U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: ADMINISTRATION VIEWS

PART 1

HEARING BEFORE THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

September 19, 2002

WITNESSES:

THE HONORABLE RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

THE HONORABLE R. JAMES WOOLSEY, VICE PRESIDENT, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON

THE HONORABLE JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

GENERAL CHARLES G. BOYD (INVITED), U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.), PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-IL): The committee will come to order. May you live in interesting times is a traditional Chinese curse, the full meaning of which becomes clearer every day. There is no issue more fraught with consequence than the one we face today. What should America's response be to threats posed by Iraq along with the larger challenge of extirpating terrorism of global reach?

There are disagreements about strategy, tactics, the efficacy of inspections, differing evaluations about the cost of intervention, what should follow a possible intervention, and so forth. Today I would like the attention to be focused mainly on what our expert witnesses have to say. There will be time later for us to debate these important issues, but I would offer only two observations. One is that the administration seems utterly convinced about the gravity of the threat from Iraq and the need to deal with it quickly. The second is my view that Saddam cannot be trusted. The word unconditional flows very quickly from his lips. His diplomats used it repeatedly in 1991 as they made promises that turned into endless quibbles, obstructions and defiance.

The committee begins today by welcoming five very distinguished Americans, both current and former public servants to talk about this most compelling issue of our day. This afternoon we will hear from the secretary of state and I will have a little more to say about that later. First we will hear from three former civilian government officials, Richard Perle, James Woolsey and Jessica Tuchman Mathews and retired Air Force General Charles Chuck Boyd.

I will introduce them more fully after giving my esteemed colleague, the ranking member of the committee, Tom Lantos an opportunity to make an opening statement. Mr. Lantos?

LANTOS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for holding this hearing and I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses. I fully share your opening comments. It is not only the administration which is convinced of the gravity of the threat. It is most, if not all of us in Congress, who are convinced of the gravity of the threat. I also share your second observation that Saddam Hussein on the basis of his record clearly can be trusted only by morons. I would add one more observation. Some people conduct this discussion or debate as if it would be analogous to debating the merits of an abstract painting. Some people like the color scheme. Some people don't like the color scheme. Some people would like to see different paintings and different combinations.

What distinguishes this debate from a debate on an abstract painting is that we have a history to deal with. And the totally ahistorical approach of some in the public, in the media and in the Congress is profoundly disturbing. So allow me in a minute or so to sketch what I consider to be the historical context of this discussion. The concept of preemption is not a new one as it relates to Iraq. In 1981, Iraq's nuclear reactor at Aussi Roc (ph) was destroyed. At the time, that preemptive act was widely criticized by the Reagan Administration, by most members of Congress and certainly the bulk, if not all of the media. I took a different point of view.

On the floor of this body, I praised that preemptive act because it was obvious that Saddam Hussein in 1981 was hell bent on developing nuclear weapons. Had the Aussi Roc (ph) reactor not been destroyed, the outcome of the Persian Gulf War could have been very different. The voices who even without a nuclear equipped Hussein suggested let's wait would surely have said how can we contemplate action, military action against a nuclear equipped Saddam Hussein. So maybe nothing would have happened. And Saddam Hussein today would be in control of the oil resources, not only of Iraq, but Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Emirates. And he would have a strangle hold on the jugular of the civilized world through his control of energy.

Had we decided to commence the war despite his nuclear capability, the losses would have been infinitely higher than what in fact, we suffered. There was also a debate in this body, in the Congress on whether to authorize action by the first President Bush against Iraq after they invaded Kuwait. And while we prevailed, those of us who favored authorization and voted for authorization, there was a very large negative vote which in a historic context appears to have been a profoundly mistaken negative vote. Now it's not only members of Congress who made mistakes. Some of us at the end of the war on Kuwait, on Iraq in connection with the invasion of Kuwait called on the administration of the first Mr. Bush to finish the job.

LANTOS: In retrospect, it would be hard for anyone to argue that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was a wise decision. So each of us comes to this debate not only with an understanding of what happened objectively, but what our own positions was along the way. And it is rather intriguing to see that some of the same people who gave bad advice 10 years ago and 22 years ago are again in the business of giving bad advice.

I'm looking forward to the administration sending up its proposal. I'm looking forward to our own vigorous debate here in this body and in the Senate. And I know that our distinguished witnesses will shed a great deal of light on this most important issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: Who is seeking ...

MCKINNEY: The gentlewoman from Georgia.

HYDE: Oh, there she is. Yes, gentlelady from Georgia.

MCKINNEY: I have an opening statement I'd like to read.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, I do as well.

HYDE: I understand. Who ...

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman, this hearing is about war. This hearing is about life and death. And as I look out at the audience and I see young people there, ...

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, will we all be allowed to give opening statements?

MCKINNEY: I would love to be able to give my opening statement.

HYDE: The gentlelady really has not been recognized.

MCKINNEY: Yes, I was recognized.

HYDE: Not for the purpose of giving an opening statement.

MCKINNEY: I wasn't giving an opening statement. I was giving my remarks.

HYDE: Well, you were giving an opening statement to your opening statement.

MCKINNEY: No, I was not, Mr. Chairman. But I would appreciate very much if you would allow me to give my opening statement.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman?

MCKINNEY: I can't believe that we're having a hearing on matters of war and peace and sending our young people off to war and you're trying to stifle the voices of the members of Congress.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: Who's - yes?

(UNKNOWN): Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say that I think that this chairman would never seek to stifle the voices of members of Congress. And if I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, we have some very distinguished witnesses here as you often and mostly have at our hearings. And I think we all have very, very strong opinions on this subject. In the interest of having everybody express their opinions, might I suggest that we proceed with the witnesses and those of us who have statements that we would like, take our five minutes sometimes right after them?

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman?

(UNKNOWN): Because otherwise, we will never -- multiply by five the members of this committee.

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman, we always have distinguished witnesses at all of our hearings. But that doesn't give us the right or give the chairperson the right to stifle the voices of the members of Congress.

(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of making a motion?

HYDE: Yes. The gentleman from New York.

(UNKNOWN): I would like to move that we proceed with hearing the witnesses and any member who has a statement to make, opening, closing or intermediary after the witnesses and after our questioning period be allowed seven minutes to make statements.

MCKINNEY: I'll object.

(UNKNOWN): I submit a motion. I didn't ask for unanimous consent.

HYDE: Those in favor of the motion, say aye.

MEMBERS: Aye.

HYDE: Opposed, nay.

MCKINNEY: No.

HYDE: The aye's have it. And ...

MCKINNEY: I call for a vote, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Motion is granted. The gentlelady asked for a roll call vote and the clerk -- do we have a clerk available? Will the clerk call the roll?

CLERK: Mr. Gilman?

GILMAN: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Leach? Mr. Bereuter?

MCKINNEY: Do we have a clerk available?

(UNKNOWN): Clerk is calling the roll.

CLERK: Mr. Bereuter? Mr. Smith? Mr. Burton? Ms. Gallegly? (INAUDIBLE) Mr. Ballenger? Mr. Rohrabacher?

ROHRABACHER: No.

CLERK: Mr. Royce?

ROYCE: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. King? Mr. Chabot?

CHABOT: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Houghton?

HOUGHTON? Aye.

CLERK: Mr. McHugh? (OFF-MIKE). Mr. Cantor?

CANTOR: Aye.

CLERK: Flake, Kerns, Davis, (INAUDIBLE)?

(UNKNOWN): Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Lantos?

LANTOS: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Berman? Mr. Ackerman? Mr. Faleomavaega?

FALEOMAVAEGO: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Payne? Mr. Menendez? Excuse me?

(UNKNOWN): (INAUDIBLE).

CLERK: Ms. McKinney?

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman, I have an article here from December 2 saying that there is a secret plan for a U.S. war against Iraq made by none other than Mr. Woolsey who is here. I vote no and I would love to have the opportunity to have my statement heard now as opposed to after these people have had the opportunity to have their say. Were they involved in the plan to make a secret war against ...

HYDE: The gentlelady will maintain order.

MCKINNEY: ... Iraq?

HYDE: The lady will maintain order, please.

CLERK: Mr. Sherman? Mr. Wexler? Mr. Davis?

DAVIS: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Engel? Mr. Delahunt?

DELAHUNT: No.

CLERK: Mr. Blumenhauer?

BLUMENHAUER: Aye.

CLERK: Ms. Napolitano?

(UNKNOWN): (INAUDIBLE) Ms. Berkley.

CLERK: Oh, Ms. Berkley. I'm sorry.

BERKLEY: (INAUDIBLE).

CLERK: Mr. Schiff?

SCHIFF: (INAUDIBLE).

CLERK: Mr. Hyde?

HYDE: Aye.

CLERK: Mr. Chairman, (INAUDIBLE) of 12 aye's and seven no's.

HYDE: The motion is carried.

The Honorable Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute was formerly an aid to Senator Scoop Jackson and an official of the Reagan Defense Department. Since then, he's written prolifically on defense and security issues and presides over the Pentagon's Advisory Defense Policy Board. Mr. Perle is appearing by digital video conference linked from the American Embassy in London and I thank Ambassador William S. Farrish (ph), the Minister Counselor for Public Affairs at the embassy, Mr. Daniel Srevenate (ph) and the embassy staff for enabling Mr. Perle to join us this morning.

The Honorable Jessica Tuchman Mathews has been a journalist and has worked in the non-profit sector and in government, most recently as under secretary of state for global affairs in the Clinton Administration. She's currently President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a principal author along with General Boyd of a proposal embodied in a paper entitled, "Iraq, A New Approach" issued August, 2002.

Retired Air Force General Charles Boyd is President and CEO of Business Executives for National Security. He retired from the Air Force after having served as deputy commander in chief of U.S. forces in Europe. He was shot down on his 105th mission in Vietnam and survived 2,488 days, almost seven years as a prisoner of war. Prior to assuming his current position, he was a consultant to Former House Speaker Gingrich and later executive director of the Hart-Rudman National Security Commission.

Finally, the committee welcomes the Honorable James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, ambassador to the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe, under secretary of the Navy and general counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. He was also for many years a practicing attorney and I guess still is. No. We're certainly honored to have all of you present or appearing before us.

And we'll start with Mr. Perle across the Atlantic with a five minute, give or take five minutes, summary of your statement. And the full statement will be made a part of the record. Mr. Perle?

RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I particularly want to thank you for including me in today's hearing even though I can be present only through the miracles of a video link from London. The president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense have all spoken in recent days about the urgency of dealing with the threat posed to the American people and others by Saddam Hussein.

In what may be the most important speech of his presidency, President Bush has argued eloquently and persuasively to the United Nations in New York. But Saddam's open defiance of United Nations and his scornful refusal to heed its many resolutions is a challenge to the credibility of the United Nations itself. And he has rightly asked the United Nations to approve a security council resolution that would force Saddam to choose between all compliance with the many resolutions he has scorned and violated and action to remove his regime from power. Saddam's response, calculating, deceitful and disingenuous moves only slightly in the direction of accepting UN inspections of Iraqi territory. And even in this, it is far from clear that he offered to accept a robust inspection regime.

Such a regime would, at a minimum, include substantial inspection teams with Americans in key leadership and decision making roles distributed throughout Iraq and independent capability to move anywhere from inspection team bases to any site in the country without prior notification or approval, the right to interview any Iraqi or Iraqi residents, together with his family at safe locations outside Iraq, appropriate self defense capabilities for the inspectors so they can overcome efforts to impede them and the like.

My own view is that even with all that, it is simply not possible to devise an inspection regime on territory controlled by Saddam Hussein that can be effective in locating, much less eliminating his weapons of mass destruction. In any case, the inspection regime known as UNMOVIC doesn't even come close. Its size, organization, management and resources are all inadequate for the daunting task of inspecting a country the size of France against Saddam's determined program of concealment, deception and lying.

We know, Mr. Chairman, that Saddam lies about his program to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. We know he goes to great lengths to conceal his activities. We know that he has used the years during which no inspections took place in Iraq to move everything of interest with the result of the database we once possessed, inadequate though it was, has been destroyed. We know all this, yet I sometimes think there are those at the United Nations who treat the issue not as a matter of life and death, but rather more like (AUDIO GAP) perfect and expand his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the danger to us, already great, will only grow. If he achieves his holy grail and acquires one or more nuclear weapons, there is no way of knowing what predatory policies he will pursue.

That is why, Mr. Chairman, the president is right to demand that the United Nations promptly resolve that Saddam comply fully with the full range of United Nations resolutions concerning Iraq or face an American led enforcement action. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Perle. Next we are pleased to hear from Ms. Mathews.

JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for having us to address this distinguished committee. In these five minutes, I believe that all members of the committee have been given copies of our report, "Iraq, A New Approach", and I'd just like to supplement that with a few additional points. The starting point of this proposal, and I'd like to emphasize this because for some -- in many respects, it's the most important point. And for some, it's the most controversial.

MATHEWS: Starting point for this proposal is the belief that only Saddam's weapons of mass destruction pose a threat, either to the United States or to the world. And it therefore, our belief and it underlies this proposal that eliminating the weapons of mass destruction, rather than Saddam Hussein, per se, ought to be the primary goal of U.S. policy.

Not only is this the location of the threat, it is our belief that only this provides a legitimacy for the use of force and only this as a goal commands broad international support. As soon as the United States steps beyond that goal and widens its focus beyond the goal of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, we lose the international support we want and need. This is a problem that reaches back to the middle of the Clinton Administration at least. Also as a starting point, let me emphasize that in our belief Saddam's weapons of mass destruction do pose a threat, pressing threat. That's a threat that dates back at least to 1998.

They do not pose an immediate threat that requires us in any way to rush into action in a matter of -- excuse me -- days or weeks. Or there is no evidence to support that or to resort to war as a first resort. What is the proposal then, as a middle way, a third approach between the unacceptable status quo and the enormous risks and costs, certain costs of going to war? We believe that this middle ground can be found in a proposal to create what we have called the IIF, the Inspections Implementation Force, a powerful, multi-national, military force, American led and largely, but not wholly American composed, that would enable UNMOVIC, that would strengthen the weaknesses that Mr. Perle just referred to which are real. And would enable UNMOVIC to carry out what we've called comply or else inspections.

We believe, with Mr. Lantos, that the time for negotiation and discussion with Saddam Hussein is long past, that that only produces delay. And these inspections would rely far more on Iraqi compliance than on the unlikely event of Iraqi cooperation. Under these comply or else inspections, we would have a system of inspections drastically different from those in the earlier period under UNSCOM where the balance of power in technology, in money, in resources and in political unity were all drastically tilted in Iraq's favor. This is a proposal to drastically redress that balance in favor of the inspectors. The or else in our comply or else inspections is of course, if Saddam chooses that overthrow of the regime. But in any case, the burden of choosing war would be shifted solely to his shoulders.

Let me emphasize also that when we speak of inspections, we're talking about two different phases of inspections, a time limited discovery and disarmament phase and an open ended monitoring and verification phase. That's important to keep in mind. The critical element for this scheme of coercive inspections to work is for the United States to formally, unambiguously, unequivocally forswear action on regime change for as long as inspections are working. The United States has to walk in policy a very fine line here. It must first convince Iraq and other countries that if it does not comply, we will use force. I think we're close to having conveyed that message, certainly to other countries, if not to Saddam Hussein. But we are close.

But secondly and equally important, we have to convey the message that if Iraq does comply with inspections, we will not. Otherwise, an inspection force, particularly an armed inspection force as we're proposing would be nothing more than a trojan horse for invasion and something no sane government would expect. It would be the equivalent of asking them to open a door, say come on in and take away our most precious weapons and then invade us.

So, our proposal does require the United States to make this commitment, this give. However, if our goal is disarmament, it's not giving up anything. A second point that is crucial and in particularly important in your discussions in the forthcoming days and in what is happening at the United Nations now is that the goal in our minds must not be a short-term goal about how quickly can we get inspectors into Iraq to begin their task, but under what conditions they will carry out their job once they are there.

In other words, the focus of your attention ought to be on the outcome and not on the beginning date. In our view, Saddam Hussein will give up weapons of mass destruction if and only if he is presented with a choice of doing that or the certainty of losing political power and probably his life. We must not kid ourselves that he regards inspections as anything other than war by other means. In our belief, therefore, only a credible threat of force will be required to get the teams in, but more importantly, to enable them to do their jobs once they're there.

One final key point I'd like to make if I could, Mr. Chairman. And that is that no amount of force will work without sustained political unity among the P five, the five permanent members of the security council. That is absolutely required. Any ambiguity that is left in the plan will be -- any point of disagreement among them will be a point of opportunity to sow dissension among them which Saddam Hussein has already proved himself a master at over the last five years. It was the loss of political unity among the security council beginning at about '95 that caused the unraveling of UNSCOM more than any other technical element. And so that is absolutely essential.

And if we are to achieve success, we have to find a formula that allows the P five to go forward in agreement under the UN charter with international support, but that takes away all opportunities from Saddam Hussein to debate it once these negotiations are under way. Finally, if I could, Mr. Chairman, on a relevant point, I think you have in front of you an op ed piece in today's New York Times. There was an editing error which added some language which neither General Boyd nor I wrote, and indeed, which is virtually the opposite of what we believe which suggests that inspectors would be spies in carrying out intelligence operations. This is precisely the kind of violation of the terms of an inspection regime that would destroy it. And so that's what counts for that blacked out material in the piece.

We do believe with Mr. Perle that UNMOVIC has many weaknesses in its current setup. But that all of these can be created, both through the resources of and the operations of the inspections implementation force. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I'll turn it over to General Boyd to describe how that would work.

HYDE: Thank you very.

General Boyd?

CHARLES G. BOYD, U.S. AIR FORCE, RETIRED, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: I would add to Dr. Mathews' beginning remarks by ...

HYDE: Would you put your mike on?

BOYD: I would add to Dr. Mathews' beginning remarks in expressing my sense of -- as always -- my sense of honor in being brought before this House in whatever committee to help in any way I can. I thank you for inviting me. The convictions that Dr. Mathews has expressed with respect to this larger issue were obviously shared by me. I joined her effort for that reason. I would emphasize one additional point with greater clarity. I also have the conviction that as a professional military office, a lifetime warrior, that all reasonable means to solve problems should be exploited before we resort, as a last measure, to that of armed force.

I believe there are many ways that you can get at the problem of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But I would prefer that course of action which carries the broadest base of support among other nations throughout the world, much as President Bush the first did in the Gulf War. From the standpoint of our long-term relationships with other nations and our role in that region, my task was to devise a framework by which the inspection process to do what Dr. Mathews outlined could be successful, a framework of military accompaniment with the inspectors themselves, a robust force, one capable of supporting any size operation on any kind of an inspection site, one that could provide security for the inspection process and one that could provide an intimidating force if necessary to deal with any obstruction of the moment.

But I have the conviction that she shared that this is not a force to fight its way into every inspection site it wants to inspect. At the point at which Saddam Hussein would in any meaningful way obstruct the process of inspection, than I think it should be an automatic transfer to the second phase of the operation, which would be to constitute an invasion force for the purpose of regime change. So the two are linked and the force that I have described in this report is one that, while small enough, it would not be seen as an invasion force in disguise.

It would be large and so constituted through pre-positioned equipment and infrastructure support that it could be turned into an invasion force if necessary. I'm going to yield the rest of my statement time because of the importance of your questions. I would add only one thing. In my discussion with current military planners, all describe this as a complex operation. And indeed, it is. All military operations of any size are complex. It is only in comparison to the complexity of an invasion force does it gain its appeal. And in fact, can be constituted, it has a simpler task than that of an invasion force and can be constituted and even trained, I believe, in collaboration with other members, other coalition members in a relatively short period of time and be prepared to accompany any kind of inspection regime as required.

HYDE: General, we have three votes pending. The floor calls us for three votes. So we will suspend until the final vote and we will hurry back. We will hear the rest of your testimony and Mr. Woolsey and then we'll go to questions. So if you can be patient and you, too, Mr. Perle. Thank you. Committee stands in recess until after the final vote.

(RECESS)

HYDE: The committee will come to order.

General Boyd, did you have a codicil to what you were saying? I mean, have you more?

BOYD: One concluding sentence, sir. I believe that there is a means that can be effective to solve this problem short of war. But, I would make it to the certainty that if it fails we do the war.

HYDE: Thank you, General.

Mr. Woolsey, I understand you -- I didn't introduce you in the fullness of your resume, that you are vice president of Booz, Allen and Hamilton. So, permit me to amend my introduction of you and to ask you to make your presentation.

WOOLSEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are a number of important issues before the committee, but let me turn principally to the issue of whether an inspection regime could conceivably succeed in disarming Bathus Iraq.

Let me say that my experience as Director of Central Intelligence may be a bit relevant here. But, more relevant is the fact that I was an advisor, delegate and then finally ambassador and chief negotiator in five different arms control negotiations between the United States and either the Soviet Union or later the Warsaw Pact between 1969 and 1991. And, the last treaty I negotiated, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, has probably the most demanding and intrusive inspection regime that any arms control treaties ever had. There's certain feature of the Chemical Weapons Convention that are more demanding in some specific regards.

But, I speak not as an enemy of the principle of inspections or arms control. I've spent a lot of my life at it and I supported the chemical weapons convention and testimony before the Congress. But, I believe, first of all, there is no chance that an inspection regime such as that which is represented by UNMOVIC, the new weakened regime, weakened in 1999 from the terms under which the previous inspectors worked, which also worked inadequate.

I think there's no chance that UNMOVIC could succeed under any terms that are likely to be discussed at the United Nations. I take my hat off to my colleagues on the panel. I think they have done a good job of trying to put together an inspection regime, as demanding as one could imagine. I think there are two problems even with the regime, which they have in their report and in the New York Times this morning.

The first is that we know from Kildare Hamza, the head of the nuclear program for Saddam and from Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, the head of the biological weapons program who came out in '95 and then went back to Iraq and was killed, that there were and are hundreds of sites where weapons of mass destruction are worked on in Iraq. Many of them are buried. Many of them are quite small. Saddam is not using nuclear reactors any more to make fissile material thanks to the Israeli air force strike of 1981. But, he is using centrifuge in other facilities that can be relatively small, as biological weapons' laboratories can be quite small, we believe that some seven of them are mobile on the Renault trucks that were sold by France a short while back. And, indeed, any biological weapons' production material can be quite small.

It could be, for example, very much like an equipment in a microbrewery attached to a small restaurant which it really rather resembles to ferment material and the like. So, we have to know where to look.

Now, we're not going to find that out from spies. There aren't going to be nearly enough of them. We're not going to find it out from satellite photography except in a few regards, and we're not going to find it out from intercepted communications because the Iraqis are too clever to talk about these sorts of things over communications that can be intercepted.

The only way Hamza and others will tell you that we're going to be able to find where to look is to talk to Iraqis who are in the program. Some have defected, but not enough to find everything we need to know. We have to be able to do what UNSCOM, the previous inspectors, tried to do during the '90s and talk to Iraqis who are in the program.

The problem was that the way the inspection regime worked they had to talk to Iraqi's in Iraqi, which meant that the people in the program who were being interviewed by the inspectors were interviewed with Iraqi intelligence officers standing right beside them. As Saddam has done in the past when he believes anyone may be communicating with his enemies or the inspectors, he has many delightful tactics for dealing with this.

If an individual may be out of the country he has in the past, and I'm sure would again, take the individual's wife and daughters into custody, have them raped, have them killed, have that videotaped and have that sent to the husband and father who he believes is talking to someone who he doesn't want to be talked to.

As a result, there is no imaginable way, Richard Perle alluded to this in his testimony, and Kildare Hamza has spelled it out as well.

WOOLSEY: There's no imaginable way one could have an inspection regime that would work unless one was free to remove Iraqis who wanted talk and their families from Iraq. Now, I believe that it completely inconsistent with the totalitarian regime that we see.

A second problem, I believe, with even the very demanding regime that my colleagues have come up is that I think symbolic force is not enough. And I take fully onboard the statement that the force should be substantial. But, we had a substantial force in Berlin for most of the Cold War, the Berlin Brigade. It was a well-equipped substantial force, 3,000, 4,000 troops more. That force everyone knew would die if the surrounding Soviet 25 divisions chose to move west as almost happened once or twice during the Cold War.

So, I think any force that was in Iraq surrounded by, say, republican guard and the like would not really be able to exert force. They would have to be involved in finding some way to deal with the inevitable, blocking of the front door while the biological weapons are moved out the back door and so on, that has happened so many times, time and time again during the 1990s.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I think that if we except anything other than absolute certainty that all equipment and facilities related to all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of greater than 150 kilometers range have been destroyed, then we will be putting at risk, and unless we are able to stay in Iraq for a long time, as long as this Bathus regime exists under Saddam's sons or otherwise, then we will be putting at risk Iraq's neighbors and friends and allies of the United States because biological weapons can be reconstituted relatively quickly with relatively simple equipment. And, 150-kilometer missiles can have work done to expand, extend their range relatively quickly. We should not be under any allusion that we would be able to have some solution to this problem and then leave. So, I believe what one is talking about for any really effective way of ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of greater than 150 kilometers range is an occupying force of very substantial size and a fundamental change in the nature of the Iraqi regime. That Iraq would agree to that, I find unimaginable.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.

Now, we will turn to the members for questions. I would ask them to limit their questions to five minutes. And, the technique of making a statement for four and three-quarters minutes and then asking a question prolongs the five minutes and so I ask your cooperation with the spirit of giving everyone a chance and don't forget Mr. Perle who is lurking over us like a brooding omnipresence, to use Oliver Wendell Holmes' phrase.

Anyway, we turn to the questions and Mr. Lantos?

LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend all four of our witnesses, including the brooding omnipresence of Mr. Perle from London for giving us serious and thoughtful testimony.

I'd like to spend a moment on Ms. Mathews and General Boyd. Let me just say both of you have distinguished records and you have come forward with an intellectually appealing proposal, which I do not believe has any practical likelihood of succeeding. I think you are predicating your notion on a totally artificial separation of Saddam Hussein from weapons of mass destruction. You are correct if we could wish to have all weapons of mass destruction destroyed and we really wouldn't care whether Saddam Hussein stays or not. That, in theory is a plausible approach; in fact, it is not a plausible approach.

Saddam Hussein has sacrificed, if that's the term, $50 billion, $75 billion, $100 billion in foreign exchange to develop weapons of mass destruction. And, the notion that he would cooperate in the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction I find fanciful. I also find it, with all due respect, wholly unrealistic to expect the United Nation's Security Council, as divided as it is, over a long period of time as incapable as it is over a long period of time of making decisive and cohesive decisions, to create such an entity and then relinquish control to an American military commander who would make the decisions.

I also share Mr. Woolsey's reservations, every single one of them and I do want to commend you for attempting to find what you are groping for and that is a middle way. There is no middle way in this crisis, and much as I want to applaud you intellectually, I think as a pragmatic proposal, I frankly do not think yours can be taken very seriously with all personal respect to both of you.

I would like to deal with an issue and I'd be grateful if Mr. Woolsey or Secretary Perle would comment on it, and the two of you as well. Since one of the president's economic advisors has estimated the cost that maybe $100 billion those who oppose forceful action have now gotten a new economic argument saying how can we afford to spend $100 billion on this. But, it seems to me that Iraq is potentially one of the wealthiest countries on the face of this planet. And, it is self-evident to me that any rational post-Hussein regime would be compelled over a reasonable period of time to pay for the cost of this venture.

Iraqi oil resources create an enormous difference between what we are up against in Afghanistan, where, of course, the post-war cost is infinitely smaller than this figure. All of the donors have combined to offer about $5 billion, haven't delivered half of it yet, talking about 2 billion, 2.5 billion which has been put into Afghanistan. The notion that Iraq's oil resources, under a new civilized regime, cannot be used over time to pay for this damage is to me an absurdity. And, I would like to ask perhaps starting in London with Mr. Perle, as to what your thoughts are vis-a-vis the notion of Iraqi oil resources should pay for the cost of this activity should the president decide to use military force?

PERLE: Well, Congressman Lantos, I believe that military action to remove Saddam Hussein would in fact be an act of liberation. And, the principle beneficiaries of that would be the people of Iraq. Of course, it is a question of our safety in order to contain the damage that Saddam might do, but the Iraqi's themselves have suffered horribly under the regime of Saddam Hussein. There will be a tremendous of work to do to reconstitute the country. And, I see no reason why the people of Iraq would not be prepared in the aftermath of the removal of Saddam to bear some of the cost of that, along with others in the international community.

There are those now who are skeptical about military action. I strongly believe that once Saddam is removed, much of that skepticism will give way as we see the reaction of the people of Iraq. So, I think it's entirely plausible.

One last point, one can put forward a number like $100 billion or $200 billion, no one really knows. The cost of not acting in time to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring a nuclear weapon, for example, is in estimate and $100 billion would look like a bargain if we were faced with a nuclear arms Iraq.

LANTOS: Mr. Woolsey?

WOOLSEY: I agree with what Mr. Perle has said and I would simply add that in 1944 38 percent of the American gross national product went to the military, even $100 billion is about 1 percent of our gross national product of $10 trillion approximately. So, although I agree that we could quite reasonably see some contribution from a democratic Iraqi regime in the future to a war that freed Iraq, I must say that compared with the sacrifices this country has made in its several world wars and in the Cold War, finically and otherwise, to prevail and advance the cause of democracy, which we've succeeded in doing throughout the 20th century, even $100 billion, in relative terms, is reasonably modest.

LANTOS: Ms. Mathews?

MATHEWS: Let me first make the point that the cost of $100 billion or whatever the direct cost to the fiscal treasury is is it may only be the tip of the iceberg. We don't know what the economic losses would be caused by $40 a barrel oil on one what it already a very fragile stock market. It may dwarf that figure.

However...

LANTOS: Are you assuming a protracted...

MATHEWS: No.

LANTOS: ... engagement under the circumstances?

MATHEWS: I'm not.

LANTOS: Or are you assuming just a spike in the...

MATHEWS: I'm...

LANTOS: ... price of oil, which then would recede because a very powerful argument can be made that under a new non-Hussein regime Iraq would be the most effective weapon against OPEC. Iraq will have enormous reconstruction costs. Iraq may be pumping 5 million, 6 million barrels and the price of oil could well plummet well below $20.

MATHEWS: Perhaps.

LANTOS: Are you positing a $40 figure...

MATHEWS: I'm...

LANTOS: ... for the long run?

MATHEWS: No. I'm positing a spike. And, I believe that a spike in the current stock market, which we know to be very fragile, could have very severe economic consequences. But, I...

LANTOS: I'm sorry.

MATHEWS: I'm sorry, just very quickly, we -- I think we, perhaps, kid ourselves to call this or to think of this as a liberation. To Iraqi's it will be an invasion and a great many of them will die. We're talking about urban warfare, a great many innocent Iraqis will die. I don't believe that it is going to be looked upon as a wonderful event by Iraqis, any more than an invasion of the United States under what any conditions would be felt that way by Americans.

The only...

LANTOS: But, you're not drawing an analogy between a free and open and democratic society...

MATHEWS: Of course not. I said...

LANTOS: ... and the society living under a ruthless and bloody totalitarian dictator, are you?

MATHEWS: No, of course not, but I am just trying to point out that it's, I think, from this distance to use the word liberation to what I believe will feel more like an invasion. But, I...

LANTOS: Did you view the occupation of Germany by allied forces following D-day and the movement of the Soviet Army towards Berlin an occupation or a liberation?

MATHEWS: That was a liberation. If I could just make the point that I was trying to make. It's the only way, I think, under which the U.S. could hope to get some sort of payments, which I understand to be what you're talking about, from Iraqi oil revenues to pay for this war would be under some kind of multi-lateral auspices. Anything else, I believe, will look to the world like a United States that went to war in order to get its hand on Iraq's oil resources. And, I think the cost to us of doing that would be in unestimatable.

LANTOS: General Boyd?

BOYD: I would only make one point, (inaudible).

HYDE: Mic. Mic.

BOYD: I would only make one very brief point and it won't be to really try to persuade you. You've a well-reasoned conclusion that you've made up your mind. But, let me add one point for the sake of others.

BOYD: I don't know how many nations, but I suspect very few would view a preemptive use of force for a military invasion for the purpose of regime change has been a legitimate move. It may well be...

LANTOS: If I may stop you for a minute, would you suggest that the purpose would be a regime change or the purpose would be the destruction and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, which is predicated on the regime change? I mean what is the goal? The goal clearly is to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and your formula offers an avenue, not very realistic in the minds of some of us, of bringing about a destruction of all weapons of mass destruction without a regime change.

BOYD: I think that's a distinction that doesn't mean very much. If you say to disarm, which is my objection, and the purpose of which cannot be achieved without regime change to the neighbors and for the rest of the world watching, it would look like that force was invading for the purpose of regime change. Yes, ultimately to disarm him.

But, the point is the regime change. Now, then, which I think would be viewed by very few nations as a legitimate move. If, as you say, this inspection regime that we have outlined is unrealistic and ultimately cannot be effective, cannot succeed, if, in fact, Saddam Hussein would be effective in obstructing it, then it links to the regime change that you seek. The difference being, it seems to me, that it then becomes this is a legitimizing mechanism. It seems much more obvious to me, and I think to the rest of the world, that we have attempted everything we can within the framework of existing international law. It's proven ineffective and we then have no other choice but to do the regime change in favor...

HYDE: The chair is...

BOYD: ... (inaudible) legitimizing mechanism, I believe that preemptive action does not have to.

HYDE: The chair is very reluctant to intrude, but...

LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Mr. Gilman?

GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope that equal time will be given to all of us. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for...

HYDE: You want to be here until 6 o'clock this evening?

GILMAN: Not necessarily. But, I think we have to consider Mr. Perle (ph), who is coming. I want to thank you for arranging this timely hearing on our nation's policy toward Iraq. It's certainly important for the entire Congress and I want to thank our panelists and Mr. Perle for making himself available.

I fully support the president's efforts to demand Iraqi compliance with the adopted UN resolution. Since expelling UN inspectors from Iraq, Mr. Hussein has had four years to rebuild and rearm his country's weapons stockpiles. I doubt if we're going to be able to find those. It's imperative, that the world of nations of the united front take this threat seriously and take preventative action against the tyranny of the Iraqi government and to order it to disarm before the events of September 11 are allowed to be repeated.

And, I might add that we were with the president at the UN a week ago. The UN still hasn't acted on a resolution. As September 11 taught us, Saddam's means of deploying weapons of mass destruction are by no means limited to conventional means. His continued sponsorship of terrorists groups, global reach provides him an additional mechanism with which to deliver them. As long as the Saddam regime continues policies aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons and increasing his storehouse in chemical, biological and possibly radiological weapons, the Iraqi regime continues to pose a very serious threat to our nation, not only to our nation, but to our allies as well.

And, I want to take this opportunity to commend the president for developing a strong legal case against Iraq as he set forth at the UN. Iraq's attempts to both reconstitute and to expand its weapons of mass destruction is a clear breach of the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions 686 and 687, which included the demand that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction and elimination of all of those weapons. And, that it unconditionally undertake not use, develop or require any means relevant to these weapons of mass destruction. This, in my opinion, constitutes a serious breach that must be viewed as a threat to all international peace and security. His continued material breach of these resolutions further illustrates his regime's views of itself in a perpetual state of war with our nation. It's a military, diplomatic and economic war that Saddam's regime is intent on winning and is willing to pay a heavy price to emerge as its victor. We must take all necessary steps to ensure that he fails.

Mr. Perle, I'd like to ask you what is your opinion of the coercive inspection team?

PERLE: Well, I'm afraid I share Congressman Lantos's view that it is unrealistic. I think any inspection scheme that requires the cooperation of Saddam Hussein and because he controls the territory it's hard to imagine any scheme that would not, is ultimately bound to fail. He will go to whatever lengths are necessary to prevent us from finding the things that are so easily hidden in a country the size of Iraq. So, adding some military forces, which would ultimately be modest in relation to Iraqi military forces, seems to me not to change the fundamental obstacle that any inspection team faces. It is simply too large a country, there are too many places to hide and without very precise intelligence, making known the places that we should inspect, it is virtually impossible to achieve an effective inspection regime.

GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Perle.

Mr. Woolsey, in light of the fact that the UN has not acted on the resolutions requested by the president, should we continue to put pressure on the Security Council, or what would be the alternative if they fail to act at a reasonable time?

WOOLSEY: I believe it's useful to continue to make the case to the Security Council for a time, as long as it doesn't interfere with a properly timed military action. In my judgment, the situation here does not require us to talk of preemption. There was a war in 1991 and a cease-fire agreement temporarily halted that war, there were conditions to the cease-fire agreement that Saddam give up all chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of greater than 150 kilometers. He is in clear violation of three of those four terms and he's working hard to violate the fourth, to obtain nuclear weapons.

He's in violation of the cease-fire agreement. As far as I'm concerned we don't need to claim that we have some preemptive rights. We can enforce the cease-fire agreement. Now, if it helps from the point of view of international politics to spend a bit more time working with our French and Russia and Chinese colleagues in the Security Council to obtain a resolution, that seems to me that's well within the purview of what we ought to let the president and the secretary of state and secretary of defense decide.

But, if the French and Russians especially believe that they can oppose steps to destroy Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and change the regime as necessary and still be favorably treated or have their oil companies favorably treated in a newly liberated Iraq, I believe we should give them something else to think about.

I think it is ridiculous for them to believe that Total (ph) and Elf (ph) and Luke Oil can have deals with Saddam Hussein and then, following a war in which Saddam is deposed, simply pick right up where they left off. They should be asked, I think, to think about the implications of their actions now.

HYDE: Mr. Ackerman?

GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.

ACKERMAN: Thank you.

I thank the panel.

General, I listened with great care to your statement about regime change. If the scenario were that somebody moved next door to you who was a madman and appeared with a gun and menaced your children and your family and those you love, and then some authority came along and removed those weapons, and then a short while down the road, the same thing happened, the same madman was rearmed with the same weapons intent on menacing and doing harm to your family and was disarmed. The next time this happened would you want to search his house or would you want to just disarm him again? Would you want to get rid of him? Is he the problem or is the spontaneous appearance of arms the problem? How do you solve that problem?

BOYD: If I thought I could gain the support of the United Nations' Security Council and hold in my camp a large body of world opinion in support of doing what you just outlined then that would be my first option. I don't believe that's the case. The case that we have outlined in this Carnegie Report is a step in that direction principally because we think we can do that with a much broader base of support than the first option, that of regime change oriented invasion.

But, we link to if it does not succeed; we link to the second option, which is the one you've outlined.

ACKERMAN: So, then...

BOYD: And, we think we carry a much broader base of support with us.

ACKERMAN: You would wait as this madman inched closer and closer to you while trying to gain the support of the rest of the community. At what point do you forsake the consent of the community to protect what's near and dear to you.

BOYD: I don't know what you mean by that, but if you...

ACKERMAN: What I mean is at what point, if I can switch back to the real situation, at what point do we forsake the UN's involvement and go it alone?

BOYD: If we cannot gain their consensus to begin with, then that's the point. If we do gain their consensus and move in a UN supported...

ACKERMAN: Is there a timeline here?

BOYD: However long it takes to determine that that system is not effective...

(CROSSTALK)

ACKERMAN: ... sits there and they push the envelope back and forth and there are delays. Lets assume that the inspectors go in and Saddam Hussein, again, as is obvious to most people, tries to impede the inspections and come up with terms and puts things in their way. At what point does the threshold kick in? Where's the trigger here? I think that's what's missing from your report. Is it the first time that there's a delay and when there is that first delay and I'd be willing to put $50,000 on the line with you to say there's going to be a first delay. If you want to do that, I'm willing, just to let you know. But, I'm willing to risk my money than to risk him getting more out of control.

BOYD: You could probably afford that, I probably can't, so I think I'll not take your bet.

ACKERMAN: Yes, I understand that. But, I think that the world and the international community and the region can't afford to have him do what it looks like he's going to do based on his track record. But, at what point do we stop the niceties in that process? And, when we stop that process is the retaliation limited? Is it overwhelming? Is it regime change? What is it in your plan?

BOYD: Dr. Mathews answered and the report is clear on this that we would forswear an invasion for exactly as long as the inspection process was effective, moving effectively, without impediment, without obstruction. At the point at which that ceases, that's the point that you're asking about, that's when we switch to the second option.

ACKERMAN: So, as soon as he stutters.

BOYD: As soon as the effective process of inspection and disarmament is obstructed by Saddam Hussein...

ACKERMAN: And, our response is what, just that -- this last question, Mr. Chairman.

BOYD: Then the response is that...

ACKERMAN: Regime change?

BOYD: ... invasion for the purpose of regime change.

ACKERMAN: Thank you.

HYDE: The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.

BERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to yield to the chairman.

HYDE: Would the gentleman yield very briefly? I don't want to take a lot of time, I very quickly ask -- make two comments.

HYDEL It seems to me coercive inspection leaves in the lurch a lot of people over there who have been working with us to liberate their people, the Kurds, the Shi'a, other elements within Iraq who have been working with us, clandestinely and otherwise, to liberate their country. They would suddenly find themselves isolated and alone. And, I think that's an unfortunate consequence of limiting our response to coercive inspection.

And, secondly, how do you erase from the mind of scientists over there and chemists and biologists the ability to reconstitute these things when things quiet down? Let the inspectors leave, let a couple of summers go by and bang, they're back in business with more anthrax and botulism and whatever it takes. That'll be a constant threat while Saddam Hussein and his ilk hang around.

So, just a loose end that I think deserves some attention. But, I'm not asking as a question. I just wanted to vet that.

Thank you, Mr. Berman.

BERMAN: I'd be very grateful if the panel could answer my first question just in one sentence because there's I would like to get into. I believe, as close to a certainty as one can have, that what we would find in Saddam's arsenal in weapons of mass destruction is significantly worse than the evidence of what we have is now, the evidence from satellites, from human intelligence, from defectors, from all the other testing kinds of things.

In other words, that what our intelligence agencies now know, when we finally find it out, will be much worse than what we know. Do you agree with that assessment or disagree? If you could a very short reply, I'd be grateful.

BOYD: I agree.

MATHEWS: We'll know more than we know now.

BERMAN: Will we find...

MATHEWS: But, whether it will be worse than what we consider probable I don't know. I mean partly because I'm not privy to the current intelligence, but I know a fair amount about what the -- if the import of your question is do you believe that he has attempted and has been successful in reconstituting a good deal of what we know he had in '98, the answers yes.

WOOLSEY: You're asking me to guess. I would guess the same that you're guessing, but I don't know that.

BERMAN: Mr. Perle?

PERLE: I would agree with that. We never know everything and so almost by definition what we ultimately learn is worse than what we knew when we started out.

BERMAN: OK. And, then for any of you who care to respond, just a couple of points. One, Ms. Mathews challenged the assumption that the Iraq people would view us as liberators were there to be an attack, which resulted in a regime change. I thought if things went well, one never knows, but if things went well, that it would be pretty clear that this would not be the clash of civilizations. It would not be America against the Arab people because the Iraqi people would be viewing us as liberators and it would take away the argument from those who would want to create that conflict that it would show to everyone else that, in fact, Saddam was the enslaver and America was not the enemy of the 25 million Arabs living in Iraq.

Ms. Mathews challenges that assertion and raises the issue of urban warfare. I'm particularly curious what Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Perle think of how it might go and what that reaction would be, because, certainly, tens of thousands of civilian casualties, massive deaths and that assumption might turn out to be quite wrong.

Secondly, I am curious, General Boyd, I'm told that in the previous administration part of the premise of coercive inspections is no drive zones and that there is no practical way in the world that we have the ability to enforce no drive zones in the context of conducting these inspections even with a fairly robust military presence accompanying the inspectors. It just can't be done with the current military capabilities. I'd be curious to hear your response to that. Thank you.

WOOLSEY: Congressman, I'll start on the liberation. We have two excellent case studies for how the Iraqi people would regard being freed of Saddam Hussein. One is what happened in Iraq in 1991. The other is what happened in Afghanistan last fall.

In Iraq in 1991, liberation movements erupted in 15 of Iraq's 18 providences and they were succeeding. And the joy in the streets was palpable. Read about or talk to anyone who was there and got out, there's an excellent piece in the Wall Street Journal about a young woman who was there just four or five days ago.

And, as far as Afghanistan goes, we saw when Mazar-i-Shariff and Kabul was liberated what happens when the women could finally show up in public with their faces uncovered and the men could have their beards cut and the children could fly kites and music could finally be played. It was ecstatic. And I think that after 40 years of tyranny, the chance that we would be regarded as anything other than liberators is slim to the vanishing point.

Now, any war that takes a long time and is very bloody is going to have a lot of people who don't want it to continue and are bothered by it. But, if you look at what happened in 1991, after five weeks of an air war in which we used 5 percent smart weapons, the mainline Iraqi Army, which was 800,000 to 900,000 strong then, basically made one of two choices, either they surrendered to Italian television film crews or they surrendered to American unmanned aerial vehicles. It's not that they didn't fight well. They didn't fight at all.

The republican guard fought in some cases reasonably well. But, the Iraqi Air Force fled to Iran. And I don't think that this is going to be a cakewalk at all, but I do think that we have a reasonable chance, using, as we probably will there, 80 to 85 percent smart weapons in the air war. We have a reasonable chance of making this a decisive victory. There could be retreat to the cities fighting in the cities. But, how long can Saddam hold out in the cities without oil, without resources, without food?

I am frankly more concerned that we handle the post-war occupation, rebuilding of Iraq that we could make mistakes doing that than I am about the war itself. I don't think we need to be -- should at all be overconfident. And I think we ought to put 100,000 to 200,000 troops into the region and make absolutely sure we could deal with any contingency that came up.

But I think the Iraqi people will definitely in a particularly quick and decisive war, which I think is likely, not certain, but likely. I think the Iraqi people will greet us as the liberators we would be.

BERMAN: Let me just say I think this is an excellent panel. I think all of us are getting some very important insights. But, I do have a question and would like to ask it of Ms. Mathews and the others on the panel with regard to the admittedly.

WOOLSEY: Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: Yes?

WOOLSEY: At least General Boyd had -- there was one outstanding question to him and he's just one of...

HYDE: I would ask all members and I will restrict myself to three minutes as well. General, Colin Powell, Secretary Colin Powell, will be here within an hour. So, and we have several members who want to ask questions. I would hope that we would all try to stay within three to five minute rule. I'm going to be -- General Boyd, please proceed and answer Mr. Berman's question.

BOYD: I'll be very quick. I'm familiar with the no drive argument that has taken place. And the conditions that you're describing or that debate is over an entirely different kind of a mechanism where you deny movement on the surface virtually in an enduring way.

What we foresee in this, and I've worked with current military planners on how to go about this, is short duration, denial of the assembly of military forces and movement in a defined region while the inspection, the given inspection is taking place, as well as denying the airspace. And that's an entirely different problem. And that's quite a workable problem.

BERMAN: At least let me ask one question on coercive inspections, which clearly has some surface appeal. But, I would ask the panel very briefly if they could respond. I have concerns, and I think many members have concerns one, whether or not they would be successful in their own right and, of course, that's an open question for all inspections. But, the safety of the troops, we saw in Sebernitza (ph) when Umber Four (ph) had a relatively weak mandate that over time those so-called safe havens became a Mecca of gathering part of area for people to be clustered and then, like we saw in Sebernitza, summarily killed.

And I'm very concerned about hostage taking. We know that Saddam Hussein certainly has no qualms about what he called euphemistically human shields. In a scenario where they have found weapons of mass destruction in an act of desperation that might ensue and they could be overpowered, it would seem to me as we saw in Somalia by -- even though the number of deaths obviously were largely in the sign of Somalis. It was a terrible situation that our soldiers found themselves in.

So, again, it has surface appeal. But, does it have, also, the attendant risks of hostage taking, of being, you know, this idea looks good, but obviously does not yield the results that is looked for.

Mr. Woolsey, could you answer that?

WOOLSEY: Congressman, I share your concern. In the first two years of the Clinton Administration there were a number of discussions about whether to try to use force in Bosnia or not. And the big objection in most cases was that the UN peacekeepers by that time were there and they could be taken hostage by the Serbs.

Now, I think General Boyd and Ms. Mathews have done the best they can in the context of their proposal to talk about having robust military forces and the rest. But, even, you know, a brigade or more of troops inside Iraq surrounded by the republican guard are effectively hostages. And I think that it would be a very tough decision for an American president to go to war and sacrifice that brigade and those inspectors and the rest if they were harassed, prevented from moving, et cetera by this totalitarian regime.

This is the type of proposal that would work, perhaps, with a regime that was hesitant or was autocratic but not absolutely totalitarian or that wanted the world's approval or something. But, with Saddam Hussein's Iraq I just don't think it would work.

BERMAN: Ms. Mathews, General Boyd or Mr. Perle?

BOYD: I think that there are no risk-free options here. I don't think you can guarantee security of that force, that inspection team. But, you can certainly enhance it greatly by the kind of measures that we have outlined. But you can't guarantee the security of an assembling invasion force either. And assembling that force is the moment in which I believe that it's the greatest risk. On the border of a nation that is in possession of weapons of mass destruction and your objective is to remove those who hold control of those weapons of mass destruction without an incentive at that point to hold anything back. It's show time. They're going down and I suspect they'll use everything they can, not just Saddam Hussein, but all of those who would find their future at risk as well.

So, that's a pretty high-risk operation at that point. I share Jim Woolsey's assessments in the main that I know every well how they fought in 1991. And I doubt if they're going to fight much better. Although, I accept Jessica Mathews point that people fight differently on their own soil than they fight on somebody else's soil.

So, you have to prepare for the worst as he's suggested. There are no risk-free options is that I'm saying. But, I believe you can make that inspection process in that phase relative if you the measures we've called for and you can make that risk very low.

PERLE: Mr. Chairman, could I add something?

HYDE: Yes, please, Mr. Perle.

PERLE: It seems to me that there's general agreement that the purpose of inspections is to find, leading ultimately to the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. It's not inspections for inspections' sake. And it seems to me that the proposal is seriously and deeply flawed in the following respect. Suppose we adopt this proposal and we enter into an inspection regime that is heavily reinforced. Reinforced so that when something is found we have a sufficient presence to destroy what it is that is found.

Suppose we don't find anything. Suppose we don't find anything because the country is vast and we don't know where to look. You cannot conclude from the fact that we haven't found anything that there is nothing to be found. So, when General Boyd and Jessica Mathews argue that if Saddam blocks inspections we could then take action, suppose he never blocks inspections because he has hidden the things we're trying to find so well that it isn't necessary to block inspections?

In that case, the inspection regime goes on forever while Saddam holds on to the weapons of mass destruction that have been effectively concealed and we have no means of removing those weapons of mass destruction.

Now, you know and I know that after some period of time, without having found weapons of mass destruction, the ability to sustain those inspections is going to go away. The Iraqis are going to argue you've been here for X months or years even, you've found nothing. It's time to leave and restore normalcy to Iraq.

And in that event he would have gotten away with it. So, everything depends, not on whether the inspectors have military means to back them up, but on whether we know where to look because if we don't know where to look random checks will not unearth weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

HYDE: Thank you.

Mr. Faleomavaega?

MATHEWS: Mr. Chairman, can I also provide an answer...

HYDE: Sure.

MATHEWS: ... on this. I'll be very quick.

What you've just heard and Mr. Woolsey's earlier comments are made in complete ignorance of the record of UNSCOM in the period from 1991 to 1997. Going in starting from nothing, mind you, with very little resources and without prior knowledge they uncovered all of the four areas of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The story is laid out in detail in our report. What they found and what they didn't. They uncovered is most precious secrets, the fact of the biological weapons program, not because of defection but because of their own inspections.

We know, as though these people would be going in to not knowing where to look, in Mr. Perle's phrase. They know exactly where to begin. We have a huge amount of intelligence. We have a huge amount of acquired knowledge. This team has a vast work plan already laid out. This is not going in on a blank slate at all.

I would recommend or commend to the committee the piece by Ambassador Kaiss (ph) from last Sunday's Washington Post where he lays this out, lays out how it was done and gives us a sort of granular first-hand sense of how inspections actually proceed that this discussion I think has not conveyed.

Thank you.

WOOLSEY: I have to say just one sentence. I would rather than umbrage at the assertion that I am in ignorance of the record here and that the defectors were of no utility and that the inspectors discovered this material entirely on their own. It's simply not true.

The defection of Kamel and the defection of Kildare Hamza had a great deal to do with where the inspectors looked with respect to biological weapons records and the rest. And the record simply doesn't support what Ms. Mathews said.

HYDE: Mr. Faleomavaega?

FALEOMAVAEGA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I certainly want to commend the members of our panel for their statements. I think two fundamental things that we have to be reminded as members, not only of Congress, we're all swore to sustain and support the Constitution of the United States. And two fundamental things that we need to be reminded of, the president does not declare a war. It's the Congress. That is specifically stated an act of war has to be stated clearly by the Congress.

Congress also is charged with the responsibility of raising an Army and a Navy, not the president. I have the deepest respect for our president. And I've never questioned his sincerity, his integrity. But, I think this is where our responsibility comes in to bear, to question the wisdom and the thoroughness of this very, very basic and fundamental issue of our government. We're going to declare a war on another country.

And I'd like to ask -- I have other things I want to say, but just quickly to the members of the panel. You believe the president is going to be asking the Congress for an official declaration of war, or is it going to be like another resolution of Tonkin like we did in Vietnam?

Should the president be asking for an official declaration of war by the Congress, or should it be in another form of resolution that gives him flexibility with all conditions that doesn't really state clearly it should be a declaration of war?

WOOLSEY: I don't believe a formal declaration of war is necessary. As I said earlier, I believe the 1991 war never stopped from Saddam's point of view. It was temporarily halted by a cease- fire, which he is in violation of. So, under those circumstances I don't believe a formal declaration of war if necessary. I do believe it would be wise for the president, and I'm glad he has decided to come to the Congress and present the case to the Congress and ask for congressional authorization.

The precise form of that, whether it's under the war powers resolution or something else, I would leave to the back and forth between the legislative and executive branch on this long-standing troubled constitutional issue.

So, I think Congress should deliberate and make its judgment. But, that it needs to be a formal declaration of war, such as last occurred in World War II? No, I don't believe that's necessary.

FALEOMAVAEGA: Because my time is limited, I want to end with a question to General Boyd and Dr. Mathews.

Your position is not an intellectual exercise. You're wanting to see if this could be another -- we all know what happened 10 years since the first Bush Administration, Saddam has violated every resolution that the United Nations put forth. Are you suggesting here that we ought to put more teeth on the inspection process? And if that does not work, then go to the next level, which is a mass invasion of Iraq? Is this what I sense from both of you on your proposal?

MATHEWS: That's right.

FALEOMAVAEGA: And, in addition to your asserting this position is because this has the support, not only of all the Arab countries, but also, I think the members of the Security Council and even the United Nations. Am I correct on this?

MATHEWS: Correct.

FALEOMAVAEGA: General Boyd?

BOYD: (OFF-MIKE) Proposing something that would require a United Nations Security Council resolution. So, it...

FALEOMAVAEGA: With teeth? I mean, with enforcement, procedures.

BOYD: The mechanism that we propose would require that kind of a consensus within the Security Council. Yes.

FALEOMAVAEGA: You know, it's interesting to note -- is my time over -- to note that General Westmoreland once said that politicians are the ones that create war, not the military. And I wanted to ask General Boyd; you know more than anybody what it means to be in a state of war. Are there presumptions made about -- can we say that it's a safe presumption that we're looking at millions of refugees that are going to come out of that country of Iraq once we start bombing the heck out of these people? And who are going to be taking responsibility for these 20 million people that live in that country if we take invasion as our best option, a state of war? Have we taken that into consideration?

BOYD: I don't know the answer to that, but I have to assume we have. Those who are -- these are careful men with good judgment that are doing our planning. And I have no qualms about that at all. I am only suggesting a mechanism that would precede a method that I believe can carry broad based international support to see if it's effective. And if it's not, then I'll go to this more troublesome regime change oriented invasion force that we're talking about.

FALEOMAVAEGA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know the other members want to ask questions.

HYDE: Thank you very much.

Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman from California.

ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much.

And let me pay my respects to the whole panel, especially Mr. Perle. Dr. Perle, thank you for spending the time with us today and thank you for your great service to our country. Dr. Perle, of course, was very important in -- when I was in the Reagan Administration of laying out the theories that led to the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War. The peace through strength proposal that led with President Reagan's leadership to a more peaceful world.

I think there were people on the other side of that, maybe at the Carnegie Institute who fought us and several of our efforts back in those days as well. The only thing that we're going to get widespread support from and, with all due respect to Ms. Mathews and General Boyd and to my colleague, Mr. Faleomavaega, is, as Ms. Mathews indicated, getting rid of the weapons. And that's if we can count on getting rid of all the weapons, which I have never seen evidence that we can for sure, be sure certain, that we've gotten rid of all the weapons.

But, let me note this, once we have eliminate the weapons that we do find, Ms. Mathews, doesn't this mean that we just start the process all over again? Isn't what happened that what we have right now and the fact that we're in this pickle right now and that we're in jeopardy to the likes of Saddam Hussein, isn't this due to the fact that we have this passion for a multi-lateral support and an effort last time around and we gave in to our allies and not taking out Saddam Hussein that 10 years ago? Isn't that what this is all about?

We gave into our allies saying don't take out Saddam Hussein 10 years ago and now here we are in jeopardy again. Aren't you just talking about starting that same cycle all over again and a few years down the road we're going to be right here again and you're going to be right there saying let's go to our allies and make sure that they concur with us? And then we end up in a halfhearted effort.

MATHEWS: The choice that we made not to end the war with the death of Saddam Hussein in 1991 had nothing to do with our allies. It was our own choice.

Secondly, the answer to your question about whether this would be -- start all over again in two years is no. The inspection regime, as already written, presupposes a highly intrusive open-ended, ongoing monitoring and verification phase after the disarmament phase.

ROHRABACHER: Well, I would suggest this. The only allies that count in this effort are the people of Iraq. And we have the people of Iraq on our side and I will tell you that I am very disturbed at listening to your testimony suggesting that the people of Iraq will not welcome the United States' efforts to help them rid themselves of Saddam Hussein. And I think that there is some type of a fundamental misunderstanding that you have about what people who live under such tyrants really feel. Because, if you lived under this kind of tyranny and you saw some Americans working with Iraqis to get rid of Saddam Hussein I think you would be doing what they will be doing when we liberate Baghdad and that is they will be dancing in the streets, waving American flags, thanking us for ridding themselves of this gangster whose been murdering their own people for so long.

And all this caution that we have about going in, and I think that we have to be very reasonable and rational about it, but we shouldn't show caution about the feelings of some of our "allies" who they themselves have less than free countries. We should be concerned about the people of Iraq and making sure they're on our side.

Mr. Perle, do you have something to say about that?

PERLE: Well, I very much agree with that and I think I'm sure that Jessica doesn't intend it this way. But it sounds to me a rather demeaning characterization of the Iraqi people to suggest that they would not wish to see the end of this tyrannical rule. Of course they would, anybody would.

And this, I'm afraid, is part of a larger tendency to believe that somehow the Arab world isn't fit for democracy, isn't fit for decent governance. That's not the explicit argument, but it's certainly implicit in much of what we hear.

And finally, that is one reason why the president is, in my view, absolutely right. To argue that this is more than a question about inspections. There are other issues here. There are other UN resolutions, including resolutions dealing with the way Saddam deals with his own people. There are those who want to reduce it to the very narrow question of the return of inspections. And this, clearly, is Saddam's preferred tactic at the moment. But, the issue here is much broader than simply the question of inspections, which I think is a practical matter and won't work anyway.

ROHRABACHER: Well, Ronald Reagan showed that if you have a long- term goal freedom and democracy it also brings peace. And I think that's what's going to happen in Iraq too.

Thank you very much.

HYDE: Thank you.

The chair recognizes the gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. McKinney.

MCKINNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Perle, my first and second questions are for you.

Ms. Mathews, I have several questions for you.

My first question for Mr. Perle, on behalf of the many young men and women in our armed forces who won't be paid their high deployment overtime pay as they're just about to be sent off to war in Iraq because President Bush signed an executive order denying them their pay. Do you intend to ask the president to reinstate the overtime pay of our young men and women? The second question that I would ask for Mr. Perle is Sunday Observer, December 12, 2001, entitled Secrete U.S. Plan for Iraq War mentions James Woolsey, Paul Wolfowitz, Tommy Franks, as having participated in secret plans to prosecute the war and -- in Iraq.

But, most disconcerting is the final paragraph of this article, which states that the most adventurous ingredient in the anti-Iraqi proposal is the use of U.S. ground troops Pentagon sources say. Significant numbers of ground troops could also be called on in the early stages of any rebellion to guard oil fields around the Shia port of Basra in southern Iraq.

In addition to the administration having come up with the idea of hitting Saddam on weapons of mass destruction only after the Europeans told the United States that Iraqi links to 9/11 were circumstantial at best. Is it true that U.S. troops will guard oil fields near Basra? My question's for Ms. Mathews, why would the United States' government need to spend $200 million to convince the American people that Saddam must be ousted? I have an article here that the administration is about to launch a $200 million campaign, which will be overseen by the Office of Global Communications, would sound something eerily like the Office of Strategic Influence, which was denounced publicly.

Yet, this Office of Global Communications, the existence won't be announced until next month. Why is it that we have to spend this amount of money to convince the American people that this is the right thing to do?

I also have a question for Ms. Mathews again. And this president tells us that we're going to war in order to ensure peace. How can we believe this president when we failed to use U.S. troops to ensure the peace in East Timor when it was the Indonesians, in Afghanistan when it was the Taliban, in Rwanda when it was the genocide (ph), in Sierra Leone when it was the RUF, and in Democrat Republic of Congo right now with the aggression with respect to Rwanda and Uganda? Those are the questions that I would like to have answered starting with you, Mr. Perle.

PERLE: Well, I have no particular insight into the question of pay and bonuses. So, I'm afraid I can't be very helpful...

MCKINNEY: But, you sit on the defense board.

PERLE: Yes, but the defense policy board...

MCKINNEY: Don't you set policy?

PERLE: No, no, that's a misconception, the defense policy board is a group of individuals that advise the secretary of defense, but only on some issues and that's not an issue that...

MCKINNEY: Well, don't you think it would be advisable that the men and women who are being asked to fight the war be paid for fighting the war?

PERLE: Yes, I happen to think that we should extend ourselves with respect to our troops and I would cheerfully testify in favor of budget increases to accomplish that.

On your second question I have no knowledge of the plan that you referred to. I have my doubts that the Observer Newspaper in London is well informed on these matters, but you should put that question to General Franks or Jim Woolsey's right there in front of you. I have no knowledge of it.

WOOLSEY: I've never met General Franks, Congresswoman.

MCKINNEY: That wasn't the question that was asked.

WOOLSEY: If I was supposed to be planning a secret war with him, presumably I would have met him and I...

MCKINNEY: No.

WOOLSEY: ... did not.

MCKINNEY: No. Was there a plan to go to war prior to the announcements now? And did you participate in those plans?

WOOLSEY: I have no idea. I've been in defense policy board meetings that Richard chairs, but plans for war are not the providence of advisory boards consisting of former folks who worked in government and come in for a couple of days several times a year. No military and certainly not Don Rumsfeld and certainly not the joint chiefs would delegate any planning responsibility to members like that.

MCKINNEY: Well, actually the article says it was Paul Wolfowitz. But, I don't want to use -- lose all of my time...

(CROSSTALK)

WOOLSEY: Well, neither would Paul Wolfowitz; none of them would delegate their planning...

MCKINNEY: I'd like to get to Ms. Mathews.

WOOLSEY: ... to a group like that.

MATHEWS: Congresswoman, on your first question I think it's best address as the administration itself. On the question of peace, I guess my only comment would be that if our goal is disarming Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, which I believe it should be, I believe there is a credible, peaceful way to achieve it.

MCKINNEY: And your response to the $200 million that the president intends to use to convince the American people that going to war against Saddam Hussein is the right thing to do through this Office of Global Communication, which is as yet unannounced?

MATHEWS: Well, as I said, I think the question, you know, of the legitimacy of that, of the details of it is best addressed to the administration.

HYDE: The time of the gentlelady has expired.

Chairman Royce?

MCKINNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROYCE: Thank you.

Former Director Woolsey, I was going to ask you we have heard conflicting reports on Saddam Hussein's capability to develop nuclear weapons and clearly that is a strategic goal of Iraq. But, same say it's only a matter of months, that's the view of some of the defectors. Others say it would take years. I think it was National Security Advisor Connie Rice (ph) who said she did not want to wait to see the exploding mushroom cloud to know that he'd accomplished his goal of finishing the bomb.

But, in your estimate, how long until Iraq possesses that type of weapon? And I ask that because earlier this year I had an opportunity to go to Uzbekistan, Ferghana (ph) and Afghanistan and the borders are very porous and one of the assertions that you hear is that at one time it was possible to buy anything in Central Asia from organized crime, including enriched uranium. And, so, I think we've got to rustle with this question about his capability to develop that type of a weapon and I wanted your expertise on it.

WOOLSEY: Congressman, I agree very much. I think the only reasonable answer is to when Saddam could have his first nuclear weapon is within a few months at most of the time he has 40-pounds or so of highly enriched uranium, which is about the amount you need for a primitive bomb.

We know through Kildare Hamza who headed the program and came out of Iraq in 1994 how well developed the program was in terms of design, in terms of expertise, in terms of the components of the weapon other than the fissionable material. And we know that Saddam came close to having enough fissionable material even after the acerbic reactor was destroyed in 1981. He came close to having enough; Hamza has the numbers in his book until the war in 1991 interrupted his progress.

We know that he is proceeding not to use large reactors and plutonium, but rather to use highly enriched uranium, which can be enriched through, among other things, gas centrifuges, which can be relatively small. I believe the evidence is quite good that he is seeking to import material for gas centrifuges.

So, if he needs further fissionable material to what he has now and needs to produce that himself from facilities inside Iraq it could be months. It could be a year or two, but as soon as he has the fissionable material he will relatively shorter have a weapon.

The key point is the one you mentioned that he does not necessarily need to produce this fissionable material himself. About a month ago, an operation, a joint operation by Russians and Americans, seized approximately 100 pounds of highly enriched uranium in former Yugoslavia. That would be enough for about two bombs and a bit. There are facilities in the former Soviet Union; there are even some in Africa, which have enriched, in some cases even highly enriched uranium of bomb quality, which are not well guarded.

There are real possibilities of organized crime selling such material. I was interviewed a few months ago by a French television network who believed that they had in Bulgaria, the previous year, purchased an artillery shell that had nuclear fissile material in it from Russian organized crime. They had an expert with them who verified it. They gave it back. They didn't keep the artillery shell. There's a special on French television about this.

There are a lot of risks to sitting and waiting and hoping that we would know before he has a nuclear weapon. That's why I believe Connie Rice is exactly right and in way it is my main problem with the proposal that Ms. Mathews and General Boyd have made. My main concern is delay. Each month that goes by makes it more likely he will have a nuclear weapon and will have one quite possibly without our knowing because he can do this underground. He can do it in small facilities and he's working very hard at it.

ROYCE: Based on his past behavior with respect to using chemical weapons in Persia or Iran, with respect to gas and his attacks on the Kurds would you say that if he had that type of weapon this is the type of personality that could use that type of weapon?

WOOLSEY: He might use it in a sort of twilight of the gods as he goes down kind of situation. He might use it in some effort he had talked about it reportedly against Israel. He lacks a number of the types of delivery vehicles that he would like to have, I'm sure. So, he will be limited for time in how he can strike at range.

But, I think one of the main uses he would make of it would be to let it be known that he had such a weapon and use it to deter the forming of coalitions against him, use it to deter his neighbors from cooperating with us and that would be the main problem as he sought to dominate the Middle East.

General Boyd quite reasonably said he is concerned now about the possibility that as we marshaled our forces near Iraq, Iraq might use weapons of mass destruction, such as, let's say, biologicals. If we're worried about that now, we and Iraq's other neighbors will be more worried next month and the month after and the month after. So, as far as all these proposals for inspections and all the rest, I don't have any massive problem with them as long as they don't take more than another month or so.

But, I think we ought to be ready by the time cool weather really would permit action against Iraq to move.

ROYCE: But, if we let it get to the point of a suitcase bomb, how do we know he doesn't pass that off to a terrorist organization.

WOOLSEY: He could conceivably get hold of one of the atomic demolition munitions that the Soviets have had in the past and there have been reports from General Levitt (ph) and others that some of those were missing. They're not quite suitcase, but they are pretty small. It's not unimaginable that he could acquire something like that and even give it to a terrorist group. I am more concerned about the possibility that he would acquire enough fissionable material to have a couple of bombs and then publicize the fact and use that in order to keep coalitions from forming against him and permit him to dominate the Middle East.

HYDE: Mr. Sherman?

SHERMAN: Thank you.

I hope this is a hearing about nuclear weapons, because if it's about all manner of U.N. resolutions then we should be having a hearing about invading Syria or a host of other nations. We had in this very room yesterday hearings on Syria that show that that government, except as to the development of nuclear weapons, is just as bad and they are, of course, in violation of the U.N. -- a host of U.N. resolutions, including those dealing with the withdraw from Lebanon.

In fact when you realize that there are U.N. resolutions imploring member states to follow the U.N. declaration of human rights you could argue that a decision, a new doctrine of this administration, that we invade every nation that violates U.N. resolutions could involve a majority of the U.N. member states.

Either this is about all U.N. resolutions or I hope it is about U.N. resolutions dealing with nuclear weapons. And nuclear weapons are important because they can be smuggled into the United States and once they're hidden in any apartment building in any city then American can be blackmailed into not being involved when, for example, Saddam decides to reoccupy Kuwait.

Now, there are three approaches we can take to nuclear weapons. The first was the consensus approach until September 10 of last year. And that was to simply turn a blind eye and let Saddam do whatever he's going to do while trying to limit the money that he has to do it.

President Bush never departed from that until after the tragedy of September 11. President Clinton departed from it once when, in late 1998, in response to the U.N. report that its inspectors had been barred and that the rules for those inspections had been violated. We will remember that when there were limited, modest, and in reflection, inadequate response from the Clinton Administration, the other party came forward with a torrent of some of the most ugly political rhetoric questioning President Clinton's motives.

I'm proud that the people on this side of the aisle are ready to unite behind President Bush without politics playing a role and are here to discuss policy, not to cry politics. There are two reasonable approaches, both represented by our witnesses here today. One is invade now, or, to put it another way, invade -- give Saddam a week to stop persecuting his own people and to morph into Mother Theresa and then if he doesn't, then we invade. I call that the invade now or the invade next week strategy.

The other approach is to invade unless the most extreme, intrusive, continuous, unimpeded inspections take place. That's the invade unless strategy. We are going, in this committee, to do the most important work this committee can do, probably the most important work we will do in a decade. And that is to mark up the resolution to authorize the use of force under some circumstances.

And there are two approaches this committee can take. We can take the policy setting approach or we can take the policy abdication approach. One possible draft will simply state the president is authorized to use force against Iraq whenever he feels like it's a good idea.

The other approach will be one that conditions the authorization for the use of force on a failure of Saddam to allow the most extreme kinds of inspections. My hope is that we'll debate that and it will not be that we're abdicating to the president. That we're not going to just say well the president can do whatever he wants. Because if you look at the Constitution it says that foreign policy is supposed to be set -- and I know people familiar with post-World War II history and not familiar with the Constitution are unaware of this, are supposed to be set by the United States' Congress. And I hope that we will either have a resolution that says invade now or invade if Saddam doesn't morph into Mother Theresa in a week, or one that says invade only if and when Saddam fails to consent to these extreme inspections, one way or the other.

My fear is that we in Congress will simply say we're not up to the task set for us by the Constitution. We can't decide. Let the president decide whether to invade now or invade unless. And I hope that the input you've given will allow us to feel up to that task. And I look forward to drafting that resolution.

I would welcome comment from the panel either in writing if time does not permit or now if the chairman wants to indulge me and I don't frankly deserve that indulgence.

HYDE: I would just tell the panelist we have four votes scheduled for 2:30. We've been in touch with Secretary Powell who had agreed to appear before the committee an hour later. So, we can extend this a little bit. The panelists have been advised, just advised and they graciously have agreed to that as well.

So, although we have not gotten to Dr. Perle to see whether or not he can remain, but I would ask members to keep it brief because there still are several and I don't want their time to be intruded upon. But, maybe briefly if you could respond to Mr. Sherman and then we'll go to Dr. Paul of Texas.

WOOLSEY: I'll just say a quick word, Congressman, I think that was -- that's a very well structured and wryly humorous formulation. I think that the issue is time. It is obviously not going to be the case that Saddam Hussein going to morph into Mother Theresa. I think it's only slightly more likely that he would accept a truly intrusive and effective inspection regime.

But, if it doesn't take more than a few weeks it seems to me that there is a bit of room here, but only a very bit, for the various schools to try to coalesce around something. My fear is that he will do what he has done time and time and time again in the 1990s which is accept something superficially and then start stalling and we'll the secretary general perhaps suggesting well it doesn't need to be that demanding and so on and so on.

So, whether it's morphing into Mother Theresa or accepting very extreme inspections, plus the requirement that people be -- able to be interviewed outside Iraq with their families, if we can get absolute clarity on that within the next few weeks to me that's within the realm of reason. What I'm worried about is letting the winter get behind us.

HYDE: Dr. Paul?

PERLE: Well, I would like to come back to a relevant point, which arose earlier. And that was the question what is the trigger? Because if you're talking about inspections, even an aggressive inspection program is the key, you have to ask under what circumstances do you do to the phase two that's been proposed here? And, I promise you any discover, if one were made, would be ambiguous. Any interference with an inspection regime would be ambiguous.

So, the inspectors set out to visit a site because they believe they may find something. And the highway is blocked. The highway is blocked because there's a tractor-trailer that's overturned. Is that a casus belli? Does that take us into an act of war? It isn't as clear-cut as the theory seems to suggest. So, when you talk about even a very aggressive inspection scheme the implementation of such a scheme is enormously difficult and the circumstances are never as clear as you envision when you're putting that forward as a proposal.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first want to express my disappointment about the hearings because in many ways it's very one-sided. I mean we haven't heard that there may be a diplomatic solution to this. We haven't heard about containment. And that to me is a shame. This is all one-sided. But, fortunately, I think the American people will see through this. The senate hearings were the same way. This turns out to be more propaganda for war than anything else.

So, that I'm disappointed in. And also I want to mention about the resolutions. This concentration and the gentleman before me did mention this. If this is about resolution, this is a joke. I mean literally hundreds of U.N. resolutions have been ignored. If you want to deal with a serious resolution and serious place in the world, why don't you go to Cashmere? Nuclear weapons on both sides and they ignore U.N. resolutions. So, this has nothing to do with U.N. resolutions. That is a sham. And I think it's disappointing that we place so much emphasis on that.

There's nukes around the world. There's been no indication that Saddam Hussein has this. We're willing to go to war over phantom weapons. And I think we're falling into a serious trap. And the trap is that we are going to look like we support the Christian West against the Muslim East, which they've been arguing all along. 20 Arab nations have condemned this proposal to go to war. And I think this is going to turn out to be a monstrous mistake.

There's no indication that Saddam Hussein is related to the 9/11 terrorism. So, even though the public has become to believe this because of the propaganda that we hear. But, my questions deal with the cost, because those are difficult problems and we've heard all the hyperbole over that. But, we deal with the costs. And, fortunately for our administration, they've been straightforward on this. They've told the American people, Larry Lindsey, $200 billion and we don't even know what the results will be and we don't know what the oil is going to cost.

And I want to know more about the cost and what this means, because, you know, if the American people knew that $200 billion would come out of Social Security, boy, they'd wake up all of the sudden. And all funds are fungible; all Social Security money goes to the general revenue. All they hold are treasury bills. So, if you say it's $200 billion that means there's a $200 billion possibility to undermine the Social Security system and we should not ignore that.

But, I want to know about some other costs. And these questions, the question I have now will be directed more to Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Perle because I want to quantify what you two think this war's worth in terms of human life, American human life, American soldiers.

Vietnam cost us 60,000. Is this worth 30? They say you can get done what you want and it'll cost 30,000 American soldiers. I want to know if you think it's worth 30,000 plus 20 more thousand, probably wounded or injured or come back with Persian Gulf War Syndrome that they're totally ignored by the U.S. Congress? I want to know if that's really worth to lose 30,000. Or, how much do you think it's worth? If I told you we'd lose a million, of course, nobody would believe it and it wouldn't be true. But, realistically we could lose 10, 20, 30,000 men. Is this war worth it? And I think we should answer that as honestly as possible and not just say yes, it's necessary because, you know, down the road we'd even lose more lives.

But, also I would like to know from the two of you. Is this war worth your life? Are you willing to go to the front-line...

(UNKNOWN): That's a good question.

PAUL: ... and expose yourself to this type of danger? That's what really what counts. That's what I look at as a member of Congress. If I ever vote for the declaration of war that means it's like an intruder came into my house and I'll sacrifice my life for my family. That's when we should go to war.

And, I would like to know from the two of you do you feel that strongly that you'd be willing to expose your life to pursue this cause that you so adamantly push.

(UNKNOWN): Or that of the young people in their families.

WOOLSEY: I'll take that one on, I have three sons in their 20s. I served two years in the U.S. Army. I flew a desk working on intelligence matters. I was not in combat. I was opposed to the Vietnam War. Indeed I founded in Chairgill (ph), Citizens for Eugene McCarthy for President in 1967, '68. But I went on active duty immediately after that and I would have gone to Vietnam had I been ordered to.

I think a political difference is a different thing from being willing to serve the country. I don't think it's up to private citizens to tell you how much succeeding in freeing Iraq and ridding the Mid East of this threat is worth, Congressman. The country decided, per force, that ending Nazism and Japanese militarism was worth over approximately half a million American deaths, and that ending slavery in the American South was worth hundreds and hundreds of thousands of deaths.

I think that only the elected representatives of the people and the president can make a decision on whether war is worth the sacrifices that we and our families would be called upon to make and the families of people who serve in the military.

But, on an answer to your direct question, yes, 60-year-old civilians, long out of the reserves are not normally considered front- line troops, but if I could be of assistance in this war, yes, I would be.

PERLE: Well, I find the question a particularly troubling question because the suggestion is that somehow it is illegitimate to make recommendation with respect to what one believes is in the best interest of the country and all of our citizens except in some intensely personal context.

I'm obviously not competent to contribute very much in my age and condition to the front lines. But, I believe that action to deal with Saddam Hussein, sooner rather than later, is in the best interest to protecting the lives of the American people. And if I were in a position to serve, I would do so. But, that seems to me quite the wrong question, Congressman. The question is how do we best protect the citizens of this country and I believe that purpose is best accomplished by not waiting until Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons, by not waiting until he has improved and perfected his chemical and biological weapons, by not waiting and hoping for the best. We waited too long before September 11 and some thousands of Americans lost their lives and we mustn't repeat that mistake.

HYDE: The chair recognizes...

WOOLSEY: Could I add one point, Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, just one really short sentence.

HYDE: Mr. Woolsey?

WOOLSEY: This so-called chicken hawk argument does seem to me to be an extraordinarily unworthy argument. And I think Senator John McCain has put it exactly where it belongs. For one thing it says that if an American women or an openly gay American man supports the war that an opinion is unworthy or an over age, military age, American man, that that is an unworthy and ought to be an unconsidered opinion because none of those people are going to serve in combat. And I join Mr. Perle in saying that I think that it's an extraordinarily unworthy ad hominem argument.

HYDE: The chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.

DELAHUNT: I thank the chair and I comment to my friend from Texas that maybe if we instituted a draft and we only drafted males over 60 you and I would gulp and maybe we would have a different attitude about it.

In any event, I'd like to direct my questions to Ms. Mathews just for the sake of brevity.

We hear much about, and I think it was Dr. Perle who talked about how do we protect America and how do we protect our citizens. Do you have information or do you know whether Iran and North Korea possess weapons of mass destruction? And if you have that information, acquired over time, do you know at what stage their development of weapons of mass destruction maybe?

MATHEWS: We know that Iran has been covertly and in violation of its non-proliferation treaty commitment pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that. And we know that in all probability they have greater capability even right now than Iraq does.

One of the risks of a war and I do agree with the previous point in this respect. This hearing has not really grappled with the cost of the war. And, in fact, I think there's a great -- there's a good deal more agreement on this panel then there has seemed in the key respects that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction do pose a threat that needs to be dealt with.

DELAHUNT: I understand that, Ms. Mathews. But, again if you could direct...

MATHEWS: But, the...

DELAHUNT: ... you know.

MATHEWS: ... I mean I think one of the great risks that goes directly to your question of a war is the likelihood that it will prompt Iran to withdraw from the NPT just as the United States just withdrew from the ABM Treaty. And to say that it'd believed that it needs nuclear weapons in order to prevent the same thing from happening to itself. And, I believe that if that were to happen it would never be walked back because nuclear weapons would instantly become the focus of Iranian nationalism, just as they were in Pakistan and we would have a very different and much more dangerous Middle East.

DELAHUNT: Again, I included in my question North Korea.

MATHEWS: North Korea, the North Korean program, the last time that I had some knowledge of the classified information was on hold.

DELAHUNT: Would, if you could, would you describe it in any comparable terms to the situation or to the development of the program in Iraq?

MATHEWS: Well...

DELAHUNT: If you don't know, you don't know.

DELAHUNT: ... I think it's in a very different -- it's in a very different situation right now because the framework for cooperation with North Korea has established a framework that has put that program into a very different mode than it was in before. I don't question in any way the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass -- the determination in Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

DELAHUNT: Let...

MATHEWS: I do...

DELAHUNT: ... me restate the question just a bit then. You've suggested Iran is more advanced in terms of the possession and the development of weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear device. Is that a fair statement?

MATHEWS: Of what we knew for certain when we left in '98, which is what we know for certain when the inspectors left Iraq in '98.

DELAHUNT: I'm talking Iran, though, for instance.

MATHEWS: Plus, what we can now estimate to be either possible or probable.

DELAHUNT: Then it is a fair statement, the one that I'm making?

MATHEWS: Yes.

DELAHUNT: And, what we hear is a sense of urgency. I think it was Dr. Woolsey that talked about, you know, a month. I guess we can conclude then that it is -- it ought to be of more concern to the Congress and to the American people what is happening in Iraq than either Iran or North Korea, is that a reasonable inference?

MATHEWS: That would be a reasonable inference. I don't think it's valid.

DELAHUNT: But, you don't think it's valid.

MATHEWS: I don't think it's valid.

WOOLSEY: It's also not what I said.

DELAHUNT: Well, I don't think I eluded, Dr. Woolsey, to you making any comments about Iran and North Korea.

WOOLSEY: The one month, I did not say one month. And, I think that Ms. Mathews said that that was not valid and I just wanted to make -- get it on the record that I hadn't said one month. I said months...

DELAHUNT: OK.

WOOLSEY: ... from the time they have the fissionable material.

DELAHUNT: That's...

MATHEWS: Actually what you said, I wrote it down, was a month or so.

DELAHUNT: Right. That was my memory too. But, we have a record we can check.

MATHEWS: The issue if Iraq were to get fissile material out of somewhere from the former Soviet Union, which is the most likely place, then they probably -- or they might have a nuclear weapon in a matter of months. That might have happened last year, two years ago, four years ago, or it could happen tomorrow.

DELAHUNT: But, the concern is really is a question of intention. We've known for years. We knew during the 1980s when we supported Iraq that they had chemical and biological weapons at their disposal. We supported Iraq. We, in fact, we installed an embassy in Iraq. We were aware of what they were doing in terms of the use of weapons of mass destruction against the Iranians at that point in time.

Now, I guess what I'm suggesting is that this is really more a determination when the president describes Iran, North Korea and Iraq as the axis of evil, it would appear to be that given the concern and the focus of Iraq is that the magnitude of evil in Iraq far surpasses that of Iran and North Korea. Given, I guess, what we presume to be the intentions of those particular regimes. And, given the, you know, the articulation, not just by Dr. Woolsey, but by others about urgency. That's what I mean by -- that's the point I'm trying to drive, Ms. Mathews.

MATHEWS: Right. If I could just say this, I think this is an enormously important point. To the best of my knowledge, certainly in the public domain and including everything the administration has said, there is no reason for a sense of urgency on the order of weeks or days or months here. There's nothing that has happened. There's no intelligence that suggests that we have some greater additional new reason to feel a sense of urgency that we shouldn't have felt in '98, '99, 2000, and 2001. There's no new intelligence, at least that the administration's been able or willing to make public, to do it. There is no sense of new immediacy. In other words, there is time to do this right.

There is not time, I agree with Jim, there is not time for endless delay.

HYDE: The time of the gentleman has expired.

PERLE: Can I comment on that?

HYDE: Dr. Perle, very briefly.

PERLE: Simply to say that I think the situation was more urgent in '98 than we understood. And, now partly under the influence of September 11, but partly because you have a new administration looking at this, the sense of urgency has come to the floor. We were dangerously remiss, in my view, in not taking serious action to deal with Saddam Hussein much before now. And, in particular when the inspectors were unceremoniously expelled from Iraq.

HYDE: Mr. Woolsey, I see you have a brief comment?

WOOLSEY: Very short intervention. Ms. Mathews said no urgency in terms of days, weeks or months, plural. I believe there is definitely urgency in terms of months because the winter months are the time in which are soldiers would be able to be in protective gear for chemical weapons in the desert. So, if this delay occurs and takes us past mid-winter, I believe that we are in effect delayed for another year. And that, I think, would be extremely irresponsible indeed.

DELAHUNT: Dr. Woolsey, if I may...

WOOLSEY: I never got past mister, Congressman. I'm...

DELAHUNT: I'll give you (inaudible).

HYDE: I do have to go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith. If time permits, we'll get back to you, Mr. Delahunt.

SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think reviewing where we are now. Our current quest appears to try to get more of the world's support in going to the United Nations' Security Council for their additional support. I think it's important that Congress pass a resolution giving our support to doing something and that latitude to the president. Because I think that it's going to help encourage the United Nations to take action. And I would just suggest that the United Nations doesn't take some actions to start enforcing some of the many resolutions that are not being enforced. And in that case I understand 13 with Iraq, then I think they're going to become even more insignificant in their activities in world peace.

Let me ask three questions to all of our panelists and if you'd take notes of the three questions maybe you can respond to them briefly or whatever. The first is are their conceivable ways to implement current U.N. resolutions without getting bogged down in Security Council debate over a new resolution?

The next question would be as far as going into Iraq what would you think would be our prime objective? Would it be Saddam Hussein? Would it be weapons of mass destruction, or would it be terrorist networks and the problem with terrorism in that country and that support?

And the third question is what do we do in the aftermath if there is an attack, assuming we force a regime change at Iraq who would rule? How would we lay down our responsible responsibilities in there? In other words, our exit strategy or how long do you suspect we're going to have to be there or other forces are going to have to be there?

So, in the sake of time I jumble all three questions together and maybe just starting with you, Mr. Perle and then Mr. Woolsey and Ms. Mathews, General, if you have a comment.

PERLE: Well, Congressman, the questions require a degree of presence that I'm not sure I can muster. With respect to the earlier resolutions I think a case can be made that the earlier resolutions invite member countries to do whatever they can to secure compliance. And so I'm not sure that a resolution is needed.

The president has chosen to go to the United Nations. And I think that's commendable and he did it in a brilliant speech. So, we ought to get a resolution now under those circumstances. But, I'm not sure that it was technically necessary. As for the prime objective it is my view, no one can prove this, that as long as Saddam Hussein and his regime are in power he will pose a threat to this country and to the world and he will try continuously to perfect and improve the weapons he already has and to acquire more.

And we may play an inspection game with him, but he will be relentless in this respect. And he has every chance of succeeding and hiding better than we can find.

Finally, as to the aftermath, I would hope and believe that the people of Iraq, who are sophisticated and educated and have the capacity for decent self government, would, with some help from the United States, bring to power in that country people capable of governing in a decent and humane way, in a way that brings all of the people of Iraq together. The Iraqi National Congress has been in existence for many years. It has a manifesto that calls for democracy, calls for renouncing weapons of mass destruction, calls for supporting the peace process of the region, that would be a very good place to start.

SMITH: Mr. Woolsey?

WOOLSEY: Congressman, very briefly, I agree with Richard's answer on the first question about the U.N. resolutions. I'll just adopt it.

As far as the objective, I think it has to be regime change and not just Saddam, as I said earlier, his son, Qusay, would be as bad or worse. And I think it's not just to find the weapons of mass destruction facilities, because there are hundreds of them from defectors we know this, in the country. And one has to effectively take over the country in order to deal with them.

WOOLSEY: That's been my problem with the inspection regime that was proposed here today all along. Terrorist networks, there have been definitely ties of one kind or another to terrorist networks over the years. There are some facilities, for example, Salman Pact (ph), just south of Baghdad; the Iraqis have trained for years, Islamists, non-Iraqi religious fundamentalists in hijacking aircraft. We don't have any smoking guns that relates that to 9/11, but there are terrorist training facilities, and all of these I think would be the types of things that we need to get rid of with a regime change.

And the aftermath of a regime change, I believe we would be well advised to plan to be in Iraq for at least a few years. Hopefully, together with allies, and hopefully in decreasing numbers, because I do believe that Bernard Lewis who in my judgment is our greatest expert in this country on the Mid East, says that Iraq is the Arab country best suited to democracy, because it has an educated population. It's had 40 year of tyranny and would like nothing better the people than to have decent government. And it's a potentially wealthy country. It has the second largest oil reserves in the world.

He also believes that it would be -- it would take some effort, but it is quite plausible to hold the country together in a federal structure and not have it fly apart. So, I believe we should work toward having a decent government in Iraq, moving toward a democracy and the Iraqi people ought to choose their leader. We didn't choose Conrad Adenauer in the late 1940s in Germany. We helped set up a system de-Natzified the country and the German people chose him. And I think that is the way things should go in Iraq.

MATHEWS: Congressman, I would associate myself with the previous speakers on your first and second questions. I don't think I have anything to add. If we did go to war in Iraq the primary objective, I think, would, in fact, be regime change.

And I think Richard Perle exactly spelled out the situation with respect to resolutions.

On your third question I think the only honest answer to the question of who would rule in Iraq after war is that we don't know. And that's one of the great risks of a war, along with the question that Jim just deluded to of whether the country could politically be held together.

Some weeks ago when the Foreign Relations Committee in the other body held a hearing on this a panel of regional experts was asked how long they would expect the need for American troops to be after a war. The minimum estimate among, I think, five panelists was five years. And the estimates ranged up to 20. This is for a very large contingent of American forces in order to basically hold Iraq together and rebuild it. And I believe that's one of the aspects of a war that has not gotten the attention it deserves.

BOYD: I don't have much to add. But, with respect to the first question, it strikes me that the interpretation presented in that the existing resolutions do carry enough weight to take action, the interruption of the war argument that Richard Perle made earlier. It seems to me, however, that we are assuming there that others would join us in our interpretation. And it strikes me, from what I understand anyway of the debate in the UN, is that it would take another resolution to give clarity to action and to build the kind of support that I think we need or that we would certainly benefit from having. So, I guess my answer is that I believe we have, for a variety of reasons, many of which have been discussed here today, I believe we can achieve that additional United Nations' Security Council resolution now where we couldn't have a month ago or five months ago, and may not be able to in the future if we don't do something very soon and every resolute.

I don't have anything to add on the second question. I don't think in that case you can really separate Saddam from WMD. I mean the both become the objective if you've invaded the place. I would say that there's no certainty about the future of WMD with a new regime, even if it's an -- unless we stay there as the way Jessica has just outlined.

And that leads me to the last question. I think I wouldn't argue with Bernard Lewis in that it's probably the country best suited to democracy. But, there's not much body of experience with democratic processes in that country either, which would lead me to believe it's not analogous to post -- immediate post-World War II situation in Germany.

I would opt for an answer that would be we'll stay there a long time if we really want to form and shape the kind of governmental process that will go on in the future. It'll take us a long time. I don't know what a long time is, but I don't think you do that in five years.

HYDE: Thank you, General Boyd.

Mr. Meeks?

MEEKS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, I want to thank all of the panelists. This is, indeed, a difficult time for me. Number one, being a New Yorker and what took place on 9/11, being American. And we're in this debate in regards to Iraq at this particular time and to be honest, I'm still focused on the war on terrorism and I don't know, to me, it seems to be too different things, the war on terrorism and the war against Iraq.

And 9/11 surely has changed a number of things for us and I think has also resulted in how we think about foreign policy and how we think that we need to move because when we're talking now in regards to Iraq, I believe that we're not just talking about Iraq. We're talking about how and what implications Iraq will have and what we do in Iraq on the rest of the world.

I've spent some time recently talking to individuals in my district and leaders from around the world and individuals that we call our allies on this war against terrorism. And two questions come up, what kind of world do we as Americans want our children to live in, and in the 21st Century particularly, which national security strategy do Americans think is the best way to achieve security, stability and prosperity for Americans? Perhaps, is it one that is based on United States global cooperation, or is it based on the United States global dominance? And I think that, you know, those are decisions that we have to make and what we've got to determine.

All through the testimony today I've heard of mention, well, virtually by everybody, but of the need of our allies and the countries or the neighbors of Iraq for their security. Yet, I have not heard, unless one of the panelists can tell me different, any of those allies other than the British or the neighbors of Iraq indicate that they would like for the United States to go in on a unilateral basis to strike Iraq. These are the individuals that would be in the most danger. From all of the information that I've heard, and that's what I'm trying to get, I'm trying to get information. I have not heard today one scintilla of evidence or information that says that Iraq is now ready to strike the United States of America or have the capability to do that now, or can do it in a month. I have not heard that.

And, for me, that becomes of importance because I think that my job, my first job is, is to protect the citizens of the United States of America. And when I saw what took place on 9/11 it wasn't a nuclear weapon that killed those 3,000 people in new York City or those at the Pentagon or those that dies in Pennsylvania. It was the use of an airplane that was made as a weapon.

And so I'm concerned about this new type of terrorism. So, my first question is and as I talked to individuals -- then I'll say this, the other facts that I know is that there are people hell-bent on attacking us in America. They're hell-bent, and, some individuals who've become our allies who were not our allies prior to 9/11. Some doubted, whether or not -- I can remember an argument, discussions, debates here in Congress whether or not we should even chance Pakistan being an ally of ours against the war on terrorism. And they have proven to be a country which have fought and is now uncovering cells, preventing individuals from attacking us, the same with Malaysia, the same with Indonesia, the same with another one that's eluding me right now.

But, my first question then is if, in fact, and maybe I direct this to Mr. Perle, if we had some intelligence and/or knowledge that some of these Muslim countries or the majority of Muslim countries, that if we did unilaterally attack Iraq, if we did it unilaterally without them being our allies that that would have a decrease in their cooperation against us against the known threats that's going to happen to, you know, against us in America, would you feel that by attacking Iraq, could therefore decrease the security of American citizens?

That'd be my first question. And then the second question that I'll ask because to me it's also an overall theme of where we go from here. Do you think a winning strategy, you know, what we are fighting now on this current era that we're in, the permanent war against terrorism, do you think a winning strategy rests on the idea that the United States must maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent new rivals from rising up to challenge on a world stage. Is that what's going to keep us in peace and just having overwhelming military strength?

Mr. Perle?

PERLE: Well, Congressman, I don't believe that an effective removal of Saddam Hussein from power would cause any of our friends to diminish their cooperation with us in the fight against terrorism. The countries that are working with us are doing so, not because they're doing us a favor, but because they believe it is in their interest as well, at least that's what they say. They're opposed to terrorism. They are potentially victims of terrorism themselves, and so they're cooperating with us. And I see no reason to believe that that cooperation would cease or diminish if we were effective in removing Saddam Hussein.

In fact, I think the opposite is true. If we were now to recoil from dealing effectively with Saddam Hussein it would convey an impression of weakness in the resolution that would be both an encouragement to terrorists and a discouragement to those who cooperate with us in the war on terror.

Finally, let me just say that a number of the countries that I think you have in mind have one view in public and another view in private. And I don't think any tears would be shed for Saddam Hussein in any of the countries that I think you're referring to.

Finally, with respect to American military strength, I think the United States is a force for stability in the world. We certainly have an obligation to protect our citizens. And I think we need to maintain whatever strength is necessary for that purpose, not to dominate others, but in order to be strong enough to discourage others from seeking to do harm to us and our friends and our allies.

MEEKS: My point simply is though that...

HYDE: Would the gentleman please end? We have four members remaining and we have to be ought of here by 2:30. So, you've already gone -- your questions are well taken, but I would ask you to conclude if you would and maybe a brief response from our panelists.

MEEKS: I will respect my other members. So, I yield back.

HYDE: Ms. Lee?

LEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to also thank our panelists for their testimony and your willingness to really provide this committee with the information, which we need with regard to the grave and important decisions with which we are faced.

Nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons, they're all pointed in all directions here in our world. And I think it's up to us to make sure that no country, and I mean no country, ever uses these. We know that robust, unfettered inspections probably would uncover what's in Iraq. It did in the '90s. The inspection process in the '90s took on a search and destroy mission. And it's my understanding that much, and I think we've heard testimony, that much of what was found was destroyed.

LEE: And I'm still unclear about -- and I understand what the -- what you all have said with regard to regime change versus ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, but I'm trying to get some understanding of what you think our U.S. policy is or should be toward Iraq at this point. Should it be ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction or should it be, as a goal, regime change?

So, let me just ask any of you who could respond to that, and also just, the second part of my question is this whole notion of the doctrine of preemption. Do you believe that once we engage in a first strike military attack to topple a regime, Saddam Hussein, do you think that our moral authority, our standing in the world as it relates to preemption, to first strike, for example, with regard to India or Pakistan or China and Taiwan, do you believe we've set another standard and will we be able, then, to -- would we allow such a launch of preemptive strikes by other countries? Would that be a new standard we've set and a new doctrine and a new part of our foreign policy that we have allowed to emerge?

MATHEWS: Perhaps I start...

LEE: Sure.

MATHEWS: ... and try to very quickly address your two questions. On the first, I do believe, as I how I began my initial statement, that the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq to be the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the disarmament of those weapons and of the threat that Saddam poses outside of his borders, outside his region and towards us.

LEE: Should be. But, I'm asking what is it?

MATHEWS: I think it's evolving. I think it's uncertain. I think it's not fully shaped. I think both houses of Congress have to have a say in this. And I think the president has, very wisely, made it clear that it matters to him what the community of nations believes on this as well. So, I think it's in play.

On your second question, I think that the consequences of turning a tactic that has always been one available to the U.S. military and to U.S. policymakers, namely of preemptive strikes, of turning that from a tactic into a doctrine would be enormously costly for the United States.

As you suggested, it invites other to exercise that exact same doctrine on their own. You can pick your own nightmare. For me the most obvious one is a choice by India to say well, we're facing terrorist strikes across our border. If you can go halfway around the world, we can certainly go a few 10 kilometers. And we're going to take preemptive action too. And I think we might well have nuclear war on our hands.

LEE: Can I ask Mr. Perle to respond to that secondly and then the other panelists please?

PERLE: Sure. I think you have to look at the context. And the context here is one of a decade of Saddam Hussein's defiance of resolutions agreed to by the United Nations, as the president pointed out. We're not talking about a decision to take some preemptive action against a perfectly innocent state that menaces no one. We're talking about giving substance to what the UN has, on many occasions, declared.

The president's gone back to the UN for a still further expression. But, I think the situation of Saddam Hussein, one of the most vicious tyrants on the face of the earth, in open defiance of the UN, is the context in which one has to look at the question of preemption, that is taking action before he does. And I don't believe India policy will, in any way, be affected by what we choose to do here.

And the suggestion somehow that if move against Saddam, there may be a nuclear war in the subcontinent, I think is stretching things beyond any reasonable (inaudible).

LEE: But, that's not remotely what I said. I was addressing the issue of adopting a doctrine of preemption.

HYDE: Congresswoman (inaudible).

PERLE: Well, this isn't a question of doctrine. This is a question of what we do in the very practical circumstances we now face, circumstances in which Saddam has expelled inspectors for four years and continue to work away at acquiring weapons of mass destruction. So, we can be as theoretical as we like. We have a problem and we need a solution.

WOOLSEY: Congresswoman, let me take a crack at the two questions real quickly. First of all, ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction or regime change. In practical terms, I think these are exactly the same thing. I think more and more people are coming to realize that. I think that even in historical terms, very ambitious inspection regime, which General Boyd and Ms. Mathews have suggested, I believe would be ineffective for the reasons that I stated. It doesn't have anything in it about taking people out of Iraq to interview, them and their families, in order to learn what one could -- where the hundreds of places are that one would have to look. And I think the military force, even if reasonably substantial would effectively end up being a hostage and prevent our further military action.

As far as preemption is concerned, I don't think we need to reach that issue. The other circumstances you described and the one that Ms. Mathews described with India and Pakistan are not parallel to what we have. What we have here is a cease-fire agreement 11 years ago that temporarily ended a war in which all people of good will believe the other side is in violation of.

And if you sign a cease fire agreement that temporarily halts hostilities and then you violate it by developing and having in possession chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and you're working hard on violating the fourth term, having nuclear weapons, it is a completely different situation under international law and otherwise, than a situation such as India and Pakistan where there is not a cease-fire agreement that anyone is violating as far as we know.

So, that cease-fire agreement is implemented by these 15, 16, 17 UN resolutions, which Saddam is also in violation of. So, I think the legal situation with respect to Iraq is completely different than a bolt out of the blue preemptive attack on one country by another.

LEE: General Boyd?

Are we done, Mr. Chairman?

(CROSSTALK)

HYDE: I think (inaudible). OK. Perhaps they could respond in answer to another question.

LEE: Thank you.

HYDE: The chair recognizes Chairman Leach, the gentleman from Iowa.

LEACH: It strikes me in all this that the administration's made a very powerful legal case, but it's not necessarily a compelling one and partly because they've overlooked one aspect of the legal case and that aspect that they've overlooked underscores the dangers of action. And by that I mean most the legal case that's been made relates to Gulf War circumstances. But, it strikes me the most powerful legal case is one that relates to international law and it's called the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, where it is illegal to develop, produce or stockpile biological agents.

And if you're going to make the UN relevant it's upholding this aspect of international law that strikes me as very important. Now, having said that, we have underestimated the nature of biological agents. These are living organisms that have greater potential of jeopardizing life on the planet than all other weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear.

And, so, we have a circumstance of MAD, the old Soviet doctrine, mutually assured destruction, and MEDS (ph), in the form of a head of state, that is a very dangerous individual. And we've also moved in the direction of shortchanging international law in the sense that we had an opportunity to upgrade the biological and toxin weapons conventions with a tougher inspections regime, that is a verification protocol, last year and we turned back from that.

We also have the option of moving forth with ratification of a comprehensive test ban, which is a basis for intervention. And so, I would like to ask the three of you and also our visitor from abroad, from afar, is should we be moving to upgrade this protocol? Should we be moving to a comprehensive test ban? Should we be recognizing that the regime change issue is one that may be more compelling than going to war is? And that this notion of biological agents being unleashed in the world is of such stunning significance that we have not given that enough thought in terms of our strategies, which clearly envision, I think, a rather ready conventional control of Iraq, but not necessarily before biological agents are unleashed. Would you care to comment on that? First, Mr. Woolsey.

WOOLSEY: Congressman, I think you make excellent points. On the biological weapons convention there is a reasonable dispute about the nature of the inspection regime and the administration has not wanted to go forward with that because of the difficultly of it. But, quite apart from that issue, which I haven't decided what I think on it yet, it's a complicated question and I haven't gotten into the details of it. I supported the chemical weapons convention and the inspection regime there.

But, quite apart from the biological weapons convention's inspection regime, we know that Saddam is in violation of it because we know he has anthrax, botulinum and aflatoxin. Aflatoxin is clearly only a terror weapon, because as far as we know its only real use is to create liver cancer principally in children long-term. It has no battlefield use at all.

So, the fact that we know he is in violation of that convention strikes me as an added, important added reason for considering a regime change to be necessary. As far as the comprehensive test ban is concerned, I have long thought that if that had not been set at a zero, an absolute zero level, if we had set the level for testing at a level which could be verified, or if the test ban had not been perpetual, if it had been a trial period of, you know, five years or 10 years or something like that, we might well have been able to have worked with it. It was the fact that the Clinton Administration made it absolutely zero and perpetual, departing from a lot of the previous negotiations and discussions that needed...

LEACH: As did the Eisenhower Administration, as did the Nixon Administration.

WOOLSEY: Not to my knowledge, zero, Congressman...

LEACH: Yes, sir. This was a comprehensive test ban. The word is comprehensive.

WOOLSEY: There's a long history of this, we may have to do this off line. But, I don't think at the level of hydro tests and the like, those previous discussions ever envisioned an absolutely zero level.

LEACH: They surely did.

Mrs. Mathews?

MATHEWS: I do believe that the verification protocol that was being looked at a year and a half ago was inadequate. But, I believe a strong one could be drafted with effort. And I believe it should be. It should be a very, very high priority. I think there'd be broad international support for that effort to create one that holds water.

I also believe that the U.S. ought to ratify the CTB. I would just add to your points that Saddam is also in violation of the non- proliferation treaty, the most widely signed and honored treaty in the world, 186 countries, by which he pledged not to seek nuclear weapons.

So, the legal case, as you say, it's overwhelming. The case is made for action, the question is whether the case has been made for war.

LEACH: Go ahead.

BOYD: (OFF-MIKE) take a moment. With my work with the Hart Rudman commission I came to believe what I think you have just said as your principle concern, that the greatest potential danger is in the world of biological weapons, more so in my own personal view than with nuclear weapons. Exactly what to do about it is beyond the scope of my time left. But, it is certainly in the presence, in my view, of why it is essential to deal with these weapons in Iraq at this time. We only differed here today on the method that we get at it. That we should go and do it is simply not in question in my mind.

LEACH: Sir, from afar, Dr. Perle?

PERLE: Congressman, I certainly share your concern about the danger of the use of biological weapons and the horrendous potential they have for inflicting mass fatalities. I wish I thought that tweaking the protocol to the convention banning them would solve the problem. I don't think it will. I think we now have seriously to consider whether the idea of very broad and inclusive global agreements are the right way to protect against menaces like biological weapons, or, for that matter, the proliferation of nuclear ones.

It may well be that a relatively small number of liberal democracies will have to band together to deal with those countries, and in some cases even individuals, who seem determined to acquire these terrible weapons. And that approach may prove to be more effective than broad global agreements that are often violated and cannot be enforced.

PERLE: And I think it's worth noting, as Jessica Mathews just did, that Saddam has, for a long time, been in violation of the CTBT and for a long time no one did anything about it. So, simply passing more laws that are violated, like the laws that went before them, is not a solution by itself.

HYDE: Mr. Blumenhauer?

LEACH: If I could just conclude with one 10-second observation. A great deal of what Mr. Perle said is precisely right. On the other hand, when you have international law you have a justification for action that can be respected by all parties in the world, not simply some geo-strategist here in Washington. So, the reason you have a treaty is to operate under the rubric of law. The reason you might have to act is to uphold the law and that is all I'm suggesting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Mr. Blumenhauer?

BLUMENHAUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the patience of our witnesses staying with us adding, I think, valuable context to what we're wrestling with. I would just have one brief comment about my colleague, the ranking minority member when he talked about the liberation of Germany. And I was thinking, this is not analogous, but even there, the liberation of Germany, because of a whole series of unintended consequences and circumstances that we didn't foresee led to 40 years of repression, dictatorship and the world teetering on the balance. And it seems to me that it's not at all clear what the consequences are going to be if we move into a very unstable part of the world bent on regime change. It's not just innocent victims that might be killed. But, we don't know what we're left with. And, just even looking at the experience in Central Europe after World War II when we won ought to give us pause I think.

I am intrigued, General, Dr. Mathews, with the proposal that you have brought forward. It seems to me that it is extraordinarily valuable to advance this type of strategy even if it doesn't work in terms of harnessing attention, focusing our efforts, unifying the world around us. And, it may work, but if it doesn't we're in a stronger position to hasten the day when there is a change in regime and when we don't have to fear weapons of mass destruction.

Even if your proposal is hopeless impractical, it seems to me to be valuable, but I'd like to give you a minute or two to respond to the notion that it's hopelessly impractical. We've heard a number of people; at least in the time I've been here, dismiss it. I don't feel comfortable with that dismissal and I wonder if you want to elaborate a little bit on why your effort, over a number of months with very distinguished people, feel that this does have the potential of being successful.

BOYD: I'm mindful that it's past 2:30 and I thought we were going to turn into a pumpkin or something. But, I'll take a minute. To your first point...

BLUMENHAUER: Take two, I'd rather have you talk than me.

BOYD: ... it is true. I was seven years old in 1945, so I'm not certain what was going on in Germany, but I don't recall many images of Germans in the streets waving American flags rejoicing their liberation even from one of the most heinous figures in human history.

To the second point, I would say just this, if you make up your mind that inspections cannot work, if obstruction would certainly occur and always in such an ambiguous way that you could never distinguish whether it was really obstruction or not and thus make your case, if you really believe that, then that seems to me to be an excessively pessimistic or almost a defeatist notion. And I reject it.

I believe that, structured properly, forcefully and with clarity to the alternative that that process can work. But, I would always give myself an exit strategy. And the exit strategy is this. Is if I cannot make it work, I've got a stronger hammer to use after its failure. But, we are faced with this particular case, this particular moment in history. We're going to deal with this issue in other places and other times in the future. And I don't want to be in a position where I only have one arrow on my quiver and that's always the arrow of invasion, preemptive action when I feel threatened. And I reject this, frankly, unrealistic that preemption could ever be used in a context where a perfectly benign neighboring state would be invaded. People always invade or always contemplate action when they truly feel threatened for whatever reason.

So, I only conclude in that I'm willing to take -- I share the objectives, ultimately, of, I think, all of our panelists here. But, don't have the sense of urgency that I can't take a little time to try a system that may produce the results that I achieve without going to war.

MATHEWS: Just to add something to that because I think General Boyd raised the key question about the efficacy of inspections per say, which is something we've alluded a lot today but haven't really grappled in what I think in this kind of satisfactory way. If you look of the list of participants who worked on developing this, you will see six or seven, I believe, former inspectors with collectively several dozen years of experience on the ground in Iraq. The four of us have collectively zero experienced man-years on the grounds in Iraq inspecting.

We've put a lot of time and though, effort and critical self- questioning into whether or not we were producing something that could work on the ground. I think that the strongest case that -- since he isn't here to speak for himself, but I would commend to you Ambassador Kais (ph) piece in the Post where he said in effect this is what worked before, this is why we need a stronger regime now and this is why I think it can work.

HYDE: Thank you.

Mr. Schiff?

BLUMENHAUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Blumenhauer.

SCHIFF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to direct this -- I have a couple interconnective questions to Mr. Perle and Mr. Woolsey and then a second question to Ms. Mathews and General Boyd. The first question I have is if we invade Iraq there is some possibility, maybe even a probability, that if we assume that Saddam Hussein has the chemical and biological weapons that prompt our invasion that he will be inclined to use them against American troops when cornered, when confronted with the realization that our goal is, not only disarmament, but regime change. So we have to contend with that probability or possibility. We also have, I think, a fairly realistic scenario that he tries to change the nature of the conflict by, once again, attacking Israel. And, there again is the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction against Israel. And some possibility that if biological or chemical weapons are used against Israel, Israel will respond with a nuclear weapon, depending on the severity of that chemical or biological attack.

So, at some level an invasion does increase the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction actually being used against Americans, in this case American troops. And also increases the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by some nation, in this case, Israel against Iraq. And I want to get your thoughts on evaluating. On the one hand the short-term increase and likelihood of the use of those very weapons that we're concerned with, compared with the longer term concern about they're falling into the wrong hands or being used by Iraq against us elsewhere.

And the second question is how would unilateral U.S. action against this threat affect other nation's willingness to use preemptive action against their perceived threats? In other words, will we change the international calculus in a way such that Russia and Chechnya or Georgia can now say that we are doing nothing than the United States is doing or really any other nation, Azerbaijan, Incarba (ph) or others claiming that they are, too, like the United States acting preemptively before they're struck?

PERLE: Well, Congressman, if I could begin with the second question, I don't believe that the behavior of any other country will be altered by what we choose to do. The circumstances are very specific. There are massive violations of U.N. resolutions. There is, as Jim Woolsey has pointed out two or three times, the particular situation of a cease-fire agreement that has now been violated. None of these circumstances apply to any of the other situations you've suggested. And I think countries do what they feel it is vital to do in their national interest. And what we do is not going to have any systemic effect. I think that's what you were getting at.

On the danger of the use of chemical and biological weapons, there is no question that that danger exists. It's very real. It isn't going to get better with the passage of time. Saddam's chemical and biological capabilities now, to the best of our knowledge, are not terribly well-developed. They will be better developed with the passage of time, better means of delivery, a great variety of weapons, including, potentially, a greater variety of biological weapons. So, time is not on our side in this regard.

We know how to deal with chemical weapons in the battlefield. That's one of the reasons why, as Jim Woolsey has suggested, we cannot afford to wait until the use of protective gear is made ineffective by seasonal change.

Finally, with respect to a weapon of mass destruction being used against Israel, that danger certainly exists. Again, it doesn't get better with the passage of time. We believe that the number of missiles that Saddam possesses that are capable of reaching Israel from the western deserts is small and Israel now has some capacity to intercept those missiles and we have a great capacity then we had in 1991 to detect them before they're launched, not a perfect capacity, but a much better capacity.

So, there are risks and it would be foolish to suggest otherwise. The question is how do you measure those risks against the risk of allowing Saddam to go on improving all of those capabilities. And I come down on the side of taking action sooner rather than later.

WOOLSEY: I agree with Richard's answers on those points. I'd only add one thing, which is that the fact that if we invade he may use chemical and bacteriological weapons means protective gear for our troops is extremely important, that's why the winter months are the key months. And that in turn is the underlying reason why I would disagree with the proposal for inspections that my two fellow panelists have made because there's no realistic way I think those would work, but even if they could work in part, they're not going to work within the next few weeks. And I think we need to be able and ready to move this winter because if we let another year go by waiting for another window of time in which we, our troops, could wear chemical protective gear for example, we will have many months in which Saddam could either enrich himself or obtain by theft and put into an already designed bomb, the fissionable material that he would need for nuclear weapons.

So, in addition to the points Richard mentioned, which I agree with, I think that delay beyond a very few weeks here is very much not in the nation's interest and the world.

HYDE: I want to thank our very distinguished witnesses for your very incisive commentary. The arguments you've made before the committee will be very helpful, not just for ourselves, but for the American people who have seen this by way of C-SPAN and by extension by the members of the media who are here.

These are obviously very troubling questions that we're grappling with and, again, your incisive commentary has been very, very helpful and I want to thank all four of you for your expert testimony before the committee today.

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

HYDE: In a minute. Let me just say as well that we will leave open the record of any additional comments you might want to make in a timely fashion in answer to questions that might have been posed, members who were unable because of scheduling to pose questions to you might want to submit those. We'll get those to you in a timely manner and we hope that you will respond.

HYDE: And, so, again, I want to thank you very deeply for your expert testimony. Again, it is very, very useful. Thank you. You are dismissed.

We do have four votes...

MCKINNEY: Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: ... I will yield to the gentlelady in one moment. We have four votes pending on the floor. I'll say to the distinguished General that we thought those votes were going to begin at 2:30 that's why we had that time limit imposed and thankfully we've got a little extension there. Pursuant to a motion that was made earlier by Mr. Ackerman I would like to recognize any member for an opening statement. I will have to leave, as will other members to vote, but seven minutes was the time Chairman Hyde had agreed to. So, I recognize the gentlelady if she has an opening statement.

MCKINNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You read my mind. Once again the world now waits with fear and trepidation regarding the threat of a U.S. attack on Iraq. The president provides a justification for this impending attack, the Iraqi refusal to comply with U.N. resolutions regarding weapons inspections, the alleged Iraqi threat to its neighbors and the Iraqi governments mistreatment of its own citizens.

The American people are being called upon to send their young sons and daughters to go and kill young Iraqi sons and daughters. This war, like all wars, will be brutal and will leave many American and Iraqi families mourning the loss of their children. We're not allowed to publicly question the Bush Administration for fear of being called unpatriotic. Aren't we entitled to really know why we're being urged to go to war? Aren't we entitled to be confident that the administration is telling the truth?

We know that this administration has some trouble with the truth. You might recall that the White House has a kind of amnesia a few months ago and didn't tell the truth about 9/11 until I asked some pretty straightforward questions. In so doing, it seems I helped them remember that they had, in fact, received a whole raft of reports warning of terrorist attacks against this country. And this is the same administration which stole the 2000 election in Florida and then lied about it. There have been so many times I wished our country could have used its massive military resources for noble goals as protecting civilians and enforcing U.N. Security Council resolutions. I'd be their greatest supporter. But, I've sat upon this committee for 10 years and I've seen our country repeatedly refuse to use its military to save civilians from slaughter.

I only need to remind you of our country's shameful failure to intervene in Rwanda in 1994 and in so doing we allowed 1 million Rwandan men, women and children to be butchered with axes and machetes in 100 days. And, yes, we're the same country that abandoned the people of Afghanistan to the Taliban, that abandoned the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the invading Rwandans and Ugandans, that abandoned the people of East Timor to the invading Indonesians, that abandoned the people of Sierra Leone to the brutal hand-chopping killers of the RUF, that abandoned the people of Chechnya to the brutal Russian Army, that abandoned the people of the Philippines to brutalities of Ferdinand Marcos, that abandoned the people of Chile to monstrous crimes of General Pinochet and on and on and on.

But, the president would have us believe that this time things are different. For once he says we're going to war to save lives. However, just last Sunday, September 15, 2002, the Washington Post's lead story carried the banner headline, An Iraqi War Scenario, Oil is the Key Issue. The article then went on to describe how U.S. oil companies were looking forward to taking advantage of the oil bonanza, which would follow Saddam Hussein's removal from office.

Apparently so the article says CIA, former CIA Director James Woolsey indicated that non-U.S. oil companies who sided with Hussein would most likely be excluded from sharing in Iraq's massive oil reserves, second only to Saudi Arabia. And I find the current Bush fervor and alleged urgent justifications for attacking Iraq startling because I read an article from the London Guardian on December 2, 2001, last year, a banner headline which read, Secret U.S. Plan for Iraq War. The article, almost a year old now, is interesting because it reports that the president had already ordered the CIA and his senior military commanders to draw up detailed plans for a military operation against Iraq. What I found most incredible about the article, especially after reading last week's Washington Post article was the last sentence, which said, "The most adventurous ingredient in the anti-Iraqi proposal is the use of U.S. ground troops. Those troops could also be called on in early stages of any rebellion to guard oil fields around the Shia port of Basra in Southern Iraq." Isn't it amazing that the London Times didn't refer to U.S. troops guarding the new parliament or the schools or hospitals full of ravaged civilians or saving the men, women and children who have been brutalized under years of Hussein's rule?

I wonder why the president hasn't talked about these plans, which were being cooked up nearly a year ago? I learned this week from the Times of London that the Bush Administration plans to spend some $200 million on convincing a skeptical America and world public that the war against Iraq is justified. I didn't realize that telling the truth would be so expensive.

And, surely, if we were really interested today in the truth about whether Iraq has weapons of mass destruction wouldn't this committee have heard from Scott Ritter? And, in fact, we went through this entire hearing without even the mention of his name. I cannot believe that he's not here today. Before we send our young men and women off to war we really need to make sure that we're not sacrificing them so rich and powerful men can prosecute a war for oil?

I love this country too much to see it abused this way. And I implore other members of the House to join me in voting no and denouncing such a war of aggression.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms. McKinney.

This hearing is adjourned and I want to thank everyone for attending and especially want to thank our distinguished witnesses.