September 24, 2002

Early this month, the International Institute for Strategic Studies issued an assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The report concluded Sadaam Hussein’s nuclear program probably needs several years to produce enough fissile material for a weapon. But if Iraq were to acquire enough enriched uranium from foreign sources, Sadaam could have the bomb “in a matter of months.”

That chilling scenario leads us to ask: Where would Iraq, Al Queda, or Hezbollah go shopping for the missing core of their malevolent atomic aspirations? How can the threat of nuclear terrorism be reduced?

As we will hear today from witnesses expert in nuclear programs and non-proliferation efforts, a global radiological bazaar has opened for business since the demise of the Soviet Union. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 17 confirmed incidents since 1993 involving diversion of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Some of that material has never been recovered. More than three hundred research reactors in 58 nations generate weapons-grade uranium kept under security arrangements ranging from adequate to appalling.

To be sure, acquiring or building a nuclear device involves complex technical challenges, and requires more visible infrastructure than terrorists generally prefer. But the growing public record of attempts by Usama Bin Laden and others to purchase fissile fuel and other radiological material demonstrates a determination we dare not underestimate or dismiss.

The threat also lurks here at home, where nuclear weapons labs, civilian generating facilities and even medical waste storage sites stand as tempting targets for those seeking to spread radioactive terror.

In May, I joined a congressional delegation lead by Indiana Senator Richard Lugar to examine the progress of cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union. We saw the obvious benefits of facilities like the Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak, Russia, where roughly one trillion dollars worth of uranium and plutonium will be secured. But much material remains to be protected, and the expertise to make more needs to be productively reemployed.

While this is our first hearing on these issues, it will not be the last. The shape and scope of current threat reduction programs to staunch the availability of dangerous nuclear materials are being discussed by the conferees on the 2003 Defense Authorization bill. In the coming months, we need to hear from the administration, from our government and private partners in this effort, and from scientists on how effectively the threat of nuclear terrorism is being addressed.

We thank all our witnesses for coming this morning. We look forward to their testimony.