COMBATING TERRORISM:
PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERAN AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE

September 24, 2002

WITNESSES:

DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS AND FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL, IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM;   MATTHEW BUNN, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY;   DR. RENSSLEAR LEE, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE;   ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE;   CHRISTOPHER PAINE, SENIOR RESEARCHER, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL;   DANIELLE BRYAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT;   DR. AMATZIA BARAM, PROFESSOR OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA, HEAD OF THE JEWISH-ARAB CENTER AND MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

BODY: REP. CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (R-CT): The quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations hearing entitled Combating Terrorism: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism is called to order.

Early this month the International Institute for Strategic Studies issued an assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The report concluded Saddam Hussein's nuclear program probably needs several years to produce enough fissile material for a weapon, but if Iraq were to acquire enough enriched uranium from foreign sources, Saddam could have the bomb in a matter of months. That chilling scenario leads us to ask where would Iraq, Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah go shopping for the missing core of their malevolent atomic aspirations? How can the threat of nuclear terrorism be reduced? As we will hear today from witness experts in nuclear programs and nonproliferation efforts, a global radiological bazaar has opened for business since the demise of the Soviet Union. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 17 confirmed incidents since 1993 involving diversion of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Some of that material has never been recovered. research reactors in 58 nations generate weapons grade uranium kept under security arrangements ranging from adequate to appalling. To be sure, acquiring or building a nuclear device involves complex, technical challenges and requires more visible infrastructure than terrorists generally prefer. But the growing public record of attempts by Osama bin Laden and others to purchase fissile fuel and other radiological material demonstrates a determination we dare not underestimate or dismiss. The threat also lurks here at home where nuclear weapons labs, civilian generating facilities and even medical waste storage sites stand as tempting targets for those seeking to spread radioactive terror.

In May, I joined a congressional delegation led by Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, to examine the progress of cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union. That trip blew my mind. We saw the obvious benefits at facilities like the fissile materials storage facility at Mayak, Russia, where roughly $1 trillion worth of uranium and plutonium will be secured. But much material remains to be protected and the expertise to make much more needs to be productively re-employed.

While this is our first hearing on these issues, it will not be our last. The shape and scope of current threat reduction programs to staunch the availability of dangerous nuclear materials are being discussed by conferees on the 203 Defense Authorization Bill. In the coming months we need to hear from the administration, from our government and private partners in this effort and from scientists on how effectively the threat of nuclear terrorism is being addressed.

We thank all our witnesses for coming this morning. We look forward to their testimony and I'm going to remind people that what you hear is available to the public. This is not a closed hearing. I'll say as a member of Congress, I am tired of the number of hearings I have that are so-called secret that the American people have a right to know. And if they just listen to what was being discussed today, they'd learn almost if not more than frankly what I learn behind closed doors.

(Laughter.)

You all set? May I present my ranking member, Mr. Kucinich, who has been very, very active on this committee.

REP. DENNIS KUCINICH (D-OH): I thank the chair for his ongoing efforts to protect the security of the United States of America. I want to indicate my appreciation for your conscientiousness in that regard. I want to welcome all of our witnesses here. Each of them has raised concerns regarding potential vulnerability to nuclear terrorism ranging from insufficient security of nuclear materials in the former soviet states to lack of import controls at our borders, to the inadequate protection of nuclear facilities right here in the United States. In addition we also have as this hearing's keynote speaker, a Dr. Hamza, someone who has worked inside the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Dr. Hamza will offer insight into the research that was ongoing during his tenure years ago.

I must indicate, Mr. Chairman, that in my preparation for today's hearings, after reviewing some of Dr. Hamza's statements to the press, I have to express my concern because I've seen statements that indicate that Dr. Hamza has said or implied that Saddam Hussein was behind the anthrax attacks. I know that the FBI has been critical for failing to connect the dots but as far as I know they have no evidence or even a reasonable suspicion that Saddam Hussein was involved in any way with the anthrax attacks.

You know, we spend billions of dollars in U.S. intelligence agencies and they've scoured every bit of evidence at their disposal. They haven't made that connection nor have they made a connection as Dr. Hamza has stated that Hussein has cooperated and collaborated with the Al-Qaeda because, at this point in the briefings that I have been privy to, there's been no connection between Iraq and 9/11 nor Iraq and the Al-Qaeda or Hussein and Al-Qaeda or the anthrax attacks.

So I'm interested in hearing from Dr. Hamza as to how he was able to crack both of these cases when our own government could not do so. Even more troubling and directly related to the subject of today's hearings, Dr. Hamza stated that Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons. Not just, that is, developing them or seeking to acquire them but that he currently possesses them. Now again, I've received briefings and no one in the briefings that I've received has been able to establish that Iraq currently possesses any kind of useable nuclear weapons.

I understand that Dr. Hamza defected to the United States back in 1994 and that it has been several years since he actually worked on the Iraqi nuclear program and since then United Nations inspectors have been to Iraq, have located facilities and have destroyed them. If in fact Iraq has acquired nuclear weapons since the inspectors left in 1998, we need to know that and we need to know how anyone has come by that information and how it was obtained and how our intelligence agencies missed it.

I will say that there are things that Dr. Hamza and I may agree on. I was one of those members of Congress, Mr. Chairman, as I think you were too, who voted in 1998 for this country to take a position which reflected disfavor upon the regime of Saddam Hussein and indicated we would support efforts to remove him. Of course, I don't go as far as some would today in saying that assassination and regime change by force are acceptable, but I did vote for that resolution. And I agree that the record of Mr. Hussein in killing and torturing his own people and using chemical weapons against them and flouting U.N. resolutions should be held to accountability, but judging from the statements that have been made to the media, there are people who want to send in troops, United States troops to settle the score with Hussein. No matter how little support this country has in the world community, no matter how many lives we sacrifice, no matter how great the degree of regional conflagration and no matter that they don't even have a plan as to what to do after we conquer Iraq.

So, Mr. Chairman, I understand the gravity of this meeting, I'd like to offer Dr. Hamza a little bit of unsolicited advice. When you're here today, doctor, you're not speaking just to a media forum, you're speaking to the United States Congress and you'll be under oath and you'll be speaking on a topic of utmost gravity which reflects for many people here the question of whether or not the United States of America should send hundreds of thousands of its young men and women directly into harm's way. So I hope that you'll recognize that some will use your statements here today to try to justify an all out attack on Iraq that would result in the deaths of many Americans as well as the deaths of many innocent Iraqi civilians.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SHAYS: I thank the gentleman.

And we're joined by Ms. Schakowsky, the gentlelady from Illinois and a very active member and competent member of this committee.

REP. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY (D-IL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and Mr. Kucinich for convening this hearing.

This is a timely discussion since the issue of nuclear terrorism has been a topic of concern for the administration, the Congress and the American people. In a recent speech before the United Nations, President Bush suggested that a primary reason for taking military action against Iraq is that Saddam Hussein is seeking nuclear weapons which he could provide to terrorists. Administration officials also have stated that they have intelligence indicating that Al-Qaeda operatives were actively seeking to obtain nuclear weapons. I consider these statements to be great cause for concern and it is important that we analyze this issue very carefully.

We need to understand the different ways that terrorist groups can acquire radiological or nuclear weapons and ways to prevent such actions from occurring. I'm eager to learn more about the expertise and resources that terrorists would need to build a radiological or nuclear weapon. Another important issue to investigate is what current safeguards exist and what new ones need to be put in place to protect our homeland against such a deadly attack and I'm hoping that these concerns will be addressed in today's hearing.

When discussing threats of terrorist groups and nations using weapons of mass destruction on the United States and our allies, the current debate of whether we should attack Iraq is so important. One of the underlying reasons that the administration claims to support a preemptive strike against Iraq is the idea that Iraq may supply weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups or will in turn use them on the United States and its allies. If the president's National Security Strategy report, in his report for 2002, had stated that the administration has, quote, "irrefutable proof" unquote, that Iraq has acquired nuclear weapons, if such irrefutable proof truly exists, why has the president not yet presented it to the Congress or the American people? Where is the proof that these nuclear weapons are being sold to terrorist groups?

Another issue of concern to me is our policy on nuclear proliferation. Why is the president only concentrating on Iraq's nuclear ambitions and ignoring the countless numbers of insecure nuclear facilities across the globe? Why is the president not making sure that Russia's stockpile of uranium, for example, is not made more secure? Why is the president not working harder to prevent nuclear scientists all over the world from joining the ranks of terrorist organizations and rogue nations?

A new investment in non-proliferation would help convince a skeptical world that we're serious about nuclear proliferation. By solely concentrating our efforts on Iraq, it's getting harder to convince the world that this is just about weapons of mass destruction not domestic politics or oil or revenge. Instead of spending $200 billion on a war with Iraq, we could invest in non-proliferation which would make more of a positive impact on the global war on terrorism and would actually make us safer than a unilateral war on Iraq would.

I am hoping that today's hearing will shed some more light on these important issues. Nuclear terrorism is a serious topic that must not be overlooked. We must make sure that terrorist groups never get their hand on such destructive and deadly weapons. However, it is also very important that, before we go after these organizations with military action, that we must have absolute proof that they have nuclear weapons in their possession.

But when dealing with rogue nations such as Iraq, the situation becomes even more complicated. Dismantling a terrorist organization is one thing, but preemptively attacking an entire nation is something else. If nuclear weapons do exist in Iraq, are we actually going to be safer if we launch this kind of unilateral preemptive attack. It is important for us to work with the international community to continue to force weapons inspections. I believe in coercive inspections to resume in Iraq and to continue to isolate Iraq if they push back.

It is vital that we work with our international allies and others in the international community to make sure that we look over all possible options in preventing these groups and nations from acquiring such weapons before we look to military solutions. Where we have concerns, we must have undertake aggressive actions, aggressive efforts to protect this nation. When the threat is imminent, the president has many tools and options at his disposal to deal with that threat. However, it is imperative that when time and circumstances permit, we exercise all diplomatic options before sending our young men and women to war and into harm's way.

Thank you.

REP. SHAYS: I thank you very much. I'm going to announce our panel and welcome them. I will swear them in. I want to apologize from the start. You are somewhat cramped but we thought the synergy with the seven of you will be very helpful. I will also say that you have five minutes to make a statement. But if you run over close to ten, I'll stop you but you have more than five and I am also going to say that we don't do the five minute rule, particularly when we have so few members. So, if a number of you want to jump in and answer a question, you can. So we're going to learn a lot today and it's going to be very informative.

Our panel is comprised of Dr. Khidhir Hamza, the president, Council on Middle Eastern Affairs, former director general, Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Program. Blows me away. Mr. Matthew Bunn, senior research associate, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard. Dr. Rensslear Lee, consultant, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service. Ms. Rose Gottemoeller, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Christopher Paine, senior researcher in Natural Resources Defense Council. Ms. Danielle Bryan, executive director of the Project on Government Oversight. Dr. Amatzia Baram, Professor of Middle East History, University of Haifa, head of the Jewish-Arab Center and Middle East Institute.

We welcome all of you. I'd ask you to stand. As you know, we swear in all our witnesses.

We have consistently throughout the years except only one and this was Senator Byrd. I chickened out. Will you raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

WITNESSES: I do.

REP. SHAYS: I note for the record the witnesses responded in the affirmative and let me just take care of one housekeeping. I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for a few days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record and without objection, so ordered. And that enables you, particularly those who will follow because we are just going down the row here -- if you want to just submit your testimony and speak extemporaneously, feel free to do that. It's five minutes and then a rollover. Okay?

Dr. Hamza, welcome. Let me make sure your mike is on. If you hit that mike in front of you, let's see if it's on there.

DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA: It's working now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. If I may answer some of the questions raised earlier about my earlier statements. The anthrax, I did not say Iraq.

REP. SHAYS: Give us your statement. I'll let you answer those --

DR. HAMZA: Okay, that's fine. I just --

REP. SHAYS: You give us your statement and before -- this was a sneaky way for him to ask some questions before. And feel free to then respond to those points.

DR. HAMZA: Okay. That's fine.

REP. SHAYS: And important -- I was joking.

DR. HAMZA: The Iraqi Program actually, the Institute for Strategic Studies of London, did a good study of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. It did declare, like the inspectors did, that Iraq do possess a working design for a nuclear weapon. It has all the components needed for a nuclear weapon except for the fissile core, the nuclear core. Iraq has a program, a larger program to produce fissile materials locally. Iraq has local resources for natural uranium production from its phosphates. It's already delivered to the inspectors 160 tons produced locally from natural resources. It has its own uranium stockpile right now. The Germans estimate something like 10 tons of natural uranium, 1.3 tons of slightly enriched uranium.

The institute states that Iraq, if it has fissile material right now, acquired this through black market or other means, it could produce a nuclear weapon within months. The estimate is correct but I think it misses the point in one aspect and that is, Iraq program is more serious than this. This is a program that's meant to produce an arsenal of nuclear weapons, not just one.

One nuclear weapon will not provide the regime with the deterrents it needs to stay in power long enough and to be protected in such a way that it could menace its neighbors, be the bully of the region, do whatever Saddam wants to do. He already invaded two countries, two of his neighbors and if he wants to continue on this path, he needs a much more credible deterrent than just one nuclear weapon because if he tests that, he loses.

The Iraqi program is meant to produce enriched uranium to bomb grade and it has two technologies to do that, already resolved all the bottlenecks in these technologies. One was provided to them by the German scientist, Karl Schaab who already was on trial in Germany and because of the complicity of the German government in allowing him to go ahead and supply us with the technology needed for uranium enrichment, the judge was sympathetic and only sentenced him only to time served. So actually the only man caught smuggling nuclear technology in the weapon area to Iraq is out of jail now and actually served no serious jail time. He was sentenced to time served plus something like $32,000 in fines.

What we have in Iraq is really a program that, put together, it could in two to three years produce fissile material enough -- I estimate it could be, in two years operational and in three years it would have enough nuclear material for two to three nuclear weapons. I didn't say Iraq has right now nuclear weapons. The London Times misquoted, the reporter misquoted my statement and when I sent a correction he said it was too late for the print, for the issue to come out.

The Iraq -- the timeframe I stated earlier in my testimony to Congress, to the Senate, is that in two to three years I expect Iraq will have enough equipment put together to produce enough material for nuclear weapons. The inspectors right now -- the issue of inspectors going back in -- the inspectors were in Iraq, they did dismantle most of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure. The remaining issue in disarmament in Iraq is not just equipment and facilities. What is needed is really the whole infrastructure there that makes weapons be dismantled: that includes scientists and knowledge base. Nothing on that was done by the inspectors.

The inspectors were not given full access to scientists, minders were always there during inspections. They didn't get the straight story from the scientists. They got the story the government of Iraq wanted them to get. So, if the inspectors are to be effective if they go back to Iraq, a measure has to be taken to force the Iraqi government to allow them to talk to the scientists outside Iraq, without their minders and if possible, so that no retribution can be taken by the Iraqi government against their families and their families go with them. And if the measure is to mean anything, if going and sending the inspectors back in is to be effective and to be the solution of the problem, well that's the accompanying measure that has to go with it.

The scientists we talk to outside Iraq. The only time it happened is when three scientists were sent to Vienna to speak to the inspectors in 1993 and the scientists were chosen by the Iraqi government, not by the inspectors. The inspectors then didn't know much about the personnel working in the program and the scientists. So the choice was made by the Iraqi government. Right now there is much more information on who is who in the Iraqi program who can provide more information and the choice could be decided by the inspectors and the U.S. government and not by the Iraqi government.

The weapons area -- nuclear materials availability on the black market, I believe, is overstated. I don't think it is as easy as it has been billed. I don't think you can just go ahead and buy fissile material on the market at will. In the Soviet Union we found out, the former Soviet Union and Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, there were just too many sting operations going on. It was too dangerous for Iraqi operatives to go in and just buy nuclear material. I talked to a Soviet expert here a few years back and he told me there are more sellers in the Soviet Union and Russia right now than buyers. I don't believe it. There might be more sellers than buyers but they would be mostly part of a sting operation.

So the Iraqi program was directed not to purchase of black market nuclear material basically. It was directed to a local production on a larger scale and I believe this is more dangerous and more of concern than just trying to clamp down on available material outside Iraq. The bigger concern is that Iraq will have its own production facilities in the nuclear area and then you are dealing with a major nuclear power after a while and would that be an acceptable future one would want for the Middle East with Iraq in possession of several nuclear power -- nuclear weapons sitting right there in the region and doing what it wants under a nuclear umbrella. And it would be much more dangerous to get rid of Saddam after they're done.

I think the training needed for terrorism and nuclear weapon area, nuclear radiation area is more than what is available to terrorist groups on their own right now. If one remembers Al-Qaeda documents that were discovered in their hideouts were primitive. They were not on a level that a terrorist could use comfortably or be in a grasp of enough knowledge and training to be able to deal comfortably or safely with nuclear materials. I believe what is needed is a state support to get this going. That's -- Al-Qaeda knew this when they tried to contact the Pakistani scientist whose name, I believe, was Dr. Mohammed, one of the former directors of one of the reactors and it was immediately found out by Pakistani security and he was interrogated and the operation stopped.

So, what is needed by a terrorist is a safe -- more of a safe haven, a state sponsor that would provide him with this training and information safely without being caught right in the middle and the operation stopped.

Modern day terrorists are more in the information area and the training area, where the terrorists are taught with more training and information on what to do and I believe a terrorist in the nuclear area would need this more than actual having his hand actually on some radioactive material which he can bring with him. I think they would be found out. He'll have problem transporting them, getting them to where he wants to get them and putting them in such a way that he could spread them or cause damage with them. A safer bet would be that he would be trained on how to handle a certain weapon site or a certain repository of nuclear material. Either blow it up or find a way to get some of the material outside of that site and use it.

I think I'll reserve the rest for the questions and answers.

REP. SHAYS: Let me do this. Let me have you respond now and then we'll have questions later, but I did interrupt you and you wanted to respond to the issues of claiming that Iraq was responsible for --

DR. HAMZA: Okay. Actually the congressman mentioned two major things. I already answered one. I never said that Iraq is in possession of nuclear weapons. I was quoted as saying and improperly by some British reporter. Most of it was correct at the time. He said two to three months. I didn't say that. I said two to three years.

The other issue is the anthrax. I never said Iraq is known to have done the anthrax. What I said is Dr. Richard Spertzel, the chief weapons inspector for the Iraqi biological weapon program, thinks that Iraq may have its fingerprints or the -- especially the letter sent to Senator Daschle. They think the anthrax spores there on the powder, the quality used as a base as a substrate for putting the anthrax spores on is of such a quality that only Iraq possesses the technologically to do this and he thinks Iraqi fingerprints are on that kind of powder used.

For my side, all I could confirm is that the micron to five micron size reported for the powder used in that letter is within Iraqi capabilities because we did import this kind of equipment when I was there from Germany, okay. And I believe that they had two or three machines of that kind. So the powder technology, that's all I could confirm at the time. The powder technology is there, how it is used by the biologists -- they could manage to use it as a base to put -- as a carrier for the spores needed for the anthrax. That's the area for the biologists. I am not an expert in biological weapons and I used -- merely I reported what Dr. Spertzel already reported to Congress.

REP SHAYS: We will start out with the question with Mr. Kucinich and I'll follow him. And I apologize to Mr. Kucinich if he in any way thinks that I don't think this is important. It's a very serious issue and I'm happy you raised it and I didn't mean to make light of it.

Mr. Bunn, we'll go with you and you have the floor now.

MR. MATTHEW BUNN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to be here today to discuss what I think is --

REP. SHAYS: Move the mike in front.

MR. BUNN: -- one of the more urgent security issues facing the United States today, and that is the threat of nuclear terrorism.

My message today is quite simple, that I believe the danger is real, I believe the danger is urgent, but I believe there are things that the United States can and should be doing to reduce that danger to a very low level and that Congress has a key role in doing that. In my prepared statement I have 15 specific recommendations. I won't burden you with more than five in my opening remarks.

Since September 11 we've been hearing over and over again that the warnings weren't sufficiently clear to tell us what it was we needed to do to stop the attack. Here that is not the case. The warnings are clear and I think the facts are relatively stark. We know that Osama bin Laden himself has said that he wants nuclear weapons, that he sees getting weapons of mass destruction as a religious duty. Al-Qaeda operatives have repeatedly attempted to buy highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. They have tried to recruit nuclear weapon scientists to help them.

The extensive materials found in Iraq -- in Afghanistan, excuse me, were evidence of Al-Qaeda's continuing interest. They were primitive, I agree with Dr. Hamza, but on the other hand one doesn't necessarily leave one's best stuff in the safe house as you flee. We know from the physics of the situation that unfortunately making a nuclear bomb, while difficult, is not necessarily beyond the bounds of a large and well-organized terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda. Indeed, DoE's own internal security regulations require protection against the possibility of terrorists who might break into a DoE site being able to set off a nuclear explosion while they were still inside the facility with the materials right to hand.

We know that the amounts required are small and we know at the same time that plutonium and highly enriched uranium, while radioactive, are not so radioactive as to be difficult to steal and carry away or to be easy to detect as they are crossing our borders. We know that there is enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium in the world today for nearly a quarter of a million nuclear weapons and it is in hundreds of buildings in scores of countries around the world with security at some of these sites that is simply appalling.

There are some sites that literally have no armed guard at the door. There are sites with no detector at the gate. If someone were carrying out plutonium or HEU in his briefcase. There are sites with no security cameras in the area where the plutonium or highly enriched uranium is stored.

These materials are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons and they need to be secured at least as well as gold and diamonds are. That is demonstrably not the case in the world today. It seems to me that these facts lead inescapably to one conclusion, and that is that we need to do everything in our power to secure nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials needed to make them wherever they may be anywhere in the world.

By contrast, it does not make sense to me, the notion that Iraq would actually intentionally give a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials to terrorists. Saddam Hussein is a fanatical dictator, he wants to control everything. That is his nature. The notion of giving -- if he were to get a nuclear weapon or materials after this hard-won effort, that he would give it away to someone he couldn't control simply is not in his nature. And particularly to a group like Al-Qaeda, which has sworn to destroy the secular governments of the Arab world like Saddam Hussein's government. The Defense Department's own assessment of the threat says that the probability of such an event is low.

Unfortunately, our current response is not as intensive as it should in fact be. We have a patchwork quilt of dozens of programs and several cabinet departments dealing with everything from securing nuclear materials to trying to stabilize nuclear scientists, and many of these are making progress and deserve strong support. But the reality is that to date only about 40 percent of the nuclear material in the Soviet Union has had even rapid upgrades in place, bricking over windows, piling blocks in front of doors, this kind of thing. And comprehensive security and accounting upgrades have been accomplished for less than half of that.

Only a seventh of Russia's highly enriched uranium stockpile has been destroyed and there remain highly enriched uranium stockpiles in research reactors all over the world that are insecure. The president has said that keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists is his top priority, but his program does not yet match that rhetoric. To date we have no senior official anywhere in the U.S. government with full-time responsibility for leading and managing the effort to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. We have no integrated plan for that mission.

The resources devoted to that mission, the entire budget for cooperative threat reduction is about a third of 1 percent of our Defense budget, it's the amount we spend in a single day on our military budget. And there is little sustained high level attention, and as a result these efforts are slowed by bureaucracy, lack of coordination and often lack of vision and high level attention.

So I believe that Congress has a major role to play in correcting this situation.

First, of course, in continuing the strong bipartisan support for the relevant budget, but also in rigorous oversight including hearings with independent witnesses such as the one today. And I respectfully recommend a number of specific options and let me just run through them very quickly because I'm running out of time.

First, we need a single leader. I believe Congress should mandate that the president appoint someone on a model of Governor Ridge who wakes up every morning thinking what can I do to keep nuclear weapons out of the terrorists' hands today, who keeps this on the front burner every day. Second, we need a global coalition. Because these materials are in countries all over the world the problem can only be solved by global cooperation. I believe that Congress should direct the president to build on his achievements at the June G8 summit to build a global cooperative effort to secure weapons of mass destruction everywhere.

Third, we need to accelerate our approach with Russia and build it into a real partnership. I believe that Congress should mandate the president to develop a fully joint strategic plan with Russia to complete all of the upgrades for nuclear warheads and security within four years at the most. Fourth, I believe that we need to expand outward globally and in particular with an effort to clean out the vulnerable stockpiles like Vinca that exist around the world.

I have a memo for the Defense conferees on specifically what kinds of language changes would be needed to authorize the kind of program that is needed to clean out these vulnerable stockpiles, wherever they may be. At the same time, in that Defense Authorization Conference I think it's crucial that we -- that the president get the flexibility to spend Nunn-Lugar funds wherever in the world there may be threats to the United States that need to be addressed. And I think it's crucial that he get the permanent waiver authority that he himself has sought so that we don't end up again, as we have this year, delaying crucial investments in U.S. national security over political issues related to cooperative threat reduction.

I have a number of other points on these issues and on reactor security and dirty bombs in my statement, but I will stop there, having used up more time than I should, for which I apologize.

REP. SHAYS: No need to apologize. I appreciate your testimony.

Dr. Lee.

MR. RENSSLEAR LEE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SHAYS: Would you put the mike a little closer to you?

MR. LEE: Certainly a major concern of American policy since 9/11 has been that terrorists might acquire some kind of a nuclear capability and turn it against targets on American soil and overseas. And we've heard these intimidating statements by Osama bin Laden that acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a religious duty and his threats to unleash such weapons in retaliation against the U.S. attack, and these statements of course have added to our overriding sense of concern.

However, a certain mystery surrounds terrorists' nuclear procurement objectives and activities. Hard evidence of Al-Qaeda's forays into the nuclear marketplace is extremely sparse, in my opinion, suggesting that the threat of nuclear terrorism is overstated or has not yet materialized. For example, no terrorist connection has been discerned, at least I don't see it and authorities that I've talked to don't see it, in any of the 20 odd confirmed cases of seizures of highly enriched uranium or plutonium that have occurred internationally since the early 1990s. And indeed, one reasonably well documented case that Al-Qaeda is attempting to buy the ingredients of nuclear weapons has been recorded and this concerned a deal to purchase what purported to be enriched uranium of South African origin in the Sudan in 1993 or 1994. Many people believe that this transaction was really a hoax and that Al-Qaeda's buyers were likely victimized by Sudanese scam artists selling ordinary radioactive material that could not be used to make efficient bombs.

I could cite some lurid media reports that bin Laden and his crew tried to get or even succeeded in obtaining tactical nuclear weapons from former Soviet states but these accounts, in my opinion, lack supporting detail or contain obvious errors that diminish their credibility. And officially, at least, no Russian nuclear weapons are known to be missing or to have been stolen.

Let's look at some of the other scenarios. It's not inconceivable that terrorists could lay their hands on the perhaps 40- 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium necessary to build a crude nuclear weapon. But accomplishing this would be no small feat for a pariah non-state actor like Al-Qaeda. This would require scouting potential suppliers, creating the necessary official cover, gaining access to nuclear facilities, cultivating inside collaborators and making complex arrangements for payment and delivery and I think this would be beyond the capabilities of known terrorist groups. Now, a nation state might find it easier to mount such an operation, for example, Iran. Iran boasts wide-ranging contacts with Russia in the nuclear sphere and could leverage legitimate purchases of nuclear goods to target potential sources of strategic nuclear material.

Also the question arises -- and this has been mentioned before in this hearing -- whether the engineering challenges of building a bomb might be beyond the capabilities of a terrorist group. Although the fundamental principles are well known and described at length on the Internet, the devil, as they say, is in the details and such considerations might lead terrorists to turn to the technically and logistically simpler path of building chemical or biological weapons or radiological dispersal devices. And Al-Qaeda seems to have explored these various options.

Another scenario -- and this also has been mentioned -- concerns the risk of secondary nuclear proliferation to terrorist and rogue states such as Iran and Iraq. Such states' nuclear weapons programs are ominous in their own right. But sharing nuclear secrets obtained at great risk and cost with outsiders, including terrorist groups, seems unlikely. One factor is that international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah have independent sources of funding and definitely have independent political agendas and could not be trusted not to turn nuclear weapons against their sponsors. Of course, if a state was attacked and its survival was at stake, it might try to use terrorist agents as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. But this again raises entirely new sets of questions, some of them admittedly timely, I should say.

While nuclear terrorism may appear as something less than a clear and present danger, this is not cause for complacency. Bin Laden and other terrorists have demonstrated that their interest in having nuclear weapons, even if their efforts to date to secure them seem haphazard and unsophisticated, terrorists can learn from their mistakes and over time, they could develop more effective procurement strategies.

On the supply side, political and economic upheavals and the growth of religious fundamentalism may have diminished the ability of certain nuclear armed states to control their nuclear assets. The security problems in parts of Russia's nuclear complex, for example, are well documented. I might also note, speaking of risk factors, that Russia's efforts to attract private capital investment into its formerly secret nuclear cities, as part of its nuclear downsizing and defense conversion program, could create opportunities for hostile states and terrorists to set up front companies in these zones in close proximity to sources of nuclear material and expertise.

For these reasons, protecting sources of nuclear material, weapons and know-how may well be an important focus of counter terrorism policy. U.S. finance efforts are under way to improve defenses against nuclear theft and smuggling in Russia and other former Soviet states. Recommendations have also been made to introduce advanced U.S. tactical safeguards in facilities in Pakistan's nuclear weapons complex.

But while progress has been recorded in our risk management efforts, significant gaps and vulnerabilities remain. Some observers have argued for reconfiguring U.S. nuclear security policy to focus more on the demand side of the proliferation equation, that is, on the machinations and attentions of the terrorist adversaries themselves. Our demand side strategy would presuppose a broader international intelligence and law enforcement effort to track procurement networks of terrorists and radical states.

In addition, successes in the war on terrorism and other spheres, such as destroying terrorist bases and training camps, disrupting their finances, keeping Al-Qaeda on the run and off balance is likely to reduce the risk that terrorists can acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

Thank you.

REP. SHAYS: Thank you very much, Mr. Lee.

Ms. Gottemoeller.

MS. ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very, Mr. Chairman. I agree with what has already been said this morning regarding the threat from the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, that is the threat that materials could escape into terrorists' hands. I would like to concentrate in my five minutes this morning on steps I believe will be important to developing an international cooperative program with regard to this particular very serious problem.

But first of all, let me thank you very much and your co- subcommittee members for the opportunity to testify this morning and I would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the leadership role that you have played in bringing the House and the Senate together on this critical set of issues. I would like to state my view that of all the countries of the world, the United States has taken this problem the most seriously. While I agree with Mr. Bunn that we haven't taken it seriously enough, nevertheless, in the past 10 years, we have spent $7.1 billion on trying to tackle this problem and this is a significant investment and one that has not been matched by other countries of the world.

So I believe at this point, one of the important goals of U.S. policy should be to turn to partners around the world and ask them to put similar levels of resources into trying to tackle this particular problem. That's why I welcome very much the recent agreement at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada where the other G8 countries agreed to expend $10 billion on these problems in the next 10 years to be matched, I would note, by $10 billion by the United States. This is an excellent investment in the national security of all countries around the world, the G8 countries of course included.

Greater international cooperation to enhance the physical protection of nuclear and radiological material is the most important additional safeguard that I would recommend to preclude terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons. We are already expanding the number of countries willing to invest budgetary resources in this effort through the G8 initiative and other avenues. But now it is important to engage other countries in new regions with the primary goal of ensuring the protection of nuclear and radiological assets from terrorists. This goal again is in the national interest of every country and where international cooperation benefits this goal, it should be embraced and expanded.

We will have to work hard however to establish such cooperation with careful attention to legal and policy issues, particularly surrounding the non-proliferation treaty and its accompanying regime. But I think we also need to keep before us a keen awareness of the urgency of the threat. Recently, I have enumerated certain principles that I believe will be important to achieving successful international cooperation to enhance nuclear security in the counter terrorism struggle. For example, projects I believe should be created that would match counter terrorism priorities. Just as an example, the United States and Russia have not particularly concentrated on lower level nuclear waste or radioactive source material in their material protection control and accounting programs.

We've always stressed nuclear weapons useable material as the highest priority, highly enriched uranium and plutonium. There is no question, however, that radiological or dirty bombs are an attractive weapon for terrorism and have received much publicity as such. In this case, perhaps it is most important on an international basis to stress projects that would immediately address the particular problems of radiological weapons raised. These are primarily public panic and economic costs, including clean-up. In that case, we would focus, not so much on the protection of radiological sources, but on incident mitigation programs of various kinds.

I've already stressed the need for international partnerships but I think we should look beyond simple diplomatic efforts to develop projects that incorporate new technologies and capabilities that are cooperatively developed. One idea, for example, would be to build on cooperative training programs based on the U.S. Radiological Assistance Program which was developed as a result of the Three Mile Island accident.

The RAP teams conduct on site real time detection serving, modeling and analyses activities using non-sensitive technologies. If one were able to develop an international team fielding such capabilities, I think it would be a real asset not only for individual countries but in the possible case where we had a future terrorism threat in a broad swath of the United States. It would be good for any country facing such a threat to be able to call on international resources in this kind of emergency. Much as four relief crews are brought to bear in large natural disasters such as earthquakes and forest fires.

I stress that projects should reinforce international arms control and non-proliferation regimes. I mentioned the non- proliferation treaty. But, in closing, I would like to stress that I think we need to go beyond a simple emphasis on the Non-proliferation Treaty and its future health, continuation and strengthening. I think we need to think about ways to turn adversaries in non-proliferation policy into non-proliferation partners. And I will give you a specific example of that.

India and Pakistan have for many years taken a combatist stance with regard to the Non-proliferation Treaty branding it a discriminatory document in international forums and resisting policies developed on its basis. In this context the United States has often seen New Delhi or Islamabad as a kind of adversary in non- proliferation policy. However, in the crisis era that has emerged since September 11 when terrorists are threatening to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and countries around the world, every country has an interest in ensuring such assets do not fall into terrorist hands.

I therefore believe that it is important to develop joint projects to reduce such threats in a cooperative manner as I've been discussing and countries such as the United States, India and Pakistan has each amassed individual experience over the years in protecting nuclear materials and radiological sources. Such experience can be shared in a way that could benefit others. If the United States, together with India and separately with Pakistan, work to share best practices on protection and control of nuclear assets, the United States would be taking the first step towards transforming these countries from adversaries to partners in the non-proliferation arena.

This is but one example, sir, of the way I think we need to be thinking about working it. Much different than the way that we have worked with these countries in the past where we have, in fact, tended to keep them at arms length with regard to the non-proliferation regime and they kept us at arms length as well. So it's very difficult now to engage but I think we need to be thinking in imaginative ways about how to do so.

In closing, one final word, I believe that it will be important to make a case to the international community for cooperation that is serious and wide-ranging. For that reason I fully support the proposal that Senator Lugar has put forward to expand authorities for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program so that up to $50 million of unobligated CTR funds may be used to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism in other regions of the world. I think that this will show our intent very strongly to the rest of the world community and will be another step in bringing together the world community on this important effort.

Thank you very much.

REP. SHAYS: Thank you very much.

Mr. Paine.

MR. CHRISTOPHER PAINE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately the approaches least likely to succeed from a technical perspective are the ones that are attracting all the attention in funding -- bring it down -- is that better? It has a great political head of steam behind nuclear risk reduction strategies that emphasize preemption, possibly involving even the preemptive use of U.S. nuclear weapons as called for in the Nuclear Posture Review and also options to increase border security.

Not nearly enough attention has been paid, in our view, to reducing dependence on diversion prone nuclear fuel cycles and to better controlling or better yet eliminating nuclear weapons materials at the source before they are produced, stolen or diverted.

President Bush is proposing that we rely on preemptively destroying or disrupting known terrorist groups and networks and hostile outlaw regimes before they gain access to nuclear weapons or explosive materials. But sole or primary reliance on this strategy suffers from several weaknesses. Even if current efforts to oust Saddam Hussein is successful, there is no guarantee of continuing success over the long term with other such cases. Success in preemption depends on timely knowledge of terrorist threats, which we should not be so foolish to believe we will always have. Surely we have learned or should have learned that much from September 11th.

Erroneous intelligence could lead to misdirected preemptive attacks, increased political hostilities and an increased risk of further terrorism. A focus on preemption does not hedge adequately against the risk of societal breakdown such as nearly occurred in Russia in the early 1990s or a hostile regime change that could swiftly occur within an existing sovereign state, a nuclear weapons capable state or a quick preventive war like the one President Bush is proposing against Iraq is not a realistic policy option. For example, a sudden hostile regime change in Japan. We are not going to conduct a quick preventive war against Japan.

Heavy reliance on interdiction likewise, interdiction of illicit commerce in nuclear technology and materials to increase homeland security is also ill-advised as a long term strategy. Increased border inspections can foil unsophisticated smuggling efforts. But technically adept smugglers are not likely to be detected.

Many international borders are essentially unguarded and likely to remain so and as the volume and variety of international commerce continues to grow, it will be difficult to attain or sustain a high probability of intercepting technically competent nuclear smuggling, as we recently demonstrated in an experiment we conducted with ABC News. That experiment and its public safety implications are discussed in detail in an appendix to my prepared testimony and I have an expert with me today, if the committee desires to question him, Dr. Matthew McKenzie who is an expert on the consequences of a small terrorist explosion, the kind of consequences that could be inflicted upon a major city like New York.

Mr. Chairman, too much uncertainty persists about the size and disposition of the former Soviet stockpile and we're not doing enough to reduce that uncertainty. The Moscow Treaty signed by President Bush and President Putin does not require the elimination of a single nuclear warhead or nuclear warhead component and over the next 10 years in Russia or the United States and has no provisions, none, for identifying or controlling the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, including Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

Regrettably, the administration has demonstrated that it is more interesting of preserving a bloated U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, currently numbering some 10,000 intact nuclear devices than eliminating the proliferation and terrorist threat represented by Russian stock of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, we believe that a much higher priority should be attached to seeking a bilateral agreement with Russia to verifiably account for total U.S. and Russian warhead and fissile material production and to steadily eliminating all but a few hundred nuclear warheads in Russia and the United States.

While there are no known Russian cases that resulted in the theft of large quantities of weapons usable nuclear material, at least one incident involved the theft of three kilograms of highly enriched uranium and that amount in the hands of highly skilled designers and fabricators could have produced a weapon with a yield and a range of 100 tons to perhaps a kiloton of fission yield. Had the amounts involved in these separate episodes been combined into a single explosive device, the yield of the resulting device could have significantly exceeded one kiloton.

I'd like to comment on this supposed nexus between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda with respect to weapons of mass destruction because I think there is some ambiguity and confusion in the administration's arguments. There is a history of antagonism between Islamic Jihadists and the decadent secular Baathist regime. You will recall that Osama bin Laden originally got his start as a terrorist because the Saudi regime rejected his initiative to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait using Jihadists from Afghanistan.

Now, it seems that the only circumstance in which this feared nexus might conceivably occur is the very one President Bush seems determined to create in which an egomaniacal dictator under siege thinks he has nothing to lose and seeks to wreak vengeance on those who are toppling him. This line of inquiry leads one to ponder the following contradiction. The Bush administration argues that the threat of Saddam's unprovoked nuclear or bioweapon aggression against the U.S. is sufficiently imminent to justify prompt military intervention, but not so imminent as to justify fears of a vengeful response by a terrorist network when his regime is on the verge of defeat.

The only way the administration could seize upon the former risk while discounting the latter one is if it had detailed intelligence indicating that Saddam's regime does not yet have the capabilities or the terrorist nexus for WMD delivery, which it now claims are the proximate cause of our need for preemptive self-defense. In that case, there's time for an intrusive inspection regime to be put in place without an immediate invasion.

In the alternative, the risk of retaliation via the weapons of mass destruction terrorist nexus could actually be higher than the administration is admitting publicly, in which case the Congress ought to look very carefully at the wisdom of giving the president a blank check to wage war against Saddam. I do not know where the truth actually lies between these two alternatives. But I'm not sure the administration does either and I find that worrisome. Either Congress and the public have been subjected to a certain amount of dis- information regarding the imminence of the Iraqi threat or the administration has embarked on a bit of a gamble that could end very badly for some innocent civilians in Israel, the U.S. or Western Europe.

Mr. Chairman, current international safeguards are technically inadequate and we go into some detail on why we have found that to be true at NRDC. We tried to get the IAEA to correct the significant quantity sufficiency in 1995, that is the amount of material that the IAEA regards as a threshold amount to making a nuclear weapon. We were thwarted by the IAEA and the State Department, which claimed that using technically correct safeguards requirements would lead to an inefficient allocation of the financial resources available to the IAEA.

In our view, a more logical response would be to request additional resources to make the safeguards technically credible. Interdiction is a tool, Mr. Chairman, it's not a solution, and I'd be happy to discuss with you the details of the ABC (ph) experiment. Thank you.

REP. SHAYS: Thank you very much.

Ms. Bryan.

MS. DANIELLE BRYAN: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kucinich and other members of the subcommittee, thank you very much --

REP. SHAYS: If you'd move your -- move the mike closer to you --

MS. BRYAN: -- for inviting me to testify today.

REP. SHAYS: Thank you. You're welcome.

MS. BRYAN: First I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for requesting a GAO investigation of security at U.S. DoE nuclear weapons facilities and for holding this, the first open oversight hearing on nuclear security in several Congresses.

The Project on Government Oversight, or POGO, has spent the last 18 months investigating the adequacy of security at U.S. nuclear weapons production facilities, national labs, and transportation of weapons and special nuclear materials as well as most recently the security at U.S. nuclear power plants. POGO takes no position on nuclear power.

In early 2001, POGO began its first investigation into nuclear security at the DoE after more than a dozen high level departmental security experts came forward with concerns regarding inadequate security at the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons facilities. Just prior to September 11th last year POGO completed our investigation and concluded that the nation's 10 nuclear weapons facilities which housed nearly 1,000 tons of weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium and the transportation system for weapons and nuclear materials regularly failed to protect this material during mock terrorist attack.

The result of that investigation were issued in our report, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk."

Because of our work on DoE nuclear weapons facilities, several current and former guards from commercial nuclear power plants began contacting POGO with similar concerns about inadequate security at the nation's nuclear power plants, regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC. POGO then expanded our investigation and randomly contacted guards at additional facilities. We cross-checked our interviews with Army and Navy special forces and current and former NRC contractors and officials.

In September 2002 we issued "Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices from Inside the Fences." According to the interviews conducted for that report, we found security guards at only one of four nuclear power plants, and there are 110 reactors across the country at 65 plants, are confident their plant could defeat a terrorist attack. The guards say morale is very low and they are under-equipped, undermanned, under-trained and underpaid, despite the ads many of you in Congress will have read, the full page ads the nuclear industry has placed showing guards with guns and looking very tough.

I understand that this hearing is focused on the threat of special nuclear material or theft of a nuclear weapon. If a terrorist group were successful in stealing a U.S. nuclear weapon it would be extraordinarily difficult to detonate it because of the codes and self-disabling devices designed to frustrate an unauthorized person from triggering a detonation. However, weapons-grade material stolen from DoE facility could be used by a terrorist group to either fabricate a crude nuclear weapon or create a dirty bomb. This is not as farfetched as some might believe. In fact, in full scope mock terrorist attack tests performed by the government, half the time mock terrorists are successful in breaking in, stealing significant quantities of special nuclear material and leaving the site.

But theft requires that the terrorists get into a facility and get back out again with the material. What we have found in our investigations is that a suicidal terrorist wouldn't have to work that hard. Instead, a successful suicidal terrorist attack at several of our DoE weapons facilities could result in a sizable nuclear detonation at the facility itself. A terrorist group does not have to steal nuclear material, create a nuclear device, transport it to the United States and detonate it in a major city. They could simply gain access to the material at the U.S. nuclear facility, some of which are near large metropolitan areas, and tests have shown they can accomplish the same outcome.

This type of homemade bomb is called an improvised nuclear device, or IND. Such a detonation can be created by using conventional explosives brought into the facility in a backpack and combined with particular kinds of special nuclear materials stored at these sites. This spring Senator Biden held hearings on this matter at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In addition to the possibility of an IND, there are a number of DoE sites as well as commercial nuclear reactors where suicidal terrorists could accomplish radiological sabotage. Again, the suicidal terrorists would only have to get into the facility, they don't have to get out. They would simply need to create an explosion that, while not a detonation, would disperse radiation over a wide and in a number of cases heavily populated area. Nuclear materials at DoE sites as well as many spent fuel pools at commercial nuclear plants are not stored inside hardened containment. As a result, populations cannot be even nominally protected from fallout caused by radiological sabotage.

As you know, both the U.S. and Russia are awash in excess special nuclear materials. The U.S. has not only encouraged but has aided Russia in blending down their excess highly enriched uranium and have financed the construction of underground storage facilities, as I suspect you were just talking about, Chairman, in Russia for excess nuclear materials. Yet I find it extraordinary that we do not abide by the same standards here at home.

In this country we have hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium stored at Oak Ridge, Tennessee's Y-12 plant, in decaying 50- year-old buildings, some of which were wooden until recently. We have some of the best protected underground facilities in the world designed for storage of weapons or nuclear materials that are not being used. Currently much of this excess weapons-grade uranium in Tennessee along with the excess plutonium pits housed at Pantex, which is in Amarillo, Texas, are being stored for a war reserve. The ill- conceived plan is to transport these old nuclear weapons components across the country and marry them back together during a nuclear attack in the case that we've run out of our existing nuclear weapons.

Over 50 tons of our plutonium have already been declared excess and could be immobilized, glassified, and surrounded with irradiation shields so that it would be less attractive for theft. Instead of moving ahead with this plan, however, the U.S. has recently decided to bet on an unproven technology of turning this excess plutonium into reactor fuel called MOX, which will still result in the creation of yet more plutonium.

POGO has recommended numerous specific improvements that should be made by both DoE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to significantly upgrade security at U.S. nuclear facilities. In a broader sense however, the most important improvement that should be made is to make domestic nuclear assets less available to terrorists. At DoE this could be accomplished by consolidating weapons grade nuclear materials at fewer strategic underground facilities.

Another basic improvement would be to shift the security posture from tactics that contain terrorists inside the facilities until outside help arrives an hour or more after the loss of the facility to denying their access in the first place. In the case of commercial nuclear reactors, currently the security guards are simply required to try to hold off terrorists and call for help from outside responders which tests have shown will again take between one and two hours even though the mock terrorist attacks have shown to be over between three and 10 minutes. The NRC must upgrade its requirements of nuclear plants to expect the guards on site to be capable of preventing the terrorists from getting into key facilities in the first place.

In conclusion, it isn't a surprise to us and I suspect perhaps not to members of this committee either that the officials at the agencies responsible for allowing this inadequate security posture refuse to face reality and are, at times, even hostile to improving this situation. We welcome your oversight of these agencies. Nothing will improve without such congressional involvement.

Thank you.

REP. SHAYS: Thank you very much.

Dr. Baram.

MR. AMATZIA BARAM: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored. On December 3, 2001, Saddam Hussein met with a group of private sheiks from the southern part of Iraq. One of the panegyrics that one of the tribal sheiks read went like this -- this was by the way in southern Iraqi colloquial, so allow me to present it into colloquial English, "From inside America how five planes flew, 6000 infidels died. Bin Laden did not do this. The luck of the president" in square brackets "Saddam Hussein did it."

I'm not a nuclear scientist nor am I an expert on proliferation, I'm an historian. I'm an historian and a political analyst. All I can offer you is my analysis of Saddam Hussein's intentions and vision. And you be the judges whether this makes sense or not. I've been studying Saddam Hussein and his regime for the last 22 years so I'll try to at least explain what I think this means and other things. What did he mean by that? Of course, every poem was carefully vetted and supervised and authorized. You couldn't read such a poem on TV. It was not live by the way so it could be censured had their been a mistake. But in Iraq there are no such mistakes.

Saddam Hussein meant three things. A: To show the Iraqi people that he takes revenge. He always take revenge. So don't mess with me, I'm taking revenge on America. So certainly I'll do it when it comes to you. Be careful. B: To make it clear to the American people and the administration as well, the administration as well as people, I am behind the 9/11 attack on America. C: Not to admit that he is behind the 9/11 attack. Namely to remain, to secure deniability.

To prevent any possibility that his fingerprints will show.

This way America will not have the legal right to attack him but every single American will know that he is behind the attack on New York and Washington DC. This he needs for the simple reason that he needs to demonstrate to you his nuisance value. As long as you don't lay off me, as long as you don't stop breathing down my neck, I am not going to lay off you. And, indeed, a few days after the 9/11 attack, the Iraqi media and the Iraqi luminaries promised that something worse will happen if America did not change its position, its political behavior, about a number of things but mainly about Iraq.

It took the Iraqi regime four to five days to say for the first time we didn't do it. And then they did. But at the same time they congratulated those who did it. This, by the way, is a very well tried technique by Saddam Hussein in dealing with domestic opponents. He perfected it to the level of an art. Well, when he needs to execute somebody, he does it. He's not particularly bashful, but there are times when he thinks it would be better not to do it and admit that he did it or even declare that he did it, but rather to do it in a way which will reserve for him the essence of deniability.

In this way he got a lot. In fact, sometimes his lieutenants, his intelligence, or his domestic security people would kill somebody or would rape and then pretend -- he would pretend -- that somebody who he wanted to harm and then he meet with him and say to him I heard that something terrible happened to your family. I'm really sorry about that, but the guy he approached would suspect would, in fact, know he did it. But Saddam would say, of course, I'm sorry about it and would never admit it. But this actually got him all the way to the presidency in Iraq and he thinks it can work in the international arena as well.

In summing up of this part I'll say either you lay off him completely. You just leave him alone completely. Lift the embargo. Lift the oil embargo. Lift the weapons embargo. Completely leave him alone and then you may -- there is a chance you'll have some respite, some recession, some short periods that he won't bother you, he'll have no reason to do that, except revenge. But again revenge is not an absolute thing. Or, if you decide that you need to keep the embargo on and even if you wish to have a more robust embargo -- more robust weapons inspection -- you have to expect the worst. And I mean the worst.

Now was he behind the 9/11 attack on America? Of course I don't know. There are some indications he was in touch with Al-Qaeda but these don't produce clear cut evidence that he was behind it. But the need is to keep you informed that he can do a lot of harm and when it happens, not to admit it but to imply that he was behind it. Never to admit it and never, ever to leave fingerprints. Can he provide an Islamist terrorist organization with weapons of mass destruction? I'll say this. First of all, many people in America believe that Saddam Hussein is a secular leader. Many people in America believe that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are at daggers drawn. Nothing could be more erroneous. Nothing could be more erroneous.

For your information, Saddam since 1990 is a born again Muslim. He's a very strange one because he drinks. He's consuming alcohol apparently in large quantities but for public consumption he is a born again Muslim. He prays fives times a day, or so he says, or so he projects the image of and so on and he imposed Islamic punishments in Iraq, never to be seen in Iraq before, like chopping off the right hand of a thief or anybody who is regarded as a thief and beheading. This is by the way not Islamic, beheading young women who are accused of being prostitutes. In most part they are not, it's political. But let me say again, that's not Islamic but it all is presented as Islamic, as return to Islam.

About bin Laden. I advise you to read bin Laden's Fatwa, rabbinical sakaloha (ph) Yiddish, Jewish tradition, from February, 1998. All I can say about it is, I have it. All I can say about it is it sounds exactly like it was written in Baghdad -- in Baghdad. Maybe personally by Saddam Hussein. Not that it was, but it sounds exactly like it.

So there is absolutely no reason why Saddam shouldn't trust Al- Qaeda with any weapons at all. Now the question is, will he? The only answer that I can suggest is this, he will never provide -- by the way, Hezbollah and Assad, Hezbollah are fundamentalistic Islamic, Assad is really a state, secular President Assad of Syria and they cooperate rather effectively. So that's not a reason to say this can never happen.

I'm just saying that I don't believe Saddam will ever provide any organization outside Iraq with the technology to produce such weapons. I don't believe that. Because of the great fluidity of Islam politics, you can never trust these people a year from now. But he can and he might provide them with weapons he himself can produce provided again and that -- yes, I'm summing up -- provided again that his fingerprints don't show. He needs to keep you under constant fear that he can do you a lot of damage, so lay off me. That's all.

REP. SHAYS: Thank you very much. After listening to the very interesting presentations of all of you, I want to apologize for not putting you in two different panels. I think we probably should have done that, because we have a real focus on Iraq and then we have a focus on proliferation and how we do that, and both are very important issues. So I want to thank each of you for your patience.

And we're going to get to 10 minute questions from each, and I'm going to start with Mr. Kucinich. But when we try to talk about the intentions of Saddam, it's kind of like my -- you know, wondering how do you prove that Hitler wants to go into Poland. I don't know how you get answers to some of these questions, but let's give it a try.

Mr. Kucinich, you have the floor for 10 minutes and a little more if you need it.

REP. KUCINICH: I want to thank the gentleman.

To Dr. Hamza, I have a map of the region here. It's Iraq, and it's up on the screen. Can you tell this committee where Iraq's nuclear sites currently are located?

MR. HAMZA: Actually, that's -- Congressman, that's not the point right now. The point is --

REP. KUCINICH: So you cannot tell where the sites are?

MR. HAMZA: Nobody can actually.

REP. KUCINICH: Okay.

MR. HAMZA: Because the sites are now mostly underground, according al-Haideri, who defected recently and built some of those sites. The sites --

REP. KUCINICH: You say they're underground. Do you know where they are underground?

MR. HAMZA: They are all over the country. They are within civilian infrastructure and government infrastructure.

REP. KUCINICH: So you're saying there are nuclear sites all over the country?

MR. HAMZA: Yes.

REP. KUCINICH: Underground?

MR. HAMZA: Underground.

REP. KUCINICH: But no one knows where they are?

MR. HAMZA: Nobody knows. Some are above ground, some underground, some in civilian infrastructure. Nobody -- that's why inspection is problematic right now.

REP. KUCINICH: You know, I'm certainly in agreement with members of this committee who favor inspections. But I'm just trying to establish -- the witness says that there are nuclear sites, they're underground and no one knows where they are. So --

MR. HAMZA: Not necessarily underground. I said some may be underground, some above ground.

REP. KUCINICH: Do you know where the ones above ground are? Can you tell us?

MR. HAMZA: They are no longer where they were. Nobody knows outside Iraq right now exactly where the sites are located. They are spread, fragmented and hidden.

REP. KUCINICH: Well, when --

MR. HAMZA: That would be an easy job if somebody knows and can tell you right away and you just go there.

REP. KUCINICH: Well, linguistic construction is a marvelous science and when we say that there are sites above ground, that is a flat declarative sentence and it implies that we know where the sites are.

MR. HAMZA: No, I said they could be. I said nobody knows. They could be above ground, they could be underground. A recent defector told us he built 20 underground, but that doesn't mean that these sites are all there is. So nobody knows.

REP. KUCINICH: Okay. They could be underground, they could be above ground, nobody knows?

MR. HAMZA: Correct.

REP. KUCINICH: They could exist, they may not exist. Nobody knows and that's why we're talking about inspections. Now, what's the -- because as a member of Congress my concern is that we have proof. Proof is proof. I think the Canadian prime minister said that in a couple of different languages. And so I'm interested if the witness has any proof as to where they are underground, or where they are above ground; not that there may be weapons above ground or underground.

Now, can you tell us, Dr. Hamza, what's the current status of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program? And in your answer, not only information about fissile material everyone speaks of, but also its tamper materials, electrical materials, explosive materials, arming systems and the equipment to process these into a weapon.

MR. HAMZA: What you have in the nuclear weapon program, since already I said there is not a single defector that came out of Iraq from the core of the program. That goes for all weapons of mass destruction, since 1995. So what you have now is what you had before the Gulf War: circumstantial evidence. Purchase of equipment, some second or third tier defectors who tell us some -- like al-Haideri, the civil engineer. Lots of indicators, including equipment purchases, intercepted purchases, activity of certain groups. So what we have is what you have always in a nuclear weapon. The Indian test in 1974 -- there were no proof and everybody was talking about circumstantial evidence.

REP. SHAYS: If the gentleman would suspend a second. Ms. Schakowsky may be able to get back in time. But I just want you to look at her, because she's going to be contacting through the committee those of you to answer questions and we will respectfully request that you respond to the questions in writing. She may be back in time, but just --

MR. HAMZA: Okay.

REP. SHAYS: Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt. The gentleman has the floor.

MR. HAMZA: That's all right. Now --

REP. KUCINICH: Well, let me ask you this. What kind of a weapon is Iraq trying to build: a Hiroshima bomb, you know, a gun-type uranium device? Or a Nagasaki bomb, or a plutonium implosion device, a thermonuclear bomb, a radiological bomb, or all of the above?

MR. HAMZA: It's both nuclear and radiological. We already tested. That's been explained by the inspectors who already were there. Iraq tested the radiological bomb in 1988, but tested it in the desert, not in a building or an environment where --

REP. KUCINICH: What year was that, sir?

MR. HAMZA: 1988. And that was --

REP. KUCINICH: And does it have that same facility now? Does it have that same --

MR. HAMZA: No, no. It was one test -- one major test and one small test, and the tests were non-conclusive. I'm not saying it was an effective weapon at the time. It was tested in the desert, it was tested as a weapon of war and it proved to be not as effective as it should be. But as a weapon of terror, it's another story. Now, as for nuclear weapons, Iraq -- inspectors found that out also. They have documents and everything was revealed, you don't just have to take just my word for it. Iraq was working, and is working I believe, on making an implosion device of the Hiroshima type or size. And --

REP. KUCINICH: When was that?

MR. HAMZA: It was when I was there and it continued, I believe.

REP. KUCINICH: Did you work on that?

MR. HAMZA: Yes. I worked on the design.

REP. KUCINICH: And when were you there?

MR. HAMZA: Yes.

REP. KUCINICH: When?

MR. HAMZA: I was till 1994.

REP. KUCINICH: And you were working on that at 1994, and when is the last --

MR. HAMZA: No, 90 --

REP. KUCINICH: When is the last time you were working on that?

MR. HAMZA: I worked on it last time before the Gulf War. But I believe, according to the people I also saw, work continued till 1994.

REP. KUCINICH: Was this a facility that inspectors later on saw?

MR. HAMZA: Yes. It is in El Ethir (ph) facility. Inspectors were there, they destroyed the facility and destroyed some of the equipment. They had what is called then -- was declared to be a smoking gun, which was a design -- a workable design for a nuclear weapon. And so the knowledge base is there. The research done is more or less complete. What is needed is just the fissile material.

REP. KUCINICH: To your knowledge, were there ever any United States companies that provided Iraq with materials or with equipment that was used in any nuclear weapons?

MR. HAMZA: There were attempts. No, not major pieces of equipment.

REP. KUCINICH: Anything -- for example?

MR. HAMZA: I don't know of any that the U.S. itself -- but the Germans did supply us with some of the equipment we used to test and develop the nuclear weapon.

REP. KUCINICH: What was provided?

MR. HAMZA: By the U.S. government -- by the U.S. sources?

REP. KUCINICH: By the German government, you were saying.

MR. HAMZA: By German and other sources, we had Japanese sources, we had fast cameras that --

REP. KUCINICH: When was that?

MR. HAMZA: That was in '89/90.

REP. KUCINICH: That was a time that, Mr. Chairman, I'll be presenting some documents to this committee that will show that according to information provided through --

MR. HAMZA: I was not here. I don't know.

REP. KUCINICH: -- the State Department that there was United States companies involved in sending over certain materials to Iraq to assist them in the development of this program. Now we know they were destroyed. And I would take it, based on your testimony, that you're willing to agree that even the programs that you worked on were destroyed. Nevertheless, I think it's valuable to have you here to talk about what it was like before they were destroyed.

The only other thing I want to do, Mr. Chairman, is to -- just for the purposes -- when we began this, I have some of Mr. Hamza's statements that are verbatim transcripts of CNN on October 22, 2001, that establish his position on some of these issues that have come up here. I want to tell Mr. Hamza I'm glad you came before this committee. But at the same time, I think it's very important that none of your experience -- which is valid, it's your experience -- be interpreted by the media today as being proof of the current existence in Iraq of useable weapons of mass destruction, of the ability to deliver those weapons. You know, that's my concern.

I'm not going to discount your proof when you worked for Iraq's weapons program. I'm sure that what you know about that program is marvelous. But I'm equally sure, based on the intelligence that I've heard from my country's intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, that Iraq does not currently have useable weapons of mass destruction. And that's what I have to go on. So I appreciate your --

MR. HAMZA: You mean nuclear or otherwise?

REP. KUCINICH: I'm -- Dr. Hamza, please. I'm saying that I'm taking my position based on information I received from our Central Intelligence Agency. So thank you for being here, and I'm going to ask the chair if he'd be so kind as to include in the record these statements from CNN, as well as an article where -- we always have to be cautious in these hearings about information that's brought forward in a climate which is potentially inflammatory, because a few years ago Congress was presented with information about the Iraqi government being involved in troops storming hospitals, stealing incubators and leaving babies to die on the floor. It turned out that incident, which was brought to inflame the American public, was not true.

I'd like to submit that into the record too. These hearings are always very interesting. I want to thank the chair.

REP. SHAYS: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Tierney.

REP. SHAYS: I want to know -- I'm going to make a statement and I want to know if any of you disagree with it. We know that Saddam Hussein had a chemical, biological and nuclear program before the Gulf War. Anybody disagree with that? We know he had a chemical, biological and nuclear program after the war. Do any of you disagree with that? And we know that he kicked out inspectors when we started to destroy his programs of chemical, biological and nuclear program. Do any of you disagree with that?

Should the burden of proof be put on the individuals who believe that he doesn't have a program, to say that he -- after he kicked us out, he stopped the chemical/biological programs? Or should the burden of proof be put on individuals to say that he continued it? I'd like to ask each of you where you fall down on that point. I'm going to go right down the row. Dr. Hamza.

MR. HAMZA: Actually, in a circumstantial evidence case of this type where a country has had a long history, a proven history, of working in this area, the only way really to be on the safe side is for Iraq to admit and allow full access to its various areas of research, yes.

REP. SHAYS: Let me just repeat the question again.

MR. HAMZA: Yes.

REP. SHAYS: None of you disagree with my statement that he had a chemical, biological and nuclear program before the war, that he had one after the war, and that he kicked us out when we started -- the inspectors out when we started to dismantle his chemical, biological and nuclear programs. The question I have, and I want to ask each of you -- and it's not a long answer. Do you believe the burden of proof should be on those to prove that he is still continuing the program? Or should the burden of proof be on those to prove that he has stopped these programs?

MR. HAMZA: I believe those who believe he has stopped.

REP. SHAYS: Mr. Bunn?

MR. BUNN: It seems clear to me that he has continued those programs. I'd be amazed if for some reason he had stopped, and I would be surprised if anybody would succeed in proving that he had stopped after the inspectors had left.

REP. SHAYS: Dr. Lee?

MR. LEE: I have to give a kind of ambiguous answer. But I think that there are -- it certainly is very difficult to prove the negative. On the other hand, I think that full deployment and mobilization of our intelligence capabilities, including inspectors, can certainly come to some appropriate answers that can give us grounds for making decisions.

REP. SHAYS: I'm going to come back to you.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I was about -- Mr. Chairman, I was about also to say, as Dr. Lee just did, that it's well nigh impossible to prove a negative. I do believe that it is possible, through the idea of a coercive inspection regime, to not only make some significant determinations about what is currently in place in Iraq with regard to weapons of mass destruction programs, but also to proceed in the direction of disarmament, of disarming those programs. I think we have been overly focused on inspections per se. But it's inspection moving towards disarmament that we need to concentrate on.

REP. SHAYS: Mr. Paine?

MR. PAINE: My view, I think in NRDC's view, the burden of proof is squarely on the shoulders of the Iraqi government to comply with the U.N. resolutions, including intrusive -- very intrusive inspections, until the Security Council is satisfied. Not until the Iraqi government is satisfied that it has demonstrated its bona fides, but until the international community is satisfied.

REP. SHAYS: You gave an answer you wanted to give, and I appreciate it and so on. But I do want to ask where does the burden of proof lie: with those -- if he had it before, he had it after and he kicked us out while we destroyed it, where does the burden lie? Does the burden lie with the American government to prove that he has continued this program? Or does the burden of proof lie with those to demonstrate that he has stopped doing these weapons of mass destruction?

MR. PAINE: Who should demonstrate that he has stopped?

REP. SHAYS: The American government. Should the American government --

MR. PAINE: I --

REP. SHAYS: No, no, no. Should the people who oppose intervention have to demonstrate that he has stopped the program? Where does the burden of proof lie?

MR. PAINE: I guess I'm having trouble answering the question because I think there is a third option, which is to be agnostic on that question and to leave the result of that determination to a thoroughgoing international inspection. My answer to the question is I don't know and the burden of proof is on Hussein's regime to comply with international inspections. But that's the best I can do.

REP. SHAYS: All right. I can't tell you how to answer a question.

MS. BRYAN: Mr. Chairman, I feel the question is outside the scope of our work and I don't feel qualified to answer it.

REP. SHAYS: Okay. You have some great expertise, but I understand your response.

Dr. Baram?

MR. BARAM: Saddam stopped the inspection for a reason. According to Security Council resolutions, the burden of the proof is on Iraq that it no longer has weapons of mass destruction. I would stick with that.

REP. SHAYS: Okay. Do you believe, Dr. Lee, that he has continued his programs?

MR. LEE: Congressman, I really don't have the requisite body of -- or access to intelligence information to allow me to answer that.

REP. SHAYS: And do you need intelligence to be able to answer that question?

MR. LEE: Well, I would certainly hope that having absorbed the lessons of 9/11 and this horrendous, catastrophic experience, that we are beginning to understand again the importance of intelligence as a tool for anticipating threats against the United States, including threats from --

REP. SHAYS: Yes, I would totally agree with that. I don't know how that quite fits in to the question of whether you believe he has it or not. If you choose not to answer it, that's another issue. Do you believe he has weapons of chemical, biological, nuclear program?

MR. LEE: I'm afraid that I have to come down as an agnostic on this issue.

REP. SHAYS: You have no belief? You have no -- you're totally neutral on the issue of whether you think he has it or not?

MR. LEE: Congressman, I don't feel that I have the requisite information to make even a judgment on this.

REP. SHAYS: Yes, Ms. Gottemoeller?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Sir, I have read the various open literature that's out there, including the International Institute for Strategic Studies' dossier that you referred to in your opening remarks. On the basis of what I have seen from very knowledgeable, including the inspectors who have been working in Iraq over the years, I do believe that there is an ongoing active program, particularly in the arena of chemical and biological weapons, where we know that we did not proceed to the point of essentially dismantling those programs. In the case of nuclear weapons, I think we were very close to actually shutting down that pr