BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

COMBATING TERRORISM:
PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

September 19, 2002

To:    Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

From:  Dr. R. Nicholas Palarino and Mr. Jarrel Price

Subject:  Briefing memorandum for the hearing, Combating Terrorism: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, scheduled for Tuesday, September 24, 2002, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building.

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

The hearing will examine the threat of nuclear terrorism and how terrorists could acquire radiological or nuclear weapons.

HEARING ISSUES

1. To what extent should the United State be concerned about nuclear terrorism?

2. How would terrorists acquire radiological materials or nuclear weapons?

BACKGROUND

Some experts note the lack of direct evidence terrorist organizations have successfully acquired a nuclear device. (Web Resource 1)  Other experts contend there is significant evidence terrorist groups are actively seeking to acquire nuclear materials and develop nuclear weapons. (Web Resource 2/3)

The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrate the desire on the part of the terrorists to maximize the number of casualties inflicted during an attack.  This desire coupled with statements made by terrorist organizations that it is their duty to use weapons of mass destruction, and documents discovered during operations in Afghanistan, raise the level of concern that if terrorists acquire radiological materials or nuclear weapons they will use them against the West.

Terrorists could obtain radiological material or a nuclear weapon from countries having such capabilities.  For example, terrorists could acquire nuclear materials from a rogue nation such as Iraq.  Terrorists could also acquire nuclear materials or weapons from Russia, which has an abundance of such materials left over from the Cold War.  There are several documented cases of material being smuggled out of Russia, and of Iraqi defectors providing accounts of Saddam’s operatives testing possible routes to smuggle fissile material out of Europe. (Web Resource 4)

The United States has developed a number of programs to deter and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the majority of which focus on deteriorating nuclear sites within the former Soviet Union. (Web Resource 5) These programs will be the subject of future hearings.  This hearing focuses on the threat of nuclear terrorism, and terrorist access to such weapons.

Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terror network has made the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction a priority.  As early as 1996, bin Laden announced in his Declaration of War, “The enemy should be fought with one’s best abilities.”  He continued to define his intention in 1999 when he described attempts to acquire these weapons as a “duty.” 

There is also evidence that suggests al Qaeda would use any weapon in its possession against non-combatants.  In an interview with ABC News bin Laden said, “We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians.  They are all targets in this fatwa (religious ruling).” (Attachment 1)

Consistent with bin Laden’s statements, al Qaeda has made several attempts to acquire the materials necessary to build a nuclear device.  Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, an al Qaeda operative, was arrested and extradited to the United States in 1998.  He purchased weapons for al Qaeda, and in 1993, under his supervision, the organization purchased what it thought was weapons-grade uranium.  The material turned out to be much less threatening spent reactor fuel. (Attachment 1) 

More recently during Operation Enduring Freedom, investigators discovered a Kabul safe house which contained an assortment of documents and diagrams outlining the nuclear fission process, and how to combine highly enriched uranium and conventional explosives to develop a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), commonly referred to as a dirty bomb.  Investigators also found vessels containing some small amounts of radioactive material. (Web Resource 1) While the material in the safe house posed little threat if used in a weapon, these discoveries show al Qaeda’s recent attempts to develop a nuclear weapon.

Aum Shinrikyo another terrorist group, also explored the development and use of nuclear weapons.  Aum Shinrikyo is notable for the sarin gas attack carried out on the Tokyo subway in 1995.  The subsequent arrest of Aum Shinrikyo’s construction minister, Kiyohidi Hayakawa, revealed he had toured Russia purchasing weapons and exploring the possibility of acquiring a nuclear bomb.  Hayakawa’s diary contained a list of several prices for the purchase of a nuclear warhead.  The figure of $15 million was underlined in Hayakawa’s diary. (Web Resource 4) It has also been reported Aum Shinrikyo purchased a half-million acre ranch in Australia attempting to extract uranium for use in the construction of a nuclear device.(Attachment 1)

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Communist regime had an arsenal of approximately 30,000 nuclear weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons-grade nuclear material. (Web Resource 5)  The Soviets had an effective nuclear security system.  However, with the collapse of the central government and the ensuing economic crisis in Russia during the 1990s, the security of nuclear facilities became less important to the government.  The US Department of Energy Strategic Plan of July 2001 reported Russian nuclear facilities had holes in perimeter fences, nonfunctioning alarm systems, and disturbing disparities between paper records and actual stockpiles of nuclear weapons. (Web Resource 4) Additionally, many Russians working at what are referred too as nuclear cities had not been paid in months.  It was reported guards, safeguarding nuclear cities, left their guard posts to forage for food.  In 1999, the average salary of nuclear city workers was $43/month. (Web Resource 4)

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) estimates some 760,000 people live and work at Russian nuclear cities.  The Ministry acknowledges that 122,000 of those workers have experience in the development of nuclear weapons. (Web Resource 6) MINATOM plans to dismiss 35,000 of those workers by 2005 continuing efforts to reduce the size of the Russian nuclear program. (Web Resource 4)

The growth of organized crime and corruption in Russia also increases the possibility of nuclear materials and weapons theft.  Since 1992 Russia has had 12 documented incidents of weapons-grade nuclear material smuggling. (Web Resource 7)  In 1995, Chechen terrorists buried a RDD containing cesium-137 wrapped with explosives in a Moscow park.  While the group did not detonate the device, it is a clear example that such materials are available to terrorist groups that are interested in using weapons of mass destruction. (Web Resource 4)

Several documented attempts of nuclear material smuggling include:

• In December 1994, 2.7 kilograms of Russian highly enriched uranium was seized in the Czech Republic. (Web Resource 5)
• In March 2000, Uzbekistan boarder guards seized an Iranian truck with radioactive material bound for Pakistan.  The material was allegedly headed to bin Laden’s Afghanistan terrorist camps. (Attachment 2)
• In July 2002, police in Georgia arrested four men with 4.4 lb. of enriched uranium. (Web Resource 8)

From the early 1990s through 1998, nuclear material was seized primarily in Russia and the Eastern and Western portions of Europe.  According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) these avenues have changed, and there is an increase in trafficking of nuclear material through Georgia, Central Asia, Greece, and Turkey. (Web Resource 5) 

Pakistani and Indian nuclear capabilities could also become problematic.  These nuclear powers are located in a geographic area of the world permeated with terrorist groups eager to acquire nuclear technology.  Additionally, the longstanding conflict between the two countries is a major concern.  Pakistan is estimated to have 30 to 60 nuclear weapons including the raw materials for a plutonium weapon. (Attachment 3)  While Pakistan’s neighbor, India, maintains at least 30 to 35 nuclear warheads in its arsenal. (Web Resource 9)

It was recently reported two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashirruden Mahmood and Abdul Majid, met with Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar.  Responding to American concerns over the meeting and the knowledge these two scientist could have divulged to bin Laden and his operatives, the two were arrested.  The men were released because Pakistan concluded the men only discussed funding opportunities for their Islamic charity. (Attachment 3)

After the Gulf War many of the details of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program were exposed.  Between 1991 and 1994, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA dismantled 40 nuclear research facilities.  The inspection of these facilities demonstrated Iraq had developed electromagnetic, centrifuge, and chemical isotope separation programs in order to enrich uranium. (Web Resource 10) The IAEA also destroyed 50,000 square meters of nuclear laboratory space, some 2,000 pieces of equipment, and 600 tons of special alloys.  Investigators also reported Iraq had several hundred scientists and engineers fully employed on developing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.(Web Resource 8)

Iraqi defector, Dr. Khidir Hamza, former Director General of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, reported that RDDs were tested once or twice in Iraq.  The results of the tests were not as impressive as the Iraqi’s would have liked. (Web Resource 4)

Iraqi defectors have also provided accounts of operatives traveling elaborate routes throughout Europe, changing passports several times, on missions to determine the best routes to smuggle radiological material back to Iraq. (Web Resource 4)

Director of the CIA, George Tenet, told the Intelligence Committee, “Our major near-term concern is the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material (from a foreign country).” (Web Resource 4) 

Witnesses for the hearing were asked to address the following questions:

• How would a terrorist group acquire a radiological or nuclear weapon?
• What type of expertise and resources would terrorists need to build a radiological or nuclear weapon?
• Is it easier for a terrorist group to acquire the expertise to build and deploy a radiological or nuclear weapon or steal and deploy one of these weapons?
• What is the probability a rogue nation such as Iraq will provide a terrorist group a radiological or nuclear weapon, or the expertise to build such weapons?
• How effective are existing safeguards in countries such as Russia, India, and Pakistan against the proliferation of a radiological or nuclear weapon?
• What additional safeguards would you recommend to preclude terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons?

DISCUSSION OF HEARING ISSUES

1.  To what extent should the United State be concerned about nuclear terrorism?

Osama bin Laden has declared war on the United States.  In both word and deed, bin Laden has said the United States is the enemy of Islam and must be removed from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Region.  Bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization are responsible for the bombing of the US embassies in East Africa, the attack on the USS Cole, and the events of September 11, 2002.  The organization has called for planning follow-on attacks against the West. 

This same terrorist group has demonstrated considerable interest in acquiring nuclear materials and weapons.  This interest is substantiated in documentation, through credible witnesses, and statements made by the terrorists.  Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda or Aum Shrinkyo, want nuclear materials or weapons to cause mass destruction and maximize the amount of casualties.  They believe this type of attack will achieve their goal, in the case of Al Qaeda that the West will withdraw from Islamic regions and the people of Islam will be isolated from Western culture. 

Professor Dan Schueftan of Haifa University explains the reason these terrorists want the West to withdraw from Islamic regions.  Schueftan told a group visiting Israel that radical Islam has a problem coping with the 21^st century.  Specifically, they cannot cope with the technological advances of the modern era.  The world is moving forward and radical Islam is being left behind.  Consequently, they feel hopeless.  They believe they must isolate themselves and their people from the western influences.

The possibility al Qaeda, or another equally motivated group, will steal or smuggle a nuclear weapon or acquire the plutonium or highly enriched uranium for making a weapon cannot be dismissed.  Nor can opportunities for purchasing nuclear waste to spread in a radiological device be ignored. 

The counter argument to concerns terrorists will acquire nuclear materials or weapons is that the dimension of this threat has not been precisely calibrated.  The amount of weapons-usable material leaking out of Russia appears to be small.  Little visible evidence exists of participation by terrorists or rogue states in the black market for stolen highly-enriched uranium or plutonium.  Terrorists and rogues may place a higher priority on other weapons of mass destruction. (Web Resource 4)

Nevertheless, the possibility can be considered that the observed market in the West does not reflect the true state of affairs, because many smuggling incidents might go undetected or unreported.  Various worrisome scenarios can be contemplated, from a “shadow market” organized by professionals and brokered by criminals to outright “state-sponsored” proliferation by high-ranking Russian officials. (Web Resource 4)

2.  How would terrorists acquire radiological materials or nuclear weapons?

While state sponsorship of nuclear terror by Iraq is a strong possibility, the theft and subsequent smuggling of nuclear materials remains the most appealing opportunity for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.  There are many reports of poor security measures in and around the nuclear facilities in Russia and the Newly Independent States.  Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of radiological substance thefts from nuclear enterprises and industrial installations across the former Soviet Union.  And terrorists have considerable interest in exploiting the economic depression of these newly independent states and seem willing to pay for weapons of mass destruction. 

The IAEA has discovered a disturbing change in the smuggling patterns of nuclear materials.  Historically, Central Europe provided the most appealing route for stolen nuclear materials.  However, the IAEA has now witnessed smugglers exploiting the less protected boarders of Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia’s southern tier.

The Department of Energy reported there is 603 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium at risk of theft in Russia.  These materials, which can be found in poorly protected civilian research facilities and naval fuel storage sites are appealing to thieves because such materials can be carried in portable containers. (Web Resource 6)

Scientists capable of building a nuclear weapon also contribute to the problem of nuclear terrorism.  It does not matter if a disgruntled employee from the former Soviet Union or a Pakistani or Indian nuclear scientist decides to assist a terrorist group in development of a nuclear weapon.  The results could still be the same.  The international community should be alert to the fact such scientists may be collaborating with terrorists.

It should be noted that terrorists could also acquire nuclear materials here in the United States.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has acknowledged 1,500 individual “sources” of radioactive materials, potentially useful in the construction of a RDD, have been misplaced in the past five years.  Over 800 of these sources still have not been recovered or accounted for.  Such statistics clearly show there are sources of radiological materials available here in the United States.  A terrorist dedicated to inflicting mass casualties may not have to develop intricate smuggling networks to deliver a nuclear device here in the United States.

Web Resources

1.  Walsh, Jim Ph.D. Multilateral Non-proliferation Regimes, Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies and the War on Terrorism, Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2002, found at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs.

2.  Golovnin, Vasiliy, “Aum Cult Implicated in Nuclear Information Stealing,” Itar-Tass News Agency, March 29, 2000, found at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/03/aum.

3.  “Al-Qaeda nuclear plans confirmed,” BBC News, November 16, 2001, found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1657901.

4.  Lee, Rensseaer Ph.D. “Nuclear smuggling and international terrorism: issues and options for U.S. policy,” Congressional Research Service, August 17, 2002, found at http://www.congress.gov/cgi.

5.  United States General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Nonproliferation, US Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning,” GAO-02-426, May 2002, found at http://www.goa.gov.

6.  United States General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia’s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges,” GAO-01-429, May 2001, found at http://www.gao.gov.

7.  Department Defense Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Report No. D-2001-074, March 9, 2001, found at http://dodig.osd.mil/Audit/fy01-074.

8.  Evans, Michael, Secret Files on Baghdad’s Weapons Plans, London Times, August 29, 2002, found at http://www.timesonline.co.uk.

9.  Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “India’s Nuclear Forces,” Natural Resources Defense Council Nuclear Notebook, 2002, Vol. 58, No. 2 March/April 2002 found at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes.

10. Issue Brief for Congress, “Iraq: Compliance, Sanctions, and US Policy,” Congressional Research Service, CRS IB92117, September 6, 2002, found at http://www.congress.gov/erp/ib/pdf.

Attachments

1.  Leader, Stephan, “Osama bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD,” JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, June 1999.

2.  Alexander, Yonah and Hoenig, Milton, “The Moscow Summit and Nuclear Terrorism,” Washington Times, June 7, 2000.

3.  Neuffer, Elizabeth, “A US Concern: Pakistan’s Arsenal,” Boston Globe, August 16, 2002.