrow of the regime. But in any case, the burden of choosing war would be shifted solely to his shoulders.

Let me emphasize also that when we speak of inspections, we're talking about two different phases of inspections, a time limited discovery and disarmament phase and an open ended monitoring and verification phase. That's important to keep in mind. The critical element for this scheme of coercive inspections to work is for the United States to formally, unambiguously, unequivocally forswear action on regime change for as long as inspections are working. The United States has to walk in policy a very fine line here. It must first convince Iraq and other countries that if it does not comply, we will use force. I think we're close to having conveyed that message, certainly to other countries, if not to Saddam Hussein. But we are close.

But secondly and equally important, we have to convey the message that if Iraq does comply with inspections, we will not. Otherwise, an inspection force, particularly an armed inspection force as we're proposing would be nothing more than a trojan horse for invasion and something no sane government would expect. It would be the equivalent of asking them to open a door, say come on in and take away our most precious weapons and then invade us.

So, our proposal does require the United States to make this commitment, this give. However, if our goal is disarmament, it's not giving up anything. A second point that is crucial and in particularly important in your discussions in the forthcoming days and in what is happening at the United Nations now is that the goal in our minds must not be a short-term goal about how quickly can we get inspectors into Iraq to begin their task, but under what conditions they will carry out their job once they are there.

In other words, the focus of your attention ought to be on the outcome and not on the beginning date. In our view, Saddam Hussein will give up weapons of mass destruction if and only if he is presented with a choice of doing that or the certainty of losing political power and probably his life. We must not kid ourselves that he regards inspections as anything other than war by other means. In our belief, therefore, only a credible threat of force will be required to get the teams in, but more importantly, to enable them to do their jobs once they're there.

One final key point I'd like to make if I could, Mr. Chairman. And that is that no amount of force will work without sustained political unity among the P five, the five permanent members of the security council. That is absolutely required. Any ambiguity that is left in the plan will be -- any point of disagreement among them will be a point of opportunity to sow dissension among them which Saddam Hussein has already proved himself a master at over the last five years. It was the loss of political unity among the security council beginning at about '95 that caused the unraveling of UNSCOM more than any other technical element. And so that is absolutely essential.

And if we are to achieve success, we have to find a formula that allows the P five to go forward in agreement under the UN charter with international support, but that takes away all opportunities from Saddam Hussein to debate it once these negotiations are under way. Finally, if I could, Mr. Chairman, on a relevant point, I think you have in front of you an op ed piece in today's New York Times. There was an editing error which added some language which neither General Boyd nor I wrote, and indeed, which is virtually the opposite of what we believe which suggests that inspectors would be spies in carrying out intelligence operations. This is precisely the kind of violation of the terms of an inspection regime that would destroy it. And so that's what counts for that blacked out material in the piece.

We do believe with Mr. Perle that UNMOVIC has many weaknesses in its current setup. But that all of these can be created, both through the resources of and the operations of the inspections implementation force. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I'll turn it over to General Boyd to describe how that would work.

HYDE: Thank you very.

General Boyd?

CHARLES G. BOYD, U.S. AIR FORCE, RETIRED, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: I would add to Dr. Mathews' beginning remarks by ...

HYDE: Would you put your mike on?

BOYD: I would add to Dr. Mathews' beginning remarks in expressing my sense of -- as always -- my sense of honor in being brought before this House in whatever committee to help in any way I can. I thank you for inviting me. The convictions that Dr. Mathews has expressed with respect to this larger issue were obviously shared by me. I joined her effort for that reason. I would emphasize one additional point with greater clarity. I also have the conviction that as a professional military office, a lifetime warrior, that all reasonable means to solve problems should be exploited before we resort, as a last measure, to that of armed force.

I believe there are many ways that you can get at the problem of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But I would prefer that course of action which carries the broadest base of support among other nations throughout the world, much as President Bush the first did in the Gulf War. From the standpoint of our long-term relationships with other nations and our role in that region, my task was to devise a framework by which the inspection process to do what Dr. Mathews outlined could be successful, a framework of military accompaniment with the inspectors themselves, a robust force, one capable of supporting any size operation on any kind of an inspection site, one that could provide security for the inspection process and one that could provide an intimidating force if necessary to deal with any obstruction of the moment.

But I have the conviction that she shared that this is not a force to fight its way into every inspection site it wants to inspect. At the point at which Saddam Hussein would in any meaningful way obstruct the process of inspection, than I think it should be an automatic transfer to the second phase of the operation, which would be to constitute an invasion force for the purpose of regime change. So the two are linked and the force that I have described in this report is one that, while small enough, it would not be seen as an invasion force in disguise.

It would be large and so constituted through pre-positioned equipment and infrastructure support that it could be turned into an invasion force if necessary. I'm going to yield the rest of my statement time because of the importance of your questions. I would add only one thing. In my discussion with current military planners, all describe this as a complex operation. And indeed, it is. All military operations of any size are complex. It is only in comparison to the complexity of an invasion force does it gain its appeal. And in fact, can be constituted, it has a simpler task than that of an invasion force and can be constituted and even trained, I believe, in collaboration with other members, other coalition members in a relatively short period of time and be prepared to accompany any kind of inspection regime as required.

HYDE: General, we have three votes pending. The floor calls us for three votes. So we will suspend until the final vote and we will hurry back. We will hear the rest of your testimony and Mr. Woolsey and then we'll go to questions. So if you can be patient and you, too, Mr. Perle. Thank you. Committee stands in recess until after the final vote.

(RECESS)

HYDE: The committee will come to order.

General Boyd, did you have a codicil to what you were saying? I mean, have you more?

BOYD: One concluding sentence, sir. I believe that there is a means that can be effective to solve this problem short of war. But, I would make it to the certainty that if it fails we do the war.

HYDE: Thank you, General.

Mr. Woolsey, I understand you -- I didn't introduce you in the fullness of your resume, that you are vice president of Booz, Allen and Hamilton. So, permit me to amend my introduction of you and to ask you to make your presentation.

WOOLSEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are a number of important issues before the committee, but let me turn principally to the issue of whether an inspection regime could conceivably succeed in disarming Bathus Iraq.

Let me say that my experience as Director of Central Intelligence may be a bit relevant here. But, more relevant is the fact that I was an advisor, delegate and then finally ambassador and chief negotiator in five different arms control negotiations between the United States and either the Soviet Union or later the Warsaw Pact between 1969 and 1991. And, the last treaty I negotiated, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, has probably the most demanding and intrusive inspection regime that any arms control treaties ever had. There's certain feature of the Chemical Weapons Convention that are more demanding in some specific regards.

But, I speak not as an enemy of the principle of inspections or arms control. I've spent a lot of my life at it and I supported the chemical weapons convention and testimony before the Congress. But, I believe, first of all, there is no chance that an inspection regime such as that which is represented by UNMOVIC, the new weakened regime, weakened in 1999 from the terms under which the previous inspectors worked, which also worked inadequate.

I think there's no chance that UNMOVIC could succeed under any terms that are likely to be discussed at the United Nations. I take my hat off to my colleagues on the panel. I think they have done a good job of trying to put together an inspection regime, as demanding as one could imagine. I think there are two problems even with the regime, which they have in their report and in the New York Times this morning.

The first is that we know from Kildare Hamza, the head of the nuclear program for Saddam and from Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, the head of the biological weapons program who came out in '95 and then went back to Iraq and was killed, that there were and are hundreds of sites where weapons of mass destruction are worked on in Iraq. Many of them are buried. Many of them are quite small. Saddam is not using nuclear reactors any more to make fissile material thanks to the Israeli air force strike of 1981. But, he is using centrifuge in other facilities that can be relatively small, as biological weapons' laboratories can be quite small, we believe that some seven of them are mobile on the Renault trucks that were sold by France a short while back. And, indeed, any biological weapons' production material can be quite small.

It could be, for example, very much like an equipment in a microbrewery attached to a small restaurant which it really rather resembles to ferment material and the like. So, we have to know where to look.

Now, we're not going to find that out from spies. There aren't going to be nearly enough of them. We're not going to find it out from satellite photography except in a few regards, and we're not going to find it out from intercepted communications because the Iraqis are too clever to talk about these sorts of things over communications that can be intercepted.

The only way Hamza and others will tell you that we're going to be able to find where to look is to talk to Iraqis who are in the program. Some have defected, but not enough to find everything we need to know. We have to be able to do what UNSCOM, the previous inspectors, tried to do during the '90s and talk to Iraqis who are in the program.

The problem was that the way the inspection regime worked they had to talk to Iraqi's in Iraqi, which meant that the people in the program who were being interviewed by the inspectors were interviewed with Iraqi intelligence officers standing right beside them. As Saddam has done in the past when he believes anyone may be communicating with his enemies or the inspectors, he has many delightful tactics for dealing with this.

If an individual may be out of the country he has in the past, and I'm sure would again, take the individual's wife and daughters into custody, have them raped, have them killed, have that videotaped and have that sent to the husband and father who he believes is talking to someone who he doesn't want to be talked to.

As a result, there is no imaginable way, Richard Perle alluded to this in his testimony, and Kildare Hamza has spelled it out as well.

WOOLSEY: There's no imaginable way one could have an inspection regime that would work unless one was free to remove Iraqis who wanted talk and their families from Iraq. Now, I believe that it completely inconsistent with the totalitarian regime that we see.

A second problem, I believe, with even the very demanding regime that my colleagues have come up is that I think symbolic force is not enough. And I take fully onboard the statement that the force should be substantial. But, we had a substantial force in Berlin for most of the Cold War, the Berlin Brigade. It was a well-equipped substantial force, 3,000, 4,000 troops more. That force everyone knew would die if the surrounding Soviet 25 divisions chose to move west as almost happened once or twice during the Cold War.

So, I think any force that was in Iraq surrounded by, say, republican guard and the like would not really be able to exert force. They would have to be involved in finding some way to deal with the inevitable, blocking of the front door while the biological weapons are moved out the back door and so on, that has happened so many times, time and time again during the 1990s.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I think that if we except anything other than absolute certainty that all equipment and facilities related to all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of greater than 150 kilometers range have been destroyed, then we will be putting at risk, and unless we are able to stay in Iraq for a long time, as long as this Bathus regime exists under Saddam's sons or otherwise, then we will be putting at risk Iraq's neighbors and friends and allies of the United States because biological weapons can be reconstituted relatively quickly with relatively simple equipment. And, 150-kilometer missiles can have work done to expand, extend their range relatively quickly. We should not be under any allusion that we would be able to have some solution to this problem and then leave. So, I believe what one is talking about for any really effective way of ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of greater than 150 kilometers range is an occupying force of very substantial size and a fundamental change in the nature of the Iraqi regime. That Iraq would agree to that, I find unimaginable.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.

Now, we will turn to the members for questions. I would ask them to limit their questions to five minutes. And, the technique of making a statement for four and three-quarters minutes and then asking a question prolongs the five minutes and so I ask your cooperation with the spirit of giving everyone a chance and don't forget Mr. Perle who is lurking over us like a brooding omnipresence, to use Oliver Wendell Holmes' phrase.

Anyway, we turn to the questions and Mr. Lantos?

LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend all four of our witnesses, including the brooding omnipresence of Mr. Perle from London for giving us serious and thoughtful testimony.

I'd like to spend a moment on Ms. Mathews and General Boyd. Let me just say both of you have distinguished records and you have come forward with an intellectually appealing proposal, which I do not believe has any practical likelihood of succeeding. I think you are predicating your notion on a totally artificial separation of Saddam Hussein from weapons of mass destruction. You are correct if we could wish to have all weapons of mass destruction destroyed and we really wouldn't care whether Saddam Hussein stays or not. That, in theory is a plausible approach; in fact, it is not a plausible approach.

Saddam Hussein has sacrificed, if that's the term, $50 billion, $75 billion, $100 billion in foreign exchange to develop weapons of mass destruction. And, the notion that he would cooperate in the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction I find fanciful. I also find it, with all due respect, wholly unrealistic to expect the United Nation's Security Council, as divided as it is, over a long period of time as incapable as it is over a long period of time of making decisive and cohesive decisions, to create such an entity and then relinquish control to an American military commander who would make the decisions.

I also share Mr. Woolsey's reservations, every single one of them and I do want to commend you for attempting to find what you are groping for and that is a middle way. There is no middle way in this crisis, and much as I want to applaud you intellectually, I think as a pragmatic proposal, I frankly do not think yours can be taken very seriously with all personal respect to both of you.

I would like to deal with an issue and I'd be grateful if Mr. Woolsey or Secretary Perle would comment on it, and the two of you as well. Since one of the president's economic advisors has estimated the cost that maybe $100 billion those who oppose forceful action have now gotten a new economic argument saying how can we afford to spend $100 billion on this. But, it seems to me that Iraq is potentially one of the wealthiest countries on the face of this planet. And, it is self-evident to me that any rational post-Hussein regime would be compelled over a reasonable period of time to pay for the cost of this venture.

Iraqi oil resources create an enormous difference between what we are up against in Afghanistan, where, of course, the post-war cost is infinitely smaller than this figure. All of the donors have combined to offer about $5 billion, haven't delivered half of it yet, talking about 2 billion, 2.5 billion which has been put into Afghanistan. The notion that Iraq's oil resources, under a new civilized regime, cannot be used over time to pay for this damage is to me an absurdity. And, I would like to ask perhaps starting in London with Mr. Perle, as to what your thoughts are vis-a-vis the notion of Iraqi oil resources should pay for the cost of this activity should the president decide to use military force?

PERLE: Well, Congressman Lantos, I believe that military action to remove Saddam Hussein would in fact be an act of liberation. And, the principle beneficiaries of that would be the people of Iraq. Of course, it is a question of our safety in order to contain the damage that Saddam might do, but the Iraqi's themselves have suffered horribly under the regime of Saddam Hussein. There will be a tremendous of work to do to reconstitute the country. And, I see no reason why the people of Iraq would not be prepared in the aftermath of the removal of Saddam to bear some of the cost of that, along with others in the international community.

There are those now who are skeptical about military action. I strongly believe that once Saddam is removed, much of that skepticism will give way as we see the reaction of the people of Iraq. So, I think it's entirely plausible.

One last point, one can put forward a number like $100 billion or $200 billion, no one really knows. The cost of not acting in time to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring a nuclear weapon, for example, is in estimate and $100 billion would look like a bargain if we were faced with a nuclear arms Iraq.

LANTOS: Mr. Woolsey?

WOOLSEY: I agree with what Mr. Perle has said and I would simply add that in 1944 38 percent of the American gross national product went to the military, even $100 billion is about 1 percent of our gross national product of $10 trillion approximately. So, although I agree that we could quite reasonably see some contribution from a democratic Iraqi regime in the future to a war that freed Iraq, I must say that compared with the sacrifices this country has made in its several world wars and in the Cold War, finically and otherwise, to prevail and advance the cause of democracy, which we've succeeded in doing throughout the 20th century, even $100 billion, in relative terms, is reasonably modest.

LANTOS: Ms. Mathews?

MATHEWS: Let me first make the point that the cost of $100 billion or whatever the direct cost to the fiscal treasury is is it may only be the tip of the iceberg. We don't know what the economic losses would be caused by $40 a barrel oil on one what it already a very fragile stock market. It may dwarf that figure.

However...

LANTOS: Are you assuming a protracted...

MATHEWS: No.

LANTOS: ... engagement under the circumstances?

MATHEWS: I'm not.

LANTOS: Or are you assuming just a spike in the...

MATHEWS: I'm...

LANTOS: ... price of oil, which then would recede because a very powerful argument can be made that under a new non-Hussein regime Iraq would be the most effective weapon against OPEC. Iraq will have enormous reconstruction costs. Iraq may be pumping 5 million, 6 million barrels and the price of oil could well plummet well below $20.

MATHEWS: Perhaps.

LANTOS: Are you positing a $40 figure...

MATHEWS: I'm...

LANTOS: ... for the long run?

MATHEWS: No. I'm positing a spike. And, I believe that a spike in the current stock market, which we know to be very fragile, could have very severe economic consequences. But, I...

LANTOS: I'm sorry.

MATHEWS: I'm sorry, just very quickly, we -- I think we, perhaps, kid ourselves to call this or to think of this as a liberation. To Iraqi's it will be an invasion and a great many of them will die. We're talking about urban warfare, a great many innocent Iraqis will die. I don't believe that it is going to be looked upon as a wonderful event by Iraqis, any more than an invasion of the United States under what any conditions would be felt that way by Americans.

The only...

LANTOS: But, you're not drawing an analogy between a free and open and democratic society...

MATHEWS: Of course not. I said...

LANTOS: ... and the society living under a ruthless and bloody totalitarian dictator, are you?

MATHEWS: No, of course not, but I am just trying to point out that it's, I think, from this distance to use the word liberation to what I believe will feel more like an invasion. But, I...

LANTOS: Did you view the occupation of Germany by allied forces following D-day and the movement of the Soviet Army towards Berlin an occupation or a liberation?

MATHEWS: That was a liberation. If I could just make the point that I was trying to make. It's the only way, I think, under which the U.S. could hope to get some sort of payments, which I understand to be what you're talking about, from Iraqi oil revenues to pay for this war would be under some kind of multi-lateral auspices. Anything else, I believe, will look to the world like a United States that went to war in order to get its hand on Iraq's oil resources. And, I think the cost to us of doing that would be in unestimatable.

LANTOS: General Boyd?

BOYD: I would only make one point, (inaudible).

HYDE: Mic. Mic.

BOYD: I would only make one very brief point and it won't be to really try to persuade you. You've a well-reasoned conclusion that you've made up your mind. But, let me add one point for the sake of others.

BOYD: I don't know how many nations, but I suspect very few would view a preemptive use of force for a military invasion for the purpose of regime change has been a legitimate move. It may well be...

LANTOS: If I may stop you for a minute, would you suggest that the purpose would be a regime change or the purpose would be the destruction and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, which is predicated on the regime change? I mean what is the goal? The goal clearly is to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and your formula offers an avenue, not very realistic in the minds of some of us, of bringing about a destruction of all weapons of mass destruction without a regime change.

BOYD: I think that's a distinction that doesn't mean very much. If you say to disarm, which is my objection, and the purpose of which cannot be achieved without regime change to the neighbors and for the rest of the world watching, it would look like that force was invading for the purpose of regime change. Yes, ultimately to disarm him.

But, the point is the regime change. Now, then, which I think would be viewed by very few nations as a legitimate move. If, as you say, this inspection regime that we have outlined is unrealistic and ultimately cannot be effective, cannot succeed, if, in fact, Saddam Hussein would be effective in obstructing it, then it links to the regime change that you seek. The difference being, it seems to me, that it then becomes this is a legitimizing mechanism. It seems much more obvious to me, and I think to the rest of the world, that we have attempted everything we can within the framework of existing international law. It's proven ineffective and we then have no other choice but to do the regime change in favor...

HYDE: The chair is...

BOYD: ... (inaudible) legitimizing mechanism, I believe that preemptive action does not have to.

HYDE: The chair is very reluctant to intrude, but...

LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Mr. Gilman?

GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope that equal time will be given to all of us. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for...

HYDE: You want to be here until 6 o'clock this evening?

GILMAN: Not necessarily. But, I think we have to consider Mr. Perle (ph), who is coming. I want to thank you for arranging this timely hearing on our nation's policy toward Iraq. It's certainly important for the entire Congress and I want to thank our panelists and Mr. Perle for making himself available.

I fully support the president's efforts to demand Iraqi compliance with the adopted UN resolution. Since expelling UN inspectors from Iraq, Mr. Hussein has had four years to rebuild and rearm his country's weapons stockpiles. I doubt if we're going to be able to find those. It's imperative, that the world of nations of the united front take this threat seriously and take preventative action against the tyranny of the Iraqi government and to order it to disarm before the events of September 11 are allowed to be repeated.

And, I might add that we were with the president at the UN a week ago. The UN still hasn't acted on a resolution. As September 11 taught us, Saddam's means of deploying weapons of mass destruction are by no means limited to conventional means. His continued sponsorship of terrorists groups, global reach provides him an additional mechanism with which to deliver them. As long as the Saddam regime continues policies aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons and increasing his storehouse in chemical, biological and possibly radiological weapons, the Iraqi regime continues to pose a very serious threat to our nation, not only to our nation, but to our allies as well.

And, I want to take this opportunity to commend the president for developing a strong legal case against Iraq as he set forth at the UN. Iraq's attempts to both reconstitute and to expand its weapons of mass destruction is a clear breach of the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions 686 and 687, which included the demand that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction and elimination of all of those weapons. And, that it unconditionally undertake not use, develop or require any means relevant to these weapons of mass destruction. This, in my opinion, constitutes a serious breach that must be viewed as a threat to all international peace and security. His continued material breach of these resolutions further illustrates his regime's views of itself in a perpetual state of war with our nation. It's a military, diplomatic and economic war that Saddam's regime is intent on winning and is willing to pay a heavy price to emerge as its victor. We must take all necessary steps to ensure that he fails.

Mr. Perle, I'd like to ask you what is your opinion of the coercive inspection team?

PERLE: Well, I'm afraid I share Congressman Lantos's view that it is unrealistic. I think any inspection scheme that requires the cooperation of Saddam Hussein and because he controls the territory it's hard to imagine any scheme that would not, is ultimately bound to fail. He will go to whatever lengths are necessary to prevent us from finding the things that are so easily hidden in a country the size of Iraq. So, adding some military forces, which would ultimately be modest in relation to Iraqi military forces, seems to me not to change the fundamental obstacle that any inspection team faces. It is simply too large a country, there are too many places to hide and without very precise intelligence, making known the places that we should inspect, it is virtually impossible to achieve an effective inspection regime.

GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Perle.

Mr. Woolsey, in light of the fact that the UN has not acted on the resolutions requested by the president, should we continue to put pressure on the Security Council, or what would be the alternative if they fail to act at a reasonable time?

WOOLSEY: I believe it's useful to continue to make the case to the Security Council for a time, as long as it doesn't interfere with a properly timed military action. In my judgment, the situation here does not require us to talk of preemption. There was a war in 1991 and a cease-fire agreement temporarily halted that war, there were conditions to the cease-fire agreement that Saddam give up all chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of greater than 150 kilometers. He is in clear violation of three of those four terms and he's working hard to violate the fourth, to obtain nuclear weapons.

He's in violation of the cease-fire agreement. As far as I'm concerned we don't need to claim that we have some preemptive rights. We can enforce the cease-fire agreement. Now, if it helps from the point of view of international politics to spend a bit more time working with our French and Russia and Chinese colleagues in the Security Council to obtain a resolution, that seems to me that's well within the purview of what we ought to let the president and the secretary of state and secretary of defense decide.

But, if the French and Russians especially believe that they can oppose steps to destroy Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and change the regime as necessary and still be favorably treated or have their oil companies favorably treated in a newly liberated Iraq, I believe we should give them something else to think about.

I think it is ridiculous for them to believe that Total (ph) and Elf (ph) and Luke Oil can have deals with Saddam Hussein and then, following a war in which Saddam is deposed, simply pick right up where they left off. They should be asked, I think, to think about the implications of their actions now.

HYDE: Mr. Ackerman?

GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.

ACKERMAN: Thank you.

I thank the panel.

General, I listened with great care to your statement about regime change. If the scenario were that somebody moved next door to you who was a madman and appeared with a gun and menaced your children and your family and those you love, and then some authority came along and removed those weapons, and then a short while down the road, the same thing happened, the same madman was rearmed with the same weapons intent on menacing and doing harm to your family and was disarmed. The next time this happened would you want to search his house or would you want to just disarm him again? Would you want to get rid of him? Is he the problem or is the spontaneous appearance of arms the problem? How do you solve that problem?

BOYD: If I thought I could gain the support of the United Nations' Security Council and hold in my camp a large body of world opinion in support of doing what you just outlined then that would be my first option. I don't believe that's the case. The case that we have outlined in this Carnegie Report is a step in that direction principally because we think we can do that with a much broader base of support than the first option, that of regime change oriented invasion.

But, we link to if it does not succeed; we link to the second option, which is the one you've outlined.

ACKERMAN: So, then...

BOYD: And, we think we carry a much broader base of support with us.

ACKERMAN: You would wait as this madman inched closer and closer to you while trying to gain the support of the rest of the community. At what point do you forsake the consent of the community to protect what's near and dear to you.

BOYD: I don't know what you mean by that, but if you...

ACKERMAN: What I mean is at what point, if I can switch back to the real situation, at what point do we forsake the UN's involvement and go it alone?

BOYD: If we cannot gain their consensus to begin with, then that's the point. If we do gain their consensus and move in a UN supported...

ACKERMAN: Is there a timeline here?

BOYD: However long it takes to determine that that system is not effective...

(CROSSTALK)

ACKERMAN: ... sits there and they push the envelope back and forth and there are delays. Lets assume that the inspectors go in and Saddam Hussein, again, as is obvious to most people, tries to impede the inspections and come up with terms and puts things in their way. At what point does the threshold kick in? Where's the trigger here? I think that's what's missing from your report. Is it the first time that there's a delay and when there is that first delay and I'd be willing to put $50,000 on the line with you to say there's going to be a first delay. If you want to do that, I'm willing, just to let you know. But, I'm willing to risk my money than to risk him getting more out of control.

BOYD: You could probably afford that, I probably can't, so I think I'll not take your bet.

ACKERMAN: Yes, I understand that. But, I think that the world and the international community and the region can't afford to have him do what it looks like he's going to do based on his track record. But, at what point do we stop the niceties in that process? And, when we stop that process is the retaliation limited? Is it overwhelming? Is it regime change? What is it in your plan?

BOYD: Dr. Mathews answered and the report is clear on this that we would forswear an invasion for exactly as long as the inspection process was effective, moving effectively, without impediment, without obstruction. At the point at which that ceases, that's the point that you're asking about, that's when we switch to the second option.

ACKERMAN: So, as soon as he stutters.

BOYD: As soon as the effective process of inspection and disarmament is obstructed by Saddam Hussein...

ACKERMAN: And, our response is what, just that -- this last question, Mr. Chairman.

BOYD: Then the response is that...

ACKERMAN: Regime change?

BOYD: ... invasion for the purpose of regime change.

ACKERMAN: Thank you.

HYDE: The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.

BERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to yield to the chairman.

HYDE: Would the gentleman yield very briefly? I don't want to take a lot of time, I very quickly ask -- make two comments.

HYDEL It seems to me coercive inspection leaves in the lurch a lot of people over there who have been working with us to liberate their people, the Kurds, the Shi'a, other elements within Iraq who have been working with us, clandestinely and otherwise, to liberate their country. They would suddenly find themselves isolated and alone. And, I think that's an unfortunate consequence of limiting our response to coercive inspection.

And, secondly, how do you erase from the mind of scientists over there and chemists and biologists the ability to reconstitute these things when things quiet down? Let the inspectors leave, let a couple of summers go by and bang, they're back in business with more anthrax and botulism and whatever it takes. That'll be a constant threat while Saddam Hussein and his ilk hang around.

So, just a loose end that I think deserves some attention. But, I'm not asking as a question. I just wanted to vet that.

Thank you, Mr. Berman.

BERMAN: I'd be very grateful if the panel could answer my first question just in one sentence because there's I would like to get into. I believe, as close to a certainty as one can have, that what we would find in Saddam's arsenal in weapons of mass destruction is significantly worse than the evidence of what we have is now, the evidence from satellites, from human intelligence, from defectors, from all the other testing kinds of things.

In other words, that what our intelligence agencies now know, when we finally find it out, will be much worse than what we know. Do you agree with that assessment or disagree? If you could a very short reply, I'd be grateful.

BOYD: I agree.

MATHEWS: We'll know more than we know now.

BERMAN: Will we find...

MATHEWS: But, whether it will be worse than what we consider probable I don't know. I mean partly because I'm not privy to the current intelligence, but I know a fair amount about what the -- if the import of your question is do you believe that he has attempted and has been successful in reconstituting a good deal of what we know he had in '98, the answers yes.

WOOLSEY: You're asking me to guess. I would guess the same that you're guessing, but I don't know that.

BERMAN: Mr. Perle?

PERLE: I would agree with that. We never know everything and so almost by definition what we ultimately learn is worse than what we knew when we started out.

BERMAN: OK. And, then for any of you who care to respond, just a couple of points. One, Ms. Mathews challenged the assumption that the Iraq people would view us as liberators were there to be an attack, which resulted in a regime change. I thought if things went well, one never knows, but if things went well, that it would be pretty clear that this would not be the clash of civilizations. It would not be America against the Arab people because the Iraqi people would be viewing us as liberators and it would take away the argument from those who would want to create that conflict that it would show to everyone else that, in fact, Saddam was the enslaver and America was not the enemy of the 25 million Arabs living in Iraq.

Ms. Mathews challenges that assertion and raises the issue of urban warfare. I'm particularly curious what Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Perle think of how it might go and what that reaction would be, because, certainly, tens of thousands of civilian casualties, massive deaths and that assumption might turn out to be quite wrong.

Secondly, I am curious, General Boyd, I'm told that in the previous administration part of the premise of coercive inspections is no drive zones and that there is no practical way in the world that we have the ability to enforce no drive zones in the context of conducting these inspections even with a fairly robust military presence accompanying the inspectors. It just can't be done with the current military capabilities. I'd be curious to hear your response to that. Thank you.

WOOLSEY: Congressman, I'll start on the liberation. We have two excellent case studies for how the Iraqi people would regard being freed of Saddam Hussein. One is what happened in Iraq in 1991. The other is what happened in Afghanistan last fall.

In Iraq in 1991, liberation movements erupted in 15 of Iraq's 18 providences and they were succeeding. And the joy in the streets was palpable. Read about or talk to anyone who was there and got out, there's an excellent piece in the Wall Street Journal about a young woman who was there just four or five days ago.

And, as far as Afghanistan goes, we saw when Mazar-i-Shariff and Kabul was liberated what happens when the women could finally show up in public with their faces uncovered and the men could have their beards cut and the children could fly kites and music could finally be played. It was ecstatic. And I think that after 40 years of tyranny, the chance that we would be regarded as anything other than liberators is slim to the vanishing point.

Now, any war that takes a long time and is very bloody is going to have a lot of people who don't want it to continue and are bothered by it. But, if you look at what happened in 1991, after five weeks of an air war in which we used 5 percent smart weapons, the mainline Iraqi Army, which was 800,000 to 900,000 strong then, basically made one of two choices, either they surrendered to Italian television film crews or they surrendered to American unmanned aerial vehicles. It's not that they didn't fight well. They didn't fight at all.

The republican guard fought in some cases reasonably well. But, the Iraqi Air Force fled to Iran. And I don't think that this is going to be a cakewalk at all, but I do think that we have a reasonable chance, using, as we probably will there, 80 to 85 percent smart weapons in the air war. We have a reasonable chance of making this a decisive victory. There could be retreat to the cities fighting in the cities. But, how long can Saddam hold out in the cities without oil, without resources, without food?

I am frankly more concerned that we handle the post-war occupation, rebuilding of Iraq that we could make mistakes doing that than I am about the war itself. I don't think we need to be -- should at all be overconfident. And I think we ought to put 100,000 to 200,000 troops into the region and make absolutely sure we could deal with any contingency that came up.

But I think the Iraqi people will definitely in a particularly quick and decisive war, which I think is likely, not certain, but likely. I think the Iraqi people will greet us as the liberators we would be.

BERMAN: Let me just say I think this is an excellent panel. I think all of us are getting some very important insights. But, I do have a question and would like to ask it of Ms. Mathews and the others on the panel with regard to the admittedly.

WOOLSEY: Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: Yes?

WOOLSEY: At least General Boyd had -- there was one outstanding question to him and he's just one of...

HYDE: I would ask all members and I will restrict myself to three minutes as well. General, Colin Powell, Secretary Colin Powell, will be here within an hour. So, and we have several members who want to ask questions. I would hope that we would all try to stay within three to five minute rule. I'm going to be -- General Boyd, please proceed and answer Mr. Berman's question.

BOYD: I'll be very quick. I'm familiar with the no drive argument that has taken place. And the conditions that you're describing or that debate is over an entirely different kind of a mechanism where you deny movement on the surface virtually in an enduring way.

What we foresee in this, and I've worked with current military planners on how to go about this, is short duration, denial of the assembly of military forces and movement in a defined region while the inspection, the given inspection is taking place, as well as denying the airspace. And that's an entirely different problem. And that's quite a workable problem.

BERMAN: At least let me ask one question on coercive inspections, which clearly has some surface appeal. But, I would ask the panel very briefly if they could respond. I have concerns, and I think many members have concerns one, whether or not they would be successful in their own right and, of course, that's an open question for all inspections. But, the safety of the troops, we saw in Sebernitza (ph) when Umber Four (ph) had a relatively weak mandate that over time those so-called safe havens became a Mecca of gathering part of area for people to be clustered and then, like we saw in Sebernitza, summarily killed.

And I'm very concerned about hostage taking. We know that Saddam Hussein certainly has no qualms about what he called euphemistically human shields. In a scenario where they have found weapons of mass destruction in an act of desperation that might ensue and they could be overpowered, it would seem to me as we saw in Somalia by -- even though the number of deaths obviously were largely in the sign of Somalis. It was a terrible situation that our soldiers found themselves in.

So, again, it has surface appeal. But, does it have, also, the attendant risks of hostage taking, of being, you know, this idea looks good, but obviously does not yield the results that is looked for.

Mr. Woolsey, could you answer that?

WOOLSEY: Congressman, I share your concern. In the first two years of the Clinton Administration there were a number of discussions about whether to try to use force in Bosnia or not. And the big objection in most cases was that the UN peacekeepers by that time were there and they could be taken hostage by the Serbs.

Now, I think General Boyd and Ms. Mathews have done the best they can in the context of their proposal to talk about having robust military forces and the rest. But, even, you know, a brigade or more of troops inside Iraq surrounded by the republican guard are effectively hostages. And I think that it would be a very tough decision for an American president to go to war and sacrifice that brigade and those inspectors and the rest if they were harassed, prevented from moving, et cetera by this totalitarian regime.

This is the type of proposal that would work, perhaps, with a regime that was hesitant or was autocratic but not absolutely totalitarian or that wanted the world's approval or something. But, with Saddam Hussein's Iraq I just don't think it would work.

BERMAN: Ms. Mathews, General Boyd or Mr. Perle?

BOYD: I think that there are no risk-free options here. I don't think you can guarantee security of that force, that inspection team. But, you can certainly enhance it greatly by the kind of measures that we have outlined. But you can't guarantee the security of an assembling invasion force either. And assembling that force is the moment in which I believe that it's the greatest risk. On the border of a nation that is in possession of weapons of mass destruction and your objective is to remove those who hold control of those weapons of mass destruction without an incentive at that point to hold anything back. It's show time. They're going down and I suspect they'll use everything they can, not just Saddam Hussein, but all of those who would find their future at risk as well.

So, that's a pretty high-risk operation at that point. I share Jim Woolsey's assessments in the main that I know every well how they fought in 1991. And I doubt if they're going to fight much better. Although, I accept Jessica Mathews point that people fight differently on their own soil than they fight on somebody else's soil.

So, you have to prepare for the worst as he's suggested. There are no risk-free options is that I'm saying. But, I believe you can make that inspection process in that phase relative if you the measures we've called for and you can make that risk very low.

PERLE: Mr. Chairman, could I add something?

HYDE: Yes, please, Mr. Perle.

PERLE: It seems to me that there's general agreement that the purpose of inspections is to find, leading ultimately to the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. It's not inspections for inspections' sake. And it seems to me that the proposal is seriously and deeply flawed in the following respect. Suppose we adopt this proposal and we enter into an inspection regime that is heavily reinforced. Reinforced so that when something is found we have a sufficient presence to destroy what it is that is found.

Suppose we don't find anything. Suppose we don't find anything because the country is vast and we don't know where to look. You cannot conclude from the fact that we haven't found anything that there is nothing to be found. So, when General Boyd and Jessica Mathews argue that if Saddam blocks inspections we could then take action, suppose he never blocks inspections because he has hidden the things we're trying to find so well that it isn't necessary to block inspections?

In that case, the inspection regime goes on forever while Saddam holds on to the weapons of mass destruction that have been effectively concealed and we have no means of removing those weapons of mass destruction.

Now, you know and I know that after some period of time, without having found weapons of mass destruction, the ability to sustain those inspections is going to go away. The Iraqis are going to argue you've been here for X months or years even, you've found nothing. It's time to leave and restore normalcy to Iraq.

And in that event he would have gotten away with it. So, everything depends, not on whether the inspectors have military means to back them up, but on whether we know where to look because if we don't know where to look random checks will not unearth weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

HYDE: Thank you.

Mr. Faleomavaega?

MATHEWS: Mr. Chairman, can I also provide an answer...

HYDE: Sure.

MATHEWS: ... on this. I'll be very quick.

What you've just heard and Mr. Woolsey's earlier comments are made in complete ignorance of the record of UNSCOM in the period from 1991 to 1997. Going in starting from nothing, mind you, with very little resources and without prior knowledge they uncovered all of the four areas of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The story is laid out in detail in our report. What they found and what they didn't. They uncovered is most precious secrets, the fact of the biological weapons program, not because of defection but because of their own inspections.

We know, as though these people would be going in to not knowing where to look, in Mr. Perle's phrase. They know exactly where to begin. We have a huge amount of intelligence. We have a huge amount of acquired knowledge. This team has a vast work plan already laid out. This is not going in on a blank slate at all.

I would recommend or commend to the committee the piece by Ambassador Kaiss (ph) from last Sunday's Washington Post where he lays this out, lays out how it was done and gives us a sort of granular first-hand sense of how inspections actually proceed that this discussion I think has not conveyed.

Thank you.

WOOLSEY: I have to say just one sentence. I would rather than umbrage at the assertion that I am in ignorance of the record here and that the defectors were of no utility and that the inspectors discovered this material entirely on their own. It's simply not true.

The defection of Kamel and the defection of Kildare Hamza had a great deal to do with where the inspectors looked with respect to biological weapons records and the rest. And the record simply doesn't support what Ms. Mathews said.

HYDE: Mr. Faleomavaega?

FALEOMAVAEGA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I certainly want to commend the members of our panel for their statements. I think two fundamental things that we have to be reminded as members, not only of Congress, we're all swore to sustain and support the Constitution of the United States. And two fundamental things that we need to be reminded of, the president does not declare a war. It's the Congress. That is specifically stated an act of war has to be stated clearly by the Congress.

Congress also is charged with the responsibility of raising an Army and a Navy, not the president. I have the deepest respect for our president. And I've never questioned his sincerity, his integrity. But, I think this is where our responsibility comes in to bear, to question the wisdom and the thoroughness of this very, very basic and fundamental issue of our government. We're going to declare a war on another country.

And I'd like to ask -- I have other things I want to say, but just quickly to the members of the panel. You believe the president is going to be asking the Congress for an official declaration of war, or is it going to be like another resolution of Tonkin like we did in Vietnam?

Should the president be asking for an official declaration of war by the Congress, or should it be in another form of resolution that gives him flexibility with all conditions that doesn't really state clearly it should be a declaration of war?

WOOLSEY: I don't believe a formal declaration of war is necessary. As I said earlier, I believe the 1991 war never stopped from Saddam's point of view. It was temporarily halted by a cease- fire, which he is in violation of. So, under those circumstances I don't believe a formal declaration of war if necessary. I do believe it would be wise for the president, and I'm glad he has decided to come to the Congress and present the case to the Congress and ask for congressional authorization.

The precise form of that, whether it's under the war powers resolution or something else, I would leave to the back and forth between the legislative and executive branch on this long-standing troubled constitutional issue.

So, I think Congress should deliberate and make its judgment. But, that it needs to be a formal declaration of war, such as last occurred in World War II? No, I don't believe that's necessary.

FALEOMAVAEGA: Because my time is limited, I want to end with a question to General Boyd and Dr. Mathews.

Your position is not an intellectual exercise. You're wanting to see if this could be another -- we all know what happened 10 years since the first Bush Administration, Saddam has violated every resolution that the United Nations put forth. Are you suggesting here that we ought to put more teeth on the inspection process? And if that does not work, then go to the next level, which is a mass invasion of Iraq? Is this what I sense from both of you on your proposal?

MATHEWS: That's right.

FALEOMAVAEGA: And, in addition to your asserting this position is because this has the support, not only of all the Arab countries, but also, I think the members of the Security Council and even the United Nations. Am I correct on this?

MATHEWS: Correct.

FALEOMAVAEGA: General Boyd?

BOYD: (OFF-MIKE) Proposing something that would require a United Nations Security Council resolution. So, it...

FALEOMAVAEGA: With teeth? I mean, with enforcement, procedures.

BOYD: The mechanism that we propose would require that kind of a consensus within the Security Council. Yes.

FALEOMAVAEGA: You know, it's interesting to note -- is my time over -- to note that General Westmoreland once said that politicians are the ones that create war, not the military. And I wanted to ask General Boyd; you know more than anybody what it means to be in a state of war. Are there presumptions made about -- can we say that it's a safe presumption that we're looking at millions of refugees that are going to come out of that country of Iraq once we start bombing the heck out of these people? And who are going to be taking responsibility for these 20 million people that live in that country if we take invasion as our best option, a state of war? Have we taken that into consideration?

BOYD: I don't know the answer to that, but I have to assume we have. Those who are -- these are careful men with good judgment that are doing our planning. And I have no qualms about that at all. I am only suggesting a mechanism that would precede a method that I believe can carry broad based international support to see if it's effective. And if it's not, then I'll go to this more troublesome regime change oriented invasion force that we're talking about.

FALEOMAVAEGA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know the other members want to ask questions.

HYDE: Thank you very much.

Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman from California.

ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much.

And let me pay my respects to the whole panel, especially Mr. Perle. Dr. Perle, thank you for spending the time with us today and thank you for your great service to our country. Dr. Perle, of course, was very important in -- when I was in the Reagan Administration of laying out the theories that led to the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War. The peace through strength proposal that led with President Reagan's leadership to a more peaceful world.

I think there were people on the other side of that, maybe at the Carnegie Institute who fought us and several of our efforts back in those days as well. The only thing that we're going to get widespread support from and, with all due respect to Ms. Mathews and General Boyd and to my colleague, Mr. Faleomavaega, is, as Ms. Mathews indicated, getting rid of the weapons. And that's if we can count on getting rid of all the weapons, which I have never seen evidence that we can for sure, be sure certain, that we've gotten rid of all the weapons.

But, let me note this, once we have eliminate the weapons that we do find, Ms. Mathews, doesn't this mean that we just start the process all over again? Isn't what happened that what we have right now and the fact that we're in this pickle right now and that we're in jeopardy to the likes of Saddam Hussein, isn't this due to the fact that we have this passion for a multi-lateral support and an effort last time around and we gave in to our allies and not taking out Saddam Hussein that 10 years ago? Isn't that what this is all about?

We gave into our allies saying don't take out Saddam Hussein 10 years ago and now here we are in jeopardy again. Aren't you just talking about starting that same cycle all over again and a few years down the road we're going to be right here again and you're going to be right there saying let's go to our allies and make sure that they concur with us? And then we end up in a halfhearted effort.

MATHEWS: The choice that we made not to end the war with the death of Saddam Hussein in 1991 had nothing to do with our allies. It was our own choice.

Secondly, the answer to your question about whether this would be -- start all over again in two years is no. The inspection regime, as already written, presupposes a highly intrusive open-ended, ongoing monitoring and verification phase after the disarmament phase.

ROHRABACHER: Well, I would suggest this. The only allies that count in this effort are the people of Iraq. And we have the people of Iraq on our side and I will tell you that I am very disturbed at listening to your testimony suggesting that the people of Iraq will not welcome the United States' efforts to help them rid themselves of Saddam Hussein. And I think that there is some type of a fundamental misunderstanding that you have about what people who live under such tyrants really feel. Because, if you lived under this kind of tyranny and you saw some Americans working with Iraqis to get rid of Saddam Hussein I think you would be doing what they will be doing when we liberate Baghdad and that is they will be dancing in the streets, waving American flags, thanking us for ridding themselves of this gangster whose been murdering their own people for so long.

And all this caution that we have about going in, and I think that we have to be very reasonable and rational about it, but we shouldn't show caution about the feelings of some of our "allies" who they themselves have less than free countries. We should be concerned about the people of Iraq and making sure they're on our side.

Mr. Perle, do you have something to say about that?

PERLE: Well, I very much agree with that and I think I'm sure that Jessica doesn't intend it this way. But it sounds to me a rather demeaning characterization of the Iraqi people to suggest that they would not wish to see the end of this tyrannical rule. Of course they would, anybody would.

And this, I'm afraid, is part of a larger tendency to believe that somehow the Arab world isn't fit for democracy, isn't fit for decent governance. That's not the explicit argument, but it's certainly implicit in much of what we hear.

And finally, that is one reason why the president is, in my view, absolutely right. To argue that this is more than a question about inspections. There are other issues here. There are other UN resolutions, including resolutions dealing with the way Saddam deals with his own people. There are those who want to reduce it to the very narrow question of the return of inspections. And this, clearly, is Saddam's preferred tactic at the moment. But, the issue here is much broader than simply the question of inspections, which I think is a practical matter and won't work anyway.

ROHRABACHER: Well, Ronald Reagan showed that if you have a long- term goal freedom and democracy it also brings peace. And I think that's what's going to happen in Iraq too.

Thank you very much.

HYDE: Thank you.

The chair recognizes the gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. McKinney.

MCKINNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Perle, my first and second questions are for you.

Ms. Mathews, I have several questions for you.

My first question for Mr. Perle, on behalf of the many young men and women in our armed forces who won't be paid their high deployment overtime pay as they're just about to be sent off to war in Iraq because President Bush signed an executive order denying them their pay. Do you intend to ask the president to reinstate the overtime pay of our young men and women? The second question that I would ask for Mr. Perle is Sunday Observer, December 12, 2001, entitled Secrete U.S. Plan for Iraq War mentions James Woolsey, Paul Wolfowitz, Tommy Franks, as having participated in secret plans to prosecute the war and -- in Iraq.

But, most disconcerting is the final paragraph of this article, which states that the most adventurous ingredient in the anti-Iraqi proposal is the use of U.S. ground troops Pentagon sources say. Significant numbers of ground troops could also be called on in the early stages of any rebellion to guard oil fields around the Shia port of Basra in southern Iraq.

In addition to the administration having come up with the idea of hitting Saddam on weapons of mass destruction only after the Europeans told the United States that Iraqi links to 9/11 were circumstantial at best. Is it true that U.S. troops will guard oil fields near Basra? My question's for Ms. Mathews, why would the United States' government need to spend $200 million to convince the American people that Saddam must be ousted? I have an article here that the administration is about to launch a $200 million campaign, which will be overseen by the Office of Global Communications, would sound something eerily like the Office of Strategic Influence, which was denounced publicly.

Yet, this Office of Global Communications, the existence won't be announced until next month. Why is it that we have to spend this amount of money to convince the American people that this is the right thing to do?

I also have a question for Ms. Mathews again. And this president tells us that we're going to war in order to ensure peace. How can we believe this president when we failed to use U.S. troops to ensure the peace in East Timor when it was the Indonesians, in Afghanistan when it was the Taliban, in Rwanda when it was the genocide (ph), in Sierra Leone when it was the RUF, and in Democrat Republic of Congo right now with the aggression with respect to Rwanda and Uganda? Those are the questions that I would like to have answered starting with you, Mr. Perle.

PERLE: Well, I have no particular insight into the question of pay and bonuses. So, I'm afraid I can't be very helpful...

MCKINNEY: But, you sit on the defense board.

PERLE: Yes, but the defense policy board...

MCKINNEY: Don't you set policy?

PERLE: No, no, that's a misconception, the defense policy board is a group of individuals that advise the secretary of defense, but only on some issues and that's not an issue that...

MCKINNEY: Well, don't you think it would be advisable that the men and women who are being asked to fight the war be paid for fighting the war?

PERLE: Yes, I happen to think that we should extend ourselves with respect to our troops and I would cheerfully testify in favor of budget increases to accomplish that.

On your second question I have no knowledge of the plan that you referred to. I have my doubts that the Observer Newspaper in London is well informed on these matters, but you should put that question to General Franks or Jim Woolsey's right there in front of you. I have no knowledge of it.

WOOLSEY: I've never met General Franks, Congresswoman.

MCKINNEY: That wasn't the question that was asked.

WOOLSEY: If I was supposed to be planning a secret war with him, presumably I would have met him and I...

MCKINNEY: No.

WOOLSEY: ... did not.

MCKINNEY: No. Was there a plan to go to war prior to the announcements now? And did you participate in those plans?

WOOLSEY: I have no idea. I've been in defense policy board meetings that Richard chairs, but plans for war are not the providence of advisory boards consisting of former folks who worked in government and come in for a couple of days several times a year. No military and certainly not Don Rumsfeld and certainly not the joint chiefs would delegate any planning responsibility to members like that.

MCKINNEY: Well, actually the article says it was Paul Wolfowitz. But, I don't want to use -- lose all of my time...

(CROSSTALK)

WOOLSEY: Well, neither would Paul Wolfowitz; none of them would delegate their planning...

MCKINNEY: I'd like to get to Ms. Mathews.

WOOLSEY: ... to a group like that.

MATHEWS: Congresswoman, on your first question I think it's best address as the administration itself. On the question of peace, I guess my only comment would be that if our goal is disarming Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, which I believe it should be, I believe there is a credible, peaceful way to achieve it.

MCKINNEY: And your response to the $200 million that the president intends to use to convince the American people that going to war against Saddam Hussein is the right thing to do through this Office of Global Communication, which is as yet unannounced?

MATHEWS: Well, as I said, I think the question, you know, of the legitimacy of that, of the details of it is best addressed to the administration.

HYDE: The time of the gentlelady has expired.

Chairman Royce?

MCKINNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROYCE: Thank you.

Former Director Woolsey, I was going to ask you we have heard conflicting reports on Saddam Hussein's capability to develop nuclear weapons and clearly that is a strategic goal of Iraq. But, same say it's only a matter of months, that's the view of some of the defectors. Others say it would take years. I think it was National Security Advisor Connie Rice (ph) who said she did not want to wait to see the exploding mushroom cloud to know that he'd accomplished his goal of finishing the bomb.

But, in your estimate, h