U.S. OPTIONS IN CONFRONTING IRAQ

Hearing of the
House International Relations Committee

February 25 , 1998

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

BENJAMIN GILMAN,
A Representative from New York,
and
Chairman, Committee on International Relations

Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] The Committee will come to order; Members will take their seats.

The subject of today's hearing is U.S. options in confronting Iraq. When we planned this hearing initially, we thought we'd spend most of our time today exploring the risks and rewards associated with military action against Iraq, but the agreement reached in Iraq 2 days ago by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has changed that equation. Military action remains a distinct possibility down the road, but for the time being, President Clinton has committed our Nation to seek in good faith to implement the agreement negotiated by the Secretary General.

Many of us are skeptical of that agreement. Saddam Hussein has broken his word to the United Nations many times before. Perhaps this time he means to honor his commitments, but we tend to have some skepticism about all of that.

There are several provisions within the agreement that are deeply troubling. It obligates U.N. weapons inspectors to, and I quote, "respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty, and dignity." That sounds an awful lot like Saddam Hussein's description of what the dispute was all about in the first place.

The agreement changes the composition and the structure of the U.N. inspection agency in ways that may reduce its effectiveness. The agreement then goes on to direct the reconstituted inspection agency to carry out its work in accordance with, and I quote, "specific detailed procedures which will be developed, given the special nature of the Presidential sites."

We don't know just what these specific detailed procedures will be, but if they are designed to respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, to sovereignty, and to dignity, as defined by Saddam Hussein, there's bound to be some problem up ahead.

Most troubling of all is the question of whether this agreement commits us to a course that will in short order render the continuation of international sanctions on Iraq untenable. Make no mistake about it, the sanctions regime that has been in place against Iraq since 1990 has been one of our most effective tools in containing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

In that connection, we should recall that during Congress' 1991 debate over whether to authorize President Bush to use military force to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait, a significant minority of this institution held the sanctions regime in such high regard that they urged us to rely on it to the exclusion of military force as a means most likely to restore freedom to Kuwait.

It would, indeed, be tragic if the net result of the saber-rattling we witnessed over the last several weeks was to speed up the lifting of international sanctions on Saddam Hussein. For all these reasons, many of us were surprised when President Clinton rushed to embrace the agreement negotiated by the Secretary General. Some suggest that the Administration may have developed second thoughts about the military course to which it had been committed previously. Whether that course was a wise one is a subject we hope to explore today.

For example, was the confrontational course adopted by the Administration warranted by changes in Iraqi behavior over the last several months or was Iraq simply behaving as it has since the war ended in 1991? Was the Administration strategy of using air power to coerce Iraq into complying with the Security Council resolutions likely to succeed or would it have isolated us internationally without advancing our objectives in Iraq?

And, finally, I think we all agree that our Nation needs a more comprehensive strategy to deal with the real problem in Iraq, Saddam Hussein's continued grip on power. What are the necessary elements for such a strategy? Does the Secretary General's agreement with Iraq make it easier or harder for us to carry out such a strategy? These are topics that I hope our witnesses will be able to address for us this morning.

But before introducing our witnesses, I'll recognize our ranking Member, Mr. Hamilton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

LEE HAMILTON,
A Representative from Indiana,
and
Ranking Member, Committee on International Relations

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm very pleased that you're having the hearing, and I look forward to hearing our distinguished witnesses this morning, and welcome each of them to the Committee for that purpose.

I guess all of us have a lot of questions about the agreement that was negotiated, and we clearly are headed for a period of testing to see whether in this instance Saddam Hussein lives up to his word or not. Quite clearly, as your statement reflected, all of us are skeptical, and I think we have a right to be skeptical, about Saddam Hussein's promises and agreements.

We'll all be looking very carefully, of course, in the next few days on the implementation. Words are one thing, and implementation and deeds are quite another, and the key, of course, will be in the implementation. I think our bottom line, which is to have unfettered access to all of the sites, is the right one, and we must continue to insist upon it, as we move along here.

But we have with us today genuine experts on these matters, and I look forward to their testimony.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

Any other Members seeking recognition?

Mr. Clement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

BOB CLEMENT,
A Representative from Tennessee

Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm pleased also with these hearings. I'm also pleased that we have peace rather than bombing or the missiles flying at this particular time. I think that a lot of people around the country were very concerned that we were going to have a military attack. I just think our timing was wrong—a lot of unrest in the world. The economy in the United States is very strong, as a lot of us know, but in other countries they're experiencing high unemployment, high inflation. And because of all this, and knowing that the bombing itself would not necessarily get Saddam Hussein out of power, and knowing also that by destroying much of Iraq's infrastructure, maybe their electrical system, maybe their sewer system, bring about more refugees in the world, and also the fact, what about if we happen to hit one of those chemical/biological agents and 2 to 3 million people in Iraq were killed? What would be the potential for more conflicts in the world and more international terrorism, where the United States is looked upon as the bully or the country that is trying to dominate other nations?

I'm proud of the United States. I'm proud of what we've accomplished in the world. I'm proud of the fact that we stand for freedom and democracy. And I'm really looking forward to hearing all the witnesses today to talk about what we might have avoided by not bombing at this particular time, but I surely agree with the chairman and Mr. Hamilton that we want Saddam Hussein to fulfill these written commitments that our Secretary General has been able to get from the Iraqi leadership. This is very important to us, but I think we should do everything we possibly can to keep the peace. I think this is a good day, not a bad day, that we have peace, and if we can keep the peace and still keep the heat and pressure on Saddam to fulfill the commitments and open up these sites, and make sure these inspections are done in an expeditious manner, because I know a lot of the Iraqi people sure have suffered greatly under these economic sanctions, because of Saddam Hussein's ruthless dictatorship, and not being concerned about his people.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Clement.

Mr. Leach.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JAMES A. LEACH,
A Representative from Iowa

Mr. LEACH. Well, maybe this is a good week to discuss a little bit about perspective. And of the perspectives that I think are not inappropriate, one relates to the fact that we institute in a policy in almost a domino way of decisionmaking without, in my judgment, a very clear understanding of what the end result would be. The fact that the U.N. Secretary General stepped in with an agreement is something all of us ought to bear in mind as we think about whether or not we can afford a dollar a year per citizen to support the United Nations in our annual dues. I personally think that the institution of the United Nations, which the Secretary General symbolizes, saved us many, many, many more dollars in I week that we would be expending for our annual dues.

Second, as a former foreign service officer, I was part of the delegation that negotiated the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, and I would stress that I do not believe that this Administration thought very well through the distinction between biological and chemical weapons. As Mr. Clement noted, the possibility of hitting a site with awesome effects is not trivial. Those numbers are inconceivable with a chemical weapon circumstance.

But the idea that one could bomb a biological plant from 30,000 feet and have any hope that that would be a secure thing to do is beyond human comprehension, and I don't think there's a single member of the scientific community of the United States that would consider that as a very secure option for our government.

The thing about biological weapons that everyone in the field has understood for many years is that these are agents that are living organisms, and they have no bound. You don't know if they're going to be contained in Iraq or if they're going to spread around the world. So I think this potential strategy is something that was not very deeply thought through, and people are obligated to do it.

There is a second aspect that I think Baghdad ought to give a lot of thought to, and that relates to Richard Nixon. In 1969, President Nixon unilaterally determined that the United States would stop experimenting with biological agents, and he made that determination after a major scientific study in the United States in which it was determined that in the most sophisticated, scientific country in the world that it was too dangerous to even experiment with these agents in careful laboratory conditions; that they were too apt to get out. That is one of the reasons that in a unilateral decision we determined not to go forward with the biological capacity, and I think that that judgment is something that all countries in the world ought to be thinking through.

Finally, let me just say that everybody in international relations knows that a professor of Harvard named Samuel Huntington has fleshed out a thesis that's been around for many decades in international affairs: the whole notion that maybe the world is moving toward a clash of civilizations rather than nation states. My own view is, as we think through the reaction in this country of the Muslim community, as well as look at the reaction in the Arab world, it's not inconceivable that this kind of act that we were very close to contemplating could have been the first circumstance in world affairs where that clash could well have been precipitated. And I just think that all of us ought to give pause to think through what almost occurred and breathe a sigh of relief that it didn't.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Leach. Mr. Lantos.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

TOM LANTOS,
A Representative from California

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we all know that peace is fragile any place, and it's particularly fragile in the Middle East, and only time will tell whether the agreement negotiated by the Secretary General will hold. The best guarantee of its holding, of course, is the presence of a robust U.S./British military force on the ground and in the air and in the seas. It is much too early at this stage to pass definitive judgment on the outcome of these discussions Mr. Kofi Annan had in Baghdad.

There is one thing, however, which I do not believe is debatable. We are better off today than we were several days ago, and the extraordinary diplomatic skill of this extraordinary international public servant needs and deserves recognition. I am asking my colleagues to join me in nominating Kofi Annan for the Nobel Peace Prize, which he so richly deserves. Other recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize have seen subsequent events snatch away from them the peace they had sought, and that might well be the case with Kofi Annan, but I think all of us, and indeed the entire world, owe him a profound sense of gratitude. A man of impeccable integrity, extraordinary intelligence, and a profound commitment to the finest values of a civilized society has achieved, with the presence of U.S. military force in the region, a remarkable victory, and I hope all of my colleagues across the aisle will join me in nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize.

I thank the Chair.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Mr. Bereuter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

DOUG BEREUTER,
A Representative from Nebraska

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the fact that you have scheduled these hearings today, and I look forward to our witnesses, but this is one of those rare opportunities to say a few things about this situation with our colleagues.

This past week I led a delegation in our annual meeting to the North Atlantic Assembly where we visited with parliamentarians from the other 15 NATO countries. The conversation and debate inevitably turned to Iraq, since it was expected that the military strike could be launched soon against Iraq. After listening to our European and Canadian colleagues, I spoke and said I thought that our colleagues here and also in our 15 NATO counterpart countries had a right to expect answers to three questions, or three kinds of things that should happen.

One, they had a right to expect that the U.S. Administration—which would be leading such a strike—had thought through all of the potential consequences of the strike and was prepared to deal with those consequences. That was not clear to many Members of Congress; it was not clear to me.

Two, I said I thought they had a right to expect that our government would better inform our citizens and their governments better inform their citizens about the consequences of biological and chemical weaponry. That had not been done, really still has not been done. It was surprising to me to find that, so far, the best spokesman about the incredible dangers of these forms of weapons of mass destruction was Prime Minister Tony Blair when he was here at a news conference.

Three, I said that if we were asking for their support for such a military strike, they had a right to expect, as I think Members of Congress do, that planning was underway at least for removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, because that is ultimately the only solution to this problem. If anyone here believes that he intends to keep his promises or intends not to stall in the inspection process and do everything possible to thwart that inspection process, they have not looked at the record; they don't understand this man. That's what the American people were saying: If you're going to do something in the way of a military strike, let's make sure we're not required to do this, in effect, every several months.

One of my colleagues and I, Howard Berman, visited Israel after that meeting, and there was understandable nervousness and concern on the part of the Israeli people and other people living in Israel at that time—but not panic. After all, they remember that Saddam Hussein lobbed those scud missiles into Israel during the last conflict, even though they did nothing to precipitate it. And so the Jerusalem Post and other newspapers were full of stories about the preparations for protecting themselves against a chemical and biological attack, because we've known now, after looking at what happened in Iraq, that Saddam Hussein had weaponized missiles to deliver chemical and biological weapons even some years ago.

And so you found discussion among parents about whether schools were taking adequate protection to protect the children, because, after all, children, especially small ones, cannot cope with gas masks for any length of time. That's why our ambassador said to all of our embassy and consulate personnel at 5 p.m. on Friday that they were free to leave with their children. It's why the number of visas was up 40 percent. That's why the number of people moving to Elat as far away as possible from Iran was happening, and that's why there was so much concern about what was happening. So they understand the incredible devastation that these weapons of mass destruction can bring at least a little bit better than Europeans, Americans, and Canadians.

I urge my colleagues to think long and hard about not being lulled into a sense of complacency about this problem. This problem, even if Kofi Annan has pulled off a remarkable feat, is not going to go away.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. I'm going to urge my Members to be brief, so we can get on with our witnesses Mr. Fox.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JON FOX,
A Representative from Pennsylvania

Mr. FOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, these are bipartisan issues. The Secretary General's agreement is a breakthrough. However, the proof will be in the execution of the agreement and not the signing.

For many of us, two questions remain. One, if the sites of the weapons of mass destruction are inspected freely and with no time limits, in accordance with this new agreement, what about the weapons that have been moved out of Iraq? What about the disclosure regarding those and the inspection and their elimination? And, two, if sanctions have not worked with Saddam Hussein in the past, then what will?

Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fox.

And now I'm pleased to call on our witnesses Dr. Paul Wolfowitz is dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Previously, he held a number of important government positions, including his position as Ambassador to Indonesia during the Reagan Administration and Under Secretary for Defense for Policy during the Bush Administration.

Dr. Richard Haass is director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. He also has served in government, most notably, as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs for President Bush during the Gulf War.

Dr. David Kay is vice president of Science Applications International Corporation and director of the Center for Counterterrorism Technology and Analysis. He has served as the U.N.'s chief weapons inspector in Iraq, and led numerous weapons inspection teams in Iraq following the Gulf War.

Our final witness, Dr. Eliot Cohen, who I understand will be arriving shortly, is a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Among other achievements, he directed and edited "The Gulf War Air Power Survey," which was the Air Force official review of the contributions of air power to our 1991 victory over Saddam Hussein.

Gentlemen, we thank you for taking the time to join us this morning. Dr. Wolfowitz, do you have a short summary of your testimony, or if you prefer, we'll put the entire testimony in the record. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF

PAUL WOLFOWITZ,
Former Ambassador to Indonesia,
and
Dean, Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. If you don't mind, I'll put the whole statement in the record, and I'll just concentrate in these remarks on a portion of it.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I'm going to skip very lightly over the first three pages, which talk about the agreement itself. Let me say at the outset I'm not only pleased at the opportunity to testify before this Committee; I'm delighted at the change in subject matter from the time of the initial invitation. I thought we were going to come up here to talk about how to bomb Iraq or whether to bomb Iraq, and instead, we're taking about an agreement. I'm going to say some negative things about the agreement, but I'm much happier that were in this situation than in a different one.

But I'm not going to go into a lot of detail about it because David Kay is the real expert on UNSCOM. He served on UNSCOM, and he will have a lot more to say.

I think the important thing that I want to emphasize is that, even if this is the best possible agreement, even if it allows free, unfettered access to all the sites in Iraq, which is the best possible outcome, and remember that that comes after 4.5 months of plenty of time to hide and move stuff, so we're not starting back at square one. The inspectors are starting back at square minus seventeen at best.

But the best possible outcome is that eventually the inspectors get lucky, they get another high-level detector, or somehow they get on the trail again, and eventually they start to find the stuff, and then they're going to be blocked again. I don't think anyone has any doubt, though we may want to say we keep open minds, about what Saddam Hussein is up to here, and if the inspections are successful, they will be blocked again. And then well be back in the same position that we were this week, of having to choose between a bad agreement and worse military options. I want to say briefly why I think the military options that we were considering were awful, and then I want to talk about what I think the right options should be.

I think they were awful because they promised to accomplish next to nothing, at the cost of American lives, at the cost of probably large numbers of Iraqi civilian lives, at enormous political cost to anyone who's associated with us in the Arab world because this was already creating a firestorm even before the bombs fell. And all of those costs, you may say, are worth bearing, or in Mr. Berger's words, worth fighting for, if you are achieving something, but I submit that substantially reducing his threat of weapons of mass destruction, which is the goal the Administration finally settled on, is not that objective.

In fact, as Secretary Cohen emphasized with his five-pound bag of sugar, you have to do a lot more than substantially reduce in order to deal with this threat. And I think everyone really does know the only real way to deal with this threat is, in fact, to deal with Saddam Hussein.

And I think the relevant question is the question that that old veteran asked at Columbus, Ohio, and I'm quoting from him, so the profanity is his and not mine. "If push comes to shove, and Saddam will not back down, will not allow or keep his word, are we ready and willing to send the troops and finish this job, or are we going to do it half-ass, the way we did it before?"

I think it is the right question. I think the answers that he got are not very impressive answers. If I can read from page 4 at the bottom of my prepared testimony, Secretary Cohen answered him that, "What we are seeking to do is not to topple Saddam Hussein, but to do what the United Nations has said in its declarations." But on other occasions, he has emphasized that this goes beyond anything the United Nations may or may not recognize in its declarations. The President has said correctly this is about the future of the 21st century. I don't think that we should be limited by what may or may not be in U.N. resolutions, if in fact the fundamental security of this country—and, indeed, the peace of the world—is at stake.

Saddam Hussein has demonstrated that he will cheat and try to build weapons of mass destruction as long as he remains in power. He has demonstrated, and I'd like to emphasize this because I continue to be astonished at how many people still are not aware that he tried to assassinate former President George Bush, early in the term of a new American Administration, with whom he had every reason to try to get on good behavior. This is a man who's bent on vengeance; he demonstrated when he burned Kuwait's oil fields as his army left that country, and he continues to be bent on vengeance against anyone who opposed him. This is like a super-mafia godfather, and he doesn't forget; he doesn't forgive. His power is based on his ability to punish.

He demonstrated not only in 1990, but then, surprisingly, soon again in 1994 that he will pose a threat to Kuwait whenever he thinks he has a chance. He has demonstrated time and time again that he will conduct genocide and war crimes against his own people. He has gased them with chemical weapons. He has forced them to dig mass graves and machine gun them. He has diverted rivers to starve them and drive them out of their homes. The one effective way to cope with the weapons of mass destruction problem and these other problems is to help the Iraqi people remove him from power.

As President Clinton said, the issue of weapons of mass destruction is one that concerns the future of the 21st century, and as Mr. Berger said in Columbus, it is an issue "worth fighting for." Why is it worth fighting for ineffectively with air power and not worth fighting for effectively with means that will work? Instead of deciding what means it is willing to use and then tailoring the goals to fit them, the Clinton Administration should decide what it takes to do the job, and ask the country to support it.

However—and I think this is very important—the estimates that it would take a major invasion with U.S. ground forces seriously overestimates Saddam Hussein. We did the same thing for much too long in Bosnia, where we painted a brutal mob of aggressors as mighty giants, when in fact they turned out to be military pygmies.

There was some excuse for overestimating the capability of the fourth largest army in the world, as we called it—it was, on paper anyway—prior to the Gulf War, when all we had to go on was their performance against Iran in the long, brutal war in the 1980's. There is no reason to be doing so today, when their weakness was exposed in 1991 and when the Iraqi army of today is even further demoralized and weaker than the one that we faced then.

The key to getting at Saddam Hussein is also the basis of his power. Saddam has been compared often to Hitler, people say too often. Let me offer you maybe a more appropriate comparison. I think he's better compared to Stalin. Hitler ruled by many means; terror was only one of them. For Stalin, terror was the beginning and the end, and for Saddam terror is the beginning and the end. Many of the calculations that we find irrational are calculations meant to terrorize people, including his closest associates. He trusts no one around him, and for very good reason.

I think that is the asset that we have to use, and I think, unfortunately, a measure of how we've squandered that asset or how much it has diminished can be illustrated if I tell you a little anecdote that I read about in a diplomatic or intelligence report about a month after the Gulf War. It was a story about a group of U.N. inspectors, four in a car, traveling inside Iraq—not inspectors; I believe they were AID officials. They were stopped in an Iraqi roadblock, and one of them was an American. When the Iraqi soldier, with his AK-47 saw the American passport, he told the American to get out of the car, pointed with his gun to the back, moved the American to the back of the car. By this time, the poor American thought he was about to be shot. Instead, the Iraqi soldier looked over both shoulders, looked behind his back, and when he was sure no one was looking, he gave a thumbs up and he said, "George Bush No. 1." That's how the Iraqi people, 98 percent of them, felt about the United States after that war. They thought we were going to finish the job that they desperately wanted to see done.

I think it is a measure of where we have come now that throughout Iraq and throughout large portions of the Arab world it is now believed that if Saddam Hussein is still in power 7 years after this war, it must be because it's convenient for the United States to have him there, and then they construct a bunch of reasons, which I'm not endorsing by mentioning them, but they construct a fabric of sort of plausibility—that we like having an excuse to have our troops in the region; we like having an opportunity to contain Iraq; we like having an opportunity to beat up on Iraq from time to time.

The fact is, of course, as you all know, the American people would like nothing more than to see Saddam out of power. President Clinton will be a hero if he's the President that can accomplish that aim. He's not there because we want him there, but he is there, I think, because we haven't really tried hard enough to get rid of him.

And I just want to conclude with three points, Mr. Chairman. First of all, in spite of claims from the Administration and, to be fair, from prior Administrations, we have not, in my view, ever really tried serious support for the Iraqi opposition. And, again in fairness, I think the best opportunity to overthrow Saddam was, unfortunately, lost in the month right after the war. I think in fairness also, George Bush did an incredible job in getting the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. He didn't exactly have a unified country behind him. He certainly didn't have a country urging him to do more. There were a lot of reasons to be a bit slow in figuring out what happened.

But, unfortunately, the result was that, for a month in March 1991, Saddam Hussein flew helicopters that slaughtered the people in the south and in the north who were rising up against him, while American fighter pilots flew overhead, desperately eager to shoot down those helicopters, and not allowed to do so.

But, in fact, I think the Clinton Administration, which promised more when it came in, has delivered less, and the real low point for me was in the fall of 1996, when the very people that we had promised to support were rolled up in the north while we bombed a few useless radars in the south and declared that the north was of no strategic importance. That is not serious. That is not how you get people to die for a cause. That's how you get people to feel that dying is going to be absolutely useless.

Second, I don't believe that it's as hard as it is made to sound. Maybe it's not as simple as it sometimes sounds, but it's certainly not as hard as Sandy Berger makes it sound when he talks about a major land invasion of Iraq.

I know there are differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, but I think it is relevant to point out that we overthrew the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan without a single American ground troop; matter of fact, without a single American pilot. But we would never have done it without a single American weapon, and that is, in effect, what we were trying to do in Iraq. For all the talk about opposing Saddam, for all the talk about supporting the opposition, the United States has yet to deliver a single rifle to the Iraqi opposition, much less the kind of anti-tank weaponry, for example, that could be a real equalizer for them.

I know there are differences with Afghanistan. In fact, I would hope that Iraq might someday have a fate that's better than Afghanistan's, but I don't believe all those differences argue for why this should be more difficult. After all, the beaten Iraqi army is not the red army of the Soviet Union. Having the American Air Force literally 20 miles away is not quite the same thing as what the Mujahedin faced in Afghanistan. The Mujahedin may have been tough customers, but I believe Saddam Hussein is not 10 feet tall.

And we don't have to go to other countries or analogies to understand this. Let me mention briefly, because I don't believe this history is sufficiently known or appreciated, that Operation Provide Comfort, which, to his great credit, President Bush ordered about a month after the end of the war, when it became apparent that we, and in particular our Turkish ally, could not tolerate the effects of Saddam's depredations in northern Iraq—at that point, the President ordered the Iraqi army out of the northern part of the country, and we were able to accomplish that with a large number of lightly armed Kurdish irregulars, with eight battalions, I believe it was, of light infantry, of which only two were American. One was Royal Marines; the other was a fairly motley collection of troops from Spain, the first ever deployed overseas in 50 years; Luxembourg, that great military power; Italy. This was not what you would call a big force. But, of course, it was backed up by the U.S. Air Force, and the Iraqi army, for some reason, doesn't feel any more like going up against the U.S. Air Force.

And in one famous incident involving Operation Provide Comfort, a colonel named Richard Knapp, with his Kurdish interpreter and a jeep and an M-16, faced an Iraqi brigade moving north, and told them to turn around and go back. Ana the Iraqi commander said, 'This is my country. Who are you to order me around?"

And Colonel Knapp took his M-16 and pointed at him and said,'This is who I am. Turn around." And they turned around.

I'm not saying that it's necessarily that easy, but I do believe that, if anything, Afghanistan was much more difficult. Saddam Hussein is far weaker than these statements about major ground invasions imply, and again, I would remind you of Bosnia.

And the third point I would like to make is, while getting rid of Saddam is what will change the situation, curbing his power, liberating even portions of his country, will make a difference, and the goal is liberation. We should get away from thinking about planning coup attempts in downtown, in Baghdad. It is not quite a certainty—nothing in life is certain—but it is nearly a certainty, given the penalties that you pay in Iraq, and that your children pay, if you fail to report conspiracies, that any conspiracy will be discovered and penetrated fairly soon, and as we've experienced in the past, hundreds of people will then be rolled up and executed.

Saddam has very good security against that kind of thing. I think it's also foolish to think that we'll somehow put a bomb in his living room. I don't even think that's probably right, but we'll never succeed at it.

It's a mistake to ask, as I've heard senior Administration officials ask, "What do we do when an Iraqi division commander announces that he's heading for the Presidential palace; he's about to seize power, and he wants our support?" My answer is, you sent out the wrong message if that's what he's doing, because he's heading in the wrong direction. The message to any Iraqi commander that wants to defect is it's perfectly safe; we have a secure zone for you in the south. We have a democratic opposition that is organizing a provisional government of free Iraq. Come join them; you'll be safe, and we'll turn the Iraqi army around.

I think the agreement that Kofi Annan has just signed—and that David Kay will say more about, can best be said, it buys some time for us. If at the end of that time we're left in the same blind alley with lousy military options and bad agreements to choose between, then we will not have used that time well.

I think it's important to start using that time right now, and I think the Congress has a role. On this note, I'd like to conclude. I think there are two things I would stress as particularly important. The most urgent thing is to deal with the issue of Saddam's legitimacy. One of the great setbacks in this agreement is that Saddam Hussein has now concluded an agreement with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and I was appalled to hear the Secretary General say, "This is a man we can do business with." That is a phrase Margaret Thatcher used about Michel Gorbachev, but Michel Gorbachev was no Saddam Hussein. I believe it is important to emphasize that this is a man we cannot do business with, and I believe the effort by a number in this House and a number in the Senate to press the issue of war crimes indictment is a very important issue.

And don't let people tell you it's meaningless because we'll never get Saddam; we'll never bring him to trial. It is important, even if you don't. It is important as a clear statement that the United States does not plan to deal with this man in the future. That is important in emboldening opposition to him. It is important in the efforts of a new government of Iraq in a provisional state to be able to secure access to things like Iraqi assets. It is very important.

And, finally, I would like to urge, Mr. Chairman, that you consider appropriating money. This Congress appropriated $100 million to equip and train the Bosnians at a time when the Administration still had them under an arms embargo. When it finally turned out that we were ready to do something, that money was the only money from the United States that was available to provide a program that has been essential to the success so far of the Dayton efforts. I believe you can do a similar service here by making clear that there is military support available from the United States for Iraqis that will take their fate in their own hands. Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wolfowitz.

Dr. Richard Haass, director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute, and one of the most widely quoted experts on contemporary foreign policy. Dr. Haass. Again, you may put your entire statement in the record and summarize, or however you wish to proceed.

STATEMENT OF

RICHARD HAASS,
Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program,
Brookings Institute

Mr. HAASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That's actually how I'd like to proceed—put the written statement in the record, and I'll just make a few points.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. HAASS. Thank you, sir.

I won't spend a lot of time this morning assessing the deal that the Secretary General signed with the Iraqis. To be blunt, it is not ideal, but also it is a done deal. And sometimes one has to take yes, or a near yes, for an answer, and I would think that this is one of those times.

The reason is simply that we would be too isolated in opposition to this agreement. And, also, we should keep in mind three things. We are talking about U.N. resolutions, U.N. inspectors, and the fact that from the outset the United States has said that this is not a struggle between the United States and Iraq, but between Iraq and the international community. Well, now the Secretary General, who as much as anyone represents the international community, has negotiated this arrangement. Again, there are problems with it, but more important than any problems in the text will be the need, as both you and Mr. Hamilton have pointed out, to test Saddam through implementation. So that the next phase for American foreign policy and for this entire issue ought to be less to put this agreement under a microscope and more to test it.

Toward that end, I think we should encourage UNSCOM, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and this new special group that is created by this agreement to undertake the most aggressive, sustained series of inspections that we have seen to date. Let's find out whether Saddam Hussein, at least for the time being, plans to live up to this agreement.

And the reason we should do this now is that we have the largest accumulation of American military force in the region since Desert Storm, something that gives us enormous leverage. So if there is any repeated frustration by Saddam Hussein of the inspectors, the fact that we have 300-plus aircraft in the region gives us an immediate option. We don't have to once again go through the entire process of trying to gather our forces and watch the diplomatic sense of urgency dissipate.

So, again, I would take advantage of that presence. Hopefully, that will be enough to persuade Saddam to live up to this agreement. If not, then we ought to hit hard against the Republican Guards, and, slightly different from what the Administration had planned to do, I would not simply hit hard in a punitive