Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume Two
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 7 Other Allegations of Illegal Arms Exports to Iraq

Excerpt:
CONSIDERATION OF ROYAL ORDNANCE’S PROPOSAL TO EXPORT A ROCKET PLANT TO IRAQ

D7.16 Notwithstanding the general awareness among UK manufacturers of the ban on the export of lethal goods to Iraq, enquiries as to the prospects of obtaining export licences for such goods were still made. Some enquiries followed the formal procedure of submission of an AWP application. *23 Others simply took the form of letters.

D7.17 One such informal enquiry was made by a representative of Royal Ordnance, Rocket Motors Division, in a letter to MOD/DESO dated 17 May 1988. *24 The company wished to follow up and confirm matters discussed during a visit by DESO staff to Royal Ordnance and sought formal comments on the possibility of obtaining permission to supply, to the Iraqi Government:

“1. A complete plant for the manufacture of extruded double base rocket charges including the technology.

2. Propellant ingredients for this plant, eg NC, ballistic modifiers, stabilisers etc.

3. Ammonium perchlorate.

4. An X-ray plant for non-destructive testing”.

D7.18 The MOD put the letter before the IDC at its meeting on 28 June 1988 and expressed concern over the proposed supply. It was later reported in the summary record of the meeting *25 that after due consideration and with valid comments having been made by both the FCO and DTI, “The view of the IDC was that there was almost no possibility that the supply of this equipment would be allowed”.

D7.19 The way in which the Royal Ordnance enquiry was dealt with by the IDC provides a good illustration of the approach adopted by the Government to proposed “lethal” exports. The papers which I have seen clearly show that the Government was not prepared to countenance the supply of lethal equipment to either Iran or Iraq. When applications for such exports were made they were generally processed very quickly and were invariably rejected.

Endnotes:

*23 - see paragraph C2.30 supra

*24 - FCO/2.6.214

*25 - FCO/2.6.191

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.