PREPARED TESTIMONY OF

ROBERT L. GALLUCCI
Dean
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

31 July 2002

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to address the critical issue of American policy towards Iraq.

I would begin with the premise that the only way Iraq poses a critical threat to the United States or our allies is through the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in one of two scenarios:

- if Iraq were to transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons to a terrorist group; or

- if Iraq were to use these weapons against American or Allied forces, or our homelands, in order to prevent or impede an American led invasion aimed at overturning the Iraqi regime.

Let me put this another way.  If Iraq can be prevented from acquiring WMD - particularly viral biological weapons or nuclear weapons - then Iraq poses no special threat to America or her allies.  If Iraq does acquire WMD, the threat  still does not rise to a critical level because our deterrent, our threat to retaliate in the event of Iraqi use of WMD, is credible and effective.

However, if Iraq acquires and clandestinely transfers WMD to a terrorist group, or if the United States should move to overthrow Saddam Hussein, then we should not expect our deterrent to be effective, either in preventing terrorist use of WMD against us, or Iraqi use against us in an effort to prevent regime change.

This line of reasoning leads us to ask about Iraqi WMD capabilities.  I submit that no one outside of Iraq knows with high confidence what those capabilities are today.  However, we do know that Iraq had programs that successfully produced chemical weapons (CW), including VX, biological weapons (BW), including anthrax, and an implosion type nuclear weapons triggering  package with some, but not enough, fissile material for a weapon.  We also know what was destroyed over seven years of UNSCOM inspections, suspect some material that had been produced was not found, and that more has been produced during the last four years of no inspections.  Furthermore, since clandestine manufacture of BW and CW agents could be accomplished by Iraq without high confidence of detection by allied intelligence agencies, and Iraq’s intention to acquire those weapons cannot be assumed to have diminished, the only prudent assumption is that Iraq has or will have chemical and biological weapons at some point.

The nuclear weapons issue is more complicated.  Although the wish to acquire nuclear weapons must be assumed to continue in the Iraqi leadership, the facilities required to produce the necessary fissile material probably would be detected, even if Iraq attempted to clandestinely construct them, especially if plutonium was sought.  That said, a clandestine centrifuge program, producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) could not be ruled out. What makes matters worse, however, is that the acquisition of HEU or plutonium from the states of the former Soviet Union cannot be ruled our either, in light of the well known inadequacies that persist in material accountancy and control in those countries.  Since Iraq has already done the “signature” work to design and develop the triggering package for a weapon, we cannot have any real confidence that Iraq is now, or will remain, a non-nuclear weapons state.

In light of the threat posed by Iraqi acquisition of WMD, the unfulfilled requirements of the 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 687, the likelihood that Iraq will continue efforts to acquire such weapons, and the character of the Iraqi regime, I do not think it would be prudent for the United States to leave Iraq free to pursue WMD acquisition indefinitely.  This assessment stands even if we lack any intelligence that Iraq would, in fact, transfer WMD to a terrorist group.  It is also an assessment that leads some analysts to favor military action against Iraq aimed at overturning the regime - which is one of the two circumstances in which deterrence could be expected to fail and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction used against America or her allies.  It seems to me, therefore, that if the United States is to block Iraqi acquisition of WMD, it should look for ways to do so short of such a war for this, if for no other reason.  And the other reasons - loss of life, severe budgetary consequences, alienating friends and allies in the region and around the world, and avoiding the challenge of post-conflict regime reconstruction and maintenance - are important as well.

The question is, then, can a politically plausible inspection regime be designed and put in place that would offer sufficient assurance of preventing Iraq from acquiring WMD over the long term?  And could such a regime be forced upon the current Iraqi government in the near term without first going to war against that government?  Fortunately, the seven years or so of UNSCOM inspections give us some insight into what a desirable regime would look like, and what pitfalls need to be avoided in designing one.

First, we can assume that any regime that appeared as though it would be effective in blocking Iraqi WMD acquisition would also be resisted by Iraq.  Therefore the only way to impose such a regime short of war would be to pose to Iraq the credible alternative of a prompt invasion and regime change, if the inspection regime is resisted.  Just as clearly, Iraq must be convinced that accepting such an inevitably intrusive regime - permanently - would indeed protect it from invasion, at least by the regime sponsors.

Second, it should be clear to all by now that an inspection regime that fails to give us high confidence that it is successfully uncovering and blocking any serious WMD development is worse than no regime at all.  Such a regime gives Iraq cover and the initiative, protects it from invasion, and in some circumstances would supply it with hostages. 

Third, it is probably true that an inspection regime that is too robust, that is, one accompanied by substantial supporting military units deployed to the region, would inevitably be taken by friends and allies, as well as Iraq, as a step to invasion:  Desert Shield masquerading as UNMOVIC PLUS.

Fourth, we are, therefore, in search of the “Goldilocks Inspection Regime,” one that is balanced just right to be effective, acceptable and sustainable.  Some obvious elements of such a regime are the following: 

– inspectors who have unrestricted, unlimited, and immediate access to any site in Iraq; there can be no sanctuaries or exceptions;

– inspectors must be chosen for their experience and expertise without regard for geographic balance;

– inspectors must be free to receive, exchange, and discuss intelligence with governments as necessary to conduct their missions;

– inspectors must be able to take whatever steps are necessary to maintain the security of their communications and their operational plans;

– inspections must be undertaken in an environment free of Iraqi movements of any kind, air or ground, in the area of the inspection; and

– inspectors should have the option of conducting inspections supported by a specially configured and prepositional military unit to assist it in entry, prevent loss of containment at an inspection sight, and to manage any “spontaneous” civilian opposition.

On the last point, the inspection regime must be capable of inspecting any designated sight and overcoming any Iraqi non-cooperation or resistance, except that mounted by a significant military unit.  In short, if an inspection fails, it must do so in a way that creates a clear casus belli. 

There will be many with international inspection experience who would only participate in an inspection regime that presumed host government cooperation, and who would oppose a regime that had a military force organic to it, as is proposed here.  There are good reasons for adopting such a position as a rule, but our past experience with UNSCOM provides ample reason to treat Iraq as an exception to that rule. This inspection regime would be designed to prevent Iraq from manipulating the inspection process.  It would aim to strike the right balance, linking the inspection regime to an invasion if Iraq fails to cooperate, without being so robust as to appear to inevitably presage a move to overthrow the Iraqi government.